FY 25
MISSION COMMAND TRAINING PROGRAM
Key Observations

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Foreword

The Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) is the U.S. Army's premier deployable Combat Training Center (CTC) that is Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) directed. Team MCTP consists of four operations groups focused on corps, divisions, and special operations forces (SOF) training audiences as well as the MCTP staff, including exercise control (EXCON) that enables coverage and execution for multiple Warfighter Exercises (WFXs) per fiscal year. WFXs are professionally rigorous leader development experiences to drive further change and education on warfighting doctrine while enhancing unit readiness and informing strategic-level learning demands.

Mission: MCTP facilitates collective training opportunities and leadership experiences for Commanders and their staffs to plan, prepare, fight, and win during Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO).

Purpose: Provide leader experiences that produce division and corps level professional warfighters. We must prepare our warfighters (people and organizations) to fight and win our Nation's future wars. Achieving our purpose during a period of increased change requires agility, leadership, and professionalism across our team of teams.

Enduring Priorities: People, Transformation, WFX execution, Driving Change and connecting to the Army.

This document captures the MCTP observations and learning from the five FY25 WFXs, which focus on LSCO. Chapter one captures experimentation in FY25, Chapter two captures MCTP's key overall observations, with six additional chapters that cover observations from the six warfighting functions.

Our purpose is clear and important. Our mission and method are proven and valued. We are excited to Drive Change!

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Chapter 1

Experimentation

Introduction

In Fiscal Year 2025 (FY25), warfighter exercises (WFXs) incorporated extensive experimentation, resulting in significant learning and growth for the Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) and Army proponents. The WFX program provides unique and unmatched opportunities to learn from experiments at scale and load at the division and corps level of warfighting. MCTP facilitates dialogue between Army senior leaders, exercise directors, training units, and Army proponents to balance experimentation learning demands, large-scale combat operations (LSCO) training objectives, and operational plan insights from exercise design through warfighter execution. During FY25 MCTP executed five WFXs in support of two Army Service Component Commands, all four Army corps, multiple Active and National Guard divisions, and partner nations. Specifically, during FY25, MCTP conducted four Army-directed and myriad unit requested experiments during WFX 25-2/Yama Sakura 87 (YS87), WFX 25-4, and WFX 25-5.

WFX 25-2/YS87/Multi-Domain Command (Experimental) [MDC(X)] was conducted on three continents, four countries, with nine training audiences (five U.S. Army training audiences), spanning 12 time zones – executed during December 2024. YS87's primary training audiences included the Japanese Ground Self Defense Forces (JGSDF) with their Western and Eastern Armies partnered with III MEF United States Marine Corps (USMC), and Australian Defense Forces (1st Australian Division) and elements of I Corps (U.S. Army) and 593rd ESC. WFX 25-2 primary U.S. training audiences included I Corps, 11 t h Airborne Division, 25th Infantry Division, and 1st Special Forces Group. United States Army Pacific served as the higher command (HICOM). WFX 25-2/YS87 featured the MDC-X, which combined the 7th Infantry Division (7ID) and the 1st Multi-Domain Task Force (1MDTF) into a two-star theater enabling command. This experiment focused on the employment, organizational structure, and functional impacts of merging these commands. The experiment generated recommendations on transformation from a division headquarters to a theater enabling command ready to collect, assess and execute a multi-domain strategy ready to prosecute lethal and non-lethal effects against maritime and land targets in support of theater joint forces.

WFX 25-4 was conducted across two continents, three countries, with five senior training audiences, spanning eight time zones executed during late May and early June 2025. United States Army Europe and Africa served as the HICOM. The senior training audiences included III Armored Corps (III AC), 4th Infantry Division (4ID), 3rd United Kingdom Division (3UK), 1st French Division (1FR), and 10th Panzer Division (10PZ).

U.S. Army III Armored Corps was task organized with three multinational divisions which created technical, and procedural, interoperability challenges across all domains and warfighting functions at echelon. WFX 25-4 featured the first of two Multifunctional Brigade-Strike (MFB-Strike) experiments, with III AC transforming its Field Artillery Brigade (75th FAB) and selecting organic and non-organic enabling battalions and companies into an MFB-Strike formation. This initiative aimed to extend the corps' operational reach and provide dedicated strike capabilities. The experiment generated recommendations to resource MFB-Strike formations with processing, exploiting, and dissemination (PED) capabilities to enable targeting,

and to develop a battlefield framework that facilitates immediate firing capability without having to clear missions through the corps headquarters. The experiment also generated a recommendation to make the air defense artillery (ADA) battalion commander augmenting MFB-Strike to serve as the corps air defense coordinating officer (ADCOORD) to make MFB-strike a multifunctional organization responsible for the planning and synchronization of all offensive and defensive fires within the Corps area of operations.

WFX 25-5 executed at Camp Atterbury training facility in Indiana and Fort Hood in Texas August 2025. The primary training audience was the Texas Army National guard 36th Infantry Division. The second MFB-Strike experiment took place during WFX 25-5, again with III AC as the higher command (HICOM) and involving the 45th Field Artillery Brigade (45FAB). Additionally, WFX 25-5 included the fourth experiment, focusing on the multifunctional brigade-corps support (MFB-CS). This purpose-built formation integrated organic corps enablers and enabler units from reporting divisions to support rear operations, facilitate movement, extend operational reach, and sustain the desired tempo of corps operations. The experiment generated recommendations for the MFB-CS on securing and protecting the corps support area across multiple domains.

Future WFX experimentation will adopt a more deliberate and holistic approach to fully develop capabilities across the entire doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) spectrum. Senior leader dialogue and collective proponent continuity of effort remain crucial to balancing WFX training objectives and experimentation learning outcomes. MCTP remains ready to integrate experiments that meet Army senior leader priorities to inform strategic decisions on force development through the execution of a world-class experience to build unit readiness for LSCO that accelerates transformation and ensures WFX training insights are rapidly translated into battlefield advantage.

Chapter 2

Mission Command Training Program Top Overall Observations

Key Observation: #1: Event Template

Observation. Decision making is not informed by the event templates (EVENTEMPs). G-2 sections struggle to produce doctrinally complete EVENTEMPs resulting in a degraded ability to predict threat actions to drive decision making, increase efficiency in information collection, and improve targeting and assessment accuracy.



Figure 2-1. Developing an Event Template

Discussion. Units do not conduct continuous intelligence preparation of the operational environment after production of Annex B (or D in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO])] resulting in incomplete EVENTEMPs during warfighter exercises:

- Units do not communicate verbally or execute visually enemy courses of action in time and space at echelon to increase detail in the planning and target process; often reducing their ability to provide an assessment for the desired friendly effects on those formations or key equipment.

- The analysis and control element often briefs situational templates (SITEMPs) during all key battle rhythm events. These SITEMPS do not focus on confirming or denying enemy courses of action (ECOAs) as an EVENTEMP would and are a roll up of significant enemy activity.
- Units only use one ECOA or enemy SITEMP for all working groups or decision boards.
- Lack of detailed EVENTEMPs negatively impacts the collection management team's ability to plan when and where to collect.
- Units use non-doctrinal products such as operations schedules, 8-day sketches, and single course of action (COA) SITEMPs, to describe the threat in time and space to the commander, but never fully account for how the enemy would operate beyond one ECOA. The products, while good briefing tools, lacked the fidelity needed to fully describe the enemy and the potential dilemmas in a large-scale combat operations (LSCO) fight.



Figure 2-2. Completed Event Template example

Recommendation(s):

- Develop, rehearse, and gain commander's approval of the EVENTEMP as a “fighting product.” The EVENTEMP should be a fighting product and replace the commonly used SITEMP. Operations require synchronized collection and targeting, and an EVENTEMP ensures this happens and the commander’s decision support matrix is accurate.
- Effective doctrinal EVENTEMPs require daily refinement during execution and will ultimately reduce production requirements.
- Continual emphasis on the development and continual refinement of an EVENTEMP that accounts for multiple enemy ECOAs posed to friendly operations.
- During military decision-making process (MDMP) step 4 (COA Analysis/Wargaming), refine the EVENTEMP based upon "blue" actions to provide a more precise EVENTEMP during MDMP step 7 (Orders Production).

Doctrinal References:

- ADP 2-0, *Intelligence*, 31 July 2019
- ATP 2-01, *Collection Management*, 25 September 2025 (common access card Restricted)
- ATP 2-01.3, *Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*, 1 March 2019
- FM 2-0, *Intelligence*, 1 October 2023
- FM 3-0, *Operations*, 21 March 2025

Key Observation: #2: Dynamic Targeting

Observation. Divisions and Corps often struggle to resynchronize kinetic and non-kinetic effects as conditions and targeting priorities change through commander-to-commander dialogues or enemy action.

After publishing the targeting fragmentary order (FRAGORD), there are typically no additional battle rhythm events to resynchronize changes to the targeting plan. In LSCO, targeting priorities can change significantly within a few hours due to varying enemy EVENTEMPS, targeting priority adjustments from commanders, or unsupported asset requests that adjust targeting priorities.

Staff must communicate potential risk to the force following the realignment of assets and targeting priorities to prevent the misalignment of assets and conditions with the maneuver plan.



Figure 2-3. 7-minute Drill Example

Discussion. Divisions and corps are challenged by resynchronizing multi-domain effects to support immediate operational needs.

At both the corps and division level, emerging tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) such as the multidomain effects cell (MDEC) or on-call, target refinement boards (TRBs) have assisted units in resynchronizing assets with emerging targeting priorities within the 24-hour planning horizon.

Some organizations manned their MDEC as a permanent planning cell with members from each staff section, coming at the cost of additional planning power from each section. While these TTPs risk parallel planning efforts between integrating cells, it also enables organizations to dynamically fight the enemy, not the plan. Targeting working groups (TWGs) tend to spend most of the time resynchronizing the next 24 hours. An MDEC or TRB enables the targeting team to focus on building the next 72 hours and drafting recommended guidance for the next 96 hours.

Refinements to the targeting plan risks misaligning long-lead requested assets with changes to the maneuver plan. Staff must communicate accrued risk from the dynamic resynchronization of targeting objectives to all effected commanders while also communicating priority changes to the targeting team.

Recommendation(s): Implement on-call, TRBs that enable the organization to remain dynamic, as required, as the enemy situation changes; targeting priorities adjust due to commander-to-commander dialogues, or when the staff can capitalize on an opportunity.

Ideally, the TRB is driven by a division or corps senior leader, who understands the commander's emerging priorities, understands the associated risk with shifting available assets, and holds the approval authority to dynamically shift targeting assets in the 24-hour window.

Changes to the targeting plan also must be communicated to the targeting team to ensure that targeting objectives are also realigned in future ATOs.

Doctrinal References:

- ADP 3-0, *Operations*, 21 March 2025
- ATP 3-60.1, *Multi-service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Dynamic Targeting*, 5 January 2022 (CAC Restricted)
- FM 3-0, *Operations*, 21 March 2025
- FM 3-60, *Army Targeting*, 11 August 2023

Key Observation #3: Staff Integration- FUOPS Manning, Assessments, Battle Rhythm and Key Leader Placement

Observation. Units often do not define the roles and responsibilities of key leaders, integrating cells, and warfighting functions (WFF). Units focus on meetings rather than fighting. Key leaders spend as many as nine hours per day in meetings. Units place too much work on the plans cell and under-utilize the future operations (FUOPS) cell resulting in rigid plans that attempt to perfectly align resources at the expense of flexibility.

Division future operations cells are typically undermanned, mismanaged, and unproductive. Some units attempt to combine the G-5 and G-35 cells, and most FUOPS cells are only three or four majors with no standardized staff processes. The majority operate with no standard inputs or outputs, and the cell tends to focus on whatever product they are told to build. For example, planning tends to be based on outcomes of the targeting coordination board and then rushing to FRAGORD publication without integrating targeting into a unit plan or considering WFF input.

Units tend to create extra meetings and products. For example, the Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) frequently observes units failing to create a clear visualization and understanding for the commander during the battle update brief (BUB) and then adds another meeting to try to do it better. The non-doctrinal commander's visualization board is the most common example of an extra meeting. The most common and impactful product misuse example is the substitution of known enemy location screenshots from MAVEN in the place of an EVENTEMP.

Discussion. When control of the unit is placed too heavily in the hands of a pre-key developed major, the unit inevitably fails to identify opportunities on the battlefield, to seize and exploit initiative, or to make timely and anticipatory decisions.

Best practices include senior leaders who are fully engaged in controlling the fight from the combat operations and intelligence center (COIC) who anticipate opportunities and threats, seize and exploit opportunities, and maintain initiative as opposed to reacting to the enemy as the plan devolves. Furthermore, leaders and staff who prioritize the right input (products) to feed the right staff processes achieve better visualization, faster decision-making, and maintain effective planning horizons with less dependency on meetings or additional work.

If the assessment process is effectively integrated with the BUB, commanders' update assessment (CUA), and operations synchronization (OPSYNC) guided by leaders, an additional meeting is not necessary. When the assessment process is effectively built into the BUB, CUA, and OPSYNC planning is more efficient and senior leaders are better informed to make decisions at the correct time.

Start the BUB, CUA, and OPSYNC with a 5-minute assessment update using Annex M. Then discuss what adjustments are needed to stay on track to achieve the desired end state. This requires staff to train assessment updates and communicate clear and concise impacts to connect cross-functional staff assessments to the commander's decision-making requirements at critical battle rhythm events.



Figure 2-4. Integrating Staff Assessments

Additionally, the FUOPS cell should be manned with its own internal representation from each WFF and resourced with its own formal working group that facilitates further course of action development, COA Analysis, or any other staff process as needed (mirror the G-5 cell's people and processes). The rhythm of the battle informs what the FUOPS cell focuses on from day to day and what processes they must use to adjust course from the Plans cell's outputs to the evolving situation in current operations (CUOPS).

Existing time and talent in the integrating cells should be formally structured and align with standard inputs and outputs of the MDMP.



Figure 2-5. Example Annex M

Recommendation(s):

- **Key leader employment.** The key to implementing anticipatory decision-making and processes is senior leader placement. A unit that employs the deputy commanding general-maneuver and the G-3 as the COIC leads will have an experienced, empowered decision-maker at the hub of information and operations. With rare exceptions, this eliminates the need to wait for the next meeting or commanding general decision-making touchpoint and allows the unit to identify, seize, and exploit opportunities faster than the enemy.

- **Focus on integrating staff and leaders in the right processes.** Make the BUB, CUA, and OPSYNC the backbone of the battle rhythm. Staff the integrating cells with the right talent able to work behind the scenes on their own schedule with the appropriate level of key leader touch points. Use staff tools and execution products that simultaneously facilitate the commander's visualization and the brigades' ability to execute their assigned tasks and eliminate excessive meetings and products. While MAVEN and other new tools are powerful, we must not lose sight of sound doctrine as we implement these systems into our processes. Start by identifying the basic execution products that subordinate units and CUOPS cells need to execute the operation based on doctrinal outputs of MDMP. Then codify as standard operating procedure deliverables from FUOPS. Determine appropriate system and format for each deliverable. If those products are good enough for subordinate units to fight with, then they should be good enough for everybody and additional products should not be necessary.

- **Prioritize talent in the future operations cell.** A lightly manned G-5 cell will carry the long-range planning horizon responsibility. A lightly manned FUOPS cell will not be capable of making constant adjustments/refinements to the plan that the FUOPS cell is doctrinally responsible for. Therefore, the FUOPS cell should be manned, led, and supported with prioritized, resident talent that allows the cell to function semi-autonomously with little reliance on additional staff inputs.

