Secretary of War Elihu Root, a talented lawyer with great vision, established the Army War College in 1901 after America's military failings during the Spanish-American War. Root, a future Secretary of State, Senator, Ambassador, and Nobel Peace Prize winner, was an instrumental reformer of the Army during his five years leading the War Department.

This report, a study on the future of the United States Army conducted by the U.S. Army War College’s Carlisle Scholars Program, is named in his honor in an attempt to strengthen, improve, and advance the Total Army – the greatest fighting force on earth.

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The Carlisle Scholars Program integrates the seminar experience of traditional Professional Military Education with the autonomy of a self-directed fellowship. Selected students will form a single seminar to complete approximately 10 weeks of intense course work, and then shift focus to research, writing, and advising senior leaders through a combination of individual, team, and faculty-coordinated work. The essence of the Carlisle Scholars is competitive analysis of strategic challenges, and contribution to broad strategic dialogue among national security leaders and stakeholders about problems/opportunities of national security. The Class of 2016 Carlisle Scholars Program Seminar is a collection of 17 senior officers from the Total Army (Regular, Reserve, and National Guard), the joint, interagency, and multinational communities.

This study is dedicated to the current generation of non-commissioned officers, captains, and majors, who have sacrificed so much and will inherit the Army we leave them.

For information about this study please contact Professor Andrew Hill, andrew.a.hill13.civ@mail.mil.
The United States Army finds itself at an inflection point. Fifteen years of war have yielded inconclusive results, and the American people have limited enthusiasm for new investments in blood and treasure. Yet the global security environment is one of growing complexity and danger, and the demand for an adaptive, agile military persists. The U.S. Army has a solemn responsibility to protect and defend the nation and the Constitution, and this requires critical assessment.

This report is an analysis of the Army conducted by the Carlisle Scholars Program at the U.S. Army War College. Recent studies of the Army have tended to fixate on the mismatch between the ends of national military strategy and the means available to execute it, epitomized by the 2011 Budget Control Act and the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. This approach to framing risk is a “short game” that has achieved limited results. This study recommends that the Army reframe its approach. We believe that Army leaders are missing a critical opportunity to use the forcing mechanism of resource constraints to make essential internal changes.

We advocate a “long game”: the Army should focus less on communicating the gap between means and ends, and focus more on closing the gap by innovating in ways. Barring a transformative national security event, the study assumes that means—the financial resources and numerical strength authorized for the Army by the Congress—are unlikely to increase over the next decade. Furthermore, the Army influences but does not control the ends to which it is employed by policy makers. The great challenge for the Army is therefore to remain ready to meet the enduring needs of the nation despite constraints that it cannot control. We focus on how the Army can help itself, analyzing the ways by which the Army organizes and prepares itself to meet the nation’s varied and unpredictable ends, using the means that it is given.

The Army’s choices about its ways are shaped by three powerful tensions: a volatile strategic environment that produces unpredictable demands for Army capability; a wide range of legal and institutional requirements that the Army must fulfill, regardless of the security situation; and a deeply-rooted organizational culture that is both an asset and a liability to the Army. Part One of the report focuses on these three tensions.

The first chapter analyzes the strategic environment, which will increasingly challenge traditional rules, geographic boundaries and identities. This environment creates a demand for capabilities to address four security imperatives:

- Defeat and deter the enemies of the United States with combat-ready expeditionary forces, primarily against state adversaries
- Operate in “gray spaces” against unconventional threats
- Lead planning for future stability operations, jointly with civilian agency colleagues, international partners, and other elements of the joint force
- Build capacity of security partners as a long-term investment in global security

The second chapter explores the Army’s role as the nation’s multi-purpose force, with the widest and most diverse range of responsibilities. It focuses on the Army’s functions and requirements, derived from the U.S. Constitution and statutes, national security strategy documents, Department of Defense regulations, and joint and Army doctrine. This breadth and diversity, however, creates a prioritization challenge, especially in a resource-constrained policy environment. The Army must make some hard choices.

The third chapter examines how Army culture creates both opportunities and obstacles. While the Army’s culture is overwhelmingly beneficial to the nation, it may nevertheless contribute to strategic risk. The Army’s “can-do,” problem-solving approach is a great strength, a source of justifiable pride, and valuable to policy makers. Yet it also restricts the Army’s ability to prioritize and be explicit about risks when presenting military advice and options. Additionally, the Army is biased toward the active duty combat arms community; the cultural focus on combined arms maneuver underemphasizes the broader capability options the Total Army must provide.
Finally, the gap between the Army’s espoused values and its actual system of incentives impairs its ability to innovate, its tolerance for prudent risk, and its development of needed efficiencies. This is problematic in a strategic environment that demands resiliency and adaptation.

As the force that operates in and among populations, the Army must be the service most capable of linking tactical and operational gains to sustainable political outcomes. The Army’s response to this challenge has been to reemphasize combined arms maneuver—a choice motivated by the Army’s interpretation of the environment and its requirements, understood through the filter of its culture. While appropriate to deter state actors, too much emphasis on high-intensity conflict undermines the Army’s preparedness for other security imperatives. Strategic trends, the Army’s mandated functions and requirements, and overwhelming historical evidence demonstrate the need to maintain a broader range of capabilities.

Informed by this assessment of institutional pressures, the second part of the report explores three areas in which the Army can become more prepared to meet the nation’s needs.

Chapter Four examines the Army’s ability to operate in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment. Given fewer resources and persistent demands from a volatile strategic environment, the Army no longer has the luxury to go it alone. Despite some progress, the Army’s engagement with allies and partners remains problematic, contributing to a lack of trust. This distrust, combined with the Army’s “can-do” culture, has undermined relationships and further eroded performance in this critical area. The Army can do better. The study recommends the following:

- Establish a dedicated Train, Advise, and Assist (TAA) group in each of the regionally-focused corps headquarters, in support of the Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) concept, and in cooperation with the National Guard (NG) State Partnership Program (SPP) and the theater special operations commands (TSOCs).
- Expand opportunities and requirements for JIIM-relevant education and training for more personnel earlier in their careers.
- Develop assignments with a JIIM focus and recognize and reward officers who succeed in those jobs and create more structures for bringing the expertise of Foreign Area and Special Forces Officers with extensive JIMM experience to the Total Force.

Chapter Five proposes reforms for the Army’s command structure to improve efficiency and effectiveness. As the force most required to integrate the efforts of diverse partners, the Army must execute expeditionary mission command. If an element within the existing force structure does not contribute to mission effectiveness in a manner commensurate with its cost, then it should be eliminated or consolidated. This chapter seeks to inform the current defense-reform dialogue, and recommends the following:

- The Army must right-level the organization, pushing greater responsibility to lower levels. The proliferation of officers, especially in the middle grades, has created a top-heavy, costly structure out of balance with core operational capability.
- The Army must reform a command structure that has remained largely unchanged since World War II, right-layering the organization to retain levels that are essential to operational success. The study advances one proposal for such reform, allocating the current responsibilities of Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs) to corps headquarters, under the operational control of Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs). Corps headquarters, with their embedded mission command capabilities and operational focus, will effectively support GCCs and are better suited for employment as Joint Task Forces (JTFs).

The final chapter explores ways of developing agility for the Total Army. The Army must retain robust capability (if not capacity) in the broad range of functions required by the strategic environment, statutes and regulations, and national security policy—all despite declining resources. While the report advocates no change to overall readiness requirements across the Total Army, it suggests that the Army can improve by matching active and reserve readiness requirements with the inherent strengths of those components. Readiness is not simply a product of training. It also arises from the inherent human capital that resides in the elements of the Army. These reforms would take advantage of the intrinsic skills of the various Army components, improving the Total Army’s readiness for all operational contingencies. Additionally, assigning a lead role to the Guard will do much to address a cultural bias that undervalues the reserve components. The report recommends the following:

- The Army should assign areas of emphasis for operational readiness to the Regular Army and the National Guard, with multi-component training to develop and preserve shared readiness across the full spectrum of operations, and the U.S. Army Reserve continuing to provide combat support for those operations.
• The Army National Guard should focus on developing, maintaining, and innovating in readiness for wide-area security missions.

• The active duty Army's status and requirement to “fight tonight” favor a continued focus on combat arms maneuver readiness.

• Given significant limits on capacity (especially for prolonged ground operations), the Total Army must reinvigorate its capability for expansion. This chapter briefly introduces one approach: a program to develop more pre-trained manpower.

The Army has a tremendous opportunity for change. Military excellence requires continual, relentless self-assessment. Such scrutiny can be painful, but it is better to learn hard lessons without lethal consequences. In reforming the ways in which it organizes, leads, trains, develops, and equips its soldiers, the Army will better serve the strategic ends of the nation, and be a better steward of the resources that the American people provides to it. Since 1775, the Army has defended and preserved the nation. That it will always continue to do so is the guiding spirit of this study.
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The strategic environment is changing. The rules of the international system, geographic boundaries, and social and political identities are all in flux. During the Cold War, national security shifted away from the international disinterest of the “splendid isolation” of America’s first 175 years. Cold War U.S. policy focused on containing Soviet (and other communist) expansion through economic and security alliances, supported by a strong standing military that provided nuclear and conventional deterrence, projecting American power through multi-decade commitments of hundreds of thousands of American military personnel in Europe and East Asia. Thus, Cold War national security policy emphasized preventing the emergence of an unfavorable international order. Today, national security threats that arise from chaos and disorder have become the main themes of U.S. foreign policy. Unstable governance, economic instability and national debt, societal upheaval and sectarian conflict, ecological changes, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction head the list of national security concerns.

As the largest and most flexible force within the United States military, the Army must offer options to U.S. policy makers that are responsive to the evolving risks and opportunities presented by the strategic environment. It must also be prepared to adapt under pressure, as the Army has historically borne the brunt of the problems that arise from the inherent unpredictability of that environment. In pursuing national security for the United States, policy makers seek military options from the Army that are both robust and nested within a broader framework of joint, interagency, inter-governmental, and multinational (JIIM) capability.

At the same time, the Army must provide these options in a context of declining financial resources, with domestic fiscal constraints that challenge the Army’s preferred way of building and sustaining the force. The American public is war-weary following two long and unproductive conflicts in the Middle East, and there seems to be little interest in maintaining (much less extending) U.S. commitments abroad.

In this environment, the Army must be prepared to meet four strategic imperatives: to defeat and deter the enemies of the United States with combat-ready expeditionary forces, to operate in “gray spaces,” to lead planning for potential future wide-area security operations, and to build security partners’ capacities. In meeting all four imperatives, the Army must operate as part of the joint force, a role to which it has become quite accustomed. To succeed in the last three, the Army must devote more attention to interagency, intergovernmental, and
multinational partnerships; it must engage with these partners as effectively as it has with other U.S. military services, improving its agility through an effective use of the total force, and streamlining its organizational and command structures to make the best use of limited resources.

The Army’s mission is to “fight and win our nation’s wars.” In today’s security environment, a military response may be necessary for victory, but it is seldom sufficient. The Army’s self-reliance and view of itself as a supported force may inhibit it from working effectively with other necessary partners. In facing national security threats that are complex and changing, including traditional state adversaries, proxies, non-state actors, and contextual threats that arise from disorder, traditional military force alone may be ineffective or even counter-productive. An Army that is not ready to operate as a supporting element within a whole-of-government strategy increases strategic risk to the nation. The Army’s preference for fighting and winning decisively in traditional combat operations can leave it unprepared for its critical role in supporting the strategic goals of the United States and its partners.

### Three Elements of an Evolving Strategic Environment

This analysis highlights three key ways in which the global strategic environment is evolving. The rules of the international system, the accepted realities of world geography, and the range of overlapping sociopolitical identities are being redefined in ways that create both threats and opportunities for the United States. Each of these evolutions has implications for the U.S. Army.

#### The Changing Rules of the International System

Following World War II, and again at the end of the Cold War, the United States used its dominant political, military, and economic power to promote what it considered to be a universal set of international norms—human rights, economic liberalism, and democratization—to shape multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations. Despite notable flaws and inconsistencies, this rules-based system facilitated a global wave of decolonization; helped reintegrate former Warsaw Pact countries into Europe; set the conditions for rapid economic development and industrialization in East Asia, which has lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty in a single generation; and provided a basis for countries to cooperate on a range of issues from space exploration to addressing global climate change. Ironically, the success of this global system of rules—based as it is on respect for sovereignty, concerns about social justice, and mutual adherence to basic international norms—has also created a backlash against its core principles from an array of nations and non-state actors. Even as global living standards rise and societies become better connected, the uneven distribution of political and economic power gives rise to competing perspectives that challenge the legitimacy of the existing system of rules and institutions.

For example, leftist governments in Latin America and elsewhere regularly challenge U.S. ideas about the benign effects of capitalism and free trade. They broadcast a populist narrative portraying American and European corporations and governments as imperialist scavengers of commodities. And, they blame decades of political and economic inequality on the global system that seems to perpetuate a global divide between rich and poor. These arguments resonate with local citizens and can inflame economic and political tensions in certain countries. Over time, these differing perspectives may come into direct competition with existing international rules and threaten to spill over into conflict.

The challenge for U.S. leaders is in shaping appropriate and effective responses to rules violations, in coordination with international organizations and multinational partners, which may or may not involve military operations. Achieving the right balance is particularly difficult in cases where violating the principles of international law does not present an imminent national security threat to the United States or its allies. Knowing how and when to defend international rules for their own sake will be a continuous strategic challenge, particularly in cases where other nations use military force to press their claims. In recent years, the U.S. military has played a central role in establishing the command-and-control, sustainment, combat, and stabilization forces that form the foundation of a JIIM response to violations of international rules. This role is unlikely to change in the near future, which underscores the need for strong, durable, and flexible JIIM relationships.

#### New Geographies

The strategic realities of geography are evolving just as quickly as the rules of the international system, thanks to the application of technology as a factor in organizing and communicating to non-state actors. If the U.S. Army views geography primarily as a stable set of points, shapes and vectors on a map, it risks overemphasizing the importance of seizing a piece of territory against a foe whose footprint may touch lightly on the ground it seeks to occupy. The emergence

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2. Such partners may include entities that are competitors or even adversaries in other contexts.
and persistence of violent extremist organizations (VEOs) provides a notable example. VEOs tend to begin as limited-violence opposition to local grievances in a nation. They may then evolve into regional actors that threaten the stability of neighbors, and then become global “franchises” of violence, networks of operationally independent organizations (such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, commonly known by its acronym, ISIS). Or a VEO can skip the intermediate step and become transnational before it is regional. Traditional geographic expansion is the pattern of increasing the contiguous space that an entity governs, or in which a group operates. VEOs transcend physical geography—theirs is the geography of information and influence in both physical and cyber space, and they are bounded only by the limits of their persuasiveness. This makes them very difficult to attack using traditional battlefield geometry.

The geographic elements that formerly contained or limited security threats are no longer as effective. The current and future operational environment includes adversaries who can leap over barriers; all that is needed is a sympathetic actor on the other side. They create and defend spheres of influence that defy the rules-based international system. For example, these adversaries may deploy and sustain fighters using commercial travel and illicit trafficking networks, and operate across the vast, landlocked regions of Africa and Asia. Future adversaries who are familiar with the U.S. organizing principles, rules of engagement, and operational design can use those new geographies as a strategic seam to undermine military effectiveness, even to the point of attacking the United States with weapons of mass destruction. This existential threat highlights the need for constant cultivation and maintenance of JIIM relationships.

New geographical concerns are also redefining national security threats beyond traditional military operations. For example, pandemics, epidemics, and natural disasters often bypass established borders, affect large populations, and present security challenges within a larger context of disaster response and recovery. The response to the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa and the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami provide two high-profile examples of the U.S. military providing substantial assistance within a JIIM context. While not traditional U.S. Army combat missions, these operations demonstrate the need for agile forces with the capability and capacity to respond in coordination with a broad range of partners. In the future, U.S. policy makers will likely continue to direct the Army to support or lead these efforts. When a crisis of significant magnitude occurs, no other institution can respond with the combination of speed, flexibility, and persistence of the U.S. Army. These new geographic factors challenge Army leaders to question what they think they know about geography—a frame of reference that has served the Army well in past fights—and consider how these new realities will influence the strategies, capabilities, and limitations of Army forces.

Identity

The evolution of rules and geography coincides with a fundamental change in the way that communities and individuals define their identity in a global system. Identity is one of the most important characteristics of the strategic environment for the U.S. land forces, since human interactions are an element of every ground mission. As societies become more complex and connected, their members become adept at maintaining several overlapping allegiances, and they organize their perspectives, passions, and actions accordingly. In the strategic environment facing the U.S. Army, at least five overlapping categories of identity can become relevant to military operations that affect local populations.

At the most basic or feudal level, groups and individuals define themselves by the tribe, family, or band to which they belong. U.S. land forces dealt with this daily in interactions in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and it is a recurring pattern of social organization across the world.

A second category of identity expands upon the first by adding religion, ethnicity, and culture. Samuel P. Huntington’s 1993 Foreign Affairs article, “The Clash of Civilizations?” famously predicted that cultural and religious identities will become the primary source of conflict in the post-Cold War world. Huntington’s argument reflected the significance of ethnic and religious differences as causes of the post-Cold War conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and various locations in Africa. The escalating conflicts between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims across the Arab world are a more recent example of this clash of identities.

The third category of identity involves political affiliations and loyalties to cities, nations, and states. People define themselves as Parisians, Berliners, or Muscovites; or Germans, Italians, or Soviets. These identities have been central to conflicts like the Napoleonic Wars, the unification of Germany and Italy, World War I, the Russian Revolution, and World War II.

The fourth category of identity is a product of the information age. Non-state actors, gangs, and organized crime syndicates proliferate in a sort of neo-feudalism. Michael Hayden, former director of the CIA, said, “Whereas the industrial age strengthened the nation-state, the post-industrial information age erodes the power of the nation-state. ... Things that we used to think could be done only by government are now being

done by sub-state actors, groups, gangs, even individuals.” Examples of such empowered groups include the Central American “maras,” such as Mara Salvatrucha 13 (MS 13) and the Eighteenth Street gang (Barrio 18 or Calle 18), as well as VEOs such as ISIS and Al Qaeda.

The fifth category of identity involves online, social, cyber, and virtual groupings of individuals coalesced around causes with decentralized structures that are connected globally in a network. A current example is Anonymous, an international network of cyber-activists with no physical structure or territory and “a very loose and decentralized command structure that operates on ideas rather than directives.” This final category of identity will be the hardest for law enforcement and military forces to track and target, as attribution is exceedingly difficult in the information realm—groups can easily hide their activities behind social media pages and applications.

All five of these categories of identity are likely to converge and operate simultaneously in future conflicts, as well as in non-combat operations. This convergence of identities will further complicate an already difficult effort to understand local populations. Competitors of the United States will mask their true intentions and activities, using deception to cover their movements and their identity. It will become harder for the U.S. land forces to identify the enemy, and to determine whether that enemy is physical or virtual. They will operate on the premise that if the U.S. Army cannot identify or locate them, then they cannot be targeted.

Resource Constraints

The fiscal constraints of the federal budget will impact the U.S. Army’s capacity to respond to these evolving rules, geographic realities, and overlapping identities. Senior military leaders recognize that the size and growth of the national debt presents an overall economic security risk that must be addressed through changes to the federal budget, and that defense appropriations—one-sixth of federal outlays and half of discretionary spending—will certainly be affected. Admiral Mullen, while serving as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated, “The most significant threat to our national security is our debt...because the strength and the support and the resources that our military uses are directly related to the health of our economy over time.” Overall, the U.S. military values effectiveness over efficiency. U.S. military culture values accomplishing the mission no matter the cost—a perspective particularly strong in the Army. This great value placed on effectiveness, and the relatively little value placed on efficiency, exacerbates the problems created by budget constraints.

Given the political reluctance to raise taxes or cut mandatory spending programs, congressional efforts to reduce the federal deficit have led to disproportionate cuts in defense spending and other discretionary categories of the budget that fund government operations. The Budget Control Act (BCA, P.L. 112-25) of August 2, 2011 delineates the means within which the Department of Defense and its components must learn to operate while minimizing risk to the U.S. national security posture. As Acting Secretary of the Army Patrick J. Murphy said on April 4, 2016, “When I left congress five years ago, the Army budget was $243 billion dollars. We are now hoping to be funded, including overseas contingency operations, at $148 billion.” This is a telling story of the economic challenge that the Army faces today.

Complicating these challenges is the fact that many U.S. allies have simultaneously cut their defense budgets in an era of repeated financial crises, slow economic growth, and a gradual decline in working-age populations in several European and Asian countries.

However unpleasant a scenario the BCA presents, it also affords opportunities for candid discussions regarding risk, readiness, and the appropriate structure supporting national defense and collective security. Working with diplomatic and economic policy counterparts, military leaders must maintain a substantive and constructive dialogue with the Congress and U.S. allies to recognize and mitigate the national security risk posed by the budget situation. Since the passage of the BCA, strategic thinkers representing all political views have produced insightful research providing budgetary savings options to policy makers. The general themes of this research indicate that cost savings could be realized by reducing the excess physical infrastructure from the Department of Defense, adjusting the size and structure of the civilian workforce, modifying modernization and acquisition efforts, and updating the military compensation system. These measures would

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8. As compared to mandatory spending, which the BPA did not affect.
mitigate pressure to reduce the end strength of active and reserve forces as the primary vehicle for budgetary savings. In the same spirit, this report recommends changes to force structure that would increase cost effectiveness, advocates for greater reliance on JIIM partnerships to mitigate conflicts, transform security consumers into security providers, and proposes a more efficient use of the total force to minimize risk as resources decline due to the BCA.

Implications for U.S. National Security: Threats and Challenges

The evolution of international rules, geographic realities, and overlapping identities, coupled with resource constraints faced by the United States and its allies, create a host of national security threats and challenges for which policy makers must develop strategic responses. In the words of Representative Mac Thornberry, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, “We have to make those judgment calls within limited budgets and in the most complex, difficult national security environment our nation has ever faced.”

Future interstate conflicts will likely pit the Western, rules-based maintenance of the status quo against countries seeking to expand or regain their spheres of influence. This is clear in the evolving situation in Eastern Europe, where the United States seeks to deter an adventurist Russia that operates at a geographic advantage as it challenges the future of NATO and regional stability. Putin’s Russia has been an irresponsible international player, challenging global norms in Georgia, Crimea and the Ukraine, while courting other actors like Iran, Iraq, Syria, Hezbollah and organized crime bosses. Concurrently, Russia created a counter-narrative that it is defending the human rights of ethnic Russians (in Ukraine) and assisting the democratically elected leader of a sovereign state (Syria) against terrorism. Russia perceives the U.S. as politically hostile, exemplified by U.S. policy in the Baltic States and Ukraine, and by U.S. actions against Syrian Leader and Russian client Bashaar Al-Asaad. Russia therefore seeks to undermine U.S. hegemony. For example, Russia is trying to erode U.S. influence in the Americas by building relationships with Latin American countries. Russian military forces are employing new tools in cyberspace, as well as hybrid warfare capabilities, to achieve Russian interests without provoking conflict with NATO. Looming in the background is Russia’s nuclear capability, which makes Russia an existential threat to any adversary, and complicates the assessment of its conventional military power.

In the South China Sea, China is pursuing its own disruptive strategy, challenging U.S. maritime dominance in East Asia. In claiming new frontiers based on artificially created islands in disputed waters in the South China Sea, China has asserted sea and airspace control, as well as expanded “sovereign zones.” China has thus far been oblivious to contrary claims by her maritime neighbors. The resultant security problem is clear. Whereas China sees its demands that other nations coordinating air and naval movement within China’s newly claimed air and sea spaces to be the legal and legal assertion of China’s sovereign rights, the U.S. and other nations in the region do not consider these demands to be legitimate. In addition, China’s technological capabilities place it in the forefront of both space and cyberspace, and China has increased its efforts to modernize its armed forces, including its nuclear capabilities. China is also a significant competitor for resources in Africa and South America that are essential to its economic growth.

Some current U.S. allies (e.g., Thailand, Japan, and Turkey) may respond to Russian or Chinese actions by seeking to extend their own spheres of influence, or by protecting the status quo. The United States risks being drawn into conflicts as a result of these dynamics, even when such efforts seek to maintain the global commons or uphold international norms. U.S. leaders must carefully weigh the trade-offs that may involve military action at one extreme or the redefinition of terms of the alliance or bilateral relationship at the other.

