

UNDERSTANDING SECURITY COOPERATION



Approved for Public Release
Distribution Unlimited



The Center for Army Lessons Learned leads the Army Lessons Learned Program and delivers timely and relevant information to resolve gaps, enhance readiness, and inform modernization.



CONTACT US

10 Meade Ave.
Bldg 50
Fort Leavenworth
KS 66027

DSN: 552-9533
913-684-9533



Center for Army Lessons Learned

DIRECTOR

COL Scott Allen

ANALYSTS/AUTHORS

Robert Schafer, CALL

Brandon Denecke,
DSCA

Richard Merrin,
ARSOUTH

MAJ Matthew Hughes,
ARSOUTH

MAJ Aaron Malcolm,
USASAC/SATMO

MAJ Chris Mullis,
2SFAB

MAJ James Brown II,
2SFAB

MAJ Curt Belohlavek,
2 SFAB

MAJ L.H. Ginn, 4SFAB
CPT Jacob Gibson,
2SFAB

CPT Ryan Johnson,
2SFAB

INFORMATION DIVISION CHIEF

Eric Hillner

CHIEF, PUBLISHING AND DIGITAL MEDIA

Diana Keeler

PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER

Michael Hagen

EDITOR

Michaela Pursley

ILLUSTRATOR

Jorge Sainz

SECURITY

Sandra Griffin



WRITE with CALL

Have a game-changing best practice or compelling story? Let CALL lead you to publishing success!

We recognize your insights' immense value and potential impact. CALL offers unmatched resources and expertise to showcase your ideas in respected military journals.

Our team helps you easily shape your narrative and navigate the publishing journey. Don't let your knowledge go unnoticed—become a published author with CALL's support.

ARMY.MIL/CALL | (913) 684-9533/2255



Foreword

This handbook would be inaccurate or incomplete without the contributions from the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC), the U.S. Army Security Assistance Training Management Organization (SATMO), and the final review by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). It is one thing to describe security cooperation (SC) policy and doctrine from observations alone, it is another to have experienced practitioners translate policy and doctrine into a handbook designed to inform those who desire to learn more about the U.S. SC enterprise in general.

The U.S. Army Security Force Assistance Command deserves an accolade as well. Chapter 6 of this handbook is dedicated members of those advisor teams who want a voice in expressing their challenges and victories in the daily practice of security force assistance (SFA). The competition continuum can be difficult for those who lack an understanding of the importance of training with friendly foreign forces and the imperative of making adversaries aware of the full complement of warfighting functional capabilities the U.S. Army offers to its allies and partners.

Finally, the perspectives in Appendix B from Mr. Richard C. Merrin, the policy advisor (POLAD) to U.S. Army South (USARSOUTH); and Major Matthew A. Hughes, the SC liaison to the command group at USARSOUTH, are most welcome in this handbook. In their own words, POLADs often have foreign language skills and broad cultural expertise specific to the theater Army's area of operations. This expertise can be used to mentor members of the staff, while providing context as planners consider courses of action and second- and third-order effects of SC activities. The utility of POLADs at the theater Army is an imperative in the information space, the up-to-date domain of SC, and irregular warfare messaging in competition, crisis, and armed conflict.


Endorsement

Deliberate security assistance planning, developed in close coordination with operational and contingency plans, can prioritize foreign military sales, training, and education to provide discrete capabilities that can be employed in combined operations. Employing security assistance in this way can reduce United States force requirements while relieving pressure on the services' generating force and reducing strategic risk for concurrent contingencies. Planning and execution require a nuanced understanding of the authorities, regulations, laws, and tools that enable security cooperation activities.

The U.S. will not go into crisis or conflict without allies or partners. A granular understanding of these nations' military capabilities can facilitate key leader and institutional conversations about strategic investments in military capabilities.

Since Russia's further invasion of Ukraine in February 2021, one of the conflict's defining aspects has been the United States' provision of military material and training to Ukraine for resisting Russian aggression. Security assistance has likely not played such a public and visible role in a contemporary conflict since the 1973 Arab Israeli War. While the scale and speed of the ongoing assistance activities are uncommon, the fiscal and regulatory authorities underwriting the United States' military support to Ukraine are longstanding. U.S. foreign policy has always incorporated security assistance as just one of numerous means for achieving national objectives or goals. Broad economic, political, and diplomatic ties between states are often accompanied by varying degrees of military relationships.

Increasingly, the role of security assistance for geographic combatant commands and theater armies expands not only strategic access but builds capacity or capabilities with allies and partners as part of setting the theater. This is particularly true during phase zero shaping and phase one deterrence operations. Campaign planning to set the theater must account for security assistance. This includes provision of defense articles, military education and training, and military-specific construction for partner and allied nations through foreign military sales and foreign military financing. Three important areas in which security assistance activities support setting the theater is filling capability gaps, improving interoperability, and sharing logistics. A holistic approach to security assistance can ensure that allies and partners are able to provide forces that contribute to filling capability or force gaps in U.S. operational and contingency plans.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Jason B. Nicholson". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name being the most prominent.

Jason B. Nicholson
Brigadier General, USA
Commander, U.S. Army Security Assistance Command

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
Chapter 1	
Security Cooperation Policy Overview.....	5
Chapter 2	
Security Cooperation Stakeholders.....	17
Chapter 3	
Significant Security Cooperation Initiatives.....	29
Chapter 4	
Foreign Military Sales Case Development and Execution	37
Chapter 5	
Pseudo-LOA (Building Partner Capacity) Case Development and Execution.....	51
Chapter 6	
Security Force Assistance Employment.....	57
Chapter 7	
Assessment, Monitor, and Evaluate	67
Appendix A	
Authorities, Funding Sources, and Funding Considerations.....	75
Appendix B	
The Foreign Policy Advisor at the Theater Army	91
Appendix C	
Assessment Frameworks.....	97
Appendix D	
Security Cooperation Knowledge Management Tools.....	105
Glossary.....	109

Figures

Figure 1-1. Security force assistance contribution to security cooperation	11
Figure 1-2. Inter-relationship of foreign assistance and security cooperation activities	12
Figure 2-1. Department of the Army functional organization for SA/SC..	25
Figure 3-1. Strategic guidance to Army campaign support planning.....	31
Figure 7-1. AM&E framework	69
Figure 7-2. LEAP framework.....	73

Tables

**Table A-1. Security cooperation categories
with related programs and authorities86**

Introduction

BACKGROUND

Despite recent legislative changes to security cooperation (SC) programs and activities, there still exists a considerable gap in SC knowledge among planners and practitioners. For most Army Service component command (ASCC) SC stakeholders, learning SC has been mostly from a de facto apprenticeship. Usually, the only knowledge stakeholders will have when they are assigned to an SC activity is what they read in policy or doctrine.

Army SC doctrine has failed to keep pace with a rapidly evolving strategic environment. The COVID-19 pandemic, Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and Department of Defense (DOD) budget and manning challenges have combined to create a significant shift in policy makers' and combatant commanders' expectations for SC activities and effects. (In fiscal years [FY] 22 and 23, security assistance (SA) packages were funded via more than 48.7 billion dollars in regular and supplemental appropriations, including the Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 [P.L. 117-103], and the Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 [P.L. 117-128].)¹ The joint force needs the ability to use SC as a primary tool in the competition space and a primary way to set the theater for conflict. This situation has only further highlighted the need for better informed SC planners and practitioners.

The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) began to address this need with the publication of the *Security Force Assistance Primer* in November 2022.² As a response to the Army's introduction of security force assistance brigades (SFABs) without clear funding, authorities, or operational employment models, the *Security Force Assistance Primer* was designed to inform stakeholders of doctrine, policies, and authorities specific to security force assistance (SFA). However, the *Security Force Assistance Primer* did not address the other SC-related activities that most stakeholders encounter, such as SA activities. This handbook will endeavor to close those remaining gaps.

PURPOSE AND APPROACH

This handbook is designed to provide a condensed, subject matter resource on the U.S. policy approach to SC; key SC stakeholders and their roles and responsibilities in the SC operations process; and the SC operations process itself. This handbook describes the SC operations process through three iterative and continuous phases of planning, execution, and oversight, although these phases are less distinct than those in standard joint operational planning.

Major topics include the purpose of significant security cooperation initiatives (SSCIs) and why they are important to the SC operations process; cultivating an understanding for developing and implementing foreign military sales (FMS) and building partner capacity (BPC) cases; understanding how SFABs are employed; and an overview of the assessment, monitoring, and evaluation (AM&E) process that governs SC activities.

This handbook is composed of seven chapters and four appendices. Chapter 1 provides an overview of foundational SC policy and law. Chapter 2 describes the roles and responsibilities of key SC stakeholders. Chapter 3 describes the SC planning process, including steps leading up to the creation of SSCIs. Chapter 4 examines the development and implementation of FMS cases. Chapter 5 examines the development and implementation of BPC cases. Chapter 6 is an examination of how SFABs and other conventional units conduct SFA activities as described through a small series of vignettes. Finally, Chapter 7 provides an examination of the joint process for assessing, monitoring, and evaluation, which is a mandatory oversight function of geographic combatant commands (CCMDs) and theater armies involved with those activities that directly support SSCIs.³

Because this handbook is written for Army stakeholders, it is necessary to understand how SC programs and activities support multi-domain and large-scale combat operations (LSCO) defined in Army doctrine. Therefore, where applicable to doctrine, the concepts from updated Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*, 1 October 2022; and FM 3-22, *Army Support to Security Cooperation*, 1 July 2023 are referenced. Furthermore, because this handbook describes the SC planning process in general, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 5-0, *The Operations Process*, 31 July 2019; and Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Planning*, 1 December 2020 are referenced and compared. Although, it should be noted that the SC planning process is not the same as joint operational planning. Finally, because this handbook also serves as a resource for joint stakeholders, joint terms and concepts are used where applicable.

End Notes

1. Congressional Research Service Report, *U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine*, updated 15 February 2024.
2. 23-02 (703), *Security Force Assistance Primer*, 23 November 2022, available at: https://www.army.mil/article/262266/security_force_assistance_primer.
3. Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense Instruction 5132.14, *Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise*, Washington D.C., 13 January 2017, 3.



REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) provides a unique service to the force by providing research and answers on a wide variety of topics.

CHAPTER 1

Security Cooperation Policy Overview

This chapter is an overview of the public laws and policies that govern or regulate security cooperation (SC) programs and activities. This chapter defines the common approaches to SC without reference to the overarching national and military strategies, which are explored in further detail in Chapter 3.

The purpose of SC is to enable the joint force to leverage the capabilities of U.S. allies and partners to meet strategic objectives by building combat power and increasing available maneuver space. SC activities are designed to build and strengthen international relationships, develop partner capability, increase capacity, and enable and enhance interoperability.¹ SC programs and activities, therefore, should directly support theater Army campaign plans and contingency plans.

PUBLIC LAWS 87-195 AND 90-629

Taken together, Public Laws (P.L.) 87-195 and 90-629 comprise the bulk of Title 22 United States Code (USC), which authorizes and governs U.S. security assistance (SA) as a subset of foreign assistance.

P.L. 87-195, better known as the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended, is the principal guiding law that the Department of State (DOS) draws upon for SA policy. This expansive set of laws authorizes and regulates all aspects of U.S. foreign assistance, from agricultural and energy development to military assistance and peacekeeping operations. Most importantly for Army SC planners and practitioners, the FAA covers foreign military sales (FMS) and foreign military financing (FMF); transfer of excess defense articles (EDA); international military education and training (IMET); peacekeeping operations; and the family of nonproliferation, antiterrorism, de-mining, and related assistance accounts.

For example, FAA Chapter 5, §541, defines IMET as an SA activity and authorizes the President to furnish military education and training to defense personnel of foreign countries, including attendance at military educational and training facilities in the U.S.² The purpose of these training and educational activities, under §541, is three-fold:

- To encourage effective and mutually beneficial relations and an increased understanding between the U.S. and the partner nation.
- To improve upon the partner nation's ability to use their own resources, which include defense articles and services obtained by them from the U.S.
- To increase awareness of foreign nationals participating in such activities of basic issues involving internationally recognized human rights.

Thus, IMET, like other major SA activities, provides the U.S. with multiple strategic advantages at a relatively low cost.

P.L. 90-629, also known as the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA), as amended, is the basic U.S. law providing the authority and general rules for the conduct of FMS and direct commercial sales (DSCs) of defense articles, services, and training. The AECA came into existence with the passage of the Foreign Military Sales Act (FMSA) of 1968, which Congress passed to establish greater regulation of and control over FMS and military exports. The AECA was amended in 1971 to establish declarations to promote international peace and national security for economic, political, and social progress. A subsequent amendment in 1976 changed the name from FMSA to the current AECA.

Knowledge of these laws is imperative for SC stakeholders, as they provide the legal foundation for common Title 22 SA activities. For instance, these laws require a deliberate time-consuming congressional oversight process for FMS under normal circumstances, but they allow the President of the United States to take certain actions more quickly if an unforeseen emergency arises. This exception was important in February 2022, when Russia's invasion of Ukraine triggered an international crisis and prompted Ukraine to request immediate U.S. SA support (including defense articles and services). In this instance, Title 22 USC §2318, *Special Authority*, allowed the President to direct the drawdown of defense articles and services from existing Department of Defense (DOD) operational stock for emergency transfer to Ukraine.

SECURITY SECTOR ASSISTANCE

On 5 April 2013, then-President Obama signed Presidential Policy Directive-23 (PPD-23), *Security Sector Assistance*, which created the U.S. policy on security sector assistance. This new policy aimed to strengthen the U.S.' ability to provide ally and partner nations to build their own security capacity, consistent with the principles of good governance and the rule of law.³ It is important to note that security sector assistance is different from sector security reform, as the former refers to the U.S.' ability to enable allies and partners to provide security for their own people and respond to common security challenges, whereas the latter refers to those programs conducted by the host nation to improve upon their own security and justice systems. PPD-23 established DOS as the lead federal agency for all foreign assistance, including security sector assistance. This policy requires DOD to coordinate its SC policies, programs, and activities with DOS in support of larger U.S. strategic goals and objectives.

The security sector is composed of those institutions that have the authority to use force to protect the state and its citizens at home or abroad; to maintain international peace and security; and to enforce the law and provide oversight of those organizations and forces.⁴ The security sector includes military and civilian organizations and personnel operating at the international, regional, national, and sub-national levels. Security sector actors include state security and law enforcement providers; governmental security and justice management and oversight bodies; civil society; institutions responsible for border management; customs and civil emergencies; and non-state justice and security providers.

Security sector assistance is broader in scope than SC or SA and refers to the policies, programs, and activities the U.S. uses to do the following:

- Engage with foreign partners and help shape their policies and actions in the security sector.
- Help foreign partners build and sustain the capacity and effectiveness of legitimate institutions to provide security, safety, and justice for their people.
- Enable foreign partners to contribute to efforts that address common security challenges.⁵

For example, in April 2023, Secretary of Defense Austin and Secretary of State Blinken and their Philippine counterparts, Secretary of Foreign Affairs Manalo and Secretary of National Defense Galvez, convened the third U.S.-Philippines Ministerial Dialogue in Washington, D.C. The purpose of the dialogue was three-fold:

- Modernize alliance cooperation
- Deepen interoperability
- Accelerate capability development

The core of the dialogue was that the U.S. and the Philippines agreed to continue to prioritize the modernization of shared defense capabilities through a range of mechanisms, such as FMF and EDA, as well as:

“Committing to adopt expeditiously a Security Sector Assistance Roadmap, which will guide shared defense modernization investments and the delivery over the next five to 10 years of priority defense platforms, as well as institutional capacity-building to enhance the Philippines’ multi-domain deterrence.”⁶

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION POLICY

Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5132.03, DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation, directs the DOD to prioritize, plan, conduct, and align resources for SC as an integral element of the DOD mission and a tool of national and foreign policy. This policy identifies the combatant command (CCMD) campaign plans (CCPs) as the primary conduit for the development and articulation of integrated DOD SC plans. Furthermore, country-specific SC sections of the theater campaign plans serve as the core organizing documents for articulating DOD country-level objectives for the application of SC and should inform, and be informed by, the corresponding DOS integrated country strategies (ICs). DODD 5132.03 aligns with PPD-23 in the support of the integration of DOD SC activities with broader national security efforts and initiatives in a whole-of-government approach.

SC refers to all DOD interactions with foreign security establishments that “build and develop allied and partner security capabilities and capacity for self-defense and multinational operations, provide the armed forces of the United States with access to the foreign country during peacetime or a contingency operation, and build relationships that promote specific United States security interests.”⁷ SC programs are authorized and appropriated under Title 10 USC, Chapter 16, and Title 22 USC, and executed by commanders and staffs.⁸

Multiple types of SC activities can often occur simultaneously with overlapping purposes. These activities include, but are not necessarily limited to, SA, BPC, SFA, foreign internal defense (FID), counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) operations, stability operations, foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), and support to security sector reform efforts. The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), for example, supports the SC enterprise by conducting lessons learned seminars, courses, briefings, and, when requested, assists partner nations in establishing their own lessons learned program. These activities should, as a best practice, directly support a significant security cooperation initiative (SSCI), which supports the attainment of CCMD campaign objectives that have been written into CCPs.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Authorized by DOS and administered by the DOD under the auspices of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), SA refers to a group of programs by which the U.S. provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services. As authorized by the FAA and AECA, SA provides these items to foreign allies and partners via grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.

The most common SA program is FMS, which is regulated under 22 USC §2261-2262, *Authorization of Appropriations*. In the case of FMS, Congress grants the authority to sell defense articles, training, and services from stock and procurement, and these cases are typically funded by the recipient nation. FMF (22 USC §2276) allows foreign nations to obtain articles, training, and services via the FMS process with funds provided by the U.S. as a grant or loan. Other Title 22 SA programs include IMET (22 USC §2247), which allows partners to attend U.S. military education and training programs, and Direct Commercial Sales (22 USC §2778), which allows the U.S. defense industry to sell certain defense articles, defense services, and training directly to specific partner nations.

BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY

BPC is an umbrella category for multiple Title 10 and Title 22 authorities and programs that collectively allow the U.S. to help partner nations establish or increase operational and institutional capacity in a variety of areas. Key authorities and programs include §333 (Authority to Build Capacity), §332 (Institutional Capacity-Building), IMET, and multiple humanitarian assistance (HA) and disaster relief programs funded via DOD Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid appropriations (OHDACA) funds. The full list of BPC programs and authorities are too numerous to detail in this handbook.⁹

These programs may be implemented directly by the DOD or indirectly through other departments and agencies. In the latter cases, the DOD provides defense articles and services to those departments and agencies under the authority of the Economy Act or other transfer authorities. The Economy Act, 31 USC §1535-1536, authorizes agencies to enter into agreements to obtain supplies or services from another agency. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) applies when one agency uses another agency's contract to obtain supplies or services. If the interagency business transaction does not result in a contract or an order, then the FAR does not apply. Furthermore, the Economy Act also provides authority for placement of orders between major organizational units within an agency. Procedures for such intra-agency transactions are addressed in agency regulations. Finally, the Economy Act applies when more specific statutory authority does not exist. Importantly, all BPC programs—whether under Title 10 or Title 22 authority—require coordination across DOD and DOS.¹⁰

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

SFA are those activities under Title 10 USC, Chapter 16, that support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions, whether of an ally, partner, or an international organization (shown in Figure 1-1).¹¹ The Army executes SFA using a variety of forces, including general purpose forces, special operations forces (SOF), and the purpose-built security force assistance brigades (SFABs).

In general, although not exclusively, SFABs are employed by theater armies to develop or improve upon country-specific security capabilities or capacities for partner nations to sustain their own security forces and supporting institutions. This is accomplished by providing training with foreign security forces through warfighting functions that are specific to each SFAB, such as maneuver companies, fires companies, logistics support companies, etc. This enables SFABs to tailor their training support packages to country-specific requirements identified by the country teams at U.S. embassies in countries where the U.S. has access and influence. Because operations often include conventional and irregular forces from multinational partners, commanders must consider how they will maintain unity of effort without direct command authority. SFABs, as well as other Army organizations, add vital capacity to the Army's ability to partner with conventional allies and partners.¹² Additional Army capabilities to employ in partnering with conventional allies and partners includes theater-assigned, attached, and rotational forces, as well as the National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP).




Figure 1-1. Security force assistance contribution to security cooperation¹³

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

FID represents the bulk of the Army’s contribution to joint operations in the competition space (COIN, CWMD, stability operations, and FHA comprise far smaller total force outlays). FID is defined as “the participation by civilian agencies and military forces of a government or international organization in any of the programs or activities taken by a partner nation government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, violent extremism, terrorism, and other threats to its security.”¹⁴

Although FID is also a component of SC and is like SFA at first glance, the two differ in scope and focus (shown in Figure 1-2). In scope, FID is a far broader mission set. The U.S. applies FID programs or operations within a whole-of-government approach to enhance a partner nation’s internal defense and development program by specifically focusing on an anticipated, growing, or existing internal threat. The DOD typically supports FID programs through routine SC activities as part of the CCP. In focus, FID programs or operations target internal threats, whereas SFA targets the capability or capacity of a host nation’s security force to address external threats.

