

STUDY of  
*the* FUNCTIONS  
ORGANIZATION  
*and* PROCEDURES of *the*  
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OSD PROJECT 80 (ARMY)



Part I

Overall Report

*Department of the Army*  
*Washington 25, D.C.*

*October 1961*

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OSD PROJECT 80 (ARMY)

5 October 1961

The Honorable Elvis J. Stahr, jr.  
Secretary of the Army

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Overall Report (Part I) on OSD Project 80, entitled "Study of the Functions, Organization and Procedures of the Department of the Army," is submitted herewith. In compliance with your directions and those of the Chief of Staff, and in accord with guidelines provided by the Office, Secretary of Defense, the study analyzed the functions, organization and procedures of the Department of the Army and developed proposals for change as found desirable.

The study and the Overall Report are directed to major matters of organization and management which are considered appropriate for your attention and that of the Chief of Staff. In order to arrive at conclusions regarding these matters, however, it was necessary to examine deeply into a myriad of aspects of operation and management throughout the Department of the Army. Further, to provide an understanding of the proposals for those who must be concerned with the specifics of given functional or organizational areas, the concepts have been developed in some detail in the six primary studies from which this Overall Report has been synthesized. The results of the six studies are presented in separate volumes, Parts II through VII.

The report contains not only conclusions and recommendations, but also comparative evaluations of a number of alternative patterns of organization and management. These patterns were developed without prejudice before firm conclusions were reached, and the evaluations provided, while necessarily brief, represent the objective appraisals of the project team. It is my understanding that you will want to have such alternatives available for your consideration in addition to our recommendations.

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It is my impression that most of the major proposals of the study stand out fairly clearly in the text and charts of the report. I am troubled, however, with the thought that the sheer volume of subjects and material will obscure the recognition of one critical requirement. I refer to the need for strong and continuing emphasis on anticipation of the nature of future military demands and on planning and action to meet them. The nature of the Government environment is such that top officials are almost overwhelmed with actions to deal with current matters, some of which are today's results of yesterday's problems. Exceptional effort and organizational and procedural arrangements are required to accord the future the attention and resources it deserves.

The principal proposals resulting from the study would require action by the Secretary of Defense and submission to the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives for consideration. Either Committee could refer the proposals to the Congress for consideration, and adverse action by either House would block action. A few proposals would require legislation. It is assumed that as a matter of courtesy any proposed action would be discussed informally with members of appropriate committees in any case.

The Project 80 study group is indebted to the numerous individuals -- military and civilian, active and retired, private citizens and public servants -- who have given unstintingly of their time and effort to assist with their valued views and opinions in an appraisal of the Department of the Army and the requirements of the future. Of particular note was the outstanding cooperation of representatives of the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, and the British Army, whose organizations were a matter of considerable interest in conjunction with the Project 80 study.


Special recognition must be given to the members of the Project Advisory Committee, whose broad experience, mature judgment and expert advice were of great value and assistance to the overall study effort. As indicated in the project plan, it was anticipated that unanimity of agreement could not be attained in all the conclusions and recommendations of a study of this scope and magnitude. This expectation was borne out, although a majority favored the general concepts for handling personnel, training and materiel logistics matters. The advice of the members during the study and their carefully developed specific comments and recommendations on the draft of the reports contributed greatly to the product.

I particularly want to express my appreciation to those who constituted the working members of the project. The sixty three officers and senior civilians demonstrated the finest devotion to their assignments and to the welfare of the Army, with remarkable detachment from branch and other affiliations. Some of the officers endured substantial hardships by reason of being separated from their families. Further, the loyalty and hard work of the clerical workers was impressive and gratifying, especially in light of the many hours of overtime required of them.

Finally, I should like to express my gratitude and appreciation to you and General Decker for your splendid support in providing me with a most competent study organization, and for your utmost cooperation in enabling the study to be conducted with ready access to all sources of information within the Department of the Army.

The project staff joins me in commending our study to you for appropriate action.

Respectfully,



L. W. Hoelscher  
Project Director







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## INTRODUCTION

### 1. Preliminary Statement

The Department of the Army, one of the three military departments within the Department of Defense, derives its basic internal organization from the Army Organization Act of 1950, which, in turn, was predicated on the National Security Act of 1947. Its mission is to support national policy by providing and supporting land forces of the United States for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations, in accordance with plans for national security. The Department of the Army, while representing an evolution of the historic Department of War, is, in its present form, a relatively new governmental organization - as is its parent organization, the Department of Defense. However, during the short period of its current history, the Department of the Army has foreseen the necessity to effect changes in its organization and management - not for change's sake - but in order to acquire a better posture for anticipating and meeting the requirements of the future. Just as the art of warfare is evolving rapidly and creating new demands on the military strategists and tacticians of the Army, so is the science of administrative organization and management imposing obligations for better machinery of management on those charged with the administration of overall functions and operation of the Department.

In recent years numerous studies of specific aspects of the functions, organization, and procedures of the Department of the Army have been conducted by various staff agencies of Headquarters, Department of the Army. Some of these studies have resulted in varying degrees of change. However, the last comprehensive study undertaken was that of the Secretary of the Army's Advisory Committee on Army Organization (referred to as the "Davies Committee"), which was completed in December, 1953. As a result of this study, significant organizational changes were effected during the period 1954 - 1955. These included the following: establishment within the Headquarters of the position of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, with command-type authority over the technical services; activation of the US Continental Army Command; and allocation of staff responsibility for research and development to a Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and



Research. Further changes in 1956 resulted in the organization of the Headquarters, Department of the Army essentially as it exists today. Other modifications, of a more limited nature, have been effected during the ensuing period.

## 2. Origin and Conduct of the Study

At the beginning of the present Administration, it was recognized by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army that significant changes had occurred in the Defense environment since the last comprehensive study of Army organization. Therefore, it was determined that a study should be undertaken of the functions, organization, and procedures of the Department of the Army, in the light of current and projected trends. Accordingly, in February, 1961 the Secretary of the Army, in agreement with the Secretary of Defense, directed that such a study be conducted. It was subsequently identified as OSD Project 80. The guidelines for this study approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense specified that the scope would include, but not be limited to, studies of the Headquarters, Department of the Army (Secretariat and Army Staff), US Continental Army Command, and the technical services. In addition, the original scope included examination of the civil function of the Corps of Engineers; but this requirement was subsequently deleted by agreement with the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The guidelines also provided that, for study purposes, the basic provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, would continue to apply (Annex A, Appendix 1.)

After consultation with the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of the Army appointed Mr. Leonard W. Hoelscher, Deputy Comptroller of the Army, as Director of OSD Project 80. A study plan for the project was approved by the Chief of Staff on 14 February 1961 and by the Under Secretary of the Army on 1 March, which provided for delineation of areas of study, establishment of a study organization, phasing of the study project, and working relationships with the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. (Annex A, Appendix 1.)



A Project Advisory Committee, composed of eight general officers and a professor of the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, was appointed to furnish periodic advice to the Project Director on the development of the study, and on the conclusions and recommendations (Annex A, Appendix 2.)

Based on the approved study plan, the Project Director developed a plan for assignment of responsibilities to groups of the working staff. A study group was established for each of the following major study areas: Headquarters, Department of the Army; the US Continental Army Command and related agencies; the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, the technical services, and logistical functions; research and development; personnel functions; and the Reserve components. Six study groups were organized to conduct studies in these areas, with a seventh group organized to function as a coordination group to synthesize overall findings for the Project Director.

The personnel assigned to the various study groups comprised a carefully selected, representative group of relatively senior military officers and civilians. Their backgrounds and experience varied considerably; however, all were selected on the basis of general analytical ability and specific experience in activities related to the particular study area in which they were assigned. Military officers comprised approximately three-fourths of the total personnel conducting the study; of this number, one-third were provided from field commands and agencies. The remainder were furnished from various Department of the Army agencies in the Washington area. Most of the civilian personnel who participated in the study project are assigned permanently to staff agencies of the Headquarters, Department of the Army. (For identification of project members, see Annex A, Appendix 3.) It is noteworthy that the personnel who conducted the study presented their own views, based on current research and prior experience, rather than the views of the organizations and agencies from which they had been assigned to the study project.



In the conduct of the study, initial attention was given to an examination of the Defense environment and projected trends as they affect the various functional and organizational areas of the Department of the Army. The next step was to delineate the roles and missions of the Army, both with respect to the present and the future, in the light of predictable changes in the Defense environment. This was followed by a comprehensive analysis of current Army organization and operation. In order to give meaningful direction to this analysis, certain tentative criteria were established as guidelines for effective and efficient organization and management. Concurrent preliminary research indicated those significant functional, organizational and procedural areas that would require analysis in depth. As research and fact-finding proceeded, certain basic considerations were evolved; these constitute the sub-conclusions of the study as to the principal criteria which the structure of the Army organization and management should satisfy. They are the keystones upon which subsequent analysis of alternative patterns of organization and management was predicated, and are the basis for determination of the proposed organizational changes contained in the overall conclusions and recommendations of the study.