Doctrinal References:

- ADP 3-0, *Operations*, 21 March 2025
- FM 3-0, *Operations*, 21 March 2025
- FM 5-0, *Planning and Orders Production*, 4 November 2024
- FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 16 May 2022

Key Observation: #4: Posturing for success

Observation. Rear command post requires FUOPS planning capability.

Discussion. Doctrine specifies what capabilities are present in the rear command post (RCP), but with the modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) manning of the RCP for corps at or below under 40 personnel, units must tailor this element to meet their needs at a cost to other sections and units manning.



Figure 2-6. Rear Command Post Functions

Common to each unit observed was the expectation that the rear command post enables sustainment operations. Most sought to enable sustainment operations by including FUOPS sustainment planning elements in the RCP.

Corps and divisions that maintained FUOPS sustainment planning only in the supporting expeditionary sustainment command (ESC) or division sustainment brigade, or in the main command posts consistently struggled to synchronize operations within the 48–72-hour planning window.

Although the FUOPS planning effort continued, guidance, priority of effort, and consistent feedback from the unit's deputy commanding general-support, chief of sustainment, G-1, G-8, and division surgeon were not provided on a consistent basis. The separation of these planners

from the RCP inhibited the staff's ability to accurately integrate sustainment with the maneuver plan and assess sustainment operations resulting in failures in economy of effort and reduced responsiveness as shared understanding of requirements and resources eroded.



Figure 2-7. Armored Corps Sustainment Command

Recommendation(s): Form follows function. The chief of staff must codify what is required of their RCP and staff and equip accordingly. Regardless of MTOE, the responsibility to organize effectively to conduct planning is paramount:

- The 48-72 hours planning horizon is crucial to synchronization within the sustainment and the other warfighting functions through execution.
- Planning methods must address emerging requirements. Planning methods that rely on ad hoc planning teams often result in desynchronization that increases risk to force and mission that are unsustainable given the demands and pace of LSCO.
- ATP 4-91 specifies that "the division support brigade (DSB) support operations officer (SPO) officer is the principal staff officer for planning, coordinating, and synchronizing sustainment operations… the SPO and its subordinate sections are primarily focused on the mid-range planning horizons." Although not specified in doctrine, observed best practices place the DSB SPO and their staff in the RCP to provide the deputy commanding general-support and sustainment staff primaries a co-located FUOPS planning capability.

- Placing the ESC/DSB SPO in the RCP has the effect of enhancing the senior sustainment commander's influence into all rear area operational planning.

Figure 2-8. Division Rear Command Post "A Way"

- The RCP staff must include representatives from all the WFFs and deliberately integrate planner(s) with the G-5's planning events to synchronize maneuver plans and concepts with FUOPS planning in the RCP. The RCP must include representation in all operations related battle rhythm events to ensure continuity during RCP planning windows. Such an arrangement provides key leaders immediate access to planners inside the 48-72 hours planning horizon for rapid decision making, guidance or feedback, and additional resources for problem solving.

Doctrinal References:

- ADP 4-0, *Sustainment*, 31 July 2019
- ADP 5-0, *The Operations Process*, 31 July 2019

- ATP 4-91, *Division Sustainment Operations*, 14 March 2022
- ATP 6-0.5, *Command Post Organization and Operations*, 1 March 2017
- FM 3-94, *Armies, Corps, and Division Operations*, 23 July 2021
- FM 4-0, *Sustainment*, 14 August 2024
- FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 16 May 2022

Key Observation: #5: Protection Critical Path

Observation. The protection WFF lacks a defined critical path to operationalize decisions and manage risk.

Discussion. Current unit operations demonstrate a critical disconnect between protection planning and execution. Protection cells struggle to integrate within the unit's battle rhythm and nest the scheme of protection with the scheme of maneuver. Staffs rarely consider how an understanding of operational risk influences planning and decision making, which in turn limits the demand for this information from the integrating cells and working groups. This also limits proactive risk management, forces a reactive posture focused on immediate threats, and limits the commander's ability to preserve the combat power necessary for setting favorable conditions. This integration failure stems from two key information gaps:

- **Decision linkage.** Protection working groups (PWG) often fail to link outputs to decisions and planning requirements and conversely, lacks awareness of the inputs driving its own recommendations. This hinders effective integration into unit systems and processes.
- **Situational awareness and capability integration.** Protection efforts are hampered by limited presence in integrating cells and working groups, resulting in insufficient awareness of unit operations across all planning horizons. Furthermore, a narrow focus on maneuver enhancement brigade and division air defense artillery assets limits protection inputs to reactive risk management measures and prevents inputs into more offensive collections and targeting measures.

"Creating and exploiting relative advantages require Army forces to operate with endurance and in depth" (FM 3-0). Without addressing these informational gaps, protection WFF cells will default to reactive measures focused on immediate survival, severely limiting our ability to preserve combat power across the depth and duration of operations.

Recommendation(s): Establish a dedicated protection critical path that directly supports decision making. Utilizing the operations process as a framework, the critical path must carry information through a unit's battle rhythm from inception, to decision, and through execution and assessment. When defining a protection critical path, units must consider the following:

- Staff must support information requirements within the critical path through the integration of protection personnel, systems, and processes directly into the unit's integrating cells, battle rhythm, and operations process.
- Utilize the decision authorities matrix and battle rhythm to identify when and where protection planning and risk decisions are made by senior leaders and commanders. These decisions determine what information is pushed and pulled (inputs and outputs) through the critical path.
- Depicted in Figure 2-9, the critical path starts with the integrating cells. The protection WFF must ensure dedicated planners are represented – plans (green), FUOPS (amber), and CUOPS (red).
- The protection WFF must define the input into other critical staff processes such as targeting and collections. This ensures risk management measures are directly informed and aligned

with the commander's intent and the unit's operational plan. This process also ensures risk mitigation efforts set favorable conditions and proactively address vulnerabilities and could impact on critical unit mission objectives.

- Organize and structure the PWG to analyze, integrate and refine daily outputs that inform planning (integrating cells) and decisions (decision boards). Once approved, protection management decisions must be codified in orders to be executed by oversaw by CUOPS.
- Finally, the assessment working group (AWG) is integral to the protection critical path. Staff must assess the overall effectiveness of the scheme of protection and risk during the daily AWG. Outputs of the AWG then feed back into the integrating cells to inform the creation of new plans and/or the refinement of existing one.



Figure 2-9. Protection Critical Path

Doctrinal References:

- ADP 3-0*, Operations*, 21 March 2025
- ADP 3-37, *Protection*, 10 January 2024
- FM 3-0, *Operations*, 21 March 2025

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Chapter 3

Movement and Maneuver Warfighting Function

Introduction

This chapter delves into critical observations gleaned from corps and division warfighting exercise (WFX) experiences, revealing both the strengths and the persistent challenges in translating doctrinal principles into tangible battlefield advantages. This chapter argues that improving the operational framework, refining condition setting practices and planning horizons, focusing on deep attack capabilities, and optimizing the current operations integration cell (COIC) are important to achieve agility, convergence, endurance, and depth.

The first observation, titled "Operational Framework," examines the foundation upon which large-scale combat operations (LSCO) are built. While units increasingly recognize the importance of synchronizing operations across echelons and domains, they continue to struggle with the effective allocation of combat power towards the main effort. This dilution of resources hinders the ability to achieve favorable force ratios, leading to attritional warfare rather than decisive maneuver. Sustainment misalignment further exacerbates this problem, limiting operational reach and endurance. Prioritizing the main effort, holistically aligning all warfighting functions, and focusing on purposeful functions that achieve tangible effects are crucial for realizing the full potential of the operational framework. We must ask, "Is the framework enough to support the dynamism required by modern conflict and how well does it facilitate rapid adaptation and the integration of diverse capabilities?" A poorly defined framework can stifle agility and hinder the convergence of effects, ultimately undermining endurance and depth.

The second observation, "Condition Setting," is central to proactive maneuver. Currently, condition setting is often approached with broad objectives, limiting the ability to proactively shape the battlefield. A focus on shorter-term planning cycles, often driven by the air tasking order, creates friction between current operations, future operations, and long-range plans, hindering decision dominance. Strengthening condition setting requires precise, assessable outcomes, deliberate integration across all warfighting functions (WFFs), and thoughtful transitions between planning horizons. A clear, shared understanding of planning horizons is essential for synchronized condition setting.

The third observation, "Setting Conditions to Enable Combat Aviation Deep Attacks," underscores the critical importance of division-led planning and the active integration of all warfighting functions. Divisions are delegating the planning and battle tracking of combat aviation brigade (CAB) deep attacks to the CAB headquarters, leading to attacks that are not nested with the division's main efforts or executed during corps convergence windows. These deep attacks are intended to extend operations throughout the area of influence and create multiple dilemmas for the enemy, however, if these attacks are not integrated with the division's overall plan, they may fail to achieve the desired tactical effect and may even become isolated actions. Divisions that delegate these plans are unable to rapidly adapt these attacks to changing battlefield conditions and synchronize them with overall maneuver plans. Without division-led deep operations planning teams and sufficient prioritization and integration of WFFs the division is unable to achieve synergistic effects which generate the high payoff for a high-risk operation. To learn about depth.

> ***Depth*** is the extension of operations in time, space, or purpose to achieve definitive results (ADP 3-0).While the focus of endurance is on friendly combat power, the focus of depth is on enemy locations and dispositions across all domains. Commanders achieve depth by understanding the strengths and vulnerabilities of the enemy's echeloned capabilities, then attacking them throughout their dispositions in simultaneous and sequential fashion. Although simultaneous attacks through all domains in depth are not possible in every situation, leaders seek to expand their advantages and limit enemy opportunities for sanctuary and regeneration. Leaders describe the depth they can achieve in terms of operational reach.
>
> FM 3-0, *Operations*, March 2025, Page 55 3-35.

Figure 3-1. Depth as Explained in FM 3-0, *Operations*, March 2025

The final observation, "The Current Operations Integration Cell (COIC)" highlights its pivotal role as the operational nerve center. The COIC's capacity to anticipate future events, track ongoing operations with precision, seize opportunities, and proactively mitigate risk is crucial for maintaining agility and exploiting convergence. Yet, many COICs limit themselves to battle tracking, failing to proactively assess the current situation and inform decision points. A reactive COIC fails to synchronize warfighting functions and create a shared understanding of the operational environment.

Inadequate combat power tracking further impacts endurance. A well-functioning COIC acts as a force multiplier, enabling commanders to make timely decisions and effectively allocate resources across the battlespace, bolstering endurance, seizing and exploiting opportunities, and fostering the seamless integration of diverse elements.

In conclusion, these observations paint a picture of ongoing efforts to refine and optimize the implementation of FM 3-0, *Operations*, 21 March 2025. While the doctrine provides a solid framework, the true test lies in its practical application. By addressing the challenges outlined in these observations (strengthening the operational framework, unifying condition-setting efforts and planning horizons, enabling deep attack capabilities through division-led planning, and optimizing the COIC) corps and division headquarters can unlock the full potential of agility, convergence, endurance, and depth. Ultimately, by continuously refining our approach to planning and execution, we can bridge the gap between doctrine and reality, ensuring that our forces are prepared to meet the demands of the modern battlefield and achieve decisive victory in LSCO.

Observation: #1: Operational Framework

Observation. Units demonstrated improvements in defining operational frameworks during planning, particularly in delineating deep, close, and rear areas. However, units continue to inadequately **allocate combat power to weigh and sustain the main effort.** This issue leads to diluted combat power and positional warfare of attrition rather than maneuver.

Discussion. Compared to past observations, units in FY25 increasingly recognized the importance of the operational framework to synchronize operations across echelons and domains. In general, units more consistently apply boundary mechanisms and define the deep, close, and rear areas to define fights at echelon. This consistency resulted in improved apportionment of higher headquarters' joint and multidomain effects through the targeting process inside the battle rhythm. These efforts reflect a growing understanding of the operational framework's role of enabling synchronization and convergence.



Figure 3-2. Conceptual into Detailed Planning

Despite these advancements, units consistently fail to allocate combat power effectively towards the **main effort**. Divisions and corps often spread combat power evenly across subordinate units, rather than concentrate resources at the decisive point. This approach undermines the ability to achieve favorable force ratios and forces brigades to attack enemy strengths, resulting in heavy attrition and slowed operational tempo. For example, during one WFX, divisions advanced multiple brigades abreast without achieving favorable force ratios, leading to attritional engagements and missed opportunities to achieve decisive outcomes.

Sustainment misalignment further exacerbates this problem. Units struggle to anticipate and prioritize sustainment requirements for the main effort, leading to delays in resupply and reduced operational reach and endurance. This issue was evident in one WFX where units failed to align sustainment efforts with the main effort, resulting in logistics gaps and diminished combat effectiveness.

Additionally, although units improved dynamic adjustments to their operational frameworks during execution, these revisions remain focused on components of the deep, close, and rear areas almost exclusively. This narrow focus limits a unit's ability to adapt to changing battlefield conditions and reallocate combat power as needed. The operational framework outlined in FM 3-0 addresses geographic boundaries to define and scope authorities, assignment of areas of operation to scale operations, and assigning main, supporting, and reserve forces to prioritize resources. These challenges are assessed by two contributing factors during the planning phase:

- First, units do not adequately factor in terrain and enemy considerations as it relates to preservation of combat power or its efficient use. In the selected scenarios the Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) provides training audiences, it is not uncommon to observe units retain the preponderance of organic combat power at echelon, despite terrain and enemy considerations that favor attacker or defender roles in a unit's assigned areas.

- Second, planners do not adequately apply the connective *logic* of the operational framework as it relates to **forms of maneuver** and tactical sequencing of forces inside the **tactical framework**. For example, units describe operational flanks for envelopments in localized tactical sense; but in practice, force apportionment and boundary placement retain the characteristics of a frontal attack (attack across a broad frontage with evenly distributed forces). Additionally, there remains a consistent lack of thought to interpret the **minimum essential combat power required to achieve a desired effect to enable the application of weight the main effort** based on any stated form of maneuver. A unit's task organization, as reflected in Annex A during an exercise provides evidence of this persistent trend. It is not uncommon to see few significant deviations from corps- and division-level organic combat power.

In each factor, a unit's task organization, as reflected in Annex A, provides evidence of this persistent trend. Few units make significant adjustments to corps and division organic task organizations that would be required to align the capabilities or force ratios needed to execute the forms of maneuver as visualized by the commander.

The second order effect of this consequence is natural tension between the conduct of simultaneous versus sequential actions. Units understand their role is to shape the deep area to enable the close fight. However, when units do not weigh the main effort, it forces commanders and staff to continuously create suboptimal choices, using limited resources to continue shaping through the close fight to achieve favorable correlation of forces and means (COFMS). The effect is observed through delayed tempo, often between one or more targeting cycles. When units do not adequately weight the main effort throughout the entirety of the operational framework, units usually achieve only attritional effects. As a result, units subsequently adjust tactics from a commander's (typical) preference from simultaneous to sequential operations.

This observation highlights an issue as it limits a commander's options for creating dilemmas and limits a unit's ability to achieve endurance and depth.



Figure 3-3. Operational Framework

Recommendation(s): Begin with the enemy and end in mind. Units must apply the backwards planning methodology created during planning and translate the stated effects into application of the operational framework:

- Units must use and apply assessments from enemy Event Templates (EVENTEMPs) and Situation Templates (SITEMPs) during planning and execution to apply meaningful context to plans.
- Application of defeat mechanisms should translate to employment of a stated form of maneuver. For example, if the defeat mechanism desired was to **dislocate**, the form of maneuver may require a single envelopment or penetration. Subsequently, the geometry (unit boundaries) and sequencing of forces should reflect this logic.
- The sequencing and functions of forces outlined in FM 3-90, *Tactics*, 1 May 2023, reinforce the likely phases and transitional points for different forms of maneuver.