SFA; however, supports FID through the training of those foreign security forces that are charged with internal security and stability, such as the Iraqi Security Forces. In the narrowest of terms, that small piece of FID that concerns itself with the training of a partner nation’s internal security force to counter an insurgency is SFA. The capability for the Iraqi Security Forces to liberate Mosul from the Islamic State in 2016 is perhaps the strongest case study today of the conventional FID-SFA relationship.¹⁵




Figure 1-2. Inter-relationship of foreign assistance and security cooperation activities¹⁶

SC ACTIVITY RELATIONSHIPS AND KEY DISTINCTIONS

As depicted in Figure 1-2, SA, SFA, FID, and the various BPC programs play complementary roles in pursuit of U.S. strategic goals. They also demonstrate considerable overlap in theory and practice, which often leads to confusion among planners and practitioners alike. However, each set of authorities fulfills a specific role. In simplest terms, it may prove helpful to arrange them from broadest focus to narrowest.

BPC is the broadest category of programs, as it involves numerous U.S. government departments and agencies and provides support to nearly all aspects of foreign governments. FID narrows its scope to focus on supporting foreign governments against internal threats but otherwise remains very broad (in both U.S. organizations involved and foreign organizations supported).

SA is narrower still: as it allows support to a variety of host nation security organizations, against internal and external threats, but only from DOD organizations on the U.S. end. The narrowest authority of the group, SFA, is like SA in scope, focus, and U.S. involvement; but it does not generally involve materiel delivery or institutional capability development. Typical SFA authorities allow for augmentation or expansion of existing partner nation institutions, but not for establishment of new capabilities. For example, an SFAB may help a given country enhance its drill sergeant academy or program of instruction (POI), but it cannot establish a new drill sergeant academy. Typical authorities that govern this include 10 USC §284, §321, §333.

In terms of Army SC categories, SA and SFA require careful balance and sequencing for maximum effect. The following example helps illustrate this point:

The rich SC environment in Europe allows for simultaneous, synchronized activities to allow an ally to rapidly achieve full operational capability. A North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally recently requested to purchase M1A2 Abrams main battle tanks to provide an important protected maneuver capability for the ally while supporting U.S. foreign policy goals and U.S. national objectives in Europe.¹⁷

The U.S. Army Service component command (ASCC) drew upon the wealth of SC tools available in the theater and directed V Corps to put in place an effort that was synchronized with multiple organizations.¹⁸


In tandem with the final letter of offer and acceptance (LOA) signing, V Corps and subordinates began working with the U.S. ally to build an Abrams capability. Conventional practice might be to sequence events; however, the availability of resources and the ally's desire to move as quickly as possible gave the ASCC the opportunity to pursue SC activities in parallel. Although the Army SA enterprise was busy finalizing the LOA details, V Corps hosted the first Abrams Operations Summit; 4SFAB began working with the first division to receive the Abrams; and the program executive office for ground combat systems (PEO-GCS) worked together with U.S. Army Europe and Africa (USAREUR–AF) headquarters and subordinate units to establish the Abrams Tank Training Academy.

Headquarters, USAREUR–AF-led efforts, with tremendous support by USAREUR–AF subordinate units, allowed for close synchronization between all the SC executors, including The Office of the Deputy Assistant of the Army for (defense exports and cooperation) (DASA[DE&C]), PEO–GCS, United States Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC), Security Assistance Training Management Organization (SATMO), the SPP, V Corps, 1st Infantry Division, 4SFAB, and the ally.

All worked together to ensure that they could contribute to the maximum extent possible, without overmatching the ally’s absorptive capacity. These simultaneous efforts continue, with close synchronization and cooperation, and the ally is well on the way to achieving Abrams full operational capability. This capability will be validated in combined exercises. The result will be a tremendous, critical addition to NATO and a modernized, interoperable ally for the U.S. Army. When properly aligned as in this example, security cooperation resources can work together simultaneously to support U.S. national objectives and foreign policy goals.

End Notes

1. Field Manual (FM) 3-22, *Army Support to Security Cooperation*, 1 July 2023, 1-1.
2. Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Senate, *Legislation on Foreign Relations through 2002*, Washington D.C., July 2003, 266.
3. White House, Presidential Policy Directive 23, *U.S. Security Sector Assistance Policy*, Washington D.C., 5 April 2013.
4. Ibid, pp 1-2.
5. Presidential Policy Directive 23, *Security Sector Assistance*, 2013.
6. U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), *FACT SHEET: U.S.- Philippines 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue*, 11 April 2023, <https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3359459/fact-sheet-us-philippines-22-ministerial-dialogue/>.
7. Joint Publication (JP) 3-20, *Security Cooperation*, 9 September 2022, pg. I-2.
8. FM 3-22, *Army Support to Security Cooperation*, 1 July 2023, 1-2-1-6.
9. For more details on BPC programs, consult Table C15.T2 in *BPC Programs and Authorities* at <https://samm.dscamilitary.com/table/table-c15t2>.
10. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Department of Defense, *Security Cooperation Management*, Edition 40, Arlington, VA, May 2020, 1-8.
11. Ibid, II-3.
12. FM 3-0, *Operations*, 1 October 2022, 2-15.
13. JP 3-20, *Security Cooperation*, 9 September 2022.
14. JP 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*, 17 August 2018, I-1.
15. Ibid, I-21 (See vignette on Enabling Iraqi Foreign Security Forces in Liberating Mosul).
16. FM 3-22, *Army Support to Security Cooperation*, 1 July 2023.
17. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, *News Release, Poland—M1A1 ABRAMS Main Battle Tanks*, 6 December 2022, <https://www.dscamilitary.com/press-media/major-arms-sales/poland-m1a1-abrams-main-battle-tanks>.
18. FM 1-02.1, *Operational Terms*, 28 February 2024, page 1-7.



Request for PUBLICATIONS

The CALL library archives thousands of articles and publications to support units and Soldiers in multiple scenarios covering CTC and MCTP rotations, DSCA, and ongoing contingency operations.

CHAPTER 2

Security Cooperation Stakeholders

This chapter details the security cooperation (SC) stakeholders' roles and responsibilities within the vast SC enterprise, including those who have the responsibility of managing foreign military sales (FMS) or other security assistance (SA)-related activities. The list and description of these stakeholders, although not all-inclusive, is designed to inform broadly. For a more detailed description of more SC stakeholders and their roles and responsibilities, please review Chapter 3 of the latest version of the Defense Security Cooperation University's (DSCU) *Security Cooperation Management* handbook, also known as the "Green Book".

Primary stakeholders at the national level include Congress, the Executive Office of the President, the Departments of State and Defense, and the combatant commands (CCMDs). Department-internal stakeholders include the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), the Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Guard Bureau (NGB) State Partnership Program (SPP), security cooperation organizations (SCOs), and the military departments (MILDEPs).

UNITED STATES CONGRESS

SC programs and activities are foreign policy tools that support U.S. political, economic, military, technological, and national security goals, such as enabling allies and partners, to deter and defend against possible aggression, maintain regional military balance and defense posture, and enhance coalition interoperability. The ability to engage with allies and partners and conduct SC and SA programs and activities is defined in federal law and must be authorized by Congress on an annual basis. Congress oversees these SC programs and activities (as required) through annual amendments to Title 10; United States Code (USC) Chapter 16 authorities; the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA); the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA); and the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).

Congress exercises its power and influence over SC in several ways, including ratifying treaties with other nations that may have implications for current or future SC programs or activities; enacting appropriations acts; and developing and acting on legislation to establish or amend basic SC authorization acts. Furthermore, during those times when appropriation actions are incomplete, Congress has the power to pass joint continuing resolutions that permit the incurrence of obligations to carry on essential SC programs and activities until proper appropriation action is complete.

THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Within the Executive Office of the President of the United States, the Office of Management and Budget and the National Security Council (NSC) have the most significant effect on SC programs and activities.¹

The Office of Management and Budget controls the apportionment of appropriated funds for obligation and expenditure in support of SC programs and activities. The Office of Management and Budget assists the President in the budget process by interacting with federal agencies to develop a budget for congressional review and approval. The Office of Management and Budget is also interested in the effect that SC programs and activities have on Department of Defense (DOD) military and civilian manpower and facilities, as well as the amounts of the appropriations themselves.

The NSC advises the President concerning the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security, including assisting the President in the formulation of a variety of national security documents, such as the national security strategy. From a strategic perspective, SC guidance begins here.

Finally, as it relates to SA, §38 of Title 22 USC §2778, *Control of Arms Exports and Imports*, 30 June 1976, authorizes the President to control the import and export of defense articles and defense services and to delegate the authority to develop and enact regulations with respect to exports of defense articles and defense services. Executive Order 13637, *Administration of Reformed Export Controls*, 8 March 2013, delegates this authority to develop and enact import and export regulations to the Department of State (DOS).

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The DOS sets SA priorities and oversees the DOD's implementation of SA programs. The day-to-day administration of the authorities to control the export and temporary import of defense articles and defense services are further delegated to offices within the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, specifically the Directorate for Defense Trade Controls (DDTC), the Office of Regional Security and Arms Transfers (RSAT), and the Office of Security Assistance. The DDTC is responsible for controlling the export and temporary import of defense articles and administers the International Traffic in Arms Regulation, which implements the AECA. RSAT manages the bilateral or multi-lateral political-military and regional security relations and the sale or transfer of U.S.-origin defense articles and services to foreign governments. The Office of Security Assistance manages military grant assistance programs, including foreign military financing (FMF), international military education and training (IMET), and peacekeeping operations.

Chiefs of mission, with support of the full U.S. country team, develop and publish the integrated country strategy (ICS) for their respective countries. The ICS is a three-year U.S. government plan that identifies the most significant U.S. national interests in any country and details the U.S. strategic approach to address these interests.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The Secretary of Defense establishes military requirements and implements programs to transfer defense articles and services to eligible foreign countries and international organizations. The DOD implements several SA programs, such as FMS, under the DOS' oversight and authority. The Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]) serves as the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense on all SC matters but delegates responsibility to the DSCA.

DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY

DSCA is the DOD lead on the management of SC programs and activities. DSCA's mission is to advance U.S. defense and foreign policy interests through building the capacity of foreign partners so that allies and partners can respond to shared challenges. DSCA facilitates building partner capacity (BPC) in several ways, but there are three functional offices that stand out: Office of International Operations; Office of Strategy, Plans, and Policy; and the DSCU.

The Office of International Operations handles the operational functions of DSCA and maintains the directorates that are responsible for managing regional and global SC program management, including the execution of Title 22 SA and Title 10 §333 BPC programs through the FMS system.

The Office of Strategy, Plans, and Policy coordinates with CCMDs to prepare Title 10 §333 BPC programs for congressional notification, ensuring programs are delivering full-spectrum capability, meeting statutory congressional requirements, and are coordinating through DSCA, Office for the OUSD(P), and the State Department.

DSCU is the DOD's Center of Excellence for SC education, training, development, research, and institutional capacity building. DSCU, through its Institutional Capacity Building Directorate, manages DSCA's worldwide institutional capacity building effort to support foreign counterparts in developing critical ministerial and institutional security capabilities. This includes the Ministry of Defense Advisors Program, where qualified candidates are recruited, trained, then sent abroad for up to two years for non-resident advisory as well as educational activities conducted by DSCU's Institute for Security Governance (ISG) and Defense Institute for International Legal Studies (DIILS).

THE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

DTSA administers the development and implementation of DOD technology security policies on international transfers of defense-related goods, services, and technologies. DTSA identifies and mitigates national security risks associated with the international transfer of controlled information and advanced technology to maintain the U.S. warfighter's technological edge and support U.S. national security objectives. DTSA is part of the DOS decision-making process when considering the approval or disapproval of a proposed sale of military equipment.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

The Joint Chiefs of Staff provide implementation guidance for U.S. military plans and programs and provide the Secretary of Defense with military advice concerning SC. The Joint Chiefs of Staff review, in conjunction with the USD(P) and CCMD, campaign plans and oversee deconfliction of the campaign plans, as necessary. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also collect and review the campaign plan assessments completed by the CCMD through the comprehensive joint assessment and advise the USD(P) on the effectiveness of DOD SC efforts.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also assign force/activity designators for priorities in the allocation of stocked defense articles, defense services, and military education and training between and among partner nations and organizations and the U.S. armed forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend priorities for allocation of materiel and equipment for partner nations when competing needs cannot be resolved by DSCA.

Finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are responsible for assigning Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) project codes that identify a project, operation, force, or activity sanctioned by the Chairman that requires heightened logistic infrastructure visibility and support or that identifies a unique military project or operation when a CJCS project code is warranted for tracking purposes, but normal materiel allocation is to remain unaffected.²

COMBATANT COMMANDS

The CCMDs develop military campaign plans to conduct SC programs and provide the appropriate assistance as requested by USD(P) or DSCA. The CCMDs supervise SC offices at embassies within their regional area of responsibility in matters related to execution of the guidance for force employment, including the provision of necessary technical assistance and administrative support. The CCMD develops country-specific security cooperation sections (CSCSs) and country plans that articulate the CCMD's intent to apply time, money, and effort in a particular country. The CSCS's are linked to CCMD's campaign plans and DOS ICSs.

SECURITY COOPERATION ORGANIZATIONS

§515(a) of the FAA of 1961, as amended, authorizes the President to assign U.S. military personnel overseas to manage SA programs administered by the DOD. The President may assign members of the armed forces of the United States to a foreign country to perform numerous activities including equipment and services case management; training management; program monitoring; evaluation and planning of the host nation's military capabilities and requirements; general administrative support; promoting rationalization, standardization, interoperability, and other defense cooperation measures; and liaison functions exclusive of advisory and training assistance.³ The generic term SCO is the DOD organization overseas with the primary responsibility of interfacing with the partner nation on SC programs and activities.

The SCO is normally located within the U.S. embassy and is a part of the ambassador's country team. Although SCOs vary in size and specific composition, they generally include a group of military officers and civilian employees under the oversight of the SCO chief. The SCO chief is the DOD lead for all SC programs and activities, including DOD-administered Title 22 SA activities. The SCO chief, in turn, falls under the overall authority of the senior defense official/defense attaché (DATT). Sometimes the SCO and DATT are the same person, but this is not often the case.⁴ SCOs often go by a location-specific name in each country (e.g., office of defense cooperation, military assistance advisory group, Office of Security Cooperation (OSC), office of defense partnership, etc.).

The DOD relies upon the SCO to interface with partner nation counterparts and leadership. Thus, SCO personnel must understand partner nation national and military objectives and strategies; be familiar with partner nation capabilities and requirements; and have access to appropriate partner nation counterparts and leaders. SCOs possess a wealth of knowledge and can also contact subject matter experts to assist partner nations with detailed or technical questions in specialty areas.

MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

In coordination with DSCA and the USD(P), the MILDEPs serve as advisors to the Secretary of Defense on all SC matters related to their respective departments. MILDEPs conduct military education and training, acquisition of defense articles, and defense services for transfer to eligible foreign countries and international organizations in accordance with policies and criteria established by DSCA. MILDEPS also provide technical information and data on weapons systems, tactics, doctrine, training, capabilities, logistic support, price, source, availability, and lead-time for a proposed SC/SA sale.

Each MILDEP is primarily responsible for building and maintaining capability for U.S. military forces. As an added responsibility, the MILDEPs execute foreign sales and training as SC-implementing agencies. Each MILDEP assigns a case manager to serve as the focal point for a given SC case. More than one case manager at a MILDEP may be assigned for separate SC cases involving different programs. FMS, for example, is complex and some cases require multiple managers because equipment may be transferred or sold to multiple foreign partners as part of the same case. Moreover, FMS may be part of a broader case requiring exchange of personnel as well as high-end military equipment. In these complex cases, reporting to Congress is necessary. The MILDEP has a country program director who is responsible for overseeing that MILDEP's SC relationship with partner nations.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

As a MILDEP, the Department of the Army supports SC and SA through multiple functions. The Army organizations involved in the planning, development, management, and execution of SC and SA programs are known collectively as the Army Security Assistance Enterprise (ASAE). The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ASA[ALT]), with responsibility for setting its strategic direction and overseeing SC-related policies and programs not otherwise delegated, leads the ASAE.

The Office of the Deputy Assistant of the Army (defense export, and cooperation) (DASA [DE&C]) is responsible for policy oversight related to SA, armaments cooperation, and export control programs to engage allies and partners across the spectrum of Army acquisition to support U.S. national security objectives. The office is also tasked to formulate Army-wide SA policy, strategy, guidance, and planning for foreign military training, including the IMET program, FMS, counter-narcotics, counterterrorism, and all training of foreign nationals.

Broadly speaking, Army SA falls into three categories: materiel, training, and construction, with separate implementing agencies for each (described in detail below).

U.S. ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND

U.S. Army Materiel Command (USAMC) is the designated implementing agency for approved SA materiel programs providing materiel, training, and technical services to allies and partners through the FMS program. USAMC also develops and processes medical FMS cases through the U.S. Army Medical Materiel Agency.

The USAMC SA enterprise contains multiple USAMC major subordinate commands coordinating and collaborating to execute USAMC's SA responsibilities as outlined in Army Regulation (AR) 12-1, *Security Assistance, Training, and Export Policy*, 29 February 2024; and AR 10-87, *Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, Direct Reporting Units*, 11 December 2017.

The United States Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC) serves as the USAMC lead for synchronizing and integrating USAMC's SA capabilities to meet Army priorities and CCMD requirements (see Figure 2-1). USASAC will execute USAMC's duties and responsibilities of the implementing agency as described in AR 12-1, *Security Assistance, Training, and Export Policy*, 29 February 2024; and DA Pam 12-1, *Security Assistance Procedures and Operations*, 31 March 2016. USASAC communicates directly with DASA (DE&C), SCOs, CCMDs and Army Service component commands (ASCC) to coordinate the efforts of USAMC's various life cycle management commands and their SA management directorates in support of U.S. national security objectives.

USAMC's Army Contracting Command (ACC) supports the USAMC SA enterprise's execution of SA responsibilities through their respective contracting centers supporting the life cycle management command, SA management directorates, and ASA (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology [ALT]) program executive offices (PEOs). ACC executes through dedicated reimbursable support and uses economy of scales where feasible, in conjunction with U.S. government procurements. ACC uses the same stewardship in their procurement for the USAMC SA enterprise's mission as they do for the U.S. government requirements, using the federal acquisition regulations, defense federal acquisition regulations, and Army federal acquisitions regulations.

USAMC also executes a global training mission through USASAC's subordinate Security Assistance Training Management Organization (SATMO). As the Army's lead for non-institutional SA training, SATMO employs a mix of permanent change of station (PCS) and temporary duty (TDY) SA teams to execute SA training missions in support of DOS and CCMD strategic objectives. SATMO is unique in its ability to tailor force composition and mission to customer specifications, as well as its ability to operate under a wide range of authorities.

Historically, Title 22 FMS-funded training and technical advising in support of materiel cases comprises the largest share of SATMO's operations, with the other portion comprised of Title 10 §333, §321, and Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI)-funded training and technical advising operations. SATMO coordinates directly with SCOs, CCMDs and ASCCs to ensure proper incorporation of SA training as part of the total package approach.

For a more detailed explanation on what the total package approach looks like, refer to Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Publication 21-638, *Consolidating Gains with the Total Package Approach: Extending the Model Beyond Military Sale*, June 2021. This article can be found on Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) with the ID number 230306-212767 (CAC login required). JLLIS is only available to authorized users. To access the site, you must establish a JLLIS account at <https://www.jllis.mil>.

U.S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND

The Army establishes interoperability with allies and partners by conducting SC activities. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has two internal organizations that support the development of partner interoperability and capacity building: the International Army Programs Directorate (IAPD) and the Security Assistance Training Field Activity (SATFA). IAPD and SATFA enable the Army and U.S. allies and partners to establish and build relationships that support U.S. national interests. IAPD programs, plans, coordinates, and executes TRADOC support to ASCC support to combatant command campaign plans (CCPs), Army-to-Army, and TRADOC-level bilateral staff talks and distinguished foreign visits. SATFA brokers and manages Army institutional training solutions for international military students via authorized programs to provide international allies and partners with the skills, knowledge, and understanding that leads to enhanced relationships, cooperation, and shared security efforts.

U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

Finally, under the construction category, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is often called upon to design and construct facilities in the purchaser's country before the delivery of major weapons systems. USACE builds roads, runways, maintenance hangars, motor pools, storage bunkers, and administrative buildings, as needed, to support specific equipment and personnel.

PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICES

The PEOs and program managers support the ASAE by making system presentations (as requested by a foreign country and approved by DSCA and DASA (DE&C) and by assisting implementing agencies with letter of offer and acceptance (LOA) development and execution of approved FMS cases and BPC pseudo cases. PEOs and PMs also support pre-letter of request (LOR) engagements with partner nations, which helps increase the likelihood of obtaining an actionable international agreement (LOR for LOA).




Figure 2-1. Department of the Army functional organization for SA/SC⁵

U.S. ARMY SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE COMMAND

Although not technically part of the Army’s SA/SC architecture, the Security Force Assistance Command (SFAC) and its subordinate brigades play a vital role in SC implementation. SFAC organizes, recruits, staffs, trains, and equips the Army’s regionally aligned security force assistance brigades (SFABs) for employment in support of CCMD SC requirements. The SFABs are functional, purpose-built units that support the theater armies across the competition continuum by conducting targeted security force assistance (SFA) activities with foreign security forces.⁶ In competition, for example, SFABs contribute to integrated deterrence through a persistent presence in the contact layer of strategic competitors while building partner interoperability and situational awareness for joint and coalition forces.⁷ If properly integrated, SFABs also serve as a shaping element to help ASCCs set the theater.

Unlike the Army’s SA forces, the SFABs possess a combination of composition and authorities to transition from competition, through crisis, and into armed conflict. This flexibility provides CCMD and ASCC commanders additional options for force employment and can help demonstrate U.S. resolve to partners in crisis and conflict. Strategic planners must ensure SFABs are adequately integrated into theater campaign plans and operational plans across all phases of the operation.

Vignettes of how SFABs employ their capabilities can be found in Chapter 6.