The fact-finding and research conducted in the course of study were of a comprehensive nature. Numerous prior studies and other pertinent documents were examined. Research and study were facilitated by briefings, interviews, surveys, and discussion periods. Trips were made to agencies, installations and activities in the Washington area and in various parts of the Continental United States, and to United States Army Europe. In addition, cognizance was taken of other concurrent studies being conducted either within the Headquarters, Department of the Army or the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Personnel whose views were solicited included senior commanders and staff officers of the Active Army and Reserve components; senior civilian officials of the Department of the Army and the Department of Defense; distinguished retired officers and civilian personnel formerly associated with the Department of the Army; leaders in industry;



scientists and other professional personnel; and representatives of other governmental departments and agencies, including staff members of Congressional Committees. Fact-finding extended to the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, and the British War Office, whose organizations were analyzed for possible application in considering changes in Army organization. (For details on bibliography and other sources of information, see Annex A, Appendices 4 and 5.)

### 3. Organization of the Report

The integrated findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Project 80 study organization are contained in this volume, which is entitled "Part I - Overall Report". This part is the report of the Project Director to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff. It is based on, and is in large measure a synthesis of, the six primary studies conducted by separate study groups which have contributed to the Overall Report. The various sections of this Part correspond generally to the sequential steps involved in the conduct of the study. Specifically, they are as follows: Section A, "The Defense Environment", emphasizes the current environment and projected trends as they affect the Department of the Army. Section B, "Roles and Missions of the Army", describes, in brief form, the assigned and derived roles and missions of the Army, based on statutory regulations and Executive Orders, and discusses certain limitations on these roles and missions. Section C, "Current Organization and Management", contains a brief factual description of the current organization and management structure of the Department of the Army. Section D, "Summary of Findings", comprises a resumé of the most significant areas for improvement identified in the study. Section E, "Basic Considerations", constitutes the sub-conclusions of the study concerning the principal criteria which the structure of organization and management should satisfy. Section F, "Alternative Patterns of Organization and Management", presents and analyzes a series of organizational and management patterns, including current organization, that are considered



most nearly to meet the criteria of the Basic Considerations and appear to be feasible of adoption by the Army. Section G, "Conclusions and Recommendations", includes a description of the organizational pattern that is considered best suited to provide the Army with an optimum attainable command and management posture. It also includes a summary of recommendations, and a concept for effecting transition toward the proposed organizational and management objectives.

The contributory studies are reflected in the detailed reports of the six study groups. These reports are contained in separate volumes, which are identified as follows: Part II - "Headquarters, Department of the Army"; Part III - "The US Continental Army Command and Related Agencies"; Part IV - "The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, the Technical Services, and Logistical Functions"; Part V - "Research and Development"; Part VI - "Personnel Functions"; and Part VII - "The Reserve Components". While these reports, with the exception of Part V, generally support the findings contained in Part I, there are some variations, based on judgment and evaluation rather than inconsistency, and in these respects they reflect the views of the study groups rather than those of the Project Director. In addition, Parts II through VII included considerably more detailed treatment and numerous findings, conclusions and recommendations of lesser scope and magnitude than the more significant findings that have been incorporated in Part I. The contributory studies are commended for consideration by those concerned with specific areas of the total study.

#### 4. Concluding Statement

The Project 80 study necessarily emphasizes areas for improvement in Department of the Army functions, organization and procedures. While recognizing that there are important opportunities for improvement, it is also necessary to realize that the Department of the Army has demonstrated an inherent organizational capability to plan, direct and control the

administrative and operational activities of the Army in a commendable manner. However, in the light of the ever-changing Defense environment, progress in the form of organizational and management changes is inevitable - as an evolutionary process that contains the characteristics of stability as well as awareness of the long-range requirements of the future. This study undertakes to propose modifications of this nature.





## SECTION A. THE DEFENSE ENVIRONMENT

Since 1955, and particularly since the enactment of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, there have been numerous appraisals of the organization, functions, and procedures of the Department of Defense, both internally by Defense officials and externally by the Executive Branch, the Congress, the press and the public generally. Many reorganization plans have been offered; some have been partially implemented. Identification of significant changes and trends is a condition precedent to this study. The present Defense environment affords the Army an excellent opportunity and occasion to identify its own problems and take corrective action. The following paragraphs constitute a summary of identifiable significant changes and trends within the Defense environment, and an interpretation and projection of these changes and trends as they bear upon the Army's mission, organization and procedures.

There is an increasing likelihood that the Secretary of Defense will assign virtually all "ready" combat and combat support forces of all Services to unified and specified commands, which will operate under the direct control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The continuation of the existing trend in this regard will lead to increased influence by unified commanders on the development of equipment, training of personnel, and organization of forces destined for employment within their commands. It will also lead in time to the requirement to "cost out" components of unified commands.

If the remaining combat and combat support elements were removed from the Department of the Army, the Army's role would become one of organizing, training, and equipping combat, combat support, and service support units; training and schooling individuals for assignment to Army components of unified and specified commands, as directed; developing and providing doctrine for the employment of Army forces; participating in the development of joint and combined doctrine; training and



supervising Reserve component forces; conducting research, developing and procuring materiel; providing administrative and logistical support to elements of combatant commands, as directed; and maintaining a training, materiel, and mobilization base.

Similarly, it can be anticipated that the function of planning for the conduct of combat operations will continue to be performed primarily within the JCS organization and by unified and specified commands. The Army and other Services are being progressively relieved of responsibility in this regard, except in support of the JCS organization; however, the Army will retain a responsibility for other planning and operational matters, including designation of units for assignment to combatant commands, determination of training requirements, and logistical support.

The national strategy must be supported by a variety of capabilities to meet the full threat spectrum in order to provide the United States with a variety of responses to such threats. This requires that the Army maintain conventional as well as nuclear capabilities, an adequate mobilization base, and be prepared to deal with para-military as well as military operations at all levels.

The trend toward centralized control by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which has been evident since 1958, may be expected to continue. This trend is marked by a steady increase in, and exercise of, the staff powers of the Secretary's various assistants, by demands for repeated justification of requirements, by investigation and inquiries, and by a tendency to favor organizational patterns which facilitate the supervision in detail from the highest level. One general effect of this trend is the tendency to make the Secretary of the Army serve more as an extension of the Office of the Secretary of Defense rather than as an active proponent of Army objectives.

The trend toward central control is particularly noticeable in the area of interest of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. Control is generally exercised by individual actions related to selected



projects, rather than by provision of guidance in terms of objectives, policies, and program goals. There is also a tendency to emphasize the role of civilian science and industry in the generation of tactical concepts and materiel requirements.

One major factor which encourages and extends the trends just mentioned is the increasing cost and complexity of new equipment. In combination with overall shortages of funds and manpower, the increasing costs of aircraft and missiles, in particular, will continue to confront the Army with hard choices, and will continue to engender opposition within the Army to expansion in these two fields.

There has been a definite tendency for the Secretary of Defense to establish a single point of responsibility for each function or major activity, either in one Service or in a special agency, e.g., the Military Air Transportation Service, Military Sea Transport Service, Defense Communications Agency, and Defense Intelligence Agency. In line with this trend, certain additional services common to two or more Departments may be consolidated within a single Department, or within a joint agency of the Department of Defense. Further extension of this concept may lead to widespread sharing of installations by elements of two or more Services.

The Department of Defense budget will be based primarily on approved programs or "program packages" designed to provide integrated and balanced military capabilities in relation to identified or contingent threats, rather than being based primarily upon bulk allocation of manpower and funds to the several Departments.

Uniform management information and control systems, including estimates, budgets, and accounting procedures, based on a standard classification, will probably be prescribed throughout the Department of Defense to emphasize, clarify, and facilitate effective program and financial management and to associate more closely the resources and tasks performed. This change will take place by phases, with first emphasis given to decision-making at the highest levels.

Systems management concepts will be emphasized, with responsibility for specific weapons systems or equipment systems and their associated programs normally assigned to military departments for further assignment within these departments.

There have been continuing pressures and efforts, both within the Army and from higher authority, to improve the Army's combat-to-support ratio. At the same time, there has been a tendency for the Army, both by direction and on its own initiative, to put more than its proportionate share of resources into DOD integrated activities, or to provide extensive support to other governmental agencies. It is probable that these two trends will continue to offset one another.