Differing identities and the tension between U.S. values and interests—even among allies and partners—present enduring security dilemmas for the United States. For example, Korea poses a significant challenge. Korean identity is strong, and both North and South desire reunification of the peninsula; but each wants it on terms unfavorable to the other, and each side has a patron that prefers the status quo to instability and war. The U.S. is more concerned with maintaining the sovereignty of South Korea and isolating the North than it is with restoring the fellowship of the Korean people in the near future.

An even greater dilemma is posed by U.S. alliances in southwest Asia. The U.S. has supported authoritarian governments in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Egypt and, (until recently) Pakistan. In each case, these regimes have been sympathetic to U.S. interests in the Middle East and South Asia. Yet U.S. support is seen by opposing sociopolitical groups like the Muslim Brotherhood as political interference and a barrier to the enduring right of self-determination, a value that is core to U.S. interests. U.S. values also favor some protections for minority interests, for religious expression, and for equal political representation. Yet Shiite populations in Arab nations are seen by U.S.-allied Sunni regimes as an internal threat to their power, with Iranian backing complicating efforts to resolve regional conflicts and broker new agreements, such as the Iran nuclear deal.

Instability, exacerbated by clashing identities and geographic factors, will remain a key security concern. On the contemporary map of international security challenges, an arc of instability stretches for thousands of miles from the Middle East across the Horn of Africa to the Sahel region of West Africa. VEOs within this vast territory include al Shabab in Somalia, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram in Nigeria, and now ISIS. These groups are franchises of Sunni Muslim radical extremism with extensive linkages and a common ideological foundation that belies the vast distances between their geographic centers of gravity. Within this area, the 2015 Fund for Peace Fragile States Index classifies 15 countries at an “alert” level for state failure, in which pre-existing ethnic and religious cleavages, combined with underdevelopment and poor governance, have contributed to grievances that VEOs exploit for recruitment, local social and financial support, and protection.22

Continued instability in Afghanistan provides another example of the security challenges facing the United States and its allies. The Taliban view the presence of the U.S. forces in Afghanistan as occupiers, while the Afghan Government views them as essential to stable governance and stability. However, neighboring states have interests in Afghanistan as well. Pakistan seeks to extend vast influence over the political and social progress in Afghanistan to ensure a secure neighbor state and must do so based on its delicate balancing act with India.

[India has emerged as] an extra-regional power and an aspiring global actor. It hopes that Afghanistan will not revert once more to a sanctuary for Islamist terrorism taking diktat from Pakistan. Through continued investment and support in Afghanistan, India aims to mitigate Pakistan’s tenacious efforts to cultivate Afghanistan as a client state.23

Meanwhile, despite a few incidents of arms shipments to the Taliban, “the role Iran plays in Afghanistan is relatively constructive. U.S. and Iranian interests in the country (such as stability) are for the most part convergent.”24 These competing interests complicate efforts to define an appropriate role for the United States in Afghanistan in the years ahead.

Meanwhile, traditional adversaries25 are not going away. The most significant state adversaries are North Korea and Iran. North Korea retains weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which it uses periodically to threaten its neighbors and the United States in between bouts of negotiation. North Korea also continues to export weapons and weapons technology to other state adversaries, namely Iran and Syria. In light of the recent nuclear deal with Iran, efforts have begun to monitor Iran’s nascent nuclear program while planning continues for contingency sanctions if the deal fails. Iran still possesses missile delivery systems and has grown a cyber capability and

25. An adversary is defined as an opponent of the United States, where international competition has turned hostile or has exceeded a threshold where hostility and conflict are more likely.
developed a strong regional proxy—Hezbollah. At the same time, Iran has strong ties to the Huthi insurgents in Yemen where fighting continues between the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Huthis, which has continued a destabilizing trend in the Middle East.

Malign non-state actors will exploit identity-based grievances, challenge doctrinal concepts of battlefield geometry, and flout international rules to achieve their destructive aims. VEOs represent the greatest non-state adversary to the United States and present a clear threat to U.S. interests. Violent extremists aim to cause a global ideological conflict between their twisted interpretation of Islam and the post-WWII international order. If they succeed, it will be a great setback for global stability. Future radicalized groups can exploit this template to further alienate the Muslim world from other societies. How radicalized extremists define themselves—their identity—is clearly a fundamental aspect of why they will fight. Often these groups have a political center based on grievance and ideology, as well as an economic incentive focused on a mix of legitimate and illicit commodities. These gray economies fund their activities outside the normal flow of international commerce and trade.

The international community, operating within its traditional rules and institutions, has so far failed to contain or mitigate this process. In fact, forceful efforts to crack down on these groups in the early stages of their formation gives rise to fears of further radicalization. Groups that seek to draw the United States or its allies into conflict need not affect a vital security interest. They must merely commit and publicize atrocities to trigger a responsibility to protect (R2P) intervention. While international law and institutions are evolving slowly to accommodate the R2P as a caveat to state sovereignty, VEOs will challenge those norms and create dilemmas for national leaders with few non-military options for responding effectively. They will use the pervasive nature of media and cyber-technology to bring the horrors of war into global consciousness almost instantaneously. ISIS execution videos are a poignant example. The popular perceptions of national security and personal security will blur to the point where prioritizing national interests becomes increasingly difficult to separate from daily headlines.

Implications for U.S. National Security: Opportunities

However daunting this list of threats and challenges may be, the evolving strategic environment also creates opportunities that the U.S. Army and its JIIM partners can leverage to advance national and international security interests. Most notably, the rules-based system remains a relevant starting point for international cooperation, and the United States exerts enormous leverage in multilateral settings. In those contexts, even competing states—and their non-state partners—are cooperating to address common threats. Despite challenges to the rules of international politics, global cooperation is more relevant than ever to solve transnational problems. The 2015 Paris Climate Conference is an example of nation-states and some notable non-state actors working together to attempt to solve planetary challenges. Similarly, world powers are beginning to reach common ground in response to the Islamic State and other serious extremist threats (e.g., the United Nations Security Council’s Counter Terrorism Committee agreement on anti-terror financing actions). Past and current efforts to develop international rules and norms provide templates for countries to work together in the new geographies. For example, Russia and the United States agreed on a series of actions to counter the Islamic State’s threat to the two countries and the international system. Looking ahead, the United States can lead other nations to develop “Geneva Conventions” for space, cyberspace, and biotechnology as the basis for new areas of international law, norms, standards, and definitions of legal and criminal activities.

While urbanization presents challenges in terms of terrain for warfighting, the trend toward urbanization should not be viewed solely as a threat. Cities provide the bulk of economic opportunity and access to services for developing country populations, particularly in states where governance is weak and few resources flow to rural areas (e.g., much of Africa), or where export-led economic growth creates excess demand for labor (e.g., China’s rapidly urbanizing coastal regions). Rapid urbanization creates security problems through social upheaval and increased crime, and public health problems through environmental degradation and the accelerated spread of infectious disease. Yet urbanization also presents opportunities. All of these problems require constructive solutions, and responsible actors must compete against the elements of disorder. Developed nations, NGOs, and private

firms can help developing states deal with the negative effects of rapid urbanization by making cities more livable, spur economic opportunity, and counteract the alienation, underemployment, and despair that fosters crime and violent extremism.

Good governance protects private property, which is the sine qua non of economic growth and of the creation of a middle class, both of which are related to stability and democratic institutions. The path from conflict to prosperity is seldom smooth, and many nations endure extended periods of turmoil when transitioning to a democratic system. Yet countries such as Colombia and Chile have transformed themselves from civil war and autocracy to democratic “exporters” of security cooperation, sharing their expertise with other Latin American countries on counter-terrorism, counter-illicit trafficking, peacekeeping, and disaster relief. In the wake of post-earthquake Haiti reconstruction, Brazil continues to provide leadership to the United Nations Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), while Uruguay ranks first in the world in UN peacekeepers per capita. Notably, El Salvador provided 380 troops on 11 consecutive rotations to Iraq from 2003-2009, as well as contributing troops to Afghanistan in 2011. These examples highlight the value of JIIM engagements in the context of national security.

Security coalitions and partnerships are an under-appreciated U.S. resource. Security cooperation remains a critical U.S. investment in an era of declining resources. The U.S. has not traditionally leveraged the potential of its web of standing security cooperation agreements with more than 75 countries. Moreover, the United States can also bolster regional cooperation initiatives that already exist. The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery (in Asia) and the African-led peacekeeping initiatives in Darfur and Somalia under the leadership of the African Union are prime examples. Other regional security arrangements like the Trans Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership in West Africa and NATO’s Partnership for Peace programs have yielded meaningful return on investment. Some of the trained Eastern European countries later participated in stability operations in Afghanistan. These activities continue in the form of increased U.S. cooperation with geographically vulnerable NATO member states, such as the Baltic republics (EUCOM - multinational exercises), as well as training/education of the newest NATO member, Macedonia. The newly announced, 34-nation, Saudi-led Islamic Alliance to counter against terrorism is an example of a coalition that could be supported by the United States.

At the United Nations, there are groupings formed by like-minded countries to solve a current issue such as current “Friends of Yemen” and “Friends of Darfur”. While these groups are looser than a coalition, many of the “Friends of Afghanistan” later became coalition members. These “friends of…” groups could be supported broadly by the U.S. and may develop into a more cohesive group such as a coalition.

Finally, U.S. collaboration with regional economic organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) can be a helpful mechanism for managing China’s growing strength among its neighbors, even while the U.S. pursues increased cooperation in its bilateral relationship. Likewise, while Russia has emerged as one of the U.S. principal geopolitical competitors, areas of cooperation remain significant and necessary.

**Strategic Imperatives: What the Army Must Be Prepared to Supply**

The preceding analysis of the threats and opportunities in the emerging strategic environment is a summary of what is likely to drive U.S. policy makers’ demands for capability from the U.S. Army. In response to these demands, the U.S. Army must be prepared to supply four broad areas of capability, within which it should provide options to policy makers. In each area, the Army can lead, support, or shape the environment within the context of its relationships with other JIIM partners. This report labels these demand-driven capabilities as “imperatives” determined by the external environment in which the U.S. Army operates. These imperatives are distinct from, but overlap with, two other sources of direction for U.S. Army operations: the formal requirements that law, policy, and doctrine delineate as Army responsibilities; and the Army’s own internal preferences, priorities, and interpretations of external demand signals, which are informed by Army culture. (Subsequent chapters explore Army requirements and culture.)

The first imperative is to defeat and deter the enemies of the United States with combat-ready expeditionary forces, primarily against state adversaries. The Army must remain prepared for traditional warfighting at which it has historically excelled, particularly the conventional, potentially kinetic, but non-nuclear conflicts that the strategic trends indicate as core security concerns for the United States in the coming decades. This responsibility requires a long-term presence of forces and mass for deterrence. Examples may include a lead

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role for the U.S. Army, alongside key allies, in potential conflicts with North Korea or Russia. In contrast, the U.S. Army would likely act in a supporting role—at least initially—as part of a joint force against ISIS, as well as in the less likely event of a significant confrontation with Iran and China.

The second imperative for the U.S. Army is to operate in “gray spaces.” Gray spaces refers to the purposeful employment of aggressive statecraft in a deliberate campaign-like program of persistent pressure and intimidation that achieves war-like ends through ways and means short of open conflict. Experts elaborate on that definition describing these spaces as the “physical and mental space between normal Westphalian state competition of ideas, and economics, and open warfare.” Gray space competition is not war by a classical definition, but via miscalculation and unintended escalation, it could transition to open conflict.

In contrast to the traditional range of state-based or state-like adversaries, these gray-space threats are at the nexus of criminality and military capability, usually violent extremists, organized criminals, and other dangerous non-state actors. Additionally, gray-space conflicts include proxies of other nations and groups that operate in ungoverned and alternatively governed spaces. Many of them are adept at using social and traditional media to publicize their activities and recruit supporters. This set of challenges requires a readiness and adaptability to lead, integrate, and operate in these areas when they challenge vital U.S. national interests. Department of Defense operations would likely occur on a smaller scale and be diffused over a large area. As noted in the section on geography, these threats will often leapfrog over conventional boundaries, disappear and reappear through franchised networking, and use cyberspace technologies to gain competitive advantage.

An Army response will require persistence and expertise in dealing with these fluid environments. To achieve overmatch in gray spaces, however, the Army must be prepared to build and support relationships with JIIM partners who augment and complement the capabilities and capacity available through the U.S. military. Working in a JIIM environment, the Army may find it necessary to employ forces functionally and in a networked fashion to defeat these threats, rather than the traditional employment of divisions, brigades, and battalions. Examples include potential responses to the Russian hybrid threat used recently in Ukraine, operations in the arc of instability from Yemen to West Africa, and actions against violent extremists in other areas of the world.

The third imperative for the U.S. Army from the strategic environment is to lead planning for potential wide-area security (WAS) operations, which are best done jointly with civilian agency colleagues, international partners, and other elements of the joint force. While WAS operations can be costly, unpopular, and time-consuming, the complex strategic environment clearly demonstrates a demand for these types of operations. After all, the U.S. Army has conducted them in at least six countries in the past 25 years: Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Additionally, DOD policy mandates that the military will support the efforts of civilians and international partners to conduct WAS operations, but when all else fails, the U.S. Army must step in to do it. The best insurance against going it alone in such operations is to actively lead JIIM partners in planning together for these contingencies. In recent WAS operations, the U.S. Army has endured experiences that does not want to repeat. Yet the noble desire to avoid past mistakes can be distorted into a not-so-noble desire to ignore or forget the crucial lessons of the past. As discussed in greater detail below, the Army has the capabilities to plan, lead and support WAS. Despite the obvious demand for (and stubborn persistence of) wide-area security missions, the combination of ambiguous policy requirements, limited resources, and a preference in the Army’s risk framework and in its culture makes it easy for leaders to turn away from maintaining WAS capability.

The final imperative is building the capacity of security partners. By working by, with, and through others to keep potential flashpoints from turning into conflicts, the U.S. Army can utilize its inherent training and readiness focus to build capacity and capability while cementing relationships through military-to-military engagements and diplomacy. The subsequent chapter on JIIM partnerships describes examples from Colombia and the Philippines in which Army assistance with security cooperation supported regional stability and advanced the regionally aligned forces concept by increasing troops’ exposure to the host regions. These partnership capacity building activities also help establish and reinforce confidence building measures between host nation institutions and U.S. forces.

These four strategic imperatives draw from from the future strategic environment and reinforce the Army’s core competencies. The U.S. Army operates as part of a joint force and a larger whole-of-government effort, and usually alongside its allies. However, as the nation’s largest military force, capable of conducting and sustaining a broad range of actions under the rubric of unified land operations, the U.S. Army’s leadership and operational role will be central in each

scenario. The Army must organize, structure, and resource itself for these realities, most notably through improved relationships with JiIM partners whose coordinated efforts will be needed to transform military success into durable security outcomes.

Conclusion

The dynamic strategic environment in the early 21st century will challenge traditional rules, geographic boundaries, and identities, creating friction points in contentious areas of the world while facilitating collaboration in others. This environment creates a demand for security capabilities that lead to the four broad capabilities that the Army must be prepared to supply—the imperatives described above. From this overview of the strategic environment, security demands, and Army imperatives, the next chapters turn to two other major sources of direction for Army operations: the statutory, policy, and doctrinal requirements that formally assign responsibilities to the Army, and the organizational culture that informs Army leaders’ decisions about how to prioritize, balance, take action, or ignore the imperatives and requirements. The strategic imperatives, requirements, and culture are three interlocking yet distinct ways of determining the ends, ways, means, and risks facing the U.S. Army as it prepares for an uncertain future.
The strategic environment places various and dynamic demands on the Army as it attempts to respond to global challenges and provide compelling options to policy makers. Although the strategic security environment is where the Army operates and its success is ultimately measured, the Army must also respond to institutional demands that are necessary to build and sustain the Army as well as support its joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners. This section describes those requirements—a combination of statutory, regulatory, strategic, and doctrinal demands—and analyzes the inherent tensions amongst and between them.

The Army’s myriad roles, responsibilities, and functions are derived from Congress’s intent as enunciated by federal statute, and from orders, directives, and guidance of the President and the Secretary of Defense. Like the other Services, the Army provides required forces and unique capabilities to Combatant Commanders in support of national objectives. It organizes, trains, and equips itself to conduct decisive land operations in order to win the nation’s wars. The Army is also the foundation of the joint force, with a larger force and a greater diversity of enablers than any other service. As the nation’s multi-purpose force, the Army is the most flexible option for policy makers, but this creates a prioritization challenge for the Army. With such a wide variety of potential missions, the Army must prioritize its requirements carefully in order to avoid a mismatch between its capability and the strategy employed by policy makers. Moreover, the Army must be transparent with policy makers about its priorities and explicit about the resulting trade-offs.

Requirements from Outside the DoD

Requirements by Statute

Title 10, United States Code, lists the laws regulating the Armed Forces of the United States. Pursuant to this federal statute:

It is the intent of Congress to provide an Army that is capable, in conjunction with the other Armed Forces, of preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense of the United States; supporting the national policies; implementing the national objectives; and overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States.

Title 10, United States Code, Section 3062 (a)
The “Total Army” consists of one active and two reserve components. The Army is the full-time, Federal force, and is sometimes referred to as the “Active Component” (AC). The Army National Guard (ARNG) and Army Reserve (USAR) comprise the Total Army’s Reserve Components. The purpose of each organization under federal law is to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in time of war or national emergency and at such other times as the national security may require. Detailed provisions governing the Army National Guard are contained in Title 32, United States Code. In addition to its federal mission, the Army National Guard is vested with the state mission of maintaining “trained and disciplined forces for domestic emergencies or other missions state law may require.” Unless federalized, employment of the ARNG is at the discretion of its state or territorial governor. Figure 2.1 summarizes the Army’s statutory requirements.

1. 10 U.S.C. § 10101.

Strategic Requirements

In addition to placing requirements on the Services, Congress also requires the President to publish a National Security Strategy (NSS), the Secretary of Defense to publish a Defense Strategic Review (formerly the Quadrennial Defense Review) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to publish a National Military Strategy (NMS). Strategic leaders use these statutory requirements to enumerate specific national security policies in response to the strategic environment in order to advance enduring national interests and achieve specific strategic objectives. Collectively, these documents provide national security ends, ways, and means and describe strategic risk.

While statutory requirements of the Services remain mostly static, the constantly evolving strategic environment requires continual reassessment of strategic objectives and therefore different requirements of the joint force. Figure 2.2 summarizes the strategic challenges found in the 2015 NSS that the joint force must “counter” or “react to” as well as the twelve tasks given to the joint force in the latest QDR and NMS. Whether through direct employment of Army forces or support provided to the joint force or other elements of national power, a capable Army is essential to the achievement of almost all
strategic objectives. The Army, therefore, derives requirements from strategic guidance documents and must be prepared to respond to emerging challenges in the strategic environment. This creates a consistent tension for all the Services because they must fulfill their routine Title 10 responsibilities (and for the Army and Air Force, Title 32 as well) while responding to emerging requirements, most of which are short of war and are not even considered overseas contingencies, which also creates a budget tension.4 While these challenges are common to all the Services, the Army, as the foundation of the joint force, bears an additional burden.

Requirements Directed by the Department of Defense

The Department of Defense uses DoD Directives (DoDDs) to issue institutional guidance to the Military Departments and Services. There are three DoDDs most germane to Army requirements: Functions of the DoD and its Major Components, Executive Agency, and Combatant Command Support Agents.

DoDD 5100.01, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components, dated December 21, 2010, lists functions of the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Military Departments, the Defense Agencies, and the DoD Field Activities. The Military Departments have 12 common tasks, and the Military Services have 14 common tasks.5 The Department and Service tasks expand on Title 10’s organize, train, equip, and sustain requirements. The DoD-directed Department of the Army functions, however, are operational in nature and enumerate 13 capabilities that the Army must be prepared to execute, as depicted in Figure 2.3.6

Service Tasks and Functions

4. This tension is complicated by the modern meaning of “war.” By the strict definition of the term, Congress has not declared war since 1941, but many military operations since then have approached the level of conflict and violence historically associated with “war.” Congress’s current reluctance to openly debate the categorization of current military operations further complicates the Services’ budget situation because if military operations are not classified as overseas contingency operations, the Services must pay for them using Operations and Maintenance funds.


The 12 common Military Department tasks are:

1. Recruiting
2. Organizing
3. Supplying
4. Equipping (including research and development)
5. Training
6. Servicing
7. Mobilizing
8. Demobilizing
9. Administering (including the morale and welfare of personnel)
10. Maintaining
11. Construction, outfitting, and repairs of military equipment
12. Construction, maintenance, and repair of buildings, structures, and utilities as well as the acquisition, management, and disposal of real property and natural resources

The 14 common Military Service tasks are:

1. Develop concepts, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures, and organize, train, equip, and provide land, naval, air, space, and cyberspace forces, in coordination with the other Military Services, Combatant Commands, USG departments and agencies, and international partners, as required, that enable joint force commanders to conduct decisive operations across the spectrum of conflict in order to achieve the desired end state.

2. Determine Military Service force requirements and make recommendations concerning force requirements to support national security objectives and strategy and to meet the operational requirements of the Combatant Commands.

3. Recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the assignment and deployment of forces to the Combatant Commands established by the President through the Secretary of Defense.

4. Monitor and assess Military Service operational readiness and capabilities of forces for assignment to the Combatant Commands and plan for the use of the intrinsic capabilities of the other Military Services and USSOCOM that may be made available.

5. Develop doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for employment by Military Service forces.

6. Provide for training for joint operations and joint exercises in support of Combatant Command operational requirements, including the development of Military Service joint training requirements, policies, procedures, and publications.

7. Provide logistical support for Military Service and all forces assigned to joint commands, including procurement, distribution, supply, equipment, and maintenance, unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense.

8. Organize, train, and equip forces to contribute unique service capabilities to the joint force commander to conduct the following functions across all domains, including land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace:
   a. Intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), and information operations, to include electronic warfare and MISO in order to provide situational awareness and enable decision superiority across the range of military operations.
   b. Offensive and defensive cyberspace operations to achieve cyberspace superiority in coordination with the other Military Services, Combatant Commands, and USG departments and agencies.
   c. Special operations in coordination with USSOCOM and other Combatant Commands, the Military Services, and other DoD Components.
   d. Personnel recovery operations in coordination with USSOCOM and other Combatant Commands, the Military Services, and other DoD Components.
   e. Counter weapons of mass destruction.
   f. Building partnership capacity/security force assistance operations. (7) Forcible entry operations.
   g. Missile Defense.
   h. Other functions as assigned, such as Presidential support and antiterrorism.

9. Organize, train, and equip forces to conduct support to civil authorities in the United States and abroad, to include support for disaster relief, consequence management, mass migration, disease eradication, law enforcement, counter-narcotics, critical infrastructure protection, and response to terrorist attack, in coordination with the other Military Services, Combatant Commands, National Guard, and USG departments and agencies.

10. Operate organic land vehicles, aircraft, cyber assets, spacecraft or space systems, and ships or craft.

11. Conduct operational testing and evaluation.

12. Provide command and control.

13. Provide force protection.

14. Consult and coordinate with the other Military Services on all matters of joint concern.
It is important to note that the Army executes some of these 13 functions not only in its role as the primary land force but also in support of the joint force. Executive Agency compounds the Army’s responsibility to the joint force.

Executive Agency and Command Support Functions

The Army provides the foundation for joint operations (and sometimes for interagency operations, as well). In DoD Directive 5100.01, the DoD lists functions common and unique to each of its various components. Recognizing the potential to gain efficiencies across its components, the DoD uses the Executive Agency (EA) concept. The DoD uses EA to designate a lead component within the Department to provide a common service to two or more DoD components or, in some cases, to other interagency constituents.

EA is used for three reasons: (1) “No existing means to accomplish DoD objectives exists,” (2) “DoD resources need to be focused on a specific area or areas of responsibility in order to minimize duplication or redundancy,” or (3) “Such designation is required by law, Executive Order, or Government-wide regulation.”