ARMY SERVICE COMPONENT COMMAND SECURITY COOPERATION DIRECTORATES

The Army normally executes its Title 10 USC responsibilities to organize, train, and equip operational Army units through an ASCC to support CCMD objectives. The ASCCs set and maintain the theater for the conduct of multidomain operations. Setting the theater includes posturing Army forces (ARFOR) and conducting SC activities that shape an operational environment and prevent conflict.⁸ The ASCCs provide the CCMDs flexibility in employing land power as well as planning and coordinating for the consolidation of gains in support of joint operations, such as through SC activities, although these activities are governed by CCMD's country-specific SC plans, policies, and regulations rather than by doctrine.⁹ ASCCs serve as the supported command for SC requirements that the Army is directed to accomplish in support of broader CCMD campaign plan objectives.¹⁰

Theater armies, including their assigned theater-echelon commands and brigades, perform essential functions during competition to achieve national objectives while deterring adversary malign action. Corps, divisions, and supporting brigade combat teams are crucial to the execution of operations, activities, and tasks during competition. These forces may support SFA or foreign internal defense (FID) by participating in multinational exercises and conducting humanitarian and other civil-military operations, humanitarian or developmental assistance, and training exchanges.¹¹ U.S. ARFOR at corps and lower echelons, in support of theater Army objectives, directly engage with partner nation security forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and civilian populations to accomplish missions, build rapport, and improve conditions that promote stability.

In terms of theater Army doctrine, ASCCs normally have digital liaison detachments (DLDs) to interface with allies, partners, or components that require connectivity with selected command and control systems, allowing them to participate in the operations process and to share the ground common operational picture. However, when DLDs are not available, SFABs can offer capabilities and functions like DLDs.¹²

Security cooperation directorates are typically organized under the G5 strategy, plans, and policy directorate at each ASCC. The term security cooperation directorate is commonly used across the ASCC G5s, but it is not an exclusive descriptor. U.S. Army Europe-Africa (USAREUR-AF) G5, for example, uses the term international operations division. Security cooperation directorates typically integrate, synchronize, and monitor portfolios of programmatic train and equip cases to enhance relationships and partner nation capacity across the joint, international, and interagency spectrums.

STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM

The SPP is a DOD program managed and administered by the NGB but coordinated and approved by the CCMDs and chiefs of mission. The SPP is one of the few programs authorized to engage across the spectrum of country governmental organizations and is a multi-categorization SC tool. Title 10, §341, *Department of Defense State Partnership Program*, allows the National Guard to interact with military, security forces, and emergency response or the friendly foreign governments' disaster response organizations. Thus, the SPP, under §341, can legally engage with foreign security forces as military-to-military and military-to-civilian, which is a unique SC authority.

SPP's most important quality is its potential to cultivate long-term interpersonal relationships with partner forces. Many Guardsmen remain in one state for their entire service and can thus cultivate decades-long relationships with partner nation soldiers as they rise through the ranks. These long-term interactions facilitate a deeper understanding of security concerns, capability gaps, and opportunities for engagement with partner nations. The SPP also has significant potential to achieve soft power outcomes outside the military because of Guardsmen's roots in the civilian world, which helps these partnerships transcend into whole-of-society relationships.

End Notes

1. Defense Security Cooperation University, *Security Cooperation Management*, Edition 42, May 2022, p. 3-2.
2. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 4110.01F, *Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation*, 25 September 2021, p. 3.
3. 22 U.S.C. §2321i, *Overseas Management of Assistance and Sales Programs*, 23 March 2023.
4. DOD Directive (DODD) 5205.75, *DOD Operations at U.S. Embassies*, 4 December 2013.
5. Defense Security Cooperation Agency.
6. Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*, 1 October 2022, 2-20.
7. Army Technical Publication (ATP) 3-96.1, *Security Force Assistance Brigades*, 20 September 2020, 1-1.
8. FM 3-22, *Army Support to Security Cooperation*, 1 July 2023, 1-7.
9. FM 3-94, *Army, Corps, and Division Operations*, 23 July 2021, 1-10.
10. Army Regulation (AR) 11-31, *Army Security Cooperation Policy*, 21 March 2013, 7.
11. FM 3-0, *Operations*, 1 October 2022, 4-12.
12. ATP 3-93, *Theater Army Operations*, 27 August 2021, 1-9.

CHAPTER 3

Significant Security Cooperation Initiatives

Security cooperation (SC) planning capabilities vary from country to country. SC plans consider the foreign government's economic capabilities, the support provided by third parties, and the overall U.S. and regional conventional arms transfer policies. SC plans emphasize the country's capabilities to organize, employ, and manage national resources that are allocated to defense. Plans should be consistent with overall U.S. political, economic, technological, and national security goals. This all said, in the SC operations process, a needs assessment is a critical part of long-range SC plans and is typically conducted before planning documents are developed.

This chapter describes how SC is integrated into combatant command (CCMD) campaign plans (CCPs), which requires understanding the influence that national strategy has in developing significant security cooperation initiatives (SSCIs). SSCIs are those carefully planned initiatives that, when properly executed, will achieve desired strategic effects. SSCIs are multi-year, multi-authority, and multi-recipient unit plans that link SC activities and programs to strategic Department of Defense (DOD) objectives, as outlined in the national defense strategy (NDS), through a specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound objective. SSCIs are intended to capture all efforts that the DOD intends to implement over the span of five years to achieve these objectives. This should include holistic, comprehensive designs that DOD will review and prioritize accordingly. To the extent practicable, SSCI planning should complement anticipated security sector assistance initiatives that the Department of State (DOS) will execute, as well as other relevant interagency programming.¹

In terms of a needs assessment, the DOD and DOS typically use different templates, depending on which gaps either are trying to assess and mitigate. The more common assessment frameworks used by the DOD, such as political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) and diplomacy, information, military, economics, financial, intelligence, law enforcement (DIME-FIL), are described in greater detail in Appendix C.

INTEGRATING SC INTO CCMD CAMPAIGN PLANS

U.S. national security, defense, and military strategies provide the basis for the global, regional, and functional strategic end states specified in DOD guidance for the employment of the force and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).

Yet, few things are more frustrating for new planners than realizing that what is taught at the schoolhouse does not translate smoothly in their first assignments as country desk officers at their respective Army Service component commands (ASCCs). In this chapter, the national security strategy (NSS), the NDS, and the national military strategy (NMS) are examined to determine the guidance that country desk officers will need when drafting their support plans to the CCMD's country-specific security cooperation plan.

THE THREE NATIONAL STRATEGIES

The three national strategies include the NSS, the NDS, and the NMS.

The National Security Strategy

SC planning notionally begins at the national level with the NSS. The executive branch of the U.S. government publishes the NSS, which outlines the nation's major national security concerns and how the nation plans to deal with them. The President periodically produces the NSS to inform Congress, the public, and foreign constituencies about the Administration's vision of how to deal with potential national security concerns.² The NSS then drives a series of strategies and actions throughout the executive branch, prompting the development of various department-level strategic planning documents (see Figure 3-1). Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 23, *Security Sector Assistance*, directs that executive branch agencies work together to maximize the effect of limited resources in achieving NSS goals.³ The NSS explains U.S. national interests broadly, but it is not written in a manner that extrapolates the ends, ways, and means for the planner. For example, the October 2022 NSS describes a United States' strategic goal as wanting a free, open, prosperous, and secure international order, but the approach to achieve this goal is pursued through three lines of effort (LOEs):

- Invest in the underlying sources and tools of U.S. power and influence.
- Build the strongest possible coalition of nations to enhance collective influence to shape the global strategic environment and to solve shared challenges.
- Modernize and strengthen the U.S. military so it is equipped for the era of strategic competition with major powers.⁴

Thus, the strategic approach to achieving this goal, as it relates specifically to the second LOE, is through a nuanced blend of SC programs and activities. That said, it is paramount that when planning SC activities, such as the development of SSCIs, the strategic objectives are always linked to the NSS, the NDS, and the NMS. Conducting SC without connecting it to strategic objectives leads to uncoordinated programming and ineffective use of resources. What DOD has previously called an LOE might now be called an SSCI. In fact, previous SSCI guidance has directed that CCMDs should scope SSCIs like an LOE.




Figure 3-1. Strategic guidance to Army campaign support planning⁵

The National Defense Strategy

The NDS, required by Title 10, United States Code (USC), §113(g), is signed by the Secretary of Defense and outlines the DOD’s approach to implementing the President’s NSS.⁶ The March 2022 NDS articulates safeguarding U.S. national interests through three specific approaches: integrated deterrence, campaigning, and building enduring advantages.⁷ Moreover, the NDS affirms that mutually-beneficial alliances and partnerships are the center of gravity for this strategy. Thus, through the lens of SC, there is utility in the linkage of tailored security force assistance (SFA) activities, for example, toward building capability, capacity, and interoperability with foreign security forces.

The National Military Strategy

The 2022 NMS provides the joint force with a framework to protect and advance U.S. national interests. The NMS is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's (CJCS) central strategy and planning document that General Mark A. Milley referred to as a wakeup call to adapt now, or lose later.⁸ The NMS was established by precedent in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, which charges the CJCS, the President, and the Secretary of Defense with providing strategic direction for the armed forces.⁹ In the 2022 iteration, the NMS describes campaigning as how the DOD sequences day-to-day defense initiatives, such as SC programs and activities, and develops advantageous conditions to deter conflict.

JOINT PLANNING PROCESS

Joint planning is the deliberate process of determining how to implement strategic guidance, such as how to use military capabilities in time and space to achieve objectives within an acceptable level of risk.¹⁰ In the process, joint planning frames the problem; aligns ends, ways, and means; develops operational approaches; accounts for risk and opportunities; and gives leaders decision space with proposed military options. Moreover, planning is a continuous activity of the operations process, which is perhaps better known as those steps involving planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing SC programs or activities. Specific to the SC operations process; however, is the development of SSCIs at the CCMD level and its implementation at the ASCC level. SSCI development, detailed later in this handbook, is different from the operations process in that typical development and implementation is guided through planning, execution, and oversight; not through the plan, prepare, execute, and assess processes. Ideally, planning begins with specific national strategic objectives and desired military end-states to provide a unifying purpose around which to focus actions and resources.¹¹

CAMPAIGN PLANNING

There are three forms of campaign planning, including joint strategic campaign planning, combatant command campaign planning, and country-level security cooperation planning.

Joint Strategic Campaign Plan

The joint strategic campaign plan is a five-year global strategic campaign plan that operationalizes the NMS.¹² It is the CJCS's primary document to guide and direct the preparation and integration of joint force campaign, contingency, and support plans. The joint strategic campaign plan establishes a common set of processes, products, priorities, roles, and responsibilities to support the integration of the joint force's global operations, activities, and investments from day-to-day campaigning to contingencies.¹³ The joint strategic campaign plan is the primary means by which the CJCS provides strategic and operational guidance in the preparation of joint plans.

Combatant Command Campaign Plan

The CCP is the CCMD's primary instrument for operationalizing a theater strategy. The CCP consists of all plans contained within the established theater or functional responsibilities, including contingency plans; subordinate and supporting plans; posture plans; and CSCSs and operations in execution.¹⁴ The internal CSCS for the partner nation generally contains the SC-specific intermediate military objectives that enable the accomplishment of larger strategic objectives and end states. CCPs and corresponding CSCSs should integrate all SC activities, operations, and investments with CCMD and component posture, resources, requirements, and plans to lay the foundations needed for any contingency plans.

The use of precise terminology is important, especially at the theater level. Joint doctrine and multiple senior leaders have begun using the terms "investments" and "return on investments" to describe DOD actions and outcomes within the operational environment. Moreover, the 2017 version of Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Planning*, introduced the phrase "operations, activities, and investment" to describe joint actions globally, but these terms, as they relate to SC programs and activities, are now being referred to as "inputs" and "outputs" by interagency SC stakeholders. This is important because inputs and outputs have specific, measurable meanings in SSCIs, which will be explored in greater detail later in this handbook.

Country-Level Security Cooperation Planning

It is important to note that theater-level and country-level SC planning are not conducted separately; they inform each other and are developed in unison with each other.¹⁵ Country-level planning refers to the planning for an SC program or activity with a particular country, nation, or state. For country-level planning, higher-level guidance comes from the SC planning guidance, the JSCP, the CCP, and (where applicable) theater contingency plans.

In addition to DOD strategic documents, planners should look at the DOS joint strategic plan, joint regional strategy, country-specific integrated country strategy (ICS), as well as the United States Agency for International Development's country-specific country development cooperation strategy. This all said, the goal of country-level SC planning is to develop a measurable SSCI that not only supports the NSS, the NDS, and the NMS, but is also tethered to a country-specific ICS and CDSC in support of DOS regional strategies.

End Notes

1. Defense Security Cooperation Agency Policy Memorandum 22-38, 30 September 2022.
2. Defense Security Cooperation University, *Security Cooperation Management Fiscal Year 2022*, May 2022, 19-2.
3. Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 23, *Security Sector Assistance*, 5 April 2013.
4. White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, October 2022, 10-11.
5. Field Manual (FM) 3-22, *Army Support to Security Cooperation*, 1 July 2023.
6. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Planning*, 1 December 2020, II-4.
7. U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), *National Defense Strategy 2022*, accessed 25 May 2023, <https://www.defense.gov/National-Defense-Strategy/>.
8. White House, *2022 National Military Strategy*, 27 October 2022, 1.
9. Public Law (P.L.) 99-433, Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, 1 October 1986.
10. JP 3-0, *Joint Campaigns and Operations*, 18 June 2022, I-1.
11. JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*, 1 December 2020, I-1.
12. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3100.01E, *The Joint Strategic Planning System*, 21 May 2021, C-1.
13. Ibid, C-2.
14. White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, October 2022, 10-11.
15. Defense Security Cooperation University, *Security Cooperation Management Fiscal Year 2022*, May 2022, 19-10.

OUR SERVICES



BE AN AGENT FOR CHANGE


WORKING FOR CALL

Work with us to drive Army change and impact Soldiers. Join us as a CALL Military Analyst (Forward) at a COMPO 1 active division or corps headquarters! Highly motivated self-starters currently serving in the rank of KD-qualified major or colonel (O4-O6) or master sergeant to sergeant major (E8-E9) are encouraged to apply. Soldiers selected will serve as a critical link between operational and institutional forces.



REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

CALL provides a unique service to the force by providing research and answers on a wide variety of topics. Reach out to us with your questions and your topics of interest.



REQUEST FOR PUBLICATION

The CALL library is home to thousands of articles and publications. Our materials support units and Soldiers in multiple scenarios covering CTC and MCTP rotations, DSCA, and ongoing contingency operations.

CHAPTER 4

Foreign Military Sales Case Development and Execution

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES

One of the largest sub-components of security assistance (SA) and foreign military sales (FMS) is a process through which eligible foreign governments and international organizations may purchase defense articles, services, and training from the U.S.¹ FMS provides materiel and training solutions to build or otherwise develop a partner nation's security forces capability or capacity to address internal and external threats to its sovereignty.

This chapter will explore the general policies associated with the FMS process and developing and implementing FMS cases. For more detailed information on the overall FMS process, please review chapters 4, 5, and 6 of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency's (DSCA) Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) and Army Regulation (AR) 12-1, *Security Assistance, Training, and Export Policy*. The electronic version of the SAMM can be found at <https://samm.dsca.mil/listing/chapters>.

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES CRITERIA AND ELIGIBILITY

The U.S. may sell, grant, or lease defense articles and services to a country or international organization only if the President determines that the prospective purchaser is eligible based on the following criteria per the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended §505(a), and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976, §3(a):²

- The President finds that the furnishing of defense articles and defense services to such country or international organization will strengthen the security of the U.S. and promote world peace.
- The country or international organization has agreed not to transfer title to, or possession of, any defense article or related training or other defense service so furnished to it or produced in a cooperative project, to anyone, not an officer, employee, or agent of that country or international organization, and not to use or permit the use of such an article or related training or other defense service for purposes other than those for which furnished, unless the consent of the President has first been obtained.
- The country or international organization has agreed that it shall maintain the security of such article or service and provide substantially the same degree of security protection afforded to such article by the United States.

- The country or international organization is otherwise eligible to purchase or lease defense articles or defense services.

Defense articles and services are not generally sold to foreign purchasers under the AECA unless they are part of the national defense establishment (partner nation defense institutions) under the direction and control of the ministry that is responsible for their defense matters. The determination of eligibility, therefore, is not a guarantee that a sale will be made. FMS may be suspended, and certain items may not be released to the requesting country for policy reasons or legal requirements. The reasons for a change in eligibility status of a partner nation, although not an inclusive list, typically includes unnecessary military expenditures from the partner nation, support to terrorists, being a communist country, illicit drug production or trafficking from the partner nation, etc.

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES LEGAL, REGULATORY, AND POLICY TERMS OF SALE

When the eligibility criteria are met, the Secretary of State determines whether there will be a sale to a country or international organization and the amount thereof, whether there will be a lease to a country or international organization, and whether there will be any other delivery or performance under any sale or lease. Decisions to issue licenses or approve sales under the AECA or to furnish military assistance under the FAA must consider the extent to which such exports, sales, or assistance contribute to an arms race; increase the possibility of outbreak or escalation of armed conflict; or prejudice the development of bilateral or multilateral arms control arrangements. It is important to note a restriction that, pursuant to AECA, §3(a)(2); and FAA, §505(a); all purchasers or grant recipients must agree that they will not transfer title or possession of any defense article or related training or other defense services to any other country without consent from the Department of State (DOS).

Furthermore, sales and assistance may be made to countries only for purposes of internal security; legitimate self-defense; for preventing or hindering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of the means of delivering such weapons; civic action; or to permit the recipient country to participate in regional or collective arrangements consistent with the United Nations (UN) Charter or when requested by the UN.

This all said, proper use of U.S.-origin items is a joint responsibility of the recipient and U.S. personnel. U.S. representatives are primarily responsible until the items are physically transferred to the recipient, who then assume this responsibility, including transfer to a third party or other disposal or change in end-use based on agreements under which transfers are made.

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES GENERAL POLICIES

Foreign nations often compete in weapon system procurements, soliciting bids or proposals from defense industries in the international market for arms. Depending on the nation's acquisition process, the solicitation may be a formal request for information (RFI), a tender or proposal, an invitation to bid, or a similar document that states the review criteria for proposal submissions. Given the size of the U.S. industrial base, the U.S. response may consist of more than one offering. In the international arms acquisition competition, the foreign nation releases its solicitation in the international market and when submitted through appropriate channels, the solicitation is essentially the letter of request (LOR) that initiates the FMS review process to determine whether it is in the best interest of the U.S. to participate in the international arms competition. The U.S. response in the international arms sale competition may include FMS, direct commercial sale (DCS), international cooperative agreement, or a combination of these programs. Most foreign solicitations are released to international defense industries rather than to governments, but the FMS process should not be excluded from the response solely because of how the foreign solicitation was released or initially conditioned.

Furthermore, in international arms sale competitions, DSCA is the Department of Defense (DOD) focal point for policy regarding U.S. participation in these competitions. The military departments (MILDEPs) and defense contractor team develop the proposal, which is then presented by the appropriate MILDEP as the representative of the U.S. government. DSCA becomes the lead DOD agency if there are multiple Services involved in the proposal process. The lead DOD agency facilitates, as early as possible, the U.S. government's deliberative processes to develop the policy decisions that affect the proposals. The DOD lead obtains the views of the following key U.S. stakeholders:

- DOS
- Department of Commerce
- Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P])
- Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment
- Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA)
- DSCA
- MILDEPs

The DOD lead also ensures MILDEP and contractor teams submit proposals that are consistent with internal U.S. decisions, are as responsive as possible to the requirements of the foreign solicitation, and meet the solicitation's schedule. In cases of multiple U.S. offerings, the DOD lead must facilitate all U.S. proposals impartially so that there is no perception that one offering is preferred over another and there is no biased interpretation of policy. The DOD lead must bring together all competing MILDEP and contractor teams to highlight issues; perform joint problem solving; establish plans and agreements; ensure that the U.S. candidates are being held to the same standards; address cross-cutting issues; and coordinate responses with the foreign purchaser.

In the FMS sales process, the total package approach ensures that FMS purchasers can obtain support articles and services. These support articles and services include the construction of support facilities that are needed to acquire and sustain equipment and to operate in a responsible and effective manner. This ensures the intent of the sales process is met. When preparing price and availability or letters of offer and acceptance (LOAs) to purchasers, the complete sustainability package must be included in that offer. Price and availability data is prepared by MILDEPs, DSCA, and other DOD components in response to a foreign government's request for preliminary data for the potential purchase of a defense article or service. Price and availability data are not considered valid for the preparation of an LOA according to DSCA policy.³ In addition to the system itself, other items to consider in a total package include repair parts, maintenance, training, technical assistance, initial support, software, ammunition, follow-on support, etc.

The DOD prefers those countries friendly to the U.S. fill defense requirements with U.S.-origin items. If an item has been designated as "FMS-Only," the DOD is generally neutral as to whether a country purchases U.S.-origin defense articles or services through DCS or through FMS channels. In some instances, such as for certain government-furnished equipment and government-furnished materiel, controls⁴ apply and items are sold only through FMS.⁵ Concerning an FMS-Only determination, the AECA gives the President discretion to designate which military end-items must be sold exclusively through FMS channels. FMS-Only is a determination that certain licensed exports are sold government-to-government only. This discretion is delegated under statutory authority to the Secretary of State. Per policy, this discretion is exercised upon the recommendation of DOD. However, DOS approves or disapproves all arms sales and is responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of all sales. FMS-Only items include air-to-air missiles, attack helicopters, fighter aircraft, torpedo countermeasures, etc.