Increasing national awareness of the need for a better civil defense program may result in the Army being assigned greater responsibility in this area.



SECTION B. THE ROLES AND MISSIONS OF THE ARMY

The Department of the Army, as one of the three military departments of the Department of Defense, is guided by certain statutory and executive provisions which delineate in rather broad terms its roles and missions.

The statutory statement of the Army's mission is as follows:

"a. It is the intent of Congress to provide an Army that is capable, in conjunction with the other armed forces, of --

(1) preserving the peace and security and providing for the defense, of the United States, the Territories, Commonwealths, and possessions, and any areas occupied by the United States;

(2) supporting the national policies;

(3) implementing the national objectives; and

(4) overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States.

"b. In general, the Army, within the Department of the Army, includes land combat and service forces and such aviation and water transport as may be organic therein. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. It is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war." (Title 10, US Code, 3062.)

The Secretary of Defense, in DOD Directive 5100.1, has set forth policies governing all the military departments, specifically:

"The military departments, under their respective Secretaries . . . shall:

"1. Prepare forces and establish reserves of equipment and supplies for the effective prosecution of war, and plan for the expansion of peacetime components to meet the needs of war.

"2. Maintain in readiness mobile reserve forces, properly organized, trained, and equipped for employment in emergency.

"3. Provide adequate, timely, and reliable departmental intelligence for use within the Department of Defense.



"4. Organize, train, and equip forces for assignment to unified or specified commands.

"5. Prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense budgets for their respective departments; justify before the Congress budget requests as approved by the Secretary of Defense; and administer the funds made available for maintaining, equipping, and training the forces of their respective departments, including those assigned to unified and specified commands. The budget submissions to the Secretary of Defense by the military departments shall be prepared on the basis, among other things, of the advice of commanders of forces assigned to unified and specified commands; such advice, in the case of component commanders of unified commands, will be in agreement with the plans and programs of the respective unified commanders.

"6. Conduct research, develop tactics, techniques, and organization, and develop and procure weapons, equipment, and supplies essential to the fulfillment of the functions hereinafter assigned.

"7. Develop, garrison, supply, equip, and maintain bases and other installations, including lines of communication, and provide administrative and logistical support for all forces and bases.

"8. Provide, as directed, such forces, military missions, and detachments for service in foreign countries as may be required to support the national interests of the United States.

"9. Assist in training and equipping the military forces of foreign nations.

"10. Assist each other in the accomplishment of their respective functions, including the provision of personnel, intelligence, training, facilities, equipment, supplies, and services."

In this same directive (DOD Directive 5100.1), the Secretary of Defense has further prescribed specific functions applicable to each military department. With respect to the Department of the Army, the primary functions are:

"a. To organize, train, and equip Army forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations on land -- specifically, forces to defeat enemy land forces and to seize, occupy, and defend land area.

"b. To organize, train, and equip Army air defense units, including the provision of Army forces as required for the defense of the United States against air attack, in accordance with doctrines established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.



"c. To organize and equip, in coordination with the other Services, and to provide Army forces for joint amphibious and airborne operations, and to provide for the training of such forces, in accordance with doctrines established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(1) To develop, in coordination with the other Services, doctrines, tactics, techniques, and equipment of interest to the Army for amphibious operations and not provided for in Section V, paragraph B 1 b (3) and paragraph B 1 d viz, statement of primary functions of the Navy and Marine Corps 7.

(2) To develop, in coordination with the other Services, the doctrines, procedures, and equipment employed by Army and Marine Forces in airborne operations. The Army shall have primary interest in the development of those airborne doctrines, procedures, and equipment which are of common interest to the Army and the Marine Corps.

"d. To provide an organization capable of furnishing adequate, timely, and reliable intelligence for the Army.

"e. To provide forces for the occupation of territories abroad, to include initial establishment of military government pending transfer of this responsibility to other authority.

"f. To formulate doctrines and procedures for the organizing, equipping, training, and employment of forces operating on land, except that the formulation of doctrines and procedures for the organization, equipping, training, and employment of Marine Corps units for amphibious operations shall be a function of the Department of the Navy, coordinating as required by Section V, paragraph B 1 b (3).

"g. To conduct the following activities:

(1) The administration and operation of the Panama Canal.

(2) The authorized civil works program, including projects for improvement of navigation, flood control, beach erosion control, and other water resource developments in the United States, its territories, and its possessions.

(3) Certain other civil activities prescribed by law."

The Department of the Army also has certain collateral functions assigned to it by the Secretary of Defense, namely:

a. To train forces to "interdict enemy sea and air power and communications through operations on or from land." (DOD Directive 5100.1).



b. To provide administrative and logistical support to the headquarters of two unified commands, the United States European Command and the Caribbean Command. The Department of the Army also has support responsibility for such joint activities as the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

The roles and missions assigned to the Army by the Congress are sufficiently broad to permit almost any assignment of specific missions and functions by the Secretary of Defense, so long as they are in some manner incident to operations on land. It should be noted that the law specifically includes as a part of the Army "such aviation and water transport as may be organic therein." This provision of aviation for the Army is less specific than those for the Navy and Marine Corps. However, it could permit any reasonable interpretation by the Secretary of Defense. Thus, it is reasonable to redefine the Army's responsibility as that of organizing, training, and equipping forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained operations in the land environment, to include contiguous sea and air space.

The scope of Army aviation programs has been defined by the Secretary of Defense to include aircraft necessary for the internal requirements of the Army in the conduct of operations on land (Memorandum for Members of the Armed Forces Policy Council, 26 November 1956, Subject: "Clarification of Roles and Missions to Improve the Effectiveness of Operations of the Department of Defense;" see also DOD Directive 5160.22). In essence, this definition provides that the Army shall have aircraft to perform command, liaison, courier and communications, observation, visual and photographic reconnaissance, fire adjustment, topographical survey, small unit airlift of personnel and materiel, and aero-medical evacuation within the combat zone (a zone extending not more than 100 miles forward and 100 miles rearward of the general line of contact). By this same memorandum, the so-called "point defense" - "area defense" solution to the distribution of air defense responsibilities between Army and Air Force forces was announced. The specific restrictions established are as follows:



a. Army fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft will not exceed 5,000 and 20,000 pounds in empty weight, respectively, except as specific approval may be granted by the Secretary of Defense.

b. The Army shall not have its own research and development facilities for aircraft.

c. The operation of Army aircraft is confined to the immediate battle area, i.e., the combat zone. The airlift capability is limited, in the case of troops, to small combat units and, in the case of materiel, to small quantities of supplies to improve local mobility.

d. Army missiles are limited to a design criterion of about 200 miles in range.

Although these restrictions were intended to avoid duplication and overlap of the Army's roles and missions with those of the Air Force, they also tend to inhibit the Army's ability to organize, train, and equip forces for "prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land." While the Army has not sought to change the assignment of basic responsibilities to the military Services, it is mindful of present technological trends and methods of warfare which point more and more to the need to recognize the land battlefield and the airspace above it as one continuum.

It is possible that some of the restrictions listed above will be relaxed as more and more of the forces of all Services are assigned to unified and specified commands. It also appears that the Department of Defense will give increased recognition to the fast-growing requirements of Army forces in the field of aviation, and will support the development of organic Army aviation which is required on a full time basis by the ground force commander. It is likewise anticipated that increased participation of both the Army and the Air Force in a unified command embracing strategic reserve forces will bring with it closer working relations and thereby resolution of many of the doctrinal problems that have beset the Army in the fields of both organic and support aviation.



The Department of the Army performs certain civil functions, not directly related to combat in the land environment, pursuant to statutory obligations placed upon the Secretary of the Army or specific elements of the Department of the Army. These activities include the civil works function of the Corps of Engineers, the Alaska Communication System, and the National Cemetery System.

The Army is also involved in certain other activities of the Department of Defense. Among the more important of these are:

- a. Basic responsibility for coordinating research and development activities in the chemical, biological, and radiological warfare areas, including defensive measures associated therewith.
- b. A major commitment to the maintenance of a worldwide communication system.
- c. A major commitment in support of the National Security Agency.
- d. Prime responsibility for development of a communications satellite.
- e. Basic responsibilities in the fields of mapping and geodesy in support of the entire Department of Defense.
- f. Responsibility for military construction for the Air Force and construction for other Services and DOD agencies overseas in accordance with joint, cross-servicing agreements.
- g. Responsibility for providing supplies and services in substantial amounts to other Services incident to joint, cross-servicing agreements.

Finally, the Army has contingent responsibilities, such as being prepared to contribute as directed to civil defense, national disaster relief, and military aid to the appropriate civil authorities.