Broadly speaking, there are two types of EA responsibilities assigned to the Military Departments: (1) functional EA responsibilities provided to multiple DoD components and (2) support provided to combatant commands as Combatant Command Support Agents (CCSAs).

As of December 2015, the DoD has designated 84 executive agency responsibilities. The Army, with 41, has the most of any entity in the DoD. The Air Force has 21, the Navy and Marine Corps have eight, and the remaining 14 are distributed among the DoD Agencies and Combatant Commands.

The Army’s 41 EA responsibilities are:8

- DoD Detainee Operations Policy
- Armed Services Blood Program Office
- Chemical and Biological Defense Program
- Chemical Demilitarization
- DoD Combat Feeding Research and Engineering Program
- Counter Radio Electronic Warfare (CREW) Technology
- Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center
- DoD Level III Corrections
- Explosives Safety Management
- Persian Gulf War Exposure Registry
- Homeowners Assistance Program
- DoD Biometrics
- Law of War Program (Investigation and Reporting of Reportable Incidents Against U.S. Personnel)
- Management of Land-Based Water Resources in Support of Contingency Operations
- Military Postal Service
- DoD Passport and Passport Agent Services
- Recruiting Facilities Program
- DoD Support to United Nations Missions
- DoD Civilian Police Officers & Security Guards Physical Fitness Standards Program
- Administration and Resource Support for the U.S. Military Entrance Processing Command
- USCENTCOM R&R Leave Program
- Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation
- Unexploded Ordnance Center of Excellence
- Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization
- Multinational Force & Observers Sinai
- Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance
- Medical Research for Prevention, Mitigation, and Treatment of Blast Injuries
- Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic
- Contract Foreign Language Support to the DoD Components
- Financial Disclosure Management — Ethics Reporting System
- Support for Non-Federal Entities Authorized to Operate on DoD Installations
- Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center
- Commander’s Emergency Response Program
- Georgia-U.S. Bio Surveillance & Research Center
- Forensics
- Coordination of Contracting Activities in the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility
- Operation of After Government Employment Advice Repository
- Defense Centers of Excellence for Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury
- DoD Biological Select Agent and Toxin Biosafety Program
- 2 x Classified EA Responsibilities

Each executive agency responsibility has its own DoD Directive describing the scope and specifics of the EA function. Examples include responsibilities and authorities of various components and staffs, force structure and resources required, and particulars of reimbursement between components. The level of reimbursement for EA services rendered to other components varies by EA responsibility. The Army devotes approximately twenty percent of its force structure to fulfill its EA responsibilities. The Army is also heavily involved in supporting the Combatant Commands as a Combatant Command Support Agent.

However, the Army does not effectively account for the financial cost of its executive agency functions and, its extensive contributions are not discretely tracked in budgeting—there is no activity-based accounting for these functions. “You manage what you measure,” and the lack of precision in identifying the cost of core activities makes it hard for the Army to struggle to communicate the savings and costs associated with Army support to the joint force. In many areas, the Army simply does not know what the costs and benefits are of providing support versus divesting to other entities (or using contracting). This is problematic. Additionally, while it is appropriate for a Combatant Commander to have the flexibility to organize and assign responsibilities to subordinate components as necessary to support theater strategic objectives, current DoD directives for EA and CCSA create a systemic funding tension between the Combatant Commands and the Services. Combatant Command requirements are often emergent while the budget cycle is calendar-driven. The reimbursement questions surrounding CCSA in particular can also create operational tensions because they create staff churn in the Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs), undermining unity of command and distracting from achievement of the Combatant Commander’s theater strategic objectives.

The DoD Directive governing Combatant Command Support Agents (CCSAs) provides broad guidance to the Military Departments and assigns each Combatant Command headquarters and sub-unified headquarters to a Department. CCSAs must “program and budget to fund, without reimbursement, the administrative and logistical support required by the supported headquarters of the Combatant Commands…and the subordinate unified commands.”10 It is important to note that the Army also maintains ASCCs as a subordinate headquarters to each Combatant Command. When the Army is the CCSA, that Component Headquarters


9. This figure is approximate and was provided to the Carlisle Scholars during a workshop. Subsequent efforts to obtain evidence to support this figure have been unsuccessful. This is indicative of the Army’s challenge in disaggregating costs associated with its executive agency responsibilities.

generally serves as the conduit to communicate Combatant Command administrative and logistical requirements so the Department of the Army can include those requirements in its annual budget. Figure 2.4 depicts the Army’s Executive Agency and CCSA requirements in relation to the other Services. Note that the figure does not include ASCCs, which the Army maintains in addition to fulfilling its EA and CCSA responsibilities.

In addition to CCSA requirements from DoD, Combatant Commanders often designate a Service component command to serve as the lead component for logistics; that component is not necessarily the CCSA. For example, the CCSA for USCENTCOM is the Air Force, but the lead component for logistics is the Army (ARCENT). To complicate things further, the Combatant Commander may designate a lead component for a commodity or service that does not align with DoD EA responsibilities. For example, a Combatant Commander may designate the Army as the lead component for logistics, including medical materiel when the Defense Logistics Agency is the Executive Agent for that commodity. The result is a patchwork of EA, CCSA, and lead component for logistics unique to each Combatant Command, responsibilities that may or may not align with DoD directives.

Finally, when the CCSA and the lead component for logistics are the same service (e.g. USAFRICOM), the DoDD governing CCSAs is unclear about whether non-reimbursable support extends beyond the headquarters to include operations. This matters because CCSA support is explicitly not reimbursable, but lead component logistics can be. Any Service component will naturally seek to maximize reimbursement. Therefore, the CCSA is incentivized to interpret the DoD Directive as requiring them to support only the headquarters on a non-reimbursable basis while supported components within the Combatant Command may attempt to extend that support to their operations, not only to avoid reimbursing the CCSA but also in the interest of simplicity. The alternative is either a constant negotiation over which support is reimbursable or an extremely detailed Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) that cannot possibly cover every situation. In any case, as the Service with the most EA responsibilities and the Service most likely to be designated as the lead component for logistics, the Army’s budget process and force requirements are made even more complex.

11. Common-user logistics includes those supplies and services that can be consumed by multiple components. Examples include food, water, diesel fuel, medical services, etc. Even if a component is designated by the Combatant Commander as the lead component for logistics, the military services retain responsibility for supporting their forces with service-specific supplies and services. Examples include specialized ammunition, uniforms, maintenance, and repair parts.
12. LTG(Ret) Claude Christiansen, telephone interview by COL Katherine Graef, 5 January. 2016.
The Army requirements discussed thus far have been primarily driven by ends (objectives) and means (resources) requirements. The Army must also respond to requirements driven by ways (employment of forces). These requirements are largely derived from doctrine.

**Army Requirements from Joint Doctrine**

Joint doctrine establishes the conceptual framework for employing the joint force to achieve strategic objectives using two key concepts: the Range of Military Operations (ROMO) and the Joint Phasing Construct. The Range of Military Options, shown in Figure 2.5, conceptualizes the conflict continuum from peace to war. The United States has not declared war since 1941, but it also does not enjoy peaceful relations everywhere on earth. The ROMO illustrates the range of options for policy makers when considering use of the military instrument of national power.
The Joint Phasing Construct, depicted in Figure 2.6, conceptualizes the phases through which an idealized military operation will progress in a conflict. In early phases the military is used to shape the security environment to prevent conflict and limit adversary options. If shaping fails to prevent conflict, later phases describe the use of the joint force to decisively defeat the adversary and transition the conflict to a favorable political outcome.
These two concepts, ROMO and Joint Phasing, are interrelated and reflect the Army’s requirements. It is a straightforward exercise to apply the Army’s 13 DoD-directed functions to these models. For example, in the early phases, the Army might conduct air and missile defense. During the Dominate Phase of Major Operations and Campaigns, the Army might conduct airborne, air assault, or combined arms operations while providing intra-theater aeromedical evacuation and logistics to the joint force. In later phases, the Army is the only Service that can conduct civil affairs operations and, most significant to translating tactical victory into strategic success, the Army occupies territory and provides for the initial establishment of military governance to facilitate the transitions from conflict termination to conflict resolution. In order to provide useful options to policy makers, the Army must be prepared to operate across the full spectrum of ROMO and in all six phases, simultaneously, in multiple locations around the world. The ways used by the Army must necessarily vary depending on the type and progression of the conflict, guidance from strategic leaders, and JIIM partners involved. Ideally the Army could train, man, and equip specific forces for each type of conflict and phase, but with limited means this is not possible. The Army must therefore determine the best ways to organize and train to maximize its agility and readiness. The Army’s approach to addressing this challenge is reflected in its own doctrine.

The Army’s Doctrinal Interpretation of its Requirements

The Army’s baseline doctrine is Army Doctrine Publication 1, The Army. ADP 1 states, “The mission of the United States Army is to fight and win the Nation’s wars through prompt and sustained land combat, as part of the joint force.”15 ADP 1 further defines the Army mission as, “Accomplishing all missions assigned by the President, Secretary of Defense, and combatant commanders.”16 More than any other Service, the Army is the nation’s multi-purpose force, which presents an inherent prioritization challenge. The Army’s operational doctrine, however, seems to respond by emphasizing those activities that would occur in the middle of the Joint Phasing Construct and at the high-end of the Range of Military Operations.

Army operational doctrine describes how the Army should be employed to achieve its purpose and is contained in Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations (ULO).

[Unified Land Operations] describes how the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution.17

ULO recognizes the Army’s role as the lead land domain Service, required to synchronize, coordinate, and/or integrate the activities of governmental and non-governmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. The Army executes ULO through Decisive Action, the idea that every operation will entail a combination of offensive, defensive, and wide-area security operations. To succeed at Decisive Action, the Army has determined that it must maintain two core competencies: Combined Arms Maneuver (CAM) and Wide Area Security (WAS).

The Army defines CAM as “The application of the element of combat power in unified action to defeat enemy ground forces; to seize, occupy, and defend land areas; and to achieve physical, temporal, and psychological advantages over the enemy to seize and exploit the initiative.”18 As part of the joint force, the Army conducts CAM to dominate and decisively defeat its adversaries. The Total Army is designed and organized to conduct large-scale, sustained CAM operations against opposing conventional forces. The Army is the only Service capable of conducting CAM on the scale required to defeat a nation-state, but its success will depend on the rest of the joint force. CAM can occur across the range of military operations, from small-scale contingencies to total war.

Wide Area Security (WAS) is “The application of the elements of combat power in unified action to protect populations, forces, infrastructure, and activities; to deny the enemy positions of advantage; and to consolidate gains in order to retain the initiative.”19 WAS is any military operation in a contested environment short of CAM. In WAS, the Army seeks to maintain security in terrain under its control and not seize new terrain. During WAS, the Army may operate in support of JIIM partners or other elements of national power to enable the achievement of strategic objectives.

In addition to the core competencies of CAM and WAS, the Army recognizes its diverse role as part of the joint force by including the following enabling competencies in ADP 1: support security cooperation, tailor forces for the combatant commander, conduct entry operations, provide flexible mission command, support joint and Army Forces, support domestic civil authorities, and mobilize and integrate the Reserve Components. These competencies reflect the functions assigned to the Army by the DoD but are not inclusive of all 13 of them, which provides an indicator of the Army’s prioritization of its requirements. This mismatch between functions assigned by the DoD and competencies included in Army doctrine are compounded by inconsistencies between the Army’s own strategic guidance documents.

16. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
Using four recent documents as examples, Figure 2.7 illustrates the variation within the Army’s guidance to its own force regarding its roles, core competencies, and priorities. To be fair, these documents have different temporal focuses. Doctrine and Strategic Planning Guidance apply to the Army of today and the Army Vision and Operating Concept apply to the Army of tomorrow. Nevertheless, even when the temporal focuses are similar, the terms and priorities are difficult to reconcile. These documents illustrate the difficulty of capturing the quantity and diversity of the Army’s requirements.

Figure 2.7: Army Strategic Guidance Comparison

**Army Strategic Guidance Documents**

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<tr>
<td>Army Roles:</td>
<td>Army Basic Roles:</td>
<td>Tenets of Army Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prevent</td>
<td>Beter / defeat threats on land</td>
<td>Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shape</td>
<td>Control land areas and secure their</td>
<td>Simultaneity</td>
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<td>Win</td>
<td>populations</td>
<td>Depth</td>
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<td>Core Competencies:</td>
<td>Army Enabling Roles:</td>
<td>Adaptability</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAM</td>
<td>Support to Security Cooperation</td>
<td>Endurance</td>
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<td>WAS</td>
<td>Support Domestic Civil Authorities</td>
<td>Lethality</td>
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<td>Enabling Competencies:</td>
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<td>Support security</td>
<td>Joint Force, and the Department of</td>
<td>Innovation</td>
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<td>cooperation</td>
<td>Defense</td>
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<td>Tailor forces for the</td>
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<td>combat commander</td>
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<td>Conduct entry operations</td>
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<td>Provide flexible mission command</td>
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<td>Support Joint and Army forces</td>
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<td>Support domestic civil authorities</td>
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<td>Mobilize and integrate the Reserve Components</td>
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<td>Army Roles:</td>
<td>Army Qualities:</td>
<td>Army Core Competencies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consolidate strategic gains</td>
<td>Expeditionary</td>
<td>Shape the Security Environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Integrate operations</td>
<td>Strategically Adaptive</td>
<td>Set the Theater, Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enable sustained</td>
<td>Campaign Quality</td>
<td>National Power</td>
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<td>operations</td>
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<td>Combined Arms Maneuver</td>
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<td>Operate among</td>
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<td>Wide Area Security</td>
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<td>populations</td>
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**Conclusion**

This section described the Army’s statutory, strategic, and regulatory requirements and the challenges associated with them. These are the things the Army is obliged to do for the nation. Army doctrine and other Army strategic guidance documents describe how the Army sees its requirements. These documents represent how the Army prioritizes its obligations. A comparison between these two sets of documents reveals not only a fundamental and significant prioritization challenge, but also a cultural bias that favors combined arms maneuver. This is natural because under conditions of exceptional uncertainty, when demands overwhelm resources, which the strategic environment is likely to do, the Army — like most large, established organizations — defaults to its culture for guidance. However, a focus on CAM at the expense of Wide Area Security and its other critical enabling competencies will deny policy makers the nuanced range of military options they need to achieve strategic objectives.

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20. This figure is a summary of the following four documents:
This section examines several aspects of Army culture that influence which strategic options Army leaders provide to policy makers. Army culture is an important aspect of the profession of arms. It embodies the rich set of traditions, beliefs, and values that ensure that the pursuit of violence and coercion against foes takes place within an ethical and legal context consistent with the U.S. Constitution and national values. While the role and culture of the United States Army are unique, they serve as a model for other large organizations facing environments of great uncertainty. The Army’s institutional response to change is also similar to that of other complex organizations: it draws upon the traditions, beliefs, and values that have ensured its success in the past. This reliance on proven concepts makes sense, as it provides a stable and common starting point from which Army leaders can chart a course in an unpredictable environment. Yet paradoxically, these traditions, beliefs, and values rely on a set of assumptions about the world—and the Army’s place in it—that may no longer accurately reflect the current and future operating environment. In this respect, Army culture creates both opportunities and obstacles for achieving national security objectives.

In order to offer compelling and relevant options for policy makers, the Army must be willing to undertake the difficult task of challenging its assumptions, beliefs, and values. It must broaden its focus beyond its legacy of previous successful military missions and embrace the growing spectrum of future challenges. Otherwise, the Army’s own cultural biases may contribute to miscalculations of the ends, ways, means, and risks that comprise future strategy. These miscalculations would in turn hinder quality analysis of options and the ability to prioritize and present a cogent range of options to policy makers, diminishing support for the Army during an era of limited resources. This section focuses on three key aspects of Army culture that influence the service’s perspective and national security recommendations to policy makers. Current and future Army leaders must reflect upon the impact of service culture as they challenge institutional assumptions in order to respond effectively to the current and future security environment.


Culture Analysis: the Benefits and Costs of a “Can-Do” Culture

The Army’s “can-do,” problem-solving culture contributes to its attractiveness and utility as a policy tool, yet it can also hamper Army leaders’ willingness and ability to prioritize and present cogent trade-offs among ends, ways, means, and risk. Army observers describe its high-performance orientation as “unique across public and private institutions and… a main source of competitive advantage for the Army in the joint operating environment.” In recent years, as policy makers have attempted to create whole-of-government solutions in response to complex security problems, observers have noted how the Army’s forward-leaning approach contrasts markedly— and often favorably—with the nuanced and incremental approach favored by other foreign policy actors, such as State Department diplomats. During a February 2016 U.S. Army War College symposium, panelists repeatedly cited the Army’s “can-do” attitude and its ability to solve problems creatively among its biggest assets to the nation.

Despite these positive attributes, the high-performance or “mission-first” orientation of Army culture complicates leaders’ efforts to describe trade-offs effectively, feeding perceptions that the Army is unwilling or unable to be transparent about its calculations of ends, ways, means, and risks. As noted earlier, the Army’s statutory, regulatory, and strategic requirements in the face of unknowable future threats far exceed the force’s available resources and capabilities. Rather than communicate the risks associated with this mismatch, Army culture makes it hard for leaders to admit that they anticipate a future mission for which the Army will not be prepared. They would consider such an admission a dereliction of duty. Instead, Army leaders prefer to be prepared for anything and everything resulting in public calls for more resources—usually framed in the context of overall readiness, end strength, or concerns about a hollow force. This is married with an implied, grudging acceptance that the Army will figure it out using the available resources, which ultimately results in mortgaging future readiness by postponing needed modernization programs and wasting billions of dollars on canceled acquisition programs. This response, while laudable in some respects, is not useful for policy makers faced with making difficult resource decisions, especially given that few other U.S. government agencies have as much difficulty articulating how a reduction in resources will curtail their mandates or substantially increase associated risks.

Complicating matters is the sense that other elements of the joint force, such as the Marines and Special Operations Command, are competing against the Army for specialized land power missions. Mission specialization is the point: by being more transparent about organizational limitations driven by insufficient capabilities or platform-centric missions, other services have succeeded in carving out niches among the range of strategic options available to those who wield the instruments of U.S. military power. Thus, the “can-do,” problem-solving culture of the Army combined with the expansive requirements to provide executive agency functions to the joint force, paradoxically contributes to its being under-resourced and under-appreciated, particularly during times of relative peace or fiscal constraint.

The challenge for current and future Army leaders is to acknowledge this paradox and dialogue with policy-makers regarding which roles are most important for the Army—in relation to the rest of the joint force—in the current operating and fiscal environment. In his new position as Chief of Staff of the Army, General Mark Milley articulated his view of the Army’s role by clearly establishing force readiness and unified land operations as essential elements of its core capabilities. By contrast, the Army Operating Concept (AOC) does not provide such clarity to this dialogue. Instead of acknowledging the plethora of strategic risks and requirements facing the Army as part of the joint force, the AOC does not identify service priorities and trade-offs. Not mutually exclusive in content, these two service perspectives do not advance the Army’s attempt to create greater transparency and understanding regarding its future roles and the requirements needed to support them.

6. The symposium included active-duty, retired and civilian experts representing academic institutions, the Library of Congress, the U.S. Institute for Peace, RAND Corporation, and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).
Discussions about resources need to move beyond end-strength and force structure to describe what missions the Army is less capable of doing and articulating the associated risks. To the extent possible, the Army should provide measurable, objective data to policy makers to support the options presented by senior military officials. The aim should be to overmatch potential scrutiny and skepticism with data that clarifies trade-offs, improves transparency, and links Army capabilities with achievement of national security objectives.

This approach has risks and may fundamentally alter the Army’s business model. Missions may be shifted to other elements of the joint force or remain under-resourced as a result of frank discussions between strategic leaders offering their best military advice, supported by relevant data and objective analysis. The long-term organizational value of these interactions will be a more meaningful discourse regarding national security risks and trade-offs, as well as a better definition of the Army’s role in a resource-constrained environment. An added intangible, yet critical, benefit will be an improved relationship and trust between the Army and national security policy-makers, a relationship that currently suffers from a lack of transparency and an incoherent Army narrative. Our political leaders and the American people expect and deserve no less.

**Culture Analysis: the Combined Arms Maneuver Bias**

The institutional bias toward the Combined Arms Maneuver sector of the Regular Army inhibits the Total Army’s ability to present the full range of potential options to policy makers. In American society, large-scale combat operations are the unique responsibility of the U.S. military. As the nation’s oldest and largest armed service, the Army orients its entire structure and culture toward its core mission: “To fight and win the Nation’s wars through prompt and sustained land combat, as part of the Joint Force.” The Army’s cultural focus on combat arms reflects the force’s illustrious history. It also underscores the Army’s contemporary power to deter adversaries, shape world events, and achieve its military objectives. While the Army acknowledges that success in combat operations requires a vast array of supporting and sustaining functions, conventional war fighting represents the pinnacle of the profession.

While the combat arms are, without question, the raison d’être of the Army, its cultural fixation on combat operations creates four vulnerabilities for the institution as it adapts to a more competitive strategic environment. First, the bias toward conventional war-fighting focuses too much institutional attention on tactical and operational actions on the battlefield at the expense of the larger strategic goals that policy makers intend to accomplish through the use of military force. While tactical maneuver and operational art are vital areas of study and practice for professional officers, strategic leaders need to ensure that the Army’s actions not only achieve military goals, but also ultimately advance national security objectives. This requires the Army’s enablers.

In the strategic environment facing a future Army, fighting and winning are necessary but not sufficient to achieving the durable outcomes that will advance U.S. interests in measurable, coherent, and sustainable ways. The cultural bias toward combat operations among senior leaders limits the diversity of perspective that encourages critical thinking. Too often, Army leaders and planners create artificial boundaries across fluid and complex political and security challenges to focus on conflicts most amenable to a military solution. For example, the Phase 0 – Phase IV construct was intended to be a flexible model that helped commanders link combat and stability operations, but the Army’s cultural bias contributes to a focus on Phase III (Dominate—defeating enemy forces) to the detriment of the other phases and strategic success across the conflict as a whole. In other words, they choose to prepare for and focus on high-end combat, even while the strategic environment forecasts the need for a more diverse set of capabilities.

Enshrined in doctrine, these boundaries validate cultural preferences for land combat operations as the Army’s central responsibility, leaving other strategic concerns, such as the messy aftermath of direct military confrontation, to other services and organizations. When the Army is unwillingly drawn into participating in non-preferred activities, such as stability operations and counterinsurgency, it tends to cite the absence of clearly defined political objectives as the cause. One observer noted, “Without those clearly defined political objectives, the military will focus on strictly military objectives and establish a military definition of victory.” Unfortunately, for the United States and its Army, very few global security challenges in the foreseeable future can be resolved solely by tactical, or even operational, success. The Army must embrace its role as the service uniquely qualified to translate immediate military victory into long-term strategic success by investing institutional energy in those capabilities that provide strategic persistence and enable other elements of national power.

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Second, the Army’s focus on combined arms maneuver—principally infantry, armor, and field artillery branches—downplays the array and importance of other specialized functions, capabilities, and missions through which the Army serves the nation and its allies. A key example, described in more detail above, is the more than 40 Executive Agency functions that the Army provides to other elements of the joint and interagency community. The Army is the most diverse, malleable, and multi-purpose force, with a great deal of that flexibility derived from its supporting functions, many of which are focused on a broader definition of human security that is especially relevant to the current operating environment. For example, the Army has the most robust and expeditionary medical and biological defense capabilities in the joint force, if not the nation, which makes it a natural choice for confronting challenges like Ebola or other pandemics. The combat-focused orientation of Army culture and its associated one-note narrative, however, obscure these important elements of the force and complicate the challenge of defining the Army’s true value to policy makers and the American people.

