

SECTION F. BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

General

During the course of the study, criteria were developed to provide standards for judging and testing the organization, functions, and procedures of the Headquarters, Department of the Army. The selected criteria are set out in this Section and are referred to as Basic Considerations. In effect, they constitute the conclusions of the study regarding the conditions which the Headquarters pattern of organization, management, and procedures desirably should satisfy. The reasons for the selection of the Basic Considerations are contained in the discussion following each statement.

The Basic Considerations do not necessarily reflect in every case a significant deficiency in organization, functions or procedures although, in most cases, they do represent problem areas. In all cases they represent the characteristics which it is concluded the HQ, DA, pattern of organization and management should satisfy to the extent practicable.

Basic Considerations

1. There is need for the Army Staff to be organized to provide the highest degree of support to the Office, Secretary of the Army, and for that office to avoid duplication of those functions assigned to the Army Staff.

This consideration reflects a basic principle of Army organization. The Army Staff is the Secretary's staff. It is charged by law with furnishing professional assistance to the Secretary, the Under Secretary, and the Assistant Secretaries of the Army. Under the direction and control of the Secretary, the Army Staff is also charged, among other things, with preparing for such employment of the Army, and with such tasks as will assist in the execution of any power, duty or function of the Secretary or the Chief of Staff.

In light of the assigned duties and responsibilities of the Army Staff, and in the interest of sound management, the

Office, Secretary of the Army, should avoid duplication of the Staff's functions. Duplication not only impinges upon the functions and responsibilities delegated by the Secretary to the Chief of Staff, but slows up decision-making by establishing, in effect, an intermediate staff layer. It diffuses responsibility and otherwise results in needless delays in the conduct of the Army's affairs.

2. There is need for the Headquarters, Department of the Army, to provide for clarity and continuity of Army objectives through: long-term anticipation of the future environment and of the range of demands which may be made on military forces; related long-term planning; and corresponding long-term programming which takes into account the range of anticipated resource availability.

Establishment of realistic objectives is a prerequisite for coordinated and consistent planning and programming at all levels of the Army. The analysis of trends and developments and the formulation of such objectives are the responsibility of the Army Headquarters planners. Projections based on the best available intelligence, politico-economic trends and technological forecasts should result in the establishment of requirements which can be translated into long-range plans. Such plans serve as a blueprint for the Army's contribution to Joint plans, long-range programming and the research and development activities of the Army.

The conversion of plans to programs requires a realistic projection of resource availability. In the competitive framework of governmental activities, such a long-range program must provide for the most effective forces and weapons which can be developed and supported to accomplish the roles and missions of the Army as a member of the national defense team. Clearly defined objectives will serve as a basis for establishment of requirements in submissions to the Department of Defense and as support in the development of JCS plans. Continuous review and revision will ensure continuity and will provide accurate projections of posture for those responsible for national policy. Efficient

utilization of resources and maximum effectiveness of forces would be much more easily attained if the Joint long-range planning and the Defense long-range programming were coordinated. The use of a mission format in the long-range programming would help assure that resources are best allocated to meet the anticipated military requirements.

3. The organization and functioning of the Army Headquarters need to be such that they will overcome as much as possible the divisive influences imposed by appropriations structures, functional areas, branch distinctions, and other separative influences within the Army.

Divisive influences act to divert Army effort from the attainment of overall Army purposes. The fact that the Army underwent a reduction following the end of the Korean War contributed to divisive trends in the Army Staff. The allocation of shortages and competition for limited resources have served to emphasize appropriations structures. Since the functional areas are related to appropriations and are spread in the Staff, they tend to complicate coordination, degrade uniformity, and to have consequent adverse effects upon readiness.

Branch distinctions in the Officer Corps are another divisive influence. The well being, prestige and power of branches is enhanced by powerful representation in the Headquarters, Department of the Army. The spread of responsibility for personnel management in the Headquarters is closely related to the influence of branches. Each of the technical and administrative staff agencies controls its own personnel. Each of the General Staff agencies also exercises a veto power over personnel who may be nominated for assignment to it. Owing to the powers of the agencies competing for personnel, the barriers to utilization of the total pool of personnel, and a shortage of the highly qualified persons demanded by all, it has not been possible to manage the total personnel pool to the benefit of the Army as a whole.

General Staff officers exercising command-like functions have had to face the dilemma of day to day operational problems, which

must be solved rapidly, as opposed to the broader policy questions which require more thoughtful action. This has necessarily divided their attention. The present Headquarters organization consists largely of a group of headquarters within the HQ, DA. Ideally, a General Staff officer should solve any particular problem from the point of view of the Army as a whole. His judgment should be dispassionate and unbiased, since he should not exercise in his own right any of the responsibilities of a commander. The present Army organization vests many of the prerogatives and responsibilities of command in principal staff officers, and places them, like the technical services, in competition with each other for resources.

A further divisive influence is the size of the staff, which prevents all of its members from being acquainted with the policies and problems of the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army. Not having available a body of consistent policy to serve as staff guidance, each staff officer tends to become knowledgeable in his own specialty only, and the possibility of staff disputes is increased. There is a requirement for a mechanism for disseminating information throughout the staff on policy decisions of the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army, including guidance, as necessary, for proper implementation of such decisions.

4. The organization, functions and procedures of the Department of Army Headquarters need to provide for unity of effort with orientation toward Army purposes.

The General Staff should act as an extension of the Secretary and Chief of Staff in providing coordinated guidance, direction and control for the subordinate elements of the Army. The use of the mission-task program within the Army will help to establish the desired orientation; however, the distribution of responsibilities among staff agencies is in itself divisive.

The diverse interests of the General Staff tend to prevent a singleness of orientation. For example, the Chief of Research and Development (CRD) is primarily interested in innovations while the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) is primarily interested in providing needed materiel (including new or "modern" items) to the troops. With a chronic shortage of funds, these different orientations become significant distractions from orientation toward overall Army purposes. The functional breakout by appropriations with General Staff members as appropriation directors further emphasizes diversity of interest. In extension of the example used above, the Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDTE) appropriation directed by CRD is separated from the Procurement of Equipment and Missiles, Army (PEMA) appropriation directed by DCSLOG. Thus, these closely related functions are in competition for the limited resources. Consequently, planning and decisions tend to be made primarily in relation to fund sources rather than provision of specific military capabilities.