## SECTION C. CURRENT ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT

The Department of the Army necessarily performs many diverse tasks and engages in a wide variety of activities in fulfilling the responsibilities inherent in the roles and missions discussed in the preceding section of this report. The "wholesale" logistic structure alone consists of almost 300,000 people at 394 installations who perform functions related to materiel (research and development, procurement and production, inventory management, storage and distribution, maintenance, and disposal); provide technical or professional services (construction, communications, medical, transportation, and the like); and train individuals and units in various skills and logistic techniques for the support of the Army in the field. The Reserve components of the Army consist of approximately 2,300,000 officers and enlisted personnel in the Army National Guard and the US Army Reserve. The Army school system provides the personnel and facilities to train approximately 150,000 individuals annually. Obviously, no attempt can be made here to present a complete listing of all activities of the Department of the Army; rather, the intent is to indicate the broad scope of activities which must be directed and controlled, preparatory to describing the current organization and management system which melds these diversified activities into a meaningful whole.

Although separately organized, the Department of the Army is subject to the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense. The Army, therefore, operates as part of the integrated Department of Defense, contributing its share toward the overall defense of the Nation.

The Department of the Army has two major components: Headquarters, Department of the Army, and Army Field Commands. These two components will be described in turn; this will be followed by a description of the Army Management System. (See Figure 1)


### 1. Headquarters, Department of the Army

The Headquarters, Department of the Army is the executive part of the Department at the seat of government which exercises directive and



# ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

DA POSTER 10-50  
19 MARCH 1961



By Order of the Secretary of the Army:  
OFFICIAL  
C.H. DECKER,  
General, United States Army,  
Chief of Staff  
R.V. LEE,  
Major General, United States Army,  
The Adjutant General

THIS CHART PRESENTS THE BASIC ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY. RELATIONSHIPS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEPARTMENT ARE PRESCRIBED IN AR 10-5.  
\* THE CHIEF OF PUBLIC INFORMATION ALSO SERVES AS CHIEF OF INFORMATION

Figure 1 Organization of the Department of the Army



supervisory functions. It is not restricted to agencies and personnel located in the Washington area, but includes dispersed agencies and personnel performing "national headquarters" functions, as distinguished from "field" or "local" functions.

#### Office, Secretary of the Army

Subject to the direction, authority, and control of the President, as Commander-in-Chief, and of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army is responsible for, and has the authority to conduct, all affairs of the Department of the Army. To assist the Secretary of the Army in the performance of his duties, he is currently authorized an Under Secretary as his principal civilian assistant, and three Assistant Secretaries who are currently assigned in the fields of Research and Development, Financial Management, and Installations and Logistics. The General Counsel, the Chief of Public Information, the Chief of Legislative Liaison, the Administrative Assistant, and an internal staff provide further assistance. The principal duties of members of the Secretariat include the establishment of objectives, the evaluation of methods, and the appraisal of performance in their respective areas, and the exercise of direction and supervision of all matters pertaining to the formulation, execution, and review of those Army policies, plans, and programs for which they have functional responsibility.

#### The Army Staff

The Army Staff is the military staff of the Secretary of the Army at the seat of Government and includes the Chief of Staff and his immediate assistants. The Chief of Staff, the senior military officer in the Army, is the principal military advisor of the Secretary of the Army and is responsible to the Secretary for the supervision of the members and organizations of the Army. He is assisted by the Vice Chief of Staff, who has authority to perform any duties which the Chief of Staff may perform; by the Secretary of the General Staff, who is his principal administrative assistant and who supervises the Coordination Group and the Programs and Analysis Group; by The Inspector General; and by the General Staff



Committees on National Guard and Army Reserve Policy. The Chief of Staff also represents the Army as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in which capacity he is not responsible to the Secretary of the Army.

The Chief of Staff directs all activities of the Army Staff. The Army General Staff, a portion of the total Army Staff, represents no particular arm or service, and is the principal agent of the Chief of Staff and Secretary for integrating the plans, activities, and operations of all elements of the Army. Although divided into functional areas normally headed by a Deputy or Assistant Chief of Staff (or equivalent), the General Staff is conceived to function as a single coordinating staff. Heads of General Staff agencies are given broad latitude to act for the Chief of Staff within their functional areas and, in addition to their General Staff responsibilities, direct and control specified subordinate offices, agencies, and segments of the total Army program. At the present time, the Army General Staff consists of designated officers assigned to the offices of: the Chief of Staff; Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Personnel, Military Operations, and Logistics; Chief of Research and Development; Comptroller of the Army; Assistant Chiefs of Staff for Intelligence, and Reserve Components; Chief of Civil Affairs; and General Staff Committees on National Guard and Army Reserve Policy. The remaining Army Staff agencies, commonly called special staff agencies, provide advice and assistance to the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff, other members of the Army Staff, and to all other elements of the Army on specialized matters for which they have been assigned responsibility. In addition, certain of the heads of special staff agencies are chiefs of administrative or technical services, and command assigned personnel, activities, and installations. Examples in this category include The Adjutant General, The Provost Marshal General, and the Chief of Engineers.

The technical staff, a portion of the total special staff, is composed of the Offices of the Chief Chemical Officer, the Chief of Engineers, the Chief of Ordnance, the Quartermaster General, the Chief Signal Officer, The Surgeon General, and the Chief of Transportation. As a staff officer, the



chief of each technical staff office provides advice and assistance to all elements of the Army on technical matters within his responsibility, but his principal responsibility is that of commanding major elements of his particular technical service, in which capacity he commands troops, organizations, activities, and installations needed to accomplish his mission. Each of the technical service chiefs has under his command one or more schools which train individuals and units for the performance of functions of the service concerned. The curricula of these schools are directed and controlled by the US Continental Army Command, discussed later. Additionally, the schools assist in the development and evaluation of doctrinal and operational concepts and tables of organization and equipment. Each chief of a technical service is the head of a basic branch of the Army. In this capacity, he has personnel management responsibility for members of his branch who receive specialized technical training. The technical services are under the direction and control of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, except that for research and development, test, and evaluation matters they are under the direction and control of the Chief of Research and Development.

Taken together, the seven technical services perform the wholesale logistic functions of the Army; that is, those functions related to providing the materiel and services required. In terms of the materiel which they provide, the technical services are "commodity oriented", in that each has responsibility for given classes of items throughout the materiel cycle of research and development, procurement and production, inventory management, storage and distribution, maintenance, and disposal.

Although each of the technical services includes all principal logistic functions of providing materiel and services, the different emphasis accorded each function has led to differences among them with respect to organization, procedures, and fundamental orientation. Four of the technical services (Corps of Engineers, Signal Corps, Transportation Corps, and Army Medical Service) are largely oriented toward providing the services associated with their titles. To a considerable extent, the materiel



provided by these organizations is related to that required to perform their service functions. Two of the technical services (Ordnance Corps and Quartermaster Corps) are essentially oriented toward providing materiel and supplies to all elements of the Army, with the service aspects of their mission being of secondary importance. The remaining technical service, the Chemical Corps, is primarily oriented toward the research and development of materiel, techniques, and equipment for chemical and biological warfare.

The Headquarters, Department of the Army, or elements of the Headquarters, directs and controls a number of separate agencies, offices, and schools which are not a part of the major field commands. The US Military Academy, the US Army War College and the US Army Security Agency are examples of these activities.

## 2. Army Field Commands

The Army Field Commands include virtually all elements of the Department of the Army except those included in the Headquarters. There are three major elements composing the Army Field Commands: The United States Continental Army Command, the United States Army Air Defense Command, and the oversea commands. Each of these elements will be discussed in turn.

### The United States Continental Army Command

The United States Continental Army Command (USCONARC), located at Fort Monroe, Virginia, is the senior Army Field Command in the Continental United States. The Commanding General, USCONARC, commands the six Zone of Interior Armies (ZI Armies), the Military District of Washington (MDW), and certain units, activities, and installations assigned to him. The Commanding General of each ZI Army commands all units, activities, and installations within his geographic area of responsibility except those specifically commanded by the head of an administrative or technical service or other agencies of the Department of the Army. Together, the geographic areas of responsibility of the six ZI Armies and MDW encompass the entire Continental United States.



USCONARC and its subordinate elements discharge a wide variety of responsibilities pertaining to training and readiness, Reserve components, development of doctrine and materiel requirements, emergency planning and preparedness, and the support of activities. With respect to training and readiness, USCONARC commands and directs the ZI Armies and MDW in organizing, training, equipping, and maintaining Army forces for the ground defense of North America and other US Army commitments. Currently included in these forces are the elements of the Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) troop list, at least the major part of which is to be assigned to a new CONUS unified command. In addition, USCONARC, through the ZI Armies, trains individuals as replacements for US Army forces worldwide, a mission which involves the operation of twelve Army Training Centers and eleven service schools. It develops and approves Army-wide training procedures, and directs and controls the curricula of schools which are operated by the technical and administrative services.