WHAT MAY OR MAY NOT BE PURCHASED USING THE FMS PROGRAM

The FMS program transfers defense articles and services to eligible countries and international organizations. 22 USC §2794, *Definitions*, defines defense articles as “any weapon, weapons system, munition, aircraft, vessel, boat, or other implement of war; any property, installation, commodity, material, equipment, supply, or goods used for the purposes of making military sales; any machinery, facility, tool, material, supply, or other item necessary for the manufacture, production, processing, repair, servicing, storage, construction, transportation, operation, or use of any article.”⁶ Moreover, defense services are defined as any service; test; inspection; repair; training; publication; technical or other assistance; or defense information used for the purposes of making military sales but does not include design and construction services under 22 USC §2769, Foreign Military Construction Sales. Those defense articles or services that may be procured through the FMS process are located in what is called the *U.S. Munitions List (USML)*, which is codified in the Code of Federal Regulations §121, which identifies those articles, services, and related technical data designated as defense articles or defense services pursuant to §38 and 47 of the ACEA.⁷

USML categories are organized by paragraphs and subparagraphs identified alphanumerically. These categories usually start by enumerating or otherwise describing end-items, followed by major systems and equipment; parts, components, accessories, and attachments; and technical data and defense services directly related to the defense articles of that USML category. All items described within a USML paragraph or subordinate paragraph that is preceded by an asterisk (*) are designated significant military equipment. There are 21 Roman-enumerated categories in the USML, ranging from firearms and related articles (I); to personal protective equipment (X); to articles, technical data, and defense services not otherwise enumerated (XXI).

Companies may prefer that a sale be made commercially rather than using FMS procedures. When a company receives a request for proposal from a country and prefers DCS, the company may request that DSCA issue a DCS preference for that sale. However, there are often concurrent negotiations that occur when a purchaser seeks information through FMS and from a U.S. commercial source to compare FMS and commercial pricing for the same item to gain a negotiating advantage. The U.S. Government discourages this practice because implementing agencies may not participate in FMS-commercial comparison studies unless DSCA grants an exception for specific circumstances.

Certain items may be transferred using FMS procedures only by exception. The U.S., for example, does not serve as the disbursing agent for funds received under LOAs unless those funds are required for defense articles and services provided by DOD, another federal agency, or through a DOD procurement contract. LOAs must not include transportation, lodging, per diem, or other administrative expenses of foreign government representatives even though such expenses may relate to the procured materiel or services. Moreover, certain categories of weapons, such as cluster munitions, antipersonnel land mines, or napalm, are restricted from FMS and DCS unless granted an exemption from DSCA. Concerning cluster munitions, as another material example, §7056(b) of Public Law (P.L.) 111-8 states that:

“No military assistance will be furnished for cluster munitions, no defense export license for cluster munitions may be issued, and no cluster munitions or cluster munitions technology will be sold or transferred, unless the submunitions of the cluster munitions have a 99 percent or higher functioning rate and the agreement applicable to the assistance, transfer, or sale of the cluster munitions or cluster munitions technology specifies that the cluster munitions will only be used against clearly defined military targets and will not be used where civilians are known to be present.”⁸

Noting the restrictions on these categories of weapons, certain training is also restricted, such as counterterrorism training, military intelligence training, or police training. The scope of military intelligence training is limited to training that is directly related to combat or operational intelligence, or to intelligence management of combat or operational intelligence at the joint military staff level. FAA funding for police training is prohibited, except with certain exceptions. 22 USC §2240, *Police Training Prohibition*, states that none of the funds made available under this authority, “shall be used to provide training or advice, or provide any financial support, for police, prisons, or other law enforcement forces for any foreign government or any program of internal intelligence or surveillance on behalf of any foreign government within the United States or abroad.”⁹ Moreover, the FAA prohibits using funds authorized to conduct any police training or related programs either in a foreign country or in the U.S., but this prohibition does not apply to units with the sole function of internal security that involves combat operations against insurgents, or legitimate self-defense of national territory against foreign invasion, whether or not the unit is called police.

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES PROCESS

FMS cases generally follow a three-phase lifecycle of pre-case and case development, letter of offer and acceptance (LOA), and FMS case implementation and execution, as outlined below.

Pre-Case and Case Development

The FMS process begins when an eligible foreign country or international organization requests information regarding defense articles or services, including training, that is being considered for purchase. All RFIs require the same channels of submission and must be answered consistent with the legal provisions under which the FMS program operates. The security cooperation organization (SCO) generally provides the necessary assistance for many FMS partner nations, although SCOs often reach out to Service component commands or even individual implementing agencies for technical or service-specific information.

Requests are generally referred to as LORs, whether provided through formal correspondence, requests for proposal, discussions, e-mail, letters, messages, etc. Although no specific format is required, implementing agencies are directed to develop, where appropriate, system-specific checklists designed to help ensure that requirements are fully defined. This helps account not only for weapon systems but also for the logistics, construction, training, and support services needed to deliver a complete and sustainable capability to the FMS purchaser. Partner nations should ensure that the request is complete and is submitted in accordance with the criteria provided to ensure the LOR is actionable.

A country team assessment occurs following the partner nation's LOR submission. Country team assessments present the coordinated position of senior U.S. embassy leadership in support of a proposed FMS and provides key information necessary to evaluate and explain the sales. Note that in terms of the SC operations process, assessments are conducted before decisions are made, and should be viewed as an important opportunity to provide valuable information that will expedite the decision process. The assessments should be unclassified to the greatest extent possible. Country team assessments must accompany any LOR that:

- Is likely to result in a congressional notification pursuant to the AECA based on its cost
- Would result in first introduction of a new capability for the country, regardless of cost
- Requests defense articles or services of a sensitive nature
- Are upon request by DSCA¹⁰

Letter of Offer and Acceptance

An LOA is the legal government-to-government instrument used by the United States to sell defense articles and defense services including training, and design and construction services, to a foreign country or international organization under authorities provided in the AECA. Prepared by the implementing agency, the LOA itemizes the defense articles and services offered, and when implemented, becomes an official tender by the United States. Once signed by the partner nation, the LOA initiates one of three types of FMS cases:

- **Defined Order:** This type of FMS case is for defense articles and/or services that are specified in the LOR and stated explicitly in the LOA. A defined order FMS case would most likely be used for purchasing major end items, such as trucks, and for weapon system sales. When discussing defined order FMS cases, the U.S. government will further distinguish between those that are relatively simple to execute because they are for standard items, such as 5-ton trucks, and those that are complex and involve purchaser-unique considerations, such as fighter aircraft.
- **Blanket Order:** Used to purchase a specific category of items or services at a set dollar value ceiling with no definitive listing of the exact items or quantities desired. Normally a blanket order case is used for follow-on support and training for a major item or weapon system following the initial support period of a defined order FMS case. Partner nations may also establish a separate blanket order training case to fund emergent training requirements. A blanket order case remains open as long as it has funds against it. The case can be extended simply by requesting an amendment to add funding.¹¹

Note: some individuals may refer (incorrectly) to blanket order cases as “blanket open-ended cases.”

- **Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Arrangement:** Permits countries to participate in the U.S. supply system so that they can draw frequently used parts and other supplies from U.S. stocks based on demand rates the way that U.S. military units do. Each cooperative logistics supply support arrangement consists of two separate FMS cases, one for the U.S. to purchase and sustain the spare and repair parts, and one that the FMS customer uses to order parts and replenish the stocks. Cooperative logistics supply support arrangement increases the probability of spare parts being available for issue from U.S. stock.

By law, a numbered certification must be submitted to the speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate before LOA documents that meet specific criteria may be offered to foreign purchasers. Upon receipt of the data, DSCA prepares the required notification documents, coordinates with the state, and submits the notification to Congress. Congress reviews each proposed sale and may prohibit the transfer by enacting a joint resolution before the end of the prescribed review period. If Congress does not enact a joint resolution, the LOA document can be offered when the review period expires. Standard information required for congressional notifications include statutory notification data, such as cost estimates; a Sensitivity of Technology statement, if needed; military justification; and offset certificates, if needed. Furthermore, in accordance with 22 USC §2776(b)(1), each notification will indicate whether an offset agreement is proposed in connection with the sale. If so, an Offset Certificate, which is treated as confidential information, pursuant to 50 USC §2411(c) and 22 USC §2776(g), must be included in the congressional notification.¹²

Foreign Military Sales Case Implementation and Execution

The implementing agency takes action to implement a case once the purchaser has signed the case and provided the U.S. with any required initial deposit. The FMS case must be implemented in all applicable data systems, such as Socium or Defense Security Assistance Management System (DSAMS) before case execution occurs. The implementing agency should issue detailed implementing instructions for activities that are involved in executing the FMS case. Instructions must state that implementation is subject to receipt of obligational authority issued by the implementing agency.

Case execution is the longest phase of the FMS case life cycle. Case execution includes activities such as: logistics, acquisition, supply, transportation, maintenance, training, financial management, case management, oversight, coordination, case documentation, case amendment or modification, case reconciliation, case reporting, etc. Because rapid delivery of defense articles, services, and training purchased through the FMS process constitutes a tangible demonstration of U.S. commitment to the government-to-government relationship with the purchaser, every effort should be made to deliver the articles, services, or training in a timely manner in accordance with any timelines or standards included in the LOA.

Acquisition for FMS purchasers must be in accordance with DOD regulations and other applicable U.S. policy or procedures. This affords the foreign purchaser the same benefits and protection that apply to DOD procurement and is one of the principal reasons why foreign governments and international organizations prefer to procure through FMS channels.

That said, FMS requirements may be consolidated with U.S. requirements or placed on separate contract, whichever is more expedient and cost effective. When foreign governments conduct a competition for a weapon system and a U.S. system is selected, that competition should determine the price to be paid. The purchaser determines the value of the end item it seeks. Most foreign governments want U.S. systems, but the FMS process is slow and potential buyers often move on to buy from China or Russia. Furthermore, U.S. contracts may include incentive clauses for early performance. In this case, the FMS case manager and contracting officer work together to make sure the contract and the LOA are consistent.

FMS requests for sole source procurement should meet the purchaser's objective requirements and not be used for improper or unethical considerations. U.S. representatives must remain objective in providing options or recommendations to the partner and may not solicit requests for sole source. The implementing agency must consult with its counsel on cases where facts indicate that granting a request to use sole source may violate U.S. law or ethical business practices. If the implementing agency determines that a purchaser's request to use sole source should not be approved, the memorandum informing the purchaser must be coordinated with DSCA. That said, the DOD components do not accept directions from the FMS purchaser as to source selection decisions or contract terms, nor is the FMS purchaser permitted to interfere with a prime contractor's placement of its subcontracts. However, to the extent permitted in requesting sole source procurement, the DOD components may honor an FMS purchaser's sole source request for the designation of a particular prime or subcontract source for defense articles or defense services.

Finally, the U.S. security cooperation (SC) enterprise's goal is to provide consistent, incomparable support to its purchasers. To this end, thorough reviews are conducted periodically to ensure the accurate and timely status of customer's programs and can represent a significant investment of FMS resources in terms of time and money. These reviews can be at any level, such as at policy level or service level and scoped from the country level down to case level. Concerning representation at case reviews, senior U.S. officials can co-chair case reviews, but detailed discussions require the participation of the case managers who are responsible for the day-to-day operations of the program or weapon system under review.

FMS case reviews are a key source of information for communicating agreed upon decisions affecting cases and may be driven by many requirements, such as purchaser's requirements, long-term investments, or unique requirements on the part of the purchaser or an applicable weapon system.

EMPLOYING SATMO VIA FOREIGN MILITARY SALES

As its name implies, the Security Assistance Training Management Organization's (SATMO) primary mission is the execution of SA training, the bulk of which is directed and funded via the FMS process. Interestingly, only about half of SATMO's historical and current missions involve training in support of materiel delivery. The remainder span a wide range of training and services, from coastal and riverine watercraft maintenance and small unit tactics training to institutional doctrine reform and highly specialized medical capability development. SCO personnel and other SC planners may think of SATMO as relatively limited in capacity but useful in a wide variety of niche SC applications.

To illustrate, SATMO's 2023 materiel-related operations included 42 SA teams that provided training to 28 partner nations on a broad array of U.S.-provided land systems, including the following:

- Patriot and terminal high altitude area defense (THAAD) air defense systems
- High mobility artillery rocket system (HIMARS) artillery systems
- Multiple variants of Abrams, Bradley, and Stryker
- Multiple variants of the Apache, Blackhawk, and Chinook helicopters
- A variety of small boat and small arms units

At the same time, SATMO's seven non-materiel operations include:

- Combat training center advisor mission (institutional capacity building)
- Trauma, burn, and rehabilitative medicine mission (specialized training and institutional capability development)
- Multiple professional military education support missions (e.g., national and regional war college instructors, officer basic course support, drill sergeant academy mobile training teams [MTTs])
- Multiple logistics program advisor missions (military and non-standard)
- Army support to the U.S. Coast Guard's Caribbean Basin Security Initiative
- Two national military doctrine reform and implementation advisor missions
- Multiple peacekeeping operations support, humanitarian assistance (HA)/disaster relief, medical, small unit tactics, and counter-improvised explosive device (IED) training MTTs

Similar to all FMS cases, partner nation interest, capacity, and suitability are the most important planning considerations for obtaining SATMO's capabilities via FMS. To obtain maximum benefit, SCO personnel and ASCC and CCMD security cooperation directorate officers must nest SATMO employment within theater SSCIs and other U.S. government efforts and help partner nations do the same. Other planning considerations for SATMO include:

- **Highly tailorable composition and capabilities packages.** SATMO establishes or modifies SA teams to precisely meet mission requirements. To accomplish this, SATMO requisitions personnel with the desired military occupational specialty (MOS) and grades from across the Army, and (with additional coordination) joint force. SATMO can also employ contract personnel, if required. This allows SATMO to support an extremely wide variety of partner nation requirements, as described in the examples section above.
- **Variable planning and execution time horizons.** Based on Army manning processes, the establishment of a new permanent change of station (PCS) SA team generally requires two years from LOA to boots-on-ground. Temporary duty (TDY) SA teams, by contrast, may require as little as 3 to 6 months, particularly if the mission falls within the capability scope of SATMO's organic SA training company. Once established, PCS SA team missions may continue indefinitely to meet U.S. and partner nation requirements (SATMO's longest-running current SA team has been in-country from 2009 to 2024 thus far).
- **In-house case development expertise.** As the Army's SA training implementer, SATMO has a limited capacity to coordinate directly with CCMDs, ASCCs, and SCOs, as required, to facilitate case development and execution. Where possible, SC planners should direct pre-execution SATMO RFIs through DSCA or the United States Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC) to ensure proper coordination.

For example, SATMO fielded a SA team to facilitate Taiwan's integration of newly acquired M1A2 Abrams main battle tanks. When Taiwan requested to purchase the tanks through the FMS system, the country requested new equipment training and follow-on integration/capability establishment training as part of the process.

This triggered USASAC to add a SATMO training line during case development, which in turn triggered SATMO to begin planning and preparation for the establishment and employment of a SA team. SATMO planners worked with USASAC planners and the SCO in Taiwan to finalize the LOA for partner approval. Following LOA approval, USASAC's U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM)-focused regional operations division oversaw the acquisition and delivery of Taiwan's tanks and associated equipment packages and coordinated with the program executive office (PEO) for new equipment training. Concurrently, SATMO formed, trained, and deployed a SA team to assist Taiwan with more advanced training and technical assistance required to turn the newly procured tanks into an actual combat capability. This close coordination throughout the FMS process between the partner, the SCO, and the various actors in the Army Security Assistance Enterprise (ASAE) is referred to as the total package approach.

End Notes

1. Joint Publication (JP) 3-20, *Security Cooperation*, 9 September 2022, GL-5.
2. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended §505(a), and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976, §3(a), 4 September 1961.
3. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).
4. Controls are defined or otherwise detailed in 22 United States Code (USC) §2778, *Control of Arms Exports and Imports*, 16 January 2016.
5. Ibid.
6. 22 USC §2794, *Definitions*, 3 January 2016.
7. 22 USC §2778, *Control of Arms Exports and Imports*, 16 January 2014, and 22 USC §2794, *Definitions*, 3 January 2016.
8. §7056(b) of Public Law (P.L.) 111-8, Section H, *Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009*, 11 March 2009.
9. 22 USC §2240, *Police Training Prohibition*, August 2016.
10. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, *Electronic Security Assistance Management Manual* (ESAMM) C5.1.4, 15 July 2018, Chapter 5.
11. Ibid, C5.4.1, Table C5.T6.
12. 22 USC §2776I(1), 1 January 2024.

CHAPTER 5

Pseudo-LOA (Building Partner Capacity) Case Development and Execution

This chapter will briefly describe the pseudo-letter of offer and acceptance (LOA) process designed to identify a foreign government's capacity before a formal request is made. This case development focuses on how building partner capacity (BPC) programs support significant security cooperation initiative (SSCI) outcomes. For more detailed information on the overall BPC process, please review chapter 15 of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency's (DSCA) *Security Assistance Management Manual*.

PROGRAMS OVERVIEW

BPC programs are crucial tools used by the Department of Defense (DOD) and other U.S. government agencies in furtherance of U.S. national security objectives. These programs move through the foreign military sales (FMS) system for administrative management; however, they follow a modified process: the pseudo-LOA case process.

To enable BPC program execution through existing security assistance (SA) automated systems, the DOD implementing agency develops a pseudo-LOA in the Defense Security Assistance Management System (DSAMS). The LOA is the government-to-government agreement that identifies the defense articles and services the U.S. government proposes to sell to a country to meet the requirements identified in the letter of request (LOR). BPC cases are implemented using pseudo-LOA documents, whereas FMS cases use traditional letters of acceptance. The pseudo-LOA is not signed by the partner nation that will ultimately receive the articles and services but instead serves to document the transfer of articles and services to the U.S. government-requesting authority. Certain sub-agencies in the U.S. Government request transfer of defense articles on behalf of foreign governments because the request from the foreign government has yet to occur but is imminent. Lifecycles of BPC programs and their accompanying activities are to be logged and monitored in Socium, the DOD's activity lifecycle management information system.

Congress appropriates funding to DOD for specific BPC programs through the annual DOD Appropriations Act, and in certain cases, through other appropriations acts. Aside from DOD appropriations, Congress also authorizes and appropriates funds to the Department of State (DOS) and other U.S. agencies for security cooperation (SC) and SA activities. These agencies may, in turn, transfer funds to DSCA, identifying a specific requirement for defense articles and services for a partner nation under the authority of a BPC program. Often, fund transfers occur via a memorandum of agreement (MOA). When interagency funds are transferred into the FMS trust fund for BPC programs, they are considered obligated upon signature of the MOA. Implementing agencies, in turn, must then obligate the funds contractually or through other means. Pursuant to the Economy Act, when the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) or other DOD component transfers funds to the DSCA in support of a BPC program, the funds must be obligated within their period of availability.

BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY PROCESS

The process of developing and executing a BPC case is organized into five phases:

- **Planning and Requirements Definition:** A U.S. government requesting authority, which is usually the combatant command (CCMD) but could also be another DOD or non-DOD agency, defines and initiates the BPC requirement to support specific U.S. objectives. The implementing agency may conduct a feasibility assessment to determine the most appropriate solution. The requesting authority creates a training and equipment list, which the implementing agency reviewed for feasibility, pricing, and availability. Once approved, the training and equipment list is included with the memorandum of request to begin the case implementation process. Most BPC program and case planning will occur in conjunction with annual CCMD SC planning. Crises, targeted appropriations, and other events may make it necessary for the requesting authority to begin BPC case planning outside the annual CCMD planning process. In every instance; however, the requesting authority should initiate coordination with the appropriate implementing agencies, other key stakeholders, and the CCMD J5 as early in the process as possible. It is often beneficial to invite participation from the security cooperation organization (SCO), the military departments (MILDEPs), and regional experts within DOD and DOS. SCOs generally play a greater role in planning for BPC programs because BPC cases are initiated by the U.S. government and do not involve a request from the partner nation. SCOs work to obtain partner nation agreement to accept and sustain the articles and/or training provided. They also work to obtain agreement in tracking transportation schedules and arrange to notify the partner nation of impending delivery. Finally,

they receive and transfer possession and title of shipments to the partner nation. The requesting authority must confirm that the benefitting country is not under sanctions and is otherwise eligible to receive BPC program assistance from the DOD and DOS. Human rights vetting requirements must be completed, as applicable, before a benefitting country receives BPC program assistance. The DOS Leahy Law states that no assistance may be provided under the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) or the Arms Export Control Act to any unit of the security forces (including an individual) of a benefitting country if the Secretary of State has received credible information that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights unless the partner nation is taking effective steps to bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to justice. See Appendix A for specific information on the Leahy Laws.

- **Case Development:** The requesting authority and SCO will remain actively engaged during case development to clarify requirements, ensure development is on-track, and maintain communications with the benefitting country. The implementing agency will document and price the required materiel and services on a pseudo-LOA. DSCA will place the BPC case in the “offered” status once all programmatic and policy requirements have been met. All §333 BPC programs are two-year funds and must be obligated no later than 30 September of the expiring year.
- **Case Implementation:** In the first step, the implementing agency accepts the offered case in DSAMS and DSCA authorizes required funds to be transferred into the FMS trust fund. Once the case has been accepted, it is ready to be implemented. After a BPC case has been implemented, the United States Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC) begins providing a monthly update to the SCO with a comprehensive spreadsheet on the status of all Army 333 programs and cases. The SCO may begin preparations for receipt of the materiel and services, as needed. The SCO will make no guarantee to the benefitting country that it will receive assistance until the final delivery of the materiel or services.
- **Case Execution:** During case execution, the implementing agency must often work quickly to obligate funds before they expire. The implementing agency procures the defense articles and services according to DOD regulations. Materiel is transported while the implementing agency retains oversight of the transportation process and assists with resolution of transportation issues that may arise. After materiel has arrived in country and has been inventoried, the SCO within the U.S. embassy aligned to that partner nation transfers custody and responsibility of the materiel and services to the benefitting country and begins end-use monitoring, as applicable. If training with partner nation forces is included within the BPC case, then any U.S.-partner nation training will occur during this phase.