- The geometry of the operational framework should match the form of maneuver if it is expected to work.

Prioritize the main effort across all warfighting functions. Units must clearly identify the main effort during planning and allocate combat power to achieve favorable force ratios. This includes concentrating fires, maneuver, protection, and sustainment resources on the main effort to ensure decisive outcomes:

- The main effort requires holistic support, not limited to fires and aviation. A best practice is to require all warfighting leadership to participate in the unit's operations synchronization, specifically the G-4 and protection chief. *Unity of effort* aligned to the main effort is the goal.
- Use of command and support relationships for key enablers remain effective instruments for procedural control while delivering apportioned effects.
- Units should avoid executing a frontal attack by advancing multiple subordinate units abreast unless conditions are set to achieve favorable force ratios, and it is the commander's intended form of maneuver.

Link Forces to Purposeful Functions that Achieve Effects.

- **Use the tactical framework** (**find, fix, finish, and follow through)** for apportioning forces to achieve the fundamental purposeful effects that enable sequencing of forces to mass effects at the decisive point (FM 3-90).
- **Define the purpose, then task**. During course of action development, first define the purpose and force array, then identify the appropriate task and controlling headquarters (FM 5-0, *Planning and Orders Production*, 4 November 2024). Units consistently assign tasks to subordinate units without commensurate proportional combat power, which then limits options, overcommits combat power, confuses the overall intent, and reduces flexibility.
- A best practice is often observed during the commander-to-commander dialogue where commanders focus on the purpose and outcome desired rather than the task requirements – beginning with the end and enemy in mind. This type of discussion needs to occur at the staff level first to enable bottom-up refinement of feasible options.
- **Enable flexibility.** Beyond the basics of offense or defense, tactical tasks are correlated to combat power. Through dialogue, determine the most flexible task that allows the commander flexibility to achieve the intent. For example, if discrete destruction of a critical capability is required, selection of neutralize versus destroy affords commanders at echelon their respective flexibility while adhering to mission command principles.

A common problem is dismissal of otherwise valid tasks such as disrupt, delay, canalize, interdict, or suppress (FM 3-90). An additional best practice is use of a "nesting diagram" to see the relationship of units to the main effort. This fighting product provides a more efficient visual tool to observe combat power requirements in relation to the task assignment (FM 5-0).

Continue to refine operational frameworks during execution. Units that develop a by phase operational framework during the military decision-making process (MDMP), review and adjust templated changes to the operational framework during each phase, as the operation progresses is the best practice. Specific actions and focus areas should continue to advance effectiveness:

- Continue regular updates to boundaries, fire support coordination measures (FSCMs), and airspace coordinating measures (ACMs) during the battle rhythm.
- Units should create forecasted operational frameworks accounting for the "follow-through" element of the tactical framework in pre-planned sequels for divisions and corps. This level of planning enables rapid refinement during execution and even accounts for subordinate initiative, potentially leading to "catastrophic success."
- Flexible framework planning and aggressive condition setting enable the agility of a subordinate striking force in a division- or corps-level mobile defense, another observed best practice.
- Units should include a deliberate review of resource apportionment. *Specifying* the main and supporting units alone is insufficient. Units should review the assigned tasks and assess combat power requirements using decision support tools, such as decision support matrices (DSMs), to link operational framework adjustments to commander decision points. Units should retain and carry forward the relative combat power assessments used during MDMP to assess remaining options during execution.

Doctrinal References:

- ADP 3-0, *Operations*, 21 March 2025
- FM 3-0, *Operations*, 21 March 2025
- FM 3-90, *Tactics*, May 1, 2023
- FM 5-0, *Planning and Orders Production*, 4 November 2024
- FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 16 May 2022

Observation: #2: Condition Setting

Observation. Fragmented condition setting and poorly defined planning horizons impede decision dominance.

Discussion. Many units are navigating the challenges of maintaining effective condition setting processes while balancing the demands of dynamic operational environments. Currently, condition setting is often approached with broad objectives, which can make assessment difficult. A common practice is to align planning primarily with the air tasking order (ATO) cycle. While necessary for synchronization, ATO planning limits proactive planning across all operational phases. When unit operations are planned by ATO, the COIC, and the joint air-ground integration center (JAGIC) focus on executing the 24-hour cycle while losing sight of the current phase end state. When divisions and corps plan by phase, units focus on condition setting and associated assessments across a phase or operation while allowing the COIC and JAGIC to dynamically assign taskings in support of the unit's desired end state.



Figure 3-4. Integrating Cells

This focus on shorter-term cycles can create friction between current operations (G-33), future operations (G-35), and long-range plans (G-5). Without clearly defined products and consistent transitions between these cells, maintaining synchronization can be challenging.

Strengthening condition setting requires precise, assessable outcomes, deliberate integration across all WFFs, and thoughtful transitions between planning horizons. Proactively shaping the operational environment before decisive operations offer opportunities to reduce risk and enhance mission success. A collaborative approach to planning can help ensure all elements are working towards a shared understanding of desired conditions and timelines.



Figure 3-5. Transition Checklist "A Way"

Recommendation(s): Defined products and transitions. Establish clear deliverables and handovers. Develop a standardized matrix outlining specific products and each planning horizon (current fight, next fight, fight after next) that must be delivered, including the level of completion required at each transition point.

This matrix must be approved by the division commander and enforced by the G-3. **Specifically, require the G-5, G-35, and G-33 leads to formally agreeing on product expectations** and enforcing disciplined handovers during daily synchronization meetings. These meetings should include a review of progress against established conditions and a discussion of challenges.

Ensure planning working group defines planning horizon requirements. The planning working group is responsible for defining measurable conditions for each planning horizon, assigning clear ownership of those conditions, and developing checklists that directly support the commander's guidance. The working group will conduct regular assessments of progress and

identify potential gaps or shortfalls per horizon. The working group needs to look at assessments and impacts across all horizons.



Figure 3-6. The Division Operations Process

Knowledge management optimization, enhance existing digital tools for accountability. Maximize the utilization of existing digital tools (such as SharePoint, Microsoft Teams, and current collaboration platforms) to build and maintain accessible digital workspaces for each planning horizon.

Focus on standardizing folder structures, naming conventions, and access permissions to ensure seamless information sharing. Leverage existing knowledge management officer/representative and information management expertise to develop and implement automated reporting mechanisms using current software capabilities (e.g., SharePoint alerts, power automate workflows, commander's critical information requirements, and essential elements of friendly intelligence collection alerts) to provide leaders with available readiness assessments and track progress against conditions.

Doctrinal References:

- ADP 3-0, *Operations*, 21 March 2025
- FM 3-0, Operations, 21 March 2025
- FM 5-0, *Planning and Orders Production*, 4 November 2024
- FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 16 May 2022

Observation: #3: Setting Conditions to Enable Combat Aviation Deep Attacks

Observation. Divisions are delegating the planning and battle tracking of CAB deep attacks to the CAB headquarters. This results in the attacks not being nested with the division's main efforts or not being executed during Corps convergence windows.

Discussion. Units that succeed in employing the CAB during deep attacks deliberately set conditions by leading the integration of planning efforts, resourcing critical enablers, and maintaining a shared understanding across warfighting functions (FM 3-04, *Army Aviation*, 27 March 2025).



Figure 3-7. Deep Operations Planning Team "A Way"

Divisions accomplish integrated planning by having effective deep operation planning teams (DOPTs) led by the division G-35. As outlined in ATP 3-94.2, Deep Operations, 1 September 2016, highly experienced liaison officer planners from the CAB and all division-level warfighting functions provide the necessary planning efforts and running estimates required from the division level, enabling top-down planning and bottom-up refinement from the CAB to the plan. With the restructuring of the CAB, which removes half of the AH-64 helicopter fleet and rescoping of organic intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, it is more incumbent than ever for the division to take the lead in reducing the risk to the limited assets in the CAB while still enabling maneuver for the division.

Recommendation(s): To improve effectiveness and reduce the risk of deep attacks, implement the following recommendations.



Figure 3-8. Deep Operations Planning Model "A Way"

Deep operation planning teams. For added success in the DOPT, they should follow an air assault planning process and horizon, ideally a 96-hour planning timeline. By anticipating the division's progress in the operation, the DOPT can leverage other boards and meetings, such as the targeting working group and assessment working groups, to ensure timely requests for enablers to support the CAB attack. The DOPT ensures that division staff synchronize efforts to request needed enablers, prioritize resources, and allocate airspace to employ the requisite convergence of effects. This presents multiple dilemmas to overwhelm the enemy, complicating their decision-making process, by utilizing a concentrated attack that creates an exploitable window of high-payoff target (HPT) vulnerability and minimizing risk to the force.

The final key to successful CAB deep attacks comes in a final condition check or go/no-go brief to the senior decision authority identified in the delegation authority matrix. The decision brief (with an example conditions checklist at Figure 3-9.) enables staff to provide the commander with estimates of the mission's probability of success. Allowing the proper authority to assess the risk to the force and risk to the mission, and determine if the mission needs to be delayed, diverted, or aborted.



Figure 3-9. Example Conditions Checklist

Implement a deliberate, division-led planning process. The division G-35 should lead a deliberate planning process that integrates all warfighting functions in a DOPT, with active participation and input from the CAB. This top-down planning with bottom-up refinement process should include iteratively scheduled touchpoints and candid conditions checks to ensure synchronization of operations with corps convergence effects and shared understanding.

Plan with as much horizon as possible. Whenever possible, plan any deep attacks at least 96 hours in advance. Planning allows staff to request the fire support plan, named areas of interest, aviation support requests, and space effects promptly. Staff can refine the details as the day of execution draws closer.

Target refinement. The CAB must have target fidelity prior to the conditions check. These attacks should be based on clear triggers to prosecute identified HPTs to support the division's maneuver plan. In the absence of target fidelity any decision to employ the CAB to conduct a movement to contact should be a deliberate process and risk decision.

Conduct final conditions checks. Plan to have final conditions checks or go/no-go briefs conducted not less than three hours before wheels-up time of the attack launching. This allows the appropriate leader (commanding general or deputy commanding general-maneuver) to decide whether the mission should launch and enable the crews to complete their updates/briefings.

By implementing these recommendations, the division can improve planning, coordination, and resource allocation, ultimately increase the likelihood of success and reduce the risk to friendly forces during deep attacks.

Doctrinal References:

- ATP 3-52.1, *Multi-service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airspace Control*, 21 June 2023
- ATP 3-94.2, *Deep Operations*, 1 September 2016
- ATP 6-05, *Command Post Organization and Operations*, 1 March 2017
- FM 3-0, *Operations*, 21 March 2025
- FM 3-04, *Army Aviation*, 27 March 2025
- FM 3-60, *Army Targeting*, 11 August 2023

Observation: #4: The Current Operations Integration Cell

Observation. Central to the COIC's ability to synchronize all warfighting functions (WFFs) is the common operational picture (COP) and continuously updated staff running estimates. Corps and division COICs limit themselves to battle tracking rather than continuously assessing the current situation to inform decision points, mitigate risks, and capitalize on opportunities.



Figure 3-10. Current Operations Integration Cell Processes

Discussion. COICs relied on execution checklists, relegating them to battle tracking rather than continually assessing the current operation to drive the rapid decision-making process or anticipate the commander's decision points:

- The COIC must be resourced with decision support matrices and a delegated authority matrix to be able to transition from battle tracking to fighting the battle.
- Without the authority, or the presence of a leader with authority, the COIC is unable to seize opportunities with the rhythm of the battle and are relegated to watching the operation unfold without the ability to execute branches or sequels to achieve the commanders intent and end state.

Several deficiencies in battle tracking limited the COIC's ability to anticipate and shape operations in the 12–24-hour time-horizon.

- Staff sections running estimates and COIC battle drills and processes often fell short of providing the requisite analytical rigor required to control and shape current operations effectively. The failures of the running estimates to accurately see themselves, the enemy, and the terrain at the pace of operations negatively impact the COIC's function and increases

risk to force and mission. Additionally, WFFs struggled to create shared understanding within the COIC.

- JAGICs often struggled to synchronize joint fires, airspace control, and information collection when not integrated in the division's COIC.
- Dispersed rear command posts often did not share their detailed understanding of the sustainment COP in a timely manner, hindering the main command post COIC's ability to provide accurate assessments to inform critical resourcing and task organization decisions.
- The COIC's reliance on execution checklists, rather than synchronization or execution matrices, constrained shared understanding and hindered proactive synchronization of warfighting functions. Staff members prioritized process over analysis, neglecting the conditions that should inform decisions and transitions into critical events.
- The COIC's operational update briefs and 2-minute drills often lacked analytical rigor, failing to illuminate decision points, risk, or opportunities.
- The absence of a relative combat power assessment reduced the COIC's ability to anticipate and mitigate risk in close combat, for example, by adjusting unfavorable COFMS before an attack or determining the conditions for reserve commitment.

Current combat power tracking methodology remains insufficient, providing no objective measure of the unit's ability to sustain operations or inform critical resourcing and task-organization decisions. The COIC's reliance on execution checklists without complete familiarity with the plan prevented proactive identification of decision points and constrained timely analysis.

Recommendation(s): COICs must task organize appropriately and train staff personnel in COIC processes that enable them to effectively monitor, evaluate, direct, and control the execution of orders. A division or corps COIC should adopt the following measures to transition from battle tracking to fighting the battle and anticipation of decision points, critical events, and transitions.

Proactive COIC management and focus on conditions-based decision making. The deputy commanding general-maneuver and chief of staff should train the COIC staff, especially the G-33, to monitor and analyze conditions that drive key decisions and transitions. Shift the emphasis from checklist-driven tracking to anticipatory analysis of operational conditions, enabling timely recommendations to decision-makers identified in the division or corps' decision authority matrix. Establish a disciplined battle rhythm to synchronize the G-33, JAGIC, and G-2 current operations staff and ensure rapid updates to the division COP.



Figure 3-11. 2-minute Drill

Refinement of the COIC Operational Update Brief/2-minute Drill:

- Institute a structured analytical framework within the drill to address enemy activity, friendly force, 2 level down, posture by combat units' ability, and environmental factors concerning upcoming decision points and transitions. "
- Integrate Decision Support Matrix (DSM) and Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) analysis to forecast enemy COAs. "
- Require each warfighting function to maintain a running estimate, assessing progress toward conditions that drive decisions and critical events, while identifying risks and recommending proactive mitigation measures.

Employ synchronization matrices and fighting products produced by the G-35. Train the COIC to leverage synchronization matrices and fighting products published by the G-35 to promote understanding, enable decision point anticipation, and synchronize functions.

Improve combat power tracking. Develop objective methodology for assessing combat power at division and corps levels tracking two levels down of subordinate units. Focus on combat capabilities over raw numbers and percentages in a unit. Incorporate combat and support forces and aggregate firepower for assessment, reserve commitment, and reconstitution.

Doctrinal References:

- ADP 3-0, *Operations,* 21 March 2025
- FM 5-0, *Planning and Orders Production*, 4 November 2024
- FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 16 May 2022

Chapter 4

Command and Control Warfighting Function

Introduction

According to FM 3-0, Operations, 21 March 2025, the primary purpose of the warfighting function of command and control is to assist commanders in integrating the other warfighting functions effectively at each echelon and to apply combat power to achieve objectives and accomplish missions. The primary way division and corps staff execute command and control is by running a battle rhythm that allows for integration across warfighting functions and by charging the current operations and future operations as well as the plans cells to integrate. Staff also execute command and control by maintaining mission command systems at all command posts, allowing for shared understanding across staff sections and echelons.

