HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

4

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ROBUST

15 DECEMBER 1988

VOLUME III

FINAL REPORT

VOLUME III
ALTERNATIVE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR TDA OF THE 21ST CENTURY —MAJOR COMMANDS WITHIN THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES (CONUS) AND MOBILIZATION

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PREFACE

"THE CONUS DILEMMA"

The structure of the Army in CONUS poses complex and unique organizational problems. The Army's sustainment base and management headquarters are, for the most part, located in CONUS. The dilemma, referred to in the title, is derived from the fact that these organizations must be configured to provide support to and sustain the several OCONUS Army component commands while simultaneously supporting and servicing the sustainment base itself. This is compounded by the requirement for the sustainment base to concurrently expand and provide for its own security upon mobilization as its mission requirements multiply. Central to this is the command and control structure for the United States Army Reserve.

Several methods can be used to identify problem areas in the structure of any organization. One of the easiest is a historical review to identify recurring organizational issues. The command and control structure of the United States Army Reserve is a recurring organizational issue and has been the subject of much criticism. The last major reorganization of the USAR command and control apparatus resulted from the Operation STEADFAST reorganization in 1973 (see Figure III-1).



Figure III-1. Mobilization United States Army Reserve

Although numerous changes to the Department of the Army's handling of the United States Army Reserve have been recommended, substantial progress has been made in the readiness of USAR units under the existing organization (see Figure III-2).



Figure III-2. Mobilization United States Army Reserve Strengths

Nevertheless, the Army has not been completely successful in attaining readiness objectives for Army Reserve Units. Most telling, is the extremely high 33% annual personnel turnover of the Army Reserve. The weaknesses displayed in Figure III-3 have been identified in numerous studies. The statistics regarding MOS/Branch qualification are stable through time and have defied improvement under current procedures and policies. Full time support of USAR units by military technicians has not been adequately resourced. The administrative requirements that USAR company and battalion commanders are faced with greatly surpass those of their Active component counterparts.



Figure III–3. Mobilization United States Army Reserve Weaknesses

Given the fact that over ninety percent of the USAR force structure is located in CONUS, it is clear why Forces Command (FORSCOM) is center stage of the USAR command and control issue. Within FORSCOM, the Continental United States Army (CONUSA) headquarters is the focal point for Reserve Component management (see Figure III–4.)



Figure III–4. Reserve Component Management

Design of the command and control structure for the Army Reserve must address all the organizational requirements associated with the transition from premobilization, through mobilization, to war. The organization must be configured to mobilize quickly and efficiently in order to provide essential theater force units to support Unified combatant commanders wherever necessary (see Figure III–5).



Figure III–5. Reserve Component Command and Control Structure

All the alternative configurations for managing the Army Reserve, whatever their characteristics, can be categorized under one of two basic models (see Figure III–6).

TWO BASIC MODELS

- AC COMMANDS RC
  - AC RESPONSIBLE FOR RC READINESS
  - AC RESPONSIBLE FOR RESOURCING
  - RC SUBORDINATED TO AC
- RC COMMANDS RC
  - RC RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING READY UNITS/INDIVIDUALS TO AC
  - RC RESPONSIBLE FOR RESOURCING IN COORDINATION WITH AC
  - RC CO-EQUAL WITH AC

Figure III–6. Alternative Configurations for Army Reserve Management

The ROBUST Task Force considered a variety of command and control alternatives for the Army Reserve. Each of these has certain advantages and disadvantages (see Figure III–7).



Figure III–7. Army Reserve Command and Control Alternatives

Although perhaps not obvious in the wording of Public Law 90–168, The Reserve Forces Bill of Rights and Vitalization Act, the intent of congress with regard to the management of the Army Reserve is abundantly clear in the record.

> "It was at the time of passage of this act (P.L. 90–168) and is our intent today and in the future that these Chiefs of the Guard and Reserve Components shall be managers of reserve affairs and that they shall be solely responsible for administering and supervising the Guard and Reserve programs within their respective Services."
>
> Representative Fisher (4 June 1973)

> "The necessity for a closer relationship and interdependence of their active forces and their Reserve Components than has ever existed before is recognized. I applaud the increased cooperation and dedication that I sense is the general pattern within the Department of Defense. However, when it comes to internal management of the Reserve Components, it seems we must periodically remind ourselves of the catastrophes of the past whenever the management of the Reserve Components has been usurped, in whole or in part, by the active force. Notwithstanding whatever weakness may exist in the management of these

forces, of which the Congress is quite aware, the very strength and viability of the Reserve Components today is largely due to their own ability to plan and manage from a perspective that can only be acquired from a lifetime of experience with the citizen-soldier. It is for this reason that acts of Congress for literally decades have reaffirmed the concept of management of the Reserve Components by their own Chiefs."

Representative Sikes (9 March 1976)

"It was the intent of Congress under P.L. 90-168, implemented by current Department of Defense Directives, that the Reserve Component Chiefs would have...management responsibility under the Army Chief of Staff. It may be necessary to enact legislation so that the Army and all Services will understand clearly the intent of Congress that the military Reserve Chiefs do have specific primary decision authority and responsibility to the Chief of Staff for all program and monies appropriated by Congress for Reserve Components."

Senator Thurmond (1977)

The ROBUST Task Force has developed a prescription for improving the Army's management of the Army Reserve (Figure III-8 and Chapter 15). Much more detailed work is required, however, it is the opinion of the Task Force that the path to increased readiness of USAR units, improved support to Unified combatant commanders and enhanced capability to mobilize lies along the recommended course.

TO LEVERAGE THE TALENT AND EXPERIENCE OF THE ARMY RESERVE

- ARMY COMPONENT COMMANDERS COMMAND USAR
- OPCON USAR TRAINING DIVISIONS TO TRADOC
- DESIGNATE CAR, DCG (USAR) FORSCOM
- EXPLORE ALIGNMENT OF USAR COMMAND AND CONTROL WITH STATE BOUNDARIES
- INCREASE FULL TIME SUPPORT OF USAR
- EXPLORE TRANSFER OF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS FROM CONUSA TO MUSARC
- BALANCE RC FORCE STRUCTURE MIX

Figure III-8. ROBUST Prescription for Improving Management of Army Reserve

CHAPTER 14
ARMY COMPONENT COMMAND - U.S. FORCES COMMAND (USARFOR)

The United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) is both a Specified Command and the Army's largest major command (MACOM). In its Mission Essential Task List (METL) submission to the ROBUST Task Force, FORSCOM identified nine major missions. These are:

(1) Command of Active Army units in CONUS,
(2) Command of United States Army Reserve Units in CONUS,
(3) Operate as a Specified Command,
(4) Supervise Army National Guard (ARNG) Training,
(5) Plan and execute the Land Defense Of CONUS (LDC),
(6) Plan and execute the mobilization and deployment of forces,
(7) Plan for the land defense of Alaska, less the Aleutians,
(8) Plan for Combined Canada-U.S. Land Operations (CANUS LANDOP), and
(9) Army Component Command to CINCLANT for planning.

These broad missions could be subdivided into narrower supporting missions, however, the mission of planning and executing military support of civil defense (MSCD) needs to be appended to the list. Other FORSCOM missions not listed in the METL, include command of Third U.S. Army (TUSA), the Army element supporting the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) and command of 1st Special Operations Command (1st SOCOM), the designated Army Component Command of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).

Operation STEADFAST eliminated the United States Army Continental Army Command (CONARC) and the United States Army Combat Developments Command (CDC) in 1973. In their place, the United States Army Forces Command and the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command were established. Then LTG DePuy, the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, and Coordinator of Army Studies, was the force behind what came to be known as the STEADFAST reorganization. He demonstrated how the proposed reorganization would accomplish:

(1) Reduction of the CONARC span of control,
(2) Emphasize training, readiness, and contingency planning for deployable forces,
(3) Integrate doctrine development with the service schools,
(4) Rationalize the combat and force development process,
(5) Simplify the test and experimentation process,

(6) Be manageable, and

(7) Fulfill area responsibilities in CONUS.

The STEADFAST missions for FORSCOM were: command all units of the Strategic Army Forces; command all units of the Army Reserve, less OPCON of the USAR Schools and Training Divisions to TRADOC; supervise ARNG training; command associated installations and the Continental U.S. Armies (CONUSA). The CONUSA were eliminated from the chain of command with respect to installations and Active Army units. The CONUSA were given the missions: to command USAR units; plan for mobilization; coordination of military support of domestic emergencies; and coordination of geographical responsibilities.

Time has demonstrated the wisdom of the changes made in the Army's CONUS organization through OPERATION STEADFAST. However, the organizational environment of the Army continues to change and evolve. The Department of Defense (DOD) Reorganization Act of 1986 has reinforced the responsibility and authority of the Unified and Specified commanders. With the disestablishment of the United States Readiness Command (USREDCOM), FORSCOM has been designated a Specified Command and the commanding general of FORSCOM has joined the ranks of the joint commanders. Responsibility for the Land Defense of CONUS belongs to the FORSCOM commander, as does the responsibility for combined planning for land operations with Canada. As stated, FORSCOM also commands Army Component Commands of two Unified Commands (USCENTCOM and USSOCOM) and is itself, the Army Component Command of a third Unified Command (USLANTCOM). Given the Army's commitment to force modernization, and joint operations, it is easy to understand how FORSCOM's missions have multiplied and become more diverse over time.

14.1 OBSERVATION

United States Army Forces Command has multiple and diverse missions.

14.1.1 SCOPE

The Unified Command Plan; Headquarters, Department of the Army; United States Army Forces Command; Continental United States Armies; United States Army Reserve Units; CONUS Installations.

14.1.2 PROPOSAL

Initiate a study to review FORSCOM missions, functions, and organizational relationships.

14.1.3 CRITERION

Principles of war (FM 100–5, Operations, Appendix A). Span of control. Rules of inefficiency (Annex D, Inefficiency Rules, to Chapter 3, Methodology for Comprehensive Review, to this report).

14.1.4 ANALYSIS

Army Regulation 10–42, Organizations and Functions, United States Army Forces Command (effective 15 April 1984), lists the FORSCOM mission as follows:

(1) Command, control, and support assigned forces.
(2) Organize and modernize the force to meet wartime requirements.
(3) Prepare the force for mobilization and commitment to perform wartime and other missions.
(4) Train and motivate individuals and units to perform assigned missions.
(5) Provide an environment that will attract and retain the people required to sustain the force.

This regulation goes on to list six functions of the FORSCOM commander as Commander in Chief, United States Army Forces, Readiness Command (USCINCARRED), three functions as Commander in Chief, United States Army Forces, Atlantic (CINCARLANT); the responsibility of providing administrative and logistical functions supporting the Army components to the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) and Joint Task Force (JTF) Alaska; and thirty-four (or thirty-eight, depending on how one counts) functions as a major Army commander. AR 10–42, also lists ten other agencies/commands upon which FORSCOM is dependent for a variety of essential services and support.

Although, obviously in need of substantial updating, AR 10–42 accurately reflects the breadth and variety of FORSCOM missions and responsibilities. It is safe to say that no other major Army command is required to establish and maintain the number or variety of external organizational relationships, that are necessitated by Forces Command's multiple and diverse missions.

Forces Command is at the hub of what the Director of the ROBUST Task Force, has referred to as the CONUS DILEMMA. The preponderance of the major Army commands that are headquartered within the continental United States are part of the Army's sustainment base. The primary MACOMs in the sustaining base are the United States Army Materiel Command (AMC), TRADOC, and FORSCOM. They are respectively responsible for industrial preparedness, training base expansion, and theater force units to include mobilization and deployment. Functional MACOMs, such as Health Services Command, Information Systems Command, Intelligence and Security Command, etc., along with numerous field operating agencies, like the Total

Army Personnel Agency, Recruiting Command, and Troop Support Agency, are also part of the sustaining base. The Army sustaining base supports and provides services to the Unified and Specified commands worldwide. The dilemma is that the sustaining base must sustain itself, must be defended, and must be capable of mobilizing simultaneously, while continuing to sustain deployed forces and support the Unified and Specified commands throughout the world (see Figure 14–1).



Figure 14–1. The CONUS Dilemma

The ROBUST Task Force explored several alternatives to address the problems associated with organizing the Army in the continental United States to perform the difficult missions reflected in the CONUS DILEMMA. The first alternative to be examined was the return of the CONUSA to pre-STEADFAST responsibility and authority. This involved conveying command and control of both Active and Reserve units, all CONUS installations, and responsibility for sustainment of the Total Army in CONUS to the CONUSA commander. Under this course of action, the CONUSA commander would enjoy command authority, within their geographical regions, analogous to that which the Task Force recommends be provided to OCONUS Army component commanders with assigned areas of responsibility (AOR) (Preface of Volume II) and would have responsibility for support analogous to that of the OCONUS Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM) commander (Chapter 7). The intent here was to maximize unity of command to facilitate coordination of the RC

support, mobilization planning and execution, LDC, MSCD, and military assistance to civil authorities (MACA) missions. This course of action was rejected for essentially the same reasons it was rejected during OPERATION STEADFAST. Expansion of CONUSA authority would increase the span of control, result in headquarters layering, and dilute the CONUSA focus on Reserve Component (RC) readiness and training.

Subsequently, the Task Force explored the total elimination of the CONUSA. This alternative was also rejected. The need for a geographical Army headquarters in four major FORSCOM mission areas, LDC, RC readiness, mobilization planning and execution, and regional representation of the Army (and DOD), is apparent from the Task Force's visits to; CONUSA, FORSCOM, Major United States Army Reserve Command (MUSARC), and State Area Command (STARC) headquarters; the Federal Emergency Management Agency; and senior Army officers in a variety of positions of great responsibility. However, some modification of the role of the CONUSA, with respect to command and resource management relationships between the CONUSA and MUSARC, was recommended by the Task Force (Chapter 15).

It is apparent that FORSCOM can and should be relieved of several missions in order to reduce its span of control and improve its ability to manage the remaining CONUS oriented missions. The Task Force has recommended that FORSCOM be relieved of responsibility for TUSA (Chapter 10) and 1st SOCOM (Chapter 13). Each of these commands are dedicated to Unified commands and there is little justification for FORSCOM involvement in their activities.

14.1.5 CONCLUSION

Initiate a study to review FORSCOM missions, functions, and organizational relationships.

14.1.6 IMPLEMENTATION

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, HQDA, in coordination with United States Army Forces Command, and the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff initiate a study to review FORSCOM missions, functions and organizational relationships in its various roles as a Specified Command, an Army component command, and a major Army command, using the criterion in 16.1.3, and prepare and submit their findings to the Army Leadership no latter than 1 May 1989. The Office of Director of Management include the missions and functions of FORSCOM in a revision of AR 10-87, Major Army Commands in the Continental United States, in accordance with the decisions of the Army Leadership concerning FORSCOM missions and functions no later than 1 July 1989.

Forces Command is the Army's largest and, as a result of its designation as a Specified Command, perhaps its most complex organization. It is apparent that

FORSCOM plays a central role both as a management headquarters and as an operations headquarters. It is essential that FORSCOM's organizational relationships be simplified and clarified in each of its structural roles.

Although, beyond the scope of the Task Force charter, it is obvious that there is a need for clarification of the role of FORSCOM as a specified command. Forces Command's designation as a Specified command creates the requirement for another set of different organizational relationships with many organizations with which the command already has organizational relationships as a major Army command. The decision to designate FORSCOM a Specified command, rather that create a Unified North American Defense Command requires explanation. Our doctrine requires joint operations and a Unified command for the LDC mission seems much more appropriate than a Specified command.

The number of related issues, that are contained in this report, is indicative of the importance of Forces Command to the Army. The following issues have a direct impact on FORSCOM: 10.1, 13.1, 15.1, 15.2, 15.3, 15.4, 16.1, 19.1, 21.1, 22.1, 23.2, 26.1, 27.1, 28.1, 28.2, 30.1, 30.3, 30.4, and 30.5.

ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 14
MANPOWER AUTHORIZATIONS BY UNIT IDENTIFICATION CODE

ANNEX A
Army Manpower Authorizations by UIC

USARFOR

UIC	Unit Designation	ASGMT	CO Auths	WO Auths	ENL Auths	CIV DHUS	CIV DHFN	CIV INFN
KA9937	ACT ARNG TNG SITE	NG	10	57	31	0	0	0
KB8017	ADG 205TH SIB (RO)	FC	0	0	392	0	0	0
W001AA	BDE 704 MI	AS	142	37	1040	26	0	0
W002AA	ELE USA NSA	AS	48	0	1	0	0	0
W005AA	DET INSCOM MI (C1)	AS	4	4	13	1	0	0
W00CAA	OFC CHIEF CHAPLAIN	CS	13	0	1	21	0	0
W00EAA	OFC SAOSA	SA	5	0	2	7	0	0
W00FAA	OFC SACUSA	SA	6	0	2	22	0	0
W00GAA	OFC SACUSA(FM)	SA	41	0	0	179	0	0
W00JAA	BD PRM OF RIFLE PRAC	SF	1	0	0	37	0	0
W00LAA	OFC SURGEON GEN	CS	68	0	1	67	0	0
W00MAA	OFC CHIEF ENGINEERS	CS	24	0	1	76	0	0
W00QAA	OFC NAT GUARD BUR	CS	55	0	4	132	0	0
W00SAA	OFC ASA (MRA)	SA	11	1	1	23	0	0
W00YAA	HQ INSCOM	AS	146	16	83	309	0	0
W01AAA	ACT MI BN CI/CE	AS	41	30	113	17	0	0
W01BAA	DET INSCOM MI (C1)	AS	3	1	5	5	0	0
W01HAA	GAR VINT HILL	X1	5	1	96	150	0	0
W01KAA	CO 749TH MI	AS	2	1	57	0	0	0
W01NAA	ACT EMRA	X1	21	5	167	426	0	0
W027AA	TM PARACHUTE	FC	3	0	56	13	0	0
W031AA	LAB USA HARRY DIAMOND	X1	5	0	0	649	0	0
W032AA	LAB COLD REG RSCH	CE	2	0	3	231	0	0
W038AA	CMD USA NATICK	X1	24	2	57	895	0	0
W039AA	AGY SATCOM	X1	4	0	41	119	0	0
W03DAA	LAB USA ENGR TOPO	CE	4	1	7	312	0	0
W03FAA	AGY FAC ENGR SPT	CE	7	8	123	181	0	0
W03HAA	AGY USA ENV HYGENE	HS	114	0	52	383	0	0
W03JAA	CMD USA MED R&D	MD	51	1	6	95	0	0
W03KAA	IST OF RSCH WRAMC	MD	146	1	229	407	0	0
W03SAA	IST USA SURGL RSCH	MD	53	0	102	74	0	0
W03WAA	IST USA ENV MED RSCH	MD	21	0	54	91	0	0
W03XAA	IST USA DENTL RSCH	MD	22	0	36	18	0	0
W03YAA	LAB USA AEROMED RSCH	MD	23	1	43	67	0	0
W041AA	CTR USA COLD RGN TEST	X1	24	1	28	0	0	0
W043AA	U AVN ENG FLT	X1	23	5	26	98	0	0
W049AA	IST USARIEES	SF	17	0	0	313	0	0
W04LAA	CTR USA BEL R+D	X1	19	0	32	872	0	0
W04WAA	RNG WHITE SAND MISSLE	X1	62	10	532	2229	0	0
W04XAA	PVG USA YUMA	X1	27	2	224	555	0	0
W04YAA	PVG USA ELECTRONIC	X1	42	3	342	225	0	0
W04ZAA	PVG JEFFERSON	X1	3	0	0	387	0	0
W05BAA	OFC ARMY RESEARCH	X1	2	0	0	115	0	0
W05JAA	AGY USA MED MATERIEL	MD	22	7	21	153	0	0
W05XAA	HQ TROSCOM	X1	49	3	45	1682	0	0
W061AA	ACT USA ENL ELIG	MP	1	0	1	24	0	0
W062AA	BD US ARMY CHAPLIN	SF	7	0	1	6	0	0
W065AA	HQ GARRISON	CZ	14	1	175	338	0	0
W06MAA	CTR USAREC SUPPORT	RC	4	0	59	13	0	0
W06NAA	U USA CMD INFO	SF	15	0	18	31	0	0

W06PAA	U USA HOMETOWN	SF	2	0	18	14	0	0
W06QAA	HQ USA RCTG CMD	RC	115	2	203	243	0	0
W06RAA	BDE 1ST REC(NE)	RC	18	0	20	49	0	0
W06SAA	BN REC BALT-WASH	RC	12	0	206	14	0	0
W06TAA	BDE 2ND REC(SE)	RC	18	0	21	44	0	0
W06UAA	BDE 5TH REC(SW)	RC	18	0	22	38	0	0
W06VAA	BDE 4TH REC(MW)	RC	14	0	25	46	0	0
W06WAA	BDE 6TH REC(W)	RC	14	0	20	45	0	0
W070AA	DIV EN N CENTRAL	CE	0	0	0	13	0	0
W071AA	DIV EN N PACIFIC	CE	8	0	1	860	0	0
W072AA	DIV EN OHIO RIVER	CE	8	0	1	510	0	0
W074AA	DIV EN S ATLANTIC	CE	11	1	5	1476	0	0
W075AA	DIV EN S PACIFIC	CE	7	0	1	1068	0	0
W076AA	DIV EN SOUTHWSTR	CE	9	0	1	1372	0	0
W07VAA	DIV EN L MISS VA	CE	0	0	1	20	0	0
W07YAA	DIV EN N ENGLAND	CE	0	0	0	33	0	0
W0BNAA	CMD TRAINING	TC	32	1	344	8	0	0
W0EEAA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	132	3	399	85	0	0
W0G0AA	HQ FIFTH US ARMY	FC	84	1	36	195	0	0
W0G1AA	HQ FOURTH US ARMY	FC	92	1	38	211	0	0
W0G2AA	HQ SIXTH US ARMY	FC	85	1	51	196	0	0
W0G4AA	BDE 4TH CST	TC	65	6	776	65	0	0
W0GRAA	BDE 1ST BASIC TNG	TC	55	0	342	6	0	0
W0GVAA	HQ USA MDW	MW	36	1	41	76	0	0
W0GWAA	HQ AMC	XI	178	1	24	1650	0	0
W0GXAA	HQ FIRST US ARMY	FC	87	1	51	243	0	0
W0GYAA	BDE 2ND BASIC TNG	TC	76	0	478	8	0	0
W0H6AA	OFC AFSC-LNO	XI	1	0	0	2	0	0
W0H9AA	CMD HQ MICOM	XI	240	24	126	6237	0	0
W0J5AA	GRP USANCA	SF	26	0	2	24	0	0
W0J7AA	CTR USA SAFETY	SF	40	11	17	118	0	0
W0JDAA	ACT EARA	SF	0	0	0	49	0	0
W0JEAA	HQ USATECOM	XI	56	1	23	434	0	0
W0JVAA	GRP USA ENGR COMD SPT	CE	14	0	4	266	0	0
W0K4AA	ARS PINE BLUFF	XI	20	0	48	1063	0	0
W0K5AA	ARS ROCKY MOUNTAIN	XI	1	0	0	162	0	0
W0K8AA	ARS ROCK ISLAND	XI	14	0	14	2443	0	0
W0K9AA	ARS WATERVLIET	XI	9	0	0	2037	0	0
W0KCAA	OFC CHIEF PA LA	SF	3	0	1	2	0	0
W0KDAA	ER NY-OFC CH PA	SF	3	0	1	1	0	0
W0KEAA	AGY USA LEGAL SERVICE	SF	367	1	10	136	0	0
W0KFAA	OFC USA CLAIMS SVC	SF	13	1	6	80	0	0
W0KLAA	GRPUSA PROG ANALYSIS	AS	0	0	2	17	0	0
W0KPAA	CTRUSA FRGN SCI	SF	31	0	8	495	0	0
W0KZAA	ACT FIELD SAFETY	XI	0	0	0	34	0	0
W0L3AA	ACT USA DEP FT WINGATE	XI	2	0	0	85	0	0
W0L6AA	DEP LETTERKENNY ARMY	XI	17	0	39	3443	0	0
W0L7AA	DEP LEX-BLU-GR ARMY	XI	6	3	25	1112	0	0
W0LAAA	ACT USARD&A INFO SYS	CZ	6	1	6	101	0	0
W0LBAA	PLN CORNHUSKER AMMO	XI	0	0	0	4	0	0
W0LCAA	PLN HOLSTON ARMY AMMO	XI	2	0	0	30	0	0
W0LDAA	PLN INDIANA ARMY AMMO	XI	2	0	0	38	0	0
W0LEAA	PLN IOWA ARMY AMMO	XI	2	0	0	43	0	0
W0LFAA	PLN KANSAS ARMY AMMO	XI	2	0	0	36	0	0
W0LGAA	PLN LAKE CTY ARMYAMMO	XI	2	0	0	66	0	0
W0LHAA	PLN LONESTAR ARMYAMMO	XI	2	0	0	58	0	0
W0LJAA	PLN LA ARMY AMMO	XI	2	0	0	42	0	0
W0LKAA	PLN MILAN ARMY AMMO	XI	2	0	0	57	0	0
W0LLAA	PLN RADFORD ARMY AMMO	XI	2	0	0	66	0	0

W0LMAA	PLN	NEWPORT ARMY AMMO	XI	1	0	0	8	0	0
W0LNAA	PLN	BADGER ARMY AMMO	XI	0	0	0	7	0	0
W0LPAA	PLN	LONGHORN ARMYAMMO	XI	2	0	0	38	0	0
W0LQAA	PLN	SUNFLOWR ARMYAMMO	XI	2	0	0	30	0	0
W0LWAA	PLN	JOLIET ARMY AMMO	XI	0	0	0	9	0	0
W0LXAA	DEP	ANNISTON ARMY	XI	24	0	27	4217	0	0
W0M4AA	CIR	USA ENL REC&EVAL	MP	5	0	26	198	0	0
W0M5AA	STA	USA RECEPTION	TC	6	0	65	19	0	0
W0M8AA	STA	USA RECEPTION	TC	7	0	54	42	0	0
W0MAAA	DEP	N CUMBERLAND ARMY	XI	16	1	37	2523	0	0
W0MBAA	DEP	USA ACT PUEBLO	XI	2	0	2	594	0	0
W0MCAA	DEP	RED RIVER ARMY	XI	22	1	34	5134	0	0
W0MDAA	DEP	SACRAMENTO ARMY	XI	19	0	25	3146	0	0
W0MEAA	DEP	USA ACT SAVANNA	XI	2	0	2	215	0	0
W0MGAA	DEP	SENECA ARMY	XI	15	4	75	858	0	0
W0MHAA	DEP	USA SHARPE	XI	14	0	22	1096	0	0
W0MJAA	DEP	SIERRA ARMY	XI	8	0	2	346	0	0
W0MLAA	DEP	US ARMY TOBYHANNA	XI	12	0	14	3948	0	36
W0MMAA	DEP	TOOELE ARMY	XI	23	0	29	3474	0	0
W0MNAA	ACT	USA DEP UMATILLA	XI	3	0	0	232	0	0
W0MTAA	RGN	1ST ROTC SR PROG	TC	455	0	410	140	0	0
W0MUAA	DEP	USA CORPUS CH	XI	12	2	11	3867	0	0
W0MYAA	GAR	USA FT ORD	FC	59	3	529	1661	0	0
W0NDAA	RGN	2ND ROTC SR PROG	TC	405	0	290	110	0	0
W0NRAA	CIR	USA FIN AND ACCTG	AC	41	0	74	2324	0	0
W0NTAA	AGY	USA AUDIT	AU	7	0	0	853	0	0
W0PBAA	CIR	USAISC EC TELE	CZ	10	3	314	80	0	0
W0RUAA	STA	USAISC STATCOM	CZ	2	1	75	26	0	0
W0PKAA	AGY	ISC-CARLISE BK	CZ	2	0	46	57	0	0
W0Q1AA	CIR	MADIGAN ARMY MED	HS	520	3	658	1067	0	0
W0Q2AA	CIR	FITZMN ARMY MED	HS	510	1	637	1424	0	0
W0Q3AA	CIR	BEAUMONT ARMY MED	HS	525	4	794	1057	0	0
W0Q4AA	CIR	LETTERMN ARMY MED	HS	492	5	572	754	0	0
W0QCAA	CIR	USA VISUAL INFO	CZ	16	0	116	196	0	0
W0QFAA	HQ	MTMC	MT	32	0	9	261	0	0
W0QKAA	PLN	STLOUIS ARMY AMMO	XI	0	0	0	2	0	0
W0S5AA	AGY	USAISC-WA1NWRI	CZ	1	0	21	34	0	0
W0S6AA	AGY	USAISC ALASKA	CZ	6	1	68	81	0	0
W0SXAA	ACT	USAISEC SPT	CZ	3	0	26	53	0	0
W0TSAA	ACT	USA REG DEN	HS	3	0	54	37	0	0
W0TUAA	ACT	USA REG DEN	HS	3	0	58	27	0	0
W0U0AA	CIR	USA QM & FT LEE	TC	24	2	137	1055	0	0
W0U2AA	CIR	USA INF & FT BEN	TC	45	8	385	2911	0	0
W0U3AA	HQ	GAR BRAGG FT	FC	53	0	471	2012	0	0
W0U4AA	GAR	HQ USA FT CAMPBL	FC	41	0	373	1596	0	0
W0U5AA	CIR	USA SIG &FTGORDON	TC	365	27	2698	2056	0	0
W0U6AA	CIR	USA TNG&FT JACKSN	TC	65	3	533	1251	0	0
W0U8AA	GAR	HQ USA FT MCPRSN	FC	45	1	442	1302	0	0
W0U9AA	CIR	USA AVN&FT RUCKER	TC	560	660	1592	2528	0	0
W0UGAA	GAR	HQ USA FT DEVENS	FC	37	4	241	1138	0	0
W0USAA	GAR	HQ USA FT MEADE	FC	56	5	376	2331	0	0
W0UUAA	GAR	USA CARLISLE BKS	TC	10	0	45	261	0	0
W0UVAA	CIR	TRANS & FT EUSTIS	TC	37	5	449	1009	0	0
W0UWAA	GAR	USA FT MONROE	TC	12	0	82	384	0	0
W0UXAA	CIR	USA ARMOR	TC	85	10	913	2598	0	0
W0V2AA	1ST	SOCOM	SO	119	9	192	127	0	0
W0V3AA	ACT	IBEA	XI	0	0	0	79	0	0
W0V4AA	ACT	AMC I & SA	XI	1	0	1	105	0	0
W0V8AA	OFC	PM CSA	XI	13	0	7	112	0	0

W0VAAA GAR HQ USA FT STEWRT	FC	49	3	449	1757	0	0
W0VBAA GAR USA FT CHAFFEE	TC	4	0	26	242	0	0
W0VCAA HQ GAR HOOD FT	FC	67	11	681	2396	0	0
W0VDAA GAR HQ USA FT S HOUS	FC	39	4	359	1104	0	0
W0VFAA GAR USA FT POLK	FC	38	3	262	1495	0	0
W0VGAA CIR USA FA & FT SILL	TC	50	6	542	1789	0	0
W0VHAA CIR AD ARTY & FTBLS	TC	42	7	396	2075	0	0
W0VKAA GAR HQ USA FT SHERDN	FC	22	3	237	911	0	0
W0VLAA CIR EN TNG&FT L WOOD	TC	266	20	1000	1557	0	0
W0VMAA GAR HQ USA FT RILEY	FC	34	1	323	1288	0	0
W0VNAA GAR HQ USA FT CARSON	FC	49	2	381	1616	0	0
W0VPAA CIR USA CA & FT LVNWT	TC	34	1	176	768	0	3
W0VWAA GAR HQ USA PRES S FR	FC	35	2	281	1132	0	0
W0W7AA PLN ALABAMA ARMY AMMO	X1	0	0	0	1	0	0
W0WCAA ACT HISA CECOM	X1	10	0	46	443	0	0
W0WFAA ACT RASA	X1	13	5	100	723	0	0
W0WPAA ACT SPT PHILA	X1	1	0	0	88	0	0
W0XNAA ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	102	0	224	226	0	0
W0XQAA HQ GAR DRUM FT	FC	23	0	218	1116	0	0
W0XYAA GAR HQ USA FT MCCOY	FC	18	0	50	787	0	0
W0Y4AA CMDDAVISON AVIATION	MW	26	52	197	104	0	0
W0Y6AA HQ AVSCOM	X1	157	11	63	3719	0	0
W0Z1AA OFC DCS INTEL	CS	71	0	6	94	0	0
W0Z2AA OFC DCSOPS & PLANS	CS	319	0	35	199	0	0
W0Z3AA OFC DCS LOGISTICS	CS	112	1	4	195	0	0
W0Z4AA OFC CHIEF RES	CS	30	0	2	54	0	0
W0Z6AA OFC OF THE IG	CS	5	0	0	3	0	0
W0Z7AA OFC J ADVOCATE GEN	CS	49	1	2	35	0	0
W0ZAAA AGY MTMC TRANS ENG	MT	6	0	0	97	0	0
W0ZGAA ACT APRO HUGHES	X1	6	3	0	124	0	0
W0ZNAA AGY USA PHYS DSAB	AG	18	0	7	35	0	0
W0ZQAA GAR HQ USA FT HUACHA	CZ	21	2	317	918	0	0
W0ZUAA OFC CHIEF OF STAFF	CS	91	1	19	102	0	0
W0ZZAA OFC DCS PERSONNEL	CS	118	1	10	167	0	0
W11IAA ACT LCA	X1	5	0	2	152	0	0
W12KAA USAG FT LEWIS	FC	35	0	484	1695	0	0
W131AA STA MEPS NEW YORK	PC	2	0	19	36	0	0
W13ZAA ELE USA-DLI-ENG LANG	TC	4	0	28	0	0	0
W149AA ACT USAAMC QA	X1	0	0	0	18	0	0
W170AA STA MEPS BUFFALO	PC	2	0	8	22	0	0
W171AA STA MEPS CINCINA	PC	2	0	7	23	0	0
W172AA STA MEPS CLEVELN	PC	2	0	12	32	0	0
W173AA STA MEPS COLUMBU	PC	3	0	5	25	0	0
W175AA STA MEPS HARRISB	PC	2	0	7	16	0	0
W176AA STA MEPS LOUISVL	PC	2	0	9	22	0	0
W177AA STA MEPS MANCHST	PC	1	0	5	17	0	0
W178AA STA MEPS NEWARK	PC	2	0	12	24	0	0
W179AA STA MEPS NEW HAV	PC	1	0	5	12	0	0
W17GAA ELE USA TC FIELD	TC	23	0	2	16	0	0
W17KAA BN USAREC BECKLE	RC	7	0	87	10	0	0
W17LAA BN USAREC BOSTON	RC	11	0	165	13	0	0
W17MAA BN USAREC COLUMBIA	RC	8	0	115	12	0	0
W17NAA BN USAREC LOUISV	RC	8	0	108	12	0	0
W17PAA BN USAREC FT MONTH	RC	10	0	115	13	0	0
W17QAA BN USAREC LI	RC	10	0	147	14	0	0
W17RAA BN USAREC PHILAD	RC	11	0	162	15	0	0
W17SAA BN USAREC PITTSBRG	RC	11	0	178	15	0	0
W17TAA BN USAREC CONCOR	RC	7	0	80	13	0	0
W17UAA BN USAREC RICHMD	RC	7	0	105	12	0	0

W17VAA	BN USAREC SYRACU	RC	12	0	165	16	0	0
W17WAA	STA MEPS BALTIMO	PC	2	0	17	30	0	0
W17YAA	STA MEPS BECKLEY	PC	2	0	6	14	0	0
W17ZAA	STA MEPS BOSTON	PC	1	0	9	26	0	0
W180AA	STA MEPS RALEIGH	PC	1	0	9	19	0	0
W182AA	BN USAREC DALLAS	RC	11	0	155	15	0	0
W183AA	BN USAREC LITTL RCK	RC	8	0	110	12	0	0
W184AA	BN USAREC N ORLEANS	RC	7	0	90	11	0	0
W185AA	BN USAREC OKLA CITY	RC	9	0	105	14	0	0
W186AA	BN USAREC S ANTONIO	RC	11	0	118	13	0	0
W187AA	STA MEPS ALBUQUE	PC	1	0	6	15	0	0
W188AA	STA MEPS AMARILL	PC	2	0	3	16	0	0
W189AA	STA MEPS DALLAS	PC	2	0	11	30	0	0
W18BAA	STA MEPS PHILADL	PC	3	0	11	31	0	0
W18CAA	STA MEPS PITTSBR	PC	1	0	14	29	0	0
W18DAA	STA MEPS PORTLAND	PC	2	0	5	15	0	0
W18FAA	STA MEPS RICHMON	PC	2	0	11	23	0	0
W18HAA	STA MEPS SPRINGF	PC	1	0	4	17	0	0
W18JAA	STA MEPS SYRACUS	PC	2	0	7	18	0	0
W18KAA	STA MEPS WILKS-B	PC	2	0	6	19	0	0
W18LAA	BN USAREC ATLANTA	RC	10	0	122	13	0	0
W18MAA	BN USAREC JACKSN	RC	9	0	153	15	0	0
W18NAA	BN USAREC MONTGO	RC	9	0	114	12	0	0
W18PAA	BN USAREC NASHVLE	RC	9	0	108	12	0	0
W18QAA	BN USAREC RALEIGH	RC	7	0	90	11	0	0
W18RAA	STA MEPS CHARLOTE	PC	2	0	8	23	0	0
W18SAA	STA MEPS MIAMI	PC	2	0	9	17	0	0
W18TAA	STA MEPS FT JACKS	PC	1	0	14	25	0	0
W18UAA	STA MEPS JACKSON	PC	2	0	6	17	0	0
W18VAA	STA MEPS JCKSONV	PC	1	0	8	26	0	0
W18WAA	STA MEPS KNOXVLL	PC	1	0	10	15	0	0
W18XAA	STA MEPS MEMPHIS	PC	1	0	12	18	0	0
W18YAA	STA MEPS MONTGMR	PC	2	0	9	35	0	0
W18ZAA	STA MEPS NASHVIL	PC	2	0	8	20	0	0
W190AA	STA MEPS KANS	PC	2	0	11	26	0	0
W191AA	STA MEPS MILW	PC	2	0	8	28	0	0
W192AA	STA MEPS MINE	PC	3	0	13	26	0	0
W193AA	STA MEPS OMAH	PC	1	0	5	17	0	0
W194AA	STA MEPS SIOU	PC	2	0	8	13	0	0
W195AA	STA MEPS ST L	PC	3	0	11	33	0	0
W196AA	BN USAREC L ANGEL	RC	13	0	233	14	0	0
W197AA	BN USAREC S FRANSCIO	RC	10	0	141	13	0	0
W198AA	BN USAREC PHOENIX	RC	7	0	124	11	0	0
W199AA	BN USAREC PORTLAND	RC	9	0	98	12	0	0
W19AAA	STA MEPS EL PASO	PC	1	0	7	12	0	0
W19BAA	STA MEPS HOUSTON	PC	1	0	12	30	0	0
W19CAA	STA MEPS LITTLE R	PC	1	0	7	20	0	0
W19DAA	STA MEPS NW ORLE	PC	2	0	11	28	0	0
W19EAA	STA MEPS OKLA CT	PC	2	0	8	27	0	0
W19FAA	STA MEPS SN ANTN	PC	2	0	10	30	0	0
W19GAA	STA MEPS SHRVPOR	PC	2	0	5	17	0	0
W19HAA	BN USAREC CHICAGO	RC	11	0	172	13	0	0
W19JAA	BN USAREC DENVER	RC	11	0	134	13	0	0
W19KAA	BN USAREC DES MO	RC	8	0	117	12	0	0
W19LAA	BN USAREC DETRIOT	RC	11	0	178	14	0	0
W19MAA	BN USAREC INDIANPLS	RC	9	0	154	13	0	0
W19NAA	BN USAREC KSNSAS	RC	11	0	151	13	0	0
W19PAA	BN USAREC MILWAU	RC	11	0	180	13	0	0
W19QAA	BN USAREC MINNEA	RC	13	0	178	14	0	0

W19RAA BN USAREC ST LOUIS	RC	10	0	175	13	0	0
W19UAA ACT ALMSA	X1	0	0	7	567	0	0
W19VAA STA MEPS DENV	PC	2	0	13	26	0	0
W19WAA STA MEPS DES	PC	2	0	9	23	0	0
W19XAA STA MEPS DETR	PC	1	0	11	33	0	0
W19YAA STA MEPS FARG	PC	2	0	6	14	0	0
W19ZAA STA MEPS INDI	PC	1	0	10	28	0	0
W1B0AA OFC SACASA(RDA)	SA	87	0	1	122	0	0
W1BYAA OFC LEGISLTVE LSN	SA	26	0	2	27	0	0
W1BZAA OFC CH OF PUB AFFAIRS	SA	23	0	1	25	0	0
W1D2AA SCH USA AD ARTY	TC	255	53	1299	776	0	0
W1D4AA CTR USA ORD SCH &	TC	190	45	1361	565	0	0
W1D5AA SCH USA QM	TC	165	16	892	346	0	0
W1D7AA SCH TRANS& AV LOG	TC	155	66	1100	481	0	0
W1DCAA CTR USA TNG & FT DIX	TC	58	0	640	1532	0	0
W1DQAA U USA MRMNSHIP	FC	31	0	153	28	0	0
W1DXAA SCH USA ARMOR	TC	305	4	2434	552	0	0
W1E0AA CTRUSA JFK SWC & SCH	TC	201	12	814	449	0	0
W1E1AA CTR ALMC	X1	63	0	7	363	0	0
W1E4AA ELE USA DEF INFO SCH	TC	19	0	70	50	0	0
W1E5AA SCH USMA PREP	SF	15	0	27	23	0	0
W1E8AA CTR USA INTEL SCH &	TC	264	30	622	336	0	0
W1EAAA CTR ODMSL&MU SCH&	TC	133	31	919	674	0	0
W1ECAA ELE USA DLI-FLC	TC	38	1	176	1183	0	0
W1ESAA SCH USA INTEL	TC	71	19	1275	282	0	0
W1ETAA SCH USA TJAG	SF	41	1	10	40	0	0
W1EUAA CTR USA CHAP SCH&	TC	51	0	95	48	0	0
W1EXAA CTR SLDR SPT&FT B HAR	TC	253	8	697	1019	0	0
W1FBAA HQ S-FACULTY USMA	MA	746	7	419	2099	0	0
W1J1AA GRP USA SP SCTY	AS	129	7	310	25	0	0
W1JEAA RGN 3RD ROTC SR PROG	TC	369	0	338	108	0	0
W1KYAA RGN 3RD ROTC JR PROG	TC	2	0	14	0	0	0
W1L4AA BDE 1ST AR TNG	TC	86	3	831	124	0	0
W1L7AA BDE 4TH TNG	TC	70	0	426	49	0	0
W1M4AA CMD MTMC MOTBA	MT	5	0	1	136	0	0
W1M5AA CMD MTMC EASTERN AREA	MT	31	0	18	543	0	0
W1M9AA U MTMC BALT OUTPORT	MT	2	0	1	13	0	0
W1MHAA ELE USA-JHGSO-CAMSTA	MW	0	0	23	85	0	0
W1MJAA PLN TWIN CITY AMMO	X1	0	0	0	8	0	0
W1MKAA PLN RAVENNA ARMY AMMO	X1	0	0	0	5	0	0
W1MLAA ACT USA MEDDAC	HS	209	8	468	628	0	0
W1MPAA BDE 2ND TNG (OSUT)	TC	57	1	475	21	0	0
W1MQAA BDE 3RD BASIC TNG	TC	74	0	489	14	0	0
W1MRAA BDE 4TH TNG	TC	52	4	1155	181	0	0
W1MUAA ELE USA SCH OF MUSIC	TC	5	2	91	17	0	0
W1MVAA BDE 3RD BASIC TNG	TC	66	0	404	9	0	0
W1MXAA BDE 5TH TNG	TC	73	1	758	27	0	0
W1N0AA ACT AVRADA	X1	9	0	3	200	0	0
W1N2AA LAB USA ATMOS SCIENCE	X1	3	0	0	386	0	0
W1N3AA LAB ELCT TECH DEVICES	X1	1	0	0	295	0	0
W1NAAA U MTMC SO ATL OTPRT	MT	2	0	3	25	0	0
W1NPAA ACT FSA/AMCCOM	X1	0	0	13	146	0	0
W1NVAA RGN 4TH ROTC SR PROG	TC	385	0	197	135	0	0
W1NWAA RGN 4TH ROTC JR PROG	TC	0	0	8	0	0	0
W1PDAA U CAPE CANAVERAL	MT	1	0	1	9	0	0
W1PEAA U GULP OUTPORT	MT	3	0	4	73	0	0
W1PLAA GRP USA TMDE SPT	X1	4	1	31	317	0	0
W1QAAA TML MTMC MOTSU	MT	6	0	7	271	0	0
W1RCAA GRP TNG	TC	16	0	229	16	0	0