Third, the bias toward conventional war fighting exacerbates tensions among the regular Army, Army Reserve (USAR), and Army National Guard (ARNG), which the recently published report by the National Commission on the Future of the Army describes in detail.14 Since the Army Reserve’s primary focus is on operational support and sustainment, the combat arms bias contributes to the perception that the regular Army is first among equals, if not superior to the other components. Similarly, although the ARNG is combat-focused when mobilized under U.S. Code Title 10, the Guard’s dual responsibilities, its wide range of non-combat roles, and its ties to civilian communities throughout the United States, isolate Guard units from the cultural forces at the center of the service. Furthermore, an analyst at the Library of Congress notes, “the Army contends active [that is, Regular Army] forces are best suited [for] unpredictable contingency operations due to their high state of readiness by virtue of their full-time status.”15 This view leaves many reserve units feeling under-utilized and under-appreciated compared to the active component.16 The refocusing of roles for the ARNG in wide-area security, proposed in a subsequent section of this report, addresses this disparity by drawing upon the innate advantages of the Guard. It also offers a more robust set of options to policy makers. Despite the advantages to the total force and the nation, this proposal will face a key obstacle: it challenges the cultural primacy of the combat arms sector of the Regular Army.

Fourth, the primacy of Regular Army combat arms includes the implicit assumption that combat arms leaders are the best-qualified, regardless of the mission. For example, the Army consistently tasks combat arms commanders with leading unconventional missions such as the 2014-2015 Ebola virus response even though the mission did not involve combat. In these missions, the wide range of joint, interagency, international, and multinational (JIIM) partners requires cooperation and consensus as well as the Army to be a supporting, rather than supported, element. Culturally, the Army’s combat support units are accustomed to cooperation, collaboration, and filling a supporting role. Nevertheless, the Army has a historical reluctance to place combat support leaders in command of unconventional missions.

To overcome these vulnerabilities, the Army’s leadership must recognize that fighting and winning the nation’s wars are only part of what the Army has done and what it will do. While combat operations must remain the Army’s core function, its leaders must address the cultural bias towards combined arms maneuver and diversify the educational experience and professional expertise of the Army’s senior ranks to reflect the broad range of capabilities in the total force. By embracing its multifunctional capabilities, the Army will improve its agility to respond to crises across the range of military operations, strengthen its ability to work with JIIM partners outside of combat zones, and, most importantly, to provide relevant and tailored options to policy makers. Additionally, acknowledging the Army’s key support functions will enrich its narrative about the total force’s value to the American people.

Culture Analysis: the Gap between Espoused Values and Actual Practices

The gap between the Army’s espoused values and its actual system of incentives and disincentives impairs its ability to tolerate mistakes, learn from its errors, and innovate. Espoused values are beliefs that have “become embodied in an ideology or organizational philosophy” and serve as a powerful cultural shaping tool. These values are alive and well in the Army and codified in official publications. The Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22, Army Leadership, defines the reason for the Army’s existence, expectations of service leaders, and the most desired attributes for its professional soldiers. To understand the impact of Army culture on the service, it is important to recognize the Army’s own aspirations.

According to ADP 6-22, the Army exists “to serve the American people, protect enduring national interests, and fulfill the nation’s military responsibilities.” It defines leadership as the “process of influencing people by providing purpose, directions, and motivation to accomplish the missions and improve the organization.” Significantly, ADP 6-22 identifies the desired attributes that Army leaders (and, by extension, all soldiers) must possess. The most notable traits are good character, mental agility, keen intellect, adaptiveness, innovative thought, and disciplined initiative.

The Army’s culture promotes a system of values that ultimately shape the creation of standards for conduct, performance evaluation, and promotion. When espoused and actual values are congruent with the day-to-day experiences of soldiers, there is tremendous organizational benefit, especially when the Army operates in complex environments. In contrast, to the extent that gaps exist or values diverge from actions, the Army’s ability to learn, adapt, and grow in response to external factors will suffer. Additionally, the organizational structure of the military intensifies both the positive and negative attributes of a service’s culture.

The current system for promotion and retention of soldiers exposes the gap between the espoused values of creativity, critical thinking, innovation, and decentralization embodied in mission command; and the unspoken but widely understood preference for control, obedience, and adherence to traditional practices. The emphasis placed on certain military competencies, specifically those supporting combined arms maneuver, and the “up-or-out” promotion system create tension between stated and actual organizational values. Shaped by policies last reformed in 1980, promotion and career development are cited as factors for the Army losing talented soldiers and not attracting the quality of officer candidates it had compared to the 1900s.

Similarly, cultural tensions stemming from the divergence of values are surfacing as the Army attempts to identify and create organizational efficiencies. Facing an austere budgetary environment, savings must be gained across the service. However, the existing bureaucratic systems and budgetary processes do not reward such actions. The previously mentioned promotion system is an example. Moreover, the federal budget itself does not reward cost savings and innovative solutions. No vehicle exists for the Army, or organizations across the federal government, to reap any benefits if or when fiscal restraint is demonstrated. As a result, the budgetary norm of “use it or lose it” permeates the service’s culture.

Studies of the personality types of Army flag officers reveal that the majority of Brigadier Generals “have a preference for stability and avoiding organizational conflict.” There are challenges created by the Army’s promotion process selecting leaders with similar thought processes and personalities. At the strategic levels of the service, an inherent tension or gap exists between the personality types that have been promoted to these levels and the need for creative thinking and innovative leaders the Army states it desires. At more junior levels, officers experience this tension as they attempt to exercise mission command, yet find their efforts undermined by senior officers who prefer to maintain a high degree of control and centralization.

The disparity between the Army’s stated values and its actual organizational preferences also complicates its relationship with the U.S. Congress. In recent decades, observers of this key political relationship have noted that Army leaders lag representatives of other military services in their relationship with the Congress. One study noted, “Army general officers are the least visible and engaged on Capitol Hill.” Another observed that Army leaders are “unwilling or unable to be transparent” about how to calculate options for policy makers. On the one hand, Army values emphasize selfless service, honesty, and subservience to civilian political authorities as central tenets of the military profession. On the other hand,

24. Interview with a congressional research analyst, 6 February 2016.
officer career paths “discourage experience in Washington—particularly with Congress.” These incentives reflect the Army’s preference for risk aversion; reliance on personal competence, loyalty, and experience over objective data; the innate belief that the Army’s value to the nation is self-evident and unquestionable; and the tendency toward discretion rather than transparency when communicating externally.26 In an era of declining resources and an increasingly complex strategic operating environment, the Army needs to overcome these self-imposed obstacles in order to tell its story more effectively to the American people and their elected representatives.

These reflections on Army culture highlight how one of the world’s most complex and revered institutions organizes itself and contributes to the maintenance of global security and American power. Yet the U.S. Army is also a human organization, guided by its past while constantly adapting to the future. The Army’s organizational culture provides a firm base for a constantly evolving total force that reflects a changing nation in a turbulent world. As with any stronghold, at home or on the battlefield, the Army’s culture is a source of strength and stability. Yet winning the battle requires letting go of the comforts and security of life on the base, taking along what is needed and leaving the rest behind, and relying on Army values, ingenuity, and a “can-do” attitude to shape the theater and achieve sustainable outcomes. Army culture helps determine which tools to bring and which to leave behind, what skills to use and which to let atrophy, when to go it alone and when to ask for cover fire, where to play it safe and where to press the advantage. For these reasons, taking an honest look at the opportunities and obstacles embedded within Army culture can only serve to strengthen the total force’s efforts to prepare itself for strategic success in the coming years.

25. Scroggs, Army Relations with Congress, 113-114.
26. Ibid.
Part II

Introduction

Part I of this report analyzed the international strategic environment, statutory and policy requirements assigned to the Army, and the culture of the Army itself. The interaction of these elements creates opportunities as well as challenges for the Army. Army leaders must balance conflicting environmental pressures (e.g. reduced budgets and a wider scope of operational demands), and continue to build a ready and capable Army. Part II of the Root Report provides a set of recommendations to address the challenges identified in Part I.

First, the Army cannot help the nation achieve sustainable political outcomes without working effectively in the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multinational (JIIM) environment. Recent history has revealed serious deficiencies in this area, many of them rooted in Army culture. Chapter 4 develops recommendations for how the Army can become better at working with key external partners, focusing particularly on better aligning the Army’s culture and incentives with the “IIM”, thereby improving the Army’s ability to respond to a wide array of national security challenges.

The report then examines how the Army can become more effective in its organizational structure. The evolving fiscal environment requires that the Army produce structural efficiencies without eroding operational capability. A shrinking force must be a lean force. Chapter 5 develops a broad framework for improving the Army’s structure, and a detailed analysis of one way to delayer the organization.

The report concludes with an analysis of the Army as a “total force”. The Army must be prepared for a wide range of requirements laid down by law and policy. Chapter 6 extends the analysis of a theme introduced in Chapter 1: the dual operational competences of Combined Arms Maneuver and Wide Area Security. It offers recommendations for improving the Total Army’s strategic agility, which it defines as a robust capability in both in CAM and WAS, and the capability to expand when the nation requires a larger force. Chapter 6 focuses on how better integration of the Active and Reserve Components of the Army can produce a more agile and effective force.
The current strategic environment, as well as Defense Department and Army doctrine, dictate a joint interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) approach to many Army operations. In particular, shaping activities, such as security cooperation conducted in steady state (phase zero) environments, are best accomplished using a JIIM approach. Despite some notable examples of progress in this respect, the Army still has a tendency to neglect the long-term investment (in experience and relationships) needed to build and sustain a effective cooperation with JIIM partners. A cultural preference for quick action may facilitate tactical success at the expense of greater strategic results. It contributes to a sense within the Army that military operations would be more likely to succeed were it not for bad policy decisions made by external decision makers. The Army is caught in a vicious cycle. Its lack of confidence in partners produces ineffective engagement with them. This then contributes to partner struggles, which further reinforces the Army’s go-it-alone-to-get-the-job-done mentality, and undermined the Army’s interest in relying on partners. The Army must break out of this loop, because it cannot succeed in creating sustainable political outcomes without effective engagement with external partners.

Improving the Army’s performance requires that education and training with respect to JIIM is conducted for more officers and earlier in their careers. To support the Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) brigades concept, Army leaders should establish a dedicated Train, Advise, and Assist (TAA) group in each of the regionally focused corps headquarters. These groups would work with the relevant National Guard (NG) State Partnership Program (SPP) elements and the theater special operations commands (TSOCs) to improve the focus, continuity, and coordination of security cooperation (SC) in each corps’ area of responsibility. Finally, to complement increased education and training, Army leaders should create assignments with a JIIM focus, as well as recognizing and rewarding officers who succeed in those jobs. Understanding the JIIM environment will improve the Army’s performance across its range of military operations (ROMO), avoid some of the mistakes made in recent JIIM environments, and augment or complement U.S. military capacity through interagency partners and multinational allies and partners. Given the declining size of the Army and the prospect of further budget reductions, effective cooperation with JIIM partners is more important than ever.

The Army’s Mandate to Operate in the JIIM Environment

Current DoD policy, as well as Joint and Service doctrine, specify that the strategic environment dictate that the U.S. military can no longer operate alone. Specifically, the doctrine for the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) recommends, “Through all stages of planning for campaigns, contingencies, and crises, Combatant Commanders (CCDR) and subordinate Joint Force Commanders (JFC) should seek to involve relevant USG departments and agencies
in planning process.” The 2015 National Military Strategy (NMS) asserts that strengthening the global network of allies and partners is a core military objective. It adds, “We coordinate with other U.S. agencies and mission partners.” At the Army level specifically, the Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2014 (ASPG), promulgated jointly by the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Secretary of the Army, directs the Army to leverage JIIM partners. Recent Army conceptual thinking is also consistent with this viewpoint. Under the heading “Central Idea,” the U.S. Army Operating Concept (AOC) Win in a Complex World describes future operations conducted by “the Army, as part of joint, interorganizational, and multinational teams.” The AOC relates this idea to each of its core competencies. Guidance on JIIM is consistent from the highest levels of the Department of Defense (DOD), the Joint Staff, and the Army. Unequivocally, Army leaders must take into account JIIM when they are preparing to supply the four broad categories of capability the army offers as a land power; defeating and deterring enemies with combat-ready forces, operating in “gray spaces,” planning for potential stability operations, and building partner capacity (BPC) via the full range of SC tools.

The Army’s Mixed Performance in the JIIM Environment

Thirty years after the Goldwaters-Nichols Act, the U.S. Army and the Defense Department write large have come a long way in increasing their joint warfighting capabilities, the joint part of JIIM. However, despite 15 years of operational deployments since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Army and DoD’s ability to work in the Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational environment, the IIM part of JIIM, has improved to a much lesser extent. During this period, the Army has participated in a variety of JIIM efforts through the ROMO from crisis response and limited contingency operations, to major operations and campaigns. Recent examples include the Ebola response supporting the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and Centers for Disease Control, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operations in Afghanistan, and multinational stabilization efforts during Operation Iraqi Freedom. However, the Army struggled to integrate its operations with interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners due to cultural differences, training shortcomings, limited experience, and the lack of sufficient linguistically qualified personnel. During a 2016 guest lecture at the U.S. Army War College, a senior foreign officer stated, “The U.S. Army could improve the way it works with its partners. I have seen circumstances where the Army hasn’t been effective as it could be, and I think you will have to depend on partners more and more in the future.” The United States military has made efforts in the last decade plus to change the culture in a way that improves international cooperation. However, the current military culture hampers Army leaders’ ability to understand partner nation realities, build consensus, and know when to compromise or even concede to partners. This is particularly true when non-military options are under consideration and play a supporting role to another military force.

Recently, the Army has done better in JIIM environments when the U.S. military is the lead agency, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan during phase three ("dominate," i.e. combat operations) when tasks are explicitly military, such as destroying an adversary’s armored corps. Similarly, phase one ("deter") and phase two ("seize the initiative") are comprised of predominately-military tasks such as deploying troops to a border or building up logistics. However, when the Army operates in a JIIM environment during phases zero ("shape") and phase four ("stabilize"), leading to phase five ("enable civil authority"), the tasks are much less explicitly combined arms maneuver (CAM) operations and more of a developmental nature, which JIIM partners such as USAID or the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) are better suited to lead. In these situations, where the Army is not the lead decision-making authority in a country, it has had its share of challenges. Specifically, some Army leaders whom have been accustomed to taking charge in the Iraq/ Afghanistan combat environment, have problems playing a supporting role during normal day-to-day phase zero BPC efforts in support of an ambassador-led country team. Yet these efforts represent the majority of persistent operational activity for DoD and occur on a daily basis. To underscore the point, the April 6, 2016 Army Times “Hot Spot” map denotes eight locations world-wide where the US Army is currently deployed.8 However, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), the DoD proponent for phase zero BPC efforts, reports ongoing SC activities with over 223 countries and international organizations globally.9 These wide-ranging...
activities include the sale of Phalanx weapon systems to Saudi Arabia, sending the first officers from Belize and Gabon to the Army War College in 2015-16, exchanging subject-matter experts from the Illinois National Guard to SPP counterparts in Poland, and various Army-led humanitarian assistance projects in East Africa as part of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa.

The Army Did JIIM before the Term “JIIM” Existed

While the term “JIIM” was coined relatively recently, the Army has a long historical association with external partners dating back to General George Washington’s operational coordination with General Jean-Baptiste Rochambeau, commander of the French Expeditionary Force, in their combined efforts to defeat the British. In the 1860’s, the U.S. Army administered the occupied South during Reconstruction, engaging in many of the political, governance, and developmental tasks that would today be found in phase three and four operations. In the 1930’s, the Army oversaw the Civilian Conservation Corps, conducted a successful counterinsurgency operation in the Philippines (1899-1902), and intervened in the Russian Civil War in (1918). In the commencement address at West Point (1914), Secretary of War Lindley Miller Garrison said, “The American Army has become the all-around handy man of the government,” and warned the cadets, “You may be called upon at any time to do any kind of service in any part of the world.”

Before the creation of the post-World War II national security and foreign affairs architecture, the Army accomplished a wide range of tasks with little assistance from other USG agencies or foreign partners. These exceedingly varied operations over the decades helped create an Army culture based on a can-do attitude, which neither questioned its orders nor the grand strategy behind them.

More recently, the Army’s conduct of its conventional CAM mission during the Gulf War in 1990 was a JIIM success, with 34 nations contributing troops or equipment to the coalition under the command of a U.S. Commander. Setting up that success on the battlefield also had a JIIM aspect. The new Commander of Central Command, General Norman Schwarzkopf, described upon his arrival that he often found Arab counterparts such as Saudi Minister of Defense Prince Sultan al-Saud unavailable for meetings. However, Schwarzkopf drew on his own experiences and cross-cultural understanding to remedy the problem. He recalled what he had learned at the U.S. Department of State’s Foreign Service Institute about Arab culture and made an effort to build personal relationships and express an interest in their culture. He began to find doors opening and interlocutors willing to share confidences. On the Korean Peninsula, since the 1960’s, a truly combined staff with both U.S. and Republic of Korea (ROK) members has evolved into the Combined Forces Command. This integration with the Korean military continues by combining the two nations’ military personnel down to the level of the U.S. Second Infantry Division/ROK-US Combined division and the conduct of combined and joint exercises such as Ulchi Freedom Guardian.

With regard to wide area security (WAS) operations, one of the most successful stability operations in U.S. military history took place in Germany following World War II. The European Recovery Program, unofficially named the Marshall Plan after the U.S. Secretary of State at the time, George C. Marshall, involved participants from across the entire JIIM spectrum. The U.S. Army played an important supporting role along with a variety of U.S. services, departments and agencies, nascent German civil authorities, the other foreign occupying powers, and a range of international non-governmental organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

The National Guard frequently operated in a JIIM environment when working in the Disaster Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) community within the United States. Under the National Response Framework (NRF), the civilian run Incident Command System (ICS) is a common language and format that all local, state, and federal agencies must subscribe to in order to have a unified effort in addressing major incidents involving multiple agencies from the government and private communities. This common language, taught to all emergency responders through FEMA training, is the foundation of the JIIM environment in the DSCA arena. DSCA happens in three Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs): NORTHCOM, SOUTHCOM, and PACOM. During California floods in 1995 and 1997, California NG worked with different civilian incident commanders in their emergency operations centers coordinating military assets to fulfill desired capabilities to address particular problems during the event.

The National Guard is but one agency supporting the Incident Commander (IC), who for example in an emergency event in 1995 in California was a county Fire Chief. According to a California National Guard member, his role was to coordinate the missions directed by the incident commander. Some missions were to rescue personnel cut-off from access to


safety. Other missions were to support local law enforcement to provide security of evacuated areas. National Guard personnel were also tasked to work alongside Department of Public Works, Department of Water Resources, County Department of Transportation, State Department of Transportation, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Red Cross, the Salvation Army, California Highway Patrol, the Coast Guard, and many other agencies as part of the Unified Effort for disaster response and mitigation.15

**Historical Successes in JIIM Environment**

Operations in phase zero to shape the environment relate closely to WAS operations and ideally use a whole-of-government approach to create conditions favorable to the U.S. and its partners.16 They take place during peacetime, and combat commanders (CCDRs) seek to “deter war through military engagement and security cooperation activities” and accomplish these objectives through a variety of methods grouped under the umbrella term of security cooperation.17 According to joint doctrine, SC is the umbrella term for DOD activities that seek to encourage and enable international partners. According to joint doctrine, “SC has an overarching functional relationship with security assistance (SA), foreign internal defense (FID), security force assistance (SFA), security sector reform (SSR) and all DOD security related activities.”18

There have been two recent, but little known, U.S. Army success stories involving shaping operations: the Philippines and Colombia. Both were small-scale, economy-of-force operations in comparison to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The former was a SFA mission with direct action authorities conducted by Special Operations Forces (SOF), including Army SF with a supporting Security Cooperation effort. The latter, was a Security Cooperation effort with a supporting Special Forces FID mission.

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review described the operation conducted in the Philippines by the Joint Special Operations Task Force – Philippines (JSOTF-P) as a successful model of shaping operations.19 In the Philippines, an element deployed by the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) TSOC to the partner nation played an important role in improving the ability of the U.S. military to coordinate with the U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines and the country team. The deployment of a TSOC not only improved communications, but it also built trust with the country team and the partner nation. They achieved a degree of transparency and understanding that was not possible when the TSOC was operating just from its headquarters.20

In Colombia from 1943 to the present, U.S. Southern Command’s (USSOUTHCOM) forward-deployed Military Group (MilGrp) and the supporting Special Forces elements successfully conducted a building partner capacity operation with the Colombian military, transforming it from a barracks-based reaction force into a mobile military that was not only able to conduct combined arms operations against the FARC but also able to maintain wide area security during their nation building effort. Due to the continual and steady U.S. support of the Colombian’s whole-of-government effort, dubbed Plan Colombia, which began in 1999, the Colombian military has been able to increase its capabilities and reduce the insurgents of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to a point of entering into peace talks in 2012.21 The United States has realized the long-term strategic dividend on its investment. On July 2, 2008, the Colombian Military unilaterally, without direct U.S. participation, rescued three American hostages that had been held for over five years in the jungles of Colombia.22 Considered one of the greatest hostage rescues in history, Operation Jaque showed how a long-term US military investment in a willing country could develop capable partners who is not only capable of helping themselves out of a bad situation but can actually provide substantial support to the United States. Another more recent example of the return on the U.S. BPC investment is the U.S./Colombia Action Plan (USCAP). This program is leveraging gains in the Colombian military capability created from the United States support to Plan Colombia and using it to support other struggling partners in the region. USCAP is a U.S.-Colombian effort where the U.S. supports the logistics and funds Colombian engagements to share its experience and lessons learned.23 The effort is resulting in the improved ability of six Latin American countries (Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama) to reduce insecurity related to transnational organized crime organizations.24 This program has been so effective and influential in the regional security that it has gone from

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15. Author interview with LTC Zac Delwiche, previously served on G3 staff, 40th Infantry Division, California National Guard, April 18, 2016.
16. ASPG, 10.
19 events in the first BPC in 2013 to 108 events projected to occur in 2016.\textsuperscript{25} Although the United States is funding USCAP, the cost to send Colombians to Central America to train U.S. partners is much less than sending U.S. trainers. Additionally, it is more politically palatable to have Colombians instead of Americans conducing training within their nation's borders. The savings realized by having Colombians train Central American partners in 2016 should be considered a return on the U.S. Plan Colombia investment. Unfortunately, many leaders lack the knowledge and corporate memory to link the two efforts.

Both of these successful, but little-known, security cooperation operations had several common threads to their individual successes. First, both the Security Cooperation Offices of the relevant U.S. embassy and SOF units had institutional experience working in a JIIM environment and specifically trained their members to work in JIIM environments. This helped them to recognize and reinforce the need for the partner nation's commitment to be greater than that of the US commitment, or, in other words, ensuring that we did not want it more than they did. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) resources and Security Cooperation Officers in country with assigned military personnel are capable of building institutional rapport and executing synchronized security cooperation programs through their continual presence.

Both Colombian and the Philippine operations went to extremes, while working for the U.S. Ambassador in the JIIM environment, to coordinate with the country team in each country to ensure the military efforts contributed to the larger U.S. Embassy effort. Both operations involved building close relations with the partner nation counterparts, while the United States respected the sovereign rights of their partners. Another positive factor was the United States Army has had a long history of working with both Colombia and the Philippines. In 1951, the United States Army fought alongside the Colombian Army in Korea. The U.S. Army relationship with the Philippines dates back even further to 1901 when the Philippine Scouts were established as an actual U.S. Army unit. One cannot overstate the importance of a long history between two armies when it comes to collaborating.

The Long-Term Return on Investment in Partners

The United States of America recognizes the importance of BPC in its National Security Strategy (NSS) by stating that the US "will lead with capable partners."\textsuperscript{26} The NSS notes that in the current globalized world most problems need regional or global solutions because they transcend individual countries' borders. U.S. Army Doctrine Reference Publication No. 3-07 (ADRP 3-07) depicts four advantages of security cooperation: encouraging partners to assume lead roles in areas that represent common interests; prompting partners to increase their capability and willingness to participate in multinational coalitions; facilitating cooperation and interoperability with partner militaries and ministries of defense; spurring the military development of partner nations through training and education, concept development and experimentation, and security assessment.\textsuperscript{27}

BPC Successes

Building Partner Capacity not only helps the partner nation in its time of need, it can actually have a return on U.S. investment in the long term with the partner nation helping other countries in need once their situation becomes stable. The challenge is that this investment only pays off when both the United States and the partner nation are truly committed. El Salvador is a great example of a long-term return on a relatively small investment by the U.S. in security cooperation. In the 1980's, the U.S. Army committed a small number of U.S. advisors during their counter-insurgency operations against the guerrillas of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). The Government of El Salvador eventually defeated the insurgency and years later when the United States asked for assistance in Iraq, the Salvadorian government deployed a battalion in support of coalition efforts for six-and-a-half straight years. Most people are not quick to recognize the fact that U.S. support to El Salvador in the 1980’s created the strategic relationship which led to thirteen deployments by the Salvadorian Military to support the US-led coalition more than two decades later.