Responsibilities for organizing, training, equipping, and maintaining the US Army Reserve units at the prescribed level of readiness are discharged through the ZI Armies and a subordinate organizational structure of fourteen US Army Corps -- located so as to permit them to cope with the magnitude of the tasks and the wide geographical dispersion of US Army Reserve units. Each ZI Army is responsible for the command, supervision of training, administration, and support of US Army Reserve units and personnel assigned to it. Since -- until Federalized -- command of Army National Guard units is vested in the respective states, responsibilities of the ZI Armies with respect to the National Guard extend only to supervising training, conducting annual inspections (General and Technical) - and preparing efficiency reports on senior commanders.

The Commanding General, USCONARC, under the general guidance of the Headquarters, Department of the Army, directs the Army combat developments activities which develop, test, and recommend new tactics, techniques, organization, and doctrine. Responsibilities with respect to the development



of materiel are closely related, and include the preparation of qualitative requirements for new materiel to be used by the field army, review of requirements for new materiel to be used by the Army in the field, and the testing of materiel after it is developed. USCONARC is also responsible for the ground defense of the United States and for assistance to civil authorities in the event of civil disaster or emergency. To fulfill these responsibilities, it prepares the necessary emergency plans and insures that the supporting plans and preparedness of subordinate elements are adequate for implementation. Mobilization responsibilities are discharged in a similar manner.

#### United States Army Air Defense Command

The United States Army Air Defense Command is the Army component of the Continental Air Defense Command, a unified command established by the Secretary of Defense. To this command are assigned all Army units designated for the air defense of the United States. Operational command of these units is vested in the commander of the unified command, and is further delegated downward through the unified command chain. The US Army Air Defense Command receives logistic and administrative support from the ZI Armies and MDW.

#### Oversea Commands

Oversea Army commands are components of unified commands and operate under the operational command of the unified commander, with the Department of the Army providing necessary logistic and administrative support. At the present time there are four major Army oversea commands: United States Army, Europe; United States Army, Pacific; United States Army, Alaska; and United States Army, Caribbean.

### 3. The Army Management System

The general management of the Army is accomplished through its Program and Budget system, i.e., the planning-programming-budgeting-direction-review-and-analysis processes. The Program and Budget system operates at all levels of command. At the Headquarters, Department of the Army level are developed the overall programs of work to be accomplished by the entire Army. Throughout the chain of command, each command receives



guidance from the next higher echelon in formulating its own plan of operation. In this way, the entire Army is tied together with common, planned objectives, with each organization carrying out its portion of the total effort.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the various Assistant Secretaries of Defense provide planning and programming guidance to the Department of the Army. This guidance, in turn, provides part of the basis for Army planning and programming instructions to its subordinate operating elements. Successful operation of the Program and Budget system is largely contingent on timely receipt of coordinated guidance, a condition which has not always been met.

The Army Strategic Objectives Plan provides the basic guidance for the Army Program Estimate, essentially an order of magnitude plan for the target fiscal year. The Chief of Staff's Control Program Directive follows, and is the basis for development of the five Army control programs: The Troop Program, Installations Program, Materiel Program, Research and Development Program, and the Reserve Components Program. The objectives set forth in the control programs are the basis for issuing Preliminary Program and Budget Guidance to all Army elements engaged in formulating the target year budget.

Although the budget process formally starts with publication of the Preliminary Program and Budget Guidance some thirteen months prior to the target year, most field agencies of the Army do not become involved in budget detail until after the President's budget message to the Congress, about six months prior to the target year. On the basis of the President's budget, revised Program and Budget Guidance is issued to the field. The field agencies then prepare and submit their operating programs. Final revisions of the operating programs take place after the appropriation has passed the Congress and apportionment has been made.

The review and analysis of Army programs and activities receives comprehensive attention at each level of command. The head of each Army Staff agency is responsible for the review and analysis of programs and projects for which he is assigned staff responsibility, and must present

the results to the Vice Chief of Staff quarterly. The Comptroller of the Army presents a composite review of Army activities each quarter, placing special emphasis on relationships among programs, and on projects or problems affecting more than one program. Additional review and analysis responsibilities are assigned to the Programs and Analysis Group in the Office of the Chief of Staff, and to the Office of Analysis and Review in the Office of the Under Secretary of the Army. As further checks on Army performance, The Inspector General, as a personal representative of the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff, inquires into matters affecting performance, discipline, efficiency, and economy, and the Army Audit Agency conducts comprehensive audits of Army activities and contract performance.



## SECTION D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

### General

This section of the report summarizes generally observations which were made during the course of the study with respect to the functions, organization, and procedures of the Department of the Army. Because the study was directed toward improvement, the findings are critical. The fact that deficiencies exist, however, should be accepted as a natural consequence of the growth and changes which have been particularly rapid during the past several years. The observations regarding opportunities for possible improvement are, in large measure, the outgrowth of the expansion of technology and the related modification of relationships within the Army; of changing relationships between the Office, Secretary of Defense and the Headquarters, Department of the Army; and of advances in the techniques of management not yet fully exploited within the Army.

### Limiting Effect of Assigned Functions

With respect to the functions of the Department of the Army, the most cogent observation was well phrased by one of its former leaders in the words, "The Army is a truncated Service." Unlike forces of the other Services, Army forces do not have organic means for strategic mobility; unlike forces of the Navy and Marine Corps, they have no organic capability for close air support or extended aerial reconnaissance. The lack of such organic capabilities, or of firm commitments for cross-service support, affects both the development of related doctrine and the nature and extent of operational training of forces required for land warfare.

### Major Trends Affecting the Army

There is a growing tendency toward centralized direction and control within the Defense Establishment. In the logistics area, this has manifested itself in the trend toward integrated management of supply and service functions under control of the Secretary of Defense. In the



intelligence area, the trend is manifested by the establishment of the Defense Intelligence Agency. In the research and development area, it is manifested by the detailed control exercised over projects.

Over the past several years, relationships of the Department of the Army to ready Army combat forces have changed rapidly. The definite trend toward the assignment of virtually all ready combat and combat support forces to the unified and specified commands has recently been confirmed by the announced establishment of a STRAC-TAC unified command. These circumstances emphasize that the growing primary role of the Department of the Army is one of providing necessary support to the Army elements of the unified commands in terms of personnel, materiel, and doctrine. Accordingly, the recommendations of this study are in large measure aimed at improvements in these areas.

It appears that the greatest needs for change in Army organization and procedures are derived from the increased complexities and ramifications of the technology with which the Army must be concerned, and from the complex characteristics of the weapons and equipment which it must employ. The proliferation of highly technical materiel, of the related industrial resources that must be utilized, and of the corresponding skills and capabilities which must be developed within the Army have vastly magnified and changed the demands on organization and procedures. Furthermore, the time span involved in the development, production, and issue of new materiel places a particular premium on means to shorten the total lead time.

An additional factor which appears to have affected the Army has been an overwhelming national concern with massive nuclear weapon capabilities during the period following World War II. Without questioning the propriety of the preoccupation, it is apparent the result has been, in part, to place the Army in a defensive position; it has had to struggle to maintain or reestablish an adequate public understanding of the essential role of land combat. It appears that attitudes in this



regard have changed materially, and that there is now increasing recognition of the vital and continuing role of the Army in the maintenance of a strong national military posture. It is desirable for the Army to shift from a certain degree of defensiveness to a greater degree of initiative; to emphasize throughout the Department the positive spirit and "out-front" attitude that have always characterized its combat elements.

#### Areas for Potential Improvements

At the operating level, four major functional areas (materiel, training and readiness, personnel management, and combat developments) were found in which worthwhile improvements can be made. Army wholesale materiel functions (research and development, procurement, inventory management, storage and distribution, and maintenance and disposal) are performed currently within seven separate technical services. These technical services also perform a wide variety of other functions and receive no unified direction short of the Army General Staff level. While this organizational structure has served well in the past, the complex equipment with which the Army is now concerned frequently requires concurrent action on the part of several technical services, and the related coordination is extremely difficult. Responsibilities for the training and readiness of individuals and units are distributed among the US Continental Army Command, seven technical services, and five administrative services. Responsibilities for personnel management and combat developments are distributed in a similar manner.