W1SEAA	AGY	USAISC PENTAGON	CZ	40	3	330	590	0	0
W1U3AA	CIR	USA FLD SPT	AS	153	122	185	382	0	0
W1U5AA	ACT	USA MED DEPT	HS	52	1	119	196	0	0
W1U7AA	STA	MEPS ALBANY	PC	1	0	7	15	0	0
W1U9AA	STA	MEPS ATLANTA	PC	1	0	13	23	0	0
W1UXAA	AGY	NG INFO MGT	GB	0	0	0	64	0	0
W1V5AA	RGN	1ST ROTC JR PROG	TC	0	0	19	0	0	0
W1VBAA	STA	MEPS CHICAGO	PC	3	0	22	36	0	0
W1VCAA	STA	MEPS BOISE	PC	1	0	4	13	0	0
W1VQAA	PLN	RIVERBANK A AMMO	X1	1	0	0	10	0	0
W1VWAA	HQ	USASAC	X1	18	0	2	618	0	0
W1WQAA	PLN	VOLUNTEER A AMMO	X1	0	0	0	6	0	0
W1WZAA	TML	MTMC MOTBY	MT	8	1	13	337	0	0
W1YJAA	OFC	RESOURCES MGT	SA	1	0	2	15	0	0
W1YMAA	OFC	GEN COUNSEL	SA	14	0	0	26	0	0
W1YNAA	OFC	EMPL PLCY/GRV REV	SF	0	0	0	15	0	0
W1YSAA	OFC	ADMIN ASST	SA	7	1	0	54	0	0
W1ZAAA	RGN	2ND ROTC JR PROG	TC	0	0	18	0	0	0
W207AA	BN	INFO SYS INSTL	CZ	8	0	402	36	0	0
W21BAA	BKS	USA DISCIPLINARY	TC	26	0	564	119	0	0
W21KAA	AGY	USAISC-MTMC	CZ	1	0	0	219	0	0
W21LAA	AGY	USAISC-EASTERN	CZ	0	0	0	154	0	0
W21MAA	AGY	USAISC-WESTERN	CZ	0	0	0	146	0	0
W21PAA	AGY	USAISC-SUNNY P	CZ	0	0	0	16	0	0
W241AA	AGY	COMD&CON SPT	SF	15	0	58	32	0	0
W248AA	CMD	USAISEC	CZ	41	7	160	459	0	0
W253AA	CIR	USA ENGR DATA PRO	CE	0	0	0	91	0	0
W262AA	CMD	HQ LABCOM	X1	20	0	7	230	0	0
W263AA	ACT	ISA/LABCOM	X1	2	0	0	389	0	0
W264AA	LAB	VAL	X1	1	0	59	196	0	0
W27RAA	ACT	TC COMB ARMS TEST	TC	422	20	964	894	0	0
W280AA	U	USA MH RSCH CO	SF	3	0	3	35	0	0
W293AA	ACT	AVIATION R&T	X1	16	0	1	507	0	0
W2AAAA	BN	USARECSALTLAKE CTY	RC	8	0	116	11	0	0
W2ABAA	BN	USAREC SEATTLE	RC	11	0	169	13	0	0
W2ACAA	STA	MEPS BUTTS	PC	2	0	4	14	0	0
W2ADAA	STA	MEPS SALT	PC	1	0	7	14	0	0
W2AEAA	STA	MEPS FRES	PC	2	0	6	17	0	0
W2AFAA	STA	USA MEPS LOS ANGL	PC	2	0	22	38	0	0
W2AGAA	STA	MEPS OAKL	PC	3	0	19	37	0	0
W2AHAA	STA	MEPS PHOE	PC	2	0	10	23	0	0
W2AJAA	STA	MEPS PORT	PC	2	0	8	24	0	0
W2AKAA	STA	MEPS SEAT	PC	2	0	7	22	0	0
W2ALAA	STA	MEPS SPOK	PC	1	0	6	15	0	0
W2D5AA	AGY	TRANS WHITE HOUSE	MW	0	0	74	0	0	0
W2DHAA	CIR	WRAMC	HS	1012	4	1537	2857	0	1
W2DJAA	ACT	USA RGN DEN-WRAMC	HS	3	0	21	24	0	0
W2DLAA	IST	ARMED FORCES PATH	MD	50	0	32	336	0	9
W2DNAA	CIR	BROOKE ARMY MED	HS	669	5	840	0	0	0
W2DQAA	ACT	USA RGN DEN	HS	3	0	33	7	0	0
W2DRAA	ACT	SPEC FGN-WRAIR	MD	30	0	18	2	155	0
W2DTAA	TML	MTMC WSTR AREA	MT	23	0	47	408	0	0
W2DUAA	TML	MTMC PAC NW OTPRT	MT	2	0	2	50	0	0
W2DVAA	U	SO CAL OUTPORT	MT	1	0	2	23	0	0
W2EKAA	ACT	AMETA	X1	0	0	0	112	0	0
W2EWAA	ACT	SURETY FIELD	X1	1	2	0	6	0	0
W2FLAA	ACT	USA MED DEPT	HS	51	1	102	208	0	0
W2FUAA	PLN	SCRANTON AMMO	X1	2	0	0	17	0	0
W2GJAA	ACT	USAAMC IG	X1	20	1	3	52	0	0

W2H6AA	SCH USA WAR COLLEGE	SF	114	0	52	183	0	0
W2H8AA	ACT USA MED DEPT USMA	HS	87	1	192	172	0	0
W2HMAA	LAB USA MAT-TECH	X1	7	0	1	540	0	0
W2JJAA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	75	2	165	207	0	0
W2JRAA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	165	7	331	400	0	0
W2KLAA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	93	5	263	251	0	0
W2KFAA	DET 1ST USA ESCORT	FC	0	0	9	0	0	0
W2KRAA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	173	5	372	500	0	0
W2L3AA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	236	13	411	798	0	0
W2L5AA	SCH USA INF	TC	528	1	2727	452	0	0
W2L6AA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	304	14	485	752	0	0
W2L8AA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	187	5	361	584	0	0
W2LAAA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	210	9	392	644	0	0
W2LFAA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	168	5	283	328	0	0
W2LMAA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	75	5	175	258	0	0
W2LPAA	GAR USA FT PICKETT	FC	7	1	66	221	0	0
W2M5AA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	326	2	511	767	0	0
W2MBAA	LAB USA CRIM INVES	CB	5	20	9	62	0	14
W2MJAA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	174	7	389	427	0	0
W2MKAA	CMD TNG	TC	16	0	223	20	0	0
W2MLAA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	95	5	177	262	0	0
W2MQAA	CTR USA AEROMEDICAL	HS	115	2	221	224	0	0
W2MSAA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	166	6	373	370	0	0
W2N3AA	CMD USA AD CTR RANGE	TC	5	0	118	64	0	0
W2NKAA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	173	3	305	410	0	0
W2NTAA	SCH USA FIELD ARTY	TC	368	27	1052	561	0	0
W2NVAA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	202	11	388	472	0	0
W2NZAA	GRP USA FA MSL SYS EV	TC	2	0	10	0	0	0
W2P0AA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	151	4	294	446	0	0
W2P1AA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	182	1	321	539	0	0
W2P2AA	HQ USA CGS COLLEGE	TC	467	0	79	304	0	0
W2P4AA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	92	1	161	202	0	0
W2Q4AA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	235	4	482	515	0	0
W2R2AA	STA WATERWAY EXP	CE	3	0	0	704	0	0
W2S5AA	ACT LSSA	X1	0	0	0	362	0	0
W2S9AA	IST LETTERMAN RSCH	MD	27	0	82	84	0	0
W2SBAA	DIV EN MO RIVER	CE	9	0	0	1352	0	0
W2SDAA	DIV EN N ATLANTIC	CE	17	0	15	1512	0	0
W2U8AA	CTR USA ENG STU	CE	5	0	0	50	0	0
W2USAA	AGY USA MSL INTEL	SF	16	0	0	433	0	0
W2V5AA	LAB CONST ENGR RSCH	CE	3	0	0	203	0	0
W2V6AA	DIV EN HUNTSVILLE	CE	11	0	0	504	0	0
W2VNAA	AGY USA LOG EVAL	SF	25	0	5	137	0	0
W2WJAA	ACT APRO BELL	X1	7	3	1	123	0	0
W2Y2AA	AGY CMPT SYS-SEL&ACQ	CZ	16	0	4	102	0	0
W2ZVAA	ACICORRECTIONAL(USACA	FC	34	0	288	93	0	0
W303AA	AGY USA IG	SF	118	2	4	72	0	0
W30MAA	PVG HQ DUGWAY	X1	34	5	106	790	0	0
W30UAA	DET USA STUDENT	TC	1	0	9	8	0	0
W316AA	ACT LAO CONUS	X1	18	0	3	96	0	0
W317AA	OFC PM TRADE	X1	26	0	4	197	0	0
W319AA	ACT USA OPS GROUP	AS	67	11	34	36	0	0
W31SAA	OFC CIVIL WORKS	SA	2	0	0	21	0	0
W31UAA	STA USA FLD SANAN	AS	8	3	259	3	0	0
W31XAA	DET USA INTEL OP	SF	21	1	7	32	0	0
W32AAA	EN CI SS SPT	AS	20	48	105	75	0	0
W32BAA	FAC USA CENTRAL SCTY	AS	4	0	9	93	0	0
W330AA	ACD NCO-ALASKA	FC	0	0	36	4	0	0
W336AA	BD DA MIL REV	SF	27	0	26	106	0	0

W337AA	FISUSAR FTS 89ARCOM	FC	12	0	29	274	0	0
W33TAA	DET USAISC WEST POINT	CZ	2	0	7	53	0	0
W33VAA	ACT USA PERS ASST	MP	1	0	6	0	0	0
W33WAA	ACT USA PERS ASST	MP	1	0	6	0	0	0
W341AA	OFC USA COML COMM	CZ	0	0	10	51	0	0
W34RAA	ACTUSA PNT ADM SYS&BI	HS	11	0	2	154	0	0
W34TAA	CTR USA FA TNG	TC	127	3	1122	85	0	0
W34WAA	ACT TACOMSA	XI	2	0	1	67	0	0
W34ZAA	AGY PGM MGT SYS DEV	SF	0	0	0	10	0	0
W350AA	OFC MTMC MATCU MCCHRD	MT	1	0	2	6	0	0
W351AA	OFC MTMC MATCO NO	MT	0	0	5	5	0	0
W352AA	OFC MTMC MATCU TI	MT	0	0	1	6	0	0
W353AA	OFC MTMC MATCU CH	MT	1	0	5	6	0	0
W354AA	OFC MATCU MCGUIRE	MT	0	0	10	4	0	0
W355AA	OFC MTMC MATCO NO	MT	0	0	0	6	0	0
W35GAA	ACTUSAINSCOM FAA	AS	2	0	7	39	0	0
W35LAA	ACD 7TH IN DIV NCO	FC	0	0	57	1	0	0
W35MAA	ACD 5TH IN DIV NCO	FC	0	0	53	0	0	0
W35SAA	CMD USAISC OPERATN	CZ	11	1	64	56	0	0
W35TAA	CTR USAISC SITERTE	CZ	4	1	216	85	0	0
W35YAA	OFC MTMC MATCU TRAVIS	MT	2	0	14	23	0	0
W35ZAA	OFC MTMC MATCU DOVER	MT	1	0	0	13	0	0
W360AA	OFC USATSA WESTERN	TS	2	0	5	1075	0	0
W36LAA	FAC USA HEALTH	MD	19	1	0	11	0	0
W36PAA	OFC SPACE PROGRAM	SP	23	0	0	21	0	0
W36SAA	ACTUSAINSCOM MAINT	AS	1	2	13	0	0	0
W36WAA	OFC PM NUC MUN	XI	9	2	0	39	0	0
W36XAA	OFC USATSA SOUTHEAST	TS	1	0	8	1817	0	0
W36YAA	OFC SATS NORTHEASTERN	TS	1	0	2	1667	0	0
W36ZAA	OFC USATSA MIDWEST	TS	1	0	6	1634	0	0
W372AA	DET USA FGN AREA OFF	AS	0	1	10	1	0	0
W376AA	ACT USA ACFT DEV TEST	XI	25	12	102	93	0	0
W37BAA	CMD USAISC-USAREC	CZ	2	0	67	88	0	0
W37NAA	HQ US MIL ENT PRO	PC	23	1	34	159	0	0
W37PAA	HQ US MEPCOM CENTRAL	PC	5	0	11	28	0	0
W37QAA	HQ US MEPCOM EAS	PC	5	0	11	30	0	0
W37RAA	HQ US MEPCOM WES	PC	5	0	12	27	0	0
W37VAA	CTR ST LOUIS AREA SPT	XI	2	0	4	46	0	0
W37XAA	ACT AISA AVSCOM	XI	0	0	0	40	0	0
W384AA	GRP USA RSCH ASSOC	SF	10	0	0	0	0	0
W387AA	ACT USA MILPERCEN PAP	MP	1	0	4	0	0	0
W38MAA	ACT USA PAP SEA-TAC	MP	1	0	2	0	0	0
W38NAA	OFC TECH ESCORT	XI	22	0	42	84	0	0
W390AA	PLN MCALESTER AMMO	XI	1	0	0	757	0	0
W398AA	ACT USA HEALTH CARE S	HS	60	0	50	171	0	0
W39BAA	OFC TEST DIR EOGW CM	XI	1	0	0	47	0	0
W39CAA	ACT USA FGN CI	AS	11	7	26	17	0	0
W39LAA	CTR USA NG OP ACT	GB	46	0	0	161	0	0
W39MAA	CTR USA NG PERS OP	GB	0	0	1	49	0	0
W39QAA	HQ USA DESCOM	XI	31	0	13	587	0	0
W39UAA	CTR NATL SCIENCE	TC	1	0	1	44	0	0
W39YAA	PLN HAWTHRONE AMMO	XI	2	0	0	68	0	0
W39ZAA	PLN CRANE ARMY AMMO	XI	1	0	1	706	0	0
W3AFAA	AGY CIV APPELLATE REV	SF	0	0	0	70	0	0
W3EDAA	CTR USAISSSC DEV FT L	CZ	46	1	141	340	0	0
W3CCAA	ACT AUTO SYSTEM	AS	9	3	59	52	0	0
W3CJAA	SCHLST BN 507 INF	TC	15	0	220	9	0	0
W3D0AA	FISUSAR FTS 425 TRNS	FC	2	0	11	42	0	0
W3D1AA	FISUSAR FTS 77 ARCOM	FC	13	0	43	287	0	0

W3D2AA	FTSUSAR FTS 98DIV-TNG	FC	7	0	23	276	0	0
W3D4AA	FTSUSAR FTS 94 ARCOM	FC	12	0	16	308	0	0
W3D5AA	FTSUSAR FTS 76DIV-TNG	FC	11	0	2	125	0	0
W3D7AA	FTSUSAR FTS 79 ARCOM	FC	9	0	23	295	0	0
W3D8AA	FTSUSAR FTS 78DIV-TNG	FC	11	0	11	200	0	0
W3DAAA	FTSUSAR FTS 103 CSC	FC	6	0	19	52	0	0
W3DPAA	FTSUSAR FTS 70DIV-TNG	FC	2	0	2	58	0	0
W3DQAA	FTSUSAR FTS 84DIV-TNG	FC	2	0	5	64	0	0
W3DRAA	FTSUSAR FTS 85DIV-TNG	FC	6	0	5	55	0	0
W3DTAA	FTSUSAR FTS 86 ARCOM	FC	17	0	46	552	0	0
W3DUAA	FTSUSAR FTS 88 ARCOM	FC	14	0	7	255	0	0
W3DVAA	FTSUSAR FTS 102ARCOM	FC	7	0	18	223	0	0
W3DWAA	FTSUSAR FTS 123ARCOM	FC	13	0	24	232	0	0
W3DYAA	FTSUSAR FTS 300 MPC	FC	2	0	7	53	0	0
W3DZAA	FTSUSAR FTS 416EN CMD	FC	5	0	9	122	0	0
W3E0AA	FTSUSAR FTS 377 TAAC	FC	2	0	4	19	0	0
W3E1AA	FTSUSAR FTS 63ARCOM	FC	12	0	35	421	0	0
W3E2AA	FTSUSAR FTS 91DIV-TNG	FC	4	0	4	70	0	0
W3E3AA	FTSUSAR FTS 104DIV-TN	FC	2	0	2	76	0	0
W3E4AA	FTSUSAR FTS 96ARCOM	FC	17	0	43	321	0	0
W3E5AA	FTSUSAR FTS 124ARCOM	FC	20	0	14	362	0	0
W3E6AA	FTSUSAR FTS 351CA CMD	FC	2	0	1	46	0	0
W3E9AA	CIR USA TNG SPT	TC	72	0	48	481	0	0
W3EAAA	FTSUSAR FTS 97 ARCOM	FC	14	0	38	508	0	0
W3ECAA	FTSUSAR FTS 80DIV-TNG	FC	10	0	6	231	0	0
W3EEAA	FTSUSAR FTS 310 TAAC	FC	4	0	22	52	0	0
W3EFAA	FTSUSAR FTS 83 ARCOM	FC	15	0	33	222	0	0
W3EGAA	FTSUSAR FTS 100DIV-TN	FC	6	0	4	67	0	0
W3EHAA	FTSUSAR FTS 99 ARCOM	FC	10	0	42	386	0	0
W3EKAA	FTSUSAR FTS 81 ARCOM	FC	11	2	41	476	0	0
W3ELAA	FTSUSAR FTS 120ARCOM	FC	9	0	29	305	0	0
W3EMAA	FTSUSAR FTS 121ARCOM	FC	11	0	35	394	0	0
W3EPAA	FTSUSAR FTS 412ENCMD	FC	2	0	2	10	0	0
W3EQAA	FTSUSAR FTS 108DIV-TN	FC	2	0	2	62	0	0
W3ERAA	FTSUSAR FTS 87 MAC	FC	12	0	2	26	0	0
W3ETAA	FTSUSAR FTS 90ARCOM	FC	11	0	43	374	0	0
W3EUAA	FTSUSAR FTS 122ARCOM	FC	9	0	21	272	0	0
W3EVAA	FTSUSAR FTS 75 MAC	FC	7	0	1	20	0	0
W3EWAA	FTSUSAR FTS 95 DIV-TN	FC	3	0	2	62	0	0
W3EXAA	FTSUSAR FTS 420EN BDE	FC	5	0	11	74	0	0
W3EYAA	FTSUSAR FTS 807MEDBDE	FC	3	0	11	73	0	0
W3GHAA	ACT GEN MAT & PETRL	X1	1	0	0	194	0	0
W3GMAA	CIR USADACS	X1	0	0	0	202	0	0
W3GZAA	CIR NE TELECOM-USACC	CZ	0	0	0	75	0	0
W3HJAA	AGY USACEEIA-CONUS	CZ	5	0	134	179	0	0
W3HUAA	ACT TV AUDIO SPT	CZ	1	0	7	79	0	0
W3HVAA	GAR HQ USA FT DETRCK	HS	6	0	21	423	0	0
W3J1AA	ELE USA J HLTH SVS	MD	8	0	4	28	0	0
W3J8AA	HQ INSTL SUPPORT ACTV	MW	37	2	665	803	0	0
W3JCAA	ACT AMSAA	X1	16	0	12	432	0	0
W3JUAA	ACT AMC R&D INTERNS	X1	0	0	0	270	0	0
W3K0AA	ACT APRO BOEING	X1	3	2	3	74	0	0
W3K2AA	BD US ARMY TNG	TC	26	0	15	16	0	0
W3KPAA	HQ USACIDC	CB	38	22	38	72	0	0
W3L8AA	GP USA FOREIGN MA	AS	16	0	88	3	0	0
W3LCAA	RGN 1ST USACIDC	CB	18	88	123	81	0	0
W3LDAA	RGN 3RD USACIDC	CB	11	41	61	42	2	0
W3LFAA	RGN 6TH USACIDC	CB	20	93	155	61	0	0
W3M0AA	BN USAREC CINCINNATI	RC	7	0	106	15	0	0

W3M1AA	EN USAREC PEORIA	RC	10	0	148	14	0	0
W3M2AA	EN USAREC ALBANY	RC	7	0	81	13	0	0
W3M3AA	EN USAREC MIAMI	RC	8	0	132	12	0	0
W3MAAA	AGY USAISC-CIDC	CZ	7	0	17	21	0	0
W3MEAA	EN USAREC N HEAVEN	RC	9	0	107	13	0	0
W3MFAA	EN USAREC HARRISBRG	RC	11	0	164	15	0	0
W3MHAA	EN USAREC NEWBURG	RC	8	0	126	14	0	0
W3MJAA	EN USAREC SANTA ANA	RC	11	0	165	14	0	0
W3MKAA	EN USAREC SACRAMTO	RC	11	0	162	12	0	0
W3MLAA	EN USAREC OMAHA	RC	10	0	147	14	0	0
W3MPAA	EN USAREC LANSING	RC	12	0	164	14	0	0
W3MQAA	EN USAREC COLUMBIA	RC	8	0	99	13	0	0
W3MSAA	EN USAREC CLEVELND	RC	11	0	182	15	0	0
W3MTAA	EN USAREC HOUSTON	RC	9	0	130	13	0	0
W3MUAA	EN USAREC ALBUQU	RC	7	0	96	12	0	0
W3MVAA	EN USAREC CHARLOTTE	RC	7	0	90	12	0	0
W3MYAA	EN USAREC JACKSON	RC	10	0	115	15	0	0
W3NQAA	HQ SECOND US ARMY	FC	82	3	54	202	0	0
W3P5AA	DET USAISC FT GREE	CZ	2	0	15	10	0	0
W3P8AA	AGY USA TROOP SUPPORT	TS	33	1	26	390	0	0
W3PXAA	FISUSAR 311 COSCOM	FC	1	0	1	18	0	0
W3Q2AA	AGY USA OT AND EVAL	SF	112	0	2	116	0	0
W3Q4AA	LAB BALLISTIC RSCH	X1	10	0	7	701	0	0
W3Q5AA	LAB HUMAN ENGR	X1	12	0	19	202	0	0
W3QMAA	CTR USA EISENHOWR MED	HS	500	10	650	883	0	0
W3QPAA	AGY USAISC HSC	CZ	9	0	3	61	0	0
W3QTAA	ACD USA SGM	TC	16	0	156	37	0	0
W3R0AA	DET USAISC FT LEWIS	CZ	1	0	51	192	0	0
W3R3AA	DET USAISC FT DRUM	CZ	1	0	4	121	0	0
W3R7AA	DET USAISC FT DEVNS	CZ	0	0	18	61	0	0
W3R8AA	HQ USAISC-TRADOC	CZ	14	0	18	133	0	0
W3R9AA	AGY USAISC FT MONROE	CZ	2	0	46	174	0	0
W3RNAA	U USAISC FORCOM	CZ	3	0	6	84	0	0
W3RPAA	AGY USAISC FT MEADE	CZ	0	0	32	190	0	0
W3RQAA	AGY DET USAISC FTB	CZ	1	0	35	232	0	0
W3RRAA	DET USAISC FT CAMP	CZ	1	0	12	126	0	0
W3RSAA	DET USAISC FT STEWRT	CZ	1	0	24	107	0	0
W3RTAA	DET USAISC FT MCPR	CZ	1	0	90	133	0	0
W3RUAA	AGY USAISC FT HOOD	CZ	8	0	50	164	0	0
W3RVAA	AGY USAISC FT RILEY	CZ	3	0	15	127	0	0
W3RWAA	DET USAISC FT MCCLD	CZ	0	0	0	73	0	0
W3RXAA	AGY USAISC PRESIDI	CZ	1	0	25	162	0	0
W3RZAA	DET USAISC FT CARSN	CZ	2	0	6	110	0	0
W3S2AA	EN USAINSCOM MI	AS	44	19	69	54	0	0
W3SAAA	DET USAISC FT SHERIDN	CZ	1	0	26	78	0	0
W3SBAA	DET USAISC FT BELVR	CZ	1	1	87	163	0	0
W3SCAA	DET USAISC FT EUSTN	CZ	1	0	13	179	0	0
W3SEAA	AGY USAISC FT BENING	CZ	1	0	13	144	0	0
W3SFAA	AGY USAISC FT LEE	CZ	1	0	15	114	0	0
W3SGAA	AGY USAISC FT RUCKER	CZ	2	0	19	161	0	0
W3SHAA	DET USAISC FT HARRSN	CZ	4	0	27	279	0	0
W3SJAA	DET USAISC FT DIX	CZ	1	0	10	91	0	0
W3SKAA	DETUSAISC FT JACK	CZ	2	0	2	76	0	0
W3SLAA	DET USAISC FT POLK	CZ	1	0	18	78	0	0
W3SMAA	DET USAISC FT L WOOD	CZ	1	0	14	94	0	0
W3SNAA	AGY USAISC FT KNOX	CZ	1	0	10	156	0	0
W3SPAA	AGY USAISC FT GORDN	CZ	3	0	57	134	0	0
W3SQAA	DET USAISC FT MCLE	CZ	1	0	7	73	0	0
W3SRAA	AGY USAISC FT BLISS	CZ	3	0	19	130	0	0

W3SSAA	AGY	USAISC FT SILL	CZ	2	0	15	150	0	0
W3STAA	AGY	USAISC FT ORD	CZ	1	0	36	107	0	0
W3SUAA	AGY	USAISC FT LVNWD	CZ	9	0	68	247	0	0
W3SZAA	AGY	USAISC FT HOUSTN	CZ	0	0	34	138	0	0
W3T0AA	DET	USAISC-LEIKY	CZ	0	0	0	253	0	0
W3T1AA	DET	USAISC-LEX BG	CZ	0	0	0	81	0	0
W3T2AA	DET	USAISC-NEW CUM	CZ	0	0	0	151	0	0
W3T4AA	DET	USAISC-RED-RIVER	CZ	0	0	0	101	0	0
W3T5AA	DET	USAISC-SACRMNT	CZ	0	0	0	122	0	0
W3T7AA	DET	USAISC SENECA	CZ	0	0	0	38	0	0
W3T8AA	DET	USAISC SHAPE	CZ	0	0	0	92	0	0
W3T9AA	DET	USAISC-SIERRA	CZ	0	0	0	33	0	0
W3TAAA	ACT	CSLA	XI	1	4	20	217	0	0
W3TDAA	LAB	MED BIOENGR R&D	MD	13	0	14	88	0	0
W3THAA	ACT	CDA	XI	1	0	4	95	0	0
W3TTAA	HQ	USAISC-DARCOM	CZ	4	0	4	189	0	0
W3TUAA	DET	USAISC BUSH HI	CZ	1	0	0	126	0	0
W3TVAA	DET	USAISC-NATICK	CZ	0	0	1	77	0	0
W3TXAA	DET	USAISC-ANISTN	CZ	0	0	0	105	0	0
W3U3AA	AGY	USAISC FT HUACHA	CZ	2	0	65	270	0	0
W3UAAA	DET	USAISC-TOBYHAN	CZ	0	0	0	130	0	0
W3UBAA	DET	USAISC-TOOELE	CZ	1	0	0	130	0	0
W3UFAA	DET	USAISC-MICOM	CZ	0	0	13	394	0	0
W3UGAA	DET	USAISC-CECOM	CZ	0	0	15	404	0	0
W3UHAA	DET	USAISC-TACOM	CZ	0	0	0	325	0	0
W3UJAA	DET	USAISC-AVSCOM	CZ	1	0	7	414	0	0
W3UNAA	DET	USAISC DOVER	CZ	0	0	0	196	0	0
W3UPAA	DET	USAISC PINE BL	CZ	0	0	0	34	0	0
W3UQAA	DET	USAISC RKY MTN	CZ	0	0	0	10	0	0
W3URAA	DET	USAISC ABERDEEN	CZ	1	0	6	191	0	0
W3USAA	DET	USAISC DUGWAY	CZ	0	0	3	70	0	0
W3UTAA	DET	USAISC JEFFERS	CZ	0	0	0	19	0	0
W3UUAA	AGY	USAISC WHITE SNDS	CZ	2	0	70	412	0	0
W3UVAA	DET	USAISC YUMA	CZ	0	0	28	52	0	0
W3UWAA	DET	USAISC ROCK ISLND	CZ	0	0	0	435	0	0
W3UXAA	DET	USAISC WATERLI	CZ	0	0	0	57	0	0
W3V8AA	AGY	USATHAMA	XI	7	0	0	83	0	0
W3VSAA	CIR	USA MIL PERS	MP	415	18	438	1337	0	0
W3VXAA	CIR	AFMIC	MD	10	0	2	49	0	0
W3VYAA	HQ	USA HLTH SVCS COMD	HS	125	3	47	298	0	0
W3VZAA	ACD	USA HEALTH SCIENC	HS	388	19	1198	614	0	0
W3W4AA	HQ	1ST ROTC REGION	TC	44	0	23	74	0	0
W3W5AA	HQ	2D ROTC REGION	TC	33	0	7	66	0	0
W3W6AA	HQ	3D ROTC REGION	TC	42	0	11	64	0	0
W3W7AA	HQ	4TH ROTC REGION	TC	34	0	10	48	0	0
W3WCAA	AGY	CONCEPT ANALYSIS	SF	93	0	10	160	0	0
W3X4AA	ACT	MRSA	XI	8	0	0	357	0	0
W3X7AA	U	GENERAL OFF MESS	SA	0	1	17	0	0	0
W3XTAA	CIR	USA LOGISTICS	TC	174	8	70	497	0	0
W3XUAA	ACT	COMBINED ARMS CD	TC	214	0	56	257	0	0
W3XYAA	CIR	USA TAGCEN	AG	0	0	0	6	0	0
W3Y1AA	CIR	CRIME REC	CB	0	4	6	51	0	0
W3Y4AA	CIR	USA CIV PERS	SF	0	0	0	170	0	0
W3Y6AA	ACD	4TH IN DIV NCO	FC	0	0	74	1	0	0
W3Y7AA	ACD	XVIII ABN CPS NCO	FC	0	0	88	2	0	0
W3Y8AA	ACD	101ST ABN DIV NCO	FC	0	0	59	0	0	0
W3Y9AA	ACD	III CORPS NCO	FC	0	0	103	1	0	0
W3YBAA	HQ	USA FORSCOM	FC	341	12	135	1032	0	0
W3YDAA	CIR	USA THREAT ANAL	SF	113	24	163	270	0	2

W3YTAA HQ USA TRADOC	TC	414	4	87	761	0	0
W3YUAA CIR USA MIL HIST	SF	7	0	3	96	0	0
W3YYAA ACT DA SUPPORT	MW	0	0	4	2	0	0
W3ZAAA ACD 1ST IN DIV NCO	FC	0	0	52	2	0	0
W3ZBAA ACD NCO I CORPS	FC	0	0	61	13	0	0
W3ZHAA SCHDOD POLYG INST	TC	0	5	1	10	0	0
W40UAA CMD INF SYS TST ACT1	CZ	6	4	9	24	0	0
W40VAA ACTINF SYS TEST ACT1	CZ	20	26	372	0	0	0
W4A0AA DET USAISC HAWTHORN	CZ	0	0	0	13	0	0
W4A2AA DET USAISC MCALEST	CZ	0	0	0	35	0	0
W4AEAA CIRTRADOC ANALY CIR	TC	202	0	49	459	0	0
W4AFAA FAC USA CENTRL PERS	MP	7	2	43	79	0	0
W4AHAA DET USAISC INSCOM	CZ	4	1	17	30	0	0
W4AJAA DET USAISC A H STA	CZ	1	1	53	8	0	0
W4AKAA DET USAISCVINTHILL	CZ	1	0	27	11	0	0
W4ARAA OFC TCATA INO/AMC	X1	2	0	0	2	0	0
W4AWAA ACT USACTA	X1	2	0	0	56	0	0
W4B3AA DET USA HAZ DEV	TC	1	0	9	8	0	0
W4BKAA PLN MISS ARMY AMMO	X1	2	0	0	41	0	0
W4BYAA ACT CECOM/FSA	X1	8	1	11	25	0	0
W4C9AA ACD 24TH DIV NCO	FC	0	0	49	1	0	0
W4CHAA AGY USA CONG CORRES	SF	8	0	3	26	0	0
W4CKAA DET USAISC LABCOM	CZ	1	0	0	90	0	0
W4CMAA DET DA CIVINGEDUC DEV	SF	20	0	0	4562	0	0
W4CPAA AGY EEOAA	SF	0	0	0	6	0	0
W4CQAA SYS USA EPG DGTL COMM	X1	20	0	192	0	0	0
W4D7AA LAB USA BIO MED	MD	42	0	42	187	0	0
W4DKAA ACT AUDIOVISUAL	AS	2	0	17	30	0	0
W4DSAA ACTUSADRUGALCOHOLTECH	SF	5	0	2	10	0	0
W4E4AA ACT MEA	X1	0	0	0	312	0	0
W4E6AA CIR NAT TNG CEN&FTIRN	FC	53	7	312	477	0	0
W4EBAA SML DISAD BUS UTIL	SA	2	0	0	5	0	0
W4EGAA GRP USA ENGR TECH REV	CE	5	0	4	259	0	0
W4ELAA STA MEPS SAN DIEGO	PC	2	0	6	17	0	0
W4EQAA CIR USA NG FINN SVCS	GB	0	0	0	6	0	0
W4EYAA CIR USAISSSC DEV ATL	CZ	3	0	2	20	0	0
W4EZAA U 1ST RSCH USAIRM	CZ	6	0	0	15	0	0
W4F0AA THE AIR ASSLT SCHOOL	FC	1	0	32	0	0	0
W4F7AA DETFC NUCL WEAP	FC	0	0	13	2	0	0
W4FBAA ACT MUN PRODBASE	X1	7	0	0	145	0	0
W4FCAA U USAISC FT IRWIN	CZ	2	0	58	45	0	0
W4FFAA OFCUSAMEDDAC FT IRWIN	HS	69	0	179	69	0	0
W4FHAA DET USAISEC	CZ	29	0	27	306	0	0
W4FSAA ACT USA ENGR CAP	CE	5	0	4	706	0	0
W4FXAA AGY MIL POSTAL SVC	AG	0	0	3	27	0	0
W4G1AA STA MEPS TAM	PC	2	0	19	18	0	0
W4G7AA BTY USAFAC MLRS TNG	TC	7	0	63	4	0	0
W4G8AA CIR CECOM R&D	X1	50	3	129	1693	0	0
W4GBAA ACT USA PAA ST LOUIS	MP	1	0	6	0	0	0
W4GGAA HQ TACOM	X1	188	6	152	4462	0	0
W4GHAA CIR TACOM R&D	X1	31	0	1	857	0	0
W4GPAA IST USA OF MED DIS	MD	62	1	227	297	0	0
W4GQAA AGYUSA MIL POLICE OPE	SF	9	0	1	7	0	0
W4GRAA U USAISC FT MEPCOM	CZ	0	0	0	3	0	0
W4GVAA OFC HQ CECOM	X1	248	8	215	5353	0	0
W4GXAA ACTUSA INTEL SPT	AS	53	25	213	4	0	0
W4GZAA ACT SRWIA	X1	1	8	7	0	0	0
W4H2AA CIR USA TNG	TC	126	0	833	118	0	0
W4HPAA ACT SPSA	X1	11	1	7	10	0	0

W4J1AA ACIUSAUNSCOM EI&CM	AS	2	3	63	33	0	0
W4J3AA ACIUSA ATC COMBAT SUP	FC	5	0	1	14	0	0
W4J9AA CIR USA NTC OPNS	TC	243	1	381	20	0	0
W4JBAA U EDCA	X1	4	0	0	18	0	0
W4JCAA ACT USA SATFA	TC	6	0	2	54	0	0
W4JKAA OFC OPM JTF	X1	25	2	4	72	0	0
W4JNAA OFC PM LAV	X1	2	0	0	34	0	0
W4JPAA OFC USA SURV MGT	X1	3	0	0	18	0	0
W4JTAA CO ARMY BRDCST SVC	SF	10	0	336	86	37	65
W4JXAA ACT TC MGT ENGR	TC	0	0	0	250	0	0
W4K5AA CIR USA CMEMP & MCLN	TC	34	6	301	696	0	0
W4K6AA GRP BASIC TNG COMM	TC	10	0	112	8	0	0
W4K7AA EDE TNG	TC	79	0	554	26	0	0
W4K8AA SCH USA MP	TC	147	12	441	161	0	0
W4K9AA SCH USA CML	TC	153	0	390	223	0	0
W4KBAA AGY DSN SYS MGT	SF	45	0	0	7	0	0
W4KKAA BN US MI (LI)	AS	24	14	170	3	0	0
W4KNAA ACT USAPROTECTIVE SVC	CB	0	23	6	0	0	0
W4KPAA U USA INTEL EXEC	AS	9	6	22	48	0	0
W4KQAA ACT USA HCS&CLIN INV	BS	23	0	3	13	0	0
W4KTAA OFC CDE MISSILE CONST	CE	3	0	0	10	0	0
W4KVAA ACT TC CONTRACT	TC	1	0	0	88	0	0
W4L6AA ACT TMDE SUPPORT	X1	0	0	138	892	0	0
W4LDAA CIRUSA HECSA	CE	0	0	0	65	0	0
W4LJAA AGYUSARMARDA	SF	5	0	30	101	0	0
W4LKAA CMD NYA & FT HAMLIN	TC	15	0	116	178	0	0
W4LXAA RESOURCE MGMT OPS ACT	FC	0	0	1	190	0	0
W4M0AA CIRUSAPERCENN	SF	31	0	46	1147	0	0
W4M2AA ACIMPR SINS SYS	MT	0	0	0	34	0	2
W4M6AA USAMRU	MD	1	0	2	1	0	0
W4M8AA CIR USA TRALINET	TC	0	0	0	18	0	0
W4MKAA CIR ARDEC	X1	57	0	22	3862	0	0
W4MLAA CIR USA CHEM R&D	X1	51	0	46	1262	0	0
W4MMAA HQ AMCCOM	X1	155	4	135	5654	0	0
W4MRAA CO USA DEV&EMPL AGY	SF	10	0	0	10	0	0
W4MSAA US ARMY RES SPT GRP	FC	284	6	474	167	0	0
W4MTAA US ARMY RES SPT GRP	FC	238	7	383	108	0	0
W4MUAA US ARMY RES SPT GRP	FC	166	4	304	92	0	0
W4MVAA US ARMY RES SPT GRP	FC	172	6	249	86	0	0
W4MWAA US ARMY RES SPT GRP	FC	165	10	270	88	0	0
W4MXAA AGY CMD SYS INT	SF	44	1	7	41	0	0
W4N7AA AGY USA HEALTH SUP	MD	97	0	1	162	0	1
W4N8AA CO INTEL SCH TNG SPT	TC	8	5	188	3	0	0
W4NHAA HQ USAISC	CZ	56	2	27	652	0	0
W4NWAA DETFC NUCL WEAP	FC	0	1	10	2	0	0
W4NXAA DETFC NUCL WEAP	FC	0	1	1	4	0	0
W4P0AA OFCOASA(IL)	SA	8	0	0	29	0	0
W4P8AA ACT USA S & ANALY	TC	99	0	16	187	0	0
W4PAAA ACTCONUS COMM SPT A	CZ	31	25	294	39	0	0
W4PBAA ACT MGT ENG	CZ	0	0	0	54	0	0
W4PCAA AGY USA FORCE DEV SPT	SF	2	0	1	69	0	0
W4PHAA USAR READINESS TNG C	FC	0	0	0	89	0	0
W4PQAA AGY FLD OPERATING	MT	18	0	3	218	0	1
W4PTAA CIR COST & ECON ANA	SF	6	0	0	117	0	0
W4PZAA ACT USAMRA	MD	2	0	0	91	0	0
W4QFAA ACT USAMMD	MD	25	0	0	38	0	0
W4QPAA AGY USA INTEL	SF	9	0	5	25	0	0
W4QSAA AGY USA CONT SPT	SF	11	0	0	52	0	0
W4QTAA FC INFO MGT FOA	FC	7	1	70	36	0	0

W4QUAA U USA CSTA	X1	32	1	190	1164	0	0
W4QVAA ACT ISA/APG	X1	20	2	206	1373	0	0
W4RHAA CIR USA COMM FAM	SF	23	0	12	120	3	0
W4RJAA ACTUSA MED DEPT	HS	29	0	82	100	0	0
W4RLAA ACT FC PI (FOA)	FC	0	0	0	30	0	0
W4RPAA BDELST AD TNG BDE	TC	68	2	576	70	0	0
W4RQAA ACT COMB ARMS TNG	TC	154	0	55	52	0	0
W4RVAA ACT USA IMA	X1	3	2	8	38	0	0
W4S1AA U USA MORTUARY-OAKLD	MP	0	0	2	6	0	0
W4SYAA HQ ROTC CADET CMD	TC	39	0	6	83	0	0
W4T8AA HQ SIR DEF CMD	SC	145	2	25	1087	0	0
W4TDAA ACT COMM SYS TEST	CZ	12	15	267	0	0	0
W4TFAA PLT DETROIT TNK	X1	3	0	1	92	0	0
W4TGAA PLT LIMA TANK	X1	6	0	1	96	0	0
W4TKAA AGYUSARMY COMM ACTS	SF	2	0	0	6	0	0
W4TVAA FTS USAR 125 AR	FC	5	0	15	247	0	0
W4U2AA ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	60	2	111	151	0	0
W4UBAA SCHUSA SCH AMERICAS	TC	54	0	154	71	0	0
W4UHAA GRP USA SPT ALASKA	FC	9	0	13	13	0	0
W4UJAA GAR USA ALASKA	FC	80	11	917	1692	0	0
W4ULAA CMD PERS INFO SYSTEM	CZ	24	2	36	358	0	0
W4UMAA U USAISC-RSRCH INST	CZ	1	0	0	24	0	0
W4URAA CIR USAISC-ARPERCEN	CZ	6	0	7	314	0	0
W4USAA CIR USAISC-MILPERCEN	CZ	10	1	70	171	0	0
W4UTAA ACT CONTRACT SUPPORT	AS	0	0	0	30	0	0
W4UUAA ACTPEN CIV PERS ACTY	TC	0	0	0	79	0	0
W4UXAA ELEFWD SPT	FC	0	1	19	0	0	0
W4UYAA PLTLINGUIST SPT	FC	2	2	96	0	0	0
W4UZAA OFC PM RMA	X1	2	0	0	34	0	0
W4V0AA ACTUSA STUSANALYSIS	AS	20	3	1	20	0	0
W4VKAA ACT USACID FLD INVSTG	CB	1	6	2	2	0	0
W4VMAA OFC PM RCASRLVIOR	CZ	0	0	0	65	0	0
W4VNAA FT US ARMY FT BELVOIR	MW	25	0	150	611	0	0
W4VUAA AGYUSA SPECIAL OPS	SF	41	0	4	11	0	0
W4VYAA ACTUSA INSCM FORG MOD	AS	1	0	3	24	0	0
W4W3AA U NG TECHNICIAN	GB	0	0	0	28120	0	0
W4W6AA CIRJOINT READ TNG CIR	TC	68	1	212	18	0	0
W4X7AA MEPS	PC	2	0	18	19	0	0
W4X9AA AGYUSA CHEM DEMIL	SF	1	0	0	5	0	0
W4XCAA AGYUSA P&O INFO SPT	SF	3	0	0	10	0	0
W4XFAA AGYUSA INFO MGT SUPRT	SF	7	0	5	79	0	0
W4XGAA AGYUSA PUB&PRINTING	SF	13	0	17	499	0	0
W4XQAA AGYUSA SPACE	SP	34	0	3	4	0	0
W4XWAA ACT LOG PROG SPT	X1	6	0	13	141	0	0
W4Y0AA AGY STAMMIS PEO	CZ	34	0	11	186	0	0
W4Y7AA OFC PEO AMMO	X1	4	0	0	59	0	0
W4YAAA CIR USAISC-WRAMC	CZ	7	0	38	107	0	0
W4YBAA CIR USAISC-FAMC	CZ	1	0	9	61	0	0
W4YCAA CIR USAISC-FT DETRICK	CZ	1	0	18	57	0	0
W4YJAA INSUSA SPACE INST	TC	11	1	2	22	0	0
W4YNAA AGYUSA OE REVIEWL	SF	4	0	0	30	0	0
W4YRAA ACTUSAISC SBNA	CZ	6	0	0	37	0	0
W4YYAA AGY NETWORKS PEO	CZ	19	0	28	163	0	0
W4YZAA AGY CMIS PEO	CZ	18	0	0	86	0	0
W4ZTAA AGYSTUDY PGM MGT	SF	3	0	0	8	0	0
W4ZUAA OFCAUDITOR GENERAL	SA	0	0	0	1	0	0
W7L0AA U MARKSMANSHIP TNG	NG	10	7	38	0	0	0
W7LZAA ACT ARNG TNG SITE	NG	57	13	187	0	0	0
W7P5AA CMD MVR TNG (DIV)	FC	170	2	143	0	0	0