There is no different from U.S. assistance to El Salvador during their 1980's insurgency. U.S. Army and the U.S. Military writ large have had several success stories with BPC. The common characteristics of these successful programs were threefold. First, they were small in scale compared to the less successful operations such as Operation Enduring Freedom. Second,

\textsuperscript{25} United States Southern Command, Dialogo, 71.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.
the US commitment (although much smaller) extended for decades rather than years. Finally, and most importantly, the countries receiving support from the United States had a larger investment in the effort and wanted to resolve their own internal struggles more than the United States wanted it.

**BPC Setbacks**

In contrast to the two aforementioned successes, there have been several recent failures in large-scale, main-effort operations. Lieutenant General (Retired) and former Ambassador, Karl W. Eikenberry has stated, “Our track record at building security forces over the past 15 years is miserable.”

For example, U.S. military security force assistance directed at Syria has had little success. U.S. President Barack Obama acknowledged in a recent press conference that the train and equip program run by the DOD “has not worked the way it was supposed to.” The Commander of the Special Operations Command Central Command (SOCCENT) was also named Commander of the Combined Joint Interagency Task Force (CJIATF) – Syria. However, SOCCENT was neither located in Syria nor working with the military of a friendly partner nation with which it has had a previous established relationship.

The typical country team also no longer existed, although there was a Department of State (DoS) envoy for Syria. They were unable to operate inside Syria, so instead they tried to identify and screen Syrian resistance members and then train and equip them in multiple foreign locations such as Turkey and Jordan. This highlights the importance of the entire JIIM team not only working together but also doing so in the country with which they are trying to partner.

However, there were significant difficulties in taking this approach. Some of the U.S. trained fighters surrendered their U.S. supplied weapons and ammunition to an Al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria, the Al-Nusra Front. Subsequently, when the U.S. Congress determined that only “four or five” U.S. trained fighters were actually on the ground in Syria rather than the 5,000 planned for the $500 million that had been authorized, the Administration acknowledged it had failed and closed the U.S. military’s program. This effort by Central Command (CENTCOM) repeated some of the same errors they made in 2003 when they authorized $97 million of equipment to train and equip Iraqi resistance fighters. At that time, of the 6,000 names submitted by Iraqi opposition groups, the U.S. was able to vet just 622 of them, and only 73 fighters completed the training program conducted in Hungary.

Recent efforts at SFA with Iraq directed by the Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq (OSC-I) within the U.S. Embassy in Iraq have also had mixed results. An assessment by the DOD Inspector General determined a number of problems. The DoS and DoD disagreed on the OSC-I mission, describing it as not fully integrated into the embassy, which contributed to a lack of clarity, and identified both the CENTCOM Theater Campaign Plan and Iraq Country Plan as out of date. Despite the approximately $25 billion spent on training Iraqi troops up until 2011 and the fact they outnumbered the fighters of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) when attacked, four of the 14 Iraqi Army divisions abandoned their positions and fled Mosul and Tikrit in 2014.

Similar problems can even plague humanitarian assistance efforts. The U.S. deployed 3,000 U.S. military troops in late 2014 through 2015, at a cost of $360 million, to construct 11 treatment centers, at a total cost of $1.4 billion, for the Ebola mission in West Africa. However, Army medical personnel have treated only 28 patients in the centers and nine of the centers have not even had an Ebola case.

While one can see the inherent increased difficulty of conducting a security cooperation operation from afar without close coordination with a country team on the ground, recent programs conducted by the U.S. military in the partner nation have also had problems. Doctrine per JDN 1-13 notes, “SFA activities are part of the unified actions of the GCC and require interagency coordination.”

However, due to a poor understanding between the senior military leader and the Ambassador, sometimes this coordination within the JIIM has not taken place. In Iraq from 2003 to 2004, the offices of Presidential Envoy Paul Bremer and Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez were located in different buildings and they did not routinely coordinate with one another. In Afghanistan, contrary to expectations that the Ambassador, retired Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry and General Stanley McChrystal would get along together...
well due to their common military background, they did not.37 Captain Robert Newsom, who from 2010 to 2012 commanded the SOCCENT element in Yemen, said they were “deeply embedded with the embassy,” but also noted, “There was not a lot of cross-talk with respect to how everybody was seeing things.”38

A convoluted U.S. interagency process is not the only obstacle to effective capacity-building. Many factors in a partner nation may weaken U.S. security cooperation efforts. Senior members of the U.S. military who fail to adequately understand a partner nation’s interests and align U.S. efforts with them are more likely to produce poor results. Writing after the Syria Train and Equip Program had been suspended, Rosa Brooks, Counselor to the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy from 2009 to 2011, observed, “We consistently fail to understand that other people want to pursue what they see as their interests and objectives, not ours. We go into complex foreign conflicts with a profound ignorance of history, language, and culture; as a result, we rarely understand the loyalties, commitments, and constraints of those we train.”39 This echoes a point made above: We (the United States) cannot want it more than they (the partner nation) do.

Winning hearts and minds among local populations is a related challenge that requires JIIM coordination to influence popular perceptions of the legitimacy of coalition military and political operations. This attention to local attitudes permeates COIN doctrine,40 but it also applies across the ROMO and in all phases of a conflict. Information operations are a relatively cheap, indirect, and effective way for over-matched opponents to resist U.S. military operations. Often, at low cost and low risk, local forces opposing the presence of U.S. forces in a conflict zone can disseminate conspiracy theories and stoke resentments, which resonate with populations that feel disempowered, insecure, and even harassed. If successful, the opposing information campaign can undermine partner governments’ efforts to demonstrate a symbiotic relationship with coalition forces, making even humanitarian assistance and economic aid difficult to implement.

The U.S. and coalition partners working to build partner capacity through security cooperation need to bear in mind the sociopolitical environment of the partner nation, including the professional standing of the nation’s ground forces. Partner nation forces may have institutional weaknesses that transcend train-and-equip activities, especially if newly constituted, poorly resourced, or organizationally fragile. A culture of corruption or lethargy compromises the performance and sustainability of BPC activities.41 Confidence in public institutions increases through enfranchisement, transparency, and fairness. Corruption and cronyism undermine that confidence. The best ground forces are created by representative governments seeking voluntary security support from citizens who have a stake in the system, all within an effective governance framework. A complete approach to comprehensive security sector reform is essential to effective and legitimate security cooperation efforts. Moreover, when truly integrated with JIIM partners, this assistance can contribute to democratization and political modernization, as has happened in Korea and Japan.

Yet the Army and other DOD actors are often more interested in visibility than viability. Appearing to play a positive role and provide “quick wins” for local populations takes precedence over the long-term efforts of development agencies, which work to empower local populations to take charge of their own development.42 The tendency of the U.S. forces to take image-building command initiatives that are isolated from parallel efforts by JIIM partners can backfire unless balanced with civilian agencies’ more prudent, sustainable, and synchronized approach.

In recent operations, the Army’s preference for immediate action has led it astray. From the best intentions, the Army often moves out too fast and forgets about coordinating with its partners. For example, an Army Senior Leader commanding a Theater Special Operations Command demonstrates the initiative to socialize the deployment of a Special Operations Command without the Combatant Command gaining concurrence from the Department of State. An Infantry Brigade Commander, designated as a Battle Space Owner in Afghanistan, offers to help a local Afghan governor deliver seed to his agricultural constituents without going through USAID, the primary interlocutor. These two examples illustrate the tensions that can exist between strategic and operational initiative. Taking initiative in a tactical setting is inculcated in all Army officers at a young age, but in the JIIM environment it must be tempered by a deliberate, consensus-seeking approach, particularly when actions have repercussions at the strategic level. JIIM requirements now pervade the operational environment. This truth, coupled with the fiscal reality that is reducing the size of the Army, means that the unilateral approach is not viable.

41. For example, the weak resolve and suboptimal professionalism displayed by the Afghan National Security Forces and the Iraqi Security Forces in the face of significant threats are reflective of the long-term impediments to transforming partner militaries, which can often reflect the governance weaknesses of some host countries.
Based on recent performance in Iraq, Afghanistan, and (to a lesser extent) Syria, the U.S. Military must improve on its ability to work in the JIIM environment (especially the IIM portion). The Army can also improve on one of the major tasks it performs in support of the IIM, Security Cooperation. Although challenges occurred with the recent large-scale missions that were quickly stood up to attempt to support with a relatively unfamiliar partner, the has succeeded in several not well publicized smaller scale efforts with some long-term partners. The lessons learned in those successes can help improve Army efforts for future BPC endeavors.

Options to Policy Makers: Improving Army Effectiveness in JIIM

Army leaders must prepare their organizations to operate more effectively in supporting roles in the JIIM environment and ensure improved performance in conducting its core competencies as well as BPC tasks in coordination with JIIM partners. As noted by Dr. Leonard Wong, real culture change is not easy, and the key to success is to apply resources to key points in the Army institution. He contends that the focus of change should be on the leaders. Subordinates will then follow the example of their leaders.43 Senior Army leaders should model an increased attention to JIIM. By reinforcing the importance of JIIM through education, training, and assignments, leaders can begin to shape the can-do culture into one that better understands and can leverage the JIIM environment.

Training and education for all field grade officers and select company grade officers should include JIIM orientation. The recent trend is for decentralized deployments, and now it is not uncommon to see company commanders leading their company independently in a BPC operation in places such as the Baltics. For selected officers, the Army should supplement this with in-depth education and follow-on assignments in the JIIM environment. On the whole, the two most JIIM experienced specialties, Foreign Area Officer (FAO) and Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) personnel, must play an important role in this adjustment of the overall Army culture. Finally, in addition to the current Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) concept, recommend the Army establish Train, Advise, and Assistance (TAA) groups to work with the Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) to support each Geographic Combatant Command (GCC). They must also cooperate with existing National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) efforts in the relevant countries.

Recommendation: Change Army Culture to Improve JIIM Effectiveness

Given the fact that DoD policy dictates that the Army operate in a JIIM environment combined with the fact that the Army has improved its performance in joint operations, the Army must look for ways to improve their integration and efforts in the Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (IIM) environments. After conducting large-scale operations, mainly unilaterally, in Afghanistan and Iraq, recent doctrine now stresses the importance of taking the JIIM aspect of the environment into account. Current Army culture is part of the root cause of the Army’s challenges in operating in the IIM environment. These challenges are akin to the challenges the Army had in operating in the joint environment in the early 1980’s. As when the Army leadership took steps to improve performance in joint operations, it should now adjust existing Army culture to better integrate IIM partners.

In the post-Cold War period, approximately 300,000 soldiers departed Germany to return to U.S. posts. This redeployment ended the large-scale interoperability and cooperation practiced by U.S. Army units who partnered daily with NATO allies on the ground, weakening 40 years of cooperation with multinational military and civil partners. Recent experience has demonstrated the disadvantages of the Army’s modular approach to fighting wars. Through over a decade of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Army squandered hard-won expertise and insight through the rotation of large units and “random staff officers”, with the the result that the Army found itself constantly re-learning hard lessons and rebuilding relationships with key partners.44 This stands in stark contrast with Korea, where continuity has been a key element of Army engagement with its partners, and the Army has developed a robust JIIM culture that is supported by its structural approach.


Changing Army culture begins with educating leaders about JIIM and then assigning them where they have opportunities to exercise the knowledge and develop their skills and experience. Therefore, to improve the Army’s ability to work in the JIIM environment, training and opportunities must be provided to leaders causing the Army writ large to eventually improve its integration and ability to operate in a JIIM environment.

However, currently officer development prioritizes experience as a commander and primary staff officer in an army tactical unit substantially over assignments in the JIIM environment. According to the Department of the Army pamphlet on professional development and career management, at each rank jobs in tactical units of the Army are noted as Key Developmental (KD) positions. In contrast, the pamphlet describes assignments in the JIIM environment as “broadening.” Also, unlike joint duty, they are not required by law for promotion to general officer.

Looking at just general officers that came from the Engineer branch shows the importance for professional success of serving in the KD positions versus the broadening JIIM assignments. The Engineer branch is interesting because it’s many assignments in U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) positions are in the JIIM environment, and are intrinsic to the branch, but are not described as KD positions, and are listed as “broadening” assignments except for District Engineer positions, which are regarded as KD for colonels. USACE exemplifies JIIM opportunities given the routine interaction with agencies such as FEMA, Department of Transportation, USCG, EPA, other federal agencies, and states and local governments. Of 22 general officers that were promoted from the Engineer branch when they were colonels, 14 of them had commanded a tactical unit, and eight had served in an USACE position. That appears to favor those that have served in tactical units at a two to one ratio. However, as there are 36 USACE District Engineer positions and only 6 Engineer Brigade Commands at the time, the percentage of colonels from the JIIM environment District Engineer position who made general officer is actually much smaller.

The fact that prior efforts to change Army culture has succeeded is proof positive that the Army can adapt its culture to the current JIIM environment. The best recent example is the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 that improved the Army’s ability to “genuinely think jointly.” However, while the act succeeded in improving jointness between the armed services, it has not improved the Army’s ability to collaborate with either the U.S. interagency partners such as DoS and the USAID or foreign partners, the IIM component of JIIM. As noted by Rosa Brooks, many of the problems stem from misalignment of the Army’s interests and those of the JIIM partner. Understanding foreign interlocutors is the DoS’ premier mission. Being able to better leverage U.S. diplomats as national security partners will improve the Army’s ability to operate in the IIM environment and ensure its security cooperation efforts are fully integrated with the Interagency’s whole-of-government efforts.

Efforts to improve Army relationships with IIM partners should focus on the two key elements that made Goldwater-Nichols a success: doctrine and training. Joint doctrine currently stresses the importance of unity of effort. The Army must provide more unique training opportunities (fellowships, liaison positions, etc.) to practice and master the IIM tradecraft, including how to better cooperate with interagency partners like DoS. Exercises and training would include all agency members and should be done together to the extent practical to give officials from each government agency the chance to interact with other USG officials and gain an appreciation for their culture, mindset, and capabilities.

A recent Rand study highlighted interpersonal skills, adaptability, knowledge of their own and interlocutors’ capabilities, cultural awareness, and effective communication skills as most important. Something as simple as changing the vernacular when talking with IIM partners can significantly improve Army officers’ effectiveness.

Structural change is needed in leader education and related assignments. The adjusted process would be similar to how officers can attend any services’ senior school and be assigned to joint billets per the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Aligned incentives such as promotion to general officer and JIIM assignments would encourage leaders to fill these billets. A good current example of a senior officer who took such a path, including assignments in the JIIM environment before reaching general officer rank is General John Abizaid. Commissioned as an infantry officer, he was an Olmsted Scholar at the University of Jordan in Amman, served with the United Nations (UN) as operations officer for Observer Group Lebanon, as a tactical unit commander, and ultimately was assigned as the CENTCOM Commander. Using both structural change and proper incentives, new experiences and training may change the underlying assumptions of leaders and allow the creation of new JIIM-oriented values in Army culture.
The Army must restructure its current training for Field Grade officers to make it more conducive to preparing operational and strategic leaders to work in the JIIM environment. Army PME training opportunities, such as Intermediate Level Education (ILE) and Senior Service College (SSC), need to ensure that they help operational and strategic leaders understand that the JIIM environment is different than the tactical environment they worked in as a company grade officer. Some of the directive leadership skills learned during the basic and advance courses are not effective in the interagency environment, which values consensus building. Furthermore, the DoD primarily serves in a supporting role while operating in this environment. Whereas the tactical environment places a premium on timely action, effectiveness in the IIM environment requires consensus-building, which may necessarily delay action. Unilateral tactical military efforts move very quickly, while multi-lateral international relations efforts often take months and years to achieve.

All field grade Army officers should be given education in the basics of IIM operations and how to successfully operate in these environments when needed. Then those officers that show a propensity to work in the IIM environment should be specifically selected based on personality assessments and performance to undertake additional IIM training with a subsequent assignment in an IIM billet. The training need not be long and does not require establishing a new Army school. Also by sending some Army Officers at the field grade level to Department of State Professional and Area Studies Courses, Army officers can gain a greater understanding of the IIM environment in which they will work. They will also better understand the Department of State culture. Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) is taking a similar approach. Under the “Powell Initiative,” senior Army SF warrant officers serve in DoS regional bureaus. This also leverages regional and SOF experience to benefit both ARSOF and DoS.52

Upon completion of the training, the Army should have an increased number of officer level positions at DoS in functional bureaus such as International Narcotics and Law Enforcement or Arms Control, and geographic bureaus such as East Asian and Pacific affairs, as well as places like the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and NATO. The Army would have to resource this opportunity using existing billets. However, such professional exchanges would build institutional rapport while providing Army officers the opportunity to live and work in an environment, which is very difficult to learn without experiencing it first-hand.

Two Army specialties should be the basis for an Army-wide effort to build JIIM effectiveness in all of its leaders: the FAO cadre and ARSOF, consisting of Army Special Forces (SF), Civil Affairs (CA) and Military Information Support Operations (MISO) officers. FAO and SF personnel currently receive training to operate routinely with foreign partners and U.S. interagency elements. However, the Army’s current management of these leaders limits the benefits of their expertise, and this must change. Because SF is now a branch instead of an assignment, and secondary specialties such as FAO are single tracked rather than dual tracked career field officers, the JIIM skills of these personnel no longer return to regular tactical units. While FAO and ARSOF leaders continue to leverage their experience and subsequent assignments and flourish in the JIIM environment, their experiences are not shared with commanders of conventional units and headquarters. Conversely, other non-FAO/SF officers experienced challenges when placed in the JIIM environment. This is a case in which simple, inexpensive changes in the assignment of personnel can have outsized benefits for the Army.

Army culture also explains, in part, some of the challenges associated with working in a JIIM environment. For the most part, the doctrine exists on how the Army should operate in a JIIM environment. Nevertheless, as discussed in the culture section of this report, the Army clearly emphasizes Combined Arms Maneuver over other endeavors and rewards its personnel accordingly. The Army has improved its cultural mindset with respect to increasing the importance of cooperation in an international setting, but the buy-in has not been equal across the Army writ large.

Recommendation: Improve the Foreign Area Officer Program—the Army’s “Strategic Scouts”

Historically, the Army Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program has been successful in preparing officers to succeed in the JIIM environment, but there is room for improvement. Not all officers in the FAO program have excelled in the JIIM environment. They have multiple lines of accountability, serving both the U.S. ambassador and the geographic combatant commander overseas, and in many cases seeking close interaction with partner nation military commanders. FAOs are currently selected based on their performance in operational units and

language aptitude. The Army must ensure that incoming FAOs have requisite characteristics such as empathy, appropriate interpersonal skills, and a desire to live and work in foreign cultures, all in addition to the current criteria of language aptitude and operational performance.

One of the recent criticisms of Army senior leadership is that the institution loses many seasoned FAOs at the rank of colonel with only a few officers per year being promoted to general officer. Recently, the Army has promoted four of 210 FAO Colonels to the rank of Brigadier General. If Army leadership desires to retain senior FAOs and provide a pathway to general officer for a select few, which has been discussed for years, certain opportunities should be given to FAOs at the lieutenant colonel and colonel levels to make them competitive and give the requisite experience needed to serve at the flag officer level. The Army must create centrally selected command-like opportunities akin to brigade command for FAOs. Having a centrally selected command as a prerequisite to promotion to the next grade has almost become a mandatory requirement in today’s Army culture. Such opportunities could be select SDO/DATT positions in key countries with large programs, commanders of JTFs deployed in region (such as JTF-Bravo in Honduras), commanders of multi-national missions (such as the MFO-Sinai), and commandant of the premier FAO training institution, the Defense Language Institute. Not only would these opportunities make FAO colonels competitive for promotion, the Army would be better served by having an FAO in each of these positions given their language, cultural, and regional expertise.

Recommendation: Building the Army’s Regionally-Aligned Force Brigades

The current concept of RAF brigades has not come to fruition in quite the way the Army expected. The idea of having non-deployed forces partner with foreign counterparts to share lessons learned and provide each other with a unique training environment is a very valid concept as demonstrated by the success the National Guard has had with the State Partner Program (SPP). However, in contrast to National Guard personnel that remain affiliated with their state and its assigned partner country throughout their career, existing routine active component personnel assignment practices mean that members of the RAF brigades frequently rotate in and out of the units. These practices prevent soldiers in RAF brigades from developing significant area expertise.

One way to improve the concept for the active component is to switch from rotating a brigade combat team (BCT) in support of a GCC to developing instead a dedicated Security Force Assistant Brigade (SFAB) to support each regionally aligned corps that is recommended to come under a GCC. This unit would be approximately 250 personnel lead by an SF or FAO colonel and populated with a cadre of senior, staff sergeant and above, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), senior company grade, and field grade officers. The group would consist of a wide range of military occupation specialties (MOS) most commonly needed for BPC missions. All would attend an Army Advisor School and receive a designation as “advisor” in their official records. Additionally, there would be language training with billets being coded for specific levels ranging from 1/1 to 2/2. Individuals assigned to the group would be a program similar to the AFFPAK hands in which they would be assigned to the group for a normal assignment period, rotated back to a conventional unit, and then return to the SFAB. The group would have native translators permanently contracted, and augmented from active duty, National Guard, and reserve elements for specific BPC deployments. The SFAB would tie in with the State Partnership Programs, the relevant Special Forces Group, and the GCC’s TSOC and work in concert to build partner-nation capacity. The SFABs would also provide expandability in the event of general mobilization. Their members would form a cadre and with the addition of junior soldiers would form a light BCT.

Conclusion

Improving the Army’s performance in the JIIM environment is a subject of great importance because the current strategic environment demands a JIIM approach. The manning and budget constraints now faced by the Army also limit its ability to operate unilaterally and collaborating with JIIM partners can help mitigate some of those constraints. In order to gain the benefit of working with interagency and foreign partners, the Army must adjust its current can-do culture, or it will experience more failures. Army leaders must prepare their organizations to operate more effectively in supporting roles in the JIIM environment and ensure improved performance in conducting its core competencies as well as BPC tasks in coordination with JIIM partners. The Army can best achieve this by modifying the current Army culture to better account for the JIIM environment. Training and education for all field grade officers should include a more in-depth look at JIIM operations. For selected officers, the Army should supplement this with assignments in the JIIM environment in such places as the Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The two most JIIM experienced specialties, Foreign Area Officers and Special Forces personnel must play an important role in changing Army culture. Finally, in addition to the current Regionally Aligned Forces concept, we recommend establishing Train, Advise, and Assistance groups to support each GCC. These groups would operate in cooperation with existing National Guard State Partnership Program efforts in the relevant countries. The best way to change its culture is to work through its leaders via their education, training, and assignments.
THE UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Army Command Structure

I, after pushing for all of those years for governmental reform on Capitol Hill, now sit on the largest bureaucracy in government and I feel something like Captain Ahab. I have finally come face to face with the white whale that I’ve been chasing all these years and I’m lashed to it.

Secretary of Defense William Cohen, May 6, 1997

This section provides a proposal to make the Army’s command structure more efficient and effective through personnel productivity, consolidation, right-leveling, and right-layering. By analyzing the level of command above the division, but below the field army level, this report proposes the elimination of Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs), replacing them with corps headquarters under the operational control of Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs). The current Army command structure has ASCCs that are ineffective in meeting operational requirements given their current functions, tasks, and roles. Corps headquarters, with their embedded mission command capabilities, provide better support to Geographic Combatant Commanders and are preferred for employment as Joint Task Forces (JTFs) because of their operational focus and manning.

If adopted, this proposal would streamline mission command, address the Army’s desire for expeditionary mission command, simultaneously resource GCCs with operationally capable Army commands, provide hundreds of senior-level personnel for reallocation within the Army force structure, and address the National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA) recommendation to provide a mobile command post manned for wartime missions. When aligned with GCCs, the corps will be forward-deployed, regionally immersed, and more capable. This proposal also shortens the response time to deploy a JTF-capable mission command node.