- **Case Closure:** The BPC case closure phase can begin as soon as supply services are complete when all materiel and services have been delivered. The implementing agency will expend BPC program funds no later than 31 July of the funds expiring fiscal year (FY) or another deadline specified in funding documents. Finally, the implementing agency must ensure that residual funds are identified for return as soon as possible to complete the closure activity. Defense Financial and Accounting Service will then close the case.

§333 QUARTERLY REPORT

Title 10 United States Code (USC) §333 provides the largest single authority for DOD BPC efforts. This authority requires DSCA to submit quarterly reports to Congress about the delivery and execution status of all defense articles, training, defense services and supplies (including consumables), and small-scale construction. The report must include information on the timeliness of those deliveries compared to the delivery schedule included in the original congressional notification. It must also include information about the status of funds for allocated programs, including amounts of unobligated funds, unliquidated obligations, and disbursements. Quarterly reports must be accurate and reflect any deviation from the original congressional notification.

EMPLOYING SATMO IN SUPPORT OF BPC EFFORTS

The Security Assistance Training Management Organization's (SATMO) small but broad utility may serve Title 10 BPC efforts just as readily as Title 22 SA efforts. SATMO fields teams to support materiel-related training, and also a broad range of non-materiel training and services. These non-materiel training and services include coastal/riverine watercraft maintenance, humanitarian assistance (HA)/disaster response training, institutional doctrine reform, and specialized medical capability development.

SC planners and practitioners should consider SATMO support to BPC SSCIs in three main instances:

- When an SSCI requires a specialized, cross-functional team not found in the Army's modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) unit inventory.
- When an SSCI requires a long-term (such as permanent change of station [PCS]) presence to achieve desired results.
- When facing difficulty obtaining forces for an SSCI (or when assigned forces fall through).

As with FMS, SATMO employment for BPC comes with several unique planning considerations.

Planning and execution time horizons. Put simply, SATMO can execute temporary duty (TDY) and PCS SA team missions in support of BPC efforts, but PCS SA teams require more careful coordination based on the relative uncertainty of BPC funds' consistency year after year. Once established, PCS SA team missions may continue indefinitely to meet U.S. and partner nation requirements, but this requires continued appropriation and obligation of supporting funds. If funds are not renewed, SATMO can work with the affected CCMD and SCO to send a SA team to FMS or foreign military financing (FMF) (as done with SATMO's PCS SA team in Panama from FY23 to FY24), but this may not be an option in some cases. TDY SA teams, by contrast, take place within a single FY and are thus easier to implement under BPC authorities.

Year-of-execution gap fills. Under certain circumstances, SATMO can field TDY SA teams (mobile training teams [MTTs]) as an expedient solution for year-of-execution force allocation shortfalls. For instance, if a special operations force (SOF) unit requests reconsideration of a 333-funded small unit tactics training mission and SATMO has sufficient available capacity, the CCMD could employ a SATMO MTT to execute the mission. This requires careful coordination and sufficient lead time (generally not less than 90 days) but may provide a useful solution for some SSCIs. SATMO and/or the USASAC representatives participate in the various SC education and training working groups or other CCMD SC planning events to help facilitate such solutions.

As an example, SATMO's ability to provide mission-tailored teams via the pseudo-LOA process allowed U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) to fill SSCI gaps left by shifts in SOF mission priorities during the Global War on Terror period. Beginning in 2006, 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) reduced its rotational force posture in Latin America to facilitate increased operational requirements in Afghanistan and Iraq, which meant a major reduction in forces available for regional augmentation team missions. To compensate, SOUTHCOM used 333 precursor funds to field SATMO SA teams as direct replacements for the SOF teams in Nicaragua, Panama, and several other countries. These teams performed a variety of BPC functions, from helping Panama establish a ground and maritime border security force to facilitating equipment integration and maintenance efforts. The Panama SA team arrived in country in 2008 and remains there at the date of publication (fall 2024), despite changes in funding and specific mission requirements—this is a highly successful example of achieving BPC goals via the pseudo-LOA process.



REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) provides a unique service to the force by providing research and answers on a wide variety of topics.

CHAPTER 6

Security Force Assistance Employment

In the context of security cooperation (SC), it is important to understand how security force assistance (SFA) supports the attainment of U.S. strategic security objectives. This chapter is focused on a collection of vignettes from advisor teams from the security force assistance brigades (SFABs) as well as from other conventional units, such as 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, and the 53rd Digital Liaison Detachment (DLD). The 101st Airborne Division and 53rd DLD both participated in a joint U.S.-Brazilian Army exercise known as Southern Vanguard 24, located in Macapa and Oiapoque, Brazil. These vignettes demonstrate the importance of knowing how SC authorities matter in mission planning and execution.

Force Package 23-2 Battalion Advisor Team 410 Employment Under 1251 Authorities

MAJ L.H. Ginn, S3 1st Battalion, 4SFAB

From April 2023 to October 2023, Battalion Advisor Team (BAT) 410 from 4SFAB was employed to Poland under §1251 authorities (or *Training for Eastern European National Security Forces in the Course of Multilateral Exercises*) to advise the 18th Mechanized Division in Siedlce, Poland. BAT 410 consisted of the battalion's staff, including the command group, staff officers in charge (OICs), and noncommissioned officers in charge (NCOICs). While employed, the BAT integrated with the 18th Mechanized Division's staff and participated in their daily battle rhythm events and planning initiatives for future exercises.

The 18th Mechanized Division holds a nation-wide exercise named ANAKONDA every two years. The objective of the exercises is to mobilize active and reserve units to quickly establish a defensive line along its northern and eastern borders. ANAKONDA also includes multinational partners, such as U.S., German, and Romanian Soldiers. For BAT 410, ANAKONDA was executed one month into its employment. Advisors from BAT 410 worked side by side with their counterparts in the 18th Mechanized Division during planning for ANAKONDA. BAT 410 advisors were most useful during the planning process by providing the liaison function and establishing contact with adjacent North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) units that were participating in the exercise. This created a shared understanding amongst the adjacent units before execution.

During ANAKONDA, BAT 410 split the staff into two groups: one group went with the 18th Mechanized Division’s tactical action center (TAC) while the other group went with their tactical operations center (TOC). The exercise lasted two weeks and included three TAC and TOC jumps to new locations. During the execution, advisors integrated with the 18th Mechanized Division’s staff and helped battle track the entire division’s movement across Poland. Advisors also assisted the division staff with creating products in the English language. Although many Polish officers and soldiers were verbally fluent in English, some required assistance with writing orders in English. Advisors from BAT 410 operated under the “be value added” mentality, which meant that advisors would do whatever they could to help the 18th Mechanized Division—which included anything from assisting in the military decision-making process (MDMP) to breaking down camouflage nets for the next TOC jump.

ANAKONDA was a major exercise for the Polish Army and was executed well by their soldiers. BAT 410 advisors found that by living, eating, and working with their counterparts daily, they quickly became part of the 18th Mechanized Division’s staff. This early building of relationships and trust allowed the BAT 410 advisors to maximize their usefulness during the rest of their employment and to create a better shared understanding between both armies.

SFAB Lessons Learned Using Security Cooperation Authorities in Kenya

CPT Jacob Gibson, 4th Battalion, 2SFAB

Subject: Using Title 10 United States Code (USC) §333 and §321 Authorities in Kenyan indirect fire (IDF) force generation.

Background: The Kenyan IDF force generation is a Title 10 USC §333 case better known as building partner capacity (BPC). This case was originally initiated as part of the State Partnership Program (SPP) with the Massachusetts Army National Guard. Southern European Task Force-Africa (SETAF-AF) aligned a field artillery advisor team (FAAT) from 2SFAB as the primary means to support the continuation of the §333 case.

Issues encountered: Delays in the U.S. congressional re-notification process resulted in a lack of §333 approval. These delays caused the SETAF-AF commander to approve Title 10 USC §321, formerly known as Training with Friendly Foreign Forces, funding for specific aspects of the case until §333 funds became available.

Lesson Learned: The lesson learned during this deployment was how an advisor team navigates through partner force training using §321 authorities to progress to a §333 case, which includes new equipment training, such as on the M119A2 105mm Howitzers, or the Call for Fire Simulator for the Kenyan Defense Force (KDF) School of Artillery (SoARTY).

The FAAT accomplished this task by configuring their engagements in such a manner that the advisors were training their mission-essential tasks with the Kenyan Army to accomplish the overarching objectives of the case. The unique partnership between the FAAT and the KDF SoARTY facilitated the necessary changes in instructional techniques without violating the FAAT's authorities and while maintaining the dissemination of training throughout the KDF operational artillery units. By training themselves as well as the Kenyan artillery soldiers, the FAAT was able to find efficiencies and condense the training timeline while increasing throughput at the SoARTY. This outcome not only accomplished §333 case objectives, but it also created far-reaching, sustainable effects throughout the KDF's operational artillery units.

Key Takeaway: Equipped with an intimate knowledge of funding authorities, an understanding of §333 case objectives, and effective problem-solving skills, advisors are more than capable of furthering case progression under a variety of authorities. It is on each individual advisor team to work their assigned cases and generate progress to enable an eventual closure of the case.

SFAB Employment in Tunisia

MAJ James R. Brown II, Executive Officer 1st Battalion, 2SFAB

During Force Package (FP) 23.2, 1st Battalion 2SFAB deployed 19 advisor teams and 164 advisors to its SETAF-AF-aligned TAC in Italy and 12 countries in the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) area of responsibility (AOR). Each team worked within the overarching theater security framework, as outlined by the Department of Defense (DOD) through AFRICOM and the Department of State (DOS) through each nation's U.S. embassy country team.

Over the course of several FPs and as part of FP 23.2, 2SFAB developed an advising effort in Tunisia that responded to AFRICOM's prioritization of the country for increased SC activities. By leveraging multiple funding authorities and arraying its advisor teams to U.S. embassy-identified Tunisian partners, 2SFAB executed advisement at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. 2SFAB efforts in Tunisia provide a holistic example of how advisor teams were able to use multiple authorities to improve both their own and the partner's capabilities.

The FP simultaneously employed up to four advisor teams in Tunisia. This included a BAT, a maneuver company advisor team (MCAT), a maneuver advisor team (MAT), and a FAAT. The BAT executed persistent and episodic efforts, maintaining a reduced presence for the entire six-month FP, but surging additional capacity for specific events. This included the planning and execution of African Lion, AFRICOM's largest security cooperation exercise that, for a month each year, spans multiple countries in North and West Africa.

For the persistent efforts, the BAT primarily operated out of the centrally located capital city of Tunis. While in Tunis, a task-organized and reduced BAT executed six months of partnered training and advising with the national-level Joint Operations Center, the adjacent Joint Intelligence Center, and the Tunisian national Military Intelligence Schoolhouse. These missions used Title 10, USC §333 to build partner capacity within the Tunisian armed forces (TAF). The case milestones included developing a collaborative and functional operations center that has the capability to coordinate and disseminate information in support of regional security across Northern Africa. This effort expanded during African Lion when the full BAT deployed to Tunisia to provide additional advisement during the exercise execution. For the planning events and African Lion execution, SFAB elements were funded by a separate SETAF-AF SC line of accounting.

In addition to the BAT, a persistently employed MAT worked a §333 case at the Tunisian combat training center in Hammamet. Here they provided institutional development by training at the Tunisian Observer, Coach, and Trainer Academy, as well as tactical training as Tunisian units rotated through the center. Episodically, an MCAT conducted tactical training with the Tunisian Brigade de Forces Speciale in Bizerte, and a FAAT executed fires training with Tunisian formations in Gabes. Both teams relied on Title 10 USC §321 authorities, focusing their efforts on developing the advisor team's capabilities while still providing a knowledge exchange with the partners. Each of these efforts, whether persistent or episodic, were facilitated through deliberate coordination with the SC planners at SETAF-AF and the U.S. Embassy in Tunisia. To achieve this outcome with the best results, the teams relied on the 2SFAB TAC for communication and coordination with SETAF-AF elements and a BAT-sourced U.S. Embassy-Tunis liaison NCO to work directly with the U.S. country team. These liaison efforts were critical to the success of the advisor teams.

Title 22 Peacekeeping Operations

MAJ Chris Mullis, B Co., 6th Battalion, 2SFAB

Company Logistics Advisor Team (CLAT) 2620 deployed to Dakar, Senegal, from March to September 2023, authorized under Title 22 USC Part VI, *Peacekeeping Operations*. CLAT 2620 is a team of eight advisors who specialize in logistical planning, transportation operations, petroleum distribution, supply support activities, small arms repair, and maintenance management. The Directorate of Services and Materiel for the Army (DSMA), or *Direction du Service Du Materiel Des Armees*, provides depot-level maintenance support for the seven zones across Senegal and deploys contingents of sustainers who provide logistical support for peacekeeping operations throughout Africa. The Senegalese sustainers are selected from across the seven zones and they participate in a three-month training cycle that will prepare them to be validated by the United Nations (UN) for their deployments to Central Africa.

The CLAT 2620 mission is to develop and enhance the Senegalese armed forces (SAF) logistics sustainment capability in support of the African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership and execute logistics training for the SAF to improve their ability to rapidly deploy and redeploy personnel and equipment in support of expeditionary peacekeeping operations. Through multiple assessments conducted by previous logistical advisor teams and CLAT 2620, they were able to identify a lack of uniformity in training before the selection of the sustainment contingent. CLAT 2620, in conjunction with DSMA leadership, created a six-month training cycle that would centralize training at the DSMA and provide a uniformed sustainment training in various fields to ensure that Senegalese sustainers have a basic shared understanding before their peacekeeping deployment.

CLAT 2620 leveraged the use of technology to create sustainment training videos that could be disseminated using cellular devices throughout the Senegalese Army to ensure continuity and training proficiency across the seven zones. Using the wheel and spoke method, CLAT 2620's training plan is now the standard across the DSMA. It can train Senegalese sustainers at a greater velocity and can build a foundational knowledge that previously was not there because of the lack of resources and time that hindered the Senegalese sustainment community. Acting as the training focal point, CLAT 2620 was able to provide predictability and create operational readiness at the sustainment tactical level.

SFAB Employment in Senegal

MAJ Curt Belohlavek, Executive Officer 3rd Squadron, 2SFAB

During FP 23.1 from September 2022 to March 2023, SFAB MCAT 2320 employed to Senegal. MCAT 2320 had the unique opportunity to operate under multiple titles and authorities. MCAT 2320 was the fifth MCAT that employed to Senegal under Title 22, Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) funding to train and advise the Senegalese peacekeeping training center. MCAT 2320 continued the progression of the previous four MCATs, advising the center's cadre to develop its institutional capacity to train and certify Senegalese units deploying in support of UN peacekeeping missions.

During FP 23.1, MCAT 2320 conducted two separate train-the-trainer-focused training events to prepare the cadre to plan and conduct training for a Senegalese company that was preparing to deploy to the Central African Republic as part of the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

MCAT 2320 conducted a crawl-walk-run approach, in which it helped the cadre prepare for classes, conducted classes for the cadre, and culminated in the evaluation of the Senegalese cadre as they conducted the classes. The overall culminating event for MCAT 2320 was planning and conducting a platoon live fire exercise. During the live fire exercise, a platoon consisting of a Senegalese cadre planned, rehearsed, and conducted the live fire exercise on an urban objective with multiple support by fire positions while MCAT 2320 served as the range safeties. This training event certified the Senegalese cadre to develop more realistic training for future Senegalese peacekeeping contingents.

The success in MCAT 2320's employment during FP 23.1 was the incorporation of other titles and authorities. A key limitation of the Title 22, GPOI authorities was that MCAT 2320 was not authorized to train or advise other units in the Senegalese armed forces. The SETAF-AF G5 theater security cooperation (TSC) branch and Senegal Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) coordinated to shift MCAT 2320's funding and authorities to a Title 10, USC §321 case focused on training with the Senegalese Armed Forces 3rd Infantry Battalion.

Using these new authorities, MCAT 2320 conducted multiple pre-deployment site surveys and coordination meetings with 3rd Battalion leaders. The team set conditions for the following MCAT to fully partner with 3rd Battalion in FP23.2.

MCAT 2320 also had the opportunity to provide bottom-up feedback and refinement to the SETAF-AF G5 TSC and Senegalese OSC Title 10, USC §333 case proposal for future SFAB teams to support Senegalese armed forces border security training and capability development.

Thus, in the span of six months, MCAT 2320 had the unique opportunity to operate under Title 10, USC §321 and Title 22, GPOI authorities while also helping develop opportunities for future teams to operate under Title 10, USC §333 authorities and participate in a joint, multinational exercise. The key to the team's success was closely coordinating with the G5 TSC and OSC to work with the right partner at the right time in the right way, which resulted in continued SFA progression.

2 SFAB §321 Vignette

CPT Ryan Johnson

Using Title 10, §321 authorities to employ an enabler engineer team allowed for a versatile employment with many entities. In Ghana, the team was able to work with operational and training units under the same authority, which allowed for a full integration into the Ghanaian engineer forces. This allowed a team to be involved in not only force generation of new Ghanaian soldiers, but also sustainment and unit training, which allowed the team to act as a bridge between the institutional and operational domains.

§321 authority allows the team to shape its advising efforts at the institutional level based on what it observes the needs of the operational units are. §321 also works the advisor team's mission-essential tasks, allowing them more of a teaching role and an advising role, all while building interoperability between an operational force and U.S. forces. Having a team embedded under §321 authorities also allow them to coordinate other SC programs and provide a direct link back to the OSC on the needs of the partner force. The flexibility of §321 authorities allow it to be used generally enough that a team can easily integrate itself into the partner force's training cycle. This is largely enabled by the advisor team's modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE), allowing for a wide range of activities.

The ability to use local operational funds to support training allows for a team to ensure productive and well-resourced training events without relying on an under-resourced partner. However, this only applies to items that can be purchased on the local economy and there remains an issue with ammunition, medical supplies, and fuel that the partner struggles to resource internally. This seems to be because sustainment training is not prioritized as the result of overtasking.

Exercise Southern Vanguard 24

SFABs are purpose-built conventional units employed by the theater armies to conduct SFA activities alongside ally and partner forces. Yet, SFABs are not the only conventional units that employ SFA; fire support elements from 1SFAB were also present during Southern Vanguard 24. The primary U.S. training audience, 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), provided staff support in the combined task force as well as provided an air assault company working closely with the Brazilian Army during the entire exercise. In addition, the 53rd DLD from the New York Army National Guard provided warfighting function subject matter experts to advise the combined task force commander and to augment the combined staff.

During Southern Vanguard 24, 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), redesignated as the Task Force 52 Jungle Infantry Battalion for the exercise and deployed to Brazil in late October 2023 under §321 authorities. The purpose of the exercise was to advance U.S.-Brazilian strategic partnership and increase interoperability. Task Force 52 training with their Brazilian counterparts not only met the exercise end state, but also met the intent of current U.S. laws and DOD policy as they relate to SFA. 10 USC §321(a)(2) states that “The general purpose forces of the United States armed forces may train only with the military forces of a friendly foreign country.”¹ Emphasis added on the limitation of “only with” because the intent here is that U.S. forces train with friendly foreign forces for the benefit of, to the maximum extent practicable, or support to the mission essential tasks of the U.S. training audience. The current guidance is that SFA activities “shall be conducted primarily to assist host countries to defend against internal and transnational threats to stability. However, the DOD may also conduct SFA to assist host countries to defend effectively against external threats; contribute to coalition operations; or organize, train, equip, and advise another country’s security forces or supporting institutions.”²

In an interview with Major Andrew S. Campbell, Deputy Commanding Officer of TF 52, when asked where and at what level interoperability was achieved, Campbell stated that there was “considerable human interoperability demonstrated between U.S. and Brazilian Army battalion staff and companies.” Campbell further commented that the Brazilian Army company commander was “fluent in English and is a U.S. Maneuver Captain’s Career Course graduate. This background enabled him to understand and use U.S. Army doctrinal terms as a common language for coordination with the U.S. commander.”³ Campbell’s comments reflect the greater purpose on why the DOD hosts military exchange programs at its Service schools.

The 53rd DLD showcased their unique capabilities at Southern Vanguard 24. DLDs, like the SFABs, can be used to provide SFA to a host nation's security forces.⁴ DLDs are assigned or attached to selected theater armies and Army Service component commands (ASCCs) for employment at theater Army or in support at corps and division echelons. Thus, a DLD provides an Army forces (ARFOR) with the capability to conduct liaison with subordinate or parallel joint and multinational headquarters in an operational area as part of unified land operations.⁵ Yet, for the purposes of Southern Vanguard 24, the 53rd liaised primarily at the brigade level. This placement may seem illogical in accordance with current doctrine, but there are times when a DLD should liaise at the brigade level.