W7P6AA	CMD MVR TNG (DIV)	FC	170	2	143	0	0	0
W7P7AA	CMD MVR TNG (DIV)	FC	169	2	144	0	0	0
W7P8AA	CMD MVR TNG (DIV)	FC	170	2	143	0	0	0
W7P9AA	CMD MVR TNG (DIV)	FC	170	2	143	0	0	0
W7PEAA	DET CIVIL DEF SPT	FC	2	0	35	0	0	0
W7PFAA	DET CIVIL DEF SPT	FC	2	0	35	0	0	0
W7PGAA	DET CIVIL DEF SPT	FC	2	0	60	0	0	0
W7PHAA	DET CIVIL DEF SPT	FC	2	0	35	0	0	0
W7PJAA	DET CIVIL DEF SPT	FC	2	0	60	0	0	0
W7PKAA	DET CIVIL DEF SPT	FC	2	0	60	0	0	0
W7PLAA	DET CIVIL DEF SPT	FC	2	0	35	0	0	0
W7PMAA	DET CIVIL DEF SPT	FC	2	0	60	0	0	0
W7Q0AA	CMD MVR TNG (DIV)	FC	170	2	143	0	0	0
W7Q4AA	ACT ARNG TNG SITE	NG	44	14	145	0	0	0
W7Q5AA	ACT ARNG TNG SITE	NG	49	10	186	0	0	0
W7Q6AA	ACT ARNG TNG SITE	NG	44	12	165	0	0	0
W7Q8AA	ACT ARNG TNG SITE	NG	44	13	148	0	0	0
W7Q9AA	ACT ARNG TNG SITE	NG	42	13	149	0	0	0
W7QAAA	CMD MVR TNG (DIV)	FC	170	2	150	0	0	0
W7QBAA	CMD MVR TNG (DIV)	FC	170	2	143	0	0	0
W7QDAA	OFF USA STATE MIL SPT	FC	8	0	8	0	0	0
W7QEAA	OFF USA STATE MIL SPT	FC	13	0	0	0	0	0
W7QFAA	OFF USA STATE MIL SPT	FC	12	0	12	0	0	0
W7QLAA	CMD USAR	FC	87	8	90	0	0	0
W7QNAA	ACTEASTERN ARNG ATS	NG	17	45	58	0	0	0
W7QUAA	CIR USA MAP DISTR	FC	6	0	102	0	0	0
W7QWAA	ELM USA NAVEUR	FC	3	0	0	0	0	0
W7QXAA	CMD MVR TNG (DIV)	FC	249	2	131	0	0	0
W7QZAA	ACT DISP EQUIP TNG	GB	2	1	58	0	0	0
W7RDAA	U PASSENGER LIAISON	FC	4	0	4	0	0	0
W7RHAA	ACT ARNG TNG SITE	NG	47	10	161	0	0	0
W7RIAA	ACTBATTLE SKILLSCRSE	NG	0	1	71	0	0	0
W7S6AA	CMD USA TWO MIL INTEL	FC	8	0	3	0	0	0
W7T0AA	SEC AVN-108 DIV (TNG)	FC	5	0	7	0	0	0
W7T4AA	SEC AVN-91 DIV (TNG)	FC	5	0	7	0	0	0
W7TCAA	ELM USA ATLANTIC DEF	FC	17	0	2	0	0	0
W7TDAA	ELM USA CARIBBEAN CMD	FC	20	1	10	0	0	0
W7TEAA	ELM USA ICELAND DEF	FC	9	0	4	0	0	0
W7TKAA	DEP GROTON CT AVCRAD	NG	16	23	372	0	0	0
W7TLAA	DEPSPRINGFIELD AVCRAD	NG	13	24	266	0	0	0
W7TMAA	DEPFRESNO CA AVCRAD	NG	12	23	268	0	0	0
W7TNAA	DEPTOGULFPORTMSAVCRAD	NG	8	16	127	0	0	0
W7TPAA	DEPAVCRAD CMD & CON	NG	17	20	28	0	0	0
W7TQAA	ACT DISP EQUIP TNG	GB	3	1	88	0	0	0
W7TSAA	DET USA TRANS RR SVC	FC	5	0	142	0	0	0
W7TWAA	DET USA PORT SCTY	FC	3	0	64	0	0	0
W7TXAA	U INT/OP CIR SPT ADG	FC	23	0	20	0	0	0
W7TYAA	SEC AVN-100 DIV (TNG)	FC	3	2	7	0	0	0
W7TZAA	SEC AVN-104 DIV (TNG)	FC	5	0	8	0	0	0
W7U1AA	GRP TRAINING-104 DIV	FC	60	3	483	0	0	0
W7U2AA	GRP LOGISTIC-104 DIV	FC	13	3	129	0	0	0
W7U3AA	GRP TRAINING-91 DIV	FC	32	3	271	0	0	0
W7U4AA	GRP LOGISTIC-91 DIV	FC	10	3	67	0	0	0
W7U5AA	GRP TRAINING-98 DIV	FC	15	4	45	0	0	0
W7U7AA	GRP TRAINING-78 DIV	FC	64	3	492	0	0	0
W7U8AA	GRP LOGISTIC-78 DIV	FC	17	3	135	0	0	0
W7U9AA	GRP TRAINING-80 DIV	FC	60	3	476	0	0	0
W7UBAA	ACT NAVAJO ARMY DEPOT	GB	15	11	108	0	0	0
W7UCAA	DET USA PORT SCTY	FC	3	0	64	0	0	0

W7UDAA	HHC USATHREE (ADG)	FC	108	10	273	0	0	0
W7UEAA	HSP USA (ADG)	AR	14	0	47	0	0	0
W7UPAA	GRP TRAINING-100 DIV	FC	45	3	276	0	0	0
W7UQAA	OFF USA STATE MIL SPT	FC	8	0	1	0	0	0
W7URAA	GRP TRAINING-70 DIV	FC	49	4	784	0	0	0
W7UUAA	GRP LOGISTIC-100 DIV	FC	18	9	178	0	0	0
W7UWAA	GRP TRAINING-85 DIV	FC	72	7	453	0	0	0
W7UXAA	GRP TRAINING-84 DIV	FC	48	5	302	0	0	0
W7UYAA	GRP LOGISTIC-84 DIV	FC	20	5	131	0	0	0
W7UZAA	GRP TRAINING-95 DIV	FC	81	6	582	0	0	0
W7V0AA	ACIWESTERN ARNG ATS	NG	16	32	67	0	0	0
W7V1AA	SCH 1ST USA ITAAS	FC	9	4	12	0	0	0
W7V2AA	SCH 2D USA ITAAS	FC	9	4	12	0	0	0
W7V3AA	SCH 4TH USA ITAAS	FC	9	4	12	0	0	0
W7V4AA	SCH 6TH USA ITAAS	FC	9	4	12	0	0	0
W7V5AA	SCH 5TH USA ITAAS	FC	9	4	12	0	0	0
W7V6AA	DET OPN SPT AIRLIFT	FC	1	7	3	0	0	0
W7V7AA	HQ USA GAR	FC	69	6	156	0	0	0
W7V8AA	ACT NCO ACADEMY(ENCO)	NG	0	2	68	0	0	0
W7V9AA	ACT NCO ACADEMY(ENCO)	NG	0	1	66	0	0	0
W7VAAA	GRP LOGISTIC-80 DIV	FC	24	5	133	0	0	0
W7VBAA	GRP TRAINING-76 DIV	FC	68	4	433	0	0	0
W7VCAA	GRP LOGISTIC-76 DIV	FC	11	3	103	0	0	0
W7VDAA	GRP TRAINING-108 DIV	FC	78	4	536	0	0	0
W7VEAA	GRP LOGISTIC-108 DIV	FC	16	2	90	0	0	0
W7VFAA	DET USA PORT SCTY	FC	3	0	64	0	0	0
W7VGAA	GRP TRAINING-402 BDE	FC	14	1	148	0	0	0
W7VHAA	CMD SPT (CONUSA ADG)	FC	94	2	118	0	0	0
W7VMAA	OFF USA STATE MIL SPT	FC	7	0	7	0	0	0
W7VNAA	DET 1ST SOCOM ADG ABN	SO	15	1	14	0	0	0
W7VPAA	CMD USAR	FC	82	6	92	0	0	0
W7VQAA	DET SIGNAL (USAISC)	FC	10	2	65	0	0	0
W7VRAA	DET SIGNAL (USAISC)	FC	8	2	51	0	0	0
W7VSAA	DET SIGNAL (USAISC)	FC	10	2	56	0	0	0
W7VTAA	DET SIGNAL (USAISC)	FC	10	2	63	0	0	0
W7VUAA	DET SIGNAL (USAISC)	FC	10	2	65	0	0	0
W7VVAA	DET SIGNAL (USAISC)	FC	7	2	40	0	0	0
W7VWAA	DET SIGNAL (USAISC)	FC	10	2	66	0	0	0
W7VXAA	DET 3397 SIG USAISC	FC	10	2	65	0	0	0
W7VYAA	DET SIGNAL (USAISC)	FC	10	2	54	0	0	0
W7VZAA	DET SIGNAL (USAISC)	FC	7	2	46	0	0	0
W7W1AA	REG TNG SITE MED	NG	3	1	23	0	0	0
W7W2AA	ACT REG MNT TNG SITE	NG	1	1	11	0	0	0
W7W3AA	ACT REG MNT TNG SITE	NG	1	1	11	0	0	0
W7W4AA	ACT REG MNT TNG SITE	NG	1	1	11	0	0	0
W7W5AA	ACT REG MIN WFR SCH	NG	7	0	41	0	0	0
W7WAAA	ACT NCO ACADEMY(ENCO)	NG	0	1	68	0	0	0
W7WBAA	ACT NCO ACADEMY(ENCO)	NG	0	1	68	0	0	0
W7WCAA	ACT NCO ACADEMY(ENCO)	NG	0	1	68	0	0	0
W7WDAA	ACT NCO ACADEMY(ANCO)	NG	0	0	57	0	0	0
W7WFAA	HQ USA GAR	FC	15	2	56	0	0	0
W7WGAA	U ASA CON & PROCESS	FC	1	4	30	0	0	0
W7WHAA	LIGHT LEADERS COURSE	NG	6	0	49	0	0	0
W7WJAA	ACITANK CO COURSE	NG	2	1	47	0	0	0
W7WKAA	ACT REG TNG CENTER	NG	5	1	23	0	0	0
W7WLAA	ACT REG MNT TNG SITE	NG	1	1	11	0	0	0
W7WMAA	ACT REG MNT TNG SITE	NG	1	1	11	0	0	0
W7WNAA	ACT REG MNT TNG SITE	NG	1	1	11	0	0	0
W7WPAA	ACT REG MNT TNG SITE	NG	1	1	11	0	0	0

W7WQAA	SCH LIT LDR CRS(205IB)	FC	2	0	19	0	0	0
W7WTAA	ACD USACNE RC NCO	FC	0	0	79	0	0	0
W7WUAA	ACD USATWO RC NCO	FC	0	0	79	0	0	0
W7WVAA	ACD USATWO RC NCO	FC	0	0	79	0	0	0
W7WWAA	ACD USAFOUR RC NCO	FC	0	0	79	0	0	0
W7WXAA	ACD USAFIVE RC NCO	FC	0	0	79	0	0	0
W7WYAA	ACD USASIX RC NCO	FC	0	0	79	0	0	0
W7XDAA	ACT REG TNG SITE MED	NG	3	1	23	0	0	0
W7XFAA	ACT REG MNT TNG SITE	NG	1	1	11	0	0	0
W7XGAA	ACT REG MNT TNG SITE	NG	1	1	11	0	0	0
W7XHAA	ACT REG MNT TNG SITE	NG	1	1	11	0	0	0
W7XJAA	HHC LINGUIST MI GROUP	NG	17	4	42	0	0	0
W7XKAA	ACT DATA PROC VA ARNG	NG	10	22	99	0	0	0
W7XLAA	DET 2374 SIG USAISC	FC	10	2	56	0	0	0
W800AA	SCH USARF	FC	20	3	138	0	0	0
W801AA	SCH USARF	FC	23	2	83	0	0	0
W802AA	SCH USARF	FC	29	3	69	0	0	0
W803AA	SCH USARF	FC	27	3	164	0	0	0
W804AA	SCH USARF	FC	32	3	189	0	0	0
W805AA	SCH USARF	FC	27	2	95	0	0	0
W806AA	SCH USARF	FC	36	7	162	0	0	0
W807AA	SCH USARF	FC	23	3	112	0	0	0
W80AAA	SCH USARF	FC	28	3	94	0	0	0
W80BAA	SCH USARF	FC	36	4	83	0	0	0
W80CAA	SCH USARF	FC	49	5	144	0	0	0
W80DAA	SCH USARF	FC	38	8	130	0	0	0
W80EAA	SCH USARF	FC	28	4	91	0	0	0
W80FAA	SCH USARF	FC	58	6	262	0	0	0
W80HAA	SCH USARF	FC	19	2	94	0	0	0
W80KAA	SCH USARF	FC	27	6	88	0	0	0
W80LAA	SCH USARF	FC	29	5	67	0	0	0
W80MAA	SCH USARF	FC	21	5	64	0	0	0
W80PAA	SCH USARF	FC	29	5	67	0	0	0
W80UAA	SCH USARF	FC	28	3	117	0	0	0
W80VAA	SCH USARF	FC	20	4	89	0	0	0
W80WAA	SCH USARF	FC	20	3	88	0	0	0
W80XAA	SCH USARF	FC	21	3	92	0	0	0
W80YAA	SCH USARF	FC	37	2	112	0	0	0
W80ZAA	SCH USARF	FC	28	3	100	0	0	0
W811AA	SCH USARF	FC	40	3	162	0	0	0
W814AA	SCH USARF	FC	35	4	117	0	0	0
W81CAA	SCH USARF	FC	38	8	124	0	0	0
W81DAA	SCH USARF	FC	34	4	83	0	0	0
W81FAA	SCH USARF	FC	36	6	70	0	0	0
W81GAA	SCH USARF	FC	33	3	143	0	0	0
W81LAA	SCH USARF	FC	20	2	128	0	0	0
W81NAA	SCH USARF	FC	34	4	126	0	0	0
W81TAA	SCH USARF	FC	25	6	108	0	0	0
W81ZAA	SCH USARF	FC	27	3	124	0	0	0
W820AA	SCH USARF	FC	27	2	107	0	0	0
W821AA	SCH USARF	FC	23	2	143	0	0	0
W822AA	SCH USARF	FC	43	6	111	0	0	0
W824AA	SCH USARF	FC	42	6	111	0	0	0
W825AA	SCH USARF	FC	41	5	151	0	0	0
W826AA	SCH USARF	FC	38	7	172	0	0	0
W827AA	SCH USARF	FC	37	8	129	0	0	0
W82HAA	SCH USARF	FC	38	4	89	0	0	0
W82KAA	SCH USARF	FC	28	4	115	0	0	0
W82LAA	SCH USARF	FC	27	3	147	0	0	0

W82MAA	SCH USARF	FC	24	3	115	0	0	0
W82NAA	SCH USARF	FC	23	2	98	0	0	0
W82PAA	SCH USARF	FC	19	2	82	0	0	0
W82QAA	SCH USARF	FC	22	2	92	0	0	0
W82RAA	SCH USARF	FC	27	2	104	0	0	0
W82SAA	SCH USARF	FC	26	2	129	0	0	0
W82UAA	SCH USARF	FC	39	2	89	0	0	0
W82VAA	SCH USARF	FC	36	3	134	0	0	0
W82WAA	SCH USARF	FC	26	3	91	0	0	0
W82XAA	SCH USARF	FC	28	4	96	0	0	0
W82ZAA	SCH USARF	FC	21	3	109	0	0	0
W83AAA	SCH USARF	FC	33	2	103	0	0	0
W83BAA	SCH USARF	FC	23	3	118	0	0	0
W83CAA	SCH USARF	FC	32	7	92	0	0	0
W83DAA	SCH USARF	FC	31	6	78	0	0	0
W83EAA	SCH USARF	FC	41	9	145	0	0	0
W83FAA	SCH USARF	FC	28	2	106	0	0	0
W83HAA	SCH USARF	FC	47	8	257	0	0	0
W83JAA	SCH USARF	FC	28	5	97	0	0	0
W83KAA	SCH USARF	FC	27	3	90	0	0	0
W83LAA	SCH USARF	FC	29	3	103	0	0	0
W83MAA	SCH USARF	FC	22	2	104	0	0	0
W83ZAA	DET SEL SVC	FC	249	9	0	0	0	0
W84RAA	SCH USARF	FC	37	7	107	0	0	0
W86GAA	HSP USA 500B	FC	107	2	286	0	0	0
W8AQAA	HQ STARC IA	NG	138	51	294	0	0	0
W8A1AA	HQ STARC KS	NG	113	36	252	0	0	0
W8A2AA	HQ STARC KY	NG	96	34	269	0	0	0
W8A3AA	HQ STARC LA	NG	123	49	329	0	0	0
W8A4AA	HQ STARC ME	NG	84	27	178	0	0	0
W8A5AA	HQ STARC MD	NG	115	47	364	0	0	0
W8A6AA	HQ STARC MA	NG	125	65	340	0	0	0
W8A7AA	HQ STARC SD	NG	82	29	179	0	0	0
W8A8AA	HQ STARC OK	NG	137	65	321	0	0	0
W8A9AA	HQ STARC TN	NG	151	55	388	0	0	0
W8ABAA	HSP 0147 USA 100 B	NG	38	1	87	0	0	0
W8ACAA	HQ STARC MI	NG	140	69	380	0	0	0
W8ADAA	HQ STARC CT	NG	101	48	250	0	0	0
W8AEAA	HQ STARC MN	NG	121	55	332	0	0	0
W8AFAA	HQ STARC DE	NG	86	28	147	0	0	0
W8AGAA	HQ STARC MS	NG	150	56	371	0	0	0
W8AHAA	HQ DC DARC	NG	78	27	151	0	0	0
W8AJAA	HQ STARC MO	NG	145	48	338	0	0	0
W8AKAA	HQ STARC FL	NG	120	40	272	0	0	0
W8ALAA	HQ STARC MT	NG	83	21	163	0	0	0
W8AMAA	HQ STARC GA	NG	166	66	349	0	0	0
W8ANAA	HQ STARC NE	NG	79	36	227	0	0	0
W8AQAA	HQ STARC NV	NG	64	14	117	0	0	0
W8ARAA	HQ STARC ID	NG	91	28	271	0	0	0
W8ASAA	HQ STARC AL	NG	193	92	536	0	0	0
W8ATAA	HQ STARC IL	NG	132	58	316	0	0	0
W8AUAA	HQ STARC AK	NG	59	17	95	0	0	0
W8AVAA	HQ STARC IN	NG	121	44	363	0	0	0
W8AWAA	HQ STARC AZ	NG	96	44	245	0	0	0
W8AXAA	HQ STARC AR	NG	130	53	337	0	0	0
W8AYAA	HQ STARC CA	NG	188	93	572	0	0	0
W8AZAA	HQ STARC CO	NG	80	34	180	0	0	0
W8BAAA	HQ STARC OR	NG	118	43	354	0	0	0
W8BBAA	HQ STARC TX	NG	145	66	468	0	0	0

W8BDAA HQ STARC UT	NG	95	40	198	0	0	0
W8BEAA HQ STARC RI	NG	86	30	173	0	0	0
W8BFAA HQ STARC VT	NG	81	28	207	0	0	0
W8BGAA HQ STARC SC	NG	143	48	318	0	0	0
W8BHAA HQ STARC NH	NG	78	21	155	0	0	0
W8BJAA HQ STARC VA	NG	112	68	489	0	0	0
W8BKAA HQ STARC NJ	NG	119	49	369	0	0	0
W8BLAA HQ STARC WA	NG	102	35	250	0	0	0
W8BMAA HQ STARC NM	NG	89	19	161	0	0	0
W8BNAA HQ STARC NY	NG	199	86	598	0	0	0
W8BPAA HQ STARC NC	NG	126	44	339	0	0	0
W8BQAA HQ STARC ND	NG	72	33	182	0	0	0
W8BRAA HQ STARC OH	NG	157	62	431	0	0	0
W8BSAA HQ STARC WV	NG	86	21	185	0	0	0
W8BTAA HQ STARC WI	NG	130	38	284	0	0	0
W8BUAA HQ STARC WY	NG	65	22	146	0	0	0
W8BWAA HQ STARC PA	NG	124	60	369	0	0	0
W8C0AA CMD USAR	FC	87	12	109	0	0	0
W8C7AA CMD USAR	FC	98	7	120	0	0	0
W8C8AA CMD USAR	FC	89	8	107	0	0	0
W8C9AA CMD USAR	FC	91	10	95	0	0	0
W8CJAA CMD 0094 USAR	FC	92	7	110	0	0	0
W8CMAA CMD USAR	FC	97	7	121	0	0	0
W8CNAA CMD USAR	FC	90	8	115	0	0	0
W8CPAA CMD USAR	FC	90	8	111	0	0	0
W8CQAA CMD 0121 USAR	FC	95	14	120	0	0	0
W8CTAA CMD USAR	FC	84	8	95	0	0	0
W8CUAA CMD 0090 USAR	FC	89	9	103	0	0	0
W8CVAA CMD USAR	FC	91	8	127	0	0	0
W8CWAA CMD USAR	FC	86	7	96	0	0	0
W8CXAA CMD USAR	FC	95	6	106	0	0	0
W8CYAA CMD USAR	FC	88	12	101	0	0	0
W8CZAA CMD USAR 0063 ARCOM	FC	88	10	113	0	0	0
W8J0AA U USA TRANS TML	FC	26	3	58	0	0	0
W8J4AA U USA TRANS TML	FC	24	1	43	0	0	0
W8J5AA U USA TRANS TML	FC	26	1	55	0	0	0
W8J6AA U USA TRANS TML	FC	24	1	47	0	0	0
W8J7AA U USA TRANS TML	FC	22	1	34	0	0	0
W8J8AA U USA TRANS TML	FC	23	1	45	0	0	0
W8J9AA U USA TRANS TML	FC	30	0	31	0	0	0
W8JAAA U USA TRANS TML	FC	26	1	55	0	0	0
W8JBAA U USA DEPLOY CONT	FC	38	1	44	0	0	0
W8JCAA U USA TRANS TML	FC	22	1	44	0	0	0
W8JEAA U USA DEPLOY CONT	FC	38	1	44	0	0	0
W8JGAA U USA DEPLOY CONT	FC	38	1	44	0	0	0
W8JHAA U USA TRANS CONT	FC	22	0	46	0	0	0
W8JJAA U USA TRANS TML	FC	26	1	55	0	0	0
W8JZAA U USA TRANS TML	FC	23	1	39	0	0	0
W8K0AA HSP USA 1000B (AUG)	FC	77	0	172	0	0	0
W8K1AA HSP USA 1000B	FC	139	2	563	0	0	0
W8K2AA HSP USA 1000B (AUG)	FC	145	1	187	0	0	0
W8K3AA HSP USA 300B	FC	48	1	192	0	0	0
W8K4AA HSP USA 500B (AUG)	FC	41	0	69	0	0	0
W8K5AA HSP USA 750B (AUG)	FC	57	0	132	0	0	0
W8K7AA HSP USA 750B	FC	108	2	420	0	0	0
W8KAAA U USA TRANS TML	FC	24	1	47	0	0	0
W8KBAA U USA TRANS TML	FC	24	1	47	0	0	0
W8KCAA U USA TRANS TML	FC	21	0	33	0	0	0
W8KEAA U USA TRANS TML	FC	26	1	55	0	0	0

W8KFAA U USA TRANS TML	FC	22	1	44	0	0	0
W8KHAA U USA TRANS TML	FC	22	1	44	0	0	0
W8KJAA HSP USA 100B	FC	25	0	78	0	0	0
W8KKAA HSP USA 1000B	FC	204	2	575	0	0	0
W8KLAA HSP USA 1000B	FC	184	2	578	0	0	0
W8KMAA HSP USA 1000B (AUG)	FC	77	0	172	0	0	0
W8KNAA HSP USA 1000B (AUG)	FC	77	0	172	0	0	0
W8KQAA HSP USA 1000B (AUG)	FC	81	0	171	0	0	0
W8KRAA HSP USA 100B	FC	32	0	78	0	0	0
W8KSAA HSP USA 750B (AUG)	FC	53	0	132	0	0	0
W8KTAA HSP USA 750B (AUG)	FC	63	0	132	0	0	0
W8KUAA HSP USA 300B (AUG)	FC	26	0	61	0	0	0
W8KVAA HSP USA 300B (AUG)	FC	38	0	61	0	0	0
W8KWAA HSP USA 1000B (AUG)	FC	90	0	172	0	0	0
W8KXAA HSP USA 1000B	FC	188	2	572	0	0	0
W8KYAA HSP USA 100B	FC	30	0	78	0	0	0
W8KZAA HSP USA 300B (AUG)	FC	25	0	61	0	0	0
W8L1AA U USA DENTAL SVC	FC	23	0	38	0	0	0
W8L2AA HQ USA GAR	FC	87	7	234	0	0	0
W8L3AA HQ USA GAR	FC	83	10	239	0	0	0
W8LAAA HSP USA 1000B	FC	166	2	575	0	0	0
W8LGAA U USA DENTAL SVC	FC	16	0	25	0	0	0
W8LHAA U USA DENTAL SVC	FC	16	0	25	0	0	0
W8LJAA U USA DENTAL SVC	FC	30	0	51	0	0	0
W8LLAA U USA DENTAL SVC	FC	30	0	51	0	0	0
W8LMAA U USA DENTAL SVC	FC	11	0	20	0	0	0
W8LNAA U USA DENTAL SVC	FC	11	0	20	0	0	0
W8LPAA U USA DENTAL SVC	FC	16	0	25	0	0	0
W8LQAA U USA DENTAL SVC	FC	23	0	38	0	0	0
W8LRAA U USA DENTAL SVC	FC	48	0	75	0	0	0
W8LSAA U USA DENTAL SVC	FC	11	0	20	0	0	0
W8LTAA U USA DENTAL SVC	FC	11	0	20	0	0	0
W8LUAA U USA DENTAL SVC	FC	11	0	20	0	0	0
W8LVAA U USA DENTAL SVC	FC	23	0	38	0	0	0
W8LWAA U USA DENTAL SVC	FC	11	0	20	0	0	0
W8LXAA U USA DENTAL SVC	FC	11	0	20	0	0	0
W8LYAA U USA DENTAL SVC	FC	33	0	49	0	0	0
W8M1AA HQ USA GAR	FC	87	4	237	0	0	0
W8M6AA HQ USA GAR	FC	85	5	228	0	0	0
W8MDAA HQ USA GAR	FC	88	5	244	0	0	0
W8MFAA HQ USA GAR	FC	87	5	242	0	0	0
W8MKAA HQ USA GAR	FC	85	5	236	0	0	0
W8N7AA CIR MBL SIG COMM	FC	5	2	29	0	0	0
W8N8AA DET SIGNAL(USAISC)	FC	10	2	63	0	0	0
W8N9AA DET SIGNAL(USAISC)	FC	7	2	46	0	0	0
W8NPAA HQ USA GAR	FC	89	6	208	0	0	0
W8NYAA HQ USA GAR	FC	87	5	233	0	0	0
W8S3AA CMD USAR	FC	97	12	133	0	0	0
W8S4AA CMD USAR	FC	83	8	98	0	0	0
W8X5AA CIR MED TNG	FC	64	3	183	0	0	0
W8XUAA BDE USA MP (OSUT)	FC	43	2	317	0	0	0
W8YPAA CMD MVR AREA	FC	373	4	180	0	0	0
W8YRAA CMD MVR AREA	FC	345	13	158	0	0	0
W8Z3AA SCH USARF	FC	34	5	48	0	0	0
W8Z5AA SCH USARF	FC	24	5	130	0	0	0
W8Z6AA SCH USARF	FC	48	6	98	0	0	0
W8Z7AA SCH USARF	FC	29	5	76	0	0	0
W8Z8AA SCH USARF	FC	24	5	71	0	0	0
W8Z9AA SCH USARF	FC	22	3	84	0	0	0

W8ZCAA	SCH USARF	FC	44	5	104	0	0	0
W8ZEAA	SCH USARF	FC	21	5	49	0	0	0
W8ZFAA	SCH USARF	FC	22	3	49	0	0	0
W8ZGAA	SCH USARF	FC	23	3	56	0	0	0
W8ZHAA	SCH USARF	FC	26	5	86	0	0	0
W8ZJAA	SCH USARF	FC	35	6	82	0	0	0
W8ZKAA	SCH USARF	FC	25	4	40	0	0	0
W8ZMAA	SCH USARF	FC	34	4	94	0	0	0
W8ZNAA	SCH USARF	FC	21	3	82	0	0	0
W8ZSAA	SCH USARF	FC	35	5	70	0	0	0
W8ZUAA	SCH USARF	FC	37	5	80	0	0	0
W8ZWAA	SCH USARF	FC	30	3	66	0	0	0
W8ZZAA	SCH USARF	FC	32	3	92	0	0	0
WA0899	ADG HHB BDE	FC	6	2	22	0	0	0
WA4A99	ADG 1ST BN 3D INF	MW	0	1	82	3	0	0
WAA699	ADG HHC DIV	FC	3	0	0	0	0	0
WAB199	ADG	FC	2	0	0	0	0	0
WADQ99	ADG HHC DIV(-)	FC	4	0	0	0	0	0
WAG999	ADG HHC DIV(-)	FC	3	0	0	0	0	0
WAGE99	ADG HHC DIV(-)	FC	4	0	0	0	0	0
WAJZ99	ADG HHC DIV	FC	2	0	0	0	0	0
WAKU99	ADG IN DIV	FC	2	0	0	0	0	0
WANG99	ADG HHC DIV(-)	FC	3	0	0	0	0	0
WAQJ99	ADG HHC DIV(-)	FC	3	0	0	0	0	0
WAR499	ADG HHC BDE SEP	FC	2	0	0	0	0	0
WAS899	ADG HHC BDE SEP	FC	2	0	0	0	0	0
WATG98	ADGHQ 3D US ARMY	3A	0	0	0	51	0	0
WAY899	ADG HHT REG CAV	FC	2	0	0	1	0	0
WBU699	ADG MI GRP CI	AS	0	0	3	33	0	0
WBVA99	ADG MI BDE EAC	AS	10	3	52	9	0	0
WBVB99	ADG MI BN OPNS	FC	0	0	12	1	0	0
WBVF99	ADG MI BN TAC	FC	4	6	35	3	0	0
WC7U99	ADG HHB CORPS ARTY	FC	1	0	29	1	0	0
WCDR99	ADG SC HHD BDE	CZ	1	0	17	0	0	0
WCEL99	ADG SC HHD BN	CZ	0	1	0	0	0	0
WCTP99	ADG CAR PERSHING OWN	MW	0	0	10	0	0	0
WCVX99	ADG DET	CB	4	11	33	25	0	0
WDFQ99	ADG SC CO JCS CONT	CZ	1	0	82	0	0	0
WDFU99	ADG HHC DIV	FC	3	0	0	0	0	0
WDG399	ADG HHC AV BDE	TC	46	41	230	72	0	0
WDGW99	ADG MT BN	FC	0	8	0	0	0	0
WDN699	ADG IN DIV	FC	2	0	0	0	0	0
WFT199	ADG SC BN HHD	CZ	0	1	0	0	0	0
WG4K99	ADG HQ GRP CMD	FC	0	0	0	58	0	0
WGKE99	ADG HHC DIV	FC	7	0	35	17	0	0
WH4U99	ADG SC HHC CMD	CZ	20	4	130	343	0	0
WHBQ99	ADG HHC BN INTG/EXPL	AS	0	4	7	0	0	0
WHUE99	ADG SC SPT CO AMSF	FC	0	1	0	4	0	0
WP9F98	MD BDE HHC-AUG (HSLD)	NG	125	0	0	0	0	0
WP9F99	ADG HHC CMD AIRPLANE	NG	0	2	1	0	0	0
WPGA99	HHCBDE AIR WEATHER	NG	0	0	3	0	0	0
WPSY99	HHCBDE AIR WEATHER	NG	0	0	3	0	0	0
WPZ299	HHCBDE AIR WEATHER	NG	0	0	3	0	0	0
WQ5Q99	ADG HHD MAINT BN	FC	1	0	4	0	0	0
WQMV99	HHCBDE AIR WEATHER	NG	0	0	3	0	0	0
WQMX98	HHCBDE AIR WEATHER	NG	0	0	3	0	0	0
WQNU99	HHCBDE AIR WEATHER	NG	0	0	3	0	0	0
WQUL97	MD BDE HHC-AUG (HSLD)	NG	45	0	0	0	0	0
WQUL98	ADG HHD CMD AIRPLANE	NG	0	2	1	0	0	0

WQV899	HHCBDE AIR WEATHER	NG	0	0	3	0	0	0
WR9D99	AUG HHC TAACOM	FC	15	0	22	0	0	0
WRF999	AUG BDE AIR WEATHER	FC	0	0	3	0	0	0
WRGB99	AUG HHC INF BN	FC	0	2	6	0	0	0
WRGL99	AUG HHC MECH BN	FC	0	2	12	0	0	0
WRGM99	AUG HHC MECH BN	FC	0	2	12	0	0	0
WRGR99	AUG HHC INF BN	FC	0	2	11	0	0	0
WRGS99	AUG HHC INF BN	FC	0	2	11	0	0	0
WRGU99	AUG HHC INF BN	FC	0	2	11	0	0	0
WRGV99	AUG BDE AIR WEATHER	FC	0	0	3	0	0	0
WRHF99	AUG HHC COSCOM	FC	0	0	3	0	0	0
WRXL99	AUG EN CMD	FC	2	1	9	0	0	0
WRXM99	AUG EN CMD	FC	246	1	175	0	0	0
WS4799	HHC BDE CORPS AUG	FC	0	0	8	0	0	0
WS6L99	AUG HHD MAINT BN	FC	2	0	6	0	0	0
WSAA99	AUG HHC MD BDE	FC	5	4	22	0	0	0
WSJ199	AUG HHC MP PW CMD	FC	4	0	8	0	0	0
WSXN99	AUG HHC TC TRANS BDE	FC	4	0	10	0	0	0
WSXQ99	HHC TAACOM AUG	FC	0	0	1	0	0	0
WUJT98	MD BDE HHC-AUG (HSLD)	NG	65	0	0	0	0	0
WUJT99	AUG HHD CMD AIRPLANE	NG	0	2	1	0	0	0
WUN699	AUG TDA SF BN	NG	18	0	0	0	0	0
WUN799	AUG TDA SF BN	NG	18	0	0	0	0	0
WUP999	AUG TDA SF BN	NG	18	0	0	0	0	0
WUPC99	AUG TDA SF BN	NG	18	0	0	0	0	0
WUPD99	AUG TDA SF BN	NG	18	0	0	0	0	0
WUPE99	AUG TDA SF BN	NG	18	0	0	0	0	0
WUPK99	AUG SF BN	FC	18	0	0	0	0	0
WUPL99	AUG SF BN	FC	18	0	0	0	0	0
WUPM99	AUG SF BN	FC	18	0	0	0	0	0
WUPP99	AUG SF BN	FC	18	0	0	0	0	0
WUPQ99	AUG SF BN	FC	18	0	0	0	0	0
WUPR99	AUG SF BN	FC	18	0	0	0	0	0
WURQ99	HHCBDE AIR WEATHER	NG	0	0	3	0	0	0
WV0F99	AUG BN 2 BDE 108 DIV	FC	20	0	107	0	0	0
WV4099	AUG BN 3 BDE 91 DIV	FC	21	1	104	0	0	0
WV4199	AUG BN 3 BDE 91 DIV	FC	18	1	89	0	0	0
WV4299	AUG BN 3 BDE 91 DIV	FC	18	1	89	0	0	0
WV4P99	AUG BN TNG (SEP)	FC	16	0	69	0	0	0
WV4Q99	AUG BN TNG (SEP)	FC	16	0	69	0	0	0
WV4U99	AUG BDE TNG (SEP)	FC	14	3	38	0	0	0
WV4V99	AUG BN 402 BDE (SEP)	FC	17	1	85	0	0	0
WV4W99	AUG BN 402 BDE (SEP)	FC	20	1	101	0	0	0
WV4X99	AUG BN 402 BDE (SEP)	FC	20	1	101	0	0	0
WV4Y99	AUG BN 402 BDE (SEP)	FC	20	1	101	0	0	0
WV4Z99	AUG BN 402 BDE (SEP)	FC	20	1	101	0	0	0
WV8799	HHCBDE AIR WEATHER	NG	0	0	3	0	0	0
WVK199	AUG MMC (TAACOM)	FC	5	1	8	0	0	0
WVS099	AUG HHC 85 DIV (TNG)	FC	78	11	141	0	0	0
WVS199	AUG BDE TNG (SEP)	FC	29	5	105	0	0	0
WVS299	AUG BN 5 BDE (SEP)	FC	18	1	146	0	0	0
WVS399	AUG BN 5 BDE (SEP)	FC	21	1	178	0	0	0
WVS499	AUG BN 5 BDE (SEP)	FC	18	1	146	0	0	0
WVS599	AUG BN 5 BDE (SEP)	FC	21	1	178	0	0	0
WVSP99	AUG HHC 100 DIV (TNG)	FC	79	10	133	0	0	0
WVSQ99	AUG HHC 104 DIV (TNG)	FC	83	7	215	0	0	0
WVSR99	AUG HHC 108 DIV (TNG)	FC	79	12	152	0	0	0
WVSS99	AUG HHC 76 DIV (TNG)	FC	85	11	241	0	0	0
WVST99	AUG HHC 80 DIV (TNG)	FC	88	11	235	0	0	0

WVSU99 ADG HHC 78 DIV (TNG)	FC	99	14	255	0	0	0
WVSV99 ADG HHC 91 DIV (TNG)	FC	87	11	273	0	0	0
WVSW99 ADG HHC 98 DIV (TNG)	FC	95	20	268	0	0	0
WVSX99 ADG HHC 95 DIV (TNG)	FC	85	13	171	0	0	0
WVSY99 ADG HHC 70 DIV (TNG)	FC	78	11	263	0	0	0
WVSZ99 ADG HHC 84 DIV (TNG)	FC	89	11	213	0	0	0
WVT099 ADG 3 BDE 70 DIV	FC	16	3	45	0	0	0
WVT199 ADG 4 BDE 70 DIV	FC	16	3	45	0	0	0
WVT299 ADG 1 BDE 76 DIV	FC	15	3	35	0	0	0
WVT399 ADG 2 BDE 76 DIV	FC	14	3	34	0	0	0
WVT499 ADG 4 BDE 76 DIV	FC	15	3	35	0	0	0
WVT599 ADG 1 BDE 78 DIV	FC	15	3	41	0	0	0
WVT699 ADG 2 BDE 78 DIV	FC	15	3	41	0	0	0
WVT799 ADG 4 BDE 78 DIV	FC	15	3	41	0	0	0
WVT899 ADG 1 BDE 80 DIV	FC	17	3	39	0	0	0
WVT999 ADG 2 BDE 80 DIV	FC	17	3	39	0	0	0
WVTY99 ADG 1 BDE 70 DIV	FC	16	3	45	0	0	0
WVTZ99 ADG 2 BDE 70 DIV	FC	16	3	45	0	0	0
WVU099 ADG 2 BDE 104 DIV	FC	11	3	37	0	0	0
WVU199 ADG 3 BDE 104 DIV	FC	11	3	37	0	0	0
WVU299 ADG 4 BDE 104 DIV	FC	11	3	37	0	0	0
WVU399 ADG 1 BDE 108 DIV	FC	15	3	40	0	0	0
WVU499 ADG 2 BDE 108 DIV	FC	15	3	40	0	0	0
WVU599 ADG 3 BDE 108 DIV	FC	15	3	40	0	0	0
WVU699 ADG 4 BDE 108 DIV	FC	15	3	40	0	0	0
WVU799 ADG BN 2 BDE 108 DIV	FC	20	0	107	0	0	0
WVU899 ADG BN 1 BDE 70 DIV	FC	18	0	91	0	0	0
WVU999 ADG BN 1 BDE 70 DIV	FC	18	0	91	0	0	0
WVUA99 ADG 3 BDE 80 DIV	FC	17	3	39	0	0	0
WVUB99 ADG 4 BDE 80 DIV	FC	17	3	39	0	0	0
WVUC99 ADG 1 BDE 84 DIV	FC	16	5	40	0	0	0
WVUD99 ADG 2 BDE 84 DIV	FC	16	5	40	0	0	0
WVUE99 ADG 3 BDE 84 TNG DIV	FC	26	5	134	0	0	0
WVUF99 ADG 4 BDE 84 DIV	FC	16	5	40	0	0	0
WVUG99 ADG 1 BDE 85 DIV	FC	15	3	38	0	0	0
WVUH99 ADG 2 BDE 85 DIV	FC	15	3	38	0	0	0
WVUJ99 ADG 3 BDE 85 DIV	FC	15	3	38	0	0	0
WVUK99 ADG 1 BDE 91 DIV	FC	17	3	41	0	0	0
WVUL99 ADG 2 BDE 91 DIV	FC	16	3	39	0	0	0
WVUM99 ADG 4 BDE 91 DIV	FC	16	3	39	0	0	0
WVUN99 ADG 1 BDE 95 DIV	FC	14	3	37	0	0	0
WVUP99 ADG 2 BDE 95 DIV	FC	14	3	37	0	0	0
WVUQ99 ADG 3 BDE 95 DIV	FC	14	3	37	0	0	0
WVUR99 ADG 4 BDE 95 DIV	FC	14	3	37	0	0	0
WVUS99 ADG 1 BDE 98 DIV	FC	15	3	44	0	0	0
WVUT99 ADG 2 BDE 98 DIV	FC	15	3	44	0	0	0
WVUU99 ADG 3 BDE 98 DIV	FC	15	3	44	0	0	0
WVUV99 ADG 4 BDE 98 DIV	FC	15	3	44	0	0	0
WVUW99 ADG 1 BDE 100 DIV	FC	15	3	41	0	0	0
WVUX99 ADG 2 BDE 100 DIV	FC	15	3	41	0	0	0
WVUY99 ADG 3 BDE 100 DIV	FC	15	3	41	0	0	0
WVUZ99 ADG 1 BDE 104 DIV	FC	11	3	37	0	0	0
WVV099 ADG BN 4 BDE 76 DIV	FC	20	0	99	0	0	0
WVV199 ADG BN 4 BDE 76 DIV	FC	17	0	83	0	0	0
WVV299 ADG BN 1 BDE 108 DIV	FC	20	0	107	0	0	0
WVV399 ADG BN 1 BDE 78 DIV	FC	20	0	104	0	0	0
WVV499 ADG BN 1 BDE 78 DIV	FC	20	0	104	0	0	0
WVV599 ADG BN 1 BDE 78 DIV	FC	20	0	104	0	0	0
WVV699 ADG BN 1 BDE 78 DIV	FC	20	0	104	0	0	0

WVV799	AUG	EN	2	BDE	78	DIV	FC	17	0	88	0	0	0
WVV899	AUG	EN	2	BDE	78	DIV	FC	17	0	88	0	0	0
WVV999	AUG	EN	2	BDE	78	DIV	FC	17	0	88	0	0	0
WVVA99	AUG	EN	1	BDE	70	DIV	FC	18	0	91	0	0	0
WVVB99	AUG	EN	1	BDE	70	DIV	FC	18	0	91	0	0	0
WVVC99	AUG	EN	2	BDE	70	DIV	FC	18	0	91	0	0	0
WVVD99	AUG	EN	2	BDE	70	DIV	FC	21	0	103	0	0	0
WVVE99	AUG	EN	2	BDE	70	DIV	FC	18	0	91	0	0	0
WVVF99	AUG	EN	2	BDE	70	DIV	FC	21	0	103	0	0	0
WVVG99	AUG	EN	3	BDE	70	DIV	FC	21	0	103	0	0	0
WVVH99	AUG	EN	3	BDE	70	DIV	FC	21	0	103	0	0	0
WVVJ99	AUG	EN	3	BDE	70	DIV	FC	21	0	103	0	0	0
WVVK99	AUG	EN	4	BDE	70	DIV	FC	21	0	103	0	0	0
WVVL99	AUG	EN	4	BDE	70	DIV	FC	18	0	91	0	0	0
WVVM99	AUG	EN	4	BDE	70	DIV	FC	21	0	103	0	0	0
WVVN99	AUG	EN	4	BDE	70	DIV	FC	18	0	91	0	0	0
WVVP99	AUG	EN	1	BDE	108	DIV	FC	20	0	107	0	0	0
WVVQ99	AUG	EN	1	BDE	76	DIV	FC	17	0	86	0	0	0
WVVR99	AUG	EN	1	BDE	76	DIV	FC	17	0	83	0	0	0
WVVS99	AUG	EN	1	BDE	76	DIV	FC	17	0	86	0	0	0
WVVT99	AUG	EN	1	BDE	76	DIV	FC	17	0	83	0	0	0
WVVU99	AUG	EN	2	BDE	76	DIV	FC	17	0	83	0	0	0
WVVV99	AUG	EN	2	BDE	76	DIV	FC	20	0	99	0	0	0
WVVW99	AUG	EN	2	BDE	76	DIV	FC	17	0	83	0	0	0
WVVX99	AUG	EN	2	BDE	76	DIV	FC	17	0	83	0	0	0
WVVY99	AUG	EN	4	BDE	76	DIV	FC	17	0	83	0	0	0
WVVZ99	AUG	EN	4	BDE	76	DIV	FC	17	0	83	0	0	0
WVW099	AUG	EN	1	BDE	84	DIV	FC	19	1	112	0	0	0
WVW199	AUG	EN	1	BDE	84	DIV	FC	19	1	112	0	0	0
WVW299	AUG	EN	1	BDE	84	DIV	FC	19	1	112	0	0	0
WVW399	AUG	EN	1	BDE	84	DIV	FC	19	1	112	0	0	0
WVW499	AUG	EN	2	BDE	84	DIV	FC	19	1	112	0	0	0
WVW599	AUG	EN	2	BDE	84	DIV	FC	19	1	112	0	0	0
WVW699	AUG	EN	2	BDE	84	DIV	FC	19	1	112	0	0	0
WVW799	AUG	EN	2	BDE	84	DIV	FC	19	1	112	0	0	0
WVW899	AUG	EN	3	BDE	84	DIV	FC	24	1	117	0	0	0
WVW999	AUG	EN	3	BDE	84	DIV	FC	24	1	117	0	0	0
WVWA99	AUG	EN	2	BDE	78	DIV	FC	17	0	88	0	0	0
WVWB99	AUG	EN	4	BDE	78	DIV	FC	17	0	88	0	0	0
WVWC99	AUG	EN	4	BDE	78	DIV	FC	17	0	88	0	0	0
WVWD99	AUG	EN	4	BDE	78	DIV	FC	17	0	88	0	0	0
WVWE99	AUG	EN	4	BDE	78	DIV	FC	17	0	88	0	0	0
WVWF99	AUG	EN	1	BDE	108	DIV	FC	20	0	107	0	0	0
WVWG99	AUG	EN	1	BDE	80	DIV	FC	23	0	127	0	0	0
WVWH99	AUG	EN	1	BDE	80	DIV	FC	23	0	127	0	0	0
WVWJ99	AUG	EN	1	BDE	80	DIV	FC	20	0	108	0	0	0
WVWK99	AUG	EN	1	BDE	80	DIV	FC	23	0	127	0	0	0
WVWL99	AUG	EN	2	BDE	80	DIV	FC	23	0	127	0	0	0
WVWM99	AUG	EN	2	BDE	80	DIV	FC	23	0	127	0	0	0
WVWN99	AUG	EN	2	BDE	80	DIV	FC	20	0	108	0	0	0
WVWP99	AUG	EN	2	BDE	80	DIV	FC	23	0	127	0	0	0
WVWQ99	AUG	EN	4	BDE	80	DIV	FC	23	0	127	0	0	0
WVWR99	AUG	EN	4	BDE	80	DIV	FC	23	0	127	0	0	0
WVWS99	AUG	EN	4	BDE	80	DIV	FC	23	0	127	0	0	0
WVWT99	AUG	EN	4	BDE	80	DIV	FC	23	0	127	0	0	0
WVWU99	AUG	EN	2	BDE	80	DIV	FC	23	0	120	0	0	0
WVWV99	AUG	EN	3	BDE	80	DIV	FC	20	0	108	0	0	0
WVWW99	AUG	EN	3	BDE	80	DIV	FC	20	0	108	0	0	0
WVWZ99	AUG	EN	1	BDE	108	DIV	FC	20	0	107	0	0	0