"Staff integration" (the command-and-control key observation in Chapter 2) highlights common staff challenges regarding leader integration, process management, and resource allocation. Observations indicate staff often struggle to effectively integrate key leaders into critical processes and utilize appropriate products, leading to reactionary rather than anticipatory decision-making. The central theme emphasizes the importance of empowering senior leaders to maintain constant control of the fight and exploit opportunities, reducing reliance on frequent meetings. This observation's recommendations advocate for properly staffing and resourcing the future operations cell to facilitate continuous plan refinement and prioritizing the right information flow to enhance visualization, decision speed and agility.

"Command post employment" focuses on improving command and control effectiveness, particularly during large-scale combat operations (LSCO), by addressing inconsistencies and synchronization issues among the division main command post (MCP), division tactical command post (TAC), and rear command post (RCP). There is also emphasis on empowering subordinate leaders via diligent enforcement of the delegated authorities matrix (DAM) and conducting regular command post (CP) synchronization exercises to improve information sharing and transition of authority procedures. Key recommendations include standardizing CP employment protocols, clarifying decision authorities through a comprehensive DAM, and fully integrating all warfighting functions into the common operational picture (COP) development to provide a holistic battlefield view.

"Assessments" highlight persistent challenges in military assessment practices. Units struggle to develop structured frameworks, integrate efforts across warfighting functions, and link assessments to actionable decisions that are codified in a decision support matrix or defined end state for the operation or phase of the operation. A key issue is the failure to define and utilize quantifiable measures of performance and effectiveness, leading to reliance on subjective estimations and raw data instead of robust analysis to generate the "so what" for a decision maker. Recommendations focus on standardizing a running assessment framework, integrating assessments both within and across staff sections, mandating quantifiable metrics, and increasing senior leader engagement in the assessments working group (AWG) to ensure assessments drive decisions related to decisive points.

"Bandwidth management" addresses the critical issue of bandwidth limitations during LSCO and the lack of proactive management surrounding it. Current doctrine acknowledges the importance of bandwidth but lacks specific guidance on planning for constrained environments. Key deficiencies include a failure to prioritize applications and users, insufficient monitoring and analysis of bandwidth consumption, and a lack of integration of bandwidth considerations into military planning processes like military decision-making process (MDMP) and joint planning process (JPP) and its impacts to command posts and their functionality and ability to execute assigned responsibilities. Recommendations center on refining doctrinal guidance, establishing standardized bandwidth management protocols, implementing regular exercises with constrained bandwidth, and equipping units with the tools to monitor and analyze network performance.

"Knowledge management" discusses the systemic struggle in our organization's approach to knowledge management (KM). Units often misconstrue the role of knowledge management officers (KMOs) as simply data managers, rather than facilitators of knowledge sharing and shared understanding focused on Essential elements of friendly information and information requirements. Also, the lack of dedicated knowledge management representatives (KMRs) within warfighting functions and inconsistent practices of content management, hinder access to critical information and impacts decision making. Recommendations focus on restructuring KM programs, prioritizing oversight by the chief of staff, assigning KMRs and digital master gunners (DMG) from each staff section, and establishing a formalized training plan and KM Working Group to clearly define roles, responsibilities, and procedures aiming to cultivate a culture of knowledge sharing and improve operational effectiveness.

The FY25 observations regarding staff integration, assessments, command post employment, knowledge management, and bandwidth management collectively reveal a critical need to refine foundational command and control practices. Addressing these areas from empowering key leaders and streamlining staff processes to standardizing assessments and fostering robust knowledge sharing is paramount to achieving proactive, rather than reactive, decision-making. By prioritizing these recommendations, units can enhance their ability to integrate across warfighting functions and echelons, improve battlefield visualization, and ultimately, maintain the initiative and exploit opportunities in complex operational environments. A concerted effort to implement these changes will be essential for maximizing effectiveness in future large-scale combat operations. The observations can be tied in many facets to the tenets of FM 3-0 to include but not limited to convergence, agility, depth and endurance.

Observation: #1: Command Post Employment

Observation. Ineffective employment of unit command posts reduces mission command effectiveness.

Discussion. Inconsistent employment standards and a lack of synchronization of division command posts (MCP, TAC, and RCP) hinder effective command and control, particularly during LSCO:

- To enhance shared understanding, the unit COPs must move beyond a maneuver, fires, and intelligence focus to fully integrate all warfighting functions to – including sustainment, protection, and information operations – providing a holistic view of the battlefield.
- Staff can strengthen the translation of the commander's intent by proactively clarifying the operational framework (deep, close, and rear areas with designated main and supporting efforts).
- Staff sections should actively seek understanding of how each task contributes to achieving the commander's intent.

Division tactical command posts (TACs) often operate with unclear authorities which limits their ability to provide effective forward command and control. Simultaneously, the RCP is underutilized as a critical node for planning, coordination, and continuity of operations, often lacking a clearly defined role during execution.

Units often do not implement a comprehensive DAM to clearly delineate responsibilities and authorities for all key functions across all command posts. Doing so will ensure timely, decisive action and prevent conflicting guidance.

Integrating both the TAC and RCP fully into the COP, with dedicated communication channels and standardized reporting, will further enhance situational awareness and coordination. Standardizing CP employment protocol and improving communication are essential to maximize command and control effectiveness.

Recommendation(s): Standardize and Validate Division CP SOPs:

- Revise and standardize division SOPs for all CPs (MCP, TAC, RCP), incorporating clear definitions of roles, responsibilities, authorities, and reporting requirements.
- Develop and validate a comprehensive DAM for each CP, outlining decision-making thresholds and escalation procedures.
- Create an operational primary, alternate, contingency, emergency (PACE) plan for each CP to clearly define each CP's operational priorities.

Refine command post employment SOPs. Refine SOPs for all command posts (MCP, TAC, and RCPs), outlining clear criteria for activation, required manning levels based on mission variables, essential equipment lists, and standardized procedures for transition of authority (TOA). SOPs must include checklists for pre-mission validation of systems, communication links, and reporting requirements. Emphasis will be placed on leveraging existing equipment and personnel.



Figure 4-1. Structure and Function of a Command Post

Conduct CP synchronization exercises. Incorporate CP synchronization exercises into all collective training events. These exercises should focus on information sharing, decision-making, and TOA procedures between MCP, TAC, and RCPs. Utilize realistic scenarios and injects to simulate battlefield complexity.

Empower subordinate leaders via DAM enforcement. Commanders at all echelons must actively enforce the DAM, empowering subordinate leaders to make decisions within their delegated authorities. Conduct regular reviews of the DAM to ensure its relevance and effectiveness.

Doctrinal References:

- ADP 3-0, *Operations*, 21 March 2025
- FM 3-0, *Operations*, 21 March 2025
- FM 5-0, *Planning and Orders Production*, 4 November 2024
- FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 16 May 2022

Observation: #2: Assessments

Observation. Units continue to face challenges in framing the focus of what they are assessing, integrating efforts across warfighting functions (WFFs), and linking assessments to decisions and data inputs to articulate progression of an operation, which hinders effective decision making.

Discussion. Assessments across the staff lack effective framing. Units tend to either narrowly focus on 24-hour increments tied to the air tasking order days, or units will focus on the entirety of the operation at large:

- In the narrow, 24-hour framing, unit assessments fail to articulate the trajectory of an operation with end state conditions and objectives as the goal.
- In the whole-of-operation framing, unit assessments fail to define the incremental phasing and intermediate objectives before reaching the end of the operation. In this case, the end state conditions outlined in the commander's intent from the original operations order is the goal, rather than end state conditions by phase.

Staff often fail to define measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs), which are essential for evaluating progress toward objectives. The result is the collection and reporting of unprocessed data rather than analyzed information and requisite collective analysis needed to link effects to objectives and decision points and therefore fails to provide actionable recommendations.

Assessments rely heavily on subjective estimations and incomplete information, hindering accurate risk identification and informed decision-making. The need for quantifiable metrics within the AWG is crucial. Without them, assessments lack the precision required for effective course correction. This results in organizations' subsequent reliance on a series of boards and working groups to direct and lead division operations, but ultimately lack a clear, unifying end state for which the division is trying to achieve.

For example, during one exercise, units presented raw data, such as the number of destroyed enemy assets, without linking these effects to operational objectives or decision points. By briefing raw data, the staff undermined their ability to produce comprehensive assessments that inform decisions, and were siloed within specific WFFs, such as intelligence or fires, rather than being integrated across all WFFs to provide a holistic understanding of the operational environment. The result was an inability to unveil risks or opportunities for future operations, nor did they clearly articulate adjustment or execution decisions to the decision-makers.

Finally, another recurring issue is the poor placement of assessments in the battle rhythm. Assessments are often scheduled too late to influence key decisions or are not synchronized with other processes like targeting and planning. For instance, in FY24 Key Observations, assessments were not placed early enough to inform targeting working groups and plans synchronization boards, limiting their impact on operational adjustments. In response, during FY25 units placed their AWGs before the targeting working group but collective staff integration remains poor, and the purpose of assessments has shifted to achieve targeting priorities rather than influencing decisions related to decisive points. These challenges are compounded by insufficient leader engagement. Senior leaders, such as deputy commanding generals and chiefs of staff, are not consistently involved in driving assessments leading to a lack of focus and discipline.



Figure 4-2. Assessment Process

Recommendation(s): To improve assessment practices, the following actions are recommended:

- **Standardize the focus of running estimates.** FM 5-0 states that running estimates will assist commanders and staff with understanding situations, assessing progress, and making effective decisions throughout an operation. Within the running estimates staff need to input analyzed information that is focused on determining progress towards achieving end state conditions. Standardize the running estimates that integrate findings from various working groups (operations, plans, sustainment, targeting) into a cohesive picture of the operational environment. When developing an assessment as a group, review the macro picture of the operation, ensuring it is nested with higher and discuss the desired end states for the current fight. Focus discussion on how the organization is progressing towards achieving those end state conditions. The discussion then needs to proceed into preparatory actions for future phases of the operation.
- **Quantifiable metrics.** Mandate the use of quantifiable metrics for each phase and integrate these metrics into regular assessment cycles throughout the day.

- **Internal and overall assessments.** The staff need to assess internally to respective staff section/warfighting functions to determine if it is performing effectively. The staff needs to assess the progress of the operation to ensure it is synchronized and sequenced accordingly.
- **Leader engagement and AWG.** Ensure leader engagement and effective battle rhythm placement of the AWG. If done as the first event of the battle rhythm, it will capture the current situation and enable the senior decision-maker to make course corrections to be carried out throughout the day.

These recommendations, grounded in the provided sources and relevant doctrine (see below), aim to transform assessment from a reactive process into a proactive, data-driven capability that enables informed decision-making and enhances mission effectiveness.

Doctrinal References:

- ATP 5-0.3, *Operation Assessment*, 7 February 2020
- FM 5-0, *Planning and Orders Production*, 4 November 2024

Observation: #3: Bandwidth Management

Observation. Contemporary military operations are increasingly reliant on data-intensive applications, advanced sensor networks, and real-time communication. However, the assumption of readily available, high-bandwidth connectivity – often pursued through solutions like fiber optic cables, upgraded encryption devices, or commercial technologies (Starlink, 5G) – may not always be readily available, particularly within the context of LSCO.

Discussion. The criticality of sufficient bandwidth to enable effective command and control, data sharing, and situational awareness is undeniable. Commanders and staff recognize its importance for maintaining operational visualization. However, current practices reveal a significant disconnect between this acknowledged need and the realistic preparation for operating in bandwidth-constrained environments. This manifests in several key areas:

- **Lack of proactive bandwidth management.** Units frequently fail to monitor bandwidth consumption, conduct trend analysis, or proactively identify network bottlenecks. This reactive posture hinders optimization efforts and prevents the establishment of a baseline understanding of network performance. Units need to understand the bandwidth requirements down to the lowest level, not just their own requirements.
- **Insufficient prioritization of applications and users**. A robust framework for prioritizing users and tasks based on bandwidth availability is often absent. This leads to inefficient allocation of limited resources and compromises the delivery of essential information to key personnel. The tendency to treat bandwidth as an unlimited resource, rather than a strategically vital constraint, exacerbates this issue.
- **Inadequate training in constrained environments.** Existing training paradigms rarely simulate realistic bandwidth limitations, relying instead on the assumption of ubiquitous connectivity. This deficiency leaves units unprepared to adapt processes and procedures when faced with degraded or limited communication capabilities.
- **Inefficient data handling practices.** Suboptimal practices regarding data storage (local versus collaborative), file compression, and unnecessary application usage contribute to bandwidth congestion.

These deficiencies collectively impede the effective functioning of command posts and staff, hindering their ability to process information, formulate plans, and execute operations in a timely and decisive manner. Doctrinal references (ATP 6-0.5, *Command Post Organization and Operations*, 1 March 2017; FM 5-0, Planning and Orders Production, 4 November 2024; FM 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations, 16 May 2022; and FM 6-02, Signal Support to Operations, 19 September 2019) emphasize the importance of robust communication networks but lack specific guidance on proactively addressing bandwidth limitations as a core component of operational planning.

Recommendation(s): Implement regular constrained bandwidth exercises. Conduct sustained operational exercises that restrict bandwidth availability, forcing units to rely on tactical communication assets. These exercises should span extended periods to foster adaptation and identify process improvements.

Develop and enforce bandwidth management procedures. Establish/refine clear, SOPs for bandwidth allocation, application prioritization, and data handling. These SOPs should include:

- Defined update schedules to minimize redundant data transmission.
- Restrictions on non-essential media consumption (e.g., streaming video) for all but designated personnel.
- Mandatory file compression prior to transmission.
- Procedures for closing unnecessary applications and browser tabs.

Establish bandwidth monitoring and analysis capabilities. Units need to effectively train on the bandwidth monitoring tools installed on their systems. Training on these tools should include monitoring bandwidth usage, identify bottlenecks, and conduct trend analysis. This data should inform future capacity planning and allocation decisions.

Integrate bandwidth considerations into MDMP/JPP. Bandwidth should be tracked as a class of supply complete with forecasts of availability and assessment of which command posts will have what level of connectivity and analysis to indicate if the allocated bandwidth is sufficient to enable a command post assigned responsibility. Explicitly incorporate bandwidth limitations into MDMP and JPP. This includes assessing the bandwidth requirements of all tasks and developing contingency plans for operating in degraded communication environments.

Refine doctrinal guidance. Update relevant doctrinal references (see below) to provide more detailed guidance on bandwidth management in LSCO, emphasizing proactive planning and adaptation to constrained environments.

Doctrinal References:

- ATP 6-05, *Command Post Organization and Operations*, 1 March 2017
- FM 5-0, *Planning and Orders Production*, 4 November 2024
- FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 16 May 2022
- FM 6-02, *Signal Support to Operations*, 19 September 2019

Observation: #4: Knowledge Management

Observation. Current division and corps practices demonstrate a systemic misalignment between KM intent and execution.

Units frequently relegate KMOs to data management tasks, managing digital layers or SharePoint permissions instead of proactively fostering knowledge sharing and shared understanding across the staff focused on information requirements and essential elements of friendly information.

This constriction of the KMO role, coupled with a lack of dedicated KMRs within warfighting functions and subordinate brigades, impedes the integration of KM into the overall operations process and negatively impacts the division commander's ability to make informed decisions.

Multiple WFXs revealed consistent difficulties locating critical products, such as fragmentary orders (FRAGORDs) and synchronization matrices (SYNCMATs), particularly during initial operations. Non-standardized naming conventions further exacerbate these challenges.

Discussion. The observed deficiencies stem from a fundamental misunderstanding of KM's purpose and a failure to enforce established KM business rules. Without dedicated personnel enforcing consistent filing, tagging, and dissemination practices, critical information becomes inaccessible, hindering shared understanding and operational tempo.