In an interview with Lieutenant Colonel Robert Stealey, executive officer (XO) of the 53rd DLD, stated that the 53rd DLD found there to be significant similarities in common doctrine between both armies at the brigade and battalion staff levels. Stealey "believe(s) it is very possible that U.S. and Brazilian armed forces could conduct battalion-level real world missions with little coordination upfront."⁶ This comment reflects a practical application to current doctrine, where there remains an option to assign a DLD to a multinational brigade under a corps.⁷ Finally, the 53rd's employment in Southern Vanguard 24 should signal to DOD leadership the need for greater exploration of the utility of a DLD at echelon within the major joint exercises conducted worldwide today, especially those exercises that emphasize mission command with ally or partner security forces.

This chapter sampled a variety of SFA activities that are not all-inclusive. Having advisor teams paired with friendly foreign forces postured globally would be an outstanding measure of not just interoperability, but of U.S. access, presence, and influence. Perhaps in the future, as the SFABs settle in their assigned regions and continue to conduct SFA activities, other general-purpose forces can assume a greater role in training with foreign friendly forces. These activities arguably benefit irregular warfare activities and assures allies and partners while deterring malign state actors simultaneously.

End Notes

1. 10 USC §321(a)(2), 6 January 2017.
2. Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5000.68, *Security Force Assistance*, 27 October 2010.
3. Interview with Major Andrew S. Campbell, Executive Officer, 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), 30 November 2023.
4. Army Training Publication (ATP) 3-94.1, *Digital Liaison Detachments*, 28 December 2017, 3-10.
5. Ibid, v.
6. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Robert Stealey, executive officer of the 53rd DLD, New York Army National Guard, 2 January 2024.
7. ATP 3-94.1, *Digital Liaison Detachments*, 28 December 2017, 3-3.

CHAPTER 7

Assessment, Monitor, and Evaluate

Late in 2016, Congress enacted legislation requiring the Department of Defense (DOD) to develop a standardized, objective evaluation of all DOD security cooperation (SC) programs and activities.¹ §1241(m) of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) added a new provision to Title 10, Chapter 16, *Security Cooperation*, of United States Code (USC) §383, *Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation of Programs and Activities*. §383 requires that the Secretary of Defense maintain a program of assessment, monitoring, and evaluation (AM&E) for DOD SC programs and activities. In terms of DOD policy on AM&E, DOD Instruction (DODI) 5132.14, *Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise*, is the governing document that directs the fostering of “accurate and transparent reporting to key stakeholders on the outcomes and sustainability of SC and track, understand, and improve returns on DOD SC investments.”² This chapter will describe the DOD AM&E process using DODI 5132.14 as the guiding document, but will also incorporate joint doctrine and best practices where appropriate. Finally, the performance management plan will be described because it is the principal document associated with the significant security cooperation initiative (SSCI) that details the frequency to which the SSCI is monitored and determines the criteria if performance indicators are working or not working.

ASSESSMENT, MONITORING, AND EVALUATION FRAMEWORK

AM&E is required for all SSCIs.³ SSCI development is generally led by the combatant commands (CCMDs) and is often articulated as specific lines of effort in the country-specific security cooperation sections (CSCS) of a combatant command campaign plan (CCP). It is important to understand that accountability and learning are the primary purposes of AM&E and they will shape efforts to leverage SC more effectively in support of defense objectives in the near, medium, and long terms. The AM&E process is a framework with a hybrid approach that informs stakeholder’s returns on investment, allows policymakers to identify and improve or eliminate ineffective initiatives, and provides credible information in support of policy and legislation.⁴ This hybrid approach uses a decentralized assessment and monitoring model combined with centralized evaluations administered by the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]) (shown in Figure 7-1).⁵

The formal AM&E framework has five steps:

- Conduct initial assessment.
- Develop initiative design document (IDD).
- Implement and monitor activities.
- Conduct independent evaluations.
- Disseminate results for learning and accountability.⁶

CONDUCT INITIAL ASSESSMENT

Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Campaigns and Operations*, describes initial assessments as providing a baseline against which to monitor SC activities to inform requirements, resources, and program planning.⁷ Initial assessments are required before the development of all SSCIs and inform how the IDDs leading into SSCIs are developed in step 2 of the AM&E process. Initial assessments should describe host nation willingness and propensity to implement and sustain assistance, improve institutional capacity, build capabilities in the context of country or other relevant objectives, and identify requirements, gaps, and potential risks.⁸

Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 5-0, *The Operations Process*, describes assessments as not only the “determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective assessment” but as a “continuous activity of the operations process that supports decision making by ascertaining progress of the operation for the purpose of developing and refining plans and for making operations more effective.”⁹ More specifically, assessments precede and guide the other activities of the operations process. During the planning phase, for example, assessment focuses on understanding an operational environment and building an assessment plan. During the preparation phase, the focus of an assessment shifts to discerning changes in the situation and the force’s readiness to execute deliberate SC programs and activities. Finally, during the execution phase, assessments involve deliberately comparing forecast outcomes to actual events while using indicators to judge operational progress toward success.

It is worth noting that in AM&E assessments are done before any planning. During execution of an SSCI, all activities associated with the SSCI are monitored to see if or where any changes need to be made. Finally, at the end of an SSCI, a formal evaluation occurs to determine if the desired strategic effect was achieved and if there is a suitable return on investment for all the resources used during the SSCI lifecycle. The AM&E framework is shown in Figure 7-1.




Figure 7-1. AM&E framework¹⁰

DEVELOP INITIATIVE DESIGN DOCUMENT

IDDs, which are required for resource allocation, are best developed through a deliberate, iterative, and inclusive process, informed by the opportunities and risks identified in the initial assessment to create a comprehensive document that increases the likelihood that SC investments are targeted, measurable, and implemented effectively. IDD should have the following:

- Clear linkage to goals or objectives in the theater campaign plan
- A problem statement, derived from the initial assessment
- A comprehensive management section that includes a logic framework, indicators and milestones, and a theory of change

- Guidance to relevant stakeholders on how their activities should contribute to SSCIs as well as expectations regarding stakeholders' role in supporting AM&E efforts¹¹

The logic framework maps goals and specific, measurable, achievable, relevant/results-oriented, and time-bound objectives to the activities necessary to achieve desired changes.¹² Simply stated, a logic framework is a visual representation that describes activities and the planned process of contributing resources to achieving SSCI objectives through specified outputs and outcomes. SSCIs use an iterative-built objective tree as a logic framework with the SSCI objective linked to higher-order strategic objectives specified in CCP, CSCS plans, or in the SC multi-year guidance.

Furthermore, regarding a theory of change, the IDD needs to make implicit assumptions more explicit by describing why certain actions will produce a desired change in any given strategic context. Because SSCIs are developed top-down and executed bottom-up, a theory of change is not just a visual representation of the desired change, but rather a blueprint for evaluation with measurable indicators of success identified. Thus, the overarching purpose of a theory of change in IDDs is to clearly state what the intended outcome of the SSCI will be and how it will be achieved.

Finally, baseline metrics incorporated into IDDs—that eventually become SSCIs for the purpose of monitoring—are inputs, outputs, and outcomes as follows:

- Input is not defined in DODI 5132.14, but references within the DODI make it clear that inputs refer to activities, events, operations, and investments necessary to achieve desired changes, such as build partner capacity (BPC) activities.
- Outputs are the direct, tangible results of inputs, such as the training and equipping of a unit in a partner security force.
- Outcomes are the results achieved through outputs, such as the unit in the partner security force undertaking the operations for which they were trained and equipped, usually within a specified timeline that supports the SSCI objective, and always as having a benefit to the U.S.

IMPLEMENT AND MONTIOR ACTIVITIES

Monitoring within the assessment process allows stakeholders to collect relevant information, specifically information about the current situation that can be compared to the forecast outcome described in SSCIs. Monitoring is a continuous observation of those conditions relevant to the current operation.¹³ Yet, in terms of monitoring SC programs and activities, performance monitoring will vary depending on the SSCI or activity. That said, parameters and expectations for indicator or milestone monitoring at pre-determined intervals throughout implementation should be clearly outlined in the performance management section of the IDD (or in the performance monitoring plan found in Annex B of the SSCI). Monitoring activities may be focused on different levels and for different reasons. For example, output monitoring can be done at the implementation level, which is useful for program managers. Or outcome monitoring can be done at the leadership/management level, which is useful at the CCMD level, which has policy, oversight, and management responsibilities. It should be noted that monitoring, which may include site visits, should also include reviewing and identifying any changes in the operational environment after the initial assessment, and identify any unforeseen changes that could affect SSCI implementation.¹⁴

CONDUCT INDEPENDENT EVALUATIONS

DODI 5132.14 identifies the USD(P) as having the full responsibility for maintaining an office that is responsible for leading a “centralized effort for independent evaluations” that measures the effectiveness and performance of SSCIs toward meeting expected outcomes.¹⁵ DODI 5132.14 provides further guidance on DOD-conducted standards of evaluations. These evaluations should serve a need or answer a specific question, be independent and free from any interference or influence from the commissioning organization, be evidenced-based with verifiable data, and be cost-effective. Independent evaluations should all have a shared criterion from which timely decisions can be made and the most common criterion for DOD-led evaluations is the use of measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of performance (MOPs) tethered to timely review of these indicators:

- MOEs are evaluation criterion used to assess the dynamics in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an output, outcome, or the overall SSCI objective. MOEs help to answer the question, are we doing the correct tasks?
- MOPs are evaluation criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. MOPs help to answer the question, are we doing tasks correctly?

- Indicators are items of information that provide insight into an MOE or MOP. Indicators take the form of reports, surveys and polls, and other information requirements. Indicators help to answer the question, what is the status of this MOE or MOP?¹⁶

In general, MOEs measure changes in a quantifiable indicator associated with the partner nation security force, whereas MOPs confirm or deny that an output or an outcome has been achieved. It is worth noting that in SC activities, MOEs can be challenging because it is difficult to discern causal effects of SC activities, and, if there are causal effects, these effects are generally long term.

DISSEMINATE RESULTS FOR LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Each CCMD has its own internal means of collecting AM&E results, conducting analysis, and disseminating those results and analyses to inform its MOEs and MOPs. It is through the rigor of analysis that the CCMDs obtain recommendation on what, if any, changes should be made in the SSCI implementation strategy. Analysis is also a means for reviewing metrics and indicators to validate that they provide the correct lens or focus to support the SSCI. Finally, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) submits the CCMD's results annually to Congress via a §383 report prepared by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. All SC stakeholders provide input for the report. This all said, in time, the DOD expects¹⁷ that all data associated with the AM&E of SSCIs are stored in Socium (see Appendix D for more detailed information) and not kept compartmentalized in other knowledge management tools.

On a final note, regarding learning and accountability, in FY 2022, the DOD transitioned from an annual strategic evaluation plan to a comprehensive learning agenda framework. The *Learning and Evaluation Agenda for Partnerships* (LEAP) framework (shown in Figure 7-2) aligns with Office of Management and Budget standards and best practices for evidence-based policymaking. The LEAP framework identifies the most urgent knowledge gaps in the SC community and then plans and prioritizes evidence-building activities to help fill these gaps. The LEAP framework builds on existing DOD processes and guidance, streamlining SC learning and evidence building under a common framework to increase coordination, collaboration, and deconfliction across the SC community.¹⁸ This all said, robust SC evidence will inform key decisions to improve SC practice, effect, and return on investment, factoring into employment of DOD resources at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.



Figure 7-2. LEAP framework¹⁹

End Notes

1. Congressional Research Service, *DOD Security Cooperation: Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation*, 23 June 2017, 1.
2. Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5132.14, *Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise*, 13 January 2017, 3.
3. *Ibid*, 12.
4. *Ibid*.
5. Congressional Research Service, *DOD Security Cooperation: Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation*, 23 June 2017, 2.
6. DODI 5132.14, *Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise*, 13 January 2017, Section 3 (Framework and Standards).
7. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Campaigns and Operations*, 18 June 2022, VI-12.
8. DODI 5132.14, *Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise*, 13 January 2017, 13.
9. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, *The Operations Process*, 31 July 2019, 5-1.
10. DODI 5132.14, *Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise*, 13 January 2017, 13.
11. DODI 5132.14, *Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise*, 13 January 2017, 14-15.
12. *Ibid*, 15.
13. ADP 3-0, *The Operations Process*, 31 July 2019, 5-2.
14. DODI 5132.14, *Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise*, 13 January 2017, 16.
15. *Ibid*.
16. Defense Security Cooperation University (DSCU), *POE 211 Primary Student Readings, Planning, Oversight, and Execution Student Planning Handbook*, 2023.
17. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and Defense Security Cooperation University (DSCU), June 2023.
18. Department of Defense (DOD), *2022 Learning and Evaluation Agenda for Partnership Framework*, 25 August 2022, 3.
19. DSCU, *POE 211 Primary Student Readings, Intermediate SC Assessment, Monitoring and Evaluation (AM&E) Course*, January 2023.

APPENDIX A

Authorities, Funding Sources, and Funding Considerations

Congress levied a new requirement for security cooperation (SC) strategies to be published by each of the six combatant commands (CCMDs) under the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) §1207, *Strategy for Security Cooperation*. These strategies will include discussions of how they will support and advance U.S. national security interests in strategic competition with near-peer rivals; prioritize and build key capabilities of allied and partner security forces to enhance bilateral and multilateral interoperability and responsiveness; and prioritize and build the capabilities of foreign partner security forces to secure their own sovereign territory. This appendix addresses common security assistance (SA) and SC authorities as well as CCMD-specific authorities that are tied to these strategies. The SC authorities typically referenced by Army Service component command (ASCC) country desk officers when developing country-specific cases for implementation are listed below, beginning with the common Department of State (DOS) and Department of Defense (DOD) authorities then the more specific, regional authorities listed by CCMD. Finally, at the end of this appendix, a graph is provided to better visualize SC categories with related programs, authorities, and institutions (Table A-1). This graphic is not an exhaustive list but represents the major elements among the more common SC programs, authorities, and institutions.

MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE AUTHORITIES AUTHORIZED UNDER TITLE 22 USC

International Military Education and Training (IMET) was originally designed for professional military education and, by exception, for technical training. It provides grant funding for military education and training to military and related civilian personnel of foreign countries. Per §541 through §543 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), grant funding for the education and training of foreign country personnel in activities is designed to achieve three objectives:

- Encourage effective and mutually beneficial relations and increased understanding between the U.S. and foreign countries in the furtherance of the goals of international peace and security.

- Improve the participating foreign countries' ability to use their resources, including defense articles and services obtained from the U.S., with maximum effectiveness, thereby contributing to greater self-reliance by such countries.
- Raise awareness of issues involving internationally recognized human rights among nationals of foreign countries participating in IMET.¹

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) is the government-to-government sale of defense articles and services as outlined in §21, §22, and §29 of the Arms Control Export Act of 1976 (AECA) as amended. Under the general supervision of the DOS, and subject to foreign disclosure decisions, the DOD is authorized to sell defense articles and services directly to ministries of defense of other countries.

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) is the financing of defense-related articles and services purchased. Under §23 of the AECA, the Secretary of State requests annual foreign assistance appropriations to fund select partner countries' purchases of U.S. defense articles and services normally via the FMS process. By policy, FMF should not be used for the purchase of consumable non-lethal articles or services unless a part of a system sale or for subsequent sustainment support.

Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) provides for the sale of defense articles and services by the U.S. defense industry to other countries under 22 USC §2751. For example, Lockheed-Martin's sale of F-16s to the United Arab Emirates, Boeing's sale of C-17s to the United Kingdom, and the sale of F-15s to Singapore are hybrid sales, meaning the major end items were purchased commercially via DCS directly from U.S. industry while the high technology components, weapons, electronics, training, and initial support repair parts were purchased via FMS from DOD.

Excess Defense Articles (EDA) authorizes the transfer of defense articles determined by uniformed services as no longer needed by the U.S. government. The transfer is completed either by FMS sale or on a grant basis and is typically used for modernization of partner forces. If acquired by FMS, EDA is generally priced based on usability ranging from 5 to 50 percent of its origin acquisition value. If acquired by grant, the concept is "as is-where is." For example, the U.S. transferred a 378-foot Coast Guard cutter to Vietnam in 2017, and then another shipment of the same class in 2020. Despite the "as is, where is" dictum normally associated with EDA, the transfer, refurbishment, upgrades, and training required to support this transfer were all funded by various grant SA programs.

Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) is a special authority of last resort for emergency assistance as determined by the President. Under Title 22 USC §2318, PDA provides for the transfer of defense articles and services as immediate assistance for a country or international organization, such as Ukraine. PDAs are used to prepare for an unforeseen emergency that requires immediate military assistance and when the emergency requirement cannot be met under the authority of the AECA or any other law.

Peacekeeping Operations

Funds for peacekeeping operations are appropriated to DOS. The peacekeeping operations legislation authorizes the provision of assistance to partner nations and international organizations on such terms and conditions as the President may determine. This includes the use of funds for regional security peacekeeping operations and other programs carried out in furtherance of U.S. national security interests. Each year, the DOS uses FAA, §632(b) memorandums of agreement (MOAs) to transfer some of the peacekeeping operations funding to DSCA in support of specific requirements. The U.S. Embassy within a benefitting country or the CCMD defines peacekeeping operation requirements and prepares the memorandum of request for those requirements that DSCA will execute as a peacekeeping operations building partner capacity (BPC) program.

TITLE 10 USC, ARMED FORCES AUTHORITIES

Combatant Command Authorities (CCAs) Title 10 USC §164 (formerly known as Traditional Combatant Commander's Activities) describes the CCMD's responsibilities and authorities, but does not explicitly authorize a CCMD to conduct typical military-to-military engagements. CCMDs execute CCA pursuant to their inherent authority to interact with the militaries of foreign nations within their area of responsibility (AOR). The purpose of a CCA must reasonably relate to a CCMD's requirement to understand foreign military counterparts and their capability gaps, as well as the ability to collaborate with foreign militaries in their AOR to further DOD mission execution.

Although CCA is a type of SC activity, CCAs are conducted for the primary purpose of furthering DOD mission execution and do not provide a means to directly build foreign partner capacity. If the primary purpose of a partner engagement is to build a partner's capacity, a different SC authority besides CCA must be relied upon, such as §333.

CCA is a combatant commander's decision to use funds provided to the CCMD to accomplish its assigned responsibilities and mission. CCA can be used, for example, for subject matter expert exchanges, a bilateral exchange of information in which CCMDs inform foreign partners how DOD forces conduct operations and understand how another military force operates in the context of the specific terrain they occupy or execute a type of military function. CCAs do not authorize military training.

Combatant Commander Initiative Fund (CCIF) is a Title 10 USC §166a program. It authorizes and funds CCMD SC activities for emergent requirements. The Secretary of Defense includes in the DOD's annual budget a separate budget submitted to Congress that includes joint exercises, force training, contingency operations, or selected operations. Furthermore, the CCIF provides for a funding proposal for force training that may include amounts for training expense payments also authorized in Title 10 USC §322.

TITLE 10 USC, CHAPTER 16 SECURITY COOPERATION AUTHORITIES

§311 Exchange of Defense Personnel Between United States and Friendly Foreign Countries allows DOD to exchange military or civilian personnel with other friendly countries. This includes the mutual exchange of military or civilian engineers and scientists with friendly countries in a permanent change of station (PCS) status. The intent is for them to become productive members of the host nation's military research, development, test, and evaluation community. It includes the non-reciprocal exchange of defense personnel with allied and friendly countries and international organizations. §311 appropriation is processed through the DOD's or military department's (MILDEP) operation and maintenance (O&M) funds.

§312 Payment of Personnel Expenses Necessary for Theater Security Cooperation allows, within certain limitations, the payment of personnel expenses (travel, subsistence, and similar expenses) for defense personnel or, with the Secretary of State concurrence, other personnel of friendly foreign governments, and non-governmental personnel that the DOD considers necessary for theater SC. The appropriation of §312 is processed through DOD or MILDEP O&M funds.

§321 Training with Friendly Foreign Countries: Payment of Training and Exercise Expenses. §321 authorizes the use of DOD funding to support a developing country's participation in a combined exercise. §321 allows U.S. forces to train themselves, with partner forces. U.S. exercises are the most common way §321 is used through funding, providing for U.S. and partner nation forces who support the training. The appropriation of §321 is processed through DOD O&M funds.

§322 Special Operations Forces: Training with Friendly Foreign Forces. §322 authorizes the deployment of U.S. special operations forces (SOF) for the primary purposes of training U.S. SOF with foreign security forces. The U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) refers to these interactions with foreign partner nation counterparts as joint combined exchange training (JCET). The purpose of §322 is to provide deployment opportunities for U.S. SOF to enhance combat skills, instructor skills, language proficiency, and cultural immersion. Although these training events are not security force assistance (SFA), per se, many foreign partner militaries are eager to host JCETs. Note that any training benefits that accrue to the host nation's forces during these events must be incidental to the purpose, which is to train U.S. SOF. None of the funding made available may be used for any training, equipment, or other assistance for the members of a unit of a foreign security force if the DOD has credible information that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights, thus violating the Leahy Law. The appropriation of §322 is through DOD and USSOCOM O&M.

§331 Friendly Foreign Countries: Authority to Provide Support for Conduct of Operations. §331 provides support, such as supplies and services, to forces of a friendly foreign country participating in an operation with U.S. armed forces; military, or stability operation that benefits U.S. national security interests; and/or solely for the purpose of enhancing the interoperability of military forces in a combined operation. Up to 450 million dollars in DOD O&M has been earmarked per fiscal year (FY).