WVX099 AUG BN 1 BDE 91 DIV	FC	21	1	104	0	0	0
WVX199 AUG BN 2 BDE 91 DIV	FC	18	1	89	0	0	0
WVX299 AUG BN 2 BDE 91 DIV	FC	18	1	89	0	0	0
WVX399 AUG BN 2 BDE 91 DIV	FC	18	1	89	0	0	0
WVX499 AUG BN 4 BDE 91 DIV	FC	15	2	105	0	0	0
WVX599 AUG BN 4 BDE 91 DIV	FC	17	3	137	0	0	0
WVX699 AUG BN 4 BDE 91 DIV	FC	17	3	137	0	0	0
WVX799 AUG BN 1 BDE 91 DIV	FC	21	1	104	0	0	0
WVX899 AUG BN 1 BDE 98 DIV	FC	15	0	103	0	0	0
WVX999 AUG BN 1 BDE 98 DIV	FC	15	0	103	0	0	0
WVXA99 AUG BN 3 BDE 84 DIV	FC	24	1	117	0	0	0
WVXB99 AUG BN 4 BDE 84 DIV	FC	19	1	112	0	0	0
WVXC99 AUG BN 4 BDE 84 DIV	FC	19	1	112	0	0	0
WVXD99 AUG BN 4 BDE 84 DIV	FC	19	1	112	0	0	0
WVXE99 AUG BN 4 BDE 84 DIV	FC	19	1	112	0	0	0
WVXF99 AUG BN 84 DIV	FC	18	0	91	0	0	0
WVXG99 AUG BN 2 BDE 108 DIV	FC	20	0	107	0	0	0
WVXH99 AUG BN 1 BDE 85 DIV	FC	17	0	106	0	0	0
WVXJ99 AUG BN 1 BDE 85 DIV	FC	17	0	106	0	0	0
WVXK99 AUG BN 1 BDE 85 DIV	FC	17	0	106	0	0	0
WVXL99 AUG BN 1 BDE 85 DIV	FC	17	0	106	0	0	0
WVXM99 AUG BN 2 BDE 85 DIV	FC	17	0	121	0	0	0
WVXN99 AUG BN 2 BDE 85 DIV	FC	17	0	121	0	0	0
WVXP99 AUG BN 2 BDE 85 DIV	FC	17	0	121	0	0	0
WVXQ99 AUG BN 2 BDE 85 DIV	FC	17	0	121	0	0	0
WVXR99 AUG BN 3 BDE 85 DIV	FC	17	0	121	0	0	0
WVXS99 AUG BN 3 BDE 85 DIV	FC	17	0	121	0	0	0
WVXT99 AUG BN 3 BDE 85 DIV	FC	17	0	121	0	0	0
WVXU99 AUG BN 3 BDE 85 DIV	FC	17	0	121	0	0	0
WVXY99 AUG BN 4 BDE 98 DIV	FC	15	0	103	0	0	0
WVXZ99 AUG BN 1 BDE 91 DIV	FC	21	1	104	0	0	0
WVY099 AUG BN 4 BDE 95 DIV	FC	20	1	104	0	0	0
WVY199 AUG BN 4 BDE 95 DIV	FC	20	1	104	0	0	0
WVY299 AUG BN 4 BDE 95 DIV	FC	20	1	104	0	0	0
WVY399 AUG BN 4 BDE 95 DIV	FC	20	1	104	0	0	0
WVY499 AUG BN 2 BDE 108 DIV	FC	20	0	107	0	0	0
WVY599 AUG BN 3 BDE 108 DIV	FC	20	0	107	0	0	0
WVY699 AUG BN 3 BDE 108 DIV	FC	20	0	107	0	0	0
WVY799 AUG BN 3 BDE 108 DIV	FC	20	0	107	0	0	0
WVY899 AUG BN 3 BDE 108 DIV	FC	20	0	107	0	0	0
WVY999 AUG BN 4 BDE 108 DIV	FC	20	0	107	0	0	0
WVYA99 AUG BN 1 BDE 98 DIV	FC	15	0	103	0	0	0
WVYB99 AUG BN 2 BDE 98 DIV	FC	15	0	103	0	0	0
WVYC99 AUG BN 2 BDE 98 DIV	FC	15	0	103	0	0	0
WVYD99 AUG BN 2 BDE 98 DIV	FC	15	0	103	0	0	0
WVYE99 AUG BN 2 BDE 98 DIV	FC	29	2	445	0	0	0
WVYF99 AUG BN 2 BDE 98 DIV	FC	17	3	424	0	0	0
WVYG99 AUG BN 3 BDE 98 DIV	FC	15	0	103	0	0	0
WVYH99 AUG BN 3 BDE 98 DIV	FC	15	0	103	0	0	0
WVYJ99 AUG BN 3 BDE 98 DIV	FC	15	0	103	0	0	0
WVYK99 AUG BN 3 BDE 98 DIV	FC	19	2	170	0	0	0
WVYL99 AUG BN 4 BDE 98 DIV	FC	15	0	103	0	0	0
WVYM99 AUG BN 4 BDE 98 DIV	FC	15	0	103	0	0	0
WVYN99 AUG BN 1 BDE 95 DIV	FC	20	1	104	0	0	0
WVYP99 AUG BN 1 BDE 95 DIV	FC	20	1	104	0	0	0
WVYQ99 AUG BN 1 BDE 95 DIV	FC	20	1	104	0	0	0
WVYR99 AUG BN 1 BDE 95 DIV	FC	20	1	104	0	0	0
WVYS99 AUG BN 2 BDE 95 DIV	FC	20	1	104	0	0	0
WVYT99 AUG BN 2 BDE 95 DIV	FC	20	1	104	0	0	0

WVYU99 AUG BN 2 BDE 95 DIV	FC	20	1	104	0	0	0
WVYV99 AUG BN 2 BDE 95 DIV	FC	20	1	104	0	0	0
WVYW99 AUG BN 3 BDE 95 DIV	FC	20	1	104	0	0	0
WVYX99 AUG BN 3 BDE 95 DIV	FC	20	1	104	0	0	0
WVYY99 AUG BN 3 BDE 95 DIV	FC	20	1	104	0	0	0
WVYZ99 AUG BN 3 BDE 95 DIV	FC	20	1	104	0	0	0
WVZ099 AUG BN 2 BDE 100 DIV	FC	20	0	149	0	0	0
WVZ199 AUG BN 2 BDE 100 DIV	FC	20	0	149	0	0	0
WVZ299 AUG BN 2 BDE 100 DIV	FC	20	0	149	0	0	0
WVZ399 AUG BN 1 BDE 100 DIV	FC	20	0	149	0	0	0
WVZ499 AUG BN 1 BDE 100 DIV	FC	20	0	149	0	0	0
WVZ599 AUG BN 3 BDE 100 DIV	FC	20	0	149	0	0	0
WVZ699 AUG BN 3 BDE 100 DIV	FC	20	0	149	0	0	0
WVZ799 AUG BN 1 BDE 98 DIV	FC	15	0	103	0	0	0
WVZ899 AUG 3 BDE 91 DIV	FC	16	3	39	0	0	0
WVZA99 AUG BN 4 BDE 108 DIV	FC	20	0	107	0	0	0
WVZB99 AUG BN 4 BDE 108 DIV	FC	20	0	107	0	0	0
WVZC99 AUG BN 4 BDE 108 DIV	FC	20	0	107	0	0	0
WVZD99 AUG BN 1 BDE 104 DIV	FC	20	0	110	0	0	0
WVZE99 AUG BN 1 BDE 104 DIV	FC	24	0	131	0	0	0
WVZF99 AUG BN 1 BDE 104 DIV	FC	24	0	131	0	0	0
WVZG99 AUG BN 1 BDE 104 DIV	FC	24	0	131	0	0	0
WVZH99 AUG BN 2 BDE 104 DIV	FC	21	0	111	0	0	0
WVZJ99 AUG BN 2 BDE 104 DIV	FC	20	0	110	0	0	0
WVZK99 AUG BN 2 BDE 104 DIV	FC	21	0	111	0	0	0
WVZL99 AUG BN 2 BDE 104 DIV	FC	21	0	111	0	0	0
WVZM99 AUG BN 3 BDE 104 DIV	FC	20	0	110	0	0	0
WVZN99 AUG BN 3 BDE 104 DIV	FC	21	0	111	0	0	0
WVZP99 AUG BN 3 BDE 104 DIV	FC	21	0	111	0	0	0
WVZQ99 AUG BN 4 BDE 104 DIV	FC	18	0	91	0	0	0
WVZR99 AUG BN 4 BDE 104 DIV	FC	20	0	110	0	0	0
WVZS99 AUG BN 4 BDE 104 DIV	FC	18	0	91	0	0	0
WVZT99 AUG BN 4 BDE 104 DIV	FC	21	0	111	0	0	0
WVZU99 AUG BN 3 BDE 100 DIV	FC	20	0	149	0	0	0
WVZV99 AUG BN 1 BDE 100 DIV	FC	20	0	149	0	0	0
WVZW99 AUG BN 3 BDE 100 DIV	FC	20	0	149	0	0	0
WVZY99 AUG BN 1 BDE 100 DIV	FC	20	0	149	0	0	0
WVZZ99 AUG BN 2 BDE 100 DIV	FC	20	0	149	0	0	0
WXF999 HHCBDE AIR WEATHER	NG	0	0	3	0	0	0
WYBK99 AUG HHC THEATER CMD	FC	0	0	3	0	0	0
WYDM99 AUG BN 3 BDE 91 DIV	FC	18	1	89	0	0	0
WYDN99 AUG BN 1 BDE 91 DIV	FC	21	1	104	0	0	0
WYDP99 AUG BN 1 BDE 91 DIV	FC	21	1	104	0	0	0
WYG599 AUG AV CO MAINT IIICP	FC	0	0	3	0	0	0
WYG999 AUG AV MAINT CO (EAC)	FC	0	0	3	0	0	0
WYLN99 AUG BN 3 BDE 98 DIV	FC	15	0	103	0	0	0
WYLP99 AUG BN 3 BDE 98 DIV	FC	15	0	103	0	0	0
*** Total ***							
		58658	6475	172576	297331	197	134

ANNEX B CHAPTER 14
REGIONAL DEFENSE COMMANDS (CONUS) BOUNDARIES

CONUS ARMIES AND READINESS GROUPS



*8-1-MCL1-006754-50

Figure 1. CONUS Armies and Readiness Groups

CHAPTER 15
UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS

The Reserve Components (RC), the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the United States Army Reserve (USAR), are an integral part of the Army's deterrent force. In 1971, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) announced the Total Force Concept, which has resulted in much greater reliance on national security being entrusted to the ARNG and the USAR. It is national policy that the RC are the primary source of additional units and individuals required for any rapid expansion of the Active Component (AC).

The ROBUST Task Force examined the Table of Distribution and Allowance (TDA) organizations of both the ARNG and USAR. The Task Force made no major observations or proposals about the ARNG structure. Therefore, this chapter deals almost exclusively with the USAR.

The Army has utilized a number of alternative management structures for the USAR. Prior to 1958, USAR activities were supervised and administered by the Military Districts, which were organized along state boundaries. The Military Districts were commanded by colonels who were supported by a staff of approximately 300 Army advisors, ROTC instructors, and administrative personnel. The chain of command went from the Military Districts through the appropriate Continental United States Army (CONUSA) and the Continental Army Command (CONARC), to the Department of the Army (DA). In 1958 the Districts were replaced by fourteen Active Army corps commanded by major generals. In 1967 the SECDEF directed the inactivation of the corps and the transfer of their responsibilities to the CONUSA. In order to implement the directive, Army Reserve Commands (ARCOM) were established to supervise the training of all USAR units not assigned to the General Officer Commands (GOCOM); the CONUSAs were authorized a major general to supervise USAR activities; and various Sector commands were established to represent CONUSA commanders in the field. A criticism of this system was that it lacked uniformity. The CONUSAs centralized functions to different degrees and support to the field varied among the CONUSAs. From 1969 through 1973, numerous studies reviewed the Army's organizational structure for command and control of the USAR. Operation STEADFAST modified the 1967 organization relieving the CONUSAs of their installation management responsibilities so they could focus on RC readiness, through nine Army Readiness Regions (ARR) and facilitate twenty-seven Readiness Groups. The deletion of the ARR and the transfer of their functions to the CONUSAs in 1984, along with the simultaneous increase from three to five CONUSAs, yielded the USAR management structure that exists today.

Since the Total Force Concept was adopted, the DA has undertaken numerous actions to improve the readiness of the RC. These actions have included large scale equipment issues and modernizations, increased affiliation between Active Army and RC units, improved recruiting programs, and increased authorizations for military technicians. At the time, it was apparent that major improvements were required in training supervision, mobilization planning, and the attainment of operational readiness.

In 1971, it was assumed that the personnel administration and logistical support activities serving the RC were satisfactory. The observations of the ROBUST Task Force do not support this assumption with regard to the USAR. The Total Army Life Cycle Personnel Management Study, completed for the Army by Arthur Andersen & Company (also known as the "GINN Report"), identified substantial headquarters layering in the command of Army Reserve units. The existing organizational structure has placed a heavy administrative burden on USAR units and detracts from training (see Annex A, List of ARCOM Required Reports).

Criticism of the command structure of the USAR is not new.

> "The Air Reserve structure is relatively efficient and viable. On the other hand, the Army Reserve Component structure contains duplicative and overlapping capabilities, is unable to move from a peacetime to a wartime configuration without significant structure modification and has deficiencies in the mechanisms for developing mobilization plans."
>
> ...GAO Report 25 April 1979

> "The Committee believes that removing the layering that exist in the USAR chain of command would result, not only in improved management but in millions of dollars in cost savings as well."
>
> Senate Armed Services Committee
> ...Report #97-330 13 April 1982

The ROBUST Task Force examined the Air Force Reserve command and control structure. Several significant differences exist between the Air Force Reserve and the Army Reserve. The Air Force Reserve is a relatively homogeneous organization with respect to mission and types of units. It is structured around 57 "flying" squadrons in three numbered Air Forces. Air Force Reserve units are maintained at or near full strength and account for only about ten percent of the Total Air Force. Upon mobilization the three reserve numbered Air Forces are integrated with Active num-

bered Air Forces (assigned to SAC, TAC, or MAC) in CONUS. The United States Army Reserve, in contrast, contains a substantial number of individual ready-reservists, as well as over 3,000 separate units, of all types within the twenty-five branches of the Army and accounts for approximately 22 percent of the Total Army. These USAR units are troop listed to Army component commands and functional commands throughout the world. Upon mobilization they must move to mobilization stations, be cross-leveled and trained, as necessary, to achieve strength and readiness standards prior to deployment. The Task Force does not advocate that the Army adopt the same command and control structure for the Army Reserve that the Air Force has adopted for the Air Force Reserve. However, there is a need to streamline the command structure of the Army Reserve and reduce the administrative burden of USAR units.

During the visits made by either the Task Force On Site Evaluation Teams and/or MG John H. Mitchell, the ROBUST Task Force Director, to the 6th U.S. Army Readiness Component Support Group, 77th ARCOM, IX Corps (Reinforcement), 4th U.S. Army, 5th U.S. Army, 6th U.S. Army, 8th U.S. Army, FORSCOM, WESTCOM, USAREUR, and the Reserve Officer Association, the importance and value of the CAPSTONE program to unit training and mobilization planning was apparent. In fact, General Thurman, the TRADOC Commander, suggested that it would be most appropriate for USAR commanders to brief their annual training programs, in accordance with the CAPSTONE "trace."

Many options for providing for the command and control of the Army Reserve were examined during Operation STEADFAST. As noted, there are several recurring themes in the literature of previous studies and recommendations concerning the management of the United States Army Reserve. One of these recurring issues is the alignment of the USAR Training Divisions. This issue has surfaced repeatedly and is the subject of issue 15.4 in this report.

15.1 OBSERVATION

Multiple layers exist between Chief, Army Reserve as USAR Appropriations Director and the USAR troop program units (TPU).

15.1.1 SCOPE

Admin/logistics and fiscal management functions being performed at CONUSA level replicate those same functions at MUSARC level and impedes the flow of information and services up and down the chain of command. CONUSA focus needs to be oriented more in areas of training assistance and mobilization planning for USAR TPU. Change will result in more efficiency and support the trend towards fewer resources in a constrained environment (see Figure 15-1).



Figure 15–1. Today—Multiple Layers Exist Between the Chief Army Reserve as USAR Appropriations Director and the USAR Troop Program Units

15.1.2 PROPOSAL

Eliminate fiscal, personnel and logistics management functions from CONUSA.

15.1.3 CRITERION

Allow CONUSA commanders to enhance their organizational efficiency by shifting admin/logistics/fiscal responsibilities to MUSARC; CONUSA emphasis has to be directed towards mobilization planning, unit training to increase overall readiness of USAR units, reacting to civil emergencies and preparing for Land Defense of CONUS.

15.1.4 ANALYSIS

For over ten years DAIG reports have indicated that there are too many managers of admin/logistics/fiscal requirements for USAR units. This is evidenced by the number of resources allocated at the CONUSA and MUSARC levels to perform these functions. The redundancy at these command levels for these functions is cumbersome and inefficient. As recent as 27 April 1988, the Arthur Anderson & Company study, "Total Army Lifecycle Personnel Management," specifically addressed aspects of these problems and made recommendations for corrective action. ROBUST Task Force conducted additional analysis of these problems to substantiate findings in the Arthur Anderson study and to further refine the major causes. An example of the proliferation of reports required in the current layered headquarters structure, is included in Annex A for a typical ARCOM. The USAR is in the best position to reduce

this overwhelming burden and free up inactive duty training periods to concentrate on unit training. Shifting the admin/logistics/fiscal functions from CONUSA to MUSARC is a positive step in the right direction. It eliminates a layer of management at CONUSA and allows the CONUSA commanders to focus their resources on crucial mobilization planning and training assistance. With MUSARC in control of admin/logistics/fiscal functions, reservists are afforded the opportunity to better manage Army Reserve requirements (see Figure 15–2).



Figure 15–2. Future

15.1.5 CONCLUSION

Shift admin/logistics/fiscal responsibilities from CONUSA to MUSARC (see Figure 15–3).

MANPOWER	CURRENT AUTHORIZATIONS	FUTURE AUTHORIZATIONS	DIFFERENCE
MILITARY:	523	328	-195
CIVILIAN:	1098	691	-407
TOTAL	1621	1019	-602

ADVANTAGES:

- STREAM LINES AND EXPEDITES USAR FUNDING AND PERSONNEL/LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT FROM CAR TO MUSARC FOR USAR TROOP PROGRAM UNITS.
- ELIMINATES REDUNDANCY AT CONUSA/MUSARC LEVELS FOR ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS FUNCTIONS

Figure 15-3. Space Redistribution

15.1.6 IMPLEMENTATION

FORSCOM, within six months, provide an implementation plan which includes validation of manpower savings for redistribution. Implementation in FY 91.

15.2 OBSERVATION

Congressional leadership has proposed for over twenty years that Reserve forces be commanded by Reserve officers. It was felt that by placing greater responsibility on Reserve forces it would hold them strictly accountable and lead to more combat ready forces on mobilization. Army Reserve forces remain predominantly under the command of FORSCOM which has further subordinated them under CONUSA. Public Law 90-168 (1 December 1967) prescribed Reserve leadership for Reserve units; USAF and USN (minus USMC) implemented 1 January 1968 and 29 May 1987, respectively, for their Reserve units.

15.2.1 SCOPE

Present study of the Army Reserve command and control system reflects a layered and cumbersome management system and one that has not increased readiness of Army Reserve forces to the satisfaction of Congress (see Figure 15-4).



Figure 15–4. Today—Layered Management of Army Reserve

15.2.2 PROPOSAL

Designate CAR as DCG (USAR), FORSCOM.

15.2.3 CRITERION

Place CAR in a leadership position of USAR Troop Program units. CAR shares FORSCOM and CONUSA commanders' responsibility for technical management of Army Reserve units, allowing them to focus on mobilization planning, training assistance and land defense of CONUS.

15.2.4 ANALYSIS

Congressional changes in the 1 December 1967 Public Law 90–168 (Reserve Forces Bill of Rights and Vitalization Act) were intended to place command of Reserve forces with the Reserve chiefs for all services. The U.S. Air Force via Special Order dated 22 December 1967, effective 1 January 1968, placed a Reserve Major General in command of the Air Force Reserve. The U.S. Navy continued to command the Naval Reserve with regular Navy Rear Admirals until Mr. Webb, as Secretary of the Navy, directed via message (270023Z May 1987) that Naval Reserves be commanded by a Reserve Rear Admiral. The Navy implemented on 29 May 1987, with a change of command at Headquarters, Naval Reserve in New Orleans, Louisiana. Both the USAFR and USNR Chiefs are dual hatted as special staff officers on Reserve matters to the CSAF and CNO; and both command their Reserve forces. Army Reserve units are still commanded by regular Army Commanders in FORSCOM, USAREUR, and

WESTCOM with the majority of the units under FORSCOM. Existing command relationships for USAR units limit the influence of the CAR and detract from his exploiting the talents and capabilities of Army reservists to improve overall readiness. Recent Congressional hearings continue to focus on why the Army has been unable to significantly increase USAR mobilization readiness in view of the billions of dollars appropriated during the 1980's to improve the combat capability of USAR units (see Figure 15-5).



Figure 15-5. Future

By placing the CAR in a dual role at HQDA and as DCG FORSCOM (USAR), it is projected that USAR readiness can be increased at a faster pace than has been the case over the last ten years. Technical command of the USAR by the CAR allows the Army Reserve to enhance its management system and be held strictly accountable for its successes as well as shortcomings. ROBUST task force analysis supports the recommendations for streamlining command and control relationships in the USAR as evidenced in the 22 April 1988 Arthur Anderson & Company study ("Total Army Lifecycle Personnel Management"). The Army should support these recommendations. The advantages supporting this concept are:

(1) Does not alter the CAR's role as USAR Appropriations Director.

(2) Eliminate redundancy by establishing a second role for CAR within FORSCOM.

(3) Recognize that majority of USAR TPU are commanded by FORSCOM, the Army Component Commander for CONUS USAR TPU.

An increased state of mobilization readiness planning for USAR units is anticipated in making this major command and control policy change. It further allows CONUSA commanders to focus their resources on mobilization planning, training assistance and reshaping of the land defense of CONUS.

15.2.5 CONCLUSION

Allowing the Army Reserve to command and control its own forces, with overwatch by the active component, is a responsible management change.

15.2.6 IMPLEMENTATION

FORSCOM, in conjunction with CAR, provide an implementation plan within six months which includes validation of manpower savings for redistribution. Implement on 1 October 1991. Implementation of proposed changes is considered to be in the best interests of the Army for increased USAR readiness and is in keeping with Congressional intent in the 1967 legislative changes to PL 90-168.

15.3 OBSERVATION

CAPSTONE trace and employment of all RC units is not identified for all component commands.

15.3.1 SCOPE

FORSCOM CAPSTONE trace is over three years old. Force structure changes for USAR TPUs have not been totally updated. Moreover, there are significant USAR TDA units which have neither a CAPSTONE trace nor a post mobilization mission and may not be postured to support a warfighting CINC (see Figure 15-6).

TODAY

FORSCOM USAR TROOP PROGRAM UNITS...

CONUSA	OCONUS DEPLOYING	AUTHORIZATIONS	NON-DEPLOYING	AUTHORIZATIONS
FIRST ARMY	556	72,362	163	22,280
SECOND ARMY	374	38,116	107	15,823
FOURTH ARMY	464	49,133	107	16,123
FIFTH ARMY	373	37,225	92	12,695
SIXTH ARMY	298	31,007	86	12,652
TOTAL	2,065	227,843	555	79,573

Figure 15-6. USAR Units Without a CAPSTONE Trace or Post Mobilization Mission

15.3.2 PROPOSAL

Establish CAPSTONE trace from FORSCOM to nondeploying USAR Troop Program units.

15.3.3 CRITERION

Each USAR unit needs to be identified for CAPSTONE to one Army component commander.

15.3.4 ANALYSIS

555 non-deploying USAR units were identified from the Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) locked master force in the force accounting system (FAS) (Annex B). The latest FORSCOM CAPSTONE Mission Priority Report has not yet been crosswalked with the M-Force to validate errors and identify those non-deploying USAR units without mobilization missions. Report codes (REPCO) from M-Force printouts indicate that many USAR units have no mobilization mission and others discontinue after M + 30 to M + 60. In consideration of the many FORSCOM high priority missions, the CDR, FORSCOM has some missions that require significant resources all of which have not yet been identified. For example, a FORSCOM review of the land defense of CONUS (LDC) mission this past year initially projected a LDC need for 85,000 additional personnel over and above the 47th Infantry Division. This increased requirement equates to an additional 80 military police battalions. A review of the USAR non-deploying units should identify additional resources for use in the LDC and other priority missions. Once identified, HQDA can provide results to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a review in order that units without valid missions on mobilization can be provided bonafide missions and added to the troop list.

15.3.5 CONCLUSION

Establish CAPSTONE trace to FORSCOM for all USAR TPU without mobilization missions.

15.3.6 IMPLEMENTATION

ODCSOPS provides in six months an implementation plan which assigns a CAPSTONE mission to all USAR non-deploying units. Implement in FY 90.

15.4 OBSERVATION

USAR training divisions and USAR schools are not under the control of the training functional command (TRADOC) (see Figure 15-7).



Figure 15-7. USAR Organizations Not Under Control of Their Functional Command

15.4.1 SCOPE

FORSCOM maximize the effective management of its varied missions and unit training. TRADOC oversees individual training. Facilitate the most effective/efficient structure for the functional control of training capability.

15.4.2 PROPOSAL

Transfer control of USAR Training Divisions and USARF Schools to TRADOC.

15.4.3 CRITERION

The missions of the training division are to train to establish or expand a U.S. Army Training Center and conduct Basic Training (BT) and/or Advanced Individual Training (AIT) upon mobilization; to command, control, and supervise assigned and/or attached personnel and units. The USARF school mission is to provide a means for personnel of all components to attain requisite military education and proficiency standards by conducting Army Service School/College approved programs of instruction. These missions are best accomplished by providing a clear and effective chain of command, authority, and doctrine from the functional headquarters for individual training. Operational control by TRADOC will enhance the priorities of TRADOC installation support to RC, and will facilitate the transition to mobilization. FORSCOM possesses the greatest expertise and resources to conduct and control unit training. TRADOC possesses the greatest expertise and resources to conduct and control individual training.

15.4.4 ANALYSIS

The transfer of the USAR training divisions and USARF schools to TRADOC simplifies the organizational structure, facilitates the transition to mobilization by giving TRADOC direct control of all individual training; decreases the need for multiple command and different CONUSA directives; transfers and coordinates school courses; and conducts training on an area wide basis in a community college type setting. By consolidating and extending unit and individual training to AC/RC/NG in the same geographic area, year round two-week training could be conducted at AC Schools/Centers more readily. (Protrain concept)

FORSCOM/TRADOC Regulation 135-3 and TRADOC Reg. 350-15 for partnership/affiliation of USARF Schools with TRADOC SChools are enhanced.

This action places individual training organizations under TRADOC and unit training focus to FORSCOM, thereby relieving FORSCOM of individual training responsibility for USAR units. No manpower redistribution is expected although it is possible a plus up of spaces in TRADOC may be in order (see Figure 15-8).



Figure 15-8. Transfer of USAR Training Divisions and Schools to TRADOC

15.4.5 CONCLUSION

Subordinate the training divisions and USARF schools to TRADOC.

15.4.6 IMPLEMENTATION

The transfer of control of training divisions and USARF schools to TRADOC should be phased to conform to the other proposed transition changes to FORSCOM.

The proposed transfer of operational control (OPCON) to TRADOC should be initiated immediately and be completed by FY 90. The second phase for TRADOC to command should be completed by FY 94.

Many training divisions are also Major U.S. Army Reserve Commands (MUSARCs) which operate as regional command and control headquarters for geographically related separate units, detachments, and other commands. MUSARC boundaries must be realigned to fill the void created when training divisions are commanded by TRADOC. Care should be taken to "protect" state boundaries as this transition occurs between FY 90 and FY 94.

Currently, Army component commanders command the USAR units that are in their areas of responsibility. This means that the commanders of WESTCOM, USAREUR, and FORSCOM command USAR units. The Task Force does not recommend any change to this set-up in the near or even mid-term. However, during the Task Force review, it was apparent that the Army National Guard management structure was more streamlined and experienced less difficulty in attaining unit readiness standards. This perception is widely held throughout the Army.

The Task Force recommends that the United States Army Reserve organization at the Major United States Army Reserve Command (MUSARC) level be the subject of a more detailed, dedicated study. Specifically, the Army should explore the alignment of MUSARC headquarters with state boundaries. This course of action appears to offer the following advantages:

(1) Aligns USAR command and control apparatus with that of ARNG, facilitating coordination. (A problem was noted in the OSET visit to the State Area Command (STARC) in Hawaii. Reserve units had recently been established in Hawaii that required the same, hard to find, technical skills that were required in Hawaii ARNG units, making recruiting more difficult for both components.) Additionally, this facilitates integrated USAR/ARNG training and support, local identification of USAR units with ARNG units, and most areas of Reserve Component management.

(2) Simplifies USAR command and control structure.

(3) Does not require any increase in the number of MUSARC (currently, there are fifty-one).

(4) Facilitates coordination and assistance by Readiness Groups.

(5) Facilitates obtaining congressional support for USAR requirements.

(6) Provides simple, logical command and control apparatus for FORSCOM contingency missions.

A second aspect of the Reserve Component (RC) structure requires additional review. The Task Force noted that the ARNG consists largely of combat units, while

the preponderance of USAR units are combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS). The balance of the RC force structure mix should be examined. Perhaps the readiness of more technical CS/CSS units would be enhanced by the lower personnel turbulence enjoyed by some ARNG units. USAR personnel turbulence is about 33 percent annually and has a very serious impact on the readiness of units that require skills with long training times.

The Task Force also noted that Full Time Support (FTS) was lagging in the USAR. During a visit to 5th U.S. Army, it was stated by the CONUSA staff that they could normally expect a one day turn around on information requests from ARNG units, but often had to wait a full month to receive complete replies from USAR units. This situation was attributed to the low level of FTS in USAR units. Office, Chief Army Reserve (OCAR) has identified a 10,000 authorization shortfall in FTS to the USAR. The USAR has the lowest FTS ratio of any of the RC of any of the services.

The Army must more fully exploit the wealth of talent that exists in the United States Army Reserve.

ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 15
LIST OF ARCOM REQUIRED REPORTS

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 120th United States Army Reserve Command
Fort Jackson, South Carolina 29207-6070

120h ARCOM Circular
No. 335-88-1

1 November 1988

Expires 31 October 1990
Management Information Control
LIST OF APPROVED RECURRING MANAGEMENT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

1. PURPOSE. To publish a listing of approved recurring management information requirements (recurring reports) from Department of the Army, Forces Command, Second U.S. Army, 120th U.S. Army Reserve Command, and other agencies.

2. APPLICABILITY. This circular is applicable to this headquarters, Major Subordinate Commands and assigned units, Reserve Centers, and activities.

3. REFERENCES.

a. AR 335-15, Management Information Control System.

b. DA Pam 25-9, List of Approved Recurring Management Information Requirements.

*This circular supersedes 120th ARCOM Circular 335-87-1, 1 Jul 87.

c. FORSCOM Suppl 1 to AR 335-15, Management Information Control System.

d. 2A Suppl 1 to AR 335-15, Management Information Control System.

e. FORSCOM Cir 335-88-11, List of Approved Recurring Management Information Requirements.

f. 2A Cir 335-88-1, List of Approved Recurring Management Information Requirements.

4. SELECTED DEFINITIONS.

a. Requirements Control Symbol (RCS). An identification symbol assigned to a reporting requirement by the Management Information Control Officer (MICO) to indicate it has been approved in accordance with AR 335-15.

b. Controlled Requirement. A requirement not specifically exempt (Chapter 5, AR 335-15) and which has been approved and assigned an RCS.

c. Exempt Requirement. A reporting requirement of the type specified in Chapter 5, AR 335-15, and which does not require assignment of an RCS. Exemptions will be cited only after approval of the MICO and will be identified by a citation similar to the following: RCS exempt: AR 335-15, paragraph 5-2a(4). The citation will be placed immediately after the request for information.

d. Unauthorized Requirement. A reporting requirement which has not been assigned an RCS prior to publication of the reporting directive.

5. POLICIES. Consistent with the objectives of an effective Management Information Control System as prescribed in AR 335-15, each level of command and the personnel within will become familiar with the content of this circular to ensure that all requirements being prepared are listed and correctly identified or are specifically exempt from management information control (Chapter 5, AR 335-15).

6. EXPLANATION OF FORMAT OF LIST OF APPROVED RECURRING MANAGEMENT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS. The following explanations are keyed to the appropriate columnar headings:

a. REQUIREMENT CONTROL SYMBOL (1). An RCS will be assigned to each separate, controllable management information requirement. See AR 335-15, Appendix C.

b. TITLE OF REQUIREMENT AND FORM NUMBER (2). Identifies the complete title of the requirement and the form number on which the requirement is prepared, where applicable.

c. FREQUENCY (3). Frequency Codes are as follows:

CODE	EXPLANATION
D	Daily
W	Weekly
M	Monthly
Q	Quarterly
S	Semiannually (every six months)
A	Annually
R	Other (irregular or as required)

d. REQUIRING DIRECTIVE (4). Established by the originating agency.

e. PREPARED BY (5). This headquarters, Major Subordinate Commands and assigned units, Reserve Centers, and activities.

f. SUSPENSE TO REQUIRING HEADQUARTERS (6). This column provides the suspense date of each report required by an higher headquarters or support agency.

g. SUSPENSE TO ARCOM HEADQUARTERS (7). This column provides the suspense date of each report to be sent to the ARCOM headquarters in order to meet internal, higher headquarters, or support agency management information requirements.

h. SUSPENSE TO MAJOR SUBORDINATE COMMAND (8). This column may be used by each MSC to provide the suspense date of each report to be sent to the MSC in order to meet management information requirements.

i. SUSPENSE TO BATTALION (9). This column may be used by each battalion to provide the suspense date of each report to be sent to the battalion in order to meet management information requirements.

RESERVED

LIST OF APPROVED MANAGEMENT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

HQUSR, 120TH ARCOM

ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION

REQUIREMENTS CONTROL SYMBOL (1)	TITLE OF REQUIREMENT AND FORM NUMBER (2)	FREQ (3)	REQUIRING DIRECTIVE (4)	PREPARED BY (5)	SUSPENSE TO REQUIRING HEADQUARTERS (6)	SUSPENSE TO ARCOM MSE (7)	SUSPENSE TO MSC (8)	SUSPENSE TO BN (9)
AFCO-105	Command Operating Budget (FORSCOM Form 810-R Series & 105-R Series)	A,R	FORSCOM Reg 11-2 & 11-1	ARCOM	As Required	As Required		
AFKD-RM-2 (R1)	Internal Control Systems Material Weakness Report	A	AR 11-2, FORSCOM Reg 11-1	ARCOM	1 July			
AFKD-RMF-O	Monthly OMAR Deviations Analysis Report	M	FORSCOM Reg 11-4	ARCOM	11th Working Day			
AFKD-RMF-2	Monthly RPA Deviations Analysis Report	M	FORSCOM Reg 11-4	ARCOM	As Required			
CSCOA-98	Internal Control Systems	A	AR 11-2, 4 Dec 87, Chap 4	ARCOM	1 July			
CSOCS-283	PARR Instructions Including MMIS	A	DA Letter Guidance Issued Yearly	ARCOM	15 Oct			
DD Comp (AR) 1618	Internal Control Improvement Activities Report	A	AR 11-2, 4 Dec 87, Chap 4, DoD Directive 5010.38 USSA RMM-M Msg 041300Z Nov 87	ARCOM	1 July			

RESERVED

LIST OF APPROVED MANAGEMENT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

DCSLOG, 120TH ARCOM

ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION

REQUIREMENTS CONTROL SYMBOL (1)	TITLE OF REQUIREMENT AND FORM NUMBER (2)	FREQ (3)	REQUIRING DIRECTIVE (4)	PREPARED BY (5)	SUSPENSE TO REQUIRING HEADQUARTERS (6)	SUSPENSE TO ARCOM MSC (7)	SUSPENSE TO MSC (8)	SUSPENSE TO BN (9)
AFKD-ACG-LG-2	Equipment Maint Schedule/ Service Chart (Form 6-88-R, Sep 88)	A	120th ARCOM Circular 750-88-1	Units		1 Nov		
AFKD-ACG-LG-3	Monthly Petroleum Products Usage Ground & Marine (120th ARCOM Form 6-12R)	M	120th ARCOM Reg 750-1	Units/ AMMAs		15th	5th	
AFKD-ACG-LG-4	Quarterly Unfinanced Demands LOG (Form 7-1-R)	Q	DA Pam 710-2-1	Units		10 Sep 10 Jan 10 Apr 10 Jul		
AFKD-ACG-LG-5	Monthly Petroleum Products Usage Aviation (Form 6-13-R, 10 Apr 78)	M	120th ARCOM Reg 750-1	Units		15/mthly		
AFKD-LG-2	Combat Service Support Training Missions Quarterly Activity Report	Q	2A Reg 140-4	ARCOM, Units	Last working day of month following end of Qtr	10th of month following end of Qtr		
AFKD-LG-7 *	Annual Review of Dining Facility Accts (IBT/AT)	A	AR 30-1 and 2A Ltr, 1 Nov 88, Subj: Annual Review of Dining Facility Accts	ARCOM, Units	Mar	As Required		

* Indicates that an official prescribing directive will be published within one year (para 2-2a(3), AR 335-15).

LIST OF APPROVED MANAGEMENT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

DCSLOG, 120TH ARCOM

ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION

REQUIREMENTS CONTROL SYMBOL (1)	TITLE OF REQUIREMENT AND FORM NUMBER (2)	FREQ (3)	REQUIRING DIRECTIVE (4)	PREPARED BY (5)	SUSPENSE TO REQUIRING HEADQUARTERS (6)	SUSPENSE TO ARCOM DCS (7)	SUSPENSE TO MSC (8)	SUSPENSE TO BN (8)
AFKD-LG-31 *	Supply Performance Report	M	Ltr, HQ 3A DCSLOG to Dist, 120th & 121st ARCOM and 788ist USAG	ARCOM, Units Having DAS 3 Support	8th/mthly	2nd/mthly		
AFKD-LG-38	Equipment Concentration Site Equipment Density Report	Q	2A Reg 140-11, Management of USAR Equipment Concentration Sites, Apr 86	SCS Units	30 Jan 30 Apr 30 Jul 30 Oct *			
AFKD-LG-61	Mobilization Assessment Report	A	2A Reg 140-11	ARCOM, SCS	15 Nov	1 Nov		
AFKD-LG-62	Equipment Density Report (2A, Form 113-R)	A	2A Reg 140-8	ARCOM, Units	1 Nov	1 Oct		
AFLG-165 (R1)	Com Movement Planning and Status System (COMPASS) Unit Movement Data Report (FORSCOM Form 880-R)	R	FORSCOM Reg 55-1	Units	30 Apr	1 Jan		
AFLG-398	Chemical Defense Equipment Status Report (Assets and Requirements)	R	Ltr, AFKA-LG-M, Status Rpt of CDE (RCS: AFLG-398 Jan 83) FORSCOM Reg 700-2	ARCOM, Units	1 Oct 1 Apr	30 Sep 30 Mar		
CSGLD-1042 (R3)	Material Condition Status Report (DA Form 2408)	Q	AR 700-138, DA Pam 738-750, FORSCOM/TRADOC Regs 750-8 & 750-14, AR 380-1	ARCOM, Units	10 Jan 10 Apr 10 Jul 10 Oct	31 Dec 31 Mar 30 Jun 30 Sep		

* Indicates that an official prescribing directive will be published within one year (para 2-2a(2), AR 335-15).