Before proceeding, we should clarify what “efficiency” and “effectiveness” mean (and do not mean) in this context. The definition of efficiency in engineering is “the ratio of the useful energy delivered by a dynamic system to the energy supplied to it.” In the case of the DoD, the efficiency ratio is dollars in: military power out. In this sense, efficiency is synonymous with economic productivity, which the US Bureau of Labor Statistics defines as a measure of economic efficiency that

shows how efficiently “economic inputs are converted into output.”
However, seldom are military leaders persuaded of the merits of efficiency, despite the real-world constraints facing military budgets. Efficiency only addresses the way that dollars are spent, not the adequacy of the spending. A miniscule national defense with an annual budget of $50,000 could be considered efficient if it used the money to pay the salary of one soldier—a significant return on investment. Military leaders therefore tend to be more interested in effectiveness, defined as the quality of “producing a result that is wanted.” For the Army, real effectiveness is the ability to contribute to and achieve strategic objectives, regardless of the operational phase in which it is employed.

For the military, effectiveness is a binary construct to determine whether or not the outcome of an assigned mission represents success. While effectiveness absent efficiency is a poor use of limited resources, efficiency absent effectiveness is an abdication of the constitutional responsibility to provide for the common defense. If an element does not contribute to mission effectiveness in a manner commensurate with its cost, then it should be eliminated or consolidated. By this criterion, the Army command structure is ripe for readjustment for reasons we explore below.

**Personnel Productivity**

The first efficiency theme is personnel productivity improvements, which the DoD is already aggressively pursuing. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), authorized military and civilian positions for the Army Secretariat and Army Staff increased from 2,272 in FY2001 to 3,639 in fiscal year 2013 (just slightly off the peak of 3,712 authorized positions in FY2011). Although much of that staff is mandated by statute (e.g., Goldwater-Nichols), growth has exceeded authorizations. Then-Secretary of Defense Hagel mandated aggressive reductions to headquarters staffs, requiring a 20 percent cut, executed over five years (FY2015-FY2019). In a September 2015 memo, Secretary Ashton Carter extended the cuts, demanding a 25 percent reduction. Implicit in this guidance is that headquarters staffs will be expected to maintain (or improve) current levels of overall effectiveness. Thus, DoD is demanding increased productivity from military officers and civilians who will serve on these staffs.

Although it is too early to comment on the effects of reductions that have not yet taken place, anecdotal evidence suggests that downsizing staffs may actually improve performance, holding all else equal. Bureaucracies excel at creating work for themselves. The administrative elements of large, public organizations like the Army have a tendency to follow “Parkinson’s Law”, which holds that “[They] would be much the same size whether the volume of work were to increase, diminish, or even disappear.” As James Locher, an expert in DoD reform, recently testified, “Middle management is working hard but not to good effect. An internal Pentagon review I participated in a decade ago noted that members of middle management typically come to work early and stay late to produce papers and attend innumerable meetings, but lack a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities and are uncertain about the outcomes desired by senior leaders.” The corollary of Parkinson’s Law is that downsizing administrative staffs may yield significant productivity gains, as staff focus less on work demands created by other staffs and more on work demands created by national security requirements.

**Consolidation**

The second theme for gaining efficiencies in the Army is the consolidation of some elements of the organization. Large firms often have specialized organizational units that provide a unique service to the rest of the organization—think of Human Resources in a large corporation. The Army is no exception. Organizations can save money and retain effectiveness by combining redundant functional elements. Even the most ardent supporters of large headquarters acknowledge this reality.

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The Army and the DoD have significant opportunities to consolidate and remove certain organizational elements. The Army is good at growth. Given the Army’s recent commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is unsurprising that headquarters staffs have grown significantly since 9/11. However, reducing those same headquarters as the Army reduces its end-strength is proving to be more of a challenge. For example, the DoD maintains numerous organizations and systems for managing compensation, which can be consolidated with little disruption to operations. Although the Army lacks the authority to execute all of the needed reforms on its own, the Army can and should innovate in its internal headquarters structure. It should also advocate for broader reforms to the DoD that would thereafter gain it greater efficiencies.

Right-Leveling

The third efficiency theme is what we term “right-leveling” the organization. The Army has exhibited a tendency to increase the rank assigned to fill a given position within the organization, especially within the larger headquarters seen recently. Over time, this results in a force structure whose cost is out of balance with its operational capability. The possible reasons for this tendency are multifold: increases in joint billets, coalition operations in which an Army officer must exceed a certain rank, and other operational demands. The result is an inflated organizational structure where both the rank and ratio of officers are higher than required. Because senior personnel are expensive and require more staff to support them, an Army that is leveled too high cannot afford enough lower-level personnel. The following table illustrates how U.S. Army leader-to-led ratio has decreased as the officer corps has grown (as a percentage of the force) over the past 60 years.

Table 5.1: U.S. Army Leader-to-Led Data, 1955-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total AC</th>
<th>Total Enlisted</th>
<th>Total Officers</th>
<th>Led to Leader Ratio*</th>
<th>Officers as % of Total Force</th>
<th>Total W01-CW5, 01-04 % of Total AC</th>
<th>Total 05 and Above</th>
<th>05 and above, % of Total AC</th>
<th>05 and up % of Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>1,109,296</td>
<td>987,349</td>
<td>121,947</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>103,661</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>18,286</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>873,078</td>
<td>771,842</td>
<td>101,236</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>84,562</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>16,674</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>969,066</td>
<td>856,946</td>
<td>112,120</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>93,976</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>18,144</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1,322,548</td>
<td>1,155,827</td>
<td>166,721</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>144,350</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>22,371</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>784,333</td>
<td>681,341</td>
<td>102,992</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>86,642</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>16,350</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>777,036</td>
<td>678,319</td>
<td>98,717</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>82,513</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>16,204</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>780,787</td>
<td>671,100</td>
<td>109,687</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>93,587</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>16,100</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>732,403</td>
<td>627,905</td>
<td>104,498</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>89,301</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>15,197</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>508,559</td>
<td>426,020</td>
<td>82,539</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>69,405</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>13,134</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>482,170</td>
<td>405,503</td>
<td>76,667</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td>64,393</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>12,274</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>492,728</td>
<td>411,072</td>
<td>81,656</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
<td>68,440</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>13,216</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>566,045</td>
<td>471,917</td>
<td>94,128</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
<td>79,803</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>14,325</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>491,365</td>
<td>396,755</td>
<td>94,610</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td>80,896</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
<td>13,715</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Led to Leader Ratio is Total Enlisted/Total Officers. Officers include Warrants.

14. The GAO reported in 2014 that it was unable to obtain accurate estimates for the full cost of a General or Flag Officer, due to the poor tracking of costs associated with those positions—advises, travel, official representation, etc.
15. Manpower data courtesy of the Defense Manpower Data Center.
The Army has periodically attempted to redress the imbalance in the leader-to-led ratio and grade-plate and to gain efficiency and effectiveness in the process, including a major review in 2011. Although a thorough review of grade plates in the Army is not feasible for this study, it is an essential part of building an efficient future Army. Without addressing this problem, the Army will continue to overpay for its force structure, and it will lose more structure than it needs to. Neither the Army nor the nation can afford to make this mistake.

**Right-Layering**

The final efficiency theme concerns the hierarchy of the Army. The linkage between hierarchy and unity of command, one of the nine enduring principles of warfare, is tight. Organizational structure exists to support operations and derives from the idea that an operation must have one officer in command. Because of the complexity of warfare, a commander cannot personally oversee all of the elements requiring coordination because he or she has a limited "span of control" (defined as the number of subordinates directly reporting to a leader).

Within the Army, military operational command rests at eight levels, beginning at the bottom: Squad, Platoon, Company, Battalion, Brigade, Division, Corps, and Numbered Army. Extending to joint command, above the Numbered Army is the Geographic Combatant Commander, the Secretary of Defense, and the President. Each level has a place in decision making and execution, which slows implementation and complicates coordination. The Army’s command structure was developed and refined in the Second World War, and has remained largely unchanged since then. The joint command structure reflects changes made under the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Does it make sense for an Army with 60 combat brigades to have three echelons of command between the brigade and the Combatant Command that they support? Are all of these layers necessary for effective military operations?

This report argues that some layers must be combined in order to promote greater efficiencies, but that “right-layering” need not sacrifice operational effectiveness. The Army can remove layers of command while still providing overwhelming power to the joint force. Specifically, the separation of administrative control (ADCON) and operational control (OPCON) functions should be married into one properly tailored headquarters that has OPCON, in order to be more responsive and more capable for the supported combatant commander.

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19. Army Regulation 10-87. Army Commands, ASCCs, and Direct Reporting Units. Department of the Army, 4 September 2007, 1.
Within this structure, the Army’s nine ASCCs fit into two broad categories: geographic and functional. All ASCCs “exercise command and control under the authority and direction of the combatant commanders to whom they are assigned.” Geographic ASCCs support Unified Campaign Plan-identified combatant commands and serve as “the Theater Army (and) as an Army Service Component Command reporting directly to Department of the Army and serving as the Army’s single point of contact for combatant commands.” The functional ASCCs provide certain capabilities and executive agency functions for JIIM partners, as detailed in the chapter on Army requirements. In contrast, the corps and divisions provide the Army’s operational and tactical forces. Army doctrine establishes the relationships of these headquarters to each other:

The theater army integrates landpower with other deterrent capabilities. The corps represents an operationally significant Army force capable of altering the land balance of forces in each geographic combatant command. The division is the tactical hammer, translating operational-level plans into offensive, defensive, and stability tasks on the ground.

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21. Ibid.
22. Army Regulation 10-87, 1. Geographic ASCCs include U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR), U.S. Army Central (USARCENT), U.S. Army North (USARNORTH), U.S. Army South (USARSO), U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), and U.S. Army Africa (USARAF).
23. Ibid, 1.
24. Ibid, 1.
other line of authority is administrative, also beginning with the President and flowing through the Secretary of Defense but devolving to the Service Chiefs. This is how the services fulfill their Title 10 functions to organize, man, and equip forces to support the joint fight.

Command Relationships: ADCON and OPCON

To execute their responsibilities, Army units have established command relationships:

HQDA, ACOMs, ASCCs, and DRUs contribute to the Title 10, United States Code (USC) support of all Army organizations through administrative control (ADCON). The ADCON relationship conveys the authority necessary to exercise the Secretary of the Army's (SA) Title 10 USC responsibilities as authorized. ADCON is the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions.27

Furthermore, because the Army is a provider of capabilities to the joint force, “All operational Army forces are assigned to combatant commands. Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) exercise Combatant Command (COCOM) authority over these forces.28 The CCDR normally delegates OPCON of Army forces to the ASCC. ASCCs are generally delegated ADCON by the SA for Army forces assigned to the CCDR.”29 A closer look at each layer and headquarters role is important to set the context for the delayering proposal.

The Role of the ASCC

The theater Army, or Army Service Component Command, “[Executes] service-specific requirements for equipping, sustaining, training, unit readiness, discipline, and personnel matters,” and “Determines the most effective and efficient distribution of service responsibilities.”30 The Army’s mission statement for ASCCs is clear:

In peacetime and wartime, the geographical Theater Army Headquarters (ASCC) is responsible for administrative control (ADCON) of all Army forces in the Area of Responsibility (AOR); integrates Army forces into the execution of theater engagement plans; and provides Army support to joint forces, interagency elements, and multinational forces as directed by the GCC. Performs operational level functions for land forces within a joint campaign in addition to Theater Army Headquarters responsibilities.31

27. Army Regulation 10-87, 1.
28. Define COCOM
The Army Service Component Commands have additional key responsibilities. The Secretary of the Army designates them as the operational-level Army forces of a combatant command. ASCCs have administrative control authority and responsibility on behalf of the Secretary of the Army and exercise operational control over Army forces as delegated by the CCDR in their area of responsibility. They support all joint, multinational, and interagency elements in the area of responsibility. When directed, they serve as a Joint Force Land Component Command (JFLCC) or Joint Task Force for command and control of joint and/or coalition forces. Army Service Component Commands are not fully manned for their potential wartime mission, but with additional joint augmentation provided by an approved Joint Manning Document (JMD), the organization provides a fully functional operational level headquarters capable of effectively commanding and controlling joint and/or coalition forces engaged in sustained military operations.32

Advantages of the ASCC

Advocates for the Army Service Component Commands argue the commands perform functions specified in the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act by executing a variety of statutory Title 10 United States Code service administrative functions while simultaneously ensuring proper coordination with HQDA.33 ASCCs also provide an advantage to combatant commands because they are “entirely focused on the region and have built relationships” over an extended period of time, typically through the large foreign area officer staffs.34 Additionally, because they are immersed in the region they support theater engagement, campaign planning, and other phase zero activities.35

Army Service Component Commands may also provide the advantage of having a globally responsive and regionally engaged mission command node responsive to a combatant commander’s priorities and requirements.36 As such, ASCC advocates argue its continuous presence in theaters allows for better support to extended operations that sometimes cross unified campaign plan boundaries and ensures readiness conditions in areas of responsibility.37 These requirements are addressed by the work of logistics professionals in Theater Support Commands (TSCs) and the varying activities that occur under the umbrella of theater security cooperation.38 Additionally, due to their Title 10 responsibilities, Army Service Component Commands may also serve a role as transformation platforms due to their links to training, equipping, and fielding.39

In discussing the Army Service Component Command and its role as a theater Army, it is important to address the possible role as a JFLCC headquarters. Joint doctrine is clear that the joint force commander, when appropriate, can establish a Joint Force Land Component Command when “forces from two or more military departments must operate in the same dimension.”40 The JFLCC can “integrate planning; reduce their span of control; and/or significantly improve combat efficiency, information flow, unity of effort, weapon system management, component interaction, or control over the scheme of maneuver” and ensure the “proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking land forces.”41 Army Service Component Commands, with augmentation to their staffs, could perform this role and subsequently provide tailor able, functional, and organized subordinate commands across the joint force and other services. An example of this occurred during Desert Shield as Army Central’s (ARCENTs) staff grew from 222 active component personnel to over 1,000 personnel in seven months while also supervising 72,000 theater level troops that supported two corps and one Marine Expeditionary Force.42 In short, Army Service Component Commands have the advantage of regional focus, continuous engagement or immersion in an Area of Responsibility, and provide an operational mission command node only with augmentation. This is telling because it introduces doubt as to whether these capabilities are only achievable with the current Army command structure and ASCC organizational construct.

32. Army Regulation 10-87, 4-13.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. U.S. Army War College. History of Landpower. Course slides. 2015
Limitations of the Army Service Component Command

In light of its mission and prescribed advantages, it is critical to look at the limitations of the Army Service Component Command. This is also important given the four operational imperatives previously presented in this study’s analysis of the strategic environment. If the Army must defeat and deter, operate in gray spaces, plan and prepare for stability operations, and build partner capacity, it should reorganize its command structure.

The limitations of the theater Army headquarters are well-established, including a lack of mobility, the inability to provide personnel to other elements without degrading its own capability, the inability to command without augmentation. Army Service Component Commands also depend extensively on augmentation from U.S.-based reserve elements, significantly slowing their responsiveness to urgent operational requirements. Crucially, the theater army is not designed, organized, or equipped to function as a combined forces land component command or a field army in major combat operations, and does not exercise operational control over corps and larger formations.

These limitations reveal that the Army Service Component Command needs extensive augmentation, is not mobile, and requires multi-component support to achieve many of its requirements. The administrative and service related functions, many of those tied to budgetary processes, are significant but not enough to outweigh the operational necessity and support to the joint force. Advocates point to setting the theater, support to security cooperation and building partner capacity, and the persistent presence of a Joint Force Land Component Command-capable headquarters, but the acknowledged limitations reflect otherwise. This is even more concerning given the Army strategy for global mission command of Army forces relies on the modular corps headquarters to mission command major operations instead of theater armies.

But with the Army’s corps currently not forward located and hence less timely to deploy, not regionally focused, and not immersed in the Geographic Combatant Commander areas of responsibility, is the Army taking too much risk in its ability to rapidly and decisively project forces for joint requirements?

Army leaders are clearly worried about this risk, acknowledging in March 2016 that the Army must rebuild its ability to deploy quickly into contested areas. This leads to the question of the role of the corps and whether right-layering should consider a different approach.

The Role of the Corps

The role of the Army corps, in contrast to that of the Army Service Component Command, is described in Army Field Manual 3-94:

The Army corps is the Army’s most versatile headquarters. The corps must be as adept at planning a rapid noncombatant evacuation operation as supporting a multiyear major combat operation. The Army corps is deployable and scalable to meet almost every requirement of the combatant commander for a senior level headquarters. The corps now functions as the principal integrator of land-power into campaigns and is the link between the operational and tactical levels of war.

44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Emmons, Transforming the Army Service Component Command to a Theater Army.
As a warfighting operational level headquarters, the preference for using corps is also clear in Army doctrine:

The Corps is the preferred Army headquarters for joint augmentation and employment as a JTF. As a joint or multinational land component command, an Army corps headquarters commands multiple Army divisions, brigades, and other formations, and multinational forces and organizations. The corps headquarters often functions as the ARFOR (Army Forces - a senior headquarters) for deployed Army forces, exercising command over Army forces in a joint operations area and prioritizing the extensive support provided by the theater army against the tactical needs of joint and multinational forces.49

Corps headquarters provide the requisite command and control structure for subordinate divisions and brigades to meet Geographic Combatant Commander requirements.50 History also provides evidence of the central role the corps has played in operational warfighting, with examples ranging from I Corps’ support to General Douglas MacArthur in Korea in 1950, V and VII Corps’ service in Germany to deter the conventional Soviet threat during the Cold War, XVIII Airborne Corps’ central role in Operation Just Cause in Panama in 1989, the multiple corps that were the thunder and lightning of Operation Desert Storm in early 1991, and the rotation of corps to serve as operational level headquarters in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom in Iraq and Afghanistan respectively.51 Currently, the Army corps retains this decisive role, and is an “essential element of the Army’s expeditionary capabilities,” capable to deploy combined arms forces, operate effectively upon arrival, seize the initiative, and accomplish the mission.52

With today’s strategic environment being “more modern, mobile, and lethal,” and having increasingly less time to respond to regional crises, is the corps the answer for joint requirements and service responsibilities for expeditionary mission command instead of the ASCC? One may argue that a corps is not regionally aligned so it would have limited regional knowledge and expertise, and lacks established, habitual relationships in a theater. The corps therefore has to learn things that the ASCC would know as a matter of course. Furthermore, the corps may have to respond to persistent requirements outside the theater, including a different higher headquarters in Army Forces Command, in addition to the Geographic Combatant Command. and that the brink of crisis is the wrong time to introduce a new headquarters that must deploy, establish mission command nodes and a logistics footprint and infrastructure, all causing added time and delay.53 Given the existing structure, authorities, and responsibilities, all of the aforementioned objections are legitimate. Yet none of these challenges is insurmountable. Indeed, in right-layering its command structure, the Army would realign formations and functions to achieve regional long-term relationships, synergistic combat power, timely application of forces to joint requirements, and similar working relationships to what the Army Service Component Commands have now

The ASCC and the Corps: A Tale of the Tape

The following tables compare the Army Service Component Command and the corps to provide a closer look at the basic functions, roles, and tasks to highlight the differences between the two types of headquarters. A comparison of the basic functions of the ASCC and corps (Table 5.3) demonstrates why some favor the Army Service Component Command role to do service specific requirements and set the conditions so the corps can focus on operational warfighting.

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49. Ibid, 1-6, 1-7.
However, the underlying assumption that a corps cannot or should not do these functions simultaneous to warfighting is not proven. As the Army’s preferred operational integrator, the corps could do Army Service Component Command functions more efficiently because they would be under the integration of a single command.

A comparison of the roles of the ASCC and corps (Table 5.4) shows the redundancy in the established roles of the Army Service Component Command and corps. Like ASCCs, corps coordinate with Army and joint forces, plan for contingency operations, tailor Army forces, plan for and conduct RSOI, exercise administrative control and operational control of forces, and prepare to serve as JTFs or JFLCCs in Geographic Combatant Commander areas of responsibility.

### Table 5.3: Comparison of the Basic Functions – ASCC vs Corps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>ASCC</th>
<th>Corps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land Component</td>
<td>Sets the conditions for effective use of land forces</td>
<td>Applies land forces as a component of a campaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Force</td>
<td>Matches Army capabilities to joint requirements; makes recommendations to the CCDR on allocation and employment of Army forces</td>
<td>Translates objectives into ground force missions to achieve joint mission; employs Army forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Area of Operations Role</td>
<td>Oversees the arrival of forces into theater Reception Staging Onward Integration (RSOI)</td>
<td>Sets the conditions for tactical use of Army and multinational forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perspective</td>
<td>Ensures soldiers receive required support in the AOR</td>
<td>Integrates land forces with other domains to dominate in land AOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Responsibility to the Joint Force</td>
<td>Logistics, CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear)</td>
<td>Dependent; may assume this responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tailored Army Force Packages (composition, size, timing, command and support relationships)</td>
<td>Plans and Requests</td>
<td>Has assigned to the Corps</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 5.4: Comparison of the Roles – ASCC vs Corps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASCC</th>
<th>Corps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theater army for the geographic combatant command to which it is assigned.</td>
<td>Provide the ARFOR within a joint force for campaigns and major operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF headquarters (with augmentation) for a limited contingency operation in an AOR.</td>
<td>Serve as a JTF headquarters (with augmentation) for crisis response and limited contingency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint force land component (with augmentation) for a limited contingency operation in an AOR.</td>
<td>Serve as the joint or multinational land component command headquarters (with augmentation) in campaigns and major operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Serve as a tactical headquarters commanding 2 to 5 Army divisions together with supporting brigades and commands in campaigns and major operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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54. Army Field Manual 3-94, 2-1 to 2-15, 4-1 to 4-12.
55. Ibid.
Similarly, a comparison of the two headquarters’ tasks (Table 5.5) raises questions about the need for both structures.

**Table 5.5: Comparison of the Tasks – ASCC vs corps**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASCC</th>
<th>Corps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serve as the primary interface between the Department of the Army,</td>
<td>Command Marine Corps and multinational brigades and divisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army commands, and other ASCCs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop Army plans to support the theater campaign plan within that</td>
<td>As a supported component, integrate supporting joint capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR.</td>
<td>with land forces within a joint operations area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tailor Army forces for employment in the AOR.</td>
<td>As a supporting component, integrate Army capabilities with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>supported component operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control RSOI for Army forces in the AOR.</td>
<td>Exercise ADCON over Army forces in a joint operations area as</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>specified by the ASCC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercise OPCON of deployed Army forces not subordinated to a joint</td>
<td>Integrate special operations forces (SOF) with conventional force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>force commander (JFC).</td>
<td>operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercise administrative control (ADCON) of all Army forces operating</td>
<td>Provide ASOS as required by the JFC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>within the AOR.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide support as directed by the combatant commander to other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service forces, multinational forces, and interagency partners.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercise OPCON of all joint forces attached to it as either a joint</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>force land component</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>command or JTF headquarters, as required by the combatant commander.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide planning in support to the GCC’s strategic planning, theater</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>campaign plan, theater posture plan, theater security cooperation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>plans, theater global force management planning, deliberate plans,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and crisis action planning.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Recommendations:**

**Eliminating the ASCCs and Empowering Corps**

This section has examined the Army Service Component Commands and corps in an effort to find increased efficiency and effectiveness as part of right-layering command structure above the brigade level. By comparing functions, roles, and tasks of the Army Service Component Command and the corps, the ASCCs forward location, regional immersion, and mission command capabilities are not solely unique. This report advocates that a different approach could position the corps to achieve timely and rapid application of land forces to joint requirements and crisis situations while achieving regional immersion and knowledge, closer linkage to Geographic Combatant Commander planning and operations, with a more capable JTF and JFLCC-capable headquarters.

This recommendation has three parts. First, reinvigorate and empower the corps headquarters and place them under the operational control of combatant commanders. Second, dissolve ASCCs and merge the Title 10, service and operational control responsibilities under the corps headquarters. Third, assign Army and National Guard divisions, separate brigades and cavalry regiments to each corps in support of joint force requirements.

