## BUILDING & SUSTAINING READINESS THROUGH A CTC ROTATION

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<th>FOCUS AREAS</th>
<th>SYSTEMS &amp; ROUTINES</th>
<th>OUTPUT DESIRED</th>
<th>ENDSTATE</th>
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| **MISSION** | • Clearly defined vision and mission that facilitate trust, open communications, and responsibility  
• Sustainment rehearsals  
• Mission Orders use: OPORD Paragraph 4, Annex F, Concept of Support, and Logistics Estimates  
• Consistent use and validation of LIS/ABCS/C4ISR Digital Mission Command Systems  
• Management of acceptable risk | • Time and resources allocated to achieve mission objectives and Commander’s intent  
• Units trained and ready to execute their Mission Essential Tasks (METs) to standard, ready to fight and win across the spectrum of operations  
• Formations integrated into combined arms teams; delivering sustainment support enabling maneuver commander freedom of action  
• Ability to synchronize, integrate, and echelon commodities and materiel in support of maneuver commanders  
• Command climate unafraid of failure; accepting of honest mistakes that inculcates accountability, the Warrior Ethos, and a customer focus | Unit trained and validated to deploy and conduct Decisive Action Operations when ordered |
| **TRAINING** | • Maximize use of time and training resources available (MCTP and home station training exercises)  
• Training Meetings, QTBs, and S-3 Synch Meetings  
• Established standards and enforcement  
• Redefined and validated SDPs/Battle Drills | • Proficiency in MDMP and orders production  
• Skilled execution of tactical tasks  
• Ready, confident, and adaptive formations prepared to operate in fluid environments  
• Confident leaders who act independently within Commander’s intent | |
| **MAINTENANCE & SUPPLY** | • Properly executed command maintenance, maintenance meetings, and logistics synchronization (LOGSYNC) meetings  
• Active CSOP and CMDP programs | • Ability to forecast sustainment and surge requirements based on operational and human factors  
• Efficiencies created through well-rehearsed processes and enforced standards and discipline  
• Expeditionary, ready, and self-deployable units | |
| **LEADER DEVELOPMENT** | • Focused on growing leaders through professional development and certification programs  
• Leadership presence, mentorship, and oversight  
• Proper balance between work, family, and health | • Professionally developed Officers and NCOs  
• Subordinate leaders trained and resourced to achieve their goals  
• Use of mission command in execution of tasks  
• Competent and adaptive leaders who overcome unplanned challenges and establish and enforce high standards and discipline  
• Learning organizations that use the AAR process | |
| **TEAM BUILDING** | • Formal and informal engagements that develop rapport and foster collaboration  
• Develop the wider sustainment team  
• Understand the role of influence vs. direct oversight  
• Integration of EAB units into long range training plan  
• Volunteer to provide OC/T support to CTC | • Organizations that quickly and effectively disseminate important information synchronized across the command  
• Seamless modularity and task organization to complete assigned tasks  
• Synchronization between tactical units (FSC/BSB), operational assets (Sustainment BDE/ESC/TSC), and strategic enablers (AMC/DLA) | |

*Unit trained and validated to deploy and conduct Decisive Action Operations when ordered*
### COMMON CTC LOGISTICAL CHALLENGES

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<th>Role Delineation: Roles and responsibilities of key Logisticians are rarely defined, enforced, or understood by senior leaders. Delineation challenges exist between BCT S4 vs. SPO, FSC CDR vs. TF S4, SASMO and SG, and all Med Community.</th>
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<td>Distribution of Assets: Sustainment is generally de-synchronized at all echelons, no two battalion supply chains look alike in terms of the capabilities and the Soldier skill set units place at the Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP) or the Field Trains Command Post (FTCP).</td>
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<td>BSA Defense: Units and leaders are challenged establishing a Brigade Support Area (BSA) defense and defending against a Level I threat.</td>
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<td>LOGSTATS: Logistical Status (LOGSTAT) reporting is produced with limited situational awareness and does not occur with regular frequency or standard, or by a common reporting platform. LOGSTAT is not driving the LOGCOP production or replenishment Tactical Convoy/Logistical Package (TCO/LOGPAC) process.</td>
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<td>LOGCOP: Units struggle with producing a near real time picture (LOGCOP) of logistics, human resources (HR), and medical information that link the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) to the Sustainment Brigade and theater planners.</td>
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<td>Concept of Support: Units and leaders are challenged with Concept of Support development and its role in the operations process. Often not tied to maneuver plan and planned sequentially vice simultaneously.</td>
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<td>Sustainment Rehearsals: Sustainment rehearsals are not being conducted, or when conducted, are ineffective.</td>
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<td>Aerial Delivery: Combat Aviation Brigades (CAB) are rarely used as a method of distribution. Low proficiency in sling load training.</td>
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<td>LIS and ABCS Systems: Units and leaders are challenged with effective use of Logistics Information Systems (LIS) and Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS).</td>
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<td>CASEVAC and MEDEVAC: Operations are planned as contingency operations and not part of the overall mission, and do not effectively balance both air and ground casualty evacuation. Average Rotational Died-of-Wounds (DOW) rate is 40%. Point of Injury (POI) to Role I is the biggest factor.</td>
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