LIST OF APPROVED MANAGEMENT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

DCSLOG, 120TH ARCOM

ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION

REQUIREMENTS CONTROL SYMBOL (1)	TITLE OF REQUIREMENT AND FORM NUMBER (2)	FREQ (3)	REQUIRING DIRECTIVE (4)	PREPARED BY (5)	SUSPENSE TO			
					REQUIRING HEADQUARTERS (6)	ARCOM HQS (7)	MSC (8)	DA (9)
CSGLD-1047 (R3)	REAR Equipment Report Overhaul Program Submissions (DA Forms 2407 & 2407-1)	M,R	TM 38-750, DA Pam 738-750, AR 140-18	Units		As Required		
CSGLD-1052 (R3)	Component Removal & Repair/ Overhaul Record (DA Form 2410)	M,R	TM 38-750-1, DA Pam 738-750	Units		As Required		
CSGLD-1072	Daily Labor Exception Listing FORSCOM Form 238	D	TM 38-750-1, 20 Dec 78, Fig 7-32 & 1A Suppl to AR 140-18	AMSA		6th/mthly		
CSGLD-1098 (R2)	Food Cost: Food Strength Summary (DA Form 3080-R)	Q	AR 30-8, AR 30-10, AR 700-138, AR 220-1 DA Pam 700-1	ARCOM	45 days after close of each Qtr			
CSGLD-1098 (R2)	Subsistence Report & Field Ration Request(DA Form 2976)	M	AR 30-1, 120th ARCOM Pam 30-1	Units, ARCOM	30 to 60 days prior to tng date	35 to 60 days prior to tng period		
RCS Exempt: AR 335-15, Para 5-2b(2)	Headcount Record DA Form 3033	M	AR 30-1, 120th ARCOM Pam 30-1, 1 Oct 87	Units		5 working days after scheduled training		
RCS Exempt: AR 335-15, Para 5-2b(2)	Purchase Request & Commitment (DA Form 3953) Catered Meals	M	AR 30-1, 120th ARCOM Pam 30-1, 1 Oct 87	Units		35 to 60 days prior to tng period		

LIST OF APPROVED MANAGEMENT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

DCSLOG, 120TH ARCOM

ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION

REQUIREMENTS CONTROL SYMBOL (1)	TITLE OF REQUIREMENT AND FORM NUMBER (2)	FREQ (3)	REQUIRING DIRECTIVE (4)	PREPARED BY (5)	SUSPENSE TO REQUIRING HEADQUARTERS (6)	SUSPENSE TO ARCOM HQS (7)	SUSPENSE TO MSC (8)	SUSPENSE TO BN (8)
CSOLD-1808	Equipment Control Record (DA Form 2408-8)	B	AR 710-2; TM 38-750; DA Pam 738-750	Units/ AMSAs		As Required		
CSOLD-1733	DOD Small Arms Serialization Program	B	AR 710-3 w/1A Suppl	Units		As Required		
CSOLD-1837 (RS)	Army Aircraft Inventory Status and Flying Time Report (DA Form 1352 Series)	M	AR 95-33 w/FORSCOM Suppl 1, AR 700-138 27 Dec 85	Units w/Aircraft		20th/mthly		
CSOLD-1840	Quarterly Report of Supply Accountability Adjustment Documents	Q	AR 735-11, 1A Letter AFKB-LG-M, 28 Dec 78	Units, ARCOM	20 days after close of Qtr	15 days after close of Qtr		
CSOLD 1848	Property Accountability Adjustment Data (DA Form 69-2 Report)	Q	AR 710-2, AR 735-11, FM 1-16-2, DA, FORSCOM Directive, AR 735-11, DA Pam 700-1	ARCOM, Units	30 to 45 days after end of each Qtr	15 days after end of each Qtr		
CSOLD-1900	Organizational Clothing and Individual Equipment (OCIE) Assets/Requirements Report	S	FORSCOM Reg 700-2	ARCOM, Units	1 Oct 1 Apr	30 Sep 30 Mar		
CSOLD-1937	Combat PLL/ASL Status Report	Q	DA Ltr AFKB-LGS-S 9 Oct 85	Units		30 Jan 30 Apr 30 Jul 30 Oct		

LIST OF APPROVED MANAGEMENT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

RCS LOG-__120TH ARCOM

ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION

REQUIREMENTS CONTROL SYMBOL (1)	TITLE OF REQUIREMENT AND FORM NUMBER (2)	FREQ (3)	REQUIRING DIRECTIVE (4)	PREPARED BY (5)	REQUIRING HEADQUARTERS (6)	SUSPENSE TO ARCOM HQS (7)	MSC (8)	HQ (9)
DAC-326 (R1)	US Army COMSEC Equip Asset Reporting System (CEARS)	Q	DA TB 380-40	ARCOM, Units				
RCS Exempt: AR 335-15, Para 5-2b(2)	Over & Under Record Mail (DA Form 3231-R, 1 Sep 78)	M	AR 26-1	Units		Within 60 days after AT period		
RCS Exempt: AR 335-15, para 5-2b(2), 5-2g	Monthly Food Service Report (Forms only) (DA Form 3553 and 3556-R)	M	Ch 14, Logistics Oper. Procedure	Units		5 marked days after log period		

RESERVED

LIST OF APPROVED MANAGEMENT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

DCSOPS, 120TH ARCOM

ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION

REQUIREMENTS CONTROL SYMBOL (1)	TITLE OF REQUIREMENT AND FORM NUMBER (2)	FREQ (3)	REQUIRING DIRECTIVE (4)	PREPARED BY (5)	SUSPENSE TO REQUIRING HEADQUARTERS (6)	SUSPENSE TO ARCOM HQS (7)	SUSPENSE TO MSC (8)	SUSPENSE TO BN (9)
AFKD-ACG-OP-1	Quarterly Schedule of Staff Supervision Visit (120th ARCOM Form 81-R)	Q	AR 1-206 and AR 140-1, 120th ARCOM Pam 1-206	ARCOM Staff, Units		1 Sep 1 Dec 1 Mar 1 Jun		
AFKD-ACG-OP-1	Quarterly Inspection Schedule (120th ARCOM Form 81-R)	Q	120th ARCOM Pam 1-202	ARCOM Staff, Units		1 Sep 1 Dec 1 Mar 1 Jun		
AFKD-ACG-OP-2	Report of Staff Visit to: (120th ARCOM Form 86-R)	R	AR 1-206 and AR 140-1, 120th ARCOM Pamphlet No. 1-202 & 1-206	ARCOM		As Required		
AFOP-S2 (R2) MIN	Units Status and Identity Reporting System	S	JCS Pub 6, FORSCOM Reg 525-3 AR 720-1	ARCOM, Units	15 Apr 15 Oct	25 Mar 25 Sep		
CSGID-186	Annual Consolidated Statistical SAEDA Data Report (120th ARCOM Form 8-7-R)	A	AR 381-12	ARCOM, Units	1 Oct	25 Sep		
CSGID-181	Red Train Plan	A	AR 350-3, Tactical Intel Readiness Training Program, Chap 4	SOF Units		As Required		
CSGPO-437	Shelter for the Homeless	M	Msg SUSA-D 161620Z Oct 84, Msg AFOP-OCF, 071820Z, Dec 84	ARCOM	As Required			

LIST OF APPROVED MANAGEMENT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

DCSOPS, 120TH ARCOM

ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION

REQUIREMENTS CONTROL SYMBOL (1)	TITLE OF REQUIREMENT AND FORM NUMBER (2)	FREQ (3)	REQUIRING DIRECTIVE (4)	PREPARED BY (5)	SUSPENSE TO REQUIRING HEADQUARTERS (6)	ARCOM HQS (7)	MSC (8)	BN (9)
DD-A(A) 1118	Annual Inspection and Verification of Compliance w/AR 380-13	A	AR 380-13 w/FORSCOM Suppl dated 30 Jul 76, SAB	Units		1 Aug		
DD-Comp (AR 1114)	Military Participation in Natural Disasters	R	AR 500-60 AR 525-1	ARCOM, Units	As Required	As Required		
DD POL(M) 1671	DOD Personnel Security Program Clearance & Investigation Reductions Report	R	Msg DAMI-CIS, 2818002 & Jun 88, & 1721002 Jul 88	ARCOM, Units	As Required	As Required		
DD POL (A) 1749	Personnel Security Clearances	A	DOD Dir 5200.2-R	Units		31 Mar		
DP (MIN)	Commander's Operations Report	R	FORSCOM/ARNEB/ARLANT Reg 525-15	ARCOM, Units	As Required	As Required		
JCS-6-11-2-1-6 (MIN)	Unit Status Report DA Form 2715	R	AR 220-1 w/FORSCOM Suppl 1	ARCOM, Units	15 Oct 15 Apr	Sep As Required in March		
JCS-10-88 (R1)	Annual OPSEC Program Report	A	AR 530-1	ARCOM, Units	1 Oct	31 May		

LIST OF APPROVED MANAGEMENT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

RCSPER, 120TH ARCOM

ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION

REQUIREMENTS CONTROL SYMBOL (1)	TITLE OF REQUIREMENT AND FORM NUMBER (2)	FREQ (3)	REQUIRING DIRECTIVE (4)	PREPARED BY (5)	SUSPENSE TO REQUIRING HEADQUARTERS (6)	SUSPENSE TO ARCOM MSC (7)	SUSPENSE TO MSC (8)	SUSPENSE TO BN (9)
JCS-10-88 (MIAR)	(u) Reporting Unknown Interference of Electro-Magnetic Systems (MIJI)	S	AR 105-3	ARCOM	As Required			
MILPC-88	Special Operations Language Training Requirements	A	AR 611-6 Army Language Management, 16 Oct 85, Chap 2.	ARCOM SOF Units	As Required	As Required		
RCS Exempt: AR 335-15 para 5-2e (2)	Intelligence Oversight Report	E	AR 380-10, Intel Activities Procedure 15, para C-310) (2)	ARCOM, MI	15 Mar 15 Jun 15 Sep 15 Dec	As Required		
RCS Exempt: AR 335-15, para 5-3	Alert Report (Test & Actual) (Format)	A,E	130-MP, Annex A	Units		1 Oct		
RCS Exempt: AR 335-15, para 5-3	MOB Alert Planning Primary and Alternate Personnel (Letter)	A,E	130-MP Annex A	ARCOM, Units	As Required	1 Oct		
RCS Exempt: AR 335-15, para 5-2e (7)	MOB Readiness Exercise (MRE) AA Report (Format)	A	130th ARCOM Pam 500-3	Units		As Required		

LIST OF APPROVED MANAGEMENT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

DCSOPS, 120TH ARCOM

ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION

REQUIREMENTS CONTROL SYMBOL (1)	TITLE OF REQUIREMENT AND FORM NUMBER (2)	FREQ (3)	REQUIRING DIRECTIVE (4)	PREPARED BY (5)	SUSPENSE TO REQUIRING HEADQUARTERS (6)	SUSPENSE TO ARCOM HQS (7)	SUSPENSE TO MSC (8)	SUSPENSE TO OS (9)
RCS Exempt: AR 335-15, para 5-2a (3) para 5-3	MOB Readiness Exercise (MRE) Dates (Letter)	A	120th ARCOM Pam 600-3	Units		1 Sep		
RCS Exempt: AR 335-15, para 5-2a (7), para 5-3	MOB Readiness Exercise (MRE) Summary of Observations & Lessons Learned (Letter)	A	120th ARCOM Pam 600-3	ARCOM		As Required		
AFRD-ACG-OP-3	CAPSTONE Update Report	S	FORMDEPS, ARCOM Memorandum 13 Jun 88, subj: CAPSTONE Update	Units		15 Mar 15 Sep		
RCS Exempt: AR 335-15, para 5-3, a-c 5	SC Annual Status Report (ltr format)	A	AR 350-3S; LOI 1A, 1 Sep 78, subj: Assess by SA Pers to SCS; ltr, FORSCOM, 21 Aug 79, subj: SCI Equip for USAR SIGINT/EW Units	SOF Units	As Required	As Required		
JCS-6-11-2-1-6	SUSA Action Plan - List of Specific Units with Readiness Problems	S	SUSA Memorandum, LOI USR, 8 Feb 88	ARCOM, Units	Within 30 days Nov May	15 Apr 15 Oct		
AFOP-380	FORSCOM Form 310-R, PTS R	A	Form DEPS Unit Cdr's Handbook/120 MP Annex C	Units, ARCOM	30 Dec	30 Oct		
AFMD-OPS3	DA Domestic Action	Q	SUSA Memorandum DA Domestic Action Program, 6 Apr 88	ARCOM	20 Jan 20 Apr 20 Jul 20 Sep			
CSMIS-6(R-3)	Annual Historical Review	A	AR 870-5 w/FORSCOM Supplement 1, 1 Nov 82 Chap 6, App B; 100-47 1 Oct 78	ARCOM	As Required			

LIST OF APPROVED MANAGEMENT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

DCST, 120TH ARCOM

ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION

REQUIREMENTS CONTROL SYMBOL (1)	TITLE OF REQUIREMENT AND FORM NUMBER (2)	FREQ (3)	REQUIRING DIRECTIVE (4)	PREPARED BY (5)	SUSPENSE TO REQUIRING HEADQUARTERS (6)	SUSPENSE TO ARCOM MSE (7)	SUSPENSE TO MSC (8)	SUSPENSE TO BN (9)
AFCO-168 (MIN)	USAR Flying Hour Program (FORSCOM 11e-R)	S	FORSCOM Reg 140-10	ARCOM	1 Apr 1 Oct			
AFKD-ACG-TR-1	Unit Tng Assemblies & Tng Highlights Rpt (120th ARCOM Form 3-1-R)	Q	FORSCOM Reg 350-2 ARCOM Ltr (4-01-C)	Units & Consolidated by ARCOM	1 Dec 1 Mar 1 Jun 1 Sep	1 Nov 1 Feb 1 May 1 Aug		
AFKD-ACG-TR-3	Schools Tng Assemblies & Tng Highlights Rpt (120th ARCOM 3-3-R)	Q	FORSCOM Reg 350-2 ARCOM, LOI Apr 86	Schools		1 Oct 1 Jan 1 Jun 1 Aug		
AFKD-RT-8	USAR School Staffing Guide/ TDA Worksheet (FORSCOM Form 28-R)	A	2A Suppl to FORSCOM/ TRADOC Reg 136-3	Schools	10 Dec	As Required		
AFKD TR-21	AT Strength Report Special Mission MOS Training (After Action Report)	R	2A Cir 136-86-R, 136-87-1	Schools	As Required	As Required		
AFKD TR 26	SCORE Summary of Appropriate Level of Training Report	Q	FORSCOM/TRADOC Reg 136-R	ARCOM, Units	30 Jan 30 Apr 30 Jul 30 Oct	30 Dec 30 Mar 30 Jun 30 Sep		
AFOP 111 (R3)	Acft Programming and Utilization Flying Hour Report FORSCOM/TRADOC 503-R	Q,A	FORSCOM/TRADOC Suppl 1 to AR 95-1 & TC 1-136	ARCOM	1 Oct 1 Jan 1 Apr 1 Jul			

LIST OF APPROVED MANAGEMENT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

DCST, 120TH ARCOM

ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION

REQUIREMENTS CONTROL SYMBOL (1)	TITLE OF REQUIREMENT AND FORM NUMBER (2)	FREQ (3)	REQUIRING DIRECTIVE (4)	PREPARED BY (5)	SUSPENSE TO REQUIRING HEADQUARTERS (6)	SUSPENSE TO ARCOM HQS (7)	SUSPENSE TO MSC (8)	SUSPENSE TO OH (8)
CSRES/AFRD-RM-S	Additional Tag Assemblies (ATA)/RMA Report)	Q	USAR Reg 350-22, 28 Feb 86, Annual 2A Letter	Units & Consolidated by ARCOM	30 Dec 30 Mar 30 Jun 30 Sep	15 Dec 15 Mar 15 Jun 15 Sep		
CSRES 74 (R3)	Consolidated USAR School Student Enrollment/Course Completion Report Form 620-R & 620-1-R	S	AR 140-1; FORSCOM/TRADOC Reg 135-5, 2A Sup to FORSCOM, TRADOC 135-2	Schools	15 Dec 31 Jul	As Required		
CSRES-188 (R1)	Marksmanship Training and Competition Report (DA Form 3736-R)	S	AR 140-135 FORSCOM Suppl 1 to AR 350-6	ARCOM	As Required			
CSRES-311 (R3)	USAR Aviation Unit Activity Report (FORSCOM Form 352-R) and USAR Aviation Unit Personnel Information (FORSCOM Form 352-1-R)	S	FORSCOM Reg 140-3	ARCOM aviation personnel	As Required			
DD(AR)(AR) 1180 (MIN)	Nuclear Accident or Significant Incidents	R	AR 385-10; AR 385-40, AR 50-5, w/FORSCOM Suppl 1	ARCOM				
DD-M (A) 1540	Operational Support Airlift	A	AR 95-1 w/FORSCOM Suppl 1	ARCOM	15 Oct			
RCS Exempt: AR 335-15 Para 5-2b(2)?	Ammunition Forecasts DA Form 5811	A	2A Reg 350-22, Annual ARCOM LOI	Units, ARCOM	As Required	As Required		
RCS Exempt: AR 335-15 para 5-2d(7)	ARSTC Training Needs Survey	A	Annual FORSCOM and 2A Letters	Units & Schools ARCOM	As Required	As Required		

LIST OF APPROVED MANAGEMENT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

DCST, 120TH ARCOM

ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION

REQUIREMENTS CONTROL SYMBOL (1)	TITLE OF REQUIREMENT AND FORM NUMBER (2)	FREQ (3)	REQUIRING DIRECTIVE (4)	PREPARED BY (5)	SUSPENSE TO REQUIRING HEADQUARTERS (6)	SUSPENSE TO ARCOM HQS (7)	SUSPENSE TO MSC (8)	SUSPENSE TO BN (8)
RCS Exempt: AR 335-15, para 5-2b(1,2), 5-3	Association of the US Army USAR School Award (ltr format)	A	FORSCOM/TRADOC 138-3	Schools, ARCOM	As Required	As Required		
RCS Exempt: AR 335-15, para 5-2c(7), 5-3	AT After Action Report USAR Schools (ltr format)	A	2A Suppl 1 to FORSCOM/ TRADOC Reg 138-3	Schools	As Required	As Required		
RCS Exempt: AR 335-15, para 5-2d(6)	External Tng Evaluations (ARTEP), Results	R	120th ARCOM Pam 350-3	Designated Evaluator		As Required		
DRC-132 (MIS)	Malfunctions Involving Ammo and Explosive (DA Forms 4370 & 4370-1)	R	AR 75-1	Units	As Required	As Required		
RCS Exempt: AR 335-15 para 5-2b(7)	External Tng Evaluation, Requests	A,R	2A 350-22 Mar 88 120th ARCOM Pam 350-3	Units thru ARCOM	As Required	As Required		
RCS Exempt: AR 335-15 para 5-2b(2)	Nomination for the USAR Superior Unit Certificate	A	AR 140-24	Units thru ARCOM	As Required	As Required		
RCS Exempt: AR 335-15 para 5-2b(7)	BC-STRIPES Individual Training Requirements Worksheet (FORSCOM Form 216-R)	S	FORSCOM/TRADOC 138-3, 120th ARCOM Reg 140-20 Oct 88	Units		As Required		
RCS Exempt: AR 335-15 para 5-2c(7)	BC-STRIPES Workshop Summary (FORSCOM Form 221)	S	FORSCOM/TRADOC 138-3, 120th ARCOM Reg 140-20 Oct 88	Schools		As Required		

LIST OF APPROVED MANAGEMENT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

DCST, 139TH ARCOM

ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION

REQUIREMENTS CONTROL SYMBOL (1)	TITLE OF REQUIREMENT AND FORM NUMBER (2)	FREQ (3)	REQUIRING DIRECTIVE (4)	PREPARED BY (5)	SUSPENSE TO REQUIRING HEADQUARTERS (6)	SUSPENSE TO ARCOM MSE (7)	SUSPENSE TO MSC (8)	SUSPENSE TO DE (9)
RCS Exempt: AR 335-15 para 5-2b(2)	Request for Ammunition Issue (DA Form 581)	B	3A 385-32 and Annual ARCOM LOI	Units	As Required	As Required		
RCS Exempt: AR 335-15, para 5-2b(7)	USAR School Estimated Tag Literature Requirements (FORSCOM 5102)	S	FORSCOM/TRADOC 135-2 2A Suppl 1 to FORSCOM/TRADOC Reg 135-2	Schools	As Required	As Required		
RCS Exempt: AR 335-15 para 5-3	Yearly Tag Program (format in LOI)	A	ARCOM LOI for Tag Programming, FORSCOM Reg 385-2	Units, ARCOM	15 Sep	15 Feb		
RCS Exempt: AR 335-15 para 5-3	120 ARCOM Aviation Standardization Board Rpt (ltr format)	Q	AR 95-1	ARCOM	1 Oct 1 Jan 1 Apr 1 Jul			
RCS Exempt: AR 335-15 para 5-3	120 ARCOM Aviation Safety Council Board (ltr format)	Q	DA 385-95	ARCOM	1 Oct 1 Jan 1 Apr 1 Jul			

LIST OF APPROVED MANAGEMENT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

DCSPER, 120TH ARCOM

ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION

REQUIREMENTS CONTROL SYMBOL (1)	TITLE OF REQUIREMENT AND FORM NUMBER (2)	FREQ (3)	REQUIRING DIRECTIVE (4)	PREPARED BY (5)	SUSPENSE TO: REQUIRING HEADQUARTERS (6)	ARCOM HQS (7)	MSC (8)	BN (8)
AFAG-12	Quarterly Awards Report (FORSCOM 348-R)	Q	AR 600-21 w/FORSCOM Suppl 2 AR 672-5-1	ARCOM, Units	4 Jan 4 Apr 4 Jul 4 Oct	20 Dec 20 Mar 20 Jun 20 Sep		
AFKD-ACG-PR-1	Report of Family Support Activity(120th ARCOM Form 87-R, 1 Nov 88)	S	Message 4100, 2USA, AFKD-PRM 081318Z, Jul 86, RCS 0AFKD PR-38, 120th ARCOM Cir 608-87-1	Units		15 Nov 15 May		
AFKD-ACG-PR-3	Strength & Utilization of USAR Technicians (120th ARCOM Form 1-0-R)	M,Q,A	120th ARCOM Pam 600-2	Units	W/I 30 days of change			
AFKD-MD-28 *	USAR Dental Records Reports	Q	FORSCOM Msg 041025Z Jun 88, Subj: USAR Dental Records	ARCOM, Units	21 Jan 22 Apr 22 Jul 23 Oct	18 Jan 18 Apr 18 Jul 18 Oct		
AFKD-PR-4	Retention SPA Phasing Plan	A	2A Cir 37-88-1	ARCOM	As Required			
AFKD-PR-5	Retention OMAR Phasing Plan	A	2A Cir 37-88-1	ARCOM	As Required			
AFKD-PR-33 *	AC Personnel on Active Duty for More than 180 Days	M	Ind AFKD-PRP-M, Subj: SAD, 10 Sep 86	ARCOM	As Required			

* Indicates that an official prescribing directive will be published within one year (para 2-5a(2), AR 335-15).

LIST OF APPROVED MANAGEMENT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

DCSPER, 120TH ARCOM

ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION

REQUIREMENTS CONTROL SYMBOL (1)	TITLE OF REQUIREMENT AND FORM NUMBER (2)	FREQ (3)	REQUIRING DIRECTIVE (4)	PREPARED BY (5)	SUSPENSE TO REQUIRING HEADQUARTERS (6)	SUSPENSE TO ARCOM HQS (7)	SUSPENSE TO MSC (8)	SUSPENSE TO BN (9)
AFPR-348	Civilian Personnel Staffing Report	M	Msg, AFPR-CPD, 071700Z Nov 78	ARCOM to Servicing CPO	5th/mthly			
AG-634	USAR Record of Reserve Tng (DA Form 1379)	M	AR 140-185	Units		15 days after drill		
CSFOR 78	Manpower Utilization and Requirements Reports, Form TRM/2B-2-R	M	AR 570-3, FORSCOM Reg 350-8	ARCOM	10/mthly			
CSGPA-147 (R4)	Accident Reports (DA Form 285, 285-1)	S	AR 385-40 w/FORSCOM Suppl, AR 385-61, 2A Reg 385-1, 120th ARCOM Cir 385-88-1	ARCOM, Units	Within 15 days after accident	Copy furnished to ARCOM		
CSGPA-A-646 (R3)	Summary of Accident Exposure (DA Form 2392)	Q	AR 385-40, 2A Reg 385-1, 120th ARCOM Cir 385-88-1	ARCOM, Units	5 Jan 5 Apr 5 Jul 5 Oct	20 Dec 20 Mar 20 Jun 20 Sep		
CSGLB-1314	Report of Marine Casualty	S	AR 55-10	Units	As Required			
CSGPA 1471 (R1)	Annual Narrative and Statistical Report on EO Progress	A	AR 600-21 w/FORSCOM Suppl 1, and 2A Cir 600-88-1, and 120th ARCOM Cir 600-88-1	ARCOM, Units	1 Dec	15 Oct		

LIST OF APPROVED MANAGEMENT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

DCSPER, 120TH ARCOM

ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION

REQUIREMENTS CONTROL SYMBOL (1)	TITLE OF REQUIREMENT AND FORM NUMBER (2)	FREQ (3)	REQUIRING DIRECTIVE (4)	PREPARED BY (5)	SUSPENSE TO REQUIRING HEADQUARTERS (6)	SUSPENSE TO ARCOM HQS (7)	SUSPENSE TO MSC (8)	SUSPENSE TO BN (9)
CSOCS-250	Reserve Components General Officer Requirements Review	A	Per Letter from DAPE-MO; FORSCOM and 3A	ARCOM	As Required			
MILPC-27	SIDPERS Input and Control Data Authentication Transmittal (DA Form 3815)	R	AR 680-1	Units		As Required		
MILPC-48 (R3)	Number and Types of Decorations Awarded	Q	FORSCOM Suppl 1 to AR 672-5-1	ARCOM	4 Jan 4 Apr 4 Jul 4 Oct	30 Dec 30 Mar 30 Jun 30 Sep		
SAOSA-8 (R1)	Report of Congressional Visits	R	AR 1-20	ARCOM	As Required			
1148-DOL-EX	Report of Serious Accident (DA Form 285 & 285-1)	A,R	AR 385-40, 3A Reg 385-1, 120th ARCOM Cir 385-88-1	ARCOM, Units	As Required	As Required		
RCS Exempt AR 335-15, para 5-2b(3)	Enlisted Evaluation Report	A,R	AR 623-205, 120th ARCOM Cir 623-88-1	ARCOM, Units	As Required	As Required		
RCS Exempt AR 335-15, para 5-2b(5)	Enlisted Evaluation Reporting Rating Scheme (120th ARCOM Form 8-8-R)	R	120th ARCOM Cir 623-88-1, AR 623-205	Units		As Required		

LIST OF APPROVED MANAGEMENT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

DCSPER, 120TH ARCOM

ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION

REQUIREMENTS CONTROL SYMBOL (1)	TITLE OF REQUIREMENT AND FORM NUMBER (2)	FREQ (3)	REQUIRING DIRECTIVE (4)	PREPARED BY (5)	SUSPENSE DATE REQUIRING HEADQUARTERS (6)	SUSPENSE DATE ARCOM HQS (7)	SUSPENSE DATE MSC (8)	SUSPENSE DATE BN (9)
RCS Exempt AR 335-15, para 5-2b(8)	Officer Evaluation Report Rating Scheme (120th ARCOM 6-9-81)	S,E	120th ARCOM Reg 623-105, AR 623-105	Units	Within 60 days after close of rating period	As Required		
RCS Exempt AR 335-15, para 5-2b(8)	ROTC Cadet Evaluation Summary (120th ARCOM PM 6-74-81)	A	120th ARCOM Reg 145-5	Units		As Required		
RCS Exempt AR 335-15, para 5-2b(8)	U.S. Army Officer Evaluation Report (DA Form 67-81)	A,E	AR 623-105, 120th ARCOM Reg 623-105	ARCOM, Units	Within 60 days after close of rating period	As Required		

LIST OF APPROVED MANAGEMENT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

DCSIM, 120TH ARCOM

ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION

REQUIREMENTS CONTROL SYMBOL (1)	TITLE OF REQUIREMENT AND FORM NUMBER (2)	FREQ (3)	REQUIRING DIRECTIVE (4)	PREPARED BY (5)	SUSPENSE TO REQUIRING HEADQUARTERS (6)	SUSPENSE TO ARCOM HQS (7)	SUSPENSE TO MSC (8)	SUSPENSE TO AR (8)
DD-COMP (AR) 1467	JCP: Printing Fac Report, DA Form 6391-series; Annual Printing Fac Rpt of Printing and Binding Equip, DA PM 6466-R; Inventory of Stored Equip, DA PM 6468-R.	A	HQ DA Ltr, 25-87-2	ARCOM	30 Sep			
AG-748	Copier Cost and Production Report (DA Forms 4877-R, 4878-R)	Q,A	AR 340-20, w/FORSCOM Suppl 1 and 2A Suppl 1	ARCOM, USAR Centers, AMSAs	15 Oct	15 Oct 15 Jan 15 Apr 15 Jul		
AG-774	Coordinated Budgetary Program for Printing, Binding, and Related Equip (DA Form 4821-R)	A	AR 310-1, w/FORSCOM Suppl 1	ARCOM	1 Oct			
AG-856	The Army Micrographic Management Information System (AMMIS) (DA Forms 4820-R and 4921-R)	A,R	AR 340-22, w/FORSCOM Suppl 1	ARCOM	As Required			
ISC-78	Quarterly Positive Accountability Postage Administrative System Report (PAPAS) FORSCOM Form 1000-R	Q	AR 340-3	ARCOM, USAR Centers, & SRAAG (MS)	15 Jan 15 Apr 15 Jul 15 Oct	8 Jan 8 Apr 8 Jul 8 Oct		
DD-(A)(ASAR)-1379	Privacy Act Annual Report	A	AR 340-21, Chg 31 w/FORSCOM Suppl 1	ARCOM, Units	20 Jan	15 Jan		
AFIM-1	Form Reduction Report (FORSCOM Form 118-R)	A	FORSCOM Suppl 1 to AR 310-1	ARCOM	15 Oct			

LIST OF APPROVED MANAGEMENT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

RCRIM, 120TH ARCOM

ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION

REQUIREMENTS CONTROL SYMBOL (1)	TITLE OF REQUIREMENT AND FORM NUMBER (2)	FREQ (3)	REQUIRING DIRECTIVE (4)	PREPARED BY (5)	SUSPENSE TO REQUIRING HEADQUARTERS (6)	ARCOM HQS (7)	MSC (8)	BN (8)
CSIM-6	Information Management Plan (IMP)	A	AR 25-6	ARCOM	1 Nov			
CSIM-16	Periodic Rev of Mgt Info Req & Preparing Agency Response & Reason (DA Form 1685-R)	R	AR 335-15	ARCOM, Units	Within 20 work days after DA Form 1685-R is prepared	As Required		
CSIM-17	ADP Prod Review Cats (DA Form 6883-R)	R	AR 335-15	ARCOM, Units	As Required	As Required		
DD-PA(TRIAA)-1365	Freedom of Information Processing Costs (FOI) (DA Form 4035-R)	A	AR 340-17 w/FORSCOM Suppl 1 25 Suppl 1	ARCOM, Units	10 Jan	5 Jan		
DRC-220 (R1)	U.S. Army COMSEC Equipment Asset Reporting System	Q	DATR-380-46	ARCOM, Units	15 Jan 15 Apr 15 Jul 15 Oct	5 Jan 5 Apr 5 Jul 5 Oct		
AFKD-IM-44	120th ARCOM Monthly DCP Expenditure Report	M	Msg AFKD-IM, 181457Z Oct 87	ARCOM	30/mthly			
RCS Exempt: AR 335-15 para 5-3b(1)	Copies of Monthly Telephone Bill	M	Memorandum AFKD-ACS-IM, dated 29 Feb 88, subj: Telecommunication Cost Reduction	Centers		10th/mthly		

LIST OF APPROVED MANAGEMENT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

DCSIM, 120TH ARCOM

ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION

REQUIREMENTS CONTROL SYMBOL (1)	TITLE OF REQUIREMENT AND FORM NUMBER (2)	FREQ (3)	REQUIRING DIRECTIVE (4)	PREPARED BY (5)	SUSPENSE TO REQUIRING HEADQUARTERS (6)	ARCOM HQS (7)	MSC (8)	BN (8)
CJ	Communications-Electronics Deployment Report (CEDREP)	R	FORSCOM/ARREQ/ARLANT, Reg 525-15	ARCOM	As Required			
CK	Communications-Electronics Post Deployment Report (A) (CEPODA)	R	FORSCOM/ARREQ/ARLANT, Reg 525-15	ARCOM	As Required			
CL	Communications-Electronics Post Deployment Report (B) (CEPODA)	R	FORSCOM/ARREQ/ARLANT Reg 525-15	ARCOM	As Required			

RESERVED

LIST OF APPROVED MANAGEMENT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

INSPECTOR GENERAL, 120TH ARCOM

ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION

REQUIREMENTS CONTROL SYMBOL (1)	TITLE OF REQUIREMENT AND FORM NUMBER (2)	FREQ (3)	REQUIRING DIRECTIVE (4)	PREPARED BY (5)	REQUIRING HEADQUARTERS (6)	SUSPENSE TO ARCOM MSC (7) (8)	BN (9)
IG (A) 1717	Semiannual Report to Congress (DD Form 2627)	S	PL 97-252, DAIG-PA 1978 Ltr, MDDA 20-87-1, 12 Feb 87	ARCOM	14 Sep 14 Mar		
RCS Exempt: AR 335-15, para 5-3, a-o	Verification of the Personnel Status Report (Format)	A	Ltr, DAIG-MSM, 24 Aug 88	ARCOM	14 Oct		

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LIST OF APPROVED MANAGEMENT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

INTERNAL REVIEW AUDIT ARCOM

ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION

REQUIREMENTS CONTROL SYMBOL (1)	TITLE OF REQUIREMENT AND FORM NUMBER (2)	FREQ (3)	REQUIRING DIRECTIVE (4)	PREPARED BY (5)	SUSPENSE TO			
					REQUIRING HEADQUARTERS (6)	ARCOM HQS (7)	MSC (8)	HQ (9)
DD-COMP (BA) 1574	Audit & Internal Review Follow-up Status Report	S	Internal Review Audit Manual, COA	ARCOM	21 Mar 21 Sep			
DD-IG (BA) 1618	Reporting Procedures for Audit Investigative & Inspection Activity	S	Public Law 97-252	ARCOM	21 Mar 21 Sep			

RESERVED

LIST OF APPROVED MANAGEMENT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE, 120TH ARCOM

ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION

REQUIREMENTS CONTROL SYMBOL (1)	TITLE OF REQUIREMENT AND FORM NUMBER (2)	FREQ (3)	REQUIRING DIRECTIVE (4)	PREPARED BY (5)	REQUIRING HEADQUARTERS (6)	SUSPENSE TO ARCOM (7)	MSC (8)	HQ (9)
S1054-100	Command Information Prog Eval (DA Para 310-5)	A	AR 360-61, 15 Jan 82	ARCOM	31 Sep			

LIST OF APPROVED MANAGEMENT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE, 120TH ARCOM

ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION

REQUIREMENTS CONTROL SYMBOL (1)	TITLE OF REQUIREMENT AND FORM NUMBER (2)	FREQ (3)	REQUIRING DIRECTIVE (4)	PREPARED BY (5)	SUSPENSE TO REQUIRING HEADQUARTERS (6)	SUSPENSE TO ARCOM HQS (7)	SUSPENSE TO MSC (8)	SUSPENSE TO BN (8)
RCS Exempt: AR 335-15, para 5-2c (4,6,7)	Quarterly Mutual Support and Related Training Survey (JAGS Form-168)	Q	Letter Directive, 8 Sep 88	ARCOM, Units	30 Apr 31 Jul 31 Oct 31 Jan	10 Apr 10 Jul 10 Oct 10 Jan		
JAG-2(R-12)	Report of Judicial Disciplinary Activity in the Army (DA Form 3168-R)	M	FORSCOM Cir 27-87-1, and AR 27-10	ARCOM	8th working day of succeeding month	4th/mthly		
RCS Exempt: AR 335-15, para 5-2b(4)	Financial Disclosure Reports (SF 278)	A	AR 600-50	ARCOM	15 Apr			

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LIST OF APPROVED MANAGEMENT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

CHAPLAIN, 120TH ARCOM

ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION

REQUIREMENTS CONTROL SYMBOL (1)	TITLE OF REQUIREMENT AND FORM NUMBER (2)	FREQ (3)	REQUIRING DIRECTIVE (4)	PREPARED BY (5)	SUSPENSE TO REQUIRING HEADQUARTERS (6)	SUSPENSE TO ARCOM HQS (7)	SUSPENSE TO MSC (8)	SUSPENSE TO AR (9)
AFKD-ACG-CH-1	Chaplain Quarterly Report (120th ARCOM Form 11-R)	Q	120th ARCOM Reg 165-1	Units		15 Jan 15 Apr 15 Jul 15 Oct		
AFKD-ACG-CH-2	Chaplain Quarterly Recruiting/ Strength Report (120th ARCOM Form 12-R)	Q	120th ARCOM Reg 165-1	ARCOM	5 Jan 5 Apr 5 Jul 5 Oct			
RCS Exempt: AR 335-15, para 5-2a(7)	Chaplain After Action Report for AT & ADT (120th ARCOM 16-R, 16-1-R)	R	120th ARCOM Reg 165-1	Units		As Required		
RCS Exempt: AR 335-15, para 5-3a,b,c	Chaplain Annual Report (FORMAT)	A	120th ARCOM Reg 165-1	Units		30 Sep		
RCS Exempt: AR 335-15, para 5-2b(6)	Chaplain Assistants Unit Assignment Roster (120th ARCOM Form 14-R)	Q	120th ARCOM Reg 165-1	Units		15 Jan 15 Apr 15 Jul 15 Oct		
RCS Exempt: AR 335-15, para 5-2b(6)	Chaplain Unit Assignment Roster (120th ARCOM Form 13-R)	Q	120th ARCOM Reg 165-1	Units		15 Jan 15 Apr 15 Jul 15 Oct		
RCS Exempt: AR 335-15, para 5-2b(7)	Master Religious Program Schedule (120th ARCOM Form 17-R)	A	120th ARCOM Reg 165-1	Units		30 Aug		

LIST OF APPROVED MANAGEMENT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

CHAPLAIN, 120TH ARCOM

ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION

REQUIREMENTS CONTROL SYMBOL (1)	TITLE OF REQUIREMENT AND FORM NUMBER (2)	FREQ (3)	REQUIRING DIRECTIVE (4)	PREPARED BY (5)	REQUIRING HEADQUARTERS (6)	SUSPENSE TO ARCOM MSG (7)	MSG (8)	RE (9)
RCS Exempt: AR 335-15, para 5-2b(7)	Unit Chaplain Annual Training Schedule (120th ARCOM Para 16-8)	S	120th ARCOM Reg 165-1	Unit		As Required		
RCS Exempt: AR 335-15, para 5-3a,b,c	Unit Chaplain Section of MOB File (FORMAT)	A	120th ARCOM Reg 165-1	Unit		30 Dec		
RCS Exempt: AR 335-15, para 5-3a,b,c	Unit Chaplain S.O.P. (FORMAT)	A	120th ARCOM Reg 165-1	Unit		30 Sep		

LIST OF APPROVED MANAGEMENT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

ENGINEER, 120TH ARCOM

ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION

REQUIREMENTS CONTROL SYMBOL (1)	TITLE OF REQUIREMENT AND FORM NUMBER (2)	FREQ (3)	REQUIRING DIRECTIVE (4)	PREPARED BY (5)	SUSPENSE TO			
					REQUIRING HEADQUARTERS (6)	ARCOM HQS (7)	MSC (8)	BN (9)
CERE-264	U.S. Army Reserve Facility Assets Catalog and Tracking System (FACTS)	A	AR 140-480	Units		30 Sep		
DD-M(AR)1329	Environmental Documentation Assessment	R	AR 200-2	ARCOM, Units	As Required	As Required		

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LIST OF APPROVED MANAGEMENT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

SURGEON, 120TH ARCOM

ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION

REQUIREMENTS CONTROL SYMBOL (1)	TITLE OF REQUIREMENT AND FORM NUMBER (2)	FREQ (3)	REQUIRING DIRECTIVE (4)	PREPARED BY (5)	SUSPENSE TO			
					REQUIRING HEADQUARTERS (6)	ARCOM HQS (7)	MSC (8)	RU (8)
AFKD-MD-27	Army Physical Fitness Over 40 Cardiovascular Screening Program	Q	3A Cir 40-1	ARCOM	30 Jun 30 Dec	15 May 15 Nov		
MED-202 (R2)	Emergency Medical Situation Report	R	FORSCOM/ARRED/ARLANT Reg 525-15	ARCOM	As Required	As Required		

RESERVED

The proponent of this circular is the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Information Management. Users are invited to send comments and recommendations concerning additions, deletions, or discrepancies in these requirements on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to the Commander, 120th U.S. Army Reserve Command, ATTN: AFKD-ACG-IM, Fort Jackson, SC 29207-6070.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

THOMAS L. HUCKS
Colonel, GS, USAR
Chief of Staff

for DAVID A. COX
Major, IN, USAR
Chief, Administrative
Services Division

DISTRIBUTION:
A

CF:
Cdr, Second U.S. Army, ATTN: AFKD-IM (2)

ANNEX B TO CHAPTER 15
DEPLOYABLE/NON-DEPLOYABLE UNITS-FY89

ANNEX B TO CHAPTER 15
DEPLOYABLE/NON-DEPLOYABLE UNITS - FY 89

	AUTH AGR	UNIT COUNT
** ARMY: 1 TYPCO: 1 DEPLOYABLE		
* REPCO: * Subsubtotal *	70029	552
* REPCO: D * Subsubtotal *	2240	3
* REPCO: N * Subsubtotal *	93	1
** Subtotal **	72362	556
** ARMY: 1 TYPCO: 2&3 NON-DEPLOYABLE		
* REPCO: N * Subsubtotal *	3	1
* REPCO: R * Subsubtotal *	9810	80
* REPCO: D * Subsubtotal *	32	2
* REPCO: M * Subsubtotal *	1369	13
* REPCO: N * Subsubtotal *	2502	13
* REPCO: R * Subsubtotal *	8564	54
** Subtotal **	22280	163

DEPLOYABLE/NON-DEPLOYABLE UNITS - FY 89 (CONTINUED)

	AUTH AGR	UNIT COUNT
** ARMY: 2 TYPCO: 1 DEPLOYABLE		
* REPCO:		
* Subsubtotal *	37363	373
* REPCO: D		
* Subsubtotal *	753	1
** Subtotal **	38116	374
** ARMY: 2 TYPCO: 2&3 NON-DEPLOYABLE		
* REPCO: R		
* Subsubtotal *	5096	39
* REPCO: M		
* Subsubtotal *	655	9
* REPCO: N		
* Subsubtotal *	2168	11
* REPCO: R		
* Subsubtotal *	7904	48
** Subtotal **	15823	107
** ARMY: 4 TYPCO: 1 DEPLOYABLE		
* REPCO:		
* Subsubtotal *	48380	463
* REPCO: D		
* Subsubtotal *	753	1
** Subtotal **	49133	464

DEPLOYABLE/NON-DEPLOYABLE UNITS - FY 89 (CONTINUED)

	AUTH AGR	UNIT COUNT
** ARMY: 4 TYPCO: 2&3 NON-DEPLOYABLE		
* REPCO: D * Subsubtotal *	422	1
* REPCO: N * Subsubtotal *	3	1
* REPCO: R * Subsubtotal *	6782	60
* REPCO: D * Subsubtotal *	31	1
* REPCO: M * Subsubtotal *	600	6
* REPCO: N * Subsubtotal *	1565	7
* REPCO: R * Subsubtotal *	6720	31
** Subtotal **	16123	107
** ARMY: 5 TYPCO: 1 DEPLOYABLE		
* REPCO: * Subsubtotal *	35719	371
* REPCO: D * Subsubtotal *	1506	2
** Subtotal **	37225	373

DEPLOYABLE/NON-DEPLOYABLE UNITS - FY 89 (CONTINUED)

	AUTH AGR	UNIT COUNT
** ARMY: 5 TYPCO: 2&3 NON-DEPLOYABLE		
* REPCO: D		
* Subsubtotal *	8	1
* REPCO: R		
* Subsubtotal *	4612	42
* REPCO: M		
* Subsubtotal *	724	5
* REPCO: N		
* Subsubtotal *	1868	9
* REPCO: R		
* Subsubtotal *	5483	35
** Subtotal **	12695	92
** ARMY: 6 TYPCO: 1 DEPLOYABLE		
* REPCO:		
* Subsubtotal *	30254	297
* REPCO: D		
* Subsubtotal *	753	1
** Subtotal **	31007	298
** ARMY: 6 TYPCO: 2&3 NON-DEPLOYABLE		
* REPCO: R		
* Subsubtotal *	4953	41
* REPCO: M		
* Subsubtotal *	669	5

DEPLOYABLE/NON-DEPLOYABLE UNITS - FY 89 (CONTINUED)

	AUTH AGR	UNIT COUNT
* REPCO: N * Subsubtotal *	1418	8
* REPCO: R * Subsubtotal *	5612	32
** Subtotal **	12652	86
*** Total ***	307416	2620

CHAPTER 16
MOBILIZATION - CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW

"The deterrent value of mobilization resides not only in the Active and Reserve Components, but also in the preparedness to convert civilian manpower and industrial production rapidly into military units, individual replacements, and supplies. The greater our capability for timely, total mobilization, the higher the risk which a potential enemy would incur as a result of actions which could escalate into war with the United States."

"The capability of the United States to expand the active force rapidly and efficiently factor in deterring potential enemies and assuring U.S. allies of U.S. resolve. Fundamental to achieving such a capability is the coordination of mobilization planning with the planned deployments of war plans which require mobilization."

Army Command and Management Theory and Practice
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA

16.1 OBSERVATION

There is split responsibility within the mobilization planning function.

16.1.1 SCOPE

Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Major Commands (MACOM), and installations.

16.1.2 PROPOSAL

Integrate mobilization planning at DA.

16.1.3 CRITERION

Principles of War (FM 100-5, Operations, Appendix A) and the rules of inefficiency (Annex D, Inefficiency Rules, to Chapter 3, Methodology for Comprehensive Review, in this report).

16.1.4 ANALYSIS

The Department of Defense (DOD) Master Mobilization Plan (MMP) (May 88) lists 41 separate authorities in the United States Code (USC) as a partial list of Emergency Authorities for Mobilization. The primary statutory authorities for mobilization are displayed below (see Figure 16-1).

Situation	Action Required	Authority	Personnel Involved	Remarks
1. Any level of emergency.	Publish order to active duty.	10 USC 672 (d) 10 USC 3504	Volunteers from National Guard and Reserves. Retired members of the Regular forces.	May be used for any lawful purpose. Consent of the governor is required for NG members serving under 10 USC 672 (d).
2. Domestic Emergency. (Selective Mobilization)	Presidential Proclamation to disperse under 10 USC 334 & Executive Order under 10 USC appropriate to purpose of the call	10 USC 3500, 8500 & appropriate orders of higher authority; 10 USC 331, 332, 333	National Guard & Reserves.	May be used for: Federal Aid to states in case of insurrection (10 USC 331); Enforce federal authority (10 USC 332); Suppress interference with State & Federal law (10 USC 333).
3. Operational mission requiring augmentation of active force (200K Call-up)	Presidential Executive Order	10 USC 673b PL 99-661	Units and individuals of Selected Reserve; limited to 200,000 (all services) for up to 90 days.	President must report to Congress within 24-hours on circumstances and anticipated use of forces. May not be used in lieu of a Call-up (10 USC 331 et seq., 3500,8500), or for disaster relief.
4. Contingency operation, war plan, National emergency (Partial mobilization)	Presidential Proclamation of a national emergency & an Executive order.	10 USC 673(a)	Ready Reserve units and Individual Ready Reserve; limited to 1,000,000 (all services) for up to 2 years.	President may extend appointments, enlistments & periods of service when Congress is not in session. (10 USC 671 b)
5. War or national emergency (Full or total mobilization).	Passage of a public law or joint resolution by the Congress declaring war or national emergency.	10 USC 671(a) 10 USC 672	National Guard & Reserve units, Individual Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, members of Retired Reserve. No numerical or time limitation unless established by Congress.	May extend enlistments in Regular and Reserve forces & extend period of active service for duration of the war plus 6 months.

Figure 16–1. Mobilization Authority

The DOD MMP defines mobilization as the process whereby the nation makes a transition from a normal state of peacetime preparedness to a war– fighting posture. It involves the assembly, organization and application of the nation's resources for national defense. The Plan establishes the following peacetime responsibilities for the military departments: develop plans, maintain units, process personnel, prepare fiscal actions, develop plans and/or procedures to acquire facilities for mobilization, deter-

mine industrial base needs, train personnel and/or units, and develop automated data processing support systems.

The Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System (AMOPS) is established by AR 500–5 (Aug 1986). AMOPS is published in four volumes. The Army Mobilization Plan (AMP) is also a part of AMOPS. The AMOPS documents are outlined below (see Figure 16–2).

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) has Army Staff (ARSTAF) responsibility for AMOPS. AR 500–5 requires major Army commands, mobilization installations, coordinating installations (AR 5–9), supporting installations (AR 5–9), each separate Reserve Component (RC) unit down to detachment level, staff support agencies (SSA) and field operating agencies (FOA) as directed by the heads of Army Staff Agencies to develop mobilization plans. The AMP consists of separate plans from:

(1) Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA)
(2) United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM)
(3) United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
(4) United States Army Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC)
(5) United States Army Materiel Command (AMC)
(6) United States Army Information Systems Command (ISC)
(7) United States Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM)
(8) United States Army Health Services Command (HSC)
(9) United States Army Western Command (WESTCOM)
(10) United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)

The HQDA MMP is part of the AMP. It is not a coordinating or base plan. It only addresses responsibilities and functions within HQDA. AR 500–5 tasks the Commanding General (CG) of FORSCOM to publish detailed instructions for RC activities and actions that will be required upon receipt of an alert or mobilization order and to coordinate matters pertaining to RC units or individuals with the National Guard Bureau (NGB), the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR), and the major Army commands (MACOM).

AR 500–5 requires the CG of TRADOC to publish detailed instructions for training base activation/expansion and to approve training base expansion annexes to mobilization station mobilization plans.