The chief of staff, as the owner of KM within the division, must actively shape intent and oversee execution, recognizing a clear distinction between data management and the broader function of knowledge management.

Existing KM programs lack formalization; a structured training plan, coupled with a KM working group, will delineate roles, responsibilities, and procedures for integrating KM into daily operations. A resilient learning organization requires collaboration, transparency, and continuous learning—elements currently underdeveloped within divisional KM structures.

Furthermore, assigning KMRs and DMGs from each staff section demonstrates leadership commitment and provides critical reach back expertise to the KMO. The KMO must then design a KM course to train KMRs in best practices, digital discipline, and the enforcement of KM principles within their respective warfighting functions.

Recommendation(s): Division and corps must fundamentally restructure their approach to knowledge management. The following recommendations are proposed:

- **Prioritize KM program oversight.** The chief of staff must prioritize KM program oversight, ensuring KMOs focus on enabling knowledge sharing rather than solely managing data.
- **Assign KMR's and DMGs.** Organizations must assign KMRs and DMGs from each staff section to facilitate integration and provide critical expertise. This will identify operational and knowledge gaps to allow for effective solutions to be determined.
- **Organize training and a KM working group**. The KMO must develop and implement a quarterly training plan for the staff, alongside a formalized KM working group, to establish clear roles, responsibilities, and procedures.

This comprehensive approach, guided by ATP 6-01.1 and informed by lessons from WFXs, will cultivate a division-wide culture of knowledge sharing, improve access to critical information, and ultimately enhance operational effectiveness.

Doctrinal References:

- ATP 6-01.1, *Knowledge Management*, 11 March 2024
- FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 16 May 2022

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Chapter 5

Intelligence Warfighting Function

Introduction

The most neglected doctrinal tool within the intelligence warfighting function (WFF) was the "Event Template." This is a key observation in Chapter 2. This resulted in a degraded ability to predict threat actions to drive decision making, increase efficiency in information collection and improve targeting and assessment accuracy. Lack of event templates reduced the ability to observe the enemy's strength and composition in depth which in turn negatively affects the unit's ability to maximize their own depth, agility and synchronize convergence.

Unit often did not continuously refine commander critical information requirements (CCIRs) during the operation. As a result, commanders did not gain a decision cycle advantage over the enemy limiting agility and the ability to achieve the outcome of convergence against the enemy.

Units often did not develop detailed information collection plans that should drive focused and synchronized collection, nor did they fully refine or assess these plans. This lack of assessment of the information collection products minimizes the units' overall operational reach and endurance.

> ***Agility*** is the ability to move forces and adjust their dispositions and activities more rapidly than the enemy (ADP 3-0). While initiative implies a bias for action, agility enables the action to occur before enemy forces can effectively react. Agility requires sound judgment and rapid decision making, often gained through the creation and exploitation of information advantages. Agility requires leaders to anticipate needs or opportunities, and it requires trained formations able to change direction, tasks, or focus as quickly as the situation requires. Change may come in the form of a transition between phases of an operation or the requirement to adapt to a new opportunity or hazard.
>
> FM 3-0, *Operations*, March 2025, Page 48 3-9.

Figure 5-1. Agility from FM 3-0, *Operations*, March 2025

Assessments are a key function within corps and divisions. Units' battle damage assessments (BDA) lacked clarity and did not have functional assessments of enemy capability and capacity. Inefficient BDA processes reduced the unit's agility to react to the changing situation. Poor assessments also led to missed opportunities and wasted resources that reduced the unit's endurance.

During fiscal year 2025 (FY25), units improved in establishing an intelligence architecture that was redundant and had flexible alternate, contingency, and emergency plans. Effective testing and executing the primary, alternate, contingency, emergency (PACE) across the intelligence architecture improved the unit's agility and depth.

Units also often did not incorporate assessments of the enemy's multidomain capabilities, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and effects during intelligence preparation of the operational

environment (IPOE). This decreased the unit's ability to leverage their own multidomain capabilities and achieve the outcome of convergence on the enemy.

Key observations within the "Intelligence Warfighting Function" over the course of FY25 highlight areas that reduced the units' efficiency level, agility, and affected their ability to provide Intelligence support to the commander. While operating under the time constrained environment of division and corps warfighters, intelligence sections and units did not fully follow doctrinal steps or fully use doctrinal tools to create shared understanding. Their production often focuses on parts of the enemy course of action (ECOA) versus the whole. Either BDA at the risk to distinguishing between ECOAs, or target development at the cost of assessments. These deficiencies reduced the units' overall ability to employ their forces to address the tenets of FM 3-0, and this resulted in a decrease in their prospects of operational success. Intelligence professionals can mitigate these issues by examining these observations and trends and identify opportunities for corps and division G-2s to guide manning, training, and operational decisions.

Observation: #1: Priority Intelligence Requirement Development and Refinement

Observation. Staff are not continuously refining CCIRs during the operation. As a result, the commander cannot make informed decisions to gain a decision cycle advantage over the enemy.

Discussion:

- Staff do not refine priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) iteratively during operations.
- Units do not use the battle rhythm such as plans working group, assessment working group, or other events to refine CCIR with all the warfighting functions.
- The G-2 rarely continues to work with the staff to evaluate whether the PIRs are still valid.
- The G-2 does not assign responsibility to a section or individual to ensure PIR is linked to new decisions developed in the plans working group and updated on the decision support matrix.
- The analysis and control element (ACE) does not track the status of the PIR or enable the commander to visualize decision space and time. Additionally, information collection is not focused on enabling decision making and instead focuses on targeting high-payoff target list (HPTL) items.

Recommendation(s):

- Develop a clear concept of operations with identified decision points for their commander. These decision points inform the intelligence staff about the priorities for collection and analysis to ensure prompt and effective decision-making on those matters most critical to achieving the unit's end state. This process should be captured in a standard operating procedure (SOP).
- The G-5 intelligence planner or other G-2 representative must attend the plans working group to record changes to PIRs after the future operations section updates the decision support matrix.
- During battle rhythm events such as the protection working group, assessment working group, or other events multiple staff sections across the WFFs must provide routine constructive feedback to the intelligence staff on written and verbal intelligence analysis.
- The G-2 section must deliberately evaluate, assess, brief, and update PIRs throughout execution of operations. Best practice is an internal battle rhythm event in the G-2 with all different sections within the ACE, along with collection management and dissemination, and the intelligence planner meet at least daily to evaluate the PIR for status updates, relevancy, and to assess the impacts of new PIR and indicator development.
- The unit process is to nominate, refine, and confirm that PIRs must be codified in the SOP and practiced throughout a unit’s battle rhythm.
- Units must also ensure that the commander receives multiple and timely updates to the status of the PIR and recommend updates as the situation develops.

Doctrinal References:

- ADP 2-0, *Intelligence*, 31 July 2019
- ADP 5-0, *The Operations Process*, 31 July 2019
- ATP 2-01, *Collection Management*, 25 September 2025 (common access card Restricted)
- ATP 2-19.3, *Corps and Division Intelligence Techniques*, 8 March 2023 (common access card restricted)
- FM 2-0, *Intelligence*, 1 October 2023
- FM 3-0, *Operations*, 21 March 2025
- FM 5-0, *Planning and Orders Production*, 4 November 2024

Observation: #2: Information Collection Planning and Refinement

Observation. Units do not develop detailed information collection plans (ICPs) that drive focused and synchronized collection. Collection managers rarely refine the ICP after initial development. Collection plans are also not included in the assessment process or updated as the situation evolves.

Discussion:

- Information collection requires a detailed ICP, information collection matrix (ICM), information collection synchronization matrix (ICSM), and the information collection overlay (ICO) to balance requirements and answer commander's PIRs. These tools link together the specific questions, indicators, and resources to identify why/what (ICM), who/when (ICSM), and where (ICO) collection operations correspond with the event template (EVENTEMP) and operational environment.
- During the FY25 Warfighter Exercises (WFXs), most of the G-2 collection management teams adopted practices during execution that focused solely on refining the ICSM and often overlooked the refinement of the ICM and ICO. Units focused on requesting collection versus detailed collection planning, resulting in an increase in dynamic collection usage. This affected targeting and had multiple WFF trickle down effects.
- Limiting collection management to the ICSM degrades the unit's ability to understand and visualize how the unit's ICP supports situational understanding, targeting, and battle damage assessments. As a result, units adopt a dynamic execution versus deliberate, which impacted their ability to effectively confirm/deny ECOAs, answer the commander's PIRs, confirm/assess BDA, and assess collection.
- Units often do not conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assessments efficiently or at all, which degrades the optimal use of collection assets (Figure 5-2), targeting processes, and assessment of enemy actions.

Recommendation(s):

- The ICO should include friendly boundaries, phase lines, objectives, intelligence handover lines, named areas of interest, target areas of interest, and supporting collection activities.
- Collection overlays should also include a list of high-payoff targets (HPTs), the targeting synchronization matrix, friendly disposition, scheme of maneuver, and the commander's guidance.
- Units update their ICPs and include changes in the daily fragmentary order (FRAGORD) to include collection emphasis messages.
- G-2s have an ISR assessments team and make a deliberate effort for the team to provide feedback to the collection requirements manager on the measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs) of the collection plan. The best practice is to appoint a mission manager to lead execution and assess collection.
- Units practice and refine their collection processes by using collection management tools and ISR assessments during the train up for warfighter and not start during execution.

- Units take advantage of the information collection/fires technical rehearsal to test sensor-to-shooter execution along with their collection and assessment process.



Figure 5-2. The Collection Management Process Continuing Tasks

Doctrinal References:

- ADP 2-0, *Intelligence*, 31 July 2019
- ATP 2-01, *Collection Management*, 25 September 2025 (common access card restricted)
- ATP 2-01.3, *Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*, 1 March 2019

Observation: #3: Battle Damage Assessments

Observation. Battle damage assessments (BDAs) are hindered by lack of clarity, poor enforcement of procedures, and missing functional assessments. Shortfalls in clearly defining roles and responsibilities, planning and enforcing collection procedures, and translating data points into functional effects reduces the effectiveness of unit BDAs.

Discussion:

- Inadequate BDA results in an inefficient decision cycle and provides poor feedback to the commander.
- Many units piece together BDA teams just before an exercise manned by Soldiers who have never executed the task before.
- Soldiers in BDA teams typically have unclear roles and responsibilities, resulting in either gaps in execution or duplication of effort as multiple elements process the same data.
- BDA teams are responsible for collecting data from higher headquarters, subordinates, and adjacent units. Often there is no SOP to inform or govern how these reports are correlated.
- Units use informal procedures such as chatrooms or emails to collect data, but this method often requires the BDA team to format the data prior to processing it.
- Subordinates do not report BDA regularly and the higher headquarters loses situational understanding of the battlefield and functional assessment of enemy capability and capacity are inaccurate.
- Unit assessments focus on numbers of equipment destroyed, forcing the commander to make the function assessment of enemy capability and capacity.
- Meaningful assessments summarize numbers into functional capabilities, such as companies/batteries/battalions destroyed and what capability the enemy has remaining on the battlefield. The current trend is to focus on numbers of systems and strength percentages, not on what the enemy can do and how the enemy phases in second echelon forces, etc.
- The most useful assessments discuss how the enemy course of action changes based on BDA, or what enemy decision points are reached in reference to the EVENTEMP.

Recommendation(s):

- Clearly articulate roles and responsibilities for each echelon's BDA team.
- Formally publish a BDA format and timeline early and enforce both.
- Create a meaningful assessment that discusses effects on the enemy courses of action and enemy commander decision points and what it means to friendly COAs.
- Codify process into the unit SOP.

Doctrinal References:

- ADP 2-0, *Intelligence*, 31 July 2019
- ATP 2-01, *Collection Management*, 25 September 2025 (common access card restricted)
- ATP 2-01.3, *Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*, 1 March 2019
- ATP 2-19.3, *Corps and Division Intelligence Techniques*, 8 March 2023 (common access card restricted)
- FM 3-60, *Army Targeting*, 11 August 2023

Observation: #4: Intelligence Architecture

Observation. G-2 sections must establish an intelligence architecture that is redundant and has flexible PACE plans using legacy, commercial off the shelf, and future systems. Multinational unit inclusion operations (Figure 5-3) increase the amount complexity to establish a reliable intelligence architecture.



Figure 5-3. Example Intelligence Architecture with Multinational Considerations

Discussion:

- Unit intelligence architecture specific SOPs lack detail, are not disseminated, and do not include multinational systems.
- Unit intelligence architecture is based on legacy and emergent upper-tactical internet (TI) transport layers limiting redundancy. This often degrades the unit's ability to exercise or develop a PACE plan including passive receivers that enable degraded data management and analysis.
- Intelligence sections often struggle to integrate emerging systems and technologies:
  - Most emerging systems lack full interoperability with existing mission command systems, increasing workloads on G-2s who must use multiple platforms simultaneously to produce intelligence.

- Multiple off-the-shelf systems limit the ability to rapidly share information, which is necessary for effective intelligence production.

- Unit intelligence sections frequently overlook detailed planning for adequate data exchange and knowledge management across the PACE plan.
- Mission partner environments challenge G-2s, EMIBs, and intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW).
- Battalions are to establish and maintain the intelligence architecture.
    - Units often default to established parallel U.S.-only networks making the cross-domain server solution a single point of failure.

Recommendation(s):

- Ensure tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) are codified pre-exercise in a software system-agnostic strategy.
- Verify interoperability with higher, lateral, multinational, and subordinate commands' command and control systems.
- Exercise all PACE simultaneously versus in sequence of failure. This may alleviate an interruption of intelligence support to the commander.
- Establish reporting mechanisms and formats via the Army Orders Process before any command post exercise (CPX), as well as exercise mechanisms and format compatibility within the CPX to identify frictions:
    - Utilize this pre-exercise to establish or refine the PACE plan.
    - Once codified during the CPX, edit prior orders with FRAGORDs to determine changes in the original order before and during WFX (where applicable).

Doctrinal References:

- ADP 5-0, *The Operations Process*, 31 July 2019
- ADP 6-0, *Mission Command*: *Command and Control of Army Forces*, 31 July 2019
- FM 2-0, *Intelligence*, 1 October 2023

Observation: #5: Enemy Multidomain Capability

Observation. G-2s often do not incorporate the enemy's multidomain capabilities, TTPs, and effects during IPOE. Reverse WFF analysis by the staff doesn't help understand and visualize the enemy's multidomain threat template.

Discussion:

- Multidomain IPOE is limited to the G-2 and rarely incorporates space, air, air defense artillery (ADA) or cyber-electromagnetic activity (CEMA) to understand the impacts associated with operating in a denied, degraded, intermittent and low-bandwidth environment.
- Collection assets become vulnerable to enemy multidomain effects resulting in reduced information collection.
- Multidomain effects can be indicators of ECOAs. These indicators are often isolated in the G-39 or G-2 ACE due to classification and network requirements.
- Units have limited understanding of available space and ground-based capabilities due to limited Space Support Element and G-2 ACE incorporation. This degrades collection planning and near-persistent monitoring.

Recommendation(s):

- Increase training for G-2 personnel in intelligence capabilities of CEMA/space/air/ADA assets, including specific systems, available products, and request procedures.
- Develop and integrate a CEMA/space/air/ADA SOP that details incorporation into all intelligence planning and operations.
- Integrate CEMA/space/air/ADA representatives with the G-2 ACE to support IPOE refinement, collection capabilities, and mitigate impacts to Gray Eagle aircraft when enemy uses global positioning (GPS) denial.