§332 Friendly Foreign Countries; International and Regional Organizations: Defense Institution Capacity Building. §332 allows subject matter experts, civilian advisors, and other experts to help a respective country's ministry of defense or various security agencies with defense responsibilities (as well as international and regional organizations with defense responsibilities). Institution capacity building (ICB) is the development of effective and accountable foreign defense establishments. §332(a) is specific to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency's (DSCA) ministry of defense advisors' program. Ministry of defense advisors typically focus on higher level ministerial functions, such as personnel and readiness, acquisition and procurement, logistics and sustainment, strategy and policy, and financial management, but can be used for any civilian function. §332(b) is most often used for activities by the Institute for Security Governance (ISG) or Defense Institute for International Legal Studies (DIILS) but can also be used by other providers if certain criteria are met. ICB activities are conducted with ministries, general staffs, service headquarters, supporting organizations (e.g., logistics) and sometimes at operational command levels to address institutional requirements. The appropriation of funds for §332 activities is processed through DOD International Security Cooperation Program Account funds (administered through the SSCI process) or FMS.

§333 Foreign Security Forces: Authority to Build Capacity. §333 allows the Secretary of Defense to provide equipment, services, and training to the national security forces of foreign countries for the purpose of building capacity to any of the following operations: counterterrorism, countering weapons of mass destruction, countering illicit drug trafficking, countering transnational organized crime, maritime/border security, military intelligence, air domain awareness operations and cybersecurity operations, or activities that contribute to on-going international coalition operations. Furthermore, 2023 NDAA §1204 modifies §333(a) by adding a 10th operational purpose, climate resiliency. Where §333 is applicable, the CCMD must show that there are also relevant ICB activities being undertaken by the DOD or DOS. The appropriation of §333 is processed through DOD International Security Cooperation Program Account funds (administered through the SSCI process run by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Partnerships).

§341 Department of Defense State Partnership Program. §341 is the DOD State Partnership Program (SPP), which allows the National Guard to interact with friendly partner nations’ military, security forces, and emergency and disaster response organizations. Each partnership is required to have a partnership support plan synced to the CCMD theater campaign plan’s country security cooperation sections. DOD Instruction (DODI) 5111.20, State Partnership Program, identifies authorities and funding that may be used for SPP activities when jointly approved by the applicable combatant commander and chief of mission.

§345 Irregular Warfare Center and Regional Defense Fellowship Program

In October 2022, with the direct approval from Congress, the Irregular Warfare Center was created with the specific mission to “serve as a central mechanism for developing the irregular warfare knowledge of the DOD and advancing the understanding of irregular warfare concepts and doctrine, in collaboration with key partners and allies.”² This is all done by:

- Coordinating and aligning DOD education curricula, standards, and objectives related to irregular warfare
- Facilitating research on irregular warfare, strategic competition, and DOD’s role in supporting interagency activities relating to irregular warfare
- Engaging and coordinating with federal departments and agencies and with academia, nongovernmental organizations, civil society, and international partners to discuss and coordinate efforts on security challenges in irregular warfare

- Developing curriculum and conducting training and education of U.S. military and civilian participants as well as those from other countries, as determined by the Secretary of Defense
- Serving as a coordinating body and central repository for irregular warfare resources, including educational activities and programs and lessons learned across components of the DOD³

§345 further provides for DOD funding for international student attendance in counterterrorism and combatting irregular warfare courses. §345 also provides for further funding assistance for international attendance at military or civilian educational institutions, regional centers, conferences, and seminars. The appropriation of §345 funds is processed through DOD O&M funds.

Africa Command

Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). Although not exclusive to The United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), the GPOI is a DOS-funded SA program focused on strengthening the international capacity and capabilities of partner countries and regional organizations to execute United Nations (UN) and regional peace operations. The GPOI’s mission is to enhance partner countries’ self-sufficient peace operations proficiencies and build the capacity of the UN and regional organizations to conduct such missions.

African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP). Established in 2015, the African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership was announced as a targeted, three-to-five-year initiative to help generate and rapidly deploy peacekeepers from six partner countries: Ethiopia, Ghana, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda. The program’s mission is to build, strengthen, and institutionalize capabilities to rapidly respond to crises on the African continent. The APRRP complements GPOI’s broader capacity building efforts by focusing on developing high demand enabling capabilities that are persistent shortfalls in UN and regional peace operations, and which underpin capacity to deploy a rapid response force. This initiative ended, and only residual funds are being expended.

Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PRACT). Established in 2009, PRACT is the U.S. government’s multi-year, multi-sector initiative to build the long-term capabilities of East African partners to contain, disrupt, and marginalize terrorist networks in the region. The DOS Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) is a critical contributor to the PRACT strategy, which seeks to build strong civilian and security sector institutions, create durable capabilities, and address conditions that contribute to the spread of violent extremism—efforts that are essential to enable host governments to take full ownership of the fight against terrorism.

INL's PRACT funds empower East African criminal justice institutions to confront complex challenges posed by cross-border terrorism. INL's active PRACT partners include Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Seychelles, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda.

Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP). Established in 2005, TSCTP is a multi-faceted, multi-year U.S. strategy aimed at developing resilient institutions that can prevent and respond to terrorism in a holistic, long-term manner. INL's TSCTP programs work to counter and prevent violent extremism by empowering partner countries to provide effective and accountable security and justice services to enhance citizen cooperation with, and trust in, law enforcement and develop the institutional foundation for counterterrorism and related capabilities, including border security, prison security, and reintegration efforts. In doing so, INL focuses on enhancing and institutionalizing cooperation among TSCTP countries so that they increasingly learn with and from each other. Partner countries include Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia.

European Command

European Deterrence Initiative (EDI). Formerly known as the European Reassurance Initiative under 2018 NDAA §1273, the EDI enhances the U.S. deterrence posture, increases the readiness and responsiveness of U.S. forces in Europe, supports the collective defense and security of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, and bolsters the security and capacity of U.S. allies and partners. The Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, for example, falls under this category. EDI has included separate funding for Ukraine each year since the inception of the program. In FY 2021, EUCOM requested 250 million dollars in SA to Ukraine via the EDI budget for intelligence support, personnel training, equipment and logistics support, supplies, and other services. EDI also provides partial funding to Operation Atlantic Resolve.

Training for Eastern European National Security Forces during Multilateral Exercises. §1251 covers the incremental expenses of certain Eastern European nations because of participation in multilateral training exercises. The purpose of §1251 is to enhance and increase the capacity, capability, and interoperability of Eastern European forces and to improve their ability to respond to external threats, including conventional and unconventional threats, or a hybrid of both. In general, the multilateral exercise training provided to such countries under this authority will be comparable or complimentary to the types of training that the U.S. armed forces receive during such multilateral exercises. Incremental expenses covered under this authority are rations, fuel, training ammunition, and transportation.

Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative. The Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative provides support for Ukraine and various partnerships for friendly nations to help them develop combat capability to preserve their sovereignty and territorial integrity against Russian and Russian-backed separatist aggression and to support ceasefire agreements. The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, can provide appropriate assistance, intelligence, and support (including lethal weapons of a defensive nature) to Ukraine and partnership for peace nations when needed to support said countries' sovereignty and territorial integrity against Russian aggression. In a press release dated 3 February 2023, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken claimed that "pursuant to a delegation of authority from the President, I am authorizing our 31st drawdown of U.S. arms and equipment for Ukraine since August 2021, valued at \$425 million. In addition, the U.S. DOD will be committing another \$1.75 billion in support for Ukraine under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative to help strengthen Ukraine's military."⁴

The Ukraine Supplemental Appropriation Act of 2022. This Act was signed into law 15 March 2022. The Ukraine Supplemental Appropriation Act added funds to many existing programs for Ukraine and other countries affected by the situation in Ukraine, as well as multiple new funds under other U.S. authorities for assistance and transfers of supplies and equipment. Per the announcement of the Ukraine Supplemental Appropriation Act, the new authorization included 800 million dollars for weapons and military equipment and other assistance to help Ukraine defend itself from Russian aggression. Additional funds were justified under the authorities of U.S. law, including §552(C)(2) and §621 of the FAA. 552(C)(2) reads, "In the event the President also determines that such unforeseen emergency requires the immediate provision of assistance under this chapter, direct the drawdown of commodities and services from the inventory and resources of any agency of the United States Government of an aggregate value not to exceed \$25,000,000 in any fiscal year." §552 (C)(2) is consistent with 22 USC §2318(a)(1), Special Authority, which describes in similar language the special authorities in which the President may use to drawdown EDA from operational stock.⁵

Indo-Pacific Command

Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI). This initiative provides the funding for, and execution of, U.S. INDO-PACOM SC activities. PDI has three objectives:

- Improve the design and posture of the joint force in the Indo-Pacific region primarily west of the international date line
- Modernize and strengthen the U.S. armed forces, including improvements to logistics and infrastructure to enhance the responsiveness and resiliency of the force

- Build the defense and security capabilities, capacity, and cooperation of allies' and partners' authority for humanitarian assistance (HA), SA, or combined exercise expenses

Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative. This initiative provides authorization to support various countries in the South China Sea region with equipment, supplies, training, and small-scale construction to increase maritime security and freedom of movement in the INDO-PACOM AOR. For example, the EDA cutter transferred to Vietnam in 2017 required refurbishment and additional equipment upgrades. Those refurbishments were funded by 2016 NDAA, §1263, as it is within the U.S. strategic interest to contribute to regional maritime security in the INDO-PACOM AOR.

FUNDING CONSIDERATIONS

Leahy Vetting

The Leahy Law is written as two distinct but similar statutes under Title 10, Chapter 16, §362 and Title 22, Chapter 32, §2378d that prohibit the DOD and DOS from providing training, equipment, or other assistance to a unit of a foreign security force when there is *credible information* that such *unit* committed a *gross violation of human rights*.⁶

The preceding italicized words are important to understanding the intent of the Leahy Laws as follows:

- DOD and DOS Leahy Laws do not explicitly define what constitutes a gross violation of human rights. The DOS is responsible for informing the DOD of information about the gross violation of human rights and, because of this, the DOD performs the Leahy vetting for both departments.
- Credible information supporting a derogatory account about a gross violation of human rights need not be admissible in a court of law and should be deserving of confidence as a basis for decision making.
- A unit may be construed as the smallest operational group in the field that has been implicated in the reported human rights violation. For Leahy vetting purposes of land forces, the smallest unit is a battalion because battalion level is the lowest organizational element capable of exercising command and discipline over its members.

The Leahy Law allows, as an exception called remediation, the resumption of foreign assistance to previously restricted security force units if:

- The host nation is taking all necessary corrective steps to bring to justice those responsible for gross violation of human rights.
- Under DOD provision, equipment or assistance is needed for disaster relief, humanitarian aid, or national security emergency.

Child Soldier Protection Act of 2017

The Child Soldier Protection Act amends the Child Soldier Prevention Act of 2008 to prohibit foreign assistance from being provided to, or licensed for, DCS of military equipment issued to the government of a country whose police or other security forces recruit and use child soldiers. In particular, the law requires that the Secretary of State publish annually a list of countries within which governmental armed forces, police, or other security forces, or government supported armed groups, including paramilitaries, militias, or civil defense forces recruited or used child soldiers during the previous year.⁷

The Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017

The Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017 contains provisions relating to SC that is three-fold to securing the national interests of the United States:

- The meaningful participation of women in conflict prevention and conflict resolution processes helps to promote more inclusive and democratic societies and is critical to the long-term stability of countries and regions.
- The political participation and leadership of women in fragile environments, particularly during democratic transitions, is critical to sustaining lasting democratic institutions.
- The U.S. should be a global leader in promoting the meaningful participation of women in conflict prevention, management, and resolution, and post-conflict relief and recovery efforts.⁸

The purpose here is to highlight that there will always exist complexity within the operating environment, such as the coercion of women in divisive regions, and the inclusion of women in decision making to enable partner nations to illuminate those best practices that mitigate predatory competitor actions against women and children. Thus, the point here is that as the scale of complexity grows across conducting SC programs in multi-domain environments, the need to include women in the security process is not only desired, but also needed, especially along the lines of recruiting additional resources, training, and education initiatives.⁹

Note: United States Central Command (CENTCOM) and United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) have no CCMD-specific authorities.

Table A-1. Security cooperation categories with related programs and authorities¹⁰


Security Cooperation Category	Related Programs and Authorities
Military-to-military contacts	Title 10 USC, §312 African Partnership Station (Navy) Southern Partnership Station (Navy) African Partnership Flight (Air Force) American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand Armies' Program (U.S. Army)
Personnel exchanges	Title 10 USC, §311 Military Personnel Exchange Program Defense Personnel Exchange Program
Combined exercises and training	Title 10 USC, §321-322 JCET Combatant Commanders Exercise and Engagement Training Transformation (OSD P&R)
Train-and-equip/provision of defense articles	Title 10 USC, §333 Foreign Military Financing Program (FMF, Title 22, USC, §2763-4) Foreign Military Sales Peacekeeping Operations (FAA, §2348)

Security Cooperation Category	Related Programs and Authorities
Defense institution building	Title 10 USC, §332 Defense Institution Reform Initiative Wales Initiative Fund Ministry of Defense Advisors DIILS
Operational support	Title 10 USC, §331 Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements Coalition Support Fund Coalition Readiness Support Program Personnel Recovery
Education	IMET, Title 22 USC, §2347 Combatting Terrorism Fellowship Program (Title 10 USC, §345) Regional Centers for Security Studies Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation
International armaments cooperation	Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements Engineer and Scientist Exchange Program Information Exchange Program Test and Evaluation Program

Security Cooperation Category	Related Programs and Authorities
HA and disaster relief	Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (Title 10 USC, §401) Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (Title 10 USC, §401 and §2561) Continuing Promise Commanders Emergency Response Program (Title 10 USC, §2333) Defense Health Programs

End Notes

1. Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, §541 through §543.
2. 10 United States Code (USC) §345 (c)(1).
3. Ibid, (c)(1)(A)(B)(C)(D)(E).
4. Anthony J. Blinken, U.S. Department of State, Press Statement, *Critical New U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine*, 3 February 2023, <https://www.state.gov/critical-new-u-s-security-assistance-to-ukraine/> (accessed 10 February 2023).
5. 5 USC § 552(C)(2).
6. Public Law (P.L.) 114-328, §362, (a) (1) (2), *Prohibition on Use of Funds for Assistance to Units of Foreign Security Forces That Have Committed a Gross Violation of Human Rights*, 2016; and 22 USC §2378d (a), *Limitation on Assistance to Security Forces*, 2022.
7. Field Manual (FM) 3-22, *Army Support to Security Cooperation*, 1 July 2023, 4-4.
8. P.L. 115-68, §3 (1) (2) (3), 2016.
9. Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) 23-02 (73), *Security Force Assistance Primer*, 2023, 12.
10. Joint Publication (JP) 3-20, *Security Cooperation*, 9 September 2022.



Request for PUBLICATIONS

The CALL library archives thousands of articles and publications to support units and Soldiers in multiple scenarios covering CTC and MCTP rotations, DSCA, and ongoing contingency operations.

APPENDIX B

The Foreign Policy Advisor at the Theater Army

Mr. Richard C. Merrin

MAJ Matthew Hughes

THE POLICY ADVISOR PROGRAM

The policy advisor (POLAD) program places experienced diplomats in functions where U.S. military leaders and operations benefit from their extensive foreign policy and multicultural expertise. The program originated during World War II, when U.S. diplomat Robert D. Murphy served as an advisor to General Dwight D. Eisenhower. The program grew from less than a dozen POLADs at the service chief or combatant command (CCMD) levels before 11 September 2001, to 80 positions in 11 states and 6 countries in 2021.¹ POLADs continue to advise service chiefs and combatant commanders, but the scope of their assignments has broadened to include the joint staff, theater armies, and other senior commands and organizations.²

By nature, many POLADs are quite independent, in that they exercise autonomy and, because of changing situations across their unit's area of responsibility (AOR), fulfill many varied duties. When considering candidates for POLAD positions, the POLAD office looks for people who work well independently; are resourceful; seek out information through cables and reports; have an expansive professional network; and follow up to gain a comprehensive understanding of the operational environment to ensure the command understands foreign policy issues. POLADs have diverse backgrounds and previously served in multiple roles as consular, economic, political, public diplomacy, or management officers in Washington and at various embassies. They constitute the most diverse office in the Department of State (DOS) in terms of their foreign service officer career tracks.³ In operational environments with "increasingly complex political and security challenges," these skilled diplomats help in "bridging the gap between diplomacy and defense" to render more effective and efficient U.S. international engagement.⁴

ADVISING THE COMMANDING GENERAL

Within a theater Army, a POLAD's primary function is to advise the commanding general and the command on foreign policy objective issues or how the U.S. government interacts with other nations to promote U.S. policy.

This includes counsel on how to support the U.S. ambassadors and partners based on U.S. policy and objectives. The POLAD provides the commanding general with insights on how foreign policy objectives can nest, align, and synchronize with Department of Defense (DOD) plans, exercises, and training.⁵ Their expertise also provides the commanding general with regional context (relevant geopolitical factors), temporal context (U.S. actions and how they fit with another country's history), political context (U.S. policy goals), and translation (conveying the idiosyncrasies of other agencies and the nuances of what U.S. and foreign individuals say).⁶ The ways a POLAD advises and fulfills responsibilities varies by the personality of the commanding general and the POLAD, among other factors. Further description below are examples of common POLAD activities.

To carry out such responsibilities, the POLAD maintains situational awareness of regional political developments and informs the commanding general of relevant issues and how they might affect the command's mission and activities. The POLAD frequently accompanies the commanding general during foreign travel involving interactions with representatives at the U.S. Embassy and partner nation leaders. On such occasions, they may advise the commanding general on how to broach discussion on malign state actor activities or topics with political sensitivities.

The POLAD also plays a role in the commander's decision and assessment cycle to advise the commanding general during key activities or events that inform decision points and shape operations. Typical battle rhythm events with POLAD presence include the commander's decision and guidance board and line of effort boards. The POLADs also participate in select ad hoc meetings or working groups for contingencies and emerging requirements. The operations and intelligence update and the commander's update board are other important battle rhythm events where the POLAD can gain insight on commander priorities, intelligence concerns, and operations, and provide feedback on interagency support. Because the POLAD monitors international responses to the theater Army's activities, they also provide unique contributions to assessments, which helps the theater Army gauge effectiveness of operations, activities, and investments in terms of achieving or furthering U.S. policy goals.

SUPPORT TO THE THEATER ARMY STAFF

Apart from decision boards, the theater Army staff benefits from the POLAD's expertise and unique perspective in other battle rhythm events or consultation on mission analysis, operations, or mentorship. The POLAD can help to identify and challenge the assumptions made by the predominantly DOD body conducting mission analysis. Similarly, the POLAD can often anticipate requirements not readily apparent to Army planners.

Examples include diplomatic factors, such as the personalities and backgrounds of key partner nation leaders and how their characteristics could affect strategic discussions, procedures for movement of personnel or equipment across international borders, or economic factors, such as how localized economic conditions could lead contracts for an exercise to exceed initial estimates. A POLAD might also ask questions others might not ask because the topic is not in their purview.

A POLAD's probing question for operations might also bring a value to planning and execution. For instance, pressing the staff judge advocate on alternative mechanisms to break open diplomatic impediments, such as the viability of a diplomatic note instead of a formal status of forces agreement to deploy forces to a partner nation, might lead planners to explore other possibilities to facilitate mission accomplishment under time constraints. In the information environment, the POLAD can aid with messaging to ensure it conveys unity between the DOD and the DOS. Regarding contingency plans, the POLAD can foster a whole-of-government approach through communication with other government agencies to obtain information or support.

POLADs often have foreign language skills and broad cultural expertise specific to the theater Army's area of operations, which they can use to mentor members of the staff. These attributes grant them a broader picture and understanding of issues, which can provide context as planners consider courses of action and second- and third-order effects of operations.

These leaders can mentor junior to mid-grade leaders who came to the theater Army with limited interagency or international experience by helping them to navigate the complex dynamics involved in this different kind of collaboration, which transcends organizational bounds of Army units and even U.S. culture. POLADs can also review and provide feedback on products, such as official correspondence prepared for the commanding general to send to foreign officials, trip reports after security cooperation engagements, proposed talking points for key leader engagements, or other political-military documents.

EXTERNAL COORDINATION

The POLAD is the theater Army's principal interlocutor with the DOS, interagency, and non-senior defense official members of embassy country teams within the AOR. As such, the POLAD maintains regular interaction with the CCMD's civilian deputy commander and/or other POLADs to nest strategies and ensure unity of effort. The POLAD also coordinates with U.S. Embassy staff, in coordination with the command's trip planners, before the commanding general's visits to ensure the necessary people are in the proper meetings.

For instance, the POLAD may review the list of modified country team participants to ensure the appropriate representatives attend to discuss the commanding general's priority topics. The POLAD also collaborates with the U.S. Embassy and the State Department to understand long-range planning to foster the theater Army's development of effective operations, activities, and investments that further partnership goals. This unique function serves as an enabler for interagency coordination where "bureaucratic practice tends to limit uniformed personnel from contacting other agencies or services," as the POLAD "can contact both easily and naturally without undue bureaucracy."⁷ Personnel in the theater Army staff generally lack extensive knowledge and experience with the interagency, so a POLAD plays a pivotal role in familiarizing staff members with other government entities and connecting people across organizations.

CONCLUSION

Within a theater Army, the POLAD advises the commanding general on foreign policy, supports the staff in a variety of functions involving foreign policy considerations, and coordinates with external entities to contribute to mission accomplishment. This DOS representative's broad and deep expertise and experience can greatly benefit the theater Army by ensuring activities are in harmony with other U.S. government efforts and further policy objectives. Staff members should understand the POLAD's role, expertise, and experience to properly leverage this resource and enhance understanding of the AOR, planning efforts, and operations.