AR 500–5 establishes a General Officer Mobilization Review (GOMR) to make recommendations to the Army leadership and provide guidance for the resolution of mobilization and deployment issues. It is chaired by the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA) and has general officer or equivalent representatives from 27 different

DOCUMENT	PURPOSE	SCOPE
AR 500-5 AMOPS I SYSTEM DESCRIPTION, RESPONSIBILITIES AND PROCEDURES	ESTABLISHES AMOPS DEFINES SYSTEM FOR: 1. ARMY MOBILIZATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION 2. ARMY PARTICIPATION IN THE JOINT OPERATION PLANNING SYSTEM (JOPS)	• CONSOLIDATES POLICIES AND PROCEDURES AND DEFINES RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ARMY MOBILIZATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION AND FOR ARMY PARTICIPATION IN JOINT OPERATION PLANNING & EXECUTION • DEFINES MOBILIZATION PLANNING AS APPLYING TO ALL PLANS FOR RAPID EXPANSION OF THE ACTIVE FORCE UNDER SELECTIVE, PARTIAL, FULL AND TOTAL MOBILIZATION, AND PLANS OF HQDA, MACOMS, INTERMEDIATE HQ, INSTALLATIONS AND AC/RC UNITS • DEFINES OPERATIONS PLANNING AS APPLYING TO ALL JOINT AND SUPPORTING ARMY PLANS FOR CONDUCT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IN A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF ARMY FORCES TO THEATER
AMOPS II STRATEGIC EMPLOYMENT OF ARMY FORCES	PROVIDES MOBILIZATION AND OPERATIONS PLANNING GUIDANCE PERTAINING TO AVAILABILITY, ALLOCATION, AND EMPLOYMENT OF ARMY FORCES	APPIES TO: 1. CBT, CS, CSS & GSF UNITS 2. DEPLOYABLE & NONDEPLOYABLE UNITS 3. ALL COMPONENTS
AMOPS III ARMY MOBILIZATION & DEPLOYMENT PLANNING GUIDANCE	PROVIDES ARMY AGENCIES, COMMANDS, AND COMPONENTS OF UNIFIED COMMANDS GUIDANCE REQUIRED TO PLAN FOR MOBILIZATION & DEPLOYMENT OF ARMY FORCES	CONTAINS ADMINISTRATIVE, OPERATIONAL, AND PLANNING GUIDANCE. APPLIES TO ALL COMPONENTS.
AMOPS IV ARMY CRISIS ACTION SYSTEM	DESCRIBES ARMY CRISIS ACTION SYSTEM, RELATIONSHIP TO JCS CRISIS ACTION SYSTEM, PRESCRIBES HQDA CRISIS MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION & STAFFING METHODS	DESCRIBES STREAMLINED STAFF ORGANIZATIONS OF JCS & ARMY, ARMY CRISIS STAFFING METHODS, MOBILIZATION DECISION SUPPORT PROCESS, ALTERNATE COMMAND CENTER OPERATIONS, PREPOSITIONED AUTHORITIES FOR MACOM USE, RELATIONSHIP TO EMERGENCY ACTION PROCEDURES
AMP ARMY MOBILIZATION PLAN	ESTABLISHES PROCEDURES FOR MOBILIZATION EXECUTION WITHIN HQDA & EACH MACOM	IS COMPRISED OF THE COLLECTED MOBILIZATION PLANS OF HQDA AND THE MACOMS

Figure 16–2. AMOPS Documents

HQDA agencies and MACOMs. The regulation also provides for an Army Mobilization Review (AMR) panel that is chaired by the Deputy Director, Operations, Readiness and Mobilization Directorate, ODCSOPS. The AMR consists of colonel level representatives from the organizations that participate in the GOMR.

AMOPS supports the Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS) and the Joint Deployment System (JDS). AMOPS, Volume 1 (Jun 88) fixes ARSTAF responsibility for Army mobilization doctrine and preparation of Army forces for deployment with DCSOPS. ARSTAF agencies and MACOMs have the responsibility to assist ODCSOPS in developing, reviewing, and maintaining those portions of AMOPS pertaining to respective areas of interest and to conduct mobilization planning within their areas of interest.

AR 10–42, FORSCOM, (Mar 84 - current) tasks CG, FORSCOM to act as the HQDA executive and coordinating authority for planning and managing mobilization and deployment of USAR units in CONUS, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Alaska. AR 10–42 also states... Mobilization and deployment is executed IAW AMOPS and FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS). FORMDEPS performs the following functions: 1) provides detailed mobilization stationing planning and assistance to ARNG and USAR units; 2) coordinates with the gaining MACOM for stationing assignments of mobilizing sustaining base units; 3) manages execution of mobilization plans for all of the above geographical areas; 4) prepares plans for activating and stationing Component 4 units required for full mobilization and for units and installations required for support of total mobilization; and 5) tasks CG, FORSCOM to prepare for the deployment of AC units according to approved contingency plans.

AMOPS Volume 1 states... The FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment System (FORMDEPS) is directive in nature... FORMDEPS serves as the framework for centralized planning management and consolidates FORSCOM policies, mission assignments, procedures, and plans for the development, coordination, dissemination, review and approval of mobilization plans and provides for planning the execution of mobilization and deployment.

The AMOPS system is divided into eight subsystems that describe the augmentation and sustainment of theater and other strategic forces and the augmentation of the CONUS base. The AMOPS structure for mobilization identifies the agents who transform the mobilization directive of the President into a mobilized force available to the theater commander for warfighting.

AMOPS suffers from the lack of an integrating Departmental Mobilization Plan. The AMP is a compilation of ten separate plans rather than a single plan or a base plan

and supporting plans. FORSCOM is responsible for the Mobilization and deployment of force units. AMC is responsible for the expansion of the industrial base (a separate function) but must support the mobilization of force units with equipment. TRADOC, whose mobilization planning system, TRADOC Mobilization and Operations Planning System (TMOPS), is responsible for the expansion of the training base. It is simultaneously responsible for supporting the mobilization of force units on its installations which are mobilization stations. AMOPS focuses on the mobilization of force units. The fact that DCSOPS and FORSCOM are each only identified as agents in three of the five functional areas of mobilization shown in Figure 16–3 should not go unnoticed. Unity of command is important to any planning process. The Army's mobilization plan lacks unity of command.

It is generally recognized that centralized planning and decentralized execution is a workable concept. With its current mobilization planning system, the Army has decentralized mobilization planning as well as execution.

The Army War College text, Army Command and Management Theory and Practice, in its discussion of Army structure, identifies three major subsystems (combat, production, and integrating) in the Army organizational system. The combat subsystem is based on AirLand Battle doctrine. It uses the output of the other two major subsystems to create and support combat ready theater force units.

The production subsystem is the sustainment base of the Army. It consists of the AMC, TRADOC, and FORSCOM (in its role as the mobilizer and deployer of theater force units); the functional commands, such as ISC, INSCOM, HSC, and USACE; numerous field operating agencies, such as the United States Total Army Personnel Agency (TAPA), United States Army Troop Support Agency (TSA), United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC), and the United States Army Community and Family Support Center. The bedrock of the Army's sustainment base is the installation. Army installations are our operating bases, logistical bases, and mobilization bases.

The integrating subsystem of the Army consists of the Secretariat and the ARSTAF. Together, they comprise HQDA. The Department's contribution, to the entire organizational system, is the horizontal and vertical integration of the nine management functions performed by the numerous MACOMs and FOAs. As currently stated these functions include structuring, equipping, manning, training, sustaining, mobilizing and deploying, managing facilities, managing information, and managing. The Army performs a tenth departmental management function, intelligence, which needs to be appended to this list (See Chapter 24, HQDA). It is the role of HQDA to integrate mobilization planning.



Figure 16–3. Functional Subsystems of AMOPS with their Principal Activities and Proponent Agencies

The organizational system is bonded together by command and management relationships. The President, as Commander–in–Chief, and then the Secretary of Defense, command all the military forces of the United States. However, within the Army, command (often less operational control) of Army organizations originates from HQDA and flows to all Army organizations through the chain of command. In a similar manner, resources are allocated by the Department to the MACOMs and then suballocated as appropriate. Command and management relationships define the organizational structure of the Army.

As stated, HQDA, integrates the management of the departmental functions both horizontally and vertically. In general, responsibility for performing individual functions is assigned to the Army's MACOMs and specific FOAs. The MACOMs are structured vertically and they generally do not extensively integrate horizontally outside their respective commands. Integration involves, not only the assignment of responsibilities, coordinating, directing, and controlling, but also planning, organizing and, perhaps most importantly, allocating resources. It is no accident that tasking authority is seldom delegated outside the normal chain of command. Resources are managed through the chain of command. It is difficult to avoid abuse of tasking authority when the tasker does not have to foot the bill.

Figure 16–4 depicts the AMOPS structure for accomplishing mobilization. The chart depicts HQDA as the lowest level of organization that can coordinate mobilization activities. It must be kept in mind that during mobilization it is likely that FORSCOM is also preparing to execute or executing CONPLAN 7040 (LDC) and the CONUSA are transitioning to Joint Regional Defense Commands (JRDC).

Much effort is expended on mobilization plans. However, the results are often frustrating and disappointing. One of the major difficulties, is the fact that mobilization planning, as currently performed, requires very detailed information about units and facilities that are continuously changing. Hence, numerous disconnects occur during mobilization exercises. The mobilization planning function is, in general, not adequately resourced to keep the data and the plans current. Our mobilization planning system is complex and our plans lack simplicity.

16.1.4 CONCLUSION

Centralize and integrate mobilization planning at HQDA.

16.1.5 IMPLEMENTATION

HQDA, DCSOPS, review and analyze the Army's mobilization planning system using the principles of war and the rules of inefficiency and prepare an implementation plan that centralizes mobilization planning and decentralizes mobilization activities no later than 1 May 1989 for implementation no later than 1 October 1991.



Figure 16–4. AMOPS Structure for Mobilization

Mobilization requires the synchronous efforts of the entire Army. (This issue is related to observation 14.1, FORSCOM has diverse and multiple missions.) The various plans for expanding the training base, industrial preparedness, and force unit mobilization and deployment must be integrated under a single plan that clearly states the mission, provides a concept of operations, identifies specific responsibilities and provides necessary coordinating instructions. Much effort is expended in mobilization planning and much has been accomplished. However, we need to ensure that planning is accomplished at the appropriate level of detail. Extremely detailed plans are very difficult to maintain and do not often justify the effort necessary to prepare them. If we expect mobilization planning to be done well, leaders must be involved. The old adage, "Units only do well, what their commanders check." applies to mobilization planning.

Finally, the Army needs to review the wartime contribution of contracted services. Contracted services have been an integral part of the sustainment of American armed forces since colonial times. The services necessary to support mobilization and the transition to war should be identified and, if appropriate, contracted for now to facilitate the mobilization process.

16.2 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Annex A, Contracting in War, and Annex B, List of Mobilization Stations provide additional information concerning a conceptual overview of mobilization.

ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 16
THE ROLE OF CONTRACTING IN WAR

ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 16
THE ROLE OF CONTRACTING IN WAR

OVERVIEW

During periods of war, the U.S. Army has contracted with civilians for a variety of functions—administration, logistics, medical, transportation, intelligence, quartermaster, engineering, domestic services, communication, ordnance, and morale. These civilians have included both U.S. national and foreign skilled as well as unskilled laborers whose duties have ranged from providing technical advice to grave digging. The purpose of this study is to trace those services the Army hired civilians to perform from the Revolutionary War through the Vietnam War.

During the early eighteenth century contractors provided for almost all of the Army's needs although there were no formal regulations or methods for entering into private contracts. The Army rarely asked for the submission of bids, but rather simply contracted through oral agreements rather than written specifications. Since these early agreements were not regulated strictly, contractors often took advantage of the situation. Because of rampant corruption and poor service during the American Revolutionary War and the War of 1812, after 1820 the Army attempted to carry out support functions itself.

When the Mexican War broke out, the Army quickly found it lacked the necessary resources and manpower since federal foundries, storage depots, and clothing factories could not meet wartime needs. Again the Army turned to fullscale utilization of civilian contractors for specialized services. This practice continued throughout the nineteenth century. The Army hired civilians to undertake a myriad of duties during the Frontier and Plains Wars. With the magnitude of operations in the Civil War and the overseas operations in the Spanish American War, the Army's need for civilian contractors increased. Once the Army realized that contractors were necessary to fulfill it mission in times of war, the Army provided greater regulation of and tighter control over the civilian contract system of provision and support throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The twentieth century brought increasing industrialization and technology which revolutionized warfare. The Army thus required greater specialization in the traditional technical services. The changing character of war brought new requirements for supplies and equipment. Beginning with World War I, military operations reflected the development of new weapons, new vehicles, new food preparations, and new equipment of all kinds. After World War II, the nature of the Army changed too. Fewer and fewer men joined infantry, armor, and artillery units; the majority of men were in

the technical services. The increasing number of men joining the Army's technical services did not, however, decrease the need for civilians. This was evident in both the Korean and Vietnam Wars when the Army hired large numbers of civilian technicians as well as foreign civilian laborers. Although the basic needs of the Army have remained the same, contractors have been needed to provide the necessary technological expertise in electronics, communications, and transportation to help the Army fight effectively.

The enclosed tables represent services, not specific individual skills, contracted for by the Army during times of war (i.e., individuals such as carpenters, plumbers, and roofers are included in the engineering category for construction). After each table is a short explanation of how and why that category was contracted.

The civilian contract system initially was weak because it made supply of the Army a function of individuals who were not under Army control. The contract system, now under unified and coordinated control and supervision has been the system arrived at in all wars to take care of the needs of the Army. As outlined in the following tables, civilian contractors have provided the same basic services throughout time. Soldiers have relied on civilian support on a variety of levels, in both official and unofficial contracts.

MEDICAL

TABLE 16-A-1. MEDICAL

	PHYSICIAN	DENTIST	NURSE	STEWARD/ ATTENDANT	VET	CONSULTANT
AMERICAN REVOLUTION	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES*	NO
WAR OF 1812	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO
MEXICAN WAR	YES**	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO
FRONTIER WAR	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO
CIVIL WAR	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO
PLAINS WAR	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO
SPANISH AMERICAN WAR	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO
PHILIPPINE/CHINA WAR	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO
WORLD WAR I	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
WORLD WAR II	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
KOREA	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
VIETNAM	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

*During the Revolution and War of 1812, the Army hired farriers. Farriers were generally blacksmiths who performed veterinarian services without being fully qualified.

**During the War of 1812, the U.S. Army General Staff positions of Surgeon General and Apothecary General were filled by civilian doctors. This is the only time that the Army paid civilians to fill these positions.

MEDICAL

The Army has hired civilian doctors, nurses, attendants, and veterinarians in every war since the Revolution. Prior to the Mexican War, however, a sufficient number of physicians were interested in serving so that it was not necessary to hire many doctors; the Army did authorize individual officers to hire civilian doctors when there were no Army surgeons attached to their unit. Initially, contract physicians performed both dental and veterinary functions until the Army established separate dental and veterinary corps in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Neither commissioned nor enlisted, without regiment or corps affiliation, the contracted personnel served at remote posts and in the field, and until World War I were given few benefits other than subsistence and housing with the soldiers.

The Army hired a larger number of nurses and attendents than physicians until the Army Nurse Corps was created after the Spanish American War. Before the Spanish American War, male help was preferred in the hospitals and the duties of female nurses usually were restricted to cooking and supervision over the linen and laundry. With the educated and trained female nurses in the latter half of the nineteenth century, female nurses became important to insure expert attendance on the patient during the absence of the physician or surgeon.

During World War I, the Army expanded the system of contracting medical personnel to include both female and foreign doctors as well as medical consultants. Generally the female physicians were utilized in Zone of the Interior hospitals, while the foreign doctors and medical consultants worked in theater hospitals. By World War II, civilian medical consultants were used for a dual role. Some of these doctors, those with special training and skills, travelled to various theater hospitals sharing their expertise with Army doctors. Other consultants were hired to oversee Army hospitals to insure that they were operating efficiently and providing the best possible care to the soldiers.

INTELLIGENCE

TABLE 16-A-2. INTELLIGENCE

	INFORMANT	SCOUT	TRANSLATOR/ INTERPRETER
AMERICAN REVOLUTION	YES	YES	NO*
WAR OF 1812	YES	YES	NO
MEXICAN WAR	YES	YES	YES
FRONTIER WAR	YES	YES	YES
CIVIL WAR	YES	YES	NO
PLAINS WAR	YES	YES	YES
SPANISH AMERICAN WAR	YES	YES	YES
PHILIPPINE/CHINA WAR	YES	YES	YES
WORLD WAR I	YES	YES	YES
WORLD WAR II	YES	YES	YES
KOREA	YES	YES	YES
VIETNAM	YES	YES	YES

*During the Revolution, the Army found sufficient volunteer translators making it unnecessary to hire translators and interpreters.

INTELLIGENCE

From the American Revolution through the Vietnam War, paid informants have provided the Army with area reconnaissance and information. Despite the fact that some type of formal Army intelligence organization existed in almost every war, individual soldiers also made use of local informants to keep them apprised of enemy operations. Intelligence operations required that information be gathered from local sources familiar with the local terrain, politics, and language. Thus, civilians were employed to collect information on the opposing forces. The Army rarely signed formal written contracts with the individuals who provided intelligence services; it simply paid them for the information provided.

QUARTERMASTER

TABLE 16-A-3. QUARTERMASTER

	CLOTHING	FOOD	FODDER	FUEL	MISC. EQUIPMENT
AMERICAN REVOLUTION	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
WAR OF 1812	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
MEXICAN WAR	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
FRONTIER WAR	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
CIVIL WAR	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
PLAINS WAR	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
SPANISH AMERICAN WAR	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
PHILIPPINE/CHINA WAR	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
WORLD WAR I	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
WORLD WAR II	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
KOREA	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
VIETNAM	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

QUARTERMASTER

During periods of war, The U.S. Army has always relied upon contractors to provide subsistence. A variety of types of contracts have been used to provision the Army with food, clothing, fuel, and equipment such as tents, bedding, canteens, and stationery. Initially there were no formal regulations governing these contracts, so many early contracts went partially filled or unfilled. Contracting became more formalized during each new period of war.

During the nineteenth century, civilian contractors not only furnished supplies, but they cleared roads, drove wagons, and operated storehouses for the Army. Prior to the Spanish American War, large numbers of civilians travelled with the Army to work as clerks, blacksmiths, packers, firemen, carpenters, and laborers. In both the Mexican and Spanish American Wars, the Army utilized foreign laborers. The Quartermasters had difficulty in controlling such civilian workers and often the failure of these laborers hampered military operations. Prior to World War I, a service corps of enlisted men was created to do the jobs previously done by civilians. The service corps grew slowly, and despite the existence of this workforce civilians were still needed to work as laborers throughout the twentieth century. The service corps was never large enough to support the logistical demands of the Army. The Army found it necessary to utilize foreign civilian labor as well as prisoners of war to supplement soldier labor in World Wars I and II, Korea, and Vietnam.

Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, the Army's supply functions were no longer confined to the support of its own units. It also had broad responsibilities for the support of the other Services, especially the Marine Corps. Also, during World War II, the Army became responsible for executing the military aspects of the government's foreign assistance programs. Increasing technology also required faster delivery of more types of subsistence supplies. For example, gasoline was much more efficient than hay and oats for moving supplies, but generally it was not to be found as easily in the remote countryside; new sources of supplies had to be found and contractors filled the new needs.

Contracting for supplies traditionally has been done on several levels. In addition to official contracts signed with major producers and suppliers in the United States, soldiers consistently have entered into smaller, and often informal, agreements with local suppliers. This was particularly true with regard to food supplies. Officers often were authorized to secure items such as fresh meat, vegetables, and fruits from local producers, since this supply was often more reliable than shipments from Army depots. On an even smaller scale, individual soldiers also procured foodstuffs from local farmers and townspeople. These were not officially sanctioned purchases, but often added variety to daily menus.

ENGINEERING

TABLE 16-A-4. ENGINEERING

	BUILDINGS (INDIVIDUAL)	INSTALLATIONS (MILITARY)	INSTALLATIONS (NON-MILITARY)	ROADS/ BRIDGES	TECHNICAL EXPERTISE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
WAR OF 1812	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
MEXICAN WAR	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
FRONTIER WAR*	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
CIVIL WAR	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
PLAINS WAR*	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
SPANISH AMERICAN WAR	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
PHILIPPINE/CHINA WAR	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
WORLD WAR I	YES	YES	YES**	YES	YES
WORLD WAR II	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
KOREA	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
VIETNAM	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

*Although the Army utilized civilian engineers during the nineteenth century Indian Wars, those civilians were used only on a limited basis. During this period, the Army expected the soldiers to take primary responsibility for construction projects.

**Beginning with World War I, the Army helped build and operate plants and factories in the United States producing war materiel.

ENGINEERING

The Army always has contracted for civilian engineers during wartime. Engineers have been hired for a myriad of reasons and projects including the construction and maintenance of buildings, installations, and roads.* The Corps of Engineers was established during the early nineteenth century to alleviate the need for civilian engineers, but engineering units traditionally have lacked the manpower necessary to fulfill the Army's worldwide needs. Generally, an engineering firm was contracted to undertake a specific project. To fulfill his contract, the primary contractor usually would subcontract various aspects of the work.

The Army also has consistently relied upon civilian technical experts to undertake special projects and to advise the Army on specific tasks. In this manner, the Army obtained sappers, miners, topographers, and demolition experts when trained soldiers were not available to undertake these duties.

*Construction activities have always been divided between the Engineers and the Quartermaster. Initially, the Quartermaster had responsibility for constructing posts, storehouses, barracks, hospitals, and military roads. In 1812, the Army gave the Engineer Department responsibility for the establishment of frontier posts, barracks, quarters, and storehouses at those forts, as well as all coastal fortifications. During World War I, the Corps of Engineers was given responsibility for all construction overseas and the Cantonment Division responsibility for all construction within the United States relieving the Quartermaster of all construction duties. In 1920, however, the Quartermaster assumed all of its previous construction duties in the United States.

DOMESTIC SERVICES

TABLE 16-A-5. DOMESTIC SERVICES

	LAUNDRESS	COOK	MISC. SERVANTS
AMERICAN REVOLUTION	YES	YES	YES
WAR OF 1812	YES	YES	YES
MEXICAN WAR	YES	YES	YES
FRONTIER WAR	YES	YES	YES
CIVIL WAR	YES	YES	YES
PLAINS WAR	YES	YES	YES
SPANISH AMERICAN WAR	YES	YES	YES
PHILIPPINE/CHINA WAR	YES	YES	YES
WORLD WAR I	YES	YES	YES
WORLD WAR II	YES	YES	YES
KOREA	YES	YES	YES
VIETNAM	YES	YES	YES

DOMESTIC SERVICES

The Army has consistently used civilian cooks, laundresses, and other domestic servants during periods of war. Until World War I, the Army never formally contracted for these services. These individuals were hired on an ad hoc basis by troops and installations in the field to free the soldiers to fight. Regardless of the fact that official funds were not available for the hire of civilian servants, soldiers since the Revolution have hired civilians to cook and clean for them. Whether these individuals were the soldiers' wives following the unit or whether they were foreign nationals living near the installations, civilians have been utilized throughout the Army's history, since their services could be obtained inexpensively.

In addition to the informal hire of domestic servants, the Quartermaster's Department formally hired civilians to provide domestic services. The Army hired foreign nationals and prisoners of war to staff laundry and mess units. In fact, the Army utilized such individuals to undertake a wide variety of duties in the camps in order to release soldiers from such duties.

ADMINISTRATION/LOGISTICS

TABLE 16-A-6. ADMINISTRATION/LOGISTICS

	TROOP INFORMATION MANUALS/NEWSPAPERS	CLERKS	PLANT/FACTORY OPERATION	SPECIALISTS
	NO	YES	NO	YES
AMERICAN REVOLUTION	NO	YES	NO	YES
WAR OF 1812	NO	YES	NO	YES
MEXICAN WAR	NO	YES	NO	YES
FRONTIER WAR	NO	YES	NO	YES
CIVIL WAR	YES	YES	NO	YES
PLAINS WAR	YES	YES	NO	YES
SPANISH AMERICAN WAR	YES	YES	NO	YES
PHILIPPINE/CHINA WAR	YES	YES	NO	YES
WORLD WAR I	YES	YES	YES*	YES
WORLD WAR II	YES	YES	YES	YES
KOREA	YES	YES	YES	YES
VIETNAM	YES	YES	YES	YES

*These plants and factories were in the United States and in the overseas theaters; they were built or appropriated to provide ordnance and subsistence materials.

ADMINISTRATION/LOGISTICS

The Army has found it to be a more economical use of time and money to contract with civilians to aid in its administration and logistics operations in theaters of operation. Various types of services have been provided in this manner. Not only were stenographers, clerks, and typists hired, but also civilian specialists trained to operate new equipment and efficiency experts educated in management techniques and hired to help the Army operate more effectively. These specialists contracted to travel with field units to aid them in solving problems.

The nineteenth century Army relied particularly on civilian clerks. These clerks had a variety of duties. They helped not only with the dispersal of information and official correspondence, but also aided the paymasters and quartermasters in the field.

The administrative load of the twentieth century Army increased with the advent of new technology. Already noticeable in World War I, and more so in World War II, this trend accelerated in the Korean conflict. Although the Army detailed large numbers of soldiers to administrative duties, an equally large number of civilians were employed. Finding enough skilled technicians for logistical and administrative support activities was a problem that grew with each technological advance in warfare. The introduction of automated data processing, for example, had a greater impact on logistics and administrative matters than either the telegraph or the radio. It provided the basis for unprecedented centralization of control over supply, and for procedures to speed up the whole supply operation. The use of new electronics and computers required trained technicians and operators. In order to fill the widening gap between available manpower and its growing needs, the Army hired civilians.

CIVIL AFFAIRS

TABLE 16-A-7. CIVIL AFFAIRS

	CIVILIAN AGENTS/ COMMISSIONERS	INSTRUCTORS	HEALTH SERVICES	GOVERNMENT ADVISORS
AMERICAN REVOLUTION	NO	NO	NO	NO
WAR OF 1812	NO	NO	NO	NO
MEXICAN WAR	NO	NO	NO	NO
FRONTIER WAR	YES	YES	YES	NO
CIVIL WAR	NO	NO	NO	NO
PLAINS WAR	YES	YES	YES	NO
SPANISH AMERICAN WAR	NO	NO	NO	NO
PHILIPPINE/CHINA WAR	NO	NO	NO	NO
WORLD WAR I	NO*	NO	NO	NO
WORLD WAR II	NO	NO	NO	NO
KOREA	YES	NO	NO	YES
VIETNAM	NO	NO	NO	NO

*During World Wars I and II, the Army commissioned civil affairs specialists to aid in its overseas activities. Hence, most American civil affairs officers were civilians in the sense that they were trained professional economists and political scientists.

CIVIL AFFAIRS

During periods of hostility, civilians generally have not been used to aid in civil affairs duties. Traditionally soldiers have been trained or commissioned to undertake such functions in occupied zones. The Plains and Frontier Wars were an exception to this policy. During these wars Indian agents and commissioners, as well as teachers, farmers, and missionaries were paid to aid in the pacification of the Indians. These individuals lived on or near Indian reservations to provide a service that the isolated and remote frontier posts had neither the men nor the resources to undertake.

The Army hired a limited number of civilians for civil affairs during World Wars I and II, when it could not commission the necessary specialists for a specific area. Usually these civilians worked in theater headquarters as consultants. The Army also utilized and worked with civilians in Korea. During the Korean War the Army lacked sufficient officers trained in civil affairs functions so it hired civilian specialists to aid in pacification and for the military government. The relationship between the Army officials and the civilians was poor, a fact that encouraged the Army to promote the idea of civil affairs training for its officers. In Vietnam, the Army did field civil affairs teams. These teams, however, were aided by civilian agencies also operating in Vietnam.

COMMUNICATIONS/SIGNAL

TABLE 16-A-8. COMMUNICATIONS/SIGNAL

	PONY EXPRESS/STAGE	CABLE	TELEGRAPH	TELEPHONE	MESSENGERS
AMERICAN REVOLUTION	YES	YES	YES	YES*	YES
WAR OF 1812	YES	YES	YES	YES*	YES
MEXICAN WAR	YES	YES	YES	YES*	YES
FRONTIER WAR	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
CIVIL WAR	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
PLAINS WAR	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
SPANISH AMERICAN WAR	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
PHILIPPINE/CHINA WAR	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
WORLD WAR I	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
WORLD WAR II	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
KOREA	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
VIETNAM	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

*— signifies that the service was not yet available.

COMMUNICATIONS/SIGNAL

Prior to the Mexican War, the Army relied upon the services of paid messengers to deliver its communications. The nineteenth century invention of the telegraph began the revolution in Army communication. First utilized during the Mexican War, extended use of telegraph lines did not occur until the Civil War. During the Mexican and Frontier Wars, the Army used the telegraph to place orders for supplies, to send administrative directives and reports, and for the mobilization of forces. The Army created a Military Telegraph Office during the Civil War to aid in strategy and tactics. It was essentially a civilian organization supervised and operated by civilians who were responsible to the Secretary of War.

Since the Mexican War, as the technology became available, the Army has contracted for the use of locally–owned and operated cable, telegraph, and telephone systems in theaters of war. These privately–owned communication networks as well, as limited numbers of civilian operators and technicians, have been necessary for the effective operation of the Army in hostile environments. Army communication units were undermanned and lacked the necessary training to undertake major communication developmental projects. Also, as technology advanced throughout the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Army lacked the resources to fulfill its needs. The Army was able to effectively utilize the increasing technology only through the use of contracted communications networks. For example, during the Vietnam War the Army contracted with ITT to establish and operate a microwave communications and electronics system in Vietnam, allowing U.S. Army Signal units to be redeployed.

TRANSPORTATION

TABLE 16-A-9. TRANSPORTATION

	LIVESTOCK	TEAMSTERS/ STEVEDORES	VEHICLES (NONMIL)	RAIL ROADS	SHIPS	DRIVERS (NONMIL VEHICLES
AMERICAN REVOLUTION	YES	NO	YES	—	YES*	YES
WAR OF 1812	YES	NO	YES	—	YES	YES
MEXICAN WAR	YES**	NO	YES	—	YES	YES
FRONTIER WAR	YES	NO	YES	—	YES	YES
CIVIL WAR	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
PLAINS WAR	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
SPANISH AMERICAN WAR	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
PHILIPPINE/CHINA WAR	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
WORLD WAR I	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
WORLD WAR II	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
KOREA	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
VIETNAM	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

TRANSPORTATION

Whether wagons, carts, ships, railroads, or cars and trucks, the Army has contracted for the use of privately–owned vehicles to transport men and supplies during war. Although major contracts were let in the United States for the production of vehicles and ships, traditionally the Army in the field has found it necessary to obtain transportation on a set fee per day basis. Whereas the majority of these agreements were official contracts, officers also found it necessary to form extra–legal agreements with local townspeople or farmers to meet their transportation needs.

Throughout its existence, the Army has faced a continual transportation revolution. Initially, solely reliant on horses, mules, carts, and wagons, mechanization and motorization have made the Army increasingly more mobile. The use of the steamboat modernized the Mexican War, but the railroads made the Civil War the first modern war. Every subsequent war has witnessed wider and wider use of transportation innovations. The use of innovations, however, has not forced the Army to abandon traditional modes of transportation. For example, the horse virtually disappeared from the battlefield during World War I, but horses and mules were still widely used to transport supplies through the Vietnam War.

The use of increasing numbers of men, supplies, and weapons have compounded the Army's logistical and transportation problems throughout time. Industrialization forced a greater reliance on the civilian population. Lacking sufficient manpower to handle all of its transportation needs, the Army relied on hired teamsters, stevedores, and other laborers to load and unload freight. The Army also has traditionally relied on civilian laborers to help build and maintain roads, bridges, and railroads in theaters of operation.

TROOP MORALE

TABLE 16-A-10. TROOP MORALE

	MUSICIANS	POST EXCHANGE	ENTERTAINERS/ TECHNICIANS	POST OFFICE	ANNOUNCERS/ REPORTERS
AMERICAN REVOLUTION	NO	NO	NO	YES	--
WAR OF 1812	YES	NO	NO	YES	--
MEXICAN WAR	YES	NO	YES*	YES	--
FRONTIER WAR	NO	NO	NO	YES	--
CIVIL WAR	NO	NO	NO	YES	--
PLAINS WAR	NO	NO	NO	YES	--
SPANISH AMERICAN WAR	NO	NO	NO	YES	--
PHILIPPINE/CHINA WAR	NO	NO	NO	YES	--
WORLD WAR I	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
WORLD WAR II	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES
KOREA	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES
VIETNAM	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES

*"In this war, there developed the practice of bringing the civilian standards of living along with the field forces. The troops in the field were provided with dancing girls, bars, theaters, ice, liquor, vaudeville, gambling houses, fancy tobaccos, fancy groceries, camp followers, Bibles, souvenir items, etc." (Kreidberg, Marvin A. and Henry, Merton G. History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army 1775-1945. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, reprinted. 1984. pp. 79-80.)

TROOP MORALE

The Army always has maintained responsibility for morale during periods of war. Except for the existence of sutlers on Army posts and travelling with the Army during the nineteenth century, the Army did not utilize large numbers of civilians to bolster the morale of soldiers until World War I. Not until this war did Army-sponsored civilian entertainers and radio announcers enter war zones. The War of 1812 and the Mexican War were exceptions—in both of these wars, officers were given permission to hire musicians to strengthen regimental bands. Beginning with World War I and continuing through the Vietnam War, the Army paid civilian announcers, actresses, technicians, hostesses, and a variety of other individuals.

During World War I, the Army granted the Y.M.C.A. authority to establish exchanges near the battlefields for the American troops in Europe. These exchanges were designed to take the place of post exchanges in order that the enlisted men and officers could be freed for military operations. During this period, the Army also authorized the hire of civilians to staff post exchanges where necessary.

The Army did not directly control the postal functions in theaters of war until World War II. The U.S. Post Office detailed civilian employees to Army camps and installations to manage mail services (this included the sale of money-orders). The Army did not pay these individuals, but provided them with support. Beginning with World War II and the creation of the Army Post Office (APO), the Army utilized soldiers to perform postal duties.

Beginning with the Civil War, although not funded by the Army, the Army did sponsor and provide transportation for volunteer service organizations interested in aiding the war effort. In the Civil War volunteer men and women, prior to the formation of the Red Cross in 1881, acted as nurses and provided refreshment, food, and other services to soldiers in camps behind the lines. The Red Cross began its war service during the Spanish American War, when volunteer workers served as doctors, nurses, hostesses, and cooks and provided a number of morale boosting activities. During World War I, other volunteer organizations, such as the Knights of Columbus, Y.M.C.A., and the Salvation Army, competed with Red Cross goodwill activities. In World War II, several nonprofit organizations combined to form the United Service Organizations (USO). Army regulations of 1943 outlined the respective duties of the U.S.O. and the Red Cross so as to eliminate competition between the groups. Under these regulations, the Army gave the U.S.O. permission to stage its overseas shows. The regulations permitted the Red Cross to operate clubs, cinemobiles, hotels, canteens, and donut dugouts at camps and installations. These volunteer organizations continued to operate in both the Korean and Vietnam Wars providing recreation and entertainment to soldiers.

ORDNANCE

TABLE 16-A-11. ORDNANCE

	AMMUNITION	WEAPONS	SPARE PARTS	MAINTENANCE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION	YES	YES	YES	YES
WAR OF 1812	YES	YES	YES	YES
MEXICAN WAR	YES	YES	YES	YES
FRONTIER WAR	YES	YES	YES	YES
CIVIL WAR	YES	YES	YES	YES
PLAINS WAR	YES	YES	YES	YES
SPANISH AMERICAN WAR	YES	YES	YES	YES
PHILIPPINE/CHINA WAR	YES	YES	YES	YES
WORLD WAR I	YES	YES	YES	YES
WORLD WAR II	YES	YES	YES	YES
KOREA	YES	YES	YES	YES
VIETNAM	YES	YES	YES	YES

ORDNANCE

The Army always hired private ordnance companies to provide it with sufficient ammunition and weapons in times of war. Historically federal munitions factories have been unable immediately to meet the Army's needs once war was declared. Lacking the resources to maintain high production levels during peace, these factories never could meet the ordnance demands of the mobilized Army. Contracts with privately-owned foundries, which possessed the resources and manpower to increase production quickly once war was declared, were necessary to keep the Army afield. Weapons, ammunition, and spare parts, however, were provided by contractors in the United States rather than in theaters of war. The Army has also procured ordnance from foreign manufacturers when U.S. production could not meet its needs.

The twentieth century Army saw the development of new types of weapons. The increasing complexity of these weapons requires that technical representatives from the munitions manufacturers be available to answer questions and help with maintenance. For this purpose, civilian representatives of the manufacturers are assigned to field units to provide technical assistance to the soldiers.

MISCELLANEOUS SERVICES

TABLE 16-A-12. MISCELLANEOUS SERVICES

	CHAPLAINS	SECURITY	MORTICIANS/ GRAVES' REGISTRATION	PAYMASTER	PURCHASING AGENTS
AMERICAN REVOLUTION	NO	NO	NO	YES	—
WAR OF 1812	YES	NO	NO	YES	—
MEXICAN WAR	YES	NO	YES	YES	—
FRONTIER WAR	NO	NO	NO	YES	—
CIVIL WAR	NO	NO	NO	YES	—
PLAINS WAR	NO	NO	NO	YES	—
SPANISH AMERICAN WAR	NO	NO	NO	YES	—
PHILIPPINE/CHINA WAR	NO	NO	NO	YES	—
WORLD WAR I	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
WORLD WAR II	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES
KOREA	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES
VIETNAM	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES

MISCELLANEOUS SERVICES

Several services, not included in earlier categories, are outlined here. These are services always needed by the Army during war, but for various reasons, represent oddities in the contracting scheme. The Army, for example, never hired civilian chaplains; chaplains were simply commissioned when needed.

Although the Army always appointed officers as paymasters, it did hire civilian assistants for the paymasters. The assistants, however, were generally clerks, possessing no particular requirements or skills. This same pattern emerged with regard to security guards. Before the formation of the military police corps, the Army always detailed soldiers to provide police duties. The Army, on the other hand, often hired civilians as guards. These guards possessed no special skills for the position, and generally were detailed from the large groups of unskilled native laborers hired by the Army.

Until World War II, the Army hired civilians to help with the burial of soldiers. But, until the Spanish American War, the Army hired civilians to provide these services on an ad hoc basis. Beginning with the Spanish American War, the Army authorized Quartermasters to hire civilians in war zones to aid in graves' registration and burial. For the first time, the Army provided for a systematic method of burial. In World War II, Graves' Registration units took full responsibility for the dead; the only civilians hired from this time on were unskilled laborers used as grave diggers.

The Army has also consistently hired civilians to act as its purchasing agents during war. The Army hired such agents for their expertise in local procurement, hence, in overseas theater the purchasing agents were foreign nationals. During the early part of the nineteenth century these agents worked on commission, but by mid-century because of the fraud inherent in such a system the Army began to pay the agents.

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ANNEX B TO CHAPTER 16

MOBILIZATION STATIONS

ANNEX B to CHAPTER 16

MOBILIZATION STATIONS

CONUSA	INSTALLATION	SUPPORT INSTL	MACOM	FORSCOM MOBPERS MS	MOBPERS MS
1	APG		AMC	X	X
	Cp Edwards	Devens	Ped-SO/PC	X	X
	Ft. Belvoir		TC	X	X
	Ft. Devens		FC	X	X
	Ft Dix		TC	X	X
	Ft Drum		FC	X	X
	Ft Eustis		TC	X	X
	Ft. AP Hill	Meade	SA-FC	X	X
	Ft I-Gap		SA-FC	X	X
	Ft Lee		TC	X	X
	Ft Meade		FC	X	X
	Ft Monmouth		AMC		X
	Ft Myer (MDW)		MDW		X
	Ft Pickett	Bragg	SA-FC	X	X
	Ft Story	Eustis	TC	X	X
	Walter Reed AMC		HSC		X
2	Cp Blanding	Stewart	SO-SO/FC	X	X
	Cp Shelby	Rucker	Fed-SO/FC	X	X
	Ft Benning		TC	X	X
	Ft Bragg		FC(TC)	X	X
	Ft Campbell		FC(TC)	X	X
	Ft Gordon		TC	X	X
	Ft Jackson		TC	X	X
	Ft Knox		TC	X	X
	Ft McClellan		TC	X	X
	Ft McPherson		FC		X
	Ft Rucker		TC	X	X
	Ft Stewart		FC	X	X
	Redstone Arsenal		AMC		X
4	Cp Atterbury	Harrison	Fed-SO/FC	X	X
	Cp Grayling	Sheridan	SO-SO/FC	X	X
	Cp Ripley	McCoy	SO-SO/FC	X	X
	Ft Harrison		TC	X	X
	Ft McCoy		FC	X	X
	Ft Sheridan		FC	X	X
5	Cp Robinson	Sill	SO-SO/TC	X	
	Ft Bliss		TCFD	X	X
	Ft Chaffee	Sill	SA-TC/FC(TBD)	X	X
	Ft Hood		FC(TC)	X	X

	Ft Leavensworth		TCX		
	Ft L. Wood		TC	X	X
	Ft Polk		FC(TC)	X	X
	Ft Riley		FC	X	X
	Ft Sam Houston		FC	X	X
	Ft Sill		TC	X	X
6	Cp Roberts	Ord	Fed–SO/FC	X	X
	Fitzsimons AMC		HSC	X	X
	Ft Carson		FC	X	X
	Ft Huachuca		SC	X	X
	Ft Irwin		FC	X	X
	Ft Lewis		(TC)	X	X
	Ft Ord		(TC)	X	X
	Gowen Field	Lewis	SO–SO/FC	X	X
	Presido of San Francisco		FC	X	X
OCONUS	Ft Buchanan	McPherson	FC	X	X
	Ft Richardson		FC	X	X
	Ft Shafter		WC	X	X
				51	53

CONUS Replacement Centers:

Fort Dix
Fort Benning
Fort Jackson
Fort Knox
Fort Leonard Wood
Fort Lewis
Fort Ord

CHAPTER 17
SUSTAINING BASE - ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND (AMC)

Reviewing Army Materiel Command, the ROBUST Task Force focused on improved support to the warfighting CINCs and better mobilization. Both AMC headquarters and ROBUST advocate reorganization of AMC anticipating 21st Century conditions. As a foundation for understanding AMC today (Figure 17-1), we will comment on the role of the Army Service Forces (ASF) in World War II and on the Army Materiel Acquisition Review Committee (AMARC) study done in 1974.



Figure 17-1. Army Materiel Command - 1988

The issue of whether AMC should manage materiel by commodity or by function at the Major Subordinate Command level was the only significant area of controversy. How ROBUST arrived at its recommended reorganization of AMC is discussed in section 17.1.4 below.

Prior to the Second World War, development of War Department materiel and supply of that materiel were separate.. No single organization managed materiel through its "life cycle." Further, much of that materiel was centrally managed. Through the "emergency period" from June 1940 to December 1941, it became evident the old system would not work. By March 1942, the War Department formed the Army Service Forces (ASF) (see Figure 17-2). The Ordnance Department and Quartermaster Corps, as two of the Technical Services, performed most of the



John D. Millett, The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 353.

Figure 17–2. Organization of the Army Service Forces: 20 July 1943

functions we associate today with AMC. Both technical services were responsible for materiel from its inception to obsolescence; developmental testing was an integral part of the materiel development process. Likewise, the ASF decentralized operations as much as possible, as did the Office of the Quartermaster General (OQMG) and the Office of the Chief of Ordnance (OCO).

Prior to the war, the OQMG was organized by commodity. Each of its major subordinate organizations managed all aspects of certain materiel from research to supply. In the crucible of World War II, the OQMG reorganized functionally. The OQMG had one major subordinate command (MSC) for research, development and procurement, another for supply and distribution, and so forth. Each of these MSCs were organized by commodities such as tentage, clothing, and shoes. The OQMG managed certain commodities and did so by function. Within each functionally oriented MSC, materiel was managed by commodity. Prior to the war the OCO was organized functionally. There was an industrial service responsible for design, development, production, and so forth. There was a Field Service responsible for storing, issuing, inspecting, repairing, modifying, and maintaining ordnance materiel. However, within each of these functional MSCs, materiel was managed by commodities such as ammunition, artillery and small arms. By the end of the war, the Ordnance Department had added a research and development service to the industrial service and field service. (Figure 17-3) Even when the Tank-Automotive Center (T-AC) was established in Detroit to manage heavy equipment commodities, its immediate subordinate organizations, branches, were functionally organized by development, engineering, manufacturing, supply, and maintenance. However, each of these functional branches were organized into commodity operating sections.



Constance M. Green, Harry C. Thomson, and Peter C. Roots, The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War, UNITED STATES IN WORLD WAR II, (Washington: Government Printing office, 1955), p. 89.

Figure 17–3. Organization of the Ordnance Department: 6 July 1944

Even though the OCO successfully managed materiel at the MSC level by function, MG Campbell, the Chief of Ordnance, appointed the Harris Board in 1944 to examine the best organization for the Ordnance Department after the war. The Board recommended organization into six "product centers" with T–AC as the model. From the UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, Green, Thomson, and Roots state in their book The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War, The success of T–AC "...led many Ordnance officers to propose that the Department [Ordnance Department] be organized after the war on the basis of similar decentralized 'product centers,' each of which would be responsible for one group of items from start to finish. This was perhaps the most significant new concept of organization developed within the Department during the war, and the one that resulted in the widest differences of opinion." (p. 118) However, Green and company further state, "This suggestion was not put into effect by Campbell's successor, Maj. Gen. Everett S.

Hughes, during the years immediately following the war and remained one of the major questions on which opinion within the Department was divided." (p. 119)

While MG Campbell contemplated reorganizing the OCO by commodity, the commander of the ASF, General Somervell, envisioned a functional organization for the new Army Supply Agency he believed would replace the ASF at war's end. In General Somervell's plan the Ordnance Department would exclusively handle the procurement function; Quartermaster would handle storage and distribution, and so forth. Each of these major, functionally organized commands would then manage materiel by commodity. Of course the ASF did not survive the post-war period, and the Army Supply Agency was never formed as each of the chiefs of the Technical Services desired restoration of their pre-war status directly subordinate to the Army Chief of Staff.