The preclusive demand for attention to JCS matters tends to detract from attention to definition and realization of Army purposes. The urgent nature of the actions of the JCS and the requirement for Army General Staff support to the Chief of Staff as a member of the JCS become an overriding responsibility which, in effect, orients an important segment of the staff to the Joint activities. Since the segment of the General Staff involved also has responsibilities for Army policies and plans, there is a tendency to give secondary attention to the guidance and supervision of Army programs.

5. A closely knit General Staff is needed for effective coordination of major planning and policy questions.

The tasks that evolve from Headquarters, Department of the Army, missions encompass a wide spectrum of military activities. This poses a requirement that the Headquarters be manned by qualified professional and specialist personnel, organized into structural elements that reflect an appropriate division of labor,

such as command, staff, and administration. It might seem to follow that even an optimal headquarters organization must of necessity be large and complex. Such a premise is questioned by those holding that the expansion of a headquarters to a point where it becomes large and complex brings into play the law of diminishing returns, with the end result being a loss in effectiveness and responsiveness, duplication of effort, and mal-utilization of critical personnel resources. While size alone is not a basic consideration, it does result too often in the use of routinized, restrictive measures that preclude rapid reaction, effective coordination, knowledgeable supervision, and informal decision making.

6. There is a need to determine what pattern of organization and management of Army-wide services of a technical nature will provide the best balance between the desirability of independent status for the service on the one hand, and span of control of the Chief of Staff, on the other.

There are a number of Army-wide services which receive little or no benefit from intermediate command supervision, and there are other services which are of such nature and magnitude as to require grouping for effective control and direction. The pattern should reflect these considerations.

7. The subordinate command structure should be such as to facilitate delegation of functions from the Headquarters, Department of the Army.

Many functions currently being accomplished by the General Staff could be delegated to a subordinate command or staff element, but certain conditions must be overcome before implementation could be undertaken with relative ease. First, there is the problem of the increasingly heavy and detailed workload generated within the JCS and OSD, to which the Army Staff must be responsive. Until such time as the OSD and JCS reduce their requirements, the Army would incur some risk in reducing the size of the staff by eliminating much of its capability for detailed work. Second, while it may be desirable to delegate some functions of the General

Staff to a subordinate agency, such agencies are not now organized or oriented along lines that would facilitate delegation without a major organizational upheaval and lessening of the Army's capabilities. The subordinate command structure consists of the United States Continental Army Command (USCONARC) and the technical services, which are entities performing multiple functions. USCONARC is concerned with training, installations, financial management, readiness (Strategic Army Force; Strategic Army Corps), joint plans (Commander in Chief, Atlantic; Tactical Air Command) and development. The technical services are involved in logistics, research and development, personnel, intelligence, training, financial management, and organization and installations activities.

The structures of these subordinate echelons are roughly parallel to that of the HQ, DA. Delegation of a function would result in a number of subordinate elements having to accomplish it. Necessary coordination and supervision by HQ, DA, could cause a major attempt at delegation to be self-defeating under the present structure.

8. There is need for decentralization of "staff authority" within the staff.

The time of senior officials must be conserved so that they can deal with the major problems of the Department of the Army. It is also important from the viewpoint of motivation and job satisfaction for subordinate staff officers to place responsibility at the lowest possible level.

Interviews and surveys have indicated that heavy demands are placed on the time of senior officials. Survey results indicate that the average Division Chief can devote only 5 to 10% of his time to planning and guiding the activities of his Division. The demands on the time of officials at echelons higher than the Division appear even more severe and a frequent comment from directors concerns the difficulty of seeing their superiors.

The extent to which "staff authority" has been delegated within the present staff varies markedly among the various agencies. Where effective delegation has not been accomplished, multiple layers of review have been created which do the same work repetitiously. In one agency, a routine cable, giving facts only, required five levels of review.

9. There is need for increased responsiveness to the Office, Secretary of Defense (OSD).

The evolutionary development of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff over a period of years has resulted in emphases and interests between these agencies and the Department of Army flowing in an uncertain and irregular pattern. Some functional areas have had far less emphasis than others. This evolving relationship has made it difficult for the organizational structure of the Army to keep pace. Undoubtedly there has been a tendency for the Army, long established as an autonomous agency, to react conservatively to change.

A problem has been inadequate communication between OSD and Army representatives, to include:

Insufficient reconnaissance by Army representatives at OSD level.

Misunderstanding of language used by both parties.

Insufficient mutual confidence.

Insufficient reconnaissance at the OSD level by Army representatives and a "language barrier" are conditions which can be improved by Army action. Both arise to some extent from the submergence of Army Staff action officers beneath successive layers of supervision. The "language barrier" is partially composed of the different lifetime temperings of military officers and civilian officials which may also contribute to insufficient mutual confidence.

10. Overall Army Programs need to be stated in terms of missions and tasks, and analyzed in terms of cost-effectiveness relationships.

The Army needs to employ a mission-task format to determine the relative cost of its activities. By a mission-task format is meant one which focuses attention on assigned Army missions in support of national security objectives and the resources required. This format should include a breakdown of forces and support activities in relation to the forces provided for each major mission or area and the relatable support and development costs for materiel and personnel. The use of such a format will make a more meaningful device for the consideration of alternative courses of action. While many projections and special computations have been made in the past, an overall comparison has been difficult, if not impossible, to make due to the functional break-out by obligating command or agency. The "package-element" format prescribed by the OSD for use in connection with the 1963 Fiscal Year budget does not yet meet these requirements. A great many factors and variables will have to be considered in the evaluation of cost-effectiveness relationships. It is recognized that such economic relationships can only be used in conjunction with political, psychological, and military judgments as a basis for decisions.

11. The programs and budgets of the Army need to be executed and administered in terms of tasks assigned to commands and other operating agencies.

The increased emphasis on clearly defined objectives and mission-oriented programs does not eliminate the requirement for execution and administration of programs and budgets on a command and operating agency basis. Army-wide objectives and plans will serve as guidance for Commanders but the prime concern of Commanders is with providing the materiel, the trained personnel and units and the services required to achieve the mission objectives; and with securing and utilizing the resources needed for the purpose. The overall Army mission-type programs will furnish commanders information that will be the basis for orienting themselves to Army purposes, but they also need program-budgets which assign specific

tasks together with allocation of required resources and funds. The present program-budget format for the "Operation and Maintenance, Army" appropriation is generally well suited to this latter purpose.

The Headquarters, Department of the Army, will be required to make the necessary conversions from command agency budget program reports to overall Army missions to use the cost-effectiveness relationships in the review and analysis procedure.

12. There is need for more comprehensive review and analysis of Army operations.

The Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff should be furnished periodic analyses of the manner in which the established program objectives have been accomplished. The review and analysis must be realistic and include estimates of capability of forces, adequacy of resources in relation to assigned missions and tasks, and commentary on cost-effectiveness of operations.

It is essential that review presentations be timely in relation to effective decision making. This can be accomplished by using the same time span for all data presented, and by using projections from the field. Reviews should be based on data summarizing areas of most importance to the Secretary and Chief of Staff. Critical areas should be identified and indicators determined so that reporting and staff analysis are responsive to the review and analysis process.

The emphasis on "horizontal" review and analysis does not obviate the need for continuing "vertical" review by staff agencies responsible for functional areas. The Army Staff should be indoctrined to accept independent "horizontal" review and analysis as a means for the Secretary and the Chief of Staff to achieve maximum efficiency and effectiveness in accomplishing the missions and tasks of the Army as a whole. Review and analysis should not be used as a hyper-critically oriented device, but accepted as an essential requirement for intelligent decision making.

13. There is need for improvement in the internal management of the Department of Army Headquarters.

Areas in which there is particular need for improvement include: control of functional assignments to staff agencies; maintenance and dissemination of current information on the organization, functions, and procedures of the Department of Defense and the other Services; study, evaluation, and modification of modern management techniques to meet the requirements of the Army; and utilization of automatic data processing.

The Comptroller of the Army is assigned the responsibility for monitoring AR 10-5, "Organizations and Functions, Department of the Army." However, as a monitor he has little, if any, authority to determine whether or not the functions of the staff agencies which are prepared by these agencies are complete, accurate or overlapping. The Management Office of the Chief of Staff supervises the manpower control and management improvement programs for the Army Staff but has no responsibility for functional assignments. As a result, the functional responsibilities of the Army Staff are self-determined except when controversy causes the Chief of Staff or Vice Chief of Staff to concern themselves with functional assignments.

Part of the establishment of team work at Army level is dependent on a good working knowledge of the organization, functions, procedures, and activities of the other Services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. At present, no elements of the Office of the Secretary of the Army or the Army Staff are charged with specific responsibility for maintaining such information and for its dissemination.

The effort expended to keep the Army abreast of improvements in management techniques has not been adequate. Partially due to reductions in manpower and resources, partly due to fragmented and competing staff efforts, the Army has not moved as rapidly in the management improvement fields as might be desired. As in most

organizations facing decreases in support, management activities have been slighted when needed most. Efforts made to adopt modern management techniques need to be coordinated, supported and fostered to ensure that the military manager has the best possible advice, assistance and support in the accomplishment of his missions. An example of the type of activity which the Army should be giving maximum consideration is systems management.

Closely related to improved management techniques is the field of reporting and data processing. It is possible that much of the basic data used by various offices of the Headquarters is, or should be, identical; thus, it appears likely that a central facility should service the staff. Particularly significant is the possibility of centralized registration and evaluation of factors and standards (primarily ratios) developed and utilized by various staff agencies. Automated processing of data offers one of the promising areas in which the Headquarters might be relieved of time consuming routine tasks. If new techniques of management are successful in prescribing orderly, repetitive patterns and requirements in parts of the program-budget area, it should become increasingly possible to handle a substantial part of the manipulating of data by machines. Army planning in this regard should be compatible with that of the Office, Secretary of Defense. Care must be exercised, however, in that automation, through a possible precipitous and unwise approach, could deluge the Headquarters with a mass of irrelevant detail gathered, stored, and reproduced by machines. The implementation of automation must be based on careful planning and detailed analysis of requirements and procedures.

SECTION G. ALTERNATIVE PATTERNS OF ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT

General

In this section, alternative patterns of organization will be presented and evaluated in light of the principal requirements reflected in the Basic Considerations discussed in the preceding section.

Two alternative patterns of organization will be presented for the HQ, DA, General Staff. Either of these patterns of organization can be utilized with any of the patterns adopted for the field organization of the Army. Only one new basic pattern for the special staff and Headquarters operating agencies will be presented, but it is compatible with any of the new patterns which organizationally fit above or below it.

The proposed alternative patterns of organization will also be compared with the present organization which will be referred to in this section as Pattern I. Pattern I (Figure 1, page 19) was analyzed in Section E. See Figures 4 and 5 for the new alternative Patterns II and III (pages 120 and 121). The summary evaluation will concentrate on major features of the various patterns. More detail will be provided in the following section -- Conclusions and Recommendations -- with respect to that pattern considered best suited to the needs of the Headquarters, Department of the Army.

Office of the Secretary of the Army

In the present pattern or either of the alternatives, the possibility of integrating the Offices of the Secretary of the Army, the Under Secretary, the Assistant Secretaries and the Office of the Chief of Staff is a feasible alternative to the present pattern of organization of those offices. It could be applied to any of the General Staff sub-structures. It is, therefore, discussed separately in the paragraphs following.

With the advent of the Office, Secretary of Defense, the traditional "civilian control" over the military forces of the United States was integrated at that level. With the transition to centralized control of the military departments, the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force have become intermediate, implementing Headquarters rather than final directive and control Headquarters for the Armed Forces. The civilian Secretariats,

however, have been retained within the organizational structure of the Services.

Over recent years, in varying degrees, the members of the Secretariat have acquired staff assistants in extension of their respective positions. With few exceptions, these staff assistants (civil service or military) perform functions similar to those performed by staff officers and civil service employees within the General and Special Staffs of the Army Headquarters. The proposal of integrating the offices of the Secretariat and the Chief of Staff encompasses the requirement that the staffs, other than personal, of the Secretariat be dissolved, and that these officials be serviced by a common administrative organization and the Army General Staff. Within this arrangement, close relationships between the Civilian Secretariat and the Army Staff would be possible. Considerable administrative time would be saved in processing matters to the top civilian officials. The Assistant Secretaries could participate in the formulative discussions on problem areas, thereby adding their guidance before the staff actions are presented to the Chief of Staff. Such early influence, however, presents obvious problems as well as advantages.

The Study Group believes that the apparent advantages of this proposal are outweighed by the disadvantages involved. There is a definite, though irregular and shaded, zone of differentiation between the civilian and political control of the Army, and its professional military direction. This differentiation is recognized by the legal provision making the Chief of Staff of the Army directly responsible to the Secretary for the efficiency of the Army and its preparedness for combat.

It is further recognized by the Secretary's delegation to the Chief of Staff of the responsibility for supervision of the members and organizations of the Army. The danger of confusion of the political aspects of control of the Army with the military aspects at a level below the Chief of Staff is inherent in the proposal to combine the offices of the Secretariat and the Chief of Staff. Under such an arrangement, the possibilities of military involvement in political matters and vice versa, are such as to endanger the effective and responsible channels of control now existing.

Nevertheless, certain measures can be taken at the Secretariat level to enhance effectiveness. The basis for these measures was discussed in Section E, "Analysis of Current Organization and Management." Specific recommendations are set forth in Section H, "Conclusions and Recommendations."

Office of the Chief of Staff


The difficulties of supervision and coordination of the Army Staff by the Office of the Chief of Staff were set forth in preceding sections. In the alternate patterns presented, these difficulties are addressed by proposals for the creation of a position in the immediate Office of the Chief of Staff to be occupied by a senior officer charged with the direction and coordination of the Army Staff. (Pattern II = Director; Pattern III = Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Readiness).

Pattern II visualizes removal of the Programs and Analysis Group (less the element dealing with congressional affairs) to the general staff agency concerned with Army planning and programming. Pattern III would retain the Programs and Analysis Group in support of a Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Readiness, who would chair the Program Advisory Committee of the Headquarters.

Both patterns would retain, in the Office of the Chief of Staff, those functions of the present Coordination Group concerned with long range anticipation of the future. In Pattern II, they would be under administration of the Director of the Army Staff; in Pattern III under that of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Resources. In both patterns, the current functions of the Coordination Group that are essentially secretarial would pass to the direct supervision of the Secretary of the General Staff.

Pattern III visualized the addition to the Office of the Chief of Staff of a Deputy Chief of Staff for Joint Plans, to be supported in his office by the Joint Action Control Office currently in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations.

Pattern III visualizes a Systems Management Office in support of the Office of the Chief of Staff; Pattern II would place this function in the



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Figure 4. Headquarters, Department of the Army - Pattern II


* CHIEF OF PUBLIC INFORMATION ALSO SERVES AS CHIEF OF INFORMATION

1 GENERAL STAFF AGENCY

2 NO CHANGE CONTEMPLATED IN STATUS OF ARMY AUDIT AGENCY

Figure 4 HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, PATTERN II

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Figure 5. Headquarters, Department of the Army - Pattern III

Figure 5 HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY ORGANIZATION PATTERN III

general staff agency responsible for Army planning and programming. See Annex C for a discussion of the Systems Management function.

Both patterns would remove the Army General Staff Civilian Personnel Office to the Special Staff level. Both would retain the current placement and functions of the Chief of Staff's Management Office, Staff Communications Office, Weekly Summary Section, Administrative Section, and Deputy and Assistant Secretaries of the General Staff. The authority of the Secretary of the General Staff to act for the Chief of Staff and Vice Chief of Staff would pass in both patterns to a senior official (Director of the Army Staff, or Deputy for Operations and Readiness), and the Secretary of the General Staff would exercise such authority as that official may assign him.

The General Staff - Pattern II

The General Staff presented in Pattern II would require two Deputy Chiefs of Staff (plus a Director) over the present number of three. Justification for this additional requirement is reflected in each instance in the discussion of the offices.

Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategy and International Affairs - Pattern II

The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategy and International Affairs (S&IA) represents a portion of the present office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, plus added elements taken from other portions of the Staff. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategy and International Affairs would be the Operations Deputy for the Army in joint activities, and would have Army Staff responsibility for joint actions. He would report directly to the Chief of Staff and Vice Chief of Staff, coordinating with other General Staff elements as may be required in conformance with the Director of the Army Staff's policies on coordination.

His office would include:

a. From the present Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations:

- (1) Joint Actions Control Office
- (2) Directorate of Operations (to include the Army War Room)

(3) Directorate of Strategic Plans and Policy (most elements)

b. From elsewhere on the Army Staff there would be assigned General Staff officers trained in personnel, intelligence, and logistics matters (not more than four in each field) familiar with joint activities.

DCSS&IA would provide a capability for response in joint plans and operational matters, and in planning and operational matters of interest to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and the Defense Intelligence Agency. In instances where Army policy had been previously formulated and in minor actions, DCSS&IA would have an in-house capability for complete staff actions; in other instances, he would depend on support from the other elements of the Army Staff.

Civil Affairs would be placed under the principal cognizance of DCSS&IA in order that the Chief of Staff may discharge his duties as executive agent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Civil Affairs most conveniently. This arrangement would afford more suitable channels through OSD and JCS to overseas commanders and to various allies of the United States. Association with the agency responsible for Special Warfare activities would exploit the close relationship between Special Warfare and Civil Affairs. If required, DCSS&IA could assume Deputy Chief of Staff cognizance of Army participation in civil defense activities.

DCSS&IA would have general staff cognizance of command control matters of interest to OSD and JCS, particularly strategic communications.

The Army input to the Joint Chiefs, such as material for inclusion in the Joint Strategic Objectives and Capabilities Plans (JSOP and JSCP), would be formulated and sponsored in the Office of the DCSS&IA as well as the corresponding Army implementing plans (ASOP and ASCP). The internal Army long-range programming direction and control would not be so placed.

The principal objective of establishing this new position is to meet the basic consideration of responsiveness to the OSD and JCS, and to relieve the remainder of the General Staff of joint and international matters

to an appreciable degree, thereby permitting more undivided attention to Army short and long-range programming.

Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans, Programs,
and Systems - Pattern II

The second new office resulting from the division of the present military operations would be that of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Programs and Systems.