End Notes

1. Andrea Gastaldo and Amanda Cronkhite, Army War College War Room, *DOS 101: Foreign Policy Advisors*, 10 August 2021, <https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/podcasts/dos-101-pt3/> (accessed 5 June 2023).
2. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State, *About Us—Office of State-Defense Integration*, <https://www.state.gov/bureau-of-political-military-affairs-office-of-state-defense-integration-pm-sdi/> (accessed 15 August 2023).
3. Andrea Gastaldo and Amanda Cronkhite, Army War College War Room, *DOS 101: Foreign Policy Advisors*, 10 August 2021, <https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/podcasts/dos-101-pt3/> (accessed 5 June 2023).
4. Brooke Leader, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, *U.S. Department of State, Foreign policy advisors strengthen security partnerships*, 9 July 2021, <https://www.africom.mil/article/33872/foreign-policy-advisors-strengthen-security-partnerships> (accessed 5 June 2023).
5. Andrea Gastaldo and Amanda Cronkhite, Army War College War Room, *DOS 101: Foreign Policy Advisors*, 10 August 2021, <https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/podcasts/dos-101-pt3/> (accessed 5 June 2023).
6. LTG William Troy, Director of the Army Staff, *Special Report: A Summary of the Political Advisor (POLAD) Conference*, 10 May 2013, 8.
7. *Ibid.*, 8.

OUR SERVICES



BE AN AGENT FOR CHANGE


WORKING FOR CALL

Work with us to drive Army change and impact Soldiers. Join us as a CALL Military Analyst (Forward) at a COMPO 1 active division or corps headquarters! Highly motivated self-starters currently serving in the rank of KD-qualified major or colonel (O4-O6) or master sergeant to sergeant major (E8-E9) are encouraged to apply. Soldiers selected will serve as a critical link between operational and institutional forces.



REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

CALL provides a unique service to the force by providing research and answers on a wide variety of topics. Reach out to us with your questions and your topics of interest.



REQUEST FOR PUBLICATION

The CALL library is home to thousands of articles and publications. Our materials support units and Soldiers in multiple scenarios covering CTC and MCTP rotations, DSCA, and ongoing contingency operations.

APPENDIX C

Assessment Frameworks

In terms of security cooperation (SC) planning, it is important to note that assessments are not the same as evaluations. An assessment is used to gather information before any decision is made regarding what to do or how to do it; whereas evaluations are typically done after decisions have been made and are designed to inform on what activity is working, why an activity is or is not working, and how an activity is or is not working. In general, assessment findings feed into the initial planning and design process of significant security cooperation initiatives (SSCI) development. There are many assessment tools in which to assess a partner nation, such as campaign assessments or intelligence reporting, but for the purpose of this handbook, there are four needs-based assessment frameworks that are systematic, scalable, and replicable in terms of identifying critical gaps in a partner nation's security apparatus. These frameworks are strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT); political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT); doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P); and diplomacy, information, military, economics, financial, intelligence, law enforcement (DIME-FIL) and are described in further detail below.

SWOT

SWOT is the most simplistic assessment framework used by the Department of State (DOS). A SWOT analysis has four categories: strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. Furthermore, a SWOT analysis can be used to review clusters of priority actions within priority objectives to develop a range of options for U.S. engagement.

Strengths

Strengths describe what a partner nation excels at and what separates it from other competitors. Strengths are internal competencies, valuable resources, or attributes that an organization can use to exploit opportunities in the external environment. Examples include a strong military or economy, loyal citizen base, or a unique industry, etc.

Weaknesses

Contrary to strengths, weaknesses inhibit or otherwise stop a partner nation from performing at its optimum level of governance. That said, weaknesses are areas where the partner nation needs to improve to remain legitimate in the eyes of its citizens or other state and non-state actors.

Such weaknesses generally include, but are not limited to, high levels of corruption, recent history of human rights abuses, lack of adherence to rule of international law, or economic stagnation.

Opportunities

Opportunities refer to favorable external factors that could give a partner nation a competitive advantage in its national security policies, such as providing a partner nation with new radar technology; training new radar operators; and fielding the equipment that bolsters the partner nation's maritime forces' capabilities to extend its patrol range and track, and interdict smugglers or pirates. In this example, the partner nation has an opportunity to secure its maritime borders, thus making international trade safer through U.S.-sponsored SC programs and activities.

Threats

Finally, threats refer to factors that have the potential to harm a partner nation. Different from weaknesses, threats are external and out of a planner's control. This can include anything from how a global pandemic affects the training of a partner nation's security forces to an unforeseen regime change in a neighboring country, which may upset the current balance of power in the region. The purpose of identifying threats is to acknowledge that these threats are real, and to design a realistic plan to overcome these threats.

PMESII-PT

The second assessment framework is known by the acronym PMESII-PT, which is a tool that aids the U.S. military in the analysis of the external environment. PMESII-PT can help describe the foundation and feature of a state, determine a state's strengths and weaknesses, and estimate the effects various actions will have across the listed categories. PMESII-PT categories, described in further detail below, are PMESII-PT.

Political: Describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of governance. Political can also refer to formally constituted authorities as well as informal or covert political powers.

Military: Explores the military or paramilitary capabilities of all relevant actors: the enemy, friendly forces, or neutral parties in an operational environment.

Economic: Encompasses individual and group behaviors related to producing, distributing, and consuming resources.

Social: Describes the cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup within an operational environment and the beliefs, values, customs, and behaviors of society members.

Information: Describes the nature, scope, characteristics, and effects of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information.

Infrastructure: Is composed of the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning of a community or society.

Physical Environment: Includes the geography and man-made structures as well as the climate and weather in the area of operations.

Time: Describes the timing and duration of activities, events, or conditions within the operational environment, as well as how the timing and duration is perceived by various actors in the operational environment.

DOTMLPF-P

The third assessment framework is known by the acronym DOTMLPF-P, which is the model the U.S. military uses in determining the acceptability, suitability, and feasibility of a proposed force design change.¹ DOTMLPF-P is the assessment framework recommended by the Defense Security Cooperation University (DSCU) for usage in assessing partner nation capability gaps. There are eight areas that the DOTMLPF-P model analyzes, described in further detail below:

Doctrine: Fundamental principles that guide the employment of U.S. military forces.

Organization: How the U.S. military builds structures of people and equipment to fight.

Training: How the U.S. military prepares to fight tactically.

Materiel: Everything necessary to equip forces to operate effectively that does not require a new development effort.

Leadership and Education: Providing purpose, direction, and motivation while operating to accomplish the mission and improve the organization. How forces prepare leaders to lead the fight.

Personnel: Individuals required in either a military or civilian capacity to accomplish the assigned mission.

Facilities: Real property, installations, and industrial plants that support the force.

Policy: Policy directs and assigns tasks, prescribes desired capabilities, and provides guidance for ensuring the U.S. armed forces are prepared to perform their assigned roles.

Note: In some DOTMLPF-P assessment frameworks, the ‘M’ is not capitalized. This is because when the Joint Requirements Oversight Council identifies joint military capability gaps, materiel solutions are de-emphasized in favor of other practical solutions, such as increased quantities or alternative applications of existing materiel.²

DIME-FIL

The fourth, and final assessment framework discussed in this handbook, is known by the acronym DIME-FIL, which typically focuses on a partner nation’s instruments of national power. DIME-FIL has been used for many years to describe the instruments of national power. These elements align to the major executive branches applying the power, such as the DOS, the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Department of Commerce, as well as the broader intelligence community. DIME-FIL analysis covers seven components: diplomatic, information, military, economy, finance, intelligence, and law enforcement.

Component 1

The first component of DIME-FIL concerns itself with diplomacy, which is the art of maintaining peaceful relations between countries, groups, or individuals. The essence of the diplomatic instrument is engagement, meaning how a nation interacts with state or non-state actors, generally to secure some form of agreement that allows the conflicting parties to coexist peacefully.³ Often, the word diplomats refers to representatives of different groups who work on issues such as conflict, trade, environment, technology, or the maintenance of security. That said, having strong diplomatic ties with many countries is an indicator of power, although many countries see its importance as much less powerful than military or economic power.

Component 2

The second component of DIME-FIL is information. Information/information security are the most important elements of virtually every strategy developed for national security and power. National security includes the security of the state and society. The informational instrument is about creating, exploiting, and disrupting knowledge.⁴ For example, a state or non-state actor benefits when it has an information advantage over another actor. How it creates and exploits that information advantage is key to the employment of the information instrument in national security strategy (NSS).

Component 3

The third component of DIME-FIL is military. The essence of the military instrument is the use of force by one party to impose its will on another. This use can entail applying force, threatening the application of force, or enabling other parties to apply force in furtherance of U.S. strategic ends.⁵

This enabling action implies successful SC programs and activities where partner nations have set conditions that currently prevent regional conflict, shape the security environment, compete for influence below the threshold of armed conflict, or prepare U.S. forces to respond to contingencies.

Component 4

The fourth component of the DIME-FIL framework analyzes the economic power of a nation and how economic power is used at the political level to influence the behavior of another state or organization. Economic power is usually a consequence of economic size. That is to say, the bigger an economy, the more economic power a nation has relative to other nations. Typically, economic power is tethered to a nation's purchasing power, which is determined by the value of a nation's currency, such as the U.S. and the value of the dollar as the dominant global reserve currency.

Component 5

The fifth component of DIME-FIL is financial. The financial instrument was born during the War on Terror, as the U.S. sought to disrupt and dismantle global terrorists' financial networks. The financial component analyzes how the power of a nation is linked to the economic power of a country. This analysis should include, for example, the ability of a partner nation to make large investments in companies abroad and to increase the influence of those companies in that country through lobbying. This all said, the financial and economic instruments appear similar; however, they are fundamentally different in scope, enabling instruments, and associated activities.

Component 6

The sixth component of DIME-FIL is intelligence. The multifaceted nature of intelligence makes this term difficult to define accurately, military doctrine notwithstanding, but intelligence can be broadly broken down into three parts: activities, products, and organizations. The term 'intelligence' is often conflated with the term 'information.' However, the recent designation of information as a new joint function helped to clarify the difference in these two terms. The focus of the intelligence instrument is, on the one hand, the production of value-added data for the commander or decision maker to make informed decisions. Whereas, on the other hand, the focus of the information instrument is to affect decision making in the cognitive, informational, and physical dimensions of the target audience whether friendly, neutral, or adversary to create a desired, strategic effect.⁶

Component 7

The seventh, and final, component of DIME-FIL, law enforcement, refers to the capacity of partner nations to regulate behavior within society, maintain order, and ensure the safety and general well-being of its citizens. The law enforcement instrument is challenging to define because it encompasses the political, strategic, operational, and tactical levels; operates through other instruments of power, such as diplomatic and military; and relies heavily on national, international, foreign state, and local partners and organizations for legal expertise or to prosecute crimes.

There is no one correct assessment framework to use as the purpose of all these frameworks is to gather and present all the necessary information to decision makers in a timely manner. Some frameworks are more useful than others, depending upon how one wants to assess their partner nation. For example, SWOT can be more useful when assessing a current regime in power, whereas DIME-FIL can yield more useful information at the national level, which could, in turn, inform potentially successful strategic SC outcomes, such as Plan Columbia, where Columbia's investment in its security sector far outpaced the U.S. investment. In fact, 95 percent of the financing for this strategy came from Colombia's economic elites, who had agreed to higher taxes because it was better for their long-term interests.⁷ No matter which assessment framework is used, remember that asking the proper questions and getting the assessment correct is critical to developing a successful SSCI. Incorrect data or indicators will create conditions for an SSCI to fail, potentially creating further capability gaps in a partner nation's security forces.

End Notes

1. U.S. Army War College, *Joint DOTMLPF-P*, 22 November 2013.
2. *Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System Manual*, 31 August 2018, B-G-F-3.
3. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine Note 1-18 Strategy*, 25 April 2018, II-5.
4. *Ibid*, II-6.
5. *Ibid*.
6. Cesar Augusto Rodriguez, Timothy Charles Walton, and Hyong Chu, Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 97, *Putting the “FIL” into “DIME” Growing Joint Understanding of the Instruments of Power*, 2nd Quarter 2020, 125.
7. Dan Restrepo, Frank O. Mora, Brian Fonseca, and Jonathan D. Rosen, Center for American Progress, *The United States and Columbia: From Security Partners to Global Partners in Peace*, 2 February 2016, 3.



REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) provides a unique service to the force by providing research and answers on a wide variety of topics.

APPENDIX D

Security Cooperation Knowledge Management Tools

SOCIUM

Socium is an innovative cloud-based activity lifecycle management system that plans, executes, monitors, and evaluates security cooperation (SC) activities. Socium is owned and maintained by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) on behalf of the Department of Defense (DOD). Socium is used by SC organizations, geographic combatant commands (CCMDs), military departments (MILDEPs), implementing agencies, regional centers, and other stakeholders that track the life cycle of SC activities, such as foreign military sales (FMS) or building partner capacity (BPC) cases. It is important to note that Socium is the DOD program of record for all significant security cooperation initiatives (SSCIs) and has developed customized workflows for various authorities, including 333, 332, Women, Peace, and Security Programs (WPS), Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative (MSI), 312, 341, 342, United States Coast Guard (USCG), foreign military financing (FMF), international military education and training (IMET), and a generic activity workflow template for all other SC activities.

Socium's original purpose was to replace the Global Theater Security Cooperation Management and Information System (G-TSCMIS) because Socium's scope is substantially broader than the former legacy system. Socium expands exponentially upon G-TSCMIS' record management by:¹

- Building and streamlining the approval process for SSCIs or strategic alignment
- Maintaining version control, collaboration, and development of the training and equipment lists
- Converting prose into structured data to enable business analytics
- Archiving, uploading, and searching community documentation to aid knowledge transfer and records management
- Centralizing the assessment, monitoring, and evaluation (AM&E) framework to house pertinent data points to improve execution
- Interfacing with other authoritative data sources to increase knowledge and reduce data-entry

Socium's functionality is determined by the user's role in the three main areas of workflows: analytics, configuration, and administration. In the workflows area, which manages end-to-end SC initiatives and activities, user roles include strategic planner, activity planner, reviewer, contributor, and implementing agency manager. In the analytics area, where strategic analysis measures progress toward achieving DOD objectives, user roles include assessment; monitoring and evaluation manager; analyst; and financial integration manager. Finally, in the configuration and administration area, which manages user roles and access controls, the principal user role is the organizational data manager.

COMMAND AND CONTROL INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

The command and control information environment (C2IE) is a web-based command and control tool that provides commanders at every echelon the ability to visualize tasks, operations, exercises, and activities to synchronize multiple elements for operational success. C2IE facilitates the execution or select stages of the military planning and execution process: planning, coordination and de-confliction, execution, and assessment of operations, activities, and investments (OAI). OAIs are individual and/or linked events, tasks, operations, exercises, and activities that are entered and executed by military commands at all echelons, which allows cross-organizational awareness and integration.

DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

The Defense Security Assistance Management System (DSAMS) is a DOD standard system used to develop and track the progress of FMS cases. It contains detailed information on FMS case development and implementation. DSAMS contains information on every FMS case and on any amendments or modifications to each case. The implementing agency inputs case information into DSAMS and DSAMS produces letters of offer and acceptance (LOAs) for U.S. government and partner nation approval and signature. DSAMS tracks the progress of an FMS case's life through milestones. DSAMS is for U.S. government use only, but it feeds information to another information technology system, the Security Cooperation Information Portal, which is accessible to FMS customers.

SECURITY COOPERATION INFORMATION PORTAL

The security cooperation information portal (SCIP) provides visibility of a partner nation's FMS case(s) to authorized users anywhere in the world using any common web browser. SCIP data is consolidated from DSAMS, MILDEP computer systems, and other financial and logistical systems. The SCIP can produce either standard automated reports or unique reports designed by the action officer. DSCA limits access to SCIP to designated U.S. government employees and to representatives of FMS purchaser countries.

U.S. access is controlled through a common access card (CAC). Non-U.S. access is controlled through electronic universal serial bus (USB) tokens distributed to non-U.S. government SCIP users. DSCA further limit access such that U.S. government employees can view information related only to partner nations for which they are responsible, and foreign representatives can view information related only to their own country.

End Note

1. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, *Department of Defense, Security Cooperation Management*, Edition 43, Arlington, VA, September 2023, A-10.

GLOSSARY

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADP	Army doctrine publication
AECA	Arms Export Control Act
AFRICOM	Africa Command
AM&E	assessment, monitoring, and evaluation
APRRP	African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership
AR	Army regulation
ARFOR	Army forces
ASA (ALT)	Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology)
ASAE	Army Security Assistance Enterprise
ASCC	Army Service component command
BAT	battalion advisor team
BPC	building partner capacity
C2IE	command and control information environment
CAC	common access card
CALL	Center for Army Lessons Learned
CCA	Combatant Command Authorities
CCIF	Combatant Commander Initiative Fund
CCMD	combatant command
CCP	combatant command campaign plan
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CLAT	company logistics advisor team
COIN	counterinsurgency
CSCS	country-specific security cooperation section
CWMD	countering weapons of mass destruction
DASA (DE&C)	Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for (defense exports and cooperation)
DATT	defense attaché
DCS	direct commercial sale
DDTC	Directorate for Defense Trade Controls

DIILS	Defense Institute for International Legal Studies
DIME-FIL	diplomacy, information, military, economics, financial, intelligence, law enforcement
DLD	digital liaison detachment
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense directive
DODI	Department of Defense instruction
DOS	Department of State
DOTMLPF-P	doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, policy
DSAMS	Defense Security Assistance Management System
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
DSCU	Defense Security Cooperation University
DSMA	Directorate of Services and Materiel for the Army
DTSA	Defense Technology Security Administration
EDA	excess defense articles
FAA	Foreign Assistance Act
FAAT	field artillery advisor team
FHA	foreign humanitarian assistance
FID	foreign internal defense
FM	field manual
FMF	foreign military financing
FMS	foreign military sales
FMSA	Foreign Military Sales Act
FP	force package
FY	fiscal year
GPOI	Global Peace Operations Initiative
G-TSCMIS	Global Theater Security Cooperation Management and Information System
HA	humanitarian assistance
IAPD	International Army Programs Directorate
ICB	institution capacity building

ICS	integrated country strategy
IDD	initiative design document
IDF	indirect fire
IED	improvised explosive device
IMET	international military education and training
INL	Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
ISG	Institute for Security Governance
JCET	joint combined exchange training
JLLIS	Joint Lessons Learned Information System
JP	joint publication
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
KDF	Kenyan Defense Force
LEAP	Learning and Evaluation Agenda for Partnerships
LOA	letter of offer and acceptance
LOR	letter of request
LSCO	large-scale combat operation
MAT	maneuver advisor team
MCAT	maneuver company advisor team
MDMP	military decision-making process
MILDEP	military department
MINUSCA	Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
MINUSMA	Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MOA	memorandum of agreement
MOS	military occupational specialty
MSI	Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative
MTOE	modified table of organization and equipment
MTT	mobile training team
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCOIC	noncommissioned officer in charge
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act

NDS	national defense strategy
NGB	National Guard Bureau
NMS	national military strategy
NSC	National Security Council
NSS	national security strategy
O&M	operation and maintenance
OHDACA	Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid
OSC	Office of Security Cooperation
OUSD(P)	Office for the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
PCS	permanent change of station
PEO	program executive office
P.L.	public law
PMESII-PT	political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, time
POI	program of instruction
POLAD	policy advisor
PPD	presidential policy directive
PREACT	Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism
RFI	request for information
RSAT	Office of Regional Security and Arms Transfers
SA	security assistance
SAMM	Security Assistance Management Manual
SAFTA	Security Assistance Training Field Activity
SATMO	Security Assistance Training Management Organization
SC	security cooperation
SCO	security cooperation organization
SETAF-AF	Southern European Task Force-Africa
SFA	security force assistance
SFAB	security force assistance brigade
SFAC	Security Force Assistance Command

SoARTY	School of Artillery
SOF	special operations forces
SOUTHCOM	U.S. Southern Command
SPP	State Partnership Program
SSCI	significant security cooperation initiative
SWOT	strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats
TAC	tactical action center
TAF	Tunisian armed forces
TDY	temporary duty
TOC	tactical operation center
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
TSC	theater security cooperation
TSCPT	Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership
UN	United Nations
USACE	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
USAMC	U.S. Army Materiel Command
USAREUR-AF	U.S. Army Europe and Africa
USARSOUTH	U.S. Army South
USASAC	U.S. Army Security Assistance Command
USB	universal serial bus
USC	United States Code
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USD(P)	Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
USML	U.S. munitions list
USSOCOM	U.S. Special Operations Command
WPS	Women, Peace, and Security Program
XO	executive officer

OUR SERVICES



BE AN AGENT FOR CHANGE


WORKING FOR CALL

Work with us to drive Army change and impact Soldiers. Join us as a CALL Military Analyst (Forward) at a COMPO 1 active division or corps headquarters! Highly motivated self-starters currently serving in the rank of KD-qualified major or colonel (O4-O6) or master sergeant to sergeant major (E8-E9) are encouraged to apply. Soldiers selected will serve as a critical link between operational and institutional forces.



REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

CALL provides a unique service to the force by providing research and answers on a wide variety of topics. Reach out to us with your questions and your topics of interest.



REQUEST FOR PUBLICATION

The CALL library is home to thousands of articles and publications. Our materials support units and Soldiers in multiple scenarios covering CTC and MCTP rotations, DSCA, and ongoing contingency operations.



CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

10 Meade Avenue, Building 50
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1350



**U.S. ARMY
COMBINED
ARMS CENTER**



**COMBINED ARMS
CENTER - TRAINING**

**NO. 25-01 (768)
October 2024**

**Approved for Public Release
Distribution Unlimited**