From the World War II period, we find that life cycle management of materiel was born and worked. Of course AMC today is responsible for the life cycle management of most Army materiel ("womb-to-tomb"). The War Department began the war with research separate from readiness at the MACOM level and found it just did not work; the two functions were combined in the ASF. Second, most supply functions were decentralized. Even CONUS base operations, the responsibility of 45% of ASF's manpower during the war, was decentrally managed on an area basis by nine regional service commands. Lastly, materiel was managed functionally at the MSC level within the Technical Services. Below the MSC level, materiel management was organized by commodity. The issue of whether to manage materiel functionally or by commodity and at which level to do so remained an unresolved issue at wars end even though most materiel was managed functionally during the war.

From December 1973 to April 1974 "a preponderantly nonmilitary, non-governmental group" was formed to conduct a "comprehensive review, analysis and critique of the Army's materiel acquisition process," at that time believed to be the worst of the three services. This group was the Army Materiel Acquisition Review Committee (AMARC). Of note the committee did not scrutinize the entire AMC organization but only those parts related to materiel acquisition.

Among their many observations, AMARC recommended AMC organize along functional lines [shades of World War II!] and "by evolution, consolidate laboratories, installation and commodity command RDT&E elements, project managers, support elements, selected user elements, and command elements into mission oriented [functional] development centers; logistic and readiness functions performed in logistic centers." AMARC did not specify at which level such reorganization should occur. From 1976 to 1977 AMC was compelled to implement AMARC and chose to do so by

organizing functionally within each commodity command instead of at the MSC level. Thus, within TACOM research and development were split from readiness and logistics.

By 1981 AMC's leadership was convinced the AMARC reorganization did not work, and by 1984 AMC was organized along commodity lines largely as it is today. The debate on functional versus commodity management and at what level was not resolved from World War II. The initial ROBUST proposal would flounder on the same rock (see Figure 17–4).

17.1 OBSERVATION

The Army Materiel Command is organized functionally and by commodity.



Figure 17–4. Observation: Army Materiel Command is Organized by Both Commodity and Function

17.1.1 SCOPE

This proposal affects every level of AMC, the Army Staff (DCSLOG), Program Executive Officers, and relationships with defense industries. The ROBUST Task Force and the staff of AMC headquarters agree that AMC should reorganize for the 21st Century. The Goldwater-Nichols legislation has profoundly affected the acquisition process. As the industrial base of the United States diminishes in areas of heavy industry, AMC's ability to mobilize its internal manufacturing capability assumes increasing importance. Complex major weapons systems make current commodity distinctions less meaningful. Financial and manpower resources will be more constrained. New capabilities in automated data processing and communications allow greater centralization.

17.1.2 PROPOSAL

Organize AMC's internal industrial base functionally and reduce the number of commodity commands.

17.1.3 CRITERION

The ROBUST proposal simplifies AMC's command and control. Fewer commodity commands is more compatible with increasingly complex weapons systems which cross traditional commodity lines. Fewer commodity commands simplifies the coordination by Program Executive Officers. The new AMC structure should improve AMC's capability to quickly mobilize its internal manufacturing foundation resident in its arsenals, depots and plants. Lastly, the ROBUST proposal reduces administrative overhead, headquarters layering, split responsibilities, and duplication of function among AMC's MSCs.

17.1.4 ANALYSIS

Based on the view of the future discussed in section 17.1.1 and the criterion in section 17.1.3 above, ROBUST proposed AMC manage materiel functionally rather than by commodity by restructuring AMC from its current ten MSCs to five (see Figure 17–5).



Figure 17-5. Original Proposal

AMC would form a Systems Command to manage research, development and acquisition (RD&A), an industrial command to manage AMC's organic manufacturing plants, arsenals and depots, and a logistics command to support materiel in the Army inventory. Thus, AMC would be organized functionally at the MSC level, but within each of these functional MSCs, materiel would be managed by commodity, analogous to the World War II experience. Analysis indicated AMC was evolving in such a direction. There were reservations among the ROBUST analysts and members of the DCSLOG staff about the wisdom of departing from management by commodity, especially given the success of AMC in providing and sustaining first-class equipment for the Army. Further, based on a query of the ROBUST relational data base, AMC seems to be making best use of their people.

RESULTS OF RELATIONAL DATA BASE QUERY

Based on the METL reports, AMC has 7652 military and 107,627 civilians. The query concludes they are being appropriately used.

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
Logistics	1708	43,306
R & D	2350	16,733
Acquisition	256	6,899
Materiel Acq.	587	5,325
	4901	72,263

Thus, 64% of military and 67% of civilians are performing duties based on Standard Work Center codes directly related to AMC's primary missions.

Other allocations of manpower:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
Command	10%	3%
Resource Mgmt	5%	10%
Personnel & Manpower	3%	3%
Ops. plans & forces	6%	2%
Administration	.5%	.5%

40% of the officers in AMC are in R & D (22%) or logistics (18%).
61% of enlisted are in R & D (36%) or logistics (25%).

The ROBUST proposal, however, seemed organizationally sound, would simplify AMC's command structure, and, over several years, would likely accrue significant savings in civilian manpower.

On 18 October MG Mitchell and COL Weigand presented the ROBUST proposal to GEN Wagner, the CG of AMC, and his command group. The proposal was well-received. Agreement was reached regarding the view of the future and the need to change. The formation of an industrial command was generally agreed upon as worthwhile. However, the proposal to disestablish the six commodity commands and form two functional commands, one for RD&A and another for logistics support, was viewed with extreme concern.

The primary concern focused on the difficulty of integrating support throughout the life cycle of the system. Who would do that in the ROBUST proposal? The PEO/PM structure does not; commodity commands do. AMC headquarters does not and would need a much larger staff to do so. The ROBUST proposal is analogous to the Air Force wholesale system. There is an Air Force Systems Command (RD&A) and an Air Force Logistics Command (logistics support or readiness). Not only do these Air Force commands duplicate much of what they do, but they even require the

Aeronautical Systems Division to coordinate their activities. Meanwhile, the Army's system of life cycle management by commodity at the MSC level insures fully integrated support throughout the life of the system.

This initial ROBUST proposal was also compared to AMC after the AMARC study. Considering each commodity command had difficulty coordinating and integrating the readiness activities and the research activities within that commodity, the problem of coordinating those activities across AMC without commodity commands becomes enormous. Everyone agreed, however, that current commodity distinctions are becoming fuzzy and that realignment of commodity responsibilities coupled with a reduction in the number of commodity commands from six to possibly four or three has merit.

Based on the constructive criticism and advice from the 18 October meeting at AMC headquarters and on subsequent meetings the following week, the proposed ROBUST reorganization of AMC assumed its present form (see Figure 17-6).



Figure 17-6. Proposed Reorganization of AMC

Whether materiel should be managed functionally or by commodity has been a controversy since at least 1944 with good arguments on both sides. The issue is unclear and probably never will be definitively resolved. Given the strong commitment within AMC to life cycle management of materiel by commodity, attempting to impose management by function is unwise. If the present ROBUST proposal, explained in more detail in sections 17.2 and 17.3 below, is accepted, and implementation is begun

by AMC, the process of change would be evolutionary. Adjustments to the broad, flexible plan undoubtedly could exploit unforseen circumstances.

MANPOWER	CURRENT AUTH	FUTURE AUTH	CHANGE
MILITARY -	7,400	7,400	0
CIVILIAN -	104,000	94,000	-10,000
TOTAL -	111,400	101,400	-10,000

ADVANTAGES:

1. A SINGLE HEADQUARTERS FOR MANAGING AMC'S INTERNAL INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY BETTER ORGANIZES INDUSTRY AND FACILITATES MOBILIZATION.
2. FEWER COMMODITY COMMANDS IS MORE COMPATIBLE WITH INCREASINGLY COMPLEX SYSTEMS WHICH CROSS TRADITIONAL COMMODITY LINES.
3. FEWER COMMODITY COMMANDS COMPLEMENT PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER ORGANIZATION.
4. COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS AND DATA PROCESSING DEVELOPMENTS SUPPORT MORE CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT.
5. REDUCES ADMINISTRATIVE OVERHEAD, HEADQUARTERS LAYERING, SPLIT RESPONSIBILITIES, AND DUPLICATION OF FUNCTION.

Figure 17–7. Space Redistribution

17.1.5 CONCLUSION

Organize the internal industrial base of Army Materiel Command functionally and reduce the number of commodity commands by realigning them.

17.1.6 IMPLEMENTATION

Allow AMC twelve months to propose a detailed plan for implementation during 1993 to 2004. AMC will require significant resources to modernize existing automated data processing and communications equipment. Expect considerable Congressional resistance as organizations are disestablished consolidated, or relocated.

17.2 OBSERVATION

Management of AMC's industrial base is divided among three major subordinate commands (see Figure 17–8).



Figure 17–8. Observation: Management of the Army Materiel Command Industrial Base is Divided Among Three Major Subordinate Commands

17.2.1 SCOPE

This proposal affects DESCOM, AMCCOM, and TACOM as well as relationships with private industry. As the industrial base of the United States diminishes in areas of heavy industry, AMC's ability to mobilize its internal manufacturing capability assumes greater importance. Financial and manpower resources will be more constrained. New capabilities in automated data processing and communications allow greater centralization.

17.2.2 PROPOSAL

Consolidate the various arsenals, plants, and depots in Army Materiel Command under one major subordinate command.

17.2.3 CRITERION

A single headquarters for managing AMC's internal industrial capacity better organizes industry and facilitates mobilization. Communications systems and data processing developments support more centralized management; reduce administrative overhead, headquarters layering, split responsibilities, and duplication of function.

17.2.4 ANALYSIS

See analysis provided in section 17.1.4. The proposal to consolidate AMC's manufacturing capability, currently resident in three MSCs, into one MSC was approved by AMC headquarters (see Figure 17–9).



Figure 17–9. Future Organization Structure

There is little doubt that one MSC headquarters can manage AMC's organic industry more efficiently and more readily mobilize that industrial capability in the event of war. Space redistribution is shown in section 17.1.4.

17.2.5 CONCLUSION

Consolidate AMC's manufacturing capability in one major subordinate command.

17.2.6 IMPLEMENTATION

Allow AMC six months to propose a detailed plan for implementation during 1991. AMC will require significant resources to modernize existing automated data processing equipment. Expect considerable Congressional resistance as organizations are disestablished or relocated.

17.3 OBSERVATION

Modern complex weapons systems cross traditional commodity lines (see Figure 17–10).



Figure 17–10. Observation: Modern Complex Weapons Systems Cross Traditional Commodity Lines

17.3.1 SCOPE

This proposal affects every level of AMC, Program Executive Offices, and relationships with defense industries. The ROBUST Task Force and the staff of AMC headquarters agree that AMC should reorganize for the 21st Century. The Goldwater–Nichols legislation has profoundly affected the acquisition process. Complex major weapons systems make current commodity distinctions less meaningful. Financial and manpower resources will be more constrained. New capabilities in automated data processing and communications allow greater centralization.

17.3.2 PROPOSAL

Consolidate some of the commodity commands in AMC thereby reducing the total number to four or less.

17.3.3 CRITERION

Fewer Commodity Commands is more compatible with increasingly complex weapons systems which cross traditional commodity lines. Fewer Commodity Commands complements program executive officer organization. Communications systems and data processing developments support more centralized management; reduce administrative overhead, headquarters layering, split responsibilities, and duplication of function.

17.3.4 ANALYSIS

See analysis provided in section 17.1.4. The increasing complexity of modern weapons systems makes commodity distinctions less clear. Further, Project Managers for many weapons systems such as the Bradley or M1 tank must coordinate with several different commodity managers. There is merit in combining some of the current commodities such as turrets at AMCCOM with hulls or chassis at TACOM. (See Figure 17-11).



Figure 17-11. Future Organization Structure

Some combination of MICOM and part of AMCCOM also seems to be in order given the complexity of "smart" munitions. Perhaps a commodity management structure organized in the broad categories of shoot, move and communicate is more in line with the future of weapons technology. Additionally, advanced technology in automated data processing and communications systems allows for the centralization of many functions such as inventory control, cataloging, printing, and some procurement. As stated in section 17.1.4, AMC headquarters supports such a consolidation of commodities and a reduction in the number of commodity commands. Space redistribution is shown in section 17.1.4.

17.3.5 CONCLUSION

Reduce the number of commodity commands in AMC from six to four or less.

17.3.6 IMPLEMENTATION

Allow AMC twelve months to propose a detailed plan for implementation during 1993 to 2004. AMC will require significant resources to modernize existing automated data processing equipment. Expect considerable Congressional resistance as organizations are disestablished or relocated.

17.4 OBSERVATION

The Central TMDE Activity (CTA) and the TMDE Support Group (TSG) duplicate acquisition, management, and accountability for Army testing, measuring and diagnostic equipment (TMDE), worldwide (see Figure 17–12).



Figure 17–12. Observation: Acquisition, Management, and Accountability of TMDE Worldwide are Performed by Two Activities

17.4.1 SCOPE

Financial and manpower resources will be more constrained. New capabilities in automated data processing and communications allow greater centralization.

17.4.2 PROPOSAL

Disestablish the CTA; redistribute some manpower to the TSG.

17.4.3 CRITERION

Rules of inefficiency; eliminate redundancy.

17.4.4 ANALYSIS

The CONUS On Site Evaluation Team examined the TSG at Redstone Arsenal, AL on 28/29 September, reporting that both the CTA at Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot, KY and the TSG reported to the Deputy Director of TMDE at AMC headquarters providing worldwide accountability of TMDE. They further reported that a 15 Jul 88 AMC IG report advocated disestablishing the CTA and transferring their functions to the TSG. The OSET's own observations supported the IG report and recommended disestablishing CTA. As a related issue, the OSET noted such consolidation "... will meet with strong opposition from Representative Hopkins (D-KY)."

Analysis of the METL reports, Section II of the TDA, and conversations with action officers in AMC headquarters, CECOM headquarters, and the TSG supported the OSET's recommendation. It was evident the TSG can do all the functions performed by the CTA. However, CTA does interface more with the Project Manager, TMDE, in acquisition matters, and does maintain the "official" registry of TMDE equipment as well as the "preferred list", authorizing additions and deletions to both lists. TSG likewise maintains a registry and preferred list of TMDE, worldwide. Indeed, they are identical to the CTA lists. They simply are not responsible for making additions and deletions to them. With the transfer of 20 spaces, and possibly some equipment, from CTA to TSG, TSG could assume all the functions performed by CTA (see Figure 17-13 and 17-14).



Figure 17-13. Future Organization Structure

MANPOWER	CURRENT AUTHORIZATIONS	FUTURE AUTHORIZATIONS	DIFFERENCE
MILITARY -	2	0	-2
CIVILIAN -	56	0	-36*
TOTAL -	58	0	-38*

ADVANTAGES:

- DISESTABLISH A UNIT PERFORMING REDUNDANT FUNCTIONS.
- AN AMC IG REPORT OF 15 JULY 1988 RECOMMENDS CENTRAL TMDE ACTIVITY BE DISESTALISHED.
- HQ AMC SUPPORTS THE RECOMMENDATION.
- THOSE FEW UNIQUE FUNCTIONS PERFORMED BY CENTRAL TMDE ACTIVITY CAN READILY BE PERFORMED BY THE TMDE SUPPORT GROUP WITH MODEST ADDITIONAL MANPOWER.

NOTE: * REDISTRIBUTE ABOUT 20 SPACES FROM CTA TO THE TMDE SUPPORT GROUP.

Figure 17-14. Space Redistribution

The OSET also suggested we consider moving the PM, TMDE from Fort Monmouth, NJ to Redstone Arsenal. Conversations with action officers in the PM's office as well as CECOM headquarters recommend against such a move. The PM's matrix support is in place in CECOM and working well. Even though the PM focuses on TMDE, his matrix support handles a variety of other issues. Since it would be unwise to move the matrix support from Fort Monmouth, it is equally unwise to move the PM, TMDE.

17.4.5 CONCLUSION

Disestablish the Central TMDE Activity.

17.4.6 IMPLEMENTATION

Allow AMC one month to propose a detailed plan for implementation during 1990. Expect considerable Congressional resistance.

17.5 OBSERVATION

Responsibility of security assistance is split geographically (see Figure 17-15).



Figure 17-15. Observation: The U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC), is Split Geographically

17.5.1 SCOPE

The U.S. Army Security Affairs Command (USASAC), a major subordinate command of the U.S. ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND (AMC) is divided into two parts at separate locations - Alexandria, VA and New Cumberland Army Depot, PA. (NCAD)

17.5.2 PROPOSAL

Consolidate operations of the two organizations within USASAC.



Figure 17-16. Future Organization Structure

17.5.3 CRITERION

THE mission of USASAC is to support United States Foreign Policy as the DA Executive Agent for Management of Army Security Assistance functions. It provides friendly countries and allies an increased capability to defend themselves through sales of materiel, services, and training. USASAC is a Field Operating Activity (FOA) of Headquarters AMC and reports through the Deputy Chief of Staff for International Partnerships to the AMC Commander. U.S. assistance organizations and U.S. Government Regulatory Agencies define all security assistance requests. USASAC'S mission is worldwide during peacetime and mobilization. Since World War I, security assistance has been congressionally legislated.

17.5.4 ANALYSIS

Security assistance is basically divided into two components, Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Military Assistance Program (MAP). Since FY82 the largest component, FM, has significantly decreased in dollar value-DoD-wide.

FY NEW ORDERS	ARMY ($)	TOTAL DOD ($)
82	4.2 BILLION	21.5 BILLION
83	4.2 BILLION	18.3 BILLION
84	3.8 BILLION	14.6 BILLION
85	3.8 BILLION	12.6 BILLION
86	2.0 BILLION	7.1 BILLION
87 (THROUGH 30 JUN 87)	1.5 BILLION	6.2 BILLION

During the USAMARDA Manpower Management Survey of USASAC conducted during the period 3 - 31 March 1987, USAMARDA recommended USASAC consider consolidating in one location. The ROBUST On Site Evaluation Team (OSET) discussed the issue with the Commander USASAC. He indicated a 10% to 20% manpower space savings would be achieved through consolidation. He also indicated a small residual force may have to remain in the National Capital Region (NCR) to coordinate with the embassies if USASAC was consolidated outside the Washington, D.C. area. Analysis indicates that a consolidation either within or outside the NCR and implementation of other USAMARDA recommendations will not only eliminate duplicate staffs but increase manpower saving to 30% of authorized staffing. Furthermore, most of the actions with embassies could be conducted by telephone or other automated means. Essential meetings could be accomplished by TDY from outside the NCR. Such methods of operation would certainly be less expensive than leaving a USASAC residual office in the NCR. Further streamlining of the security assistance mission could possibly be achieved by redesignating USASAC a Field Operating Agency and dual hatting the HQDA ODCSLOG Director for Security

Assistance as the Director of the U.S. ARMY Security Affairs Agency (RATHER THAN COMMAND).

Six additional authorizations (1 officer and 5 civilians) are listed on the Headquarters, AMC TDA. One space is the Commander, USASAC who is also dual hatted as the DCS for International Security Partnerships. AMC and USASAC are planning to transfer these spaces and related functions to the USASAC TDA during the next Management of Change (MOC) window. The functional computer support provided by the security assistance functional support office collocated at ALMSA (ST Louis, MO) in support of the Security Assistance Automation, Army (SA3) system should continue until SA3 is installed and tested. When USASAC is consolidated, the functions should be transferred to USASAC Headquarters' Information Management Office and the four SAFSO be deleted.

As the DA Executive Agent for the Management of Security Assistance, USASAC has the authority to task commodity commands to support the security assistance program. Each commodity command has a directorate to perform security assistance functions in support of the commodity commander. USASAC maintains a close relationship with these commodity command security assistance directorates. No change in this relationship should occur under the proposal.

Another element of USASAC is the Program Manager for the Saudi Arabian National Guard (PMSANG). PMSANG has a separate UIC and has its own TDA. It is located in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and has a liaison office in the AMC Building, Alexandria, VA. The PM is a major general who reports to the USASAC Commander. No change is proposed for the PMSANG organization.

17.5.5 CONCLUSION

Consolidating the two parts of USASAC at New Cumberland Army Depot PA, will provide better Command and Control as well as eliminate duplication and redundancy created by dual locations. Furthermore, it would eliminate split responsibility for internal functions, streamline the work flow process, reduce costs, and most importantly increase productivity (see Figure 17-17).

MANPOWER	CURRENT AUTHORIZATIONS	FUTURE AUTHORIZATIONS	DIFFERENCE
MILITARY:	20	4	-16
CIVILIAN:	622	452	-170
TOTAL	642	456	-186

ADVANTAGES

- CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS IN ONE LOCATION
- PROVIDES FOR SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIES AND EFFICIENCIES
- REDUCES REDUNDANCIES AND DUPLICATIONS CAUSED BY CURRENT SPLIT ORGANIZATION
- CONTINUED DIRECT ACCESS TO ODCSLOG DIRECTOR FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Figure 17-17. Space Redistribution

17.5.6 IMPLEMENTATION

U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) execute NLT end FY92. Although this proposal is a major reorganization of AMC affecting every level of the wholesale system, life cycle management of materiel and commodity management at the major subordinate command level remain in tact. Given the Goldwater Nichols legislation, the diminishing capability of U.S. heavy industry, decreasing financial and manpower resources, and new capabilities in ADP and communications, AMC must prepare now for 21st Century conditions.

ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 17
MANPOWER AUTHORIZATIONS BY UNIT IDENTIFICATION CODE

ANNEX A
Army Manpower Authorizations by UIC

AMC

UIC	Unit Designation	ASGMT	CO Auths	WO Auths	ENL Auths	CIV DHUS	CIV DHFN	CIV INFN
W01HAA	GAR VINT HILL	X1	5	1	96	150	0	0
W01NAA	ACT EMRA	X1	21	5	167	426	0	0
W031AA	LAB USA HARRY DIAMOND	X1	5	0	0	649	0	0
W038AA	CMD USA NATICK	X1	24	2	57	895	0	0
W039AA	AGY SATCOM	X1	4	0	41	119	0	0
W041AA	CTR USA COLD RGN TEST	X1	24	1	28	0	0	0
W042AA	CTR USA TROPIC TEST	X1	0	0	0	19	8	0
W043AA	U AVN ENG FLT	X1	23	5	26	98	0	0
W04LAA	CTR USA BEL R+D	X1	19	0	32	872	0	0
W04WAA	RNG WHITE SAND MISSLE	X1	62	10	532	2229	0	0
W04XAA	PVG USA YUMA	X1	27	2	224	555	0	0
W04YAA	PVG USA ELECTRONIC	X1	42	3	342	225	0	0
W04ZAA	PVG JEFFERSON	X1	3	0	0	387	0	0
W055AA	GRP USA R& D CANADA	X1	1	0	0	0	2	0
W056AA	GRP USA RSCH DEV UK	X1	6	0	0	6	9	0
W05BAA	OFC ARMY RESEARCH	X1	2	0	0	115	0	0
W05FAA	GRPUSA R&D AUST	X1	1	0	1	0	0	0
W05XAA	HQ TROSCOM	X1	49	3	45	1682	0	0
WOGWAA	HQ AMC	X1	178	1	24	1650	0	0
WOH6AA	OFC AFSC-LNO	X1	1	0	0	2	0	0
WOH9AA	CMD HQ MICOM	X1	240	24	126	6237	0	0
WOJEAA	HQ USATECOM	X1	56	1	23	434	0	0
WOK4AA	ARS PINE BLUFF	X1	20	0	48	1063	0	0
WOK5AA	ARS ROCKY MOUNTAIN	X1	1	0	0	162	0	0
WOK8AA	ARS ROCK ISLAND	X1	14	0	14	2443	0	0
WOK9AA	ARS WATERVLIET	X1	9	0	0	2037	0	0
WOKZAA	ACT FIELD SAFETY	X1	0	0	0	34	0	0
WOL3AA	ACT USA DEP FT WNGATE	X1	2	0	0	85	0	0
WOL6AA	DEP LETTERKENNY ARMY	X1	17	0	39	3443	0	0
WOL7AA	DEP LEX-BLU-GR ARMY	X1	6	3	25	1112	0	0
WOLBAA	PLN CORNHUSKER AMMO	X1	0	0	0	4	0	0
WOLCAA	PLN HOLSTON ARMY AMMO	X1	2	0	0	30	0	0
WOLDAA	PLN INDIANA ARMY AMMO	X1	2	0	0	38	0	0
WOLEAA	PLN IOWA ARMY AMMO	X1	2	0	0	43	0	0
WOLFAA	PLN KANSAS ARMY AMMO	X1	2	0	0	36	0	0
WOLGAA	PLN LAKE CITY ARMYAMMO	X1	2	0	0	66	0	0
WOLHAA	PLN LONESTAR ARMYAMMO	X1	2	0	0	58	0	0
WOLJAA	PLN LA ARMY AMMO	X1	2	0	0	42	0	0
WOLKAA	PLN MILAN ARMY AMMO	X1	2	0	0	57	0	0
WOLLAA	PLN RADFORD ARMY AMMO	X1	2	0	0	66	0	0
WOLMAA	PLN NEWPORT ARMY AMMO	X1	1	0	0	8	0	0
WOLNAA	PLN BADGER ARMY AMMO	X1	0	0	0	7	0	0
WOLPAA	PLN LONGHORN ARMYAMMO	X1	2	0	0	38	0	0
WOLQAA	PLN SUNFLOWR ARMYAMMO	X1	2	0	0	30	0	0
WOLWAA	PLN JOLIET ARMY AMMO	X1	0	0	0	9	0	0
WOLXAA	DEP ANNISTON ARMY	X1	24	0	27	4217	0	0
WOMAAA	DEP N CUMBERLAND ARMY	X1	16	1	37	2523	0	0
WOMBAA	DEP USA ACT PUEBLO	X1	2	0	2	594	0	0
WOMCAA	DEP RED RIVER ARMY	X1	22	1	34	5134	0	0
WOMDAA	DEP SACRAMENTO ARMY	X1	19	0	25	3146	0	0

W0MEAA	DEP USA ACT SAVANNA	X1	2	0	2	215	0	0
W0MGAA	DEP SENECA ARMY	X1	15	4	75	858	0	0
W0MHAA	DEP USA SHARPE	X1	14	0	22	1096	0	0
W0MJAA	DEP SIERRA ARMY	X1	8	0	2	346	0	0
W0MLAA	DEP US ARMY TOBYHANNA	X1	12	0	14	3948	0	36
W0MMAA	DEP TOOELE ARMY	X1	23	0	29	3474	0	0
W0MNAA	ACT USA DEP UMATILLA	X1	3	0	0	232	0	0
W0MUAA	DEP USA CORPUS CH	X1	12	2	11	3867	0	0
W0QKAA	PLN STLOUIS ARMY AMMO	X1	0	0	0	2	0	0
W0V3AA	ACT IBEA	X1	0	0	0	79	0	0
W0V4AA	ACT AMC I & SA	X1	1	0	1	105	0	0
W0V8AA	OFC PM CSA	X1	13	0	7	112	0	0
W0W7AA	PLN ALABAMA ARMY AMMO	X1	0	0	0	1	0	0
W0WCAA	ACT HISA CECOM	X1	10	0	46	443	0	0
W0WFAA	ACT RASA	X1	13	5	100	723	0	0
W0WPAA	ACT SPT PHILA	X1	1	0	0	88	0	0
W0Y6AA	HQ AVSCOM	X1	157	11	63	3719	0	0
W0ZGAA	ACT APRO HUGHES	X1	6	3	0	124	0	0
W109AA	DEP USA MAINZ	X1	5	3	73	99	0	58
W11LAA	ACT LCA	X1	5	0	2	152	0	0
W149AA	ACT USAAMC QA	X1	0	0	0	18	0	0
W19UAA	ACT AIMSA	X1	0	0	7	567	0	0
W1E1AA	CIR AIMC	X1	63	0	7	363	0	0
W1HNAA	ACT LAO FAR EAST	X1	2	0	1	11	8	0
W1MJAA	PLN TWIN CITY AMMO	X1	0	0	0	8	0	0
W1MKAA	PLN RAVENNA ARMY AMMO	X1	0	0	0	5	0	0
W1N0AA	ACT AVRADA	X1	9	0	3	200	0	0
W1N2AA	LAB USA ATMOS SCIENCE	X1	3	0	0	386	0	0
W1N3AA	LAB ELCT TECH DEVICES	X1	1	0	0	295	0	0
W1NPAA	ACT FSA/AMCCOM	X1	0	0	13	146	0	0
W1PLAA	GRP USA TMDE SPT	X1	4	1	31	317	0	0
W1VQAA	PLN RIVERBANK A AMMO	X1	1	0	0	10	0	0
W1VWAA	HQ USASAC	X1	18	0	2	618	0	0
W1WQAA	PLN VOLUNTEER A AMMO	X1	0	0	0	6	0	0
W262AA	CMD HQ LABCOM	X1	20	0	7	230	0	0
W263AA	ACT ISA/LABCOM	X1	2	0	0	389	0	0
W264AA	LAB VAL	X1	1	0	59	196	0	0
W293AA	ACT AVIATION R&T	X1	16	0	1	507	0	0
W2EDAA	OFC STC-FE	X1	8	0	6	5	0	15
W2EKAA	ACT AMETA	X1	0	0	0	112	0	0
W2EWAA	ACT SURETY FIELD	X1	1	2	0	6	0	0
W2F5AA	ACT LAO EUROPE	X1	17	0	3	42	2	5
W2FUAA	PLN SCRANTON AMMO	X1	2	0	0	17	0	0
W2GJAA	ACT USAAMC IG	X1	20	1	3	52	0	0
W2HMAA	LAB USA MAT-TECH	X1	7	0	1	540	0	0
W2S5AA	ACT ISSA	X1	0	0	0	362	0	0
W2WUAA	ACT APRO BELL	X1	7	3	1	123	0	0
W2ZJAA	ACT STIT-EUR	X1	9	0	5	10	0	0
W30MAA	PVG HQ DUGWAY	X1	34	5	106	790	0	0
W316AA	ACT LAO CONUS	X1	18	0	3	96	0	0
W317AA	OFC PM TRADE	X1	26	0	4	197	0	0
W34EAA	OFC CAMO-PAC	X1	7	1	5	27	0	0
W34WAA	ACT TACOMSA	X1	2	0	1	67	0	0
W36WAA	OFC PM NUC MUN	X1	9	2	0	39	0	0
W376AA	ACT USA ACFT DEV TEST	X1	25	12	102	93	0	0
W37VAA	CIR ST LOUIS AREA SPT	X1	2	0	4	46	0	0
W37XAA	ACT AISA AVSCOM	X1	0	0	0	40	0	0
W38NAA	OFC TECH-ESCORT	X1	22	0	42	84	0	0
W390AA	PLN MCALESTER AMMO	X1	1	0	0	757	0	0

W39BAA OFC TEST DIR EOGW CM	X1	1	0	0	47	0	0
W39QAA HQ USA DESCOM	X1	31	0	13	587	0	0
W39YAA PLN HAWTHRONE AMMO	X1	2	0	0	68	0	0
W39ZAA PLN CRANE ARMY AMMO	X1	1	0	1	706	0	0
W3CTAA ACT LAO PACIFIC	X1	2	0	2	7	0	0
W3GHAA ACT GEN MAT & PETRL	X1	1	0	0	194	0	0
W3GMAA CTR USADACS	X1	0	0	0	202	0	0
W3JCAA ACT AMSAA	X1	16	0	12	432	0	0
W3JUAA ACT AMC R&D INTERNS	X1	0	0	0	270	0	0
W3K0AA ACT APRO BOEING	X1	3	2	3	74	0	0
W3Q4AA LAB BALLISTIC RSCH	X1	10	0	7	701	0	0
W3Q5AA LAB HUMAN ENGR	X1	12	0	19	202	0	0
W3TAAA ACT CSLA	X1	1	4	20	217	0	0
W3THAA ACT CDA	X1	1	0	4	95	0	0
W3V8AA AGY USATHAMA	X1	7	0	0	83	0	0
W3X4AA ACT MRSA	X1	8	0	0	357	0	0
W3ZLAA OFC PM SANG	X1	40	0	5	52	20	0
W4ARAA OFC TCATA LNO/AMC	X1	2	0	0	2	0	0
W4AWAA ACT USACTA	X1	2	0	0	56	0	0
W4BKAA PLN MISS ARMY AMMO	X1	2	0	0	41	0	0
W4BYAA ACT CECOM/FSA	X1	8	1	11	25	0	0
W4CQAA SYS USA EPG DGTL COMM	X1	20	0	192	0	0	0
W4E4AA ACT MEA	X1	0	0	0	312	0	0
W4FBAA ACT MUN PRODBASE	X1	7	0	0	145	0	0
W4FDAA GRP RD GERMANY	X1	4	0	0	3	0	0
W4G8AA CTR CECOM R&D	X1	50	3	129	1693	0	0
W4GGAA HQ TACOM	X1	188	6	152	4462	0	0
W4GHAA CTR TACOM R&D	X1	31	0	1	857	0	0
W4GVAA OFC HQ CECOM	X1	248	8	215	5353	0	0
W4GZAA ACT SRWIA	X1	1	8	7	0	0	0
W4HPAA ACT SPSA	X1	11	1	7	10	0	0
W4JBAA U EDCA	X1	4	0	0	18	0	0
W4JKAA OFC OPM JTF	X1	25	2	4	72	0	0
W4JMAA OFC AMC EUROPE	X1	20	1	7	86	1	1
W4JNAA OFC PM LAV	X1	2	0	0	34	0	0
W4JPAA OFC USA SURV MGT	X1	3	0	0	18	0	0
W4L6AA ACT TMDE SUPPORT	X1	0	0	138	892	0	0
W4MKAA CTR ARDEC	X1	57	0	22	3862	0	0
W4MLAA CTR USA CHEM R&D	X1	51	0	46	1262	0	0
W4MMAA HQ AMCCOM	X1	155	4	135	5654	0	0
W4N9AA DEP USA OBERRAMSTDT	X1	1	0	3	2	0	9
W4QUAA U USA CSTA	X1	32	1	190	1164	0	0
W4QVAA ACT ISA/APG	X1	20	2	206	1373	0	0
W4RVAA ACT USA IMA	X1	3	2	8	38	0	0
W4TFAA PLT DETROIT TNK	X1	3	0	1	92	0	0
W4TGAA PLT LIMA TANK	X1	6	0	1	96	0	0
W4UVAA ACT D-SAFE	X1	1	0	2	33	16	0
W4UZAA OFC PM RMA	X1	2	0	0	34	0	0
W4XWAA ACT LOG PROG SPT	X1	6	0	13	141	0	0
W4Y7AA OFC PEO AMMO	X1	4	0	0	59	0	0
WE2G99 AUG CO MAINT (TMDE)	X1	0	1	6	16	12	12
WH7H99 AUG CS HHC	X1	0	0	3	6	2	0
WH8R99 AUG CO MAINT (TMDE)	X1	0	0	14	0	0	3
WH8S99 AUG CS CO	X1	0	0	10	0	0	45
WH8T99 AUG CS CO	X1	0	0	12	0	0	4
WH8U99 AUG HHD TMDE MAINT	X1	0	0	5	12	0	24
*** Total ***		2730	164	4505	102952	80	212

CHAPTER 18
SUSTAINING BASE - TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND (TRADOC)

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) evolved from an era of transition and reorganization within the U.S. Army. It was a time to move from combat operations to peace-time operations and face the normal post-war contraction of the military base. Economy in operations was to become the watchword throughout military departments. Operation STEADFAST in 1973 was part of a general overhaul of the entire CONUS structure which, as one of its provisions, separated command of the army's field force elements from the control of the schools and individual training. This action was responsible for the creation of Forces Command (FORSCOM) and TRADOC.

Combat developments processes, the responsibility of the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, were transferred to TRADOC at this time. Task Force ATLAS, under the auspices of Operation STEADFAST, sought to determine those organizations necessary to maintain visibility of the combat developments processes while fostering a close relationship between education and combat development to capitalize on the experiences of students and instructors. It was an effort to unite the functional areas of doctrine development and training. TRADOC was given the two-fold mission to prepare the army for war and be the architect of the future. In order to accomplish this it was necessary to conduct all concept and doctrine development, develop and maintain the training system and conduct combat developments. Resources which TRADOC had at its disposal include fourteen installations, four installations with schools, twentyfour schools, eight centers, fifteen basic training/OSUT/AIT activities, eight test boards and other activities.

To round out the combat development processes, Task Force ATLAS recommended the establishment of three integrating centers which were to coordinate doctrine and combat developments as middle managers for the Commanding General, TRADOC. These were the Combined Arms Center at Ft. Leavenworth, the Logistics Center at Ft. Lee and the Personnel and Administration Center at Ft. Benjamin Harrison. The Combined Arms Center (CAC) was responsible for the development of operational doctrine, organization and selected materiel needs for combat and combat support forces for division through field army. The Logistics Center was to serve as the focal point for personnel and services specialized in the science of planning and carrying on the training, education and doctrinal aspects of supply, maintenance and movement of forces and related logistical functions. Finally, Soldier Support Center (SSC) was to be the central point for personnel and services for development, coordination and communication of army doctrine and education related to the functional

areas of personnel, administration, finance, military justice, religious activities and medical services. A subsequent decision in 1986 by the Commanding General, TRADOC placed responsibility for integration of medical service functions with the Logistics Center.

Task Force ATLAS determined that the three centers should be established to integrate combat developments processes at the lowest possible level. In its role as integrating center, SSC coordinated the combat and doctrine development processes of the special branches (personnel, finance, military justice and religious activities) to insure that proper force structure and training programs were developed to support Army organizations. Having "tied together" these various Personnel Service Support (PSS) functions from the proponent branch schools and developed an integrated position, SSC must then insure all ramifications of their work are coordinated with the other two integrating centers for compatibility Army-wide. Additionally, SSC must evaluate personnel and administration training and education in all Army schools to insure current doctrine is being taught. The years since Operation STEADFAST and Task Force ATLAS have seen SSC mature as an integrating center. It should be noted once again that the CG, TRADOC has since transferred the mission of integration for medical services to the Logistics Center. Also, the Logistics Center currently overwatches Combat Service Support integration by maintaining approval authority for PSS actions. This interface is accomplished during Mission Area Analyses, Logistics Exercises and other In Progress Reviews (IPR) conducted by the Logistics Center. Combat Service Support functions are also integrated and support the war-fighting CINC in the Logistics Annex to Operations Orders and Plans throughout the Army.

Ongoing Department of the Army reorganization and modernization efforts impacted upon TRADOC in August, 1980. As a result of guidance from the Chief of Staff and a series of General Officer and action officer working sessions, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed which created Soldier Support Center - National Capital Region (SSC- NCR) from assets belonging to the Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN). This Memorandum of Understanding between the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER), TRADOC, Soldier Support Center and MILPERCEN (now, the Total Army Personnel Agency (TAPA)) was designed to align personnel policy with DA, DCSPER, personnel doctrinal functions with SSC and personnel operational functions with TAPA. SSC-NCR became the arm of Soldier Support Center, Ft. Benjamin Harrison, responsible for the additional functions being transferred from TAPA. Since 1980, SSC-NCR has become a vital part of the integrating process intended originally for SSC in 1973. Its linkages to HQDA, TAPA, SSC, MACOM and personnel proponents have formed complex communication and coordination channels.

Its directorates perform one-of-a-kind missions for the Army and TRADOC, however, they have no authority to insure compliance.

The final proviso of Operation STEADFAST affecting TRADOC was the inclusion of the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) as a subordinate element. It was felt that the educational processes and training provided to the students were best suited to the TRADOC environment. To command and control the ROTC structure, four regional headquarters were established, each commanded by a general officer.

Internal efforts of TRADOC to facilitate the command and control of all test and experimentation processes were begun in October 1987 with the creation of the Test and Experimentation Command (TEXCOM) at Ft Hood, Texas. Initially, only the TRADOC Combined Arms Test Activity (TCATA) and the Combat Developments Experimentation Command (CDEC) were assigned to the new command. Reorganization efforts continued with the assignment of the eight test boards to TEXCOM effective 1 October 88 leaving only the TRADOC Independent Evaluation Directorate (TIED) outside it's span of control.

Training of military intelligence skills has been accomplished in one form or another since the inception of the U.S. Army. Cryptologic training (the forerunner of Signal Intelligence, Signal Security and Electronic Warfare) was a Signal Corps responsibility from its origin until the establishment of the Army Cryptologic Agency (later redesignated the U.S. Army Security Agency). In 1945 the U.S. Army Security Agency (USASA) assumed formal training of officer and enlisted cryptologic specialists. This training was conducted as part of the National Security Agency (NSA) Training System. The USASA, acting as executive agent for cryptologic training for the army, was responsible for all cryptologic matters for the U.S. government. In 1963 the USASA began to conduct electronic warfare training for personnel assigned to USASA. The Signal Corps continued to train persons not assigned to USASA. In 1966 the Continental Army Command established an Electronic Warfare School at Ft. Huachucha, Arizona as part of the Surveillance Center. The division of responsibility for EW training stemmed from the extreme secret nature of the missions of the USASA and its direct relationship with the National Security Agency. This relationship further allowed the training of cryptologic specialists to be shared among the armed services for the most economical use of limited resources. Each service provided single skill training for all others. Army cryptologic training was conducted at Ft. Devens, Massachusetts, Naval cryptologic training at Corry Station, Pensacola, Florida and Air Force training at Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas.

Military intelligence training in the army came of age in 1942 with the establishment of the U.S. Army Counterintelligence Corps and the initiation of counterintelli-

gence specialist training in Washington, DC. In 1955, after a series of relocations and consolidations of counterintelligence training with the training of other intelligence skill training, the army consolidated all intelligence training (except cryptologic/electronic warfare) at Ft. Holabird, Maryland. The Army Intelligence School moved from Ft. Holabird to its present location at Ft. Huachuca in the early 1970's. In August, 1975 the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study, the URSANO Study, recommended the transfer of the U.S. Army Security Agency Training Center and School (USASATC & S) to the command and control of the Army Training and Doctrine Command. Further, it recommended the consolidation of USASATC & S and the Intelligence School at a single location on a near-term basis. This consolidation of combat development, doctrine development, proponency and all intelligence training would save limited resources and provide for the first time a single institute for all-source training. In late 1977 and early 1978 the Department of the Army adopted the recommendations of the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study and subordinated the newly established Intelligence School, Ft. Devens to the Intelligence Center and School at Ft. Huachuca. It further directed the consolidation of the two schools at one location. Ft. Huachuca was chosen for the site for the consolidated Intelligence School. For ten years TRADOC attempted to combine the two schools. These efforts have been frustrated by congressional opposition to the disestablishment of the Intelligence School at Ft. Devens. This opposition is based on economic impacts to the Ft. Devens area, rather than an opposition to the combining of the two schools.

18.1 OBSERVATIONS

Greater opportunities exist for the integration of training and combat and doctrine development processes among the special branches (Chaplain, Judge Advocate General) as they function in the total Combat Services Support community.

Formalized integration processes among the integrating centers should be defined.

18.1.1 SCOPE

Refine the training and combat development/integration processes within TRADOC by formalizing coordination linkages to insure impacts upon force structure are correct and viable.



Figure 18–1. Integration of Training, Combat, and Doctrine Development Process Among Special Branches

18.1.2 PROPOSALS

Formalize directed coordination of training, combat and doctrine developments of the special branches with the Personnel Service Support Center prior to implementation; formalize directed coordination from the Personnel Service Support Center to the Logistics Center and, finally, to the Combined Arms Center.

18.1.3 CRITERION

Soldier Support Center is responsible for training, combat and doctrine development for personnel and administration, as well as, the integration of these functions with the special branches (Finance, Chaplain and Judge Advocate General). It serves as the proponent for the integration of all Personnel Service Support (PSS) for the Army. The Logistics Center is the focal point for logistics-related functions and coordinates Combat Services Support. The Combined Arms Center performs integration for the combat and combat support proponents of the Army. SSC-NCR executes the MANPRINT effort, manages force structure, conducts personnel proponency MOS structure analysis and attitude and occupational surveys. The combat development processes must be integrated and controlled to insure compatibility with future Army

force structure in support of the CINC. Coordination between HQ, TRADOC, the integrating centers and subordinate proponents is essential.

18.1.4 ANALYSIS

Soldier Support Center was established to integrate the personnel and administration arenas. All special branches, to include finance, public affairs, chaplain and JAG, are to coordinate their combat and doctrine developments through SSC to insure compatibility throughout the Army. Success with which this has been accomplished over the years can be measured in varying degrees. While SSC and it's role as integrating center have matured, it is unable to prevent the special branches from acting in their own best interests when the situation warrants. As the Army moves into the 21st century with the ramifications of advanced weaponry and force structure, the absolute need for close and continual coordination becomes necessary. Training, combat, and doctrine developments must keep pace and must be fully integrated within the Army. To accomplish this the special branches must cease their independent structure changes and develop the same in concert with SSC. Likewise, it is imperative that SSC coordinates all PSS functions with the Logistics Center which has responsibility for the integration of Combat Service Support areas for the Army. In turn, the Logistics Center must ensure that combat and doctrine developments are coordinated with the Combined Arms Center which bears responsibility for combat arms and combat support arms branches, as well as, the total integration of all combat and doctrine development within the Army. These directed coordination linkages will ensure developmental processes remain synchronized with force structure and materiel advances.



Figure 18-2. Directed Coordination Among the Special Branches

18.1.5 CONCLUSION

Continued independent training, combat, and doctrine development by special branches cannot be tolerated. Total force integration is absolutely necessary in an era of modernization and dwindling resources. This can easily be accomplished through directed coordination linkages from branch proponents to SSC to the Logistics Center and, finally, to the Combined Arms Center. Appropriate authority and enforcement measures must be delegated from HQ, TRADOC to the integrating centers in order to perform their particular piece of the integration process.

18.1.6 IMPLEMENTATION

TRADOC study the proposals for six months with full implementation during FY90.

Related issues which must be addressed include the renaming of SSC as the Personnel Service Support Center to better identify its total personnel support role within the Army and the consolidation/transfer of SSC-NCR directorates to HQDA and HQ, TRADOC activities.