Doctrinal References:

- ATP 2-01, *Collection Management*, 25 September 2025 (common access card restricted)
- FM 3-60, *Army Targeting*, 11 August 2023

Chapter 6

Fires Warfighting Function

Introduction

The 2025 fires observations depicted below indicate that divisions, corps, and Army service component commands (ASCCs) continue to develop creative tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to maintain decision dominance and synchronize multidomain effects throughout Army, joint, and multinational operations.

Multi-echeloned warfighter exercises that integrate divisions, corps, ASCCs, and theater armies alongside our multinational partners have exposed several challenges within the warfighting function of fires. These challenges present unique opportunities for the fires community to improve their ability to deliberately plan and synchronize defined convergence objectives that create multiple dilemmas for the enemy while maintaining the flexibility required to enable agility and depth as conditions change. While each theater of war presents its own unique challenges, the observations and TTPs below remain relevant to each of them.

The fires key observations are centered on one principle of "**Maintaining Maximum Flexibility**" to retain decision dominance through deliberate planning and dynamic execution.

First, the ability to conduct accurate enemy and friendly assessments is critical to driving the targeting and operations process. While units often struggle to find more time in the day to conduct an assessment working group (AWG), integrating assessments into other battle rhythm events, such as the battle update assessment (BUA), it saves time while enabling staff primaries to brief their running estimates and recommendations to the commander for upcoming decisions. This recommendation works best when assessment inputs and outputs are defined and well-understood amongst the staff.

With key leaders in battle rhythm events most of the day, it is a challenge for units to remain responsive if the current operations (CUOPS) team is not given the delegated authorities to exploit opportunities dynamically. TTPs such as the multi-domain effects cell and target refinement boards (TRBs), driven by corps and division senior leaders, have helped the staff remain agile by refining the targeting plan, realigning assets, and managing risk within 24 hours of execution. Moreover, these timely adjustments allow commanders to maintain agility and responsiveness to enemy action.

Observations over the past year indicate that convergence planning responsibilities are not well understood or codified at echelon. Furthermore, convergence outcomes rarely have a defined task and purpose linked to a geographical area, making it challenging for subordinate divisions to plan, resource, and exploit opportunities within or outside of corps designated windows. Understanding convergence planning responsibilities enhances units' ability to exploit opportunities at echelon while shaping the enemy in depth to set the appropriate conditions for subordinate units.

Convergence is an outcome created by the concerted employment of capabilities against combinations of decisive points in any domain to create effects against a system, formation, or decision maker, or in a specific geographic area (ADP 3-0). Convergence is a top-down driven outcome from the senior Army tactical echelon. This echelon maintains the best understanding of the larger land tactical situation and has access to scarce multinational, joint, and Army capabilities. Higher echelons typically contend with multiple decisive points during the course of any operation.

Convergence involves integrating Army and joint capabilities at the most effective echelon and synchronizing their employment against decisive points to create effects that can be exploited through maneuver. It sets the conditions to achieve the purpose of one or more parts of the operation. Commanders employ combat power at multiple decisive points in an economical way that avoids confronting enemy strengths head on. Commanders choose combinations of decisive points against which to apply combat power based on what is most disruptive to the enemy's plan. Commanders visualize decisive points across multiple domains and all the dimensions. Categories of decisive points include:

- Functions (including C2, intelligence, protection, fires, maneuver, and sustainment).
- Key terrain or formations (including position areas for artillery, airfields, and troop concentrations).
- Key events (including gap crossings, breaches, counterfires, and resupply).
- Critical factors (including morale, will to fight, cohesion, trust, and other intangible factors).

FM 3-0, *Operations*, March 2025, Page 49 3-13.

Figure 6-1. Convergence from FM 3-0, *Operations*, March 2025

To shorten lengthy kill-chains, corps and divisions have started to task organize their force field artillery headquarters (FFAHQs) and counterfire headquarters (CFHQs) with processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) teams to conduct decentralized fire mission processing, adjacent from the corps and division headquarters. With the appropriate delegated authorities, decentralized mission routing, and continuous PED refinement, previous target selection standards concerns are significantly minimized due to increased collection capabilities physically located near the FFAHQ and CFHQ fire control elements (FCEs). This TTP enables these formations to become more lethal and agile, by allowing maximum flexibility to achieve targeting objectives.

Effective airspace integration continues to challenge units through the lack of a common operational picture (COP) between Army, Air Force, and multinational air clearance teams. Use of the joint fires element (JFE), airspace control order (ACO) generation tools, the Global Airspace Management System (GAMS), and the collaborative planning tools help units synchronize airspace in real time despite the lack of a Joint COP between services. Also, the latent publishing of airspace control measures (ACMs) continually results in the dynamic clearing of airspace rather than activating planned ACMs for long durations. Units must avoid activating dynamic ACMs for individual fire missions but rather engage the enemy throughout the depth of their operational framework with planned, long-duration ACMs that enable the rapid-engagement of high-payoff targets (HPTs).

With an increasing dependency on technology to manage staff systems and processes, joint targeting and effects cells (JTEC) and joint air-ground integration center (JAGIC), chiefs at the corps and division levels are focusing too much on digital inputs and chat windows than they are coordinating with other staff sections to proactively hunt HPTs. Chiefs are also frequently pulled to fulfill battle rhythm briefing requirements when they should be managing the CUOPS fight and conditions setting for planned operations, utilizing fighting products published by the targeting team. Chiefs must adeptly manage the CUOPS fight to create opportunities, maintain agility, and manage tempo to win the next fight.

The fires enterprise must maintain maximum flexibility to retain decision dominance through deliberate planning and dynamic execution. Units at all echelons must strive to integrate assessments, empower dynamic operations, standardize convergence planning, task-organize effectively, enhance airspace integration visualization, and communicate targeting efforts across the staff. The fires community must help the staff expand its operational reach by achieving their targeting objectives across all domains. Continued investment in education, organizational adaptation, and interoperability are critical to maximizing the full potential of multidomain fires in large-scale combat operations.

Observation: #1: Defining and Synchronizing Convergence Outcomes

Observation. Corps and divisions do not define, plan, or synchronize convergence outcomes in time and space.

Discussion. Units are unable to clearly define, synchronize, and maximize convergence outcomes. Planning convergence outcomes tend to be siloed with maneuver and effects development occurring independently of each other.

Corps. Do not effectively define the geographic location, specific effects, or desired outcomes of these windows to their subordinate units. The delays in disseminating convergence outcomes at echelon prevents the timely integration into subordinate unit planning cycles.

Divisions. Do not maximize corps convergence windows to their advantage or deliberately plan outside of them to maintain continuous operational pressure. Divisions fail to nest their plans within corps-established convergence outcomes to enable both targeting and maneuver objectives.

A critical deficiency in our current planning processes is that convergence is often planned within FUOPs, rather than plans. Convergence planning development should begin with the G-5's initial scheme of maneuver development and refined by the G-35 and the targeting team.

Furthermore, this integrated process requires a common operational picture that underpins effective convergence. Failing to integrate these functions results in fragmented plans, inefficient resource allocation, and a diminished capacity to achieve decisive results.

Recommendation(s): Corps. Define the geographic location, effects, and desired outcomes of convergence windows to enable deliberate planning at the Division level. The end state for convergence windows creates conditions that subordinates can exploit to provide friendly advantage.

Divisions. Maximize corps convergence windows or deliberately plan outside of them based on commander's guidance. Augment corps-established convergence outcomes to enable both targeting and maneuver objectives.

All units should establish a process where the G-5 initiates convergence window development as an integral part of the initial scheme of maneuver where windows are clearly defined in time and space. The G-35 and targeting team continuously refine windows based on evolving conditions and maneuver plans. Units must capture the duties and responsibilities of convergence outcome planning within their standard operating procedures (SOPs).



Figure 6-2. Defining and Synchronizing Convergence Windows

Doctrinal References:

- FM 3-0, *Operations*, 21 March 2025
- FM 3-60, *Army Targeting*, 11 August 2023

Observation: #2: Operational Assessments to inform Targeting

Observation. Divisions and corps rarely conduct operational assessments which inform the targeting, decisions, and operations process.

Discussion. Both divisions and corps rarely implement effective AWGs into their battle rhythms. Units struggle to execute AWGs in meaningful places in their battle rhythm which frustrates attendance by the right leaders. The inputs and outputs of the AWG are often not well understood while decisions rarely make it to the commander or feed the targeting and operations process.

Recommendation(s): Instead of conducting an AWG as a separate battle rhythm event, units should consider transforming their battle update briefs (BUBs) into a BUA. Both BUBs and AWGs have very similar inputs and outputs; the staff informs the commander on their running estimates while identifying potential risks. By tailoring the BUB into a BUA, units have staff primaries briefing their assessments to the commander that drives decision points while saving the staff from attending another meeting.

G-2s typically include the enemy battle damage assessments (BDA) and overall enemy assessments in their BUBs to the commander. Add the G-5 and specifically the operations research/systems analyst to provide the commander with a correlation of forces and means analysis required to determine if the organization is on or off track in meeting their operational objectives. Approved expedited guidance from the commander then should make its way back into the targeting process for actions such as reattack criteria or the reprioritization of high-payoff targets (HPTs).

Doctrinal References:

- ADP 5-0, *The Operations Process*, 31 July 2019
- ATP 3-52.1, *Multi-service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airspace Control*, 21 June 2023
- FM 2-0, *Intelligence*, 1 October 2023
- FM 3-0, *Operations*, 21 March 2025
- FM 3-60, *Army Targeting*, 11 August 2023

Observation: #3: Processing, Exploiting, and Dissemination Cell Force

Field Artillery Headquarters and Counterfire Headquarters Integration

Observation. Incorporating PED cells into FFAHQ and CFHQs has benefits.

Discussion. The collocation of PED cells within FFAHQs and CFHQs at division and corps has proved highly beneficial. Direct, face-to-face communication between mission managers, analysts, and fire control elements (FCEs) significantly improved situational awareness and rapid target engagement in the dynamic fight. These PED cells are typically small teams split from the main PED cell supporting the analysis and control element. Additional PED cells with the FFAHQs and CFHQs provide units with increased PED survivability, while providing viable options for alternate command posts. While this provides PED redundancy through geographically separated teams, PED collection areas must continually be defined in orders and SOPs to ensure the efficient use of collection assets. FFAHQs and CFHQs have benefitted from quick fire mission processing times through decentralized sensor to shooter linkages outside of the corps JTECs and Division JAGICs. However, mission routing must stay internal to the FFAHQ/CFHQ through clearly understood mission routing, delegated authorities, and ammunition guidance to maintain maximum effectiveness.



Figure 6-3. PED Cell FFAHQ and CFHQ Integration – "A Way"

Recommendation(s):

- Delegated authorities, mission routing, and ammunition guidance must be clearly defined to maximize decentralized fire mission processing effectiveness.

- PED responsibilities outside of the owning organization (i.e., in support of corps or division) need to be defined within organizational SOP and within published orders, annexes, appendices, and tables. This delineation of responsibility aims to maximize PED efficiency through clearly assigned areas of responsibility while maintaining redundant PED capability across the organization. and improve BDA and detection through intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance efforts.
- Delegated authorities matrices need to be updated to explicitly define engagement criteria and release authorities for long-range precision fires, enabling faster decision-making. Mission routing should avoid passing through the corps JTEC or division JAGIC to prevent extended fire mission times unless targets are being nominated for prosecution by joint assets.
- Units must implement a daily refinement of PED coverage areas, adjusting collection efforts to prevent duplication and maximize effectiveness as the operational framework evolves. Continue proactive planning and target development, leveraging the PED team's analytical capabilities to identify and prioritize targets.

Doctrinal References:

- ATP 3-09.12, *Field Artillery Counterfire and Weapons Locating Radar Operations*, 26 October 2021
- ATP 3-09.24, *The Field Artillery Brigade*, 30 March 2022
- ATP 3-09.90, *Division Artillery Operations and Fire Support for the Division*, 12 October 2017
- ATP 3-92, *Corps Operations*, 7 April 2016
- FM 3-09, *Fire Support and Field Artillery Operations*, 12 August 2024
- FM 3-94, *Armies, Corps, and Division Operations*, 23 July 2021

Observation: #4: Airspace Integration Standardization

Observation. A lack of standardized COP tools to conduct Airspace integration between Air Force and Army teams are creating delays in airspace clearance.

Discussion. Poor airspace integration significantly constrains multidomain operations, particularly for firing units requiring rapid airspace clearance. Inconsistent and untimely publication of airspace control measures (ACMs) creates uncertainty and forces units to rely on outdated information, increases risk, and delays mission execution.

Compounding this issue are intermittent system outages, which disrupt critical communication channels and further delays airspace clearance:

- Fragmented airspace management – characterized by a functional separation between Army and Air Force airspace managers, coupled with the use of different COPs and differing data standards – hinders situational awareness and extends airspace clearance timelines.
- Obtaining extended airspace control for firing units, particularly for precision guided munitions, necessitates proactive and often time-sensitive coordination with Air Force Tactical Command and Control (TACC2).
- The increasing integration of unmanned aircraft systems into the operational environment adds another layer of complexity, requiring robust deconfliction mechanisms to prevent collisions and ensure safe operations.
- The absence of a fully integrated, real-time airspace management system, capable of dynamically adjusting to changing conditions and accommodating diverse user requirements, ultimately limits operational flexibility, increases risk to air assets, and impedes the timely delivery of effects, potentially jeopardizing mission success.

Recommendation(s): Establish a standardized, integrated airspace management cell co-locating Army and Air Force airspace managers with a unified COP, leveraging systems (JFE and the ACO generation tools):

- Implement a pre-published airspace control schedule defining clear windows for fire support and other critical missions, integrated directly into existing battle rhythms and utilizing tools like the GAMS.
- Invest in redundant communication systems to mitigate disruptions from outages like J-CHAT and prioritize airspace coordination during planning and rehearsals utilizing systems like the collaborative planning tool.

Doctrinal References:

- ATP 3-52.1, *Multi-service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airspace Control*, 21 June 2023
- FM 3-0, *Operations*, 21 March 2025
- FM 6-05, *Multi-service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Integration, Interoperability, and Interdependence*, 25 January 2022 (common access card restricted)

Observation: #5: Joint Air-ground Integration Center and JTEC Chief Management

Observation. JAGIC and JTEC chiefs are increasingly functioning as system operators rather than system managers.

Discussion. The introduction of improved digital systems and internal communication platforms has led to JAGIC and JTEC chiefs becoming overly focused on direct system operations and digital communications. This manifests as excessive engagement with chat windows and a loss of broader situational awareness. This hyper focus on immediate digital inputs leads to less coordination within the section, less integration with the G-33 team, and less focus on fighting products received from the targeting team.

Chiefs are also frequently taken away to fulfill battle rhythm briefing roles or producing battle rhythm products which remove them from managing the fight for considerable amounts of time. Reduced visibility of the overall fight hinders the JAGIC and JTEC's ability to proactively identify and actively pursue HPTs.

Recommendation(s): JAGIC and JTEC chiefs should mirror the role of a fire direction officer (FDO) within a fire direction center (FDC):

- An FDO never operates the systems within the FDC, but leverages fighting products to manage the FDC. While technical proficiency is essential, the JAGIC and JTEC chiefs' primary responsibilities are managing the cell, synthesizing information from fighting products, and maintaining close coordination with the chief of operations (CHOPS).
- JAGIC and JTEC chiefs should delegate system operations and real-time chat monitoring to a subordinate (e.g., fire support noncommissioned officer or a dedicated assistant chief).
- Chiefs must actively leverage existing targeting products (target synchronization matrix, high-payoff target list, synchronization matrix, target list worksheet) to maintain situational awareness and drive targeting efforts.
- Chiefs must maintain a strong working relationship with the G-33 CHOPs to ensure seamless coordination and synchronization of targeting activities.