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56. Ibid.
Reinvigorate Corps Headquarters

As an alternative to Army Service Component Commands, six field army corps could be reactivated, reconstituted, and assigned to Geographic Combatant Commanders as described below. Placing these corps under the operational control of the combatant commanders streamlines the chain of command and the employment of Army forces. It also addresses one of the Army’s “Big-8” initiatives unveiled in March 2016: Expeditionary Mission Command. Corps would remain assigned to the Department of the Army, which would retain much of its current roles and missions to train, organize, and equip Army formations and where necessary reallocate Army forces under the six reinvigorated corps to meet joint and combatant commander requirements. These forward-deployed, regionally-immersed, efficient, and capable corps headquarters would be more responsive to joint requirements while providing more capable ground forces. Corps commanders, embedded with a Geographic Combatant Commander higher headquarters, would be responsible for operations ranging from security cooperation in phase zero to planning and execution of decisive operations in phase 3 and to post-conflict resolution in phases 4 and 5. In addition, the corps headquarters would also be responsible for the Title 10 functions of Army forces in the geographic area of responsibility. This recommendation also addresses Army leaders’ concerns that the Army’s approach to deployment during the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts “is not useful for the world we live in now.”

With a reinvigorated corps headquarters serving as both an operational and Title 10 organization, ASCCs can be eliminated and efficiencies gained in budget, personnel (around 300 to 1,500 AC personnel), facilities, tasks/roles/missions, and mission command. Eliminating Army Service Component Commands in favor of more capable Joint Task Force headquarters, like a corps, is not a new idea. Mr. Jim Thomas, Vice President for Studies, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, in describing relooking the unified campaign plan and Geographic Combatant Commander headquarters, testified to the Senate that:

The existing Service Component Commands would be disestablished and replaced with Joint Task Forces focused exclusively on warfighting preparation or execution. In many respects, this would simply acknowledge what has already become a reality: the current Regional Combatant Commands do not normally conduct operations, but rather farm them out to subordinate Joint Task Forces or commands.

Corps would grow minimally in size to accommodate new missions, however, the loss of the Army Service Component Command would equal force structure savings in addition to increasing agility in the use of Army forces and efficiencies in roles and missions. Currently, ASCCs execute Title 10 functions for the Army and serve as service component commands that support the combatant commands. Corps serve as three-star, JTF-capable headquarters with Training, Readiness, and Oversight (TRO) of multiple subordinate commands. TRO and Title 10 can be combined to increase efficiency in all areas and more effectively and easily use Army forces.

The force allocations would be as follows. In the Pacific theater, United States Army Pacific (USARPAC, with about 525 AC personnel) would be dissolved and its roles and missions transferred to I Corps, which would forward reposition to Hawaii. I Corps would be under the operational control of United States Pacific Command (PACOM). For United States Central Command (CENTCOM), III Corps would be placed under operational control of United States Army Central (ARCENT, with about 681 AC personnel) would stand down. In Europe, V Corps would be reconstituted out of the United States Army Europe (USAREUR) Army Service Component Command staff, with no or limited growth in headquarters size, and operational control would go to United States European Command (EUCOM). For United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), VI Corps would be reconstituted at Joint Base San Antonio (San Antonio, Texas) out of the United States Army South (USARSO) ASCC staff, with no or limited growth


in headquarters size, and its operational control would be given to SOUTHCOM. VII Corps would be reconstituted at Vicenza, Italy out of the United States Army Africa (USARAF) ASCC staff, with no or limited growth in headquarters size, and under the operational control of United States Africa Command (AFRICOM). Finally, XVIII Airborne Corps would be available for worldwide global response force and joint forceable entry requirements, under operational control of United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM). United States Army North (ARNORTH, with about 264 AC personnel) would be dissolved.

As a result of these changes, all Army Service Component Commands and the theater Army construct would be eliminated and their roles, missions, and resources consolidated under six Army corps. The Army's six corps would assume Title 10 functions and one operational command would integrate Army capabilities and synchronize Army support to combatant commands.

In implementing these changes, the Army should assign its 18 operational divisions, separate brigades and cavalry regiments, and brigade combat teams, as needed, to each of these six Corps. An example of allocation from the Army to these corps could be:

- I Corps: 25th Infantry Division (ID), 2nd ID, 34ID (ARNG), 40ID (ARNG) and other and Reserve Subordinate Units
- III Corps: 1st Cavalry Division, 1st Armored Division, 36th ID(ARNG), 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment and Associated Reserve Subordinate Units
- V Corps: 4th ID, 28th ID (ARNG), 38th ID (ARNG), 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade and Associated Reserve Subordinate Units
- VI Corps: 10th Mountain Division, 42nd ID (ARNG), and Associated Reserve Subordinate Units
- VII Corps: 1st ID, 35th ID (ARNG), and Associated Reserve Subordinate Units
- XVIII Airborne Corps: 82nd Airborne Division (Global Response Force), 101st Airborne Division, 3rd ID, 29th ID (ARNG), and Reserve Subordinate Units

With six corps, the Army would redistribute roles and missions from its three Theater Support Commands (TSCs) to ensure theater opening and closing logistics capabilities are present in support of each combatant command. The three Active Component TSCs would remain where they are and the Army would allocate the two Army Reserve and one National Guard TSC to support SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM, as necessary. TSCs working for the corps will assume the Army Service Component Command role for setting the theater and readiness conditions.

Currently, the five active duty Special Forces Groups assigned to 1st Special Forces Command as part of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command are regionally aligned and tactical control is given to combatant commanders under the direction of the regional Special Operations Commands (e.g. SOCCENT, SOCPAC). There should be no change to this command and support relationship, and effectiveness of the corps would increase with greater involvement in phase zero, building partner capacity, and security cooperation, augmented by regional immersion and knowledge.

This recommendation increases the Army's strategic and operational agility. Corps are the preferred operational entity and the minimal level required to integrate capabilities and synchronize operations for joint operational tasks. Corps are Joint Task Force-capable, and they are best positioned to integrate warfighting functions, air, special forces. The corps should be resourced, trained, organized, and structured to meet region-specific threats and support peacetime shaping activities, all under the operational control of the combatant command and therefore more responsive to combatant commander requirements. There is a cleaner linkage between the combatant commander headquarters to the corps headquarters for employment of Army forces. This streamlines the relationship between the supported and supporting commands, enabling better execution of mission command and prioritizes support to the joint force.

This recommendation is also important to consider in light of the recent report of the National Commission on the Future of the Army. Recommendation 19 in the report states:

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60. Hawaii for PACOM, North Carolina for CENTCOM, and Europe for EUCOM and AFRICOM.
The Army should ensure Combatant Commands (COCOM) and Army Service Component Commands (ASCC) have the ability to provide operational mission command in proportion to the unique mission for each COCOM. The Army should consult closely with COCOM and ASCC commanders to assess the risks entailed in mission command changes and seek to minimize risk where possible when implementing hem.61

Subsequently, the Army acknowledged the requirement as one of thirteen that “potentially or likely requires a restructuring of the current force, and additional end strength and/or funding to effectively implement.”62 The option of using a corps structure and “right-layering” by eliminating the Army Service Component Command addresses this problem. This recommendation is also appropriate considering ASCCs will be affected by a mandatory change in force structure reducing mission command capabilities.63

Increased Mission Command Agility

Agility in planning and execution comes with the commanders and planning staff immersed in the current situations and aware of its day-to-day developments. With our suggested arrangement, the corps and divisional planners and their commanders would stay abreast of developing strategic scenarios. They would remain familiar and oriented with their prioritized operational and strategic contingencies. Contingency planning would reduce the precious time spent in the planning process. The brigade commanders, in turn, would also remain aware of their division’s operational orientation and planning, thus better able to guide the battalion commanders about the evolving operational thought. The finer interpersonal and inter-headquarters relationships of mission command would begin to take root in peacetime.

In this manner of planning and execution, division commanders would always be fully current with their corps’ contingencies and the be-prepared tasks under other corps or combatant commands, thus enabling them to easily step up to take independent operational or strategic assignments in case of need. In the long-run, the enhanced orientation to the likely area of responsibility or area of operations, maintained and transferred from one set of planners and commanders to the other over an extended period, should foster a culture of better understanding of the strategic and operational dynamics. This approach inculcates strategic and operational agility much better than throwing forces ad hoc into a threat environment, and expecting the commanders and planning staff to execute the planning process and operational design without the deep familiarity required to mount effective operations in a complex environment.

What this Recommendation is Not

The Army’s recent history with reorganizational efforts may raise fears that this recommendation is a return to calls for a flatter structure, erosion of the chain of command, and multiplication of direct reporting units in the Army. An organization should have a structure that does not overwhelm the span of control of its leaders, and eliminating ASCCs would have a minimal effect on span of control. These recommendations are clearly not a return to unencumbering units and not a decoupling of leaders in the chain of command. Brigades will still work for divisions, which will still work for corps, and corps will retain a responsibility to the Army through FORSCOM. What is new is the removal of a layer and the addition of Army combat power in corps and divisions being more readily accessible to the Geographic Combatant Commanders. Aligned corps will be forward-positioned, regionally-immersed, and responsible for phase zero tasks while simultaneously more integrated with joint planning, exercises, and transformation efforts.

There are questions that remain stemming from this recommendation that need additional analysis, though none of them derail implementation if the Army chooses this solution. First, there is a broader discussion needed of the role of all service component commands in the joint structure. U.S. Air Force and Navy numbered air forces and fleets already do this in most instances. Second, in a scenario where the Army might have to employ two corps to defeat a threat, how would the Army resource a land component command to oversee all land operations? With extensive augmentation, current Army

63. LTG Michael X. Garrett, Commander’s 100 Day Assessment and USARCENT/ CFLCC Way Ahead (U.S. Army Central, Shaw Air Force Base, SC, March 10, 2016), 2.
Service Component Commands could fulfill this. However, with six manned corps that are mobile, expeditionary, and do not need extensive augmentation, the Army would have resources from which to create a land component command requirement. Reallocation of forces between Geographic Combatant Commanders would otherwise be required in a conflict requiring two corps, which would probably signify an imminent national security priority. Last, the Army would need to seek approval and address any issues with host nations of forward deployed corps, for example the restructuring of headquarters in Europe proposed in this recommendation.

Conclusion

In closing, the Army must not remain stagnant in the face of a daunting strategic environment. The Army can re-examine its command structure to improve efficiency and effectiveness either through personnel productivity, consolidation, right-leveling, or right-layering. The Army must re-examine and reevaluate its command structure and consider right-layering its formations to ensure readiness to deal with the risks of the strategic environment. The Army’s ability to lead with an expeditionary mission command node that has capacity, capability, and resources is critical in order to meet emerging contingencies in a highly volatile world. A forward positioned, regionally engaged, and operationally ready Corps headquarters with its assigned divisions and brigades provides more efficient and effective options to the Geographic Combatant Commander, and positions the Army to remain the force of choice in a crisis.

This section has examined the Army’s Army Service Component Commands and corps in an effort to find increased efficiency and possibly effectiveness as part of right-layering command structure above the brigade level. By comparing functions, roles, and tasks of the ASCC and the corps, the ASCCs forward location, regional immersion, and mission command capabilities are not solely unique. This study advocates that an innovative approach could position corps to achieve timely and rapid application of land forces to joint requirements and crisis situations while achieving regional immersion and knowledge, closer linkage to Geographic Combatant Commander planning and operations, with an improved JTF and JFLCC-capable headquarters.
This chapter examines how the strategic imperatives and statutory requirements described in previous chapters drive tradeoffs among the Army’s operational priorities and institutional risk management strategies in a context of constrained resources and under the influence of Army culture. Operationally and statutorily, the Army must be prepared to conduct Combined Arms Maneuver (CAM) and Wide Area Security (WAS)\(^1\) as part of the joint force.\(^2\) Institutionally, the Army’s strategies for managing risk include adaptation (modifying an existing element of a military force and fulfilling an unanticipated operational requirement in a timely and effective manner) and expansion (increasing the size of the force quickly enough to respond to the nation’s needs). Army leaders must assess and mitigate risks resulting from an imbalance of ends, ways, and means. Facing an environment of ambiguous ends and limited means—neither of which the Army controls directly—the Army must focus on optimizing the ways in which operates and allocates resources internally, i.e., the ways the Army generates readiness along the CAM-WAS axis, and the management of preparedness for unpredictable requirements through adaptation and expansion. This is the essence of agility.

Based on an analysis of these concepts, this report presents two broad categories of recommendations for maximizing the agility of the total Army force. The first aims to preserve both CAM and WAS capability, albeit by taking some risk with current WAS capacity (e.g., limiting support to large-scale stability operations). However, it offers clear and reliable timelines for expanding WAS capacity in the event that it is needed. The core concept for preserving CAM and WAS readiness is a framework that divides “proponency” between the Army and the National Guard, allowing the Total Army to retain a robust, affordable, and adaptable array of capabilities.

The second category of recommendations focuses on expansion. An Army that can expand rapidly is more likely to be able to generate the military capacity needed to support the nation’s operational requirements, regardless of the type of operation. The analysis thus examines the Army’s competence for rapid expansion and proposes a renewal of emphasis on this element of force management, which has been a strength of the Army for much of American history but has received little innovation and investment in recent years.

Military Agility

“Agility” is an increasingly ubiquitous term in policy circles, despite the lack of a precise definition common to both military and civilian leaders.\(^3\) In the United States, civilian policy makers, not military officers, determine when military force is used to advance national security. In civil-military dialogue,

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\(^1\) CAM refers to military operations that aim to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative in order to defeat enemy ground forces and seize and occupy land areas. WAS is the application of combat power to protect populations, forces and infrastructure, and to consolidate political gains to retain the initiative.

\(^2\) U.S. Department of the Army, The U.S. Army Operating Concept, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Fort Eustis, VA: Training and Doctrine Command, October 31, 2014), 23.

\(^3\) The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines “agile” as an adjective describing a subject that is “marked by ready ability to move with quick easy grace <an agile dancer> [or]
the concept of agility generally refers to managing capabilities and risks effectively in the context of limited means and an unpredictable future: being ready for anything, without having to bear the cost of being ready for everything. Policy makers are in this respect the “customers” of the U.S. military who seek to balance risk, cost, and policy options. The security environment dictates the options that policy makers demand, and the military and other instruments of the U.S. government supply goods and services to meet those demands. Thus to civilian leadership customers, agility equates to maintaining a broad range of capabilities at minimum cost with the implication that a trained and ready military force can be assembled in a timely manner while minimizing ponderous institutional obstacles to rapid innovation.

Of course, the military’s unique strategic mission does not correspond directly to other large organizations’ efforts to pursue agility as a corporate goal. In normal product markets, demand is somewhat predictable, and suppliers of goods and services engage in marketing and new product development to shape and respond to consumer demand. The strategic environment described above resembles a global security market, yet decisions are based on subjective estimates of risks, threats, and opportunities rather than objective measurements of demand and supply. In addition to the unpredictability of demand, military forces are expensive to supply and maintain when not in use, but indispensable when needed. Thus, the military’s customers have little interest in paying to preserve future military options. But when they decide that they want a military option, they tend to want it immediately. Inevitably, those three forces—the uncertainty of the future, the high cost of unused military capacity and capability, and the urgency of military requirements when they occur—cause a constant tension between the military and policy makers, resulting in a potential gap between what policy makers want and when they want it, and what the military can provide and when they can provide it. An agile military has the ability to narrow the gap: it swiftly provides forces that are tailored to policy requirements. An unresponsive military does not, and national security risks increase accordingly.

A military force can underwrite risk through its ability to either adapt its capabilities, expand its capacities, or both. This dichotomy is particularly important for a personnel-oriented service like the U.S. Army, where platforms matter less than the range and depth of functional specializations. A military force with tremendous depth in capacity but limited capability—

that is, one poorly prepared for war—can afford to learn, as long as the nation can withstand the cost of learning. On the other hand, a military with limited capacity but effective capability will perform well, as long as policy makers use it as intended. However, reliance on the wisdom of policy makers, and the corresponding patience of the American people, is a poor strategy for military preparation. In the post-World War II era, the U.S. Army has struggled with adapting its forces to unanticipated requirements, while the volatility of defense budgets since the end of the Cold War has complicated the Army’s efforts to balance affordability against the need for adequate capacity for absorbing operational risks. The limited capacity of the current Army—smaller than at any time since the U.S.’s entry into Second World War—and the Army’s current focus on operational readiness narrow the options available for expansion within the context of an all-volunteer force.

Proponency by Componency: Combined Arms Maneuver, Wide Area Security, and the Total Army

As demonstrated by Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Enduring Freedom (OEF), there is a symbiotic relationship between CAM and WAS: a nation cannot win a war without being successful in both competencies. In both of these recent conflicts, the Army was extremely effective at CAM, yet the wars stretched on under different conditions, in which the Army was forced to exercise WAS. Its lack of preparedness for this long-duration challenge wasted valuable time, led to ambiguous results, and nearly consumed the Army in the process. Ironically, a longer view of U.S. history in warfare demonstrates that the Army has more often than not stayed far beyond the initial fighting to conduct wide-area security and stability operations tasks. (See Figure 6.1.)

4. The U.S. Army did this in 1942, and the Soviet Army did it in 1941-42.
5. For example, in 1991, the limited aims of Desert Storm matched the military’s limited capacity at that time for a prolonged, manpower intensive operation.
In the aftermath of OIF and OEF, the Army has diligently worked to meet the needs of the current and future security environment. Recently, Chief of Staff of the Army, General Mark Milley stated, “Our fundamental task is like no other—it is to win in the unforgiving crucible of ground combat.” Milley continued, “We must ensure the Army remains ready as the world’s premier combat force. Readiness for ground combat is, and will remain, the U.S. Army’s #1 priority.”

While these statements are true, the Army sometimes interprets “readiness for ground combat” as meaning “readiness for Combined Arms Maneuver.” After many years of conducting wide-area security operations, the Army has lost some proficiency in Combined Arms Maneuver, and a reassertion of the importance of competence in CAM is fitting. However, the historical tendency of the Army in the years following long and difficult commitments to WAS-type operations has been to reassert CAM readiness and allow WAS capability to wither away. As the earlier analysis of the strategic environment showed, this outcome would be risky for the United States and its allies: like it or not, gray-zone conflicts and stability operations are extremely likely to remain as national security challenges for the foreseeable future.

The pattern of favoring CAM over WAS flows from three institutional blind spots: the Army’s cultural preferences toward combat arms, the relative difficulty of achieving clear military objectives against non-traditional adversaries, and a tendency to relegate the many essential non-combat tasks associated with WAS to a lower category of importance than CAM (unless forced to do so by persistent, real-world challenges like the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan). One key example of these cultural factors at play is the institutional focus on brigade combat teams as the standard unit of measurement for all Army operations. Fortunately, the Total Army is both broader in its scope of capabilities, and more flexible in its actual range of combat and non-combat operational structures, than Army culture typically recognizes. As the scales tip from WAS back to CAM, it is imperative to examine how the Army can maintain proficiency in both core competencies at the same time. With constrained financial resources, the Army will tend to emphasize readiness for what it deems the most dangerous

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7. Provided by the U.S. Army Strategic Landpower Task Force.
combat environments (CAM), regardless of their probability, and at the expense of readiness more likely (and just as strategically significant, albeit less lethal) WAS operations. The great challenge for the Army is preserving readiness across the entire CAM-WAS array simultaneously. Historically the Army has not demonstrated this ability. However, the structure and character of the Total Army provides an opportunity for preserving these dual capabilities.

Recommendation to Enhance Readiness by Component: CAM, WAS, and the Total Army

Today, all three components of the Total Army (the active or regular Army, the Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard) are tested and experienced after years of wide area security operations. In order to preserve the capability to conduct CAM and WAS simultaneously, this report proposes a proponency approach to dual readiness, in which CAM is the readiness priority of the active component, and WAS is the priority of the Army Reserve and Army National Guard.

Before proceeding, it is important to note that the proponency model for readiness assumes that both the Active Army and the National Guard components must remain minimally proficient in each competency. Military readiness demands that the Army provide trained, equipped, and manned forces with enough capability and capacity to combatant commanders to accomplish any mission. These missions generally span across the range of military operations from CAM to WAS. The challenge, however, is that the readiness requirements for CAM and WAS are inherently different. The proponency model builds on the relationship between time and risk in CAM and WAS operations to mitigate the differences in readiness requirements. The proponency approach allows each organization to accept some risk in their levels of persistent readiness for operations that are a secondary focus. The collective management of readiness risk demonstrates “Total Army Agility”. The following paragraphs explore this concept in greater detail.

Maximizing Agility Using the Guard and Army Reserve’s Inherent Strengths

The Army National Guard and the Army Reserve are cost-effective resources for the United States to maintain a Total Army capable of performing the broad range of missions the nation asks it to do. In order to maintain an adequately sized, capable, and adaptive Army, the Army National Guard and Reserve must be integrated and assigned roles and missions that reflect their inherent strengths: maintaining public order and the rule of law, preserving and rebuilding infrastructure, coordinating with JIIM partners, local governments, and non-governmental organizations, delivering logistical support, and performing a myriad of technical skills employed in these soldiers’ civilian livelihoods. These activities contribute to WAS, complement the CAM-focused orientation of the standing Army, and link with the homeland defense and support to civilian authorities performed by the Army National Guard.

Despite the clear demand signals of the operating environment, joint doctrine, DOD policy, and painful recent examples from OIF and OEF, these WAS-related responsibilities are rarely viewed as equally important to combat in the Army’s warfighting culture. Leading a change in these unhelpful aspects of Army culture involves integrating the three components of the Total Army into combined training and other events as often as possible. While the regionally aligned forces concept shows some promise in this respect, Army leaders should undertake a parallel effort to arrange forces to respond according to their natural strengths along the CAM-WAS spectrum.

Timing Factors: Notice and Duration

For a nation that must be prepared for war anywhere in the world at a moment’s notice, time is crucial in two respects. First, time is an essential element of preparedness. Short notice requires a “fight tonight” force structure, which generally means active duty forces. Longer notice allows much more flexibility in determining what forces to send, and force planners can match conflict requirements more closely to the capabilities of different units. Second, time is a crucial component of the conduct of the war itself. A short duration operation will likely involve only those forces initially committed to the operation. Long duration operations usually require the commitment of additional forces. Given the limited size of the active force in the United States, a longer conflict of any intensity will involve both active and reserve component forces. The active component is unlikely to be able to create new force structure fast enough to obviate the need to activate reserves.

Rethinking the Phasing Model

The concept of conflict phases, referred to previously in the discussion of JIIM coordination, emerges from doctrine on joint operations, which introduces phasing as a planning tool for joint force commanders.9 (See Figure 6.2, below.)

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While the joint phasing construct includes a great deal of flexibility, it conceptualizes conflict as a linear process and it overstates the significance of “dominating” military activities relative to other military and political actions. This does not represent reality. As discussed above, the bulk of the U.S. Army’s commitments in time and man-power over the past 120 years have focused on deterring, shaping, stabilizing, and enabling governance. Furthermore, phasing fosters the illusion of the “hand-off” to civilian authorities. Hand-offs may occur—the troops do eventually come home—but conflicts have a frustrating tendency to exhibit the characteristics of multiple phase elements at once. U.S. forces in one neighborhood may be stabilizing, while those in another are focused on building partner capacity, and a unit in an adjacent city is engaged in high-intensity operations against a well-armed adversary. This sort of simultaneity and ebbing and flowing of conditions is not well-captured by the joint phasing construct.

A view of conflict as a phenomenon that cycles repeatedly through order and disorder or high and low intensity violence is still consistent with joint doctrine, but with such a view, shaping operations become the foundational activities from which the other operations are created as needed. Instead of a sequential process of ramping activities on and off, shaping persists and the organization builds other operations as needed. Such a view of conflict underscores demands that the strategic environment places on the components of the Total Army. Figure 6.3 illustrates how time, the context of operations, and the type of forces are likely to interact in actual conflicts.