18.2 OBSERVATION

A redundancy exists in the test and evaluation processes of the TRADOC Test and Experimentation Command (TEXCOM), the test boards and the TRADOC Independent Evaluation Directorate (TIED).

18.2.1 SCOPE

Command and control of all test and evaluation processes within TRADOC and Materiel, combat, and doctrine advances will necessitate thorough and complete testing.



Figure 18–3. Redundancy Exists in the Test and Evaluation Processes of TEXCOM, Test Boards and TRADOC Independent Evaluation Directorate

18.2.2 PROPOSAL

TEXCOM control all test and evaluation functions within TRADOC.

18.2.3 CRITERION

TEXCOM plans, executes and reports on the results of experimental testing and field experimentations to support doctrine, training, force design and the materiel needs of the concept based requirements system. TIED is TRADOC's independent evaluator for operational evaluations of materiel systems and operational concepts. Unity of command and control facilitates test and evaluation processes. War fighting CINC are supported by insuring quality control of materiel and evaluations.

18.2.4 ANALYSIS

TEXCOM was provisionally established in October 1987 with the mission to coordinate all test and experimentation activities within TRADOC. Initially, only the TRADOC Combined Arms Test Activity (TCATA) and the Combat Developments Experimentation Command (CDEC) were assigned to this new command. Effective 1 October 1988 the eight test boards were also assigned to TEXCOM. Remaining outside of TEXCOM's command and control is TIED, which is TRADOC's independent "eyes" to insure that materiel and concepts remain in the best interests of the Army. TIED does not have a current mission. If subordinated, TEXCOM would be efficiently employed. It should be noted that while the eight test boards are assigned to TEX-

are OPCON to the respective school commandants. This command relationefficient and confusing. In order to facilitate command, control and the ll test and experimentation processes within TRADOC, HQ TEXCOM must esponsibility for the test boards. This does not preclude a working relationship with school commandants but does establish a defined chain of command. Additionally, control of individual test boards provides the TEXCOM commander the flexibility to use manpower from branch test boards to aid in tests from branches without organic test boards. TIED should remain as an impartial agent. They should not be involved in actual testing but remain an ardent observer. Their role could be likened to that of an IG or audit agency at a major headquarters. Assigned to HQ TEXCOM, the test and experimentation processes would then be centralized and report directly to HQ TRADOC.



Figure 18–4. Future Test and Evaluation Processes of TEXCOM, The Test Boards and TRADOC Independent Evaluation Directorate

MANPOWER	CURRENT AUTHORIZATIONS	FUTURE AUTHORIZATIONS	DIFFERENCE
MILITARY:	1,456	1,456	0
CIVILIAN:	894	894	0
TOTAL	2,350	2,350	0*

NOTE: AUTHORIZATIONS AT TIED

ADVANTAGES

- PROVIDES UNITY OF COMMAND AND CONTROL FOR ALL TEST AND EVALUATION PROCESSES WITHIN TRADOC
- REDUCES LAYERING

Figure 18–5. Space Redistribution

18.2.5 CONCLUSION

Inefficiency and confusion exists with the eight test boards assigned to HQ TEXCOM but OPCON to school commandants. Having TIED remain outside the control of HQ TEXCOM does not place all test and experimentation processes under one command and creates perceived duplication of effort. Unity of command would facilitate testing and experimentation processes.

18.2.6 IMPLEMENTATION

TRADOC will analyze and develop an action plan by 1 April 1989 with full implementation of proposals NLT 1 October 1989. (Also, see Issue 25.2.)

18.3 OBSERVATION

Thirty-nine (39) senior ROTC programs have been evaluated as unsuccessful for two or more years.

18.3.1 SCOPE

Refine ROTC Cadet Command's ability to close and shift resources from unsuccessful institutions.



Figure 18–6. Today 39 ROTC SR Programs Have Been Evaluated As Unsuccessful for Two or More Years

18.3.2 PROPOSAL

Discontinue senior ROTC programs at institutions which are unsuccessful, (see Table 18–1).

TABLE 18-1. DISCONTINUE RATE PROGRAMS AT 39 INSTITUTIONS

SOUTHERN ARKANSAS U.	SAINT PETER'S COLLEGE	UNIV OF NORTH FLORIDA (EXT)
U OF AR - LITTLE ROCK	U OF NV - LAS VEGAS	COLUMBUS COLLEGE
HENDERSON STATE UNIV	SUNY COLLEGE/FREDONIA	MERCER UNIVERSITY
U OF CO - CO SPRINGS	UNIVERSITY OF TULSA (EXT)	UNIVERSITY OF DUBUQUE (EXT)
U/S. FL, ST. PETERSBG (EXT)	CARNEGIE-MELLON UNIV	KNOX COLLEGE
IDAHO STATE UNIV	SOUTH DAKOTA SCH M&T	WICHITA STATE UNIV
EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIV	CARSON-NEWMAN COLLEGE	CENTENARY COLLEGE (EXT)
NICHOLS STATE UNIV	WEST TEXAS STATE UNIV	SAINT LAWRENCE UNIV
BEMIDJI STATE UNIV	TRINITY UNIVERSITY	UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI
WESTMINSTER COLLEGE	PAN AMERICAN UNIV	DICKINSON COLLEGE
MO WESTERN STATE UNIV	MIDWESTERN STATE UNIV	TEXAS WOMEN'S COLLEGE (EXT)
WENTWORTH MIL ACADEMY	HARDIN- SIMMONS UNIV	UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT
LINCOLN UNIVERSITY	STETSON UNIVERSITY	UNIV/WI - PLATTEVILLE

18.3.3 CRITERION

The mission of ROTC Cadet Command is to recruit, select, motivate, train, retain and commission the future officer leadership of the U.S. Army. Additionally, the command is responsible for managing the Junior ROTC (JROTC) program and the National Defense Cadet Corps (NDCC). Support is provided to the CINC through the commissioning of quality second lieutenants for the total army. Efforts to close unsuccessful institutions in the past have been blocked by national and state politicians, as well as, institution officials and alumni.

18.3.4 ANALYSIS

ROTC Cadet Command's Effective Management Program (EMP) monitors quantifiable standards, evaluates battalion effectiveness and provides a basis for shifting resources from unsuccessful institutions during annual reviews of all host schools and extension centers. Institutions whose programs are not meeting established standards "are placed on evaluation" beginning the following fall term and a letter is provided to the school president from the Commander, Cadet Command informing him/her of this action. There are currently thirty-nine senior ROTC programs which meet the criteria for immediate closure. Of these, fourteen are in their second year of evaluation and twenty-five are into their third year. Further breakout indicates that of the 416 host institutions currently in the senior ROTC program, ten are in second year evaluation and twenty-three are in third year. This leaves a total of six programs under evaluation which are from extension centers to the institutions but not affiliated with them. The redistribution which could be realized from the closure of unsuccessful programs could be utilized to implement or enhance existing programs where social environments and demographics will support the investment. Closure of unsuccessful programs will have minimal effect on the Army's and Cadet Command's abilities to

recruit, train and commission officers for the total army. The institutions in question are not producing officers in quantities sufficient to justify further expenditure of resources. Nor are they providing sufficient commissionees to impact upon the future needs of the Army. Efforts to close unsuccessful programs in the past have met with stiff opposition from national and state politicians, institution officials and alumni associations. Economic considerations are prime concerns since ROTC programs contribute large amounts of money to host institutions. As a result of this pressure, Cadet Command has been unable to remove ROTC from unsuccessful institutions and considerable resources continue to be expended to keep these programs alive.



Figure 18–7. Future ROTC SR Programs

MANPOWER	CURRENT AUTHORIZATIONS	FUTURE AUTHORIZATIONS	DIFFERENCE
MILITARY:	2873	2725	-148
CIVILIAN:	823	784	-39
TOTAL TDA	3696	3509	-187

ADVANTAGES:

1. CLOSES OUT COSTLY PROGRAMS WHICH HAVE BECOME NON-PRODUCTIVE DUE TO CHANGING DEMOGRAPHICS, SOCIAL ENVIRONMENTS.
2. IMPROVES COST EFFICIENCY OF ROTC PROGRAM.
3. ALLOWS CDR, CADET COMMAND FLEXIBILITY TO MAINTAIN A COST-EFFECTIVE PROGRAM WITH MAXIMUM OUTPUT.

Figure 18–8. Space Redistribution

18.3.5 CONCLUSION

Retention of unsuccessful senior ROTC programs is costly and inefficient to the Army. Continual efforts expended by personnel in trying to improve enrollment and commissioning at these institutions would be better invested in schools with viable, growing programs which can provide maximum return to the Army's continuing investment. Additionally, Cadet Command must be given the latitude and authority to close unsuccessful institutions and redirect resources. A time-phased closure would lessen the impact on both the institution and the Army and insure the Commander, Cadet Command has the flexibility he needs to insure the most cost effective organization to support the Army.

18.3.6 IMPLEMENTATION

Office of Legislative Liaison should work closely with TRADOC and Cadet Command to minimize potential political pressure during attempts to close unsuccessful institutions. Cadet Command's Effective Management Program (EMP) should be revised to include a time-phased closure of unsuccessful institutions and Department of the Army leadership should delegate to the Commander, TRADOC the authority to close those institutions which have proven to be unsuccessful.

18.4 OBSERVATION

Split responsibility of military intelligence training at Ft. Devens and Ft. Huachuca and the Russian Institute, Garmisch, FRG.

18.4.1 SCOPE

Refine the delivery of military intelligence training within TRADOC and the military intelligence community (see Figure 18-9.)



Figure 18–9. Today a Split Responsibility for Formal Military Intelligence Training Exists Between the Intelligence Center and School, Ft. Huachuca, The Intelligence School, Ft. Devens and The U.S. Army Russian Institute, Garmisch, FRG

18.4.2 PROPOSAL

Geographically, consolidate the Intelligence School at Ft. Devens with the Intelligence Center and School, Ft. Huachuca. Subordinate the U.S. Army Russian Institute to the Intelligence Center and School.

18.4.3 CRITERION

The Military Intelligence Center and School, Ft. Huachuca is responsible for the conduct of intelligence, cryptologic and electronic warfare training. As the Military Intelligence branch proponent, they are also responsible for combat and doctrinal processes and operational testing of materiel and systems. Additionally, they are responsible for battlefield deception and tactical weather and environmental support. The Intelligence School at Ft. Devens conducts Signals Intelligence training development and evaluation for DOD personnel. Unity of command and control of the intelligence training base, as well as, combat and doctrine processes enhances education of personnel and development of materiel and systems which provide the war fighting CINC the best possible intelligence information. Political pressure from the state of Massachusetts has blocked consolidation of Ft. Devens with Ft. Huachuca in the past.

18.4.4 ANALYSIS

Currently, responsibility for formal military intelligence training exists at both Ft. Huachuca and Ft. Devens. Both locations also conduct their own combat and doctrine developments processes. This split responsibility is dysfunctional and inefficient and has led to the proliferation of personnel at both locations. Over the past ten years the authorizations for the two schools have increased. In 1975 the Center and School at Ft. Huachuca was authorized 656 military personnel and 357 civilian employees and the school at Ft. Devens was authorized 1268 military and 127 civilians. This is a total of 2408 authorizations for the entire school. Today, the Intelligence Center and School is authorized 1177 military and 339 civilian personnel while the school at Ft. Devens is authorized 1367 military and 283 civilians. This sets the combined authorized strength for both schools at 3166 people, an increase of 758 authorizations. Not only has combat and doctrine development remained divided between the two intelligence schools, but combat and doctrine development for echelons above corps has not been transferred completely to the Intelligence Center and School from Headquarters, INSCOM. Approved recommendations of the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study established USAINSCOM from assets of the Army Intelligence Agency (USAINTA) and USASA. The impact of consolidating these two major army commands (and several smaller intelligence organizations) and the simultaneous stripping of that command of its traditional combat and doctrine development functions have proven difficult. There appears to be no dispute on the part of USAINSCOM of TRADOC's prime authority in these fields. The converse seems to be the case. The Intelligence Center and School appears reluctant to completely assume these roles for intelligence at echelons above corps. Secondly, USAINSCOM inhabits a sensitive position in the U.S. intelligence community which makes it the sole resourcing agent for unique equipment designed for and resourced by national level intelligence agencies. USAINSCOM is the service cryptologic element to the National Security Agency, and as such, is the single conduit through which NSA passes its exclusive technology and doctrine to the army. Over the last five years this situation appears to have moved slowly and consistently in the direction of consolidated combat and doctrine development at the Intelligence Center and School. This task is not complete. The Department of the Army has consistently used USAINSCOM to develop Quick Reaction Capability (QRC) intelligence systems to meet unexpected intelligence requirements. Aside from these exceptions, the transfer of combat and doctrine development to TRADOC and the Intelligence Center and School appears directed for completion by 1995.

In analyzing the mission and functions of the Army Intelligence and Security Command, there appears to be yet another inefficiency in the consolidation of all for-

mal training of military personnel under the sole direction of a single army school. Currently, the U.S. Army Russian Institute (USARI), located at Garmisch, FRG, is under the command and control of USAINSCOM. This school conducts a two year advanced academic program in soviet political and military affairs which is taught primarily in the russian language and is designed to train specialists in support of the Department of the Army Soviet Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program. The location of USARI must continue to be as close as possible to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is closed to training within its borders. The transfer of this institute to the command and control of the Intelligence Center and School is consistent with Army policy placing all formal training under



Figure 18–10. Future Split Responsibility for Formal Military Intelligence Training Exists Between the Intelligence Center and School, Ft. Huachuca, The Intelligence School, Ft. Devens and The U.S. Army Russian Institute, Garmisch, FRG

TRADOC. Transfer of this institute will not be without some adjustment on the part of TRADOC. USARI currently employs people who have recently migrated from the Soviet Union. Some of these instructors do not wish to become U.S. citizens, others may be ineligible. In the past this has complicated USARI alignment outside USAINSCOM. USARI provides students with a true and current "in–country" experience. Without these people USARI would be unable to retain its high standard of academic training in Soviet studies. This may require TRADOC and the Intelligence Center and School to hire by exception these foreign nationals, using the same criteria

that INSCOM now applies. Subordinate to USARI is the U.S. Army Foreign Language Training Center (FLTC), Europe. There is no connection with this organization and USARI, save for convenience. FLTC provides short course foreign language refresher and enhancement training to linguists assigned to European missions and assists in the development of effective INSCOM language programs. The mission and existence of this training center is valid both now and in the future. Its subordination to USARI may be less clear cut. Uniform language training for the Department of Defense is the mission of the Defense Language Institute. An exception to this was granted to the NSA's National Cryptologic School System. Establishment of language training programs by MACOM for sustainment and enhancement of command personnel's formally acquired skills is allowed under current army policy. The continued subordination of FLTC to USARI appears to be inefficient in that it places an additional layer of headquarters between users and FLTC. A better alignment, if USARI is transferred to TRADOC, would be the subordination of FLTC to the 66th Military Intelligence Group. It is to the 66th MI Brigade that the assets of FLTC will pass in time of conflict. There is no apparent reason why the unit should remain subordinate to USARI, which will be disestablished in time of war. This would place FLTC under its primary user organization. Should the relationship of USARI and FLTC continue past 1995, both organizations should be merged on one campus in Garmisch. Facility engineering information concerning real property distribution in the Garmisch area indicates this is a viable option in the near and long term (see Figure 18–11.)

MANPOWER	CURRENT AUTHORIZATIONS	FUTURE AUTHORIZATIONS	DIFFERENCE
MILITARY:	1,121	948	-173
CIVILIAN:	280	226	-54
TOTAL	1,401	1,174	-227

ADVANTAGES:

- FACILITATES COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATION OF FORMAL ARMY INTELLIGENCE TRAINING. CONSOLIDATES RESPONSIBILITY FOR TOTAL ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE TRAINING AT A SINGLE LOCATION
- COMBAT AND DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT PROCESSES FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CONSOLIDATED AT A SINGLE LOCATION
- RETAINS TRI-SERVICE COOPERATION FOR INTELLIGENCE TRAINING

Figure 18–11. Space Redistribution

18.4.5 CONCLUSION

Maintaining multiple intelligence training centers is costly, inefficient and duplicative in many respects. Economies of resources and enhancements in command, control and communications can be realized with consolidation of the Ft. Devens and Ft. Huachuca schools. Tri-service cooperation can be retained despite a consolidation. Transfer of the U.S. Army Russian Institute from USAINSCOM to TRADOC is consistent with current army policy and would eliminate the apparent split responsibility of formal intelligence training between two major commands. Resubordination of the FLTC to the 66th MI Brigade would reduce headquarters layering between user and trainer.

18.4.6 IMPLEMENTATION

TRADOC AND INSCOM analyze the proposals for six months with full implementation NLT FY95. Issues which are related to the consolidation of intelligence schools and alignment of formal intelligence training include the political efforts of the state of Massachusetts to block consolidation and the subordination of the U.S. Army Foreign Language Training Center, Europe to the 66th MI Brigade. A possible solution to the move of the Intelligence School from Ft. Devens is the relocation of Headquarters, U.S. Army Information Systems Command (ISC). Subordination of the USAFLTC to the 66th MI Brigade is logical with its assets being transferred to the brigade in time of conflict.

TRADOC was created during a period of change and reorganization within the U.S. Army and it continues to evolve to this day. It's missions to prepare the Army for war and be the architect of the future are viable now and will continue to be so into the 21st century. To accomplish these missions in an era of dwindling resources, a continual self-examination will be necessary to identify potential areas of inefficiency. This chapter has identified areas which begin this process. Directed coordination linkages between the branch proponents and Soldier Support Center and then the Logistics Center and, finally to the Combined Arms Center will insure total force integration for the Army in the 21st century; an era of modernization and reduced resources. The capturing of all test and experimentation processes under TEXCOM will insure complete and thorough testing in the wake of materiel and combat development advances. Likewise, the closing of inefficient senior ROTC programs and the redistribution of these assets to more productive areas will insure the continued availability of quality leaders for the Army of the future. Finally, the unification of formal military intelligence training at a single location insures the proper use of available resources and, more importantly, the continuity in education and combat and doctrine development processes.

Key to the understanding of the concept of organizational building blocks with which to base Army organizations is the "center" as it has developed within TRADOC in the form of branch proponents (the Infantry Center, the Armor Center, etc) and the three integrating centers (the Combined Arms Center, etc). For further development of this concept the reader should turn to Chapter 29, Management of "Centers."

TABLE 18-2. SPACE REDISTRIBUTION ANNEX

ISSUE: 18.4
UIC: W1ESAA
UNIT: Intelligence School, Ft. Devens

Para	AMSCO	OFF	WO	ENL	CIV	TOT
1	814734	6		6	9	21
2	814734			1		1
3	814734	2		1	4	7
5	814772			2		2
13	814772			1	2	3
15	814734			3		3
17	814772	2		15	15	32
19	814734				5	5
31	814734	1		1	2	4
43	814734			5	5	10
47	814734			1		1
49	814771	1		1	2	4
51	814771			5		5
55	814734	1		1	1	3
63	814734	2	1	82	10	95
65	814734	1		30		31
TOTAL		16	1	155	55	227

ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 18
MANPOWER AUTHORIZATIONS BY UNIT IDENTIFICATION CODE

ANNEX A
Army Manpower Authorizations by UIC

TRADOC

UIC	Unit Designation	ASGMT	CO Auths	WO Auths	ENL Auths	CIV DHUS	CIV DHFN	CIV INFN
W0BWAA	CMD TRAINING	TC	32	1	344	8	0	0
W0G4AA	BDE 4TH CST	TC	65	6	776	65	0	0
W0GRAA	BDE 1ST BASIC TNG	TC	55	0	342	6	0	0
W0GYAA	BDE 2ND BASIC TNG	TC	76	0	478	8	0	0
W0M5AA	STA USA RECEPTION	TC	6	0	65	19	0	0
W0M8AA	STA USA RECEPTION	TC	7	0	54	42	0	0
W0MTAA	RGN 1ST ROTC SR PROG	TC	455	0	410	140	0	0
W0NDAA	RGN 2ND ROTC SR PROG	TC	405	0	290	110	0	0
W0U0AA	CTR USA QM & FT LEE	TC	24	2	137	1055	0	0
W0U2AA	CTR USA INF & FT BEN	TC	45	8	385	2911	0	0
W0U5AA	CTR USA SIG &FTGORDON	TC	365	27	2698	2056	0	0
W0U6AA	CTR USA TNG&FT JACKSN	TC	65	3	533	1251	0	0
W0U9AA	CTR USA AVN&FT RUCKER	TC	560	660	1592	2528	0	0
W0UUAA	GAR USA CARLISLE BKS	TC	10	0	45	261	0	0
W0UVAA	CTR TRANS & FT EUSTIS	TC	37	5	449	1009	0	0
W0UWAA	GAR USA FT MONROE	TC	12	0	82	384	0	0
W0UXAA	CTR USA ARMOR	TC	85	10	913	2598	0	0
W0VBAA	GAR USA FT CHAFFEE	TC	4	0	26	242	0	0
W0VGAA	CTR USA FA & FT SILL	TC	50	6	542	1789	0	0
W0VHAA	CTR AD ARTY & FTBLS	TC	42	7	396	2075	0	0
W0VLAA	CTR EN TNG&FT L WOOD	TC	266	20	1000	1557	0	0
W0VPAA	CTR USA CA & FT LVNWT	TC	34	1	176	768	0	3
W13ZAA	ELE USA-DLI-ENG LANG	TC	4	0	28	0	0	0
W17GAA	ELE USA TC FIELD	TC	23	0	2	16	0	0
W1D2AA	SCH USA AD ARTY	TC	255	53	1299	776	0	0
W1D4AA	CTR USA ORD SCH &	TC	190	45	1361	565	0	0
W1D5AA	SCH USA QM	TC	165	16	892	346	0	0
W1D7AA	SCH TRANS& AV LOG	TC	155	66	1100	481	0	0
W1DCAA	CTR USA TNG & FT DIX	TC	58	0	640	1532	0	0
W1DXAA	SCH USA ARMOR	TC	305	4	2434	552	0	0
W1E0AA	CTRUSA JFK SWC & SCH	TC	201	12	814	449	0	0
W1E4AA	ELE USA DEF INFO SCH	TC	19	0	70	50	0	0
W1E8AA	CTR USA INTEL SCH &	TC	264	30	622	336	0	0
W1EAAA	CTR ODMSL&MU SCH&	TC	133	31	919	674	0	0
W1ECAA	ELE USA DLI-FLC	TC	38	1	176	1183	0	0
W1ESAA	SCH USA INTEL	TC	71	19	1275	282	0	0
W1EUAA	CTR USA CHAP SCH&	TC	51	0	95	48	0	0
W1EXAA	CTR SLDR SPT&FT B HAR	TC	253	8	697	1019	0	0
W1JEAA	RGN 3RD ROTC SR PROG	TC	369	0	338	108	0	0
W1KYAA	RGN 3RD ROTC JR PROG	TC	2	0	14	0	0	0
W1L4AA	BDE 1ST AR TNG	TC	86	3	831	124	0	0
W1L7AA	BDE 4TH TNG	TC	70	0	426	49	0	0
W1MPAA	BDE 2ND TNG (OSUT)	TC	57	1	475	21	0	0
W1MQAA	BDE 3RD BASIC TNG	TC	74	0	489	14	0	0
W1MRAA	BDE 4TH TNG	TC	52	4	1155	181	0	0
W1MUAA	ELE USA SCH OF MUSIC	TC	5	2	91	17	0	0
W1MVAA	BDE 3RD BASIC TNG	TC	66	0	404	9	0	0
W1MXAA	BDE 5TH TNG	TC	73	1	758	27	0	0
W1NVAA	RGN 4TH ROTC SR PROG	TC	385	0	197	135	0	0
W1NWAA	RGN 4TH ROTC JR PROG	TC	0	0	8	0	0	0

W1RCAA GRP TNG	TC	16	0	229	16	0	0
W1V5AA RGN 1ST ROTC JR PROG	TC	0	0	19	0	0	0
W1ZAAA RGN 2ND ROTC JR PROG	TC	0	0	18	0	0	0
W21BAA BKS USA DISCIPLINARY	TC	26	0	564	119	0	0
W27RAA ACT TC COMB ARMS TEST	TC	422	20	964	894	0	0
W2L5AA SCH USA INF	TC	528	1	2727	452	0	0
W2MKAA CMD TNG	TC	16	0	223	20	0	0
W2N3AA CMD USA AD CTR RANGE	TC	5	0	118	64	0	0
W2NTAA SCH USA FIELD ARTY	TC	368	27	1052	561	0	0
W2NZAA GRP USA FA MSL SYS EV	TC	2	0	10	0	0	0
W2P2AA HQ USA CGS COLLEGE	TC	467	0	79	304	0	0
W30UAA DET USA STUDENT	TC	1	0	9	8	0	0
W34TAA CTR USA FA TNG	TC	127	3	1122	85	0	0
W39UAA CTR NATL SCIENCE	TC	1	0	1	44	0	0
W3CJAA SCHLST BN 507 INF	TC	15	0	220	9	0	0
W3E9AA CTR USA TNG SPT	TC	72	0	48	481	0	0
W3K2AA BD US ARMY TNG	TC	26	0	15	16	0	0
W3QTAA ACD USA SGM	TC	16	0	156	37	0	0
W3W4AA HQ 1ST ROTC REGION	TC	44	0	23	74	0	0
W3W5AA HQ 2D ROTC REGION	TC	33	0	7	66	0	0
W3W6AA HQ 3D ROTC REGION	TC	42	0	11	64	0	0
W3W7AA HQ 4TH ROTC REGION	TC	34	0	10	48	0	0
W3XTAA CTR USA LOGISTICS	TC	174	8	70	497	0	0
W3XUAA ACT COMBINED ARMS CD	TC	214	0	56	257	0	0
W3YTAA HQ USA TRADOC	TC	414	4	87	761	0	0
W3ZHAA SCHDOD POLYG INST	TC	0	5	1	10	0	0
W4AEAA CTRTRADOC ANALY CTR	TC	202	0	49	459	0	0
W4B3AA DET USA HAZ DEV	TC	1	0	9	8	0	0
W4G7AA BTY USAFAC MLRS TNG	TC	7	0	63	4	0	0
W4H2AA CTR USA TNG	TC	126	0	833	118	0	0
W4J9AA CTR USA NTC OPNS	TC	243	1	381	20	0	0
W4JCAA ACT USA SATFA	TC	6	0	2	54	0	0
W4JXAA ACT TC MGT ENGR	TC	0	0	0	250	0	0
W4K5AA CTR USA CM&MP & MCLN	TC	34	6	301	696	0	0
W4K6AA GRP BASIC TNG COMM	TC	10	0	112	8	0	0
W4K7AA BDE TNG	TC	79	0	554	26	0	0
W4K8AA SCH USA MP	TC	147	12	441	161	0	0
W4K9AA SCH USA CML	TC	153	0	390	223	0	0
W4KVAA ACT TC CONTRACT	TC	1	0	0	88	0	0
W4LKAA CMD NYA & FT HAMLIN	TC	15	0	116	178	0	0
W4M8AA CTR USA TRALINET	TC	0	0	0	18	0	0
W4N8AA CO INTEL SCH TNG SPT	TC	8	5	188	3	0	0
W4P8AA ACT USA S & ANALY	TC	99	0	16	187	0	0
W4RPAA BDE1ST AD TNG BDE	TC	68	2	576	70	0	0
W4RQAA ACT COMB ARMS TNG	TC	154	0	55	52	0	0
W4SYAA HQ ROTC CADET CMD	TC	39	0	6	83	0	0
W4UBAA SCHUSA SCH AMERICAS	TC	54	0	154	71	0	0
W4UUAA ACTPEN CIV PERS ACTY	TC	0	0	0	79	0	0
W4W6AA CTRJOINT READ TNG CTR	TC	68	1	212	18	0	0
W4YJAA INSUSA SPACE INST	TC	11	1	2	22	0	0
WDG399 ADG HHC AV BDE	TC	46	41	230	72	0	0
*** Total ***		10758	1189	41872	37731	0	3

CHAPTER 19
FUNCTIONAL COMMAND - INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND (INSCOM)

- TECHNOLOGY WILL EXPAND AT AN INCREASINGLY RAPID RATE, REQUIRING SYSTEMS TO BE FIELDED AND RETIRED FASTER THAN THE ARMY ACQUISITION SYSTEM CAN RESPOND
- REAL TIME WEATHER/TERRAIN DATA TO ANY USER
- SPACE BASED IEW SENSORS/PROCESSORS WITH ACCESS BY ANY REQUIRED ECHELONS
- REAL TIME/NEAR REAL TIME IEW INFORMATION TO ANY COMBAT ECHELON
- THIRD WORLD THREATS WILL DRIVE INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS
- POLITICAL UNREST IN MEXICO THREATENS BORDER SECURITY

Figure 19–1. View of the Future

United States Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) was formed in late 1977 and early 1978. The organization came as the result of recommendations from the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study (often referred to as the Ursano study after its chairperson, MG James J. Ursano). The activation of INSCOM combined the United States Army Security Agency (USASA), the United States Army Intelligence Agency (USAINTA) and Special Security Offices (SSO). All Echelon Above Corps (EAC) intelligence units were assigned to the newly formed INSCOM. This included the 66th Military Intelligence Group in Europe, the 470th Military Intelligence Group in the Panama Canal Zone, and the 500th Military Intelligence Group in Japan. (All of these were reorganized into Military Intelligence Brigades in 1987) (see Figure 19–1 and 19–2).



Figure 19–2. INSCOM Today Chart



Figure 19–3. INSCOM Staff, FOAs and SSAS Today

The overriding benefit to the United States Army was the establishment of a leaner, more efficient intelligence structure in support of theater and national intelligence requirements. Of equal importance was the derived benefit of providing a single command within the Army structure which would serve as the focal command for resources provided directly from national level intelligence agencies. These resources, to include manpower authorization, funds and unique equipment, are funded under the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP). These funds are generally fenced from Department of the Army direct reductions or increases. To satisfy the concerns of Army Component Commanders in theater, all theater support groups (now brigades) were placed under the operational control of those commanders. The Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study subordinated all intelligence units at Corps and below to its supported organization. These units did not have national level missions which required a centralized command structure. The intelligence structure has evolved with little change for the last ten years. During that time several Army Component Commanders have requested that all EAC intelligence units within their theater be placed under their headquarters command and control. A multitude of studies have been chartered to review the possibility of subordinating these units to theater commanders. The most recent study was the Office of the Chief of Staff, Management Directorate report on "CONUS Based Organizations Operating OCONUS" (the Stovepipe study) published 15 August 1987. It took a deep and comprehensive look at "Stovepipe" structures within the Army and validated those structures under the requirements of the DoD Reorganization Act of 1986. Based on a study of INSCOM missions, functions, and command and control of its OCONUS subordinate elements the "Stovepipe Study" validated the current structure of INSCOM as being in compliance with existing law. It further recommended that all detachments of the United States Army Special Security Group (USASSG) which support the Army components within a geographic area be assigned to or commanded by the unified combatant commander of the geographic area. The USASSG was found not to perform a mission which is a part of a Secretary of the Army function, listed in section 3013(B), Title 10, U.S. Code. The Echelon Above Corps is the only level within the Army, among the other services, and among the unified and specified commands at which the Special Compartmented Information (SCI) security support element is not assigned to and commanded by the supported command. Further, within the command structure of a Unified Command, the Army component commander is the only Major Commander without an organic SCI element. There is no basis in the DoD reorganization act of 1986, other statutes or regulations, which would serve as a basis for exempting USASSG detachments which support Army Component Command. These detach-

ments can be converted to TO&E with no loss of effectiveness or degradation of support to the supported command. Based on this report, the Commander, INSCOM is in the final stages of reorganizing the Special Security Group to comply with this recommendation. There are current studies underway to combine the three Army Component Commands in the Pacific Basin into a single Army Component Command. This proposal is discussed in depth in Chapter eight of this report. INSCOM will be required to structure its theater intelligence accordingly.

19.1 OBSERVATION

Three theater Army Military Intelligence Brigades have either split responsibility or redundancy within three "areas of responsibility" (see Figure 19–4).



Figure 19–4. Three Theater Army Military Intelligence Brigades Have Either Split Responsibility or Redundancy Within These Areas of Responsibility

19.1.1 SCOPE

By assigning a Military Intelligence Brigade to support two or more Army Component Commanders and/or warfighting CINCs, the Army Intelligence and Security Command has created a situation that may deny vital intelligence to one or more Army component commanders and/or warfighting CINCs. INSCOM must refine delivery of intelligence support to warfighting CINCs by placing all regionally oriented intelligence assets in theater as MTOE under the operational control of the Theater Component Commander. Any intelligence structure designed to support the warfighting CINCs must be the most effective and efficient possible. Intelligence must continue to flow unobstructed to consumers at all levels of the Army structure. Current intelligence relationships between National Intelligence Agencies, the Department of the Army and

Army Intelligence units must remain matters of law, Presidential Directives and Secretarial preferences. Splitting the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) supported positions from current EAC units in support of warfighting CINCs would prove negative to the accomplishment of the intelligence mission of the Army. Intelligence assets should not be placed in reserve. Intelligence assets perform the same missions in peace as they do in war. Placing intelligence assets in a training mode only denies warfighting CINCs vital information. Dual hatting of any Intelligence staff officer as the Commander of Intelligence units must not be done at the cost of the authorities given other commander. Dual hatting of any intelligence staff officer as the commander of intelligence units will require a higher level of oversight at next higher echelon. This is to ensure that the commander will continue to balance policy issues and operational requirements within the bounds of national moral and political objectives.

19.1.2 PROPOSAL

Identify a Theater Military Intelligence Brigade for each Army Component Command.

19.1.3 CRITERION

The mission of the United States Army Intelligence and Security Command is to conduct and coordinate Electronic Warfare (EW); collect review, and analyze Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), Technical Intelligence (TI) and Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT); conduct and coordinate Counter-intelligence (CI) activities; and conduct and coordinate Operations Security (OPSEC) and related operations in support of the Army. The Commander, USAINSCOM, is the Commander of the Army Service Cryptologic Element (SCE). The Commander, USAINSCOM is also the Department of the Army Service Human Intelligence Manager and INSCOM is the Human Intelligence Service Agency. The Commander is responsible to the Department of the Army Senior Officer of the Intelligence Community (DA SOIC) for the supervision of designated Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) security and service responsibilities. The mission of USAINSCOM is global and is conducted in the geographic areas of the Unified Commands. INSCOM supports all warfighting CINCs uniformly. As a Major Army Command (MACOM) the Commander, USAINSCOM reports to the Chief of Staff of the Army. All INSCOM operations continue in war and peace. INSCOM's Theater Support Brigades, in Unified Command Areas, are under the operational control of the Army Component Command. These units fall under the Command of the Army Component Command upon mobilization or on order of higher command authority. Policy and Guidance for all Intelligence and Counterintelligence Operations conducted by IN-

SCOM is established by the Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence (DCSINT) of the Department of the Army. Intelligence Operations are subject to strict public law, Presidential directives and findings, Executive orders, Congressional oversight, and Judicial review, as well as, Department of Defense and Department of the Army Regulations and Directives. The structure of intelligence units is subject to these, and as such remain flexible to meet the needs of the National and Service Command Authorities.

19.1.4 ANALYSIS

The United States Army Intelligence and Security Command has grown since it's activation in January 1977 from an authorization level of 8,024 persons to a current authorization of 11,000. The ROBUST Task Force began its analysis of the INSCOM units organized under Tables of Distribution and Authorization (TDA) at the point of departure of the Ursano study and the "Stovepipe" study. Army manpower funded by National Foreign Intelligence Program was not evaluated as these assets fell outside the ROBUST Task Force charter. This accounted for roughly 84% of INSCOM's current authorized manpower. A design that would have placed INSCOM, as a scaled down Field Operating Agency under the Deputy Chief of Staff Intelligence (DCSINT) on the Army Staff was studied in depth. Under this design all INSCOM units would be subordinated to the Area Command in which it resided, with the exception of units which fall outside the Army's ability to resubordinate (such as NFIP funded Army Field Stations). This design proved unacceptable. The placing of INSCOM Operational Commands directly under the DA DCSINT placed the Army's primary proponent for Intelligence Policy in the position of being its Chief Operator. The secret nature of intelligence operations and the absence of balance between policy maker and operator proved too unattractive to pursue. All designs which would subordinate the INCSOM Theater Support Brigades under Theater Component Commands proved greatly inefficient compared to the existing command relationships of these units. Under current command relationships INSCOM Theater Support Brigades (66th MI Brigade, 407th MI Brigade, 500th MI Brigade, 501st MI Brigade and the 513th MI Brigade) are under the command less operational control of Headquarters INSCOM and the operational control of the Area Commander. The Army Component Commander derives direct benefit from NFIP funded assets within the Theater Support Brigades under his operational control, without having to resource these units. Units formed solely from Army funded manpower authorizations would provide extremely limited support to the Area Component Commands and the Area CINC. Placing NFIP funded resources under the complete command and control of Army Area Component Commands would required the Army to split its centralized management of EAC Intelligence resources. This would fragment the Army's ability to compete for limited national resources. Further the

national level intelligence agencies, in and outside the Department of Defense, are not under any obligation to continue to fund manpower they feel do not effectively support their needs. Reports from ROBUST Task Force On Site Evaluation Teams reported that all Army Component Commands were satisfied with the intelligence support provided them by the current structure of INSCOM. Army Component Commanders did state that for uniformity all soldiers should be under their command and control. No value added to the intelligence production of local INSCOM units could be found by doing so. There are three Army Component Commands which currently do not have INSCOM MI Brigades under their operational control. These are the Army Forces Command, the newly organized Army Space Command and Special Operations Command. Analysis indicates the Army Space Command currently requires no intelligence assets. These assets may be required when and if Army Forces are deployed into space or when surface based threat forces are found in space requiring deployment of U.S. Space Command forces to meet those threats. Under current policy Special Operations Command forces must deploy to any geographic area in the world to meet nationally designated objectives. Intelligence required by this command is derived from all source intelligence collected by all elements of the national intelligence community. Currently deployed intelligence units can provide all the intelligence needed by the Special Operations Command to meet threat forces. A Military Intelligence Brigade in direct support of the SOCOM would be redundant, unnecessary and duplicate intelligence support currently deployed. The separation of the Third United States Army from the command and control of the Army Forces Command and the placement of the 513th MI Brigade under the Operational Control of the Third Army leaves the Army Forces Command without a Military Intelligence Brigade to support it in its CONUS Defense role. This is an unacceptable position. FORSCOM will require Echelon Above Corps Intelligence assets to provide border surveillance and intelligence assets to support its intelligence collection, processing, analysis and reporting requirements (see Figures 19–5 and 19–6).



Figure 19-5. INSCOM Future



Figure 19-6. INSCOM Future

Should the current Eighth United States Army, United States Army Japan, and United States Army WESTCOM be consolidated into a single Army Component Command, there appears to be no reason for the retention of the 500th Military Intelligence Brigade in support of the Army WESTCOM and USARJ. The 501st Military Intelligence Brigade in Korea could be designated as the Theater Support Brigade. Currently the 500th MI Brigade is staffed at 90% CAPSTONED Reserve Forces. The remaining TO&E and TDA augmentation structure could be transferred under the control of the 501st MI Brigade. The command and control structure of the 501st MI Bde could then be deactivated, and its manpower assets redistributed or eliminated. Currently the 902nd MI Group provides Counterintelligence support within CONUS. The Reserve Component Forces presently attached to the 500th MI BDE could be attached to the 902nd Group to create, with no additional manpower requirements, the 902nd MI Brigade. This would not require a plus up in authorizations to the Army Reserve to compensate for those active component authorizations transferred to the 501st MI Brigade, as the Counterintelligence Units within the 902nd MI Group will provide this compensation (see Figure 19–7).

MANPOWER	CURRENT AUTHORIZATIONS	FUTURE AUTHORIZATIONS	DIFFERENCE
MILITARY:	54	0	-54
CIVILIAN:	53	0	-53
TOTAL	107	0	-107

NOTE: SPACES FUNDED BY THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM WILL BE REDISTRIBUTED WITHIN INSCOM. ARMY FUNDED SPACES WILL BE REDISTRIBUTED FOR THE BEST BENEFIT OF THE ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE.

Figure 19–7. Space Redistribution

The placement of the proposed 902nd MI BDE under the operational control of the Army Forces Command would provide the same level of intelligence support enjoyed in the OCONUS Theaters, with no loss of status to its national level missions. If the Army forms a Northwest Asian Command, by placing Army Forces located in Korea and Japan into a single command, this restructuring cannot take place. Under that area coverage INSCOM would require both Brigades in the Pacific. This will

require FORSCOM to form a Military Intelligence Brigade in the Army Reserve Structure to provide support to FORSCOM in its land defense of CONUS role.

19.1.4. CONCLUSION

The current command and control of United States Army Intelligence and Security Command units world wide is the most effective and efficient. INSCOM units supporting Army Component Commands should remain under current Command relationships. Should the three separate Army Component Commands in the Pacific into a single command, the 500th Military Intelligence Brigade should be deactivated, after redistribution of its Pacific based subordinates to the 501st Military Intelligence Brigade. NFIP funded manpower savings from the 500th Military Intelligence Brigade Command and Control elements should be redistributed within the current INSCOM structure. Those manpower positions funded within Army should be redistributed or eliminated to derive the best benefit to the Army. The 902nd Military Intelligence Group should be upgraded to an Multi-Discipline Military Intelligence Brigade to support the Strategic and CONUS Defense Missions of the Army Forces Command, by attaching the reserve units currently in support of the 500th Military Intelligence Brigade.

19.1.5 PROPOSAL

Leave Echelon Above Corps Theater Support Brigades under the command less operational control of Headquarters, United States Army Intelligence and Security Command and under the operational command of the Army Component Commands. Continue to fill Echelon Above Corps Theater Support Brigades with the most effective and efficient mix of Army funded and National Foreign Intelligence Brigade. Attach Military Intelligence units within the Army Reserve Structure, which were attached to the 500th Military Intelligence BDE, to the 902nd Military Intelligence Group. Upgrade the 902nd MI Group to a Multi-Discipline MI Brigade to support United States Forces Command in its CONUS Defense role. The commander, United States Army Intelligence and Security command should implement the findings of the Office of the Chief of Staff, Management Directorate report on CONUS based organizations operating OCONUS, by subordinating all Special Security Detachments supporting units under the command and control of the Army Component Commands to those units.

19.1.6 IMPLEMENTATION

The deactivation of the 500th Military Intelligence Brigade should occur no later than the consolidation of the Eighth United States Army, the United States Army Japan and the United States Army Western Command into the United States Army Pacific. Transfer of Reserve Component Command assets CAPSTONED to the 500th Military Intelligence Brigade to the 902nd Military Intelligence Brigade should be completed at

the same time. Structures of MI Theater Support Brigades should remain at current authorization levels should this consolidation of Army commands in the Pacific not take place.

19.2 OBSERVATION

Technical Intelligence exploitation and collection is split between the Foreign Science and Technology Center and the Foreign Materiel Intelligence Group (see Figure 19–8).



Figure 19–8. Technical Intelligence Exploitation and Collection Is Split Between the Foreign Science and Technology Center and the Foreign Materiel Intelligence Group

19.2.1 SCOPE

The United States Army Intelligence and Security Command is tasked in AR 10–87 to collect, process, review, analyze and report Technical Intelligence (TI). This effort is fragmented under two separate organizations, the Foreign Science and Technology Center (a Field Operating Agency of the DA DCSINT) and the Foreign Materiel Intelligence Group (a major subordinate command of the Intelligence and Security Command). Technical Intelligence is an immature intelligence discipline, with limited resources authorized in the active component to perform this mission. Reserve Component Technical Intelligence assets are also limited in comparison to requirements. The continuation of the fragmented Technical Intelligence effort denies Army Component Commanders and Area CINCs this capability at a time when it is vital to the success of their wartime and peacetime missions.

19.2.2 PROPOSAL

Consolidate the Foreign Science and Technology Center and the Foreign Materiel Intelligence Group.

19.2.3 CRITERION

The mission of the Foreign Materiel Intelligence Group (FMIG) is to provide Technical Intelligence Planning and Production; provide service support in depth; to provide training support to all Active Component and Reserve Component Technical Intelligence units and provide Opposing Force (OPFOR) support to the National Training Center (NTC). FMIG provides general support to all Army Component Commands by providing Technical Intelligence Collection, Processing and Analysis assets in support of assigned exploitation tasking. Additionally, Reserve Component Technical Intelligence Units are capstoned to the FMIG to provide increased TI coverage upon mobilization. FMIG is a Major Subordinate Command of Headquarters, INSCOM. The Foreign Science and Technology Center (FSTC) provides Army wide service in support of national requirements for intelligence derived from the exploitation of foreign documentation and materiel. It produces scientific and technical intelligence in final form to be disseminated to users throughout the Government. Materiel collected from sources, such as FMIG, are exploited and reported on by FSTC. Warfighters are supported indirectly through the intelligence reporting provided by FSTC. The FSTC mission remains unchanged in mobilization (see Figure 19–9).



Figure 19–9. Future Foreign Science and Technology Center and the Foreign Materiel Intelligence Group

19.2.4 ANALYSIS

Technical Intelligence is a discipline of long standing. Organizations dealing in technical and scientific intelligence exploitation and production have existed, in one form or another, since the founding of the United States. Yet for its long history, Technical Intelligence remains immature, in comparison to other intelligence disciplines. Its comparative lack of resource priority given is confusing the often high priority for information placed on it by national intelligence authorities.

Materiel developers must be given accurate threat information in order to successfully counter those threats. For this reason Technical Intelligence has been orphaned to many different and diverse command and control relationships. Both the Army Intelligence and the Army Materiel Command have shared in the production and reporting of Technical Intelligence over the last 20 years. The Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study (The Ursano Study) gave direction to the Army's intelligence production needs by stating that the need to consolidate Technical Intelligence into a single location under the ACSI (now the DCSINT) of the Army. The study made provisions for the later transfer of the combined Technical Intelligence organization under the