Doctrinal References:

- ATP 3-91.1, *The Joint Air Ground Integration Center*, 17 April 2019
- FM 3-09, *Fire Support and Field Artillery Operations*, 12 August 2024
- FM 3-52, *Airspace Control*, 20 October 2016
- FM 3-94, *Armies, Corps, and Division Operations*, 23 July 2021

Chapter 7

Sustainment Warfighting Function

Introduction

Sustainment enables all tenets of operations from FM 3-0, *Operations*, 21 March 2025 to include convergence, agility, depth, and endurance. Using the tenets of operations as a framework, the following key observations highlight critical areas for improvement to enhance operational effectiveness sustainment planning and execution during large-scale combat operations (LSCO) within corps and division headquarters.

> ***Endurance*** is the ability to persevere over time throughout the depth of an operational environment(ADP 3-0). Endurance enhances the ability to project combat power and extends operational reach. Endurance is about resilience and preserving combat power while continuing operations for as long as necessary to achieve the desired outcome. During competition, Army forces improve endurance by setting the theater across all warfighting functions and improving interoperability with allies and other unified action partners.
>
> FM 3-0, *Operations*, March 2025, Page 54 3-30.

Figure 7-1. Endurance from FM 3-0, *Operations*, March 2025

Observations and recommendations that follow are drawn from multiple observations across the Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) Operations Groups and recommend four focus areas for units preparing for the Warfighter or for war.

The first focus area, "Posturing for Success," is presented in two parts which include a discussion about the rear command post (RCP) and the criticality of future operations sustainment planning which is our Key Observation in chapter 2. In this chapter "Posturing for Success" is reinforced by second discussion about the value of a fusion cell to support personnel and casualty care.

Then, as viewed through the lens of the tenets of operations, in this chapter we address the following observations:

- Senior sustainer engagement throughout the operations process in sustainment planning.
- Rehearsing for agility and depth and the value of effective sustainment rehearsals.
- Prolonging endurance and the imperative for proactive integration of sustainment across the staff to derive the requirements necessary to achieve prolonged endurance.

Observation: #1: Posturing for Success 2 of 2

Observation. Units are challenged to plan, resource, and synchronize operations that support health service support, mortuary affairs, personnel serviced support, and detainee operations (human commodities).



Figure 7-2. Human Commodities

Discussion. Multiple sustainment and protection functions revolve around the movement, care, and processing of personnel including medical operations, medical and casualty evacuation, mortuary affairs, replacements, and detainee operations.

Division and corps staff at echelon must project requirements and plan for the transportation and operation of nodes supporting the human commodity. These functions are interconnected and often compete for limited resources, particularly transportation assets.

Effective visualization of all personnel-related requirements is critical for prioritization and task execution. Friction and duplication of effort frequently occur between corps/division G-4 staff sections and the corps sustainment command/sustainment brigade distribution management centers (DMCs).

Doctrine lacks clarity regarding the specific functions of each section and how they should integrate. This de-synchronization is often exacerbated by physical command post layouts, the level of integration between the corps sustainment command/sustainment brigade and the corps/division staff, and individual personalities.

Recommendation(s): Best practices include establishing a sustainment fusion cell comprised of representatives from the G-1, G-4, G-8, surgeon, and distribution management cell in the RCP to optimize the synchronization of casualty care and personnel replacement with all sustainment functions.

Ideally, battle rhythm events such as a G-1 Sync are rebranded as the personnel and casualty synchronization to integrate the other human commodity managers achieving economies in resource and requirement management.

Doctrinal References:

- ADP 4-0, *Sustainment*, 31 July 2019
- ATP 1-0.1, *Techniques for Human Resources Support to Operations*, 16 November 2023
- ATP 3-91, *Division Operations*, 17 October 2014
- ATP 4-02.55, *Army Health System Support Planning*, 30 March 2020
- ATP 4-16, *Movement Control*, 25 April 2022
- ATP 4-91, *Division Sustainment Operations*, 14 March 2022
- ATP 6-0.5, *Command Post Organization and Operations*, 1 March 2017
- FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 16 May 2022

Observation: #2: Senior Sustainer Engagement Throughout the Operations Process

Observation. Senior leader involvement optimizes sustainment planning.

Discussion. Beginning with the concept of support, most G-5 Sustainment planners sought guidance from senior sustainment leaders to include the deputy commanding general-support, chief of sustainment, and sustainment commanders to ensure feasibility and suitability to sustain the maneuver mission with available assets. However, once operations commence, these touchpoints are observed to occur less frequently as immediate demands of warfighting supersede discussions of sustainment being planned in the G-5.

Without consistent senior sustainer touchpoints, G-5 sustainment planner's schemes of sustainment become desynchronized with higher support plans, available resources, and revised guidance resulting in increased friction or gaps in the sustainment plan. In a resource constrained environment, sub-optimal planning degrades the commander's ability to maneuver in response to threats, opportunities and convergence windows on the battlefield.

In practice, leader-influenced concepts and schemes provide better responsiveness and the increased survivability necessary to support the tenets of operations during LSCO.



Figure 7-3. Sustainment Planning Visualization

Recommendation(s): Senior sustainer engagement throughout the operations process is crucial to success in multidomain operations:

- Deliberate integration of the G-5 sustainment planner into the RCP's battle rhythm provides regular touchpoints with the assistant division commander, chief of sustainment, and expeditionary sustainment command for planning guidance.
- During mission analysis and course of action development, most facts about sustainment capabilities are known, but understanding how to apply those capabilities against the myriad requirements of LSCO requires a deeper understanding of the operational environment, commander's guidance, and how the division or corps may fight.
- Essential to success of sustainment in LSCO is the guidance of senior sustainers who can shape concepts and schemes tailored to the mission, current capabilities, and are nested with higher echelons scheme of support. Ideally these crucial engagements are codified as part of the battle rhythm to both ensure compliance and to protect the time leaders need to effectively inform planning and execution.

Doctrinal References:

- ATP 4-91, *Division Sustainment Operations*, 14 March 2022
- FM 3-0, *Operations*, 21 March 2025
- FM 3-94, *Armies, Corps, and Division Operations*, 23 July 2021
- FM 4-0, *Sustainment*, 14 August 2024

Observation: #3: Rehearsing for Agility and Depth

Observation. Sustainment rehearsals enable agility and depth.

Discussion. When conducting a sustainment rehearsal, unless there is a change to published sustainment capabilities driven by attachment or detachment of units, or a novel form of support employed, participants should assume that sustainment will be conducted in accordance with published Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).

Units who execute sustainment in accordance with published SOPs can reallocate time to support the desired outcomes of the rehearsal, specifically on ensuring shared understanding of sustainment operations in time and space, and subordinate tasks and purposes for employment of capabilities to support the multiple courses of action (COAs), branches, and sequels.

When focused on the unique mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civilian considerations (METT-TC) factors of the current mission, it becomes much easier to identify friction points and solicit guidance from the commander to support continued planning efforts.

Figure 7-4. Rehearsals

Recommendation(s): Sustainment rehearsals begin with a robust mission analysis and complete military decision-making process (MDMP) process that produces the tools necessary to conduct an effective sustainment rehearsal:

- Specifically, the staff must produce the concept and scheme(s) of support; a logistics synchronization matrix (LOGSYNCMAT), sustainment decision support template, commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs), tasks to staff and subordinates, and must be prepared to brief schemes of support by field service and commodity.

- A thorough MDMP process ensures that the rehearsal remains a coordination event and not another COA analysis. Once conditions are set, then the rehearsal can focus on identified friction points and inform the commander how friendly and enemy decision points impact risk to force and risk to mission from a sustainment perspective.
- Focus on problem sets that impact agility, depth, endurance, or convergence events. In LSCO sustainment is not assured, therefore a focus on problem sets related to the enemy's most dangerous COA, or what happens when a risk mitigation is unsuccessful.
- The key outcome of the sustainment rehearsal is an updated LOGSYNCMAT, fragmentary order, and receipt of refined commander's guidance for continued planning across the integrating cells.
- It is particularly important to understand how the commander wants to respond to potential disruptions to sustainment that inform potential branches or sequels.

Doctrinal References:

- ADP 3-0, *Operations*, 21 March 2025
- ADP 4-0, *Sustainment*, 31 July 2019
- ATP 6-0.5, *Command Post Organization and Operations*, 1 March 2017
- FM 3-0, *Operations*, 21 March 2025
- FM 4-0, *Sustainment*, 14 August 2024
- FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 16 May 2022

Observation: #4: Prolonging Endurance

Observation. Sustainment enables endurance when understanding is achieved through horizontal integration with the other warfighting functions (WFFs).



Figure 7-5. Sustainment Integration with other Warfighting Functions

Discussion. The sustainment WFF enables endurance for a division or corps when sustainers aggressively seek integration:

- Integration drives understanding of requirements, shared planning horizons, and a better analysis of available assets at the point of need.
- Sustainers understand that enabling agility, reach, and endurance of their formation defines success. To reach these goals, one must first achieve a deep understanding of sustainment capabilities and requirements during MDMP, then update running estimates and warfighting products to reflect those same capabilities and requirements throughout current and future operations.
- Sustainers do a good job understanding and integrating capabilities and requirements within their WFF but often fall short in understanding requirements from across the staff leading to inefficient resource allocation, emergency re-supply requests, misallocation of protection assets, and failures to adhere to published priorities of support.

- The gap in understanding of requirements from other WFF stems from a passive adherence to the battle rhythm. As an example, the targeting working group (TWG) has several inputs and outputs annotated in their meeting notes, likely to include an understanding of Class V supply availability to continue planning. However, the TWG may not have any specified outputs for sustainment such as an expenditure forecast for the next 96+ hours. If the TWG doesn't have an output that includes providing an updated required supply rate by munition, an incomplete picture of fires requirements would result. LSCO demands that sustainers are active participants the battle rhythm and seek a better understanding of requirements with each engagement throughout the day.

Recommendation(s): Among the principles of sustainment, *anticipation* of requirements is crucial to the execution of the scheme of support.

- Sustainers must anticipate challenges and effectively mitigate sustainment shortfalls to enable agility, reach, endurance, and convergence.
- Sustainers must engage during battle rhythm events to inform staff and other WFFs on sustainment capabilities and limitations and act sensors that collect requirements at every opportunity.
- The chief of sustainment must ensure sustainment requirements must be annotated in the meeting notes throughout the battle rhythm to clearly articulate outputs that support the sustainment critical path.

Doctrinal References:

- ATP 3-94.4, *Reconstitution Operations*, 5 May 2021
- ATP 4-16, *Movement Control*, 25 April 2022
- ATP 4-91, *Division Sustainment Operations*, 14 March 2022
- FM 4-0, *Sustainment*, 14 August 2024
- FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 16 May 2022

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Chapter 8

Protection Warfighting Function

Introduction

The probability of success for Army forces increases greatly when commanders develop agile formations, capable of employing multi-domain effects against the enemy throughout the depth of the operational framework and across multiple planning horizons. Critical to this is the ability of the protection warfighting function (WFF) to preserve the combat power necessary to achieve these desired attributes. Protection is a complex warfighting function requiring seamless integration with other WFFs to manage holistic risk throughout the depth and duration of operations for the corps or division.

Effective protection planning demands a thorough understanding of critical combat power, vulnerabilities, and associated risks posed by the enemy within the operational environment. Protection planners must identify and inform decisions throughout the operations process – from planning through execution – and understand the critical path of information through this process to effectively manage these risks and enable freedom of action. Along this critical path, decisions are informed through developed plans that are refined and synchronized in the protection working group (PWG), communicated in the scheme of protection, and executed through an integrated staff. Units that integrate protection decisions across WFFs can effectively layer offensive and defensive capabilities, coordinated and synchronized to support the commander's ability to incorporate agility, depth, and endurance into operational plans.

Units often neglect incorporating protection planning into the early stages of the planning process, hindering its effectiveness and endurance across planning horizons:

- Protection planners must nest within the integrating cells, beginning with the G-5 planning cell, to anchor protection activities and decisions to the conditions required to achieve the commander's end state.
- Early integration allows planners to identify critical forces to preserve, develop multiple protection courses of action, and allocate sufficient time for preparation and rehearsals, enabling the commander to incorporate agility into the application of combat power across time, space, and domain.

Units frequently miss opportunities to continuously refine and synchronize the scheme of protection across WFFs and staffs for each planning horizon, further reducing operational endurance:

- The PWG is the primary forum for this critical synchronization.
- PWG outputs directly inform risk decisions of avoidance, elimination, mitigation, and acceptance across all planning horizons and throughout the depth of the operational framework.
- Failing to leverage these outputs can lead to a de-synchronization with the overall scheme of maneuver and a reliance on irrelevant information from integrating cells.

A relevant and effective scheme of protection, supported by recurring running estimates, is critical for understanding risk and integrating protection activities in depth with the scheme of maneuver. However, schemes of protection often lack the specificity needed to establish clear task and purpose for protection decisions, hindering a unit's ability to create agile plans and conduct effective assessments.

As discussed in the following key observations, proactive protection planning, informed by a clear understanding of the critical path and information flow, enables enduring and layered multi-domain effects across the depth of the operational framework.

Observation: #1: Protection Planning

Observation. When protection planning is not anchored to the scheme of maneuver, it degrades the analysis of risk to force and mission and reduces the ability to apply and assess protection activities beyond the current fight.

Proactive planning integrates protection across the unit's planning horizons to synchronize protection measures with all WFFs, creating both time and space for mission success.

Discussion. When protection teams are disjointed from the rest of the staff processes, they generally plan in a vacuum. Trends show protection teams are not involved at the onset of the planning process, resulting in cells unable to conceptualize of the scheme of maneuver.

Protection teams who plan well together are typically flexible and agile within their WFF and specific branches; however, when teams lack understanding of operational requirements, detailed planning becomes based in faulty information, resulting in internal friction at 36–48-hour mark.



Figure 8-1. Protection Air Tasking Order Integration

Best practices for protection planning occurred when units established a PWG with a 96-hour and beyond focus, prior to the start operations, leveraging a fully staffed rear command post for sustained analysis:

- The PWG informed protection considerations during key synchronization forums (i.e., rear area synchronization, targeting working group (TWG)/ targeting decision board, and battle update assessment/current operations update assessment (CUAs).
- The chief of protection chief addressed current operational requirements and facilitated condition setting within the established long-range planning horizon.
- Forethought created options for commanders to exercise the tenets and imperatives of operations, laying the bedrock for successful campaigns and war (FM 3-0, Operations, 21 March 2025).



Figure 8-2. Protection Planning

Recommendation(s): Completely integrate the protection team early with the staff across all planning horizons. This requires dedicated protection planners in plans and future operations, as well as dedicated participants with defined inputs to critical processes such as targeting, collections, and assessments. Their integration enables the protection cell to identify and assess risk anchored to the scheme of maneuver which is then refined during the PWG and incorporated into decision making:

- Ensure dedicated protection planning on the G-5 planning horizon and beyond, intending to set conditions for the unit's success.
- Build integrated fighting products with intel, operations, and subordinate units around the G-5 planning horizon and ensure these are refined once transitioned into the G-35.
- Ensure the protection cell remains involved in the G-33 as to not lose sight of the execution of plans and the evolution of assessed risk in the current fight. Clearly delineate responsibilities and clear authorities to subordinate units for execution within the G-33 planning horizon.

Doctrinal References:

- ADP 3-0, *Operations*, 21 March 2025
- ADP 3-37, *Protection*, 10 January 2024
- ADP 5-0, *The Operations Process*, 31 July 2019
- ATP 5-19, *Risk Management*, 9 November 2021
- FM 3-0, *Operations*, 21 March 2025
- FM 3-90, *Tactics*, 1 May 2023
- FM 3-94, *Armies, Corps, and Division Operations*, 23 July 2021
- FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 16 May 2022

Observation: #2: Protection Working Group

Observation. Protection risk analysis lacks the detail and synchronization necessary to support effective risk management decision making.