11. “Working within this generic phasing construct, the actual phases will vary (e.g., compressed, expanded, or omitted entirely) according to the nature of the operation and the JFC’s decisions… Phases are designed to be conducted sequentially, but some activities from a phase may begin in a previous phase and continue into subsequent phases.” Ibid., V6-V7. Not only is a cyclical phasing construct “allowable” by doctrine, it reflects a common-sense observation about the nature of recent conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Haiti, and many other contemporary trouble spots around the globe.
To maximize readiness, a portion of each component should cycle through training on the other components’ responsibilities on an annual basis, to allow the Total Army the flexibility to adjust its capacity and capability across the operational spectrum. The Total Army requires multi-component readiness for the full range of operations, but the differing risks associated with generating readiness should be the primary determinant for how readiness responsibility is allocated between the components. The active component should take on primary responsibility for Combined Arms Maneuver, and the National Guard should take primary responsibility for Wide Area Security. In order to ensure sufficient force density and depth, the Reserves train for and support either WAS or CAM, as priorities dictate. In shaping and deterring activities (including gray zone and hybrid conflicts), the three components work together, complementing each other’s strengths. The Total Army would also be able to expand vertically in capacity as needed, commensurate with evolving threats. Some commitments (such as Iraq, 2006-2008) will exhaust the capacity of both the active and reserve components, and both should have robust expansion capabilities.

Multi-Component Forces

Although CAM is the stated priority for Army Readiness, there are still significant ongoing WAS operations, and a high likelihood that WAS challenges will require U.S. military engagement for the foreseeable future. Consistent with the “one Army” concept, deployments into various operations should reflect a balanced distribution among components so the Total Army can retain necessary operational experience and institutional knowledge to be able to respond and react to any threat or mission. With a force strength capped at 980,000 soldiers, the Army must diversify its training and operational capability despite its reduced capacity. Retaining knowledge across the force structure is paramount in the event that the Army needs to expand both capacity and capability.  

A critical component to the Army’s ability to provide forces to combatant commanders is the certification process of the deploying unit’s readiness, which has generally included CAM and WAS missions for both components. However, depending on the contingency, it is possible to emphasize either CAM or WAS during the rotation itself. Another alternative to certify readiness is to ensure that every CTC rotation is multi-component, thus ensuring that the Army maximizes the CAM and WAS competencies and fosters force integration.

12. For example building a larger Army capable of conducting combined arms maneuver against North Korea and/or China would require utilizing the entire reserve component in addition to recruiting new soldiers for a potentially large campaign against such peer or near-peer competitors.
13. For example, a National Guard rotation could initiate with a combined arms attack to seize key terrain then transition to 10 days of wide area security. In the case of the
Advantages of the Proponency Model

While there would undoubtedly be institutional resistance to its adoption the proponency model has several advantages for the Army as it attempts to address strategic challenges with limited means.

Clarity

A clearer delineation of roles and missions between the active and reserve components will make the Total Army stronger by enabling each component to focus on and excel at a core competence. In amorphous, gray-zone battle-spaces, pre-defined roles and responsibilities between the active and reserve components would enable each to optimize their resource management, support one another, and effectively respond to fluid threat environments.

Affordability

As the Department of Defense searches for cost savings across the Joint Force, the proponency model also allows for more efficient allocation of resources across the Army by reducing the duplication of equipment, matériel, and so on. In addition, the Army National Guard and Reserve costs less to operate during dwell periods than the active component.14

Compatibility

Army National Guard and Reserve members would play to their natural strengths in prioritizing WAS, which requires the executing force to apply combat power to protect populations, forces, infrastructure, and activities. WAS forces must provide military support to governance, rule of law, development, and law enforcement. Many of these duties translate directly to civilian career fields. The skill sets that Army National Guard and Reserve soldiers gain in their civilian employment and their role as Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) is often very well suited for WAS and stability operations roles.

Public Support

With the Army National Guard as the primary responder for Stability Operations also ties the public and government closer to the mobilization of Army forces. This concept falls in line with the so-called Abrams doctrine, which ensures the Reserves, in defense of national interests, are mobilized as part of the Total Army. Mobilizing the National Guard from States will get governors’ attention, community attention, and other local and state representatives’ attention as these soldiers will come directly from their voting districts, places of civilian employment and parts of the community.

Support to the Total Force Concept

By validating the need to plan for and execute WAS operations, the proponency model supports the findings of the National Commission on the Future of the Army and can help resolve the ongoing tensions between the active and reserve components identified in the Commission’s report.

Despite the advantages of the proponency model in terms of clarity, affordability, mission compatibility, linkages to public support, and the boost it gives to the Total Force concept, these recommendations face one key obstacle: they challenge the Army’s cultural bias toward warfighting. According to this bias, readying and mobilizing the Army National Guard and Reserve primarily for WAS rather than CAM missions will be politically unacceptable and detrimental to the cohesion of the Total Army. In fact, as the NCFA reported, the key factor for determining buy-in from Army National Guard and Reserve units will likely be the probability of meaningful and predictable deployments, regardless of the actual scope and character of the mission. Moreover, this proposal recognizes that CAM and WAS are two broad sets of missions that overlap and, as recent history demonstrates, can waver back and forth over time in a given area of operations. In the current and future operational environment, Army National Guard and Reserve units deployed for WAS missions will continue to gain combat experience, just as the standing Army units deployed on CAM missions must always be ready to conduct WAS operations in the aftermath of dominating the adversary.

The operational challenge of aligning CAM and WAS capabilities across the Total Army is one method of balancing competing pressures from three sources: the global security demands from the strategic environment, the Army’s statutory and policy requirements, and its internal cultural preferences and biases. The range of capabilities defines the various mission sets in response to unpredictable strategic ends in a context of limited resources. The advantage of a healthy balance across the CAM-WAS spectrum is the relatively broad array of capabilities, which provide templates for adapting current force structure to address some immediate or near-term contingency through substitution of existing capacity from one capability to another. The next section presents an affordable and flexible approach to addressing a parallel challenge: how to expand Army forces, when necessary, to deepen the Army’s capacity to respond in a timely and durable manner beyond existing force structure.

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Potential Force: Time and the Challenge of Expansion

The United States is a technologically advanced nation with tremendous natural, scientific, and industrial resources. Given sufficient time, the nation can produce military capability that is unrivalled. The U.S. is also a relatively large nation, with a population exceeding 300 million. Few nations have a deeper reservoir of manpower. Given time, the U.S. can field an Army of immense size. Given the ability to dictate the timing of all military operations, the United States would have the luxury of building military forces on demand and dissolving the military when not in use. But time passes no more slowly for Americans than it does for anybody else, and the U.S. tends to get involved in wars on relatively short notice. With that in mind, the major constraint on U.S. military agility is time. As General Robert Abrams recently observed, “Time is our biggest resource challenge when it comes to building and sustaining readiness.” 15 Given this time constraint, there are two possible strategies for maintaining a responsive military: 1) maintaining a robust military with an appropriate breadth of capabilities (force-in-being) and 2) rapidly expanding a base force when needed (potential force). This section focuses on how U.S. military leaders can develop and maintain a potential force affordably to facilitate rapid expansion as a means of mitigating the risks posed by force capacity limitations.

Shaping the Military Expansion Pool: a Proposal to Transform the Individual Ready Reserve Program

An expanded U.S. Army will grow in large part using personnel from one of three expansion pools: the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), volunteers, and conscripts. Thinking in terms of human capital, the quickest mobilization would come from the Ready Reserve, since it is comprised of pre-trained manpower—mostly personnel who have separated from active duty but not fulfilled their service obligation. Thus, their learning curve should be much shorter. Volunteers and conscripts would likely take a longer time to move from initial military training through advanced individual training.

However, the U.S. Army’s experiences in expanding during the post-9/11 wars suggest that the IRR is less attractive as a source of expansion in practice than it is in theory. In Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, members to readiness for deployment in case of war-time expansion. The IRR is human capital of this type, but the program needs to be broadened and modified.

The IRR constitutes over 25% of the ready reserve, but the program appears moribund for every service but the Marine Corps. The Reserve Forces Policy Board has recommended much-needed changes to reinvigorate the IRR. However, the traditional constitution of the IRR (most of them mature members of the population with significant active duty experience) makes the IRR pool smaller and smaller in scale. 17 Given the decreasing size of the U.S. military and the pool of military veterans, IRR manpower is declining, as well. In 1985, the U.S. Army Reserve included over 300,000 IRR. By 2013, the USAR’s IRR pool had declined to just over 100,000. 19

Nevertheless, the core concept of the individual ready reserve remains compelling. Increasing the proportion of the service-eligible population that has some military experience can in theory dramatically increase the speed and predictability of expansion. 20 Given the active Army’s decreasing end-strength and its increasingly constrained operational capacity, expansion capability is more valuable to the Army than it has been in decades. At a relatively low cost in money and force structure, a modification of the IRR can create valuable options for rapid expansion for the Army and for the nation.

Innovation in Expansion: The Modified Individual Ready Reserve

There is no optimization function for building and retaining expansion capability. Several different approaches can work, so any discussion of what to do should focus first on the desired characteristics of an expansion concept. From this perspective, any expansion proposal for a nation with a volunteer military should seek to do four things:

1. Increase the proportion of the population that has served in the active Army without significantly affecting the total size of the standing force.

   This is the concept of “shaping the pool” of human capital, reducing the time and investment required to bring some members to readiness for deployment in case of war-time expansion. The IRR is human capital of this type, but the program needs to be broadened and modified.


17. It is also problematic in terms of social justice—the unappealing prospect of involuntarily mobilizing a veteran father in his thirties versus training a conscript or volunteer, for example.


20. Ibid., 1.
2. Retain more initial and advanced training capacity in the force structure than the Army needs given its existing structure, and utilize training force structure as much as possible absent expansion.

A small, all-volunteer Army in peacetime has a much lower throughput in basic and advanced individual training than an Army that is expanding to meet current operational demands. While expansion is difficult, expansion without force structure to meet surge training requirements is even harder. It is of course grossly inefficient to retain all of the training force structure that would be required in the worst-case scenario. Yet when the organization is no longer sized to support manpower-intensive operations (as in the case of the U.S. Army today) there is wisdom in cutting some operational structure now, in order to preserve flexibility in force production later. This is similar to the small premium an investor may pay to purchase a call-option on a stock. Such a premium is a predictable expense, but if the stock exceeds the strike price, the option becomes very valuable. Above a certain price level, an option can return its cost to the investor dozens of times over. Force development capacity has option-like payouts in war-time.

3. Maintain force structure that can receive and lead expansion personnel.

Armies are led by senior NCOs and experienced officers. A surge in capacity is pointless if an Army lacks the people to lead expansion units, or a force structure concept that can receive expansion personnel. In the earlier discussion of models for expansion, the costs and benefits of two generic approaches—splitting and cadre—were discussed. For an operationally stressed military facing urgent force requirements, the splitting approach is unattractive because it makes pre-existing, ready units unready for deployment after they divide. The cadre approach is therefore preferable.

With respect to both the second and third points (retaining excess training force structure and creating receiving unit force structure) an enduring challenge in maintaining structure for expansion is that bored soldiers are often demoralized soldiers. As General Hamilton Howze observed (based on his own experience leading a post-World War II unit), “There is no more stultifying, uninspiring, depressing, and seemingly useless activity than that of serving in an under-strength military unit.”

This is the “hollow force” problem. However, a unit that is under-strength for one mission is not necessarily under-strength for other missions. Which leads to the final desired characteristic of an expansion concept.

4. Force structure retained for potential expansion should be used for meeting peace-time military requirements wherever possible.

With these four attributes in mind, let us consider one approach that satisfies these requirements. With the Modified Individual Ready Reserve (MIRR), the Army brings in a certain number (to be determined through the force planning process) of new recruits annually whose active-duty commitment is for just 12-13 months. Following that year, they become members of the MIRR, and return to civilian pursuits. However, they remain in the MIRR for an extended period (ten years, as proposed here), and during that period they are required to remain physically fit for service and to maintain core military proficiency through a combination of annual training at a military facility and, where suitable, regular classroom training through distance learning. Regular active duty personnel separating from the service but wishing to maintain closer ties to the Army may also select MIRR status. As an additional incentive to serve, all MIRR personnel would receive some compensation, possibly a combination of a small stipend, college tuition assistance, and medical care through Tri-care. Most direct entrants into the MIRR would be trained for the infantry, though force planners could direct MIRR to other specialties, as needed. The emphasis in this recommendation on developing rapid expansion capacity and capability for the infantry is intentional. The infantry is the most adaptable of the Army’s operational forces. Along with rotary lift, it has the widest variety of applications across the spectrum of combat operations.

The MIRR is therefore a hybrid of the mandatory military service traditions of nations like Israel, in which a year of military service often follows high school or college graduation, and the original concept of the Individual Ready Reserve of the all-volunteer force.

The MIRR would significantly increase the pool of national manpower with some prior military service. In the event that a rapid expansion of the Army is required to support a prolonged, manpower intensive operation that does not rise to the level of a complete strategic mobilization, the MIRR, properly managed, would provide force planners with a more reliable source of personnel in developing force availability predictions. (See Figure 6.4.)

Additionally, the MIRR creates a higher training to service time ratio for the training base. In order to support the higher through-put in basic training and advanced individual training, the Army would increase training force structure to accommodate MIRR training.

Finally, MIRR personnel would be designed to be received by cadre personnel who serve in Train, Advise, and Assist units in the Army. TAA units have been recently discussed by the Army as a good use of understrength force structure to satisfy a crucial mission for the nation. There is significant merit to this view. The integration of TAA units into the MIRR concept satisfies both the third and fourth requirements discussed above: retaining expansion leadership and force structure, while using that force structure to meet current requirements, absent expansion.

**Closing Thoughts**

The Army does not possess the luxury to determine which conflicts and wars it will and will not fight. Policy makers, of course, make those decisions. Therefore it stands to reason that the Army must be prepared to fight and win in any contingency. As the U.S. Army Operating Concept states, “Army forces are prepared to do more than fight and defeat enemies: they must possess the capability to translate military objectives into enduring political outcomes. Army forces must have capability…and capacity…to accomplish assigned missions while confronting increasingly dangerous threat in complex operational environments.”

Major General (Retired) Robert Scales, a Vietnam veteran and frequent commentator on national security affairs recently wrote an article titled, “Thoughts as I watch my Army walk away from counterinsurgency once again,” ended his piece with thoughtful prose that resonated with the authors of this report. He said:

...over the past dozen years or so, the Army has developed a significant cadre of officers with extensive counterinsurgency experience and more competency in that regard than the institution has ever enjoyed. Will this experience and wisdom be lost...

22. U.S. Army Operating Concept, 10.
by the current perception that we’ll never do that again? Unfortunately, history says yes. The Army as an institution loves the image of the big war: swift maneuver, tanks, heavy artillery, armed helicopters overhead, mounds of logistics support. The nitty-gritty of working with indigenous personnel to common ends, small unit patrols in civilian-infested cities, quick clashes against faceless enemies that fade back into the populace — not so much. Lessons will fade, and those who earned their PhDs in small wars will be passed over and left by the wayside…. Here is the problem with that approach: The ability to win the big one is vital, but so is the ability to win the small wars. We paid a price for forgetting what we learned in Vietnam. I hope succeeding generations do not have to pay again.  

The purpose of the Army is to fight and win wars. By embracing a model that allows the Army to be simultaneously prepared and ready to win in the Combined Arms Maneuver or Wide Area Security environments, the Army will win, and fulfil its moral obligation to the American people.

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The Root Report reframes the Army’s approach to current strategic challenges. The Army should shift its current focus from communicating the gap between means and ends, to closing the gap between ways and ends. The report identifies significant opportunities to reform the ways the Army organizes and implements its contributions to U.S. national security.

This report has explored the difficulties of posturing U.S. Army capabilities in response to three sources of institutional pressure—the demands of the strategic environment; the requirements of statute, policy and doctrine; and the Army’s organizational culture. Army leaders must balance these conflicting pressures in a context of constrained resources, creating the need for greater efficiencies and more explicit tradeoffs. While the Army must remain ready for any threat, it cannot lead the response to every threat. To bridge this gap, Army leaders must encourage greater collaboration with the Army’s partners in the joint force, interagency, and internationally. Although the Army prefers being the leading force with unity of command, it must become more comfortable facing complex challenges using the principle of unity of effort in situations in which it is a supporting force. It must maintain a wide range of capabilities, including those not directly tied to high intensity warfare, while developing options for expanding force capacity when necessary to fulfill its core functions. Army leaders must also make more efficient use of existing force structure, by right-layering Army command structures and developing more agile operational forces that draw on the inherent strengths and orientations of the total force components. Doing so will free resources to support the readiness imperative while relieving pressure on funds for modernization—the best defense against risk in a rapidly evolving strategic environment.

The authors recognize that these recommendations are insufficient to address the national security challenges facing the United States and the wide range of requirements that the Army must fulfill by law and policy. However, we offer them as part of an important, ongoing discussion about the future of the Army and of the Joint Force. The recommendation complement and advance perspectives and ideas already offered by others.

It is our hope that the Army embraces this report and its recommendations in the spirit of reflection and critical thinking that professional military education aims to impart, based on a deep commitment to U.S. Constitution that many of the authors have sworn to uphold and protect. We recognize that our analysis and recommendations that will be challenging to certain stakeholders. Internal disagreement is a sign of organizational maturity. In complex competitive environments, there are few unambiguous answers to the questions that matter. To the extent that we provoke debate, we hope that disagreement arises from reason and evidence, as opposed to the reflexive tendencies of the Army’s culture. This culture has served the institutional well and remains worthy of emulation in many respects, yet it can prevent reform and warp responses in favor of tradition and the status quo.

**Conclusion**

The Root Report reframes the Army’s approach to current strategic challenges. The Army should shift its current focus from communicating the gap between means and ends, to closing the gap between ways and ends. The report identifies significant opportunities to reform the ways the Army organizes and implements its contributions to U.S. national security.

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The authors recognize that these recommendations are insufficient to address the national security challenges facing the United States and the wide range of requirements that the Army must fulfill by law and policy. However, we offer them as part of an important, ongoing discussion about the future of the Army and of the Joint Force. The recommendation complement and advance perspectives and ideas already offered by others.

It is our hope that the Army embraces this report and its recommendations in the spirit of reflection and critical thinking that professional military education aims to impart, based on a deep commitment to U.S. Constitution that many of the authors have sworn to uphold and protect. We recognize that our analysis and recommendations that will be challenging to certain stakeholders. Internal disagreement is a sign of organizational maturity. In complex competitive environments, there are few unambiguous answers to the questions that matter. To the extent that we provoke debate, we hope that disagreement arises from reason and evidence, as opposed to the reflexive tendencies of the Army’s culture. This culture has served the institutional well and remains worthy of emulation in many respects, yet it can prevent reform and warp responses in favor of tradition and the status quo.
The U.S. Army remains the foundation of the world’s dominant military force, but like any successful organization, its past glories can blind it to evolving threats, weighing it down with outdated assumptions while more adaptive rivals innovate. Organizational change usually requires a recognition that something is not working. The tension between building on success and creating urgency for change is an enduring challenge for mature organizations. It is doubly hard to drive change in an organization that values obedience and subordination, when constructive dissent can be misinterpreted as disloyalty. However, the devotion of all soldiers should be to the nation that the Army serves, and to the principles required to maintain an Army worthy of that service.

The current generation of leaders—including ourselves—has difficult choices to make about which elements of our own proud heritage are worth keeping, and which should be discarded. We are confident that all Army leaders strive to leave the Army better than they found it. This is what we seek, as well. We have the opportunity to build a more agile, ready, modern, efficient and effective Army for the future. Who benefits most from an honest discussion about the strategic challenges and vulnerabilities of the Army? We owe it to the next generation of Army leaders to set the theater for their future success, and we dedicate this report to those who will inherit the leadership of the Army—today’s lieutenants, captains, and majors.
# Abbreviation List

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACOM</td>
<td>Army Commands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADCON</td>
<td>Administrative Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADP</td>
<td>Army Doctrine Publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADRP</td>
<td>Army Doctrine Reference Publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFWPAK</td>
<td>Afghanistan And Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOC</td>
<td>Army Operating Concept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOO</td>
<td>Area of Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQIM</td>
<td>Al Qaeda In The Islamic Maghreb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARCENT</td>
<td>United States Army Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARNG</td>
<td>Army National Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARNORTH</td>
<td>United States Army North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARSOF</td>
<td>Army Special Operations Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASCC</td>
<td>Army Service Component Commands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASPG</td>
<td>Army Strategic Planning Guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCA</td>
<td>Budget Control Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCT</td>
<td>Brigade Combat Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPC</td>
<td>Building Partner Capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAM</td>
<td>Combined Arms Maneuver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological And Nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCDR</td>
<td>Combatant Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCSA</td>
<td>Combatant Command Support Agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Interagency Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMO</td>
<td>Combatant Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counter Insurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>Continental United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CREW</td>
<td>Counter Radio Electronic Warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSP</td>
<td>Carlisle Scholars Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTC</td>
<td>Combat Training Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DODD</td>
<td>Department of Defense Directives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRU</td>
<td>Direct Reporting Units</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSCA</td>
<td>Defense Security Cooperation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSCA</td>
<td>Defense Support To Civil Authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSR</td>
<td>Defense Strategic Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>Executive Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>Europe Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>United States European Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Foreign Area Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>FARC</td>
<td>Revolutionary Armed Forces Of Colombia</td>
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<tr>
<td>FID</td>
<td>Foreign Internal Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMLN</td>
<td>Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORSCOM</td>
<td>Force Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>Government Accountability Office</td>
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<td>GCC</td>
<td>Geographic Combatant Commands</td>
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<tr>
<td>GRF</td>
<td>Global Response Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQDA</td>
<td>Headquarters, Department Of The Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>IC</td>
<td>Incident Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of The Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICS</td>
<td>Incident Command System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>Infantry Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILE</td>
<td>Intermediate Level Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRR</td>
<td>Individual Ready Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (sometimes given as Syria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFC</td>
<td>Joint Force Commanders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFLCC</td>
<td>Joint Force Land Component Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIM</td>
<td>Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, And Multinational</td>
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<tr>
<td>JOPP</td>
<td>Joint Operation Planning Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSOTF-P</td>
<td>Joint Special Operations Task Force – Philippines</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Forces</td>
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<td>MEF</td>
<td>Marine Expeditionary Force</td>
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<td>MG</td>
<td>Military Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>United Nations Mission In Haiti</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIRR</td>
<td>Modified Internal Rate of Return</td>
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<td>MISO</td>
<td>Military Information Support Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOA</td>
<td>Memorandum of Agreement</td>
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<td>MOS</td>
<td>Military Occupation Specialties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS</td>
<td>Mara Salvatrucha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCFA</td>
<td>National Commission on The Future Of The Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Noncommissioned Officers</td>
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<tr>
<td>NMS</td>
<td>National Military Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORTHCOM</td>
<td>United States Northern Command</td>
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<td>NRF</td>
<td>National Response Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>OEF</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom</td>
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<td>OIF</td>
<td>Operations Iraqi Freedom</td>
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<td>OPCON</td>
<td>Operational Control</td>
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<td>OSC-I</td>
<td>Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq</td>
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<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of Secretary Of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>QDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Defense Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>Regionally Aligned Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROMO</td>
<td>Range of Military Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSOI</td>
<td>Reception, Staging, Onward-Movement &amp; Integration</td>
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<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Security Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>SASC</td>
<td>Senate Armed Services Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>Security Cooperation</td>
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<td>SDO/DATT</td>
<td>Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché</td>
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<td>SF</td>
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<td>SFA</td>
<td>Security Force Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFAB</td>
<td>Security Force Assistant Brigade</td>
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<td>SOCCENT</td>
<td>Special Operations Command Central Command</td>
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<td>SOCPAC</td>
<td>Special Operations Command Pacific Command</td>
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<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPP</td>
<td>State Partnership Program</td>
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<td>SSC</td>
<td>Senior Service College</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAA</td>
<td>Train, Advise And Assist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSC</td>
<td>Theater Support Commands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSOC</td>
<td>Theater Special Operations Commands</td>
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<tr>
<td>ULO</td>
<td>Unified Land Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Department Of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAFRICOM</td>
<td>U.S. Africa Command</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>U.S. Agency For International Development</td>
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<td>USCAP</td>
<td>U.S./Colombia Action Plan</td>
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<td>United States Government</td>
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<td>USPACOM</td>
<td>U.S. Pacific Command</td>
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<td>USOUTHCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Southern Command</td>
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<td>VEOs</td>
<td>Violent Extremist Organizations</td>
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<td>WAS</td>
<td>Wide Area Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWII</td>
<td>World War II</td>
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