A number of opportunities were found at the Headquarters, Department of the Army to achieve a greater degree of unity in the planning and direction of Army operations. Improvements in Army planning, in the Program and Budget system, and in the organization and procedures of the Army Staff, are fundamental to attaining a more cohesive direction of Army operations. To a considerable extent, improvements in the Headquarters, Department of the Army are contingent upon comparable improvements above



that level. While this study did not include an analysis of the Office, Secretary of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is self-evident that Army organization and management must be related to the higher organizations, and that their posture has a direct effect on the capability of the Army to improve itself. In connection with the recommendations provided later in this report, it is assumed that the role of the Department of the Army is both to carry out the programs and policies of the Secretary of Defense and to contribute to the development of those programs and policies through the established relationships with the Office, Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is further assumed that the principal functions of the higher organizations with respect to the military departments are to provide positive policy, program, and managerial guidance on a timely basis, direction and supervision of performance, and the resources to carry out assigned missions.

At both the operating and headquarters levels of the Department of the Army, a clear need was found for further application of more advanced management techniques. Considering the rapidly developing environment in which the Army operates, it is fortunate that the techniques of management are also developing. Only through the combined application and improvement of the most suitable practices of leadership, command and management, both new and old, can the Army cope with the ever-increasing complexities of its program.



## SECTION E. BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

In the early part of the study, an appraisal was made of the Army's current organization, functions, and procedures. Having in mind the identifiable trends in the Defense environment and the Army's present and foreseeable missions within this environment, the Study Group attempted to form an opinion of the merits and shortcomings of the present organization and its operations, when weighed against these requirements. To aid this effort, many so-called "problems" were selected for detailed analysis. Additional subjects for analysis came to light through research, visits to many staff and field offices, and interviews with prominent persons. The principal activities of the Army were studied with special attention to these apparent problem areas, and in the light of tentative criteria formulated for the purpose.

As a result of this initial analysis, certain preliminary conclusions were drawn which are referred to here as "Basic Considerations." In general, these Basic Considerations establish conditions which an organization, with its associated functions and procedures, should satisfy. They are set out in this section as positive statements of something needed. The reasons for their selection as principal needs are given in the discussion following each statement. It should be recognized that not every Basic Consideration can be fully satisfied; the judgment regarding the relative importance of each will affect decisions regarding the pattern to be adopted. For example, the need for stability, which argues against change, must be weighed against other Basic Considerations which advocate change. Each Basic Consideration does not necessarily represent a significant deficiency in current Army functions, organization, or procedures; however, in most cases it does pertain to specific problem areas. Collectively, as set forth below, they represent the characteristics which should be present in any Army pattern, to the maximum practical extent.



1. The functions, organization, and procedures of the Department of the Army need to be suited to the requirements of varying conditions of cold, limited, or general war.

This consideration is paramount in importance, and influences all aspects of this study. Representative factors identifying this as a problem area are cited below.

In the past two World Wars, after hostilities had begun, the Army found it necessary to make changes in its organization, particularly in its logistic structure. However, after each of these wars, the Department of the Army reverted to a different organization, presumably more suited to a peacetime environment. An optimum organization to administer the affairs of the Department in peace may not be easily adaptable to periods of increased international tension, or of limited or general war. During peacetime, when primary emphasis is placed on economy of defense expenditures, there is a natural tendency to eliminate or reduce those activities which, although essential in war, are not vital to peacetime requirements. The ideal organization should be flexible in accommodating expansion or contraction in the size and tasks of the Department of the Army, without major disruption of the structure.

The personnel, training, and supply establishment must be able to react effectively, promptly, and economically to the demands of any required posture of defense readiness. The Department of the Army organization should not only accommodate the needs of administration of the active Army forces but should also facilitate the supervision of Reserve components and provide for their ready mobilization when required. Also, the organization must be able to discharge its current regional responsibilities in the United States, as well as to assume readily additional missions in the United States, such as support of Civil Defense.

The Study Group notes that the present organization is largely the pattern established after World War II. In the event of another war, time may not permit reorganization such as that felt



necessary at the beginning of World War II. If changes are considered necessary they should be made now.

2. There is need for the Headquarters, Department of the Army to provide for clarity and continuity of Army objectives through: long-term anticipation of the future environment and requirements for military capabilities; related long-term planning; and corresponding long-term programs consonant with economic and technological capabilities and anticipated resource availability.

The analysis of trends and developments and the formulation of such objectives as those referred to in this Basic Consideration are the responsibility of the Army Staff. Projections based on the best available intelligence, politico-economic trends, and technological forecasts should result in the determination of the requirements which the Army may be called on to meet, and this estimate, in turn, provides guidance for the development of long-range plans. Such plans serve as the groundwork for the Army's contribution to joint plans, long-range programming, and the research and development activities of the Army.

The conversion of plans to long-range programs requires a realistic projection both of administrative and logistical capabilities and resource availability. The long-range programs should set out the forces, material, and facilities which must be developed and supported to accomplish the roles and missions of the Army as a member of the national defense team.

As a corollary, there is a need for the essentials of Army policy to be defined and promulgated to Army personnel at all levels. Staff officers need a body of consistent policy to serve as staff guidance in order to be aware of activities and considerations beyond their specialties.

3. There is need for thorough integration of Army planning, programming, and budgeting, and for closer correlation of short-range, mid-range and long-range implications.

While Army planning needs to be oriented to participation in joint matters, it must also provide guidance for internal operations. Mid-range and long-range planning within the Army has been directed almost entirely toward establishing requirements for Army forces in



related joint plans. Since, at times, these joint plans have not been carried to the point of resolution which would provide a basis for an Army plan, the Army has lacked this guidance for the remainder of its planning-programming-budgeting process. It is essential, therefore, that the Army continually up-date its internal planning to provide the required guidance for issuance of control programs and subsequent preparation of command operating programs.

Programming is the only adequate means of defining the requirements necessary to support approved plans, for establishing projects, and for insuring that resource allocations are consistent with planning objectives. Costed programs, in turn, provide the only sound basis for preparing budgets consistent with both plans and programs.

4. There is a need for Army program and budget decisions to be related directly to Army missions, tasks, and end-products, to include equipment and weapons systems, and for separate staff interests to be subordinated to primary Army objectives.

The Army Staff agencies in the Headquarters, Department of the Army depend upon the use of appropriations, and competition for limited resources inevitably tends to cause these agencies to place primary emphasis on functional interests identified with the source of funds, i.e., an appropriation, rather than upon the balanced requirements to carry out a mission or to establish and maintain a force. It is, in fact, difficult to keep the variously funded activities in balance, in relation to a mission or a force. To assist in overcoming some of the divisive influences, and to improve the management processes, the Army needs to employ a mission-task format for its programs, and to determine the overall cost of its various forces and activities. Also needed, is a capability to correlate demands for resources, military capabilities (forces) desired, and the related support organizations and activities involved. A subsidiary feature would be the ability to relate costs to component organizations and weapons systems. Consideration of alternative courses of action will be more meaningful if a mission-task format is used. The "package-element" format prescribed by OSD for use in connection with the



1963 Fiscal Year budget is aimed in the right direction, but does not fill the Army's requirement for a costed program reflecting missions and tasks.

A note of caution regarding the limitations of this approach is, however, in order. In particular, it must be realized that a great many factors and variables will have to be considered in the evaluation of cost-effectiveness relationships. It is recognized that such economic relationships can only be used in conjunction with political, psychological, and military judgments as a basis for decisions.

5. For selected weapons systems, major items, or new organizations, there need to be supplemental provisions for project or systems management to be applied throughout the system cycle, including research, development, procurement, production, supply, distribution, training, deployment, use, and maintenance.

The introduction of complex equipment systems has placed a requirement on the Services to adopt new management techniques to insure that these new systems move from research through development, initial procurement, production, supply, distribution, training, deployment, use, and maintenance without unnecessary and time-consuming delays. Further, it is becoming increasingly necessary to be able to combine weapons systems data in various ways and to make cost effectiveness comparisons so as to provide top-level evaluation of broad objectives and mission accomplishment, and to be able to report to OSD and Congress on these matters.

The Army has used various methods of systems management in the past. These methods have varied from the assignment of special responsibilities to a "staff assistant" to the actual "take-over of command" of the activities involved.

There is need for consistent Army-wide practices, with appropriate participation at the several organizational levels, to assure that project or systems management is used as appropriate, and that suitable procedures and assignments of responsibility are employed to achieve the positive direction and control required. In particular, there is need for adequate provision at the Army General Staff level for appropriate authoritative participation in the direction



and control of selected systems. The requirement is not limited to organizational relationships, but extends to procedures for planning, programming, direction, and control, and for flow and utilization of information. The extent to which project or systems management is employed will need to be determined in part by further experience. A proper framework, including policies and procedures, is required in any case.

6. There is a need for methods of measuring performance in relation to goals and resources utilized, and for objective review and analysis designed to provide a basis for informed decisions regarding adjustments in programs and policies.