Discussion. The current lack of comprehensive risk integration within units' protection processes, specifically during development of the protection prioritization list (PPL) and execution of the PWG, directly undermines the operational tenets of depth and endurance. Operating in silos, protection cells lack consistent input from the unit's staff, WFFs, and subordinate units. This results in a fragmented understanding of risk, ineffective prioritization of protection cell activities, and a failure to correlate threats with friendly capabilities.

Consequently, protection measures become desynchronized with the scheme of maneuver, limiting the unit's ability to extend operational reach, preserve combat power across the depth of the battlefield, and proactively manage risk which are key elements of achieving depth. This reactive approach restricts units' ability to influence the enemy and shape the operational environment.



Figure 8-3. Protection Working Group "A Way"

Recommendation(s): Include a comprehensive criticality, vulnerability, and probability assessment into PPL development for each planning horizon to synchronize protected assets with the unit's scheme of maneuver and ensure prioritization based on mission impact:

- Critical assets must support unit condition setting while threat analysis must identify critical asset vulnerabilities by detailing how, when, and where threats will employ effects to exploit those vulnerabilities.
- Organize and structure the PWG to synchronize the PPL across planning horizons with the unit's staff, WFFs, and subordinate units. This must include inputs from integrating cells and G-2 assessments tailored to outputs of the criticality, vulnerability, and probability assessments.
- The PWG (Figure 8-3) must clearly identify and refine outputs that directly inform the approval or validation of risk decisions, coordinate tailored inputs by participants to support the refinement of these identified outputs, and integrate assessments of the effectiveness of previous risk decisions into ongoing risk analysis.

Doctrinal References:

- ADP 3-37, *Protection*, 10 January 2024
- ADP 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*, 31 July 2019
- ATP 5-19, *Risk Management*, 9 November 2021
- FM 3-0, *Operations*, 21 March 2025

Observation: #3: Scheme of Protection

Observation. Observed schemes of protection lack specificity, which hindered the prevention and mitigation of detection, threat effects, and hazards to preserve combat power and enable friendly freedom of action.

Discussion. The fundamental flaw lies in the generic tasks, which do not pertain to the mission. More effective for mission success is defining the protection fight by echelon which will focus the PWG on identifying gaps in capabilities at lower echelons.

The scheme of protection should be integrated throughout the operations process as it organizes protection tasks and synchronizes protection actions. It describes how the commander sees protection supporting the concept of operations and details how to preserve combat power and deny enemy freedom of action. "It includes protection priorities by area, unit, activity, or resource, and should support the scheme of maneuver. It addresses how protection is applied and derived during all phases of an operation." (ADP 3-37). The scheme of protection states the protection responsibilities and actions at each echelon by protection mechanism (Preserve, Deny, Enable)."



Figure 8-4. Protection Tasks

Recommendation(s): "The scheme of protection is based on the mission variables; thus, it includes protection priorities by area, unit, activity, or resource and should support the scheme of maneuver." (ADP 3-37, paragraph 3-33). The staff adds specificity to the scheme of protection

by considering variables such as specific terrain and weather, operations security risk tolerance, and military deception (ADP 3-37, paragraph 3-34). These variables must be incorporated into clearly defined tasks and purposes, nested with specified protection priorities to provide actionable guidance for protection enablers and synchronized capabilities:

- The scheme of protection defines the fight at echelon by protection mechanism with each protection task and system synchronized and integrated into the scheme of protection. For example, to degrade the effects of enemy long range fires during maneuver, the scheme of protection defines task, purpose, and priorities are for organic rear area security and counter unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) capabilities in the division while actions are also defined to synchronize corps reinforcing efforts to prevent communication by special purpose forces and disrupt command and control systems for UAS.
- The protection chief, along with designated protection planners within the integrating cells must validate and review measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs). Task, purpose, method, effect (TPME) is a reliable framework to establish these MOPs and MOEs. Task and purpose for protection enablers within the scheme of protection and operations orders provide defined measures of effectiveness while their methods of employment and desired effects are measured to assess performance. MOPs and MOEs are tied to the decision support matrix and must be constantly monitored and evaluated in the PWG.
- The scheme of protection serves as the starting point for refinement during the PWG based on changes to the situation. Any gaps in lower echelon capabilities that impact the MOPs and MOEs become the higher echelon's responsibility to resolve through risk management.
- Defining the protection fight at each echelon by protection mechanism provides transparency to roles and responsibilities and enforces decision authority. By adding specificity to the scheme of protection with active and passive protection measures in support of the scheme of maneuver, units maintain agility and gain more effective endurance and depth.

Doctrinal References:

- ADP 3-37, *Protection*, 10 January 2024
- FM 3-0, *Operations*, 21 March 2025
- FM 5-0, *Planning and Orders Production*, 4 November 2024

Observation: #4: Protection Running Estimates

Observation. Protection teams generally lack a holistic protection running estimate using mission command systems such as MAVEN or Command Post Computing Environment (CPCE). This contributes to their inability to rapidly answer questions rapidly concerning capability availability and recommending solutions to decision-makers at echelon.

Discussion. A running estimate is the continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander's intent and if planned future operations are supportable (ADP 5-0):

- Running estimates allow any member of the staff or protection team to rapidly access information and inform other staff and the commander to support decisions. Maintaining a comprehensive and continuously updated running estimate enables the protection team and staff to remain agile and rapidly adapt to changing conditions and support timely decision making aligned with the commander's intent.
- The lack of initial staff estimates, and ongoing running estimates degrade the overall staff's capability to plan and execute, negatively affecting their ability to remain agile and flexible.
- Further compounding the problem, the transition between a document on a computer and the maintained staff document on CPCE or MAVEN brings issues of unfamiliarity with the system or a lack of maintaining that document for the staff.
- Protection running estimates are not routinely holistic, (i.e., they do not include military police, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN), air defense artillery, engineers and logistics explosive ordnance disposal as well as disciplines not typically associated with protection [force health, cyber, space, civil affairs, etc.]). This indecision on what is included in the protection estimate at various echelons or staff creates confusion on where the information resides. Does the protection estimate include air defense platforms, decontamination sites, and the detainee holding area? Do those specific disciplines maintain their own estimate separate from protection?

Recommendation(s): Ensure information requirements to support risk planning and decision making are identified early in the military decision-making process and are included in continuously updated running estimates that update the overall scheme of protection. These include protection functional area updates, critical information requirements and essential elements of friendly information updates, integrating cell and enemy analysis updates fed through the criticality, vulnerability, probability (CVP) assessment, and other variables within the operational environment that influence risk. This information must be communicated through products such as a Protection common operational picture to present an accurate visualization of risk and associated contributing factors in time, space, and domain.

Informed by this information, the chief of protection must be able to establish a visualization and shared understanding of operational risk to senior leaders for decision making and for planning within the integrating cells. Driving this visualization are key planning and decision-making information requirements such as the decision support matrix, commander's critical information requirements, and decision authority matrix. As eluded to earlier in the necessity of understanding this flow of information through a protection critical path (from integrating cell, through decision, into execution), protection (Figure 8-5) codifies this information as inputs and

outputs tied to critical visualization and information sharing events within the battle rhythm and decision making and planning processes to define and pull the required information to support the development and management of running estimates.



Figure 8-5. Protection Common Operational Picture

Doctrinal References:

- ADP 3-37, *Protection*, 10 January 2024
- ADP 5-0, *The Operations Process*, 31 July 2019
- FM 3-0, *Operations*, 21 March 2025

Observation: #5: Protection integration into Targeting

Observation. Detailed pattern analysis of enemy air enables effective joint collection and targeting of unmanned aerial systems.



Figure 8-6. Protection integration into Targeting

Discussion. Holistically, "layering protection tasks, systems, and methods preserves combat power and enables freedom of action" (ADP 3-37, paragraph 1-30). When protection cells proactively identify enemy threats, it enables coordinated and layered multi-echelon Protection measures. As an example, identifying enemy UAS as a key enabler for long-range precision fires through comprehensive threat analysis provides an opportunity for proactive multi-domain risk management:

- Leveraging air and missile defense workstations and the corps red air tool, division air defense processes can accurately identify enemy air avenues of approach through pattern analysis of monitored air tracks, revealing UAS points of origin and flight paths.
- Accurate identification of enemy air avenues and UAS origins, synchronized through the PWG and integrated into unit collections, enables rapid adaptation to evolving threats (a hallmark of agility).
- The ability to quickly shift collection assets and targeting priorities based on real-time intelligence allows the unit to stay ahead of the enemy's UAS capabilities.

Furthermore, the implementation of layered defenses, combining non-lethal measures against ground control stations with kinetic air defense along identified corridors promotes operational

endurance. This approach conserves critical air defense resources by distributing the defensive burden, preventing premature exhaustion of limited capabilities, and allowing sustained protection over extended periods. By proactively managing the UAS threat in this manner, the Division maintains a resilient and adaptable defense, contributing to decisive results and preserving combat power throughout the duration of operations. This system supports the broader tenets of unity of effort, tempo, concentration, depth, and multiple dilemmas as well.

Recommendation(s): Sustain proactive threat analysis through CVP assessments such as the integration of air defense pattern analysis to visualize enemy risks and corresponding risk management measures. Communicate this analysis in the vulnerability and probability assessments feeding the PPL to ensure corresponding risk management decisions (avoid, eliminate, mitigate, accept) and measures are synchronized to create an integrated, layered, redundant, and enduring scheme of protection.

Further refine the integration of these analysis processes through the PWG and into collections, targeting, and division-level risk management processes to generate layered options leveraging the full spectrum of available organic and external protection capabilities.

Doctrinal References:

- ADP 3-37, *Protection*, 10 January 2024
- FM 3-0, *Operations*, 21 March 2025

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Appendix A

References

Army Doctrine Publications

ADP 2-0, *Intelligence*, 31 July 2019.

ADP 3-0, *Operations*, 21 March 2025.

ADP 3-19, *Fires*, 31 July 2019.

ADP 3-37, *Protection*, 10 January 2024.

ADP 4-0, Sustainment, 31 July 2019.

ADP 5-0, *The Operations Process*, 31 July 2019.

ADP 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*, 31 July 2019.

Army Techniques Publications

ATP 1-0.1, *Techniques for Human Resources Support to Operations*, 16 November 2023.

ATP 2-01, *Collection Management*, 25 September 2025. (CAC Restricted)

ATP 2-01.3 *Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment,* 1 March 2019.

ATP 2-19.3, *Corps and Division Intelligence Techniques*, 8 March 2023(CAC Restricted).

ATP 3-09.12, *Field Artillery Counterfire and Weapons Locating Radar Operations*, 26 October 2021.

ATP 3-09.24, *The Field Artillery Brigade*, 30 March 2022.

ATP 3-09.90, *Division Artillery Operations and Fire Support for the Division*, 12 October 2017.

ATP 3-52.1, *Multi-service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airspace Control*, 21 June 2023.

ATP 3-60.1 *Multi-service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*

ATP 3-91, *Division Operations*, 17 October 2014.

ATP 3-91.1, *The Joint Air Ground Integration Center*, 17 April 2019.

ATP 3-92, *Corps Operations*, 7 April 2016.

ATP 3-94.2, *Deep Operations*, 1 September 2016.

ATP 3-94.4, *Reconstitution operations*, 5 May 2021.

ATP 4-02.55, *Army Health System Support Planning*, 30 March 2020.

ATP 5-0.3, *Operation Assessment*, 7 February 2020.

ATP 4-16, *Movement Control*, 25 April 2022.

ATP 4-91, *Division Sustainment Operations*, 14 March 2022.

ATP 5-19, *Risk Management*, 9 November 2021.

ATP 6-0.5, *Command Post Organization and Operations*, 1 March 2017.

ATP 6-01.1, *Knowledge Management*, 11 March 2024.

Field Manuals

FM 2-0, *Intelligence*, 1 October 2023.

FM 3-0, *Operations*, 21 March 2025.

FM 3-04, *Army Aviation*, 27 March 2025.

FM 3-09, Fire Support and Field Artillery Operations, 12 August 2024.

FM 3-52, *Airspace Control*, 20 October 2016.

FM 3-60 *Army Targeting,* 11 August 2023.

FM 3-90, *Tactics,* 1 May 2023.

FM 3-94, *Armies, Corps, and Division Operations*, 23 July 2021.

FM 4-0, *Sustainment*, 14 August 2024.

FM 5-0, *Planning and Orders Production*, 4 November 2024.

FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 16 May 2022.

FM 6-02, *Signal Support to Operations*, 19 September 2019.

FM 6-05, *Multi-service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Integration, Interoperability, and Interdependence*, 25 January 2022 (CAC Restricted).

Appendix B

Glossary

ACE	analysis and control element
ACO	airspace control order
ADA	air defense artillery
ADCOORD	air defense coordinating officer
ADP	army doctrine publication
ATO	air tasking order
AWG	assessment working group
BDA	battle damage assessment
BUA	battle update assessment
BUB	battle update brief
CAB	combat aviation brigade
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCIR	commander's critical information requirements
CEMA	cyber-electromagnetic activity
CFHQ	counterfire headquarters
COA	course of action
COFMS	correlation of forces and means
COIC	current operations integration cell
COP	common operational picture
CP	command post
CPCE	Command Post Computing Environment
CPX	command post exercise
CTC	combat training center
CUA	current operations update assessment
CVP	criticality, vulnerability, probability
CUOPS	current operations
CVP	criticality, vulnerability, probability
DAM	delegated authorities matrix

DMG	digital master gunner
DOPT	deep operation planning team
DOTMLPF-P	doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy
DSM	decision support matrix
DSB	division support brigade
D3A	decide, detect, deliver, assess
ECOA	enemy course of action (ECOA)
ESC	expeditionary sustainment command
EVENTTEMP	event template
EXCON	exercise control
FAB	field artillery brigade
FDC	fire direction center
FDO	fire direction officer
FM	field manual
FFAHQ	force field artillery headquarters
FRAGORD	fragmentary order
FUOPS	future operations
FY	fiscal year
GAMS	Global Airspace Management System
GPS	Global Positioning System
HICOM	higher command
HPT	high-payoff target
HPTL	high-payoff target list
ICSM	information collection synchronization matrix
ICO	information collection overlay
ICP	information collection plan
IPOE	intelligence preparation of the operational environment
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
JAGIC	Joint Air Ground Integration Center
JFE	joint fires element

JPP	joint planning process
JTEC	joint targeting and effects cell
KM	knowledge management
KMO	knowledge management officer
KMR	knowledge management representatives
LOGSYNCMAT	logistics synchronization matrix
LSCO	large-scale combat operations
MCTP	Mission Command Training Program
MDMP	military decision-making process
MDC(X)	multi-domain command (experimental)
MDEC	multi-domain effects cell
METT-TC	mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civilian considerations
MFB-CS	multifunctional brigade-corps support
MTOE	modified table of organization and equipment
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OPSYNC	operations sync
PACE	primary, alternate, contingency, emergency
PED	processing, exploitation, and dissemination
PIR	priority intelligence requirements
PPL	protection priority list
PWG	protection working group
RCP	rear command post
RCPA	relative combat power assessments
SITTEMP	situational template
SOF	special operations forces
SOP	standard operating procedures
SPO	support operations officer
TOA	transition of authority
TI	tactical internet
TOA	transition of authority

TPME	task, purpose, method, effect
TWG	targeting working group
TTP	tactics, techniques, and procedures
UAS	unmanned aircraft system
USMC	United States Marine Corps
WFF	warfighting function
WFX	Warfighter exercise

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