Included in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Programs, and Systems would be:

a. From within the present Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations:

- (1) Long-Range Analysis Group
- (2) Directorate of Organization and Training
- (3) Directorate of Army Aviation
- (4) Directorate of Programs and Budget
- (5) Directorate of Combat Developments (less Materiel Development Division)

(6) Some Army planning elements (to include force structuring and mobilization planning) from directorates transferred to DCSS&IA

b. From elsewhere:

(1) Elements from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel concerned with monitorship of the Troop Program

(2) A new Systems Directorate

(3) Programs and Analysis Group (less element concerned with congressional affairs) from Office of the Chief of Staff

The Army Long-Range Capabilities Plan (per Vice Chief of Staff approval of the Lead Time Study) would be formulated in this new office to provide internal Army direction in the form of a long-range plan for the Army, setting objectives and providing long-range programming guidance. From this document the 5-10 year programs in specific functional areas (Research and Development, Logistics, etc.) would be developed for addition to the annual 1-5 year program documents. The Army Program Estimate and the Control Program Directive would provide the detailed direction to the Army for the preparation

of principal Control Programs by the respective Deputy Chiefs of Staff within the Headquarters. The DCSPP&S would chair the Program Advisory Committee of the Headquarters.

Associated with the programming function is the production of policy and doctrinal guidance for Army organization, training and CONUS Army (not joint) operations. Also associated is monitorship of the Troop Program. DCSPP&S would have general staff cognizance of command and control matters of internal Army application, including the use of tactical devices.

There has been a trend in OSD in recent months to use Systems Management as a major tool for Defense control and decision-making. The Army has used this management technique to great advantage throughout its structure, particularly in the detailed management and planning of weapons and equipment development. The trend relates to weapons systems development, to include the scheduling of funds, personnel, materiel, training, etc., necessary to deploy the system for active defense purposes.

The Army has certain overall developments which could be subject to systems management. For example, the ROAD (Reorganized Army Division) is subject to such management, as are certain of the Army large missile systems. The close association, in fact, integration of these developments with Army programming functions, prompts the inclusion of this function, namely Systems Management, in the proposed Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Programs and Systems.

Close coordination between the two new offices would be required. The Strategy and International Affairs office would be guided by the Army long-range planning document and pertinent portions of Army programs in the actions it would recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. Conversely, the Plans, Programs and Systems Office would insure that Army programming and systems management implement joint-guided Army Strategic Objectives and Capabilities Plans.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel - Pattern II

Would consist of present organization, less the following:

- a. Directorate of Officer Assignments (to Special Staff, Office of Personnel Operations)

b. Personnel Actions Division of the Military Personnel Management Directorate (to Special Staff, Office of Personnel Operations)

c. Elements of Directorate of Manpower Management concerned with monitorship of Troop Program and the Mobilization Troop Program (to DCSPP&S)

Remaining elements would exercise current functions, making maximum effort to transfer details of operations to the special staff and to commands. Internal realignment would bring personnel planning, programming and budgeting under one Directorate.

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence - Pattern II

Composition and functions would be dependent on composition and functions of the Defense Intelligence Agency, which are not known at this time. A reduction of current functions is probable.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics - Pattern II

This office would be composed of current organization, less the bulk of functions of the following elements (functions to subordinate commands or Special Staff):

- a. Inspector General
- b. Directorate of Installations
- c. Directorate of Logistics Manpower and Doctrine
- d. Storage and Distribution Division
- e. Materiel Maintenance Division (most functions to subordinate commands)
- f. Directorate of Procurement

The reorganized office would contain suitable organizational entities to deal with the planning, programming, and doctrinal functions of the elements mentioned above. It also would include, immediately under the DCSLOG, a senior officer charged with logistical staff aspects of Military Assistance Program activities. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics would no longer direct and control the logistical activities of special staff agency heads, nor would he exercise manpower space allocation functions or personnel management policy formulation for subordinate logistical agencies.

Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve
Components - Pattern II

Current organization and functions would continue, less direct supervision and control of the Chief of Army Reserve and ROTC affairs. Should the senior active Army officer position dealing exclusively with reserve affairs (now at HQ, USCONARC) be eliminated from the subordinate command structure as recommended in Part III of this report, consideration should be given to Deputy Chief of Staff status for the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components. The staff of this office would be augmented to increase capabilities in the areas of supply and maintenance and administration of individuals.

Deputy Chief of Staff, Research and
Development - Pattern II

Entitling this position "Deputy Chief of Staff" would give permanence to the current directive providing that it will be regarded as the equivalent of that of a Deputy Chief of Staff.

The bulk of the current organization and functions of this office would continue in effect, less direct control and supervision of research and development activities of the present technical services. An internal realignment to bring competing weapons systems (guns and missiles performing the same combat function) under the same organizational element would be effected. The Materiel Developments function currently in DCSOPS, and the Materiel Developments Division now charged with it, would be transferred to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Development.

The Deputy Chief of Staff, R&D, would no longer exercise manpower space allocation or personnel management functions with regard to subordinate agencies.

Comptroller of the Army - Pattern II

The bulk of current organization, functions, and procedures would continue, less the functions of:

- a. Establishment of accounting procedures (to Chief of Finance)
- b. Accounting operations and review (to Chief of Finance)

c. Foreign Financial Affairs (to Chief of Finance)

d. Contract Financing (to Chief of Finance)

Management functions currently in several directorates (management engineering and surveys, systems development, statistics and reporting) would be placed under one Director in the Office of the Comptroller. The responsibility and authority of the Comptroller as advisor to the Army in the field of management would be reaffirmed.

Army Staff coordination of systems (including automation) procedures, and organization for statistical and reporting functions would be assigned to the Comptroller of the Army.

The responsibility and authority of the Comptroller with regard to making an objective and effective horizontal review and analysis evaluating effectiveness and efficiency in the utilization of money, manpower, and material resources of Army programs would be reaffirmed.

The Comptroller would retain direction of the Army Audit Agency.

The General Staff - Pattern III

In Pattern III the various functional general staff heads would be uniformly (except for the Comptroller) entitled Assistant Chiefs of Staff, in view of the grouping of three Deputy Chiefs of Staff in the Office of the Chief of Staff. In this pattern each of the General Staff sections would support each of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff as the latter may require. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Readiness would be charged with direction and coordination of the Army Staff. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Joint Plans would be the Army Operations Deputy for joint activities, mainly supported by the Assistant Chief of Staff, Joint Affairs. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Resources would be the focal point for Army direction for the future. The Systems Management Office would be under his supervision, although it would be responsive to any Deputy. The composition and functions of the various offices of the General Staff would be the same as those for corresponding offices in Pattern II, except for deletions from two offices.

The Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Joint Affairs would not include the following elements proposed for DCSS&IA in Pattern II:

a. Joint Action Control Office (to Deputy Chief of Staff for Joint Plans)

b. General Staff officers trained in personnel, intelligence, and logistics matters who are familiar with joint activities.

The Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations, would not include the following elements proposed for DCSPP&S in Pattern II:

a. Programs and Analysis Group (to Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Readiness).

b. Systems Directorate (to Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Resources).

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations, would not chair the Program Advisory Committee of the Headquarters. It would be chaired by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Readiness.

The Special Staff - Patterns II and III

The present structure of the Special Staff is well suited to the current organization of the Headquarters, Department of the Army. The present practice of direct supervision and control of various special staff agencies by specified general staff agencies, while compatible with clear delineation of lines of responsibility and convenient administratively, is not compatible with a philosophy of decentralization. It inhibits rapidity and flexibility of staff response, and fails to encourage initiative and assumption of responsibility on the part of special staff agency heads.

The principal option to be considered, therefore, is whether the special staff agencies should be assigned to particular General Staff agencies for supervision and control, as is now done, or should be directly subordinate to the Office of the Chief of Staff and equally available to whatever General Staff agency might be concerned with a specific matter at hand. The former course facilitates control and coordination, while the latter facilitates speed and flexibility and inhibits excessive compartmentalization.

The chart (Figure 4) illustrates a compromise solution, which allows all special staff agencies free and uninhibited access to all General Staff

agencies, but which relates five of them to particular General Staff agencies for purposes of information flow and coordination of programs and policies. The concept encourages the return of the General Staff to staff, rather than command-like, functions.

The composition of the proposed alternate pattern of the special staff has been largely determined by the pattern of commands subordinate to Headquarters, Department of the Army, recommended in Part I of this report. Proposed changes in each of the affected special staff agencies can, of course, be debated one by one, leading to a large number of alternatives. It is felt that the one alternative presented in Patterns II and III has a consistent basis, and is adequate as a vehicle for decision for change in whole or in part.

Merits and Demerits of Pattern II

Pattern II was evolved in an effort to satisfy the Basic Considerations set forth in Section F more completely than is the case with the current organization. The creation of a general staff agency for Army plans, programs, and systems is addressed to the need for the establishment of realistic objectives and corresponding long term programming, and to the need for orientation of the Headquarters toward Army purposes. The separation, to the extent practicable, of staff officers from the exercise of command-like functions is addressed to the need for unity of purpose in the Headquarters, as is the provision for centralized handling of personnel operations and the creation of the post of Director of the Staff. Freeing general staff agencies from "supervision and control" of specified special staff agencies contributes to the decentralization of staff authority. Responsiveness to the Joint Chiefs of Staff is enhanced by the establishment of a staff agency having joint affairs as a main interest, freeing the bulk of the staff for responsiveness to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army. The time of the Chief of Staff and Vice Chief of Staff is better utilized through the relief from staff coordination afforded them by a Director.

The foregoing advantages are achieved at a price. The pattern interposes an additional individual between staff agency heads and the Chief of

Staff. An additional general staff agency is created, with attendant increases in the complexity of coordination. These increases are particularly acute in this pattern because of the direct access of the DCSS&IA to the Chief of Staff and Vice Chief of Staff, which endangers the coordinating capability of the Director. The pattern is sufficiently different from the current organization to induce transitional stresses inimical to stability and continuity.

This pattern does not solve such problems as the lack of conformity among requirements and authorized allowances for civilian personnel and availability of funds for hire of civilian personnel. These problems stem from restrictions imposed by higher authority, and are not solved by internal organization and management. The present division of responsibility between DCSPER and the Comptroller in this field is judged to be correct.

Merits and Demerits of Pattern III

Insofar as Pattern III is similar to Pattern II, the discussion above of Pattern II applies to Pattern III. Pattern III has several additional advantages. They include the sharing of the workload of the Chief of Staff and Vice Chief of Staff by three immediately available senior assistants. All general staff agencies are under the coordinating authority of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Readiness, a situation which avoids difficulties raised by the direct access to the Chief of Staff by the DCSS&IA in Pattern II. A senior officer -- the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Resources -- is charged with unifying the Army's effort to anticipate and prepare for the future.

The comparative disadvantages of Pattern III must be weighed against the foregoing advantages. The Army Operations Deputy for joint activities is denied an immediately available staff devoted exclusively to his support and having a rather complete staff action capability. Conflicts generated among the three Deputies must be settled by the Chief of Staff or Vice Chief of Staff. Staff agencies respond to three deputies, a situation calculated to create stresses and confusion in the assignment of priorities of work. The layer of deputies may insulate the Chief of Staff and

Vice Chief of Staff from actions and problems that should require their personal attention. Separate deputies are concerned with coordination of planning and of programming, tending to perpetuate the present hiatus between these two processes. Systems Management is organizationally removed from the focal point for programming, increasing the difficulties of coordination.

Relatively Unchanged Staff Functions

No major changes in staff functions or procedures are proposed for the following agencies. Where applicable, training, personnel management, and command functions of these agencies would be transferred as indicated elsewhere in this report.

- Inspector General
- Judge Advocate General
- Provost Marshal*
- Chief of Finance (gains some functions from Comptroller)
- National Guard Bureau
- Chief Army Reserve and ROTC Affairs
- Chief of Civil Affairs
- Chief of Legislative Liaison
- Chief of Information

*"General" is dropped herein from title, in view of transfer of command, training, and career management functions.

Office of Personnel Operations

See Part VI of this report. The Office of Personnel Operations (OPO) would be a newly created Special Staff agency, composed of:

- a. Directorate of Officers Assignments (presently in ODCSPER)
- b. That portion of the Office of The Adjutant General concerned with Army-wide personnel activities (including special services)
- c. Military and civilian personnel management elements currently in ODCSLOG, CRD, Directorate of the Women's Army Corps, Office of the Chief of Staff, Office of the Secretary of the Army, and in the Offices of the Chiefs of the Technical and Administrative Services, except for the Army Medical Service, Judge Advocate General's Corps and Chaplains Corps.

The responsibilities of this office would include all Army-wide personnel operational activities and personnel support of the Departmental Headquarters.

X X X

Chief, Administrative Services

The Office of Chief of Administrative Services would be a newly created position. It consists of:

- a. That portion of the present office of the Adjutant General not included in the new Office of Personnel Operations
- b. Office of the Chief of Military History
- c. Elements of the present Office of the Quartermaster General concerned with heraldry.

Functions of the Office of the Chief, Administrative Services would include promulgation and authentication of orders, correspondence, and directives, publications, records, printing, military history, heraldry, data processing service, and postal and courier service.

Placement of the military history function with the office of Army records would facilitate research and reduces the number of separate staff agencies. Dissociation of the military history function from the direct supervision of the general staff agency charged with plans and operations would free that agency from a responsibility not closely associated with its principal purposes. There is a natural affinity between history and heraldry which would be exploited by grouping the two functions.

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Technical and Administrative Services

The chiefs of the technical services presently accomplish the research and development of new weapons and equipments for the Army. They are also responsible for production, wholesale distribution, and maintenance procedures and higher echelon operations within their respective "commodity" groupings. They provide certain services Army-wide and to other government agencies. The chiefs of technical services are both staff officers to the Headquarters of the Army and commanders of their activities under the direction of the DCSLOG and CRD. Each chief manages his personnel, both military and civilian, and trains them in the various technical specialities needed by the Army.

Offices of chiefs of technical service presently include the following functions:

- a. Personnel management and manpower management for Class II commands; world-wide personnel management for officers; career management for civilian personnel of the branch*
- b. Staff advisors to the Department of Army Headquarters in their spheres*
- c. Conducting wholesale operations, supply and services to CONUS
- d. Commanding Class II installations in CONUS*
- e. Organizing and training troop units*

*Applicable also to offices of chiefs of administrative services.

Based on the various recommendations of the Study Groups concerning the future functions and command responsibilities of the technical and administrative services, only the following principal technical and administrative services type functions would remain in the Headquarters:

- a. Provision and supervision of various Army-wide services
- b. Provision of some technical intelligence to the Army, subject to Defense Intelligence Agency actions
- c. Provision of some technical advice to the Secretary, Chief of Staff and General Staff, within the remaining reduced fields of competence.
 - a. Provision and supervision of various Army-wide services
 - b. Provision of some technical intelligence to the Army, subject to Defense Intelligence Agency actions
 - c. Provision of some technical advice to the Secretary, Chief of Staff and General Staff, within the remaining reduced fields of competence.
 - d. Personnel management

The problem is the assignment of these remaining functions to some element within the Special or possibly General, Staff. Two of these functions, personnel management and technical intelligence, are first discussed and then each of the existing technical services in turn.

Personnel management would be assigned to the Special Staff Office of Personnel Operations, except for separate management of Army Medical Service commissioned personnel, officers of the Judge Advocate General's

Corps, and Chaplains, by their respective Chiefs. Any personnel functions remaining in the reorganized offices of technical and administrative service chiefs would be solely the internal personnel functions of a staff agency head, and not the responsibility for a Corps.

Placement of technical intelligence cannot be provided for until the definitive functions of the new Defense Intelligence Agency are available. However, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, would continue to exercise overall supervision of this function within the Army. He may decentralize some of the work of the office in this field to the Intelligence Center. Insofar as the technical services are concerned, responsibility for technical intelligence concerned with materiel would pass to the Systems and Materiel Command. That inherent to Army-wide services, such as construction, mapping, and communications, would be a function of the appropriate DA Special Staff agency heads.

In considering each technical service, the responsibility of the present chief for providing technical advice to the Secretary, the Chief of Staff and the General Staff, is of particular importance. The extremely technical nature of the Army and the impact this technology will continue to have on overall planning, programming, budgeting and policies of the Headquarters, are obvious. It is also clear that technical advice cannot be divorced from technical competence. If the functions of a technical service are divided, responsibility for advice must be related to the placement of the function.

Medical

The provision of medical service to the Army involves a highly specialized professional function. The nature of the services performed, both on behalf of military personnel and their dependents, distinguishes it from the other technical services. Except for the Army in the field, it is believed that this service can be accomplished best under central professional direction. The Surgeon General has lost certain materiel and supply functions to the single manager for medical supply. However, there would remain substantial command and staff functions appropriate to DA Headquarters level. He would continue to command presently assigned Class II activities in the

CONUS and to operate the Dependent Medical Care Program. In addition, staff supervision of Army-wide medical service not under his command, should remain with the Surgeon General. The provision of medical staff advice to the Headquarters is an essential function which must be retained. Retention of officer personnel management responsibility by the Surgeon General has already been mentioned. Therefore, the functions of the Surgeon General and his Office would be essentially unchanged. The Office is described herein as "Director of Medical Services" to reflect the command and staff functions of the Surgeon General, and for the sake of uniformity.

Ordnance

With reallocation of materiel, supply, and technical intelligence functions to the Systems and Materiel Command, Military Automotive Supply Agency to the Defense Supply Agency, personnel management to OPO, and training to Force Development Command (FDC), little of the responsibilities of the Chief of Ordnance would remain. The staff function of munitions safety and explosive ordnance disposal do not warrant special staff status and could best be delegated to the Systems and Materiel (S&M) Command. The provision of technical advice is a difficult problem. There would be no office which could provide the range of advice covered by Ordnance at present. Proper assignment policies, however, can provide the General Staff with individuals who can fill part of the need. However, it would be necessary to rely on the S&M Command for a large measure of this advice. If it should develop that technical advice must be immediately available within the Headquarters, it is suggested that the S&M Command be directed to establish a liaison office for this purpose. The Office of the Chief of Ordnance would not be needed, and no residual counterpart would remain on the Army Staff.

Engineer

Materiel and supply functions would go to the S&M Command, the Military Construction Supply Agency to the Defense Supply Agency, personnel management to OPO, and training to Force Development Command. The present office would retain responsibility for world-wide construction service. This includes the civil works functions as well as extensive military construction programs for Army and Air Force. Real estate, field maintenance, and repairs

and utilities closely allied to the construction function, also would remain. The magnitude of these responsibilities warrants a special staff office whose head would exercise command over the extensive field services. He would be responsible for technical advice within this field and for technical intelligence inherent therein. The remainder of the responsibility for technical advice in materiel and supply would go to the S&M Command; and the responsibility for engineer combat and service functions of the Army in the field, to the Force Development Command. In view of the importance of the remaining responsibilities, an Office of Engineering Services would be in the Special Staff.

Signal

A large communications service responsibility would remain, even with the loss of materiel, supply, personnel management, and training functions. The operations of the Army communications service, the Alaskan Communication Service, and the White House Army Signal Agency are major activities. Photographic service could be transferred to another agency, but there appears no strong reason to do so. The same can be said of cryptology. Since communications, cryptology, and electronic warfare are major considerations in strategic and tactical planning, there is value in having a single Special Staff Office charged with all three. Therefore, an Office of Communications Services would be provided in the Special Staff with responsibility for communications, cryptology, electronic warfare, and photographic services. In addition, the Director would continue to command Army-wide communication services.

The Director of Communications Services would be responsive to the General Staff, and particularly to DCSS&IA and DCSPP&S, with regard to command control matters, including strategic communications.

Transportation

With the loss of its aircraft and other materiel and supply functions, and the loss of personnel management, the duties of the Transportation Office would be much reduced. This reduction would be extended by the transfer of training responsibility to FDC and the assignment of the Military Traffic Management Agency (MTMA) to the Defense Supply Agency. MTMA controls

commercially procured surface transportation in CONUS for the whole DOD. The remaining staff and supervisory functions would include: transportation services for the movement of persons and things for the Army and, as required, for other agencies, management control over administrative motor transportation and over Army use of over-ocean air and surface transportation, Army implementation of DOD engineering for Transportability Program, and administration of DOD activities pertaining to highways for National Defense. The provision of transportation services throughout CONUS is a highly decentralized operation under local transportation officers, coordinated generally by MTMA, with a minimum of direction from the Chief of Transportation. The three transportation terminal commands in CONUS would be subordinated to the Systems and Materiel Command. Of all the services, transportation would perhaps be the most essential to the accomplishment of the Systems and Materiel Command's missions. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that transportation planning is integral to strategic and contingency planning at departmental level. A Special Staff office for Transportation would be retained. In view of the reduced duties, the position is described here as "Transportation Officer."

Quartermaster

The Quartermaster General has lost the operation of the Military Subsistence Supply Agency, Military Textile and Clothing Supply Agency, and General Supplies Agency to the Defense Supply Agency. Responsibility for Quartermaster materiel and supply would go to the Systems and Materiel Command. With the concurrent loss of personnel management for Quartermaster Corps personnel, the Quartermaster General's functions would be drastically reduced. With no further training or troop responsibilities, his remaining staff function would be primarily the recommendation of basic policies and procedures for such activities as clothing sales, commissary operations, food services, baking, mobile refrigeration, bath, laundry and dry cleaning, parachute packing and maintenance, and air delivery. All of these activities are integral to the Logistics System since they are related closely to supply operations and are performed at installation command level.

There would remain planning responsibility for Graves Registration, a major activity in wartime. The administration of the National Cemeteries is a civil function of the Quartermaster General. It should be transferred to another governmental department such as the Department of Interior. The Quartermaster Corps also provides heraldic services to the Army and other governmental agencies. This function is closely allied to that of Military History and should be assigned to that office or closely associated with it when the Military History function is transferred to the Administrative Services Office as recommended elsewhere.

The residual office is described herein as "Support Services."

Chemical

With the transfer of materiel, supply, personnel management, and training responsibilities, the Chief Chemical Officer would have few remaining functions. At present, research and development alone occupy half of the Chemical Corps' personnel. The Chemical Corps has basic responsibility within DOD for chemical and biological warfare and associated defensive measures, coordinating and sometimes performing R&D for all services as well as providing some materiel and equipment for other services. Most of this inter-service requirement passes to the S&M Command. The remaining staff responsibility pertaining to munitions safety, storage, and disposal would be, as with Ordnance, assigned to the S&M Command. It is possible that development of the new Civil Defense mission in DOD will require increased Army staff work in the CBR field. However, the only real CBR staff function remaining after the transfer of functions from the Chief Chemical Officer would be the General Staff function of policy, planning, and programming in the CBR field. Experienced Chemical Corps Officers should be assigned to appropriate offices to participate in this work. The Office of the Chief Chemical Officer would not be needed and no CBR section would be in the Special Staff. As a related matter, the importance of this field suggests a focal point for coordination, information, and program control in the S&M Command. Such an identifiable office would make easier support

to DA Headquarters, and better relations in this field with other services and the DOD.

Because of the great importance, political impact, and safety and technical considerations involved in the atomic and CBR Weapons Systems, DA Headquarters may often need a reliable technical source of information and advice to assist in planning and operations. If the suggestion made earlier that the S&M Command maintain a liaison office at DA Headquarters is accepted, a Special Weapons Unit for Atomic and CBR Affairs within the liaison office would be appropriate. If not, then the Special Weapons Unit alone is liaison office is recommended.

SECTION H. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Section G presented two feasible alternative patterns of organization for the Headquarters, Department of the Army. Each of the alternative patterns satisfies the Basic Considerations to a greater extent than does the present pattern of organization. Each of the patterns has both advantages and disadvantages; therefore, the conclusions and recommendations are designed to provide the best pattern, on balance, for the Headquarters, Department of the Army. The first part of this Section presents conclusions and recommendations regarding an optimum pattern of organization and management. The second part provides a concept for transition to that pattern.

1. Proposed Pattern of Organization and Management

The preferred pattern for the Headquarters, Department of the Army is Pattern II. The primary organizational features of this pattern were delineated by Figure 4, Page II - 120. A number of significant modifications to management concepts which are contemplated cannot be shown on the chart. These will be discussed in the paragraphs immediately following, after which recommendations pertaining to the Office of the Secretary of the Army and the Office of the Chief of Staff will be presented. Finally, more details will be presented regarding the major features of the preferred pattern.

To supplement the discussion in this section of the Report, a further, detailed listing of the proposed functions and responsibilities of each element of the Army Staff under the preferred pattern of organization will be found at Annex D. Annex D is a draft of a proposed revision of Army Regulations No. 10-5, "Organization and Functions, Department of the Army."