The Army has established, over the years, many methods and systems for measurement of performance and of related use of resources. In certain specific areas, these measurements and related indications have been effectively utilized. For the Army as a whole, separate and partial methods of measurement have been utilized for evaluation of Army program progress. There is, however, much work that needs to be done in this respect, and particularly in the further integration of the parts into a complete Army-wide system. Reliance on obligations to measure performance has not proved effective.

The Army has a well established review and analysis process which extends to all levels of the Army. There is, however, need for major emphasis on an objective appraisal of the overall Army program, to include combat readiness of forces, organization of selected new units, adequacy of resources in relation to assigned missions and tasks, and effectiveness of utilization of resources, both with respect to assigned tasks and with respect to the question of best allocation of available resources.

The orientation of review and analysis should be primarily toward the improvement and modification of future programs and actions, rather than toward hypercritical or punitive evaluation of performance. Achievement of this goal requires prior, firm programming of Army objectives and priorities.



7. There is need to provide for automation of data processing and for related communications and display facilities, in order that the Army may function more effectively.

Automated processing and display of data offer one of the most promising means by which the Headquarters, Department of the Army might be relieved of time-consuming, routine work. Increased demands in areas such as programming, budgeting, and personnel management require accelerated adoption of automatic data processing.

In the application of automatic data processing principles to Headquarters, Department of the Army, it is highly desirable to establish a single data processing supervisory authority. Only in this way, can the required mass of basic data be handled so as to meet best the needs of the whole Army staff.

8. There is need for the Army to recognize the importance of continuously improving the administrative machinery and practices of command and management, as well as improving management skills of its key personnel assigned to non-tactical activities.

The preceding Basic Considerations point up the need for the Army to provide for continuous study and planning for improved organization, procedures, programming, budgeting, and other managerial techniques. During the past ten years, the Army has greatly improved its administrative machinery and practices and has, in fact, been one of the leading departments of the Executive Branch in adopting improved management methods.

This study, however, found many opportunities for additional improvements. In fact, no organization can remain progressive and not continually improve its capability to manage its program and resources.

9. There is need for effective relationships with higher authority.

This consideration is axiomatic, in that the Army depends upon higher authority for the direction and resources necessary to accomplish its mission. The organization, functions, and procedures of the Army should facilitate, to the maximum practical extent, the Army's ability to respond rapidly and effectively to the directives and requirements of the Secretary of Defense.



10. There is need for the Army Staff to be organized to provide the highest degree of support to the Office, Secretary of the Army, and for that office to avoid duplication of those functions assigned to the Army Staff.

No information or conclusions developed during this study indicated any need for departing from this long-standing fundamental concept of Army organization at the Departmental Headquarters, to which Army officers have been conditioned throughout their careers. The present size and composition of the Office, Secretary of the Army, however, indicate that either the Army Staff is not providing the required support or there is some degree of duplication of effort.

11. There is need for a closely coordinated Army Staff to provide effective support to the Secretary and Chief of Staff in their respective roles as civilian and military heads of the Department of the Army, while at the same time providing effective support to the Chief of Staff in his role as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Close staff coordination can best be achieved if the Army General Staff is concerned primarily with matters of policy, direction, and supervision which are normally of concern to the Secretary and the Chief of Staff, and if the size of the General Staff is kept as small as practical. Towards these ends, functions and activities which do not need to be performed by the Army General Staff should be delegated to subordinate commanders to the extent practical.

The dual role of the Chief of Staff, as Army military chief and as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and related requirements placed on the Vice Chief, result in severe limitations on the time available to these officers for the conduct of internal Army affairs. This circumstance should be compensated for by assuring that there are strong General Staff agencies available both for the conduct of internal Army affairs and for support of joint activities. There must also be adequate provision for coordination and guidance of the Army Staff.



12. There is need to divorce command responsibilities from Army General Staff agencies and to provide for decentralization of operations from the Headquarters, Department of the Army to field commands and agencies to the maximum extent practical.

There is an inevitable conflict between staff and command viewpoints. Placing both staff and command responsibilities on a single officer detracts from his capability to perform either job well. In principle, a staff officer acting as an extension of the Secretary and Chief of Staff should be able to address a problem from the viewpoint of the Army as a whole. Achievement of this objective is extremely difficult when he is responsible for the welfare, support, and performance of a particular segment of the Army which is under his command.

In all cases, it is considered desirable to decentralize operations from the Army General Staff agencies to the maximum extent practical, to include the physical movement of decentralized activities away from the Headquarters, Department of the Army. As in the case of all generalizations, this objective must be modified on the basis of practical considerations.

13. There is a need to determine what pattern of organization and management of Army-wide services of a technical nature will provide the best balance between the desirability of independent status for the service on the one hand, and span of control of the Chief of Staff, on the other.

There are a number of Army-wide services which receive little or no benefit from intermediate command supervision, and there are other services which are of such nature and magnitude as to require grouping for effective control and direction. The pattern should reflect these considerations.

14. There is a need to utilize military personnel in accord with their capabilities, without unnecessarily being limited to branch designations; to provide broad and attractive career opportunities for Army military and civilian personnel; and to meet the requirements of field commands and other claimants for trained personnel in the most complete and timely manner practical.



With the growth of technology and of the complexity of weapons and other equipment, it becomes increasingly desirable to have flexibility in the use of personnel with specialized capabilities. This observation indicates that it may be desirable, as a policy, to make assignments based primarily on specialized capabilities, rather than on branch affiliation, in all positions requiring such capabilities. Application of this general policy must take into account both the growing requirement for technical specialists and the continuing need for well-rounded military leaders.

The objective of providing attractive career opportunities for both military and civilian personnel may sometimes run counter to the need for meeting Army requirements; however, in most cases these dual objectives need not be inconsistent, and may, in many cases, be mutually supporting.

Control of the training and assignment sequence of military personnel is a unique and extremely difficult problem of management and control which directly affects the capability to meet the requirements of field commands and others for trained personnel. Involved, are the control of assignments, the scheduling of training to meet the needs of commands on a timely basis, the determination of when training responsibility will need to be transferred to unified commands, the provision of CONUS utilization tours for certain specialists (particularly enlisted men) to match the needs of overseas commands, and the coordination of actions pertaining to training and assignments with considerations related to new types of equipment. There will be continuing difficulty in solving this general problem, and there is need to assure that the process is tightened to the extent practical. Attainment of this objective will require consideration of policies as well as of organization and procedures.

15. It appears desirable to effect greater consolidation of the responsibility, control, and direction of individual and unit training



in order to assure that the product of such training will be related directly and continuously to the requirements of the active and reserve elements of the Army.

All phases of Army training should be aimed at operational requirements and designed to build a closely coordinated fighting team, each element of which is an intrinsic part of a larger unit. The training of the individual soldier or officer must evolve from the most elementary to the most complex phase in a smooth, coordinated flow, with its essential continuity unbroken. Further, the system adopted for control of individual and unit training must provide for effective control of Reserve component and ROTC training in coordination with that of the active force.

The responsibility for the direction and control of individual training is divided among many agencies of the Army. There is a natural and almost inevitable development of comparable training courses and facilities by different agencies, covering some of the same subject areas. This situation makes it difficult to standardize instruction, to assure efficient use of staffs, faculties, facilities, and support, and to prevent undesirable duplication. Where there is a requirement for training on complex and costly equipment, it is increasingly necessary to integrate the various related training activities to assure efficient use of the limited training equipment available for the purpose.

At the operating level, USCONARC is the command responsible for the training and readiness of the larger tactical organizations, and is also responsible for the training of many of the support units. At present, however, the responsibility of USCONARC for the training of units is shared by the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, the Army Security Agency, the five administrative services, and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics and the seven technical services.

Complete accountability or responsibility for the training of individuals and units does not exist below the Chief of Staff. At best, it is difficult to achieve consistency between training



objectives, primary missions and task assignments, and domestic emergency missions.

16. There is a need for clearly identifiable staff or command responsibility at each echelon of Army organization charged with Reserve component activities; for clear lines of command authority from Active Army headquarters to US Army Reserve units; and for organizational arrangements which will facilitate effective logistical and administrative support of the Reserve components.

The problems of managing the Reserve components are considerable, if only because of their size and complexity. In addition, the Reserve components must operate within an environment which is severely circumscribed and limited by factors peculiar to the Reserve components. At the level of the Headquarters, Department of the Army there must be an agency responsible for policy direction of the Reserve components. At the lowest levels, there must be control headquarters to provide command, support, and supervision for the Reserve component units and individuals. In between, at each level of organization, there is a need for easily identifiable staff elements to bear a special responsibility for Reserve component matters.

The US Army Corps, in direct command of Army Reserve units, possess only a very limited technical and administrative staff capability. Augmentation of this capability would not only facilitate command and supervision, but also the logistical support of Army Reserve units.

The lines of command and advisory authority within the substructure of the US Army Corps have gradually developed into an unnecessarily complex pattern, and are susceptible to simplification. Moreover, modifications can be made which would be more conducive to the full development of unit capabilities.

17. There is a need for continuing attention to the policies, practices, and procedures pertaining to force composition, personnel management, administration, training, and logistical support of Army Reserve components in the light of the greater dependence upon them apparent in the current Defense environment.



Policies, practices, and procedures currently in existence in the functional areas referred to in the Basic Consideration were developed to meet Reserve component requirements of the recent past. Many of these policies, practices, and procedures require revision in the light of the increased capabilities of Reserve component units as well as the increased demands and reliance placed upon them today.

18. There is a need to review the ROTC program to bring it into consonance with military requirements, academic pressures, an expanding student population, and the need to operate within limited resources.

This need is already recognized, as evidenced by the intensive study of the ROTC program underway in the Army Staff for the past several months.

During the past few years, several decisive trends have emerged with major impact on the Army ROTC program. Certain of these trends have resulted in changes to the program, including reduction in the number of hours taught in the basic course, substitution of academic subjects for military courses, and conversion of some institutions from compulsory basic ROTC to an elective program.

The impact of the trend most decisive in its current and future effects on institutions and the Army, i.e., that of the rapidly expanding student population, remains unresolved. While production of officers from the advanced course steadily declined from about 14,000 in 1956 to 12,500 in 1960, the requirement for additional junior officers from this source has increased to 15,000 annually. On the other hand, since two-thirds of the institutions sponsoring Senior ROTC require all eligible students in the first two years to enroll in ROTC, the Army's basic course population is expanding.

The Air Force has developed plans to abandon the basic course. This could materially increase the number to be trained by the Army in those institutions requiring compulsory basic ROTC. Without change of procedures to control input into the basic course, estimates indicate that there could be some 300,000 students enrolled in the basic course by 1970.



19. There is a need for integration and coordination of effort in the timely development of new concepts of military operations and organization and in the establishment of long-range materiel objectives and qualitative materiel requirements, in close consonance with the development and testing of materiel and with the preparation and application of doctrine.

A prerequisite to the creation of future Army forces which will meet national requirements is the prompt and effective translation of technological forecasts and long term strategic estimates and plans into new concepts for organizing, equipping, and employing these forces, so they will be superior in quality to those of a potential enemy. An obvious requirement for effective execution of this "combat development" function is the provision of authoritative and positive guidance by Headquarters, Department of the Army regarding, particularly, the threats to be dealt with. Also, the Headquarters, Department of the Army must accurately appraise and, where warranted, promptly adopt future force concepts, objectives, and qualitative materiel requirements. Equally essential, is the proper utilization of interrelated capabilities among the various agencies engaged in this important aspect of military planning, and in the preparation and application of doctrine.

At present, the dispersion of these planning agencies, as well as related materiel development agencies, throughout the CONUS Army structure seriously hampers adequate control, integration, and coordination of their activities. Responsibility for these activities is further fragmented among the Chief of Research and Development, the Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Military Operations and for Logistics, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, the Commanding General USCONARC, and the chiefs of the technical and administrative services. This wide distribution of responsibilities inhibits optimum effectiveness of effort and tends to increase the time required to adopt and perfect innovations which significantly increase combat capabilities.

In achieving the intent of this Basic Consideration, practical ingenuity and imagination must be applied in the development of new



tactical concepts, so as to compel significant improvements over present capabilities. This creative process requires an environment which, insofar as possible, is free from problems of day-to-day operations and from the conservative outlooks of those inclined to rely solely on tried and proved concepts. On the other hand, this creative drive must be tempered by due regard to budgetary considerations, by practical military experience, and by appreciation of special problems associated with the development, operation, and support of new weapons systems. Above all, this exercise of creative effort must produce results which will serve the realistic needs of future Army forces in the field.

20. There is a need for an environmental setting within which the innovation process can flourish in support of Army interest, research and development can expeditiously provide superior materiel, the requisite creative and professional talent can be attracted, developed, and retained and a world-wide competitively favorable scientific position can be maintained by the Army.

It is essential that the Army be forward-thinking and capable of the earliest feasible translation of the most advanced concepts into combat power. The advancing edge of exploration seeking significant improvement of the Army's effectiveness must not be unduly blunted by the logistical and operational cares of the day.

The key role of science and engineering in the betterment of weaponry and other materiel is well understood and needs no elaboration. The application of modern mathematical, operational, and other scientific methods to support doctrinal and planning activities deserves increased attention.

Not only must the Army be potent in these innovation capabilities, but it must also provide a public image to that effect. The latter is basic to gaining the confidence of the Nation and our allies in the strength of the Army. It also constitutes one of the real, though somewhat elusive, components of our military deterrence to potential enemies. At the same time, it contributes considerably to the attraction of competent scientists and engineers to the Army.



The quality of the professional executive staff is always the most telling single factor in research and development activities. Because of the lower salaries and other less favorable aspects of Government service, as compared to industry at the executive level, it becomes even more compelling that the Army's organizational environment and practices be such as to compensate for these disadvantages, in order to maximize the effectiveness of the available talent.

21. There is need for a producer logistics system of organization and management which will provide for a closely linked, orderly cycle from qualitative requirements through fielding and support; for accomplishment of this cycle in a minimum time span; for optimum efficiency in utilization of resources; and for effective and convenient support to using units.

The related activities of supporting research, component development, development of end items, engineering and service tests, industrial engineering required to effect procurement (including production and maintenance considerations), initiation of procurement and production, and subsequent actions required for fielding and support, are successively dependent one upon the other. Accordingly, the pattern of organization and management should provide for the closest possible linkage of these related activities, consistent with the need to maintain motivation of personnel involved, adequate emphasis on other scientific and research activities, and separate competence in the several areas. This concept assumes that part of the Army basic research program will be conducted in conjunction with the applied research and the development phase of the cycle.

Consideration of specific management problems would properly determine the manner in which these related activities can best be brought together as a whole, by segments, or by types of materiel.

Rapidity of obsolescence and the urgent need for superior materiel underscore the requirement for development of new weapons



and other equipment in minimum time from concept to fielding. The requirement for optimum efficiency in utilization of resources places the greatest stress on timely determination of when development efforts should be abandoned or accelerated. This requirement also demands that constant attention be given to the best use of available personnel and facilities.

The wholesale supply distribution system in particular needs to be responsive to the needs and convenience of unified commands and using elements of the Army, as well as to efficient internal operation of the system.

22. There is need for organizational arrangements, policies, and practices which will encourage industry and the academic community to provide their fullest cooperation, assistance, and participation in developing and supporting combatant forces for land warfare.

The capabilities of the Army are dependent, in large measure, on the support the Army receives from industry and the academic and scientific communities. Each year the Army spends several billions of dollars for goods, services, and research activities provided by industry and research institutions. The efficiency, speed, and economy with which these are provided are dependent, in part, on organizational arrangements, policies, and practices within the Army for its dealings with these outside agencies.

A sampling of viewpoints of industrial concerns and research institutions obtained during this study reflects a consensus that the Army does not generally get the benefit of the best efforts available in these organizations. Among the reasons advanced for this failure, is the difficulty in dealing with the Army because of the nature of its organization, delays in decisions, number of Army people involved, quality of Army representatives, and degree of progressiveness. While there are always two views regarding such matters, the views of industry and science should be accorded careful consideration.



As a rule, the viewpoints of industry representatives did not appear to be biased by the competitive nature of the Army's limited in-house production capability.

23. Although changes in organization, functions, and procedures may be desirable, it is important that a high degree of stability and continuity in Army operations be maintained.

This consideration is primarily a restraining one. In the tense international environment existing today, one must bear in mind that the Army cannot compromise its effectiveness to permit reorganization, but rather must maintain itself in a ready posture, fully prepared to fulfill its assigned missions.

Major elements of current organizations which are operating smoothly and providing effective results should generally be retained. These cohesive groupings of people, equipment, and facilities should not be disorganized while effecting transition to a new organization.

Most important, it must be remembered that thousands of dedicated people have grown accustomed to doing certain things in certain ways; these habits cannot be changed overnight. These people, both military and civilian, must be persuaded that any changes are constructive in nature, and are in their long-term interest as well as that of the Army.

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In the following section, the principal requirements reflected in the foregoing Basic Considerations will be applied to an evaluation of the present organization of the Department of the Army and to an outline of alternative patterns of organization and management of the Department of the Army. Similarly, the conclusions and recommendations set forth in the final section will also relate to the problems and needs outlined above, although, to avoid repetition, the requirements will not be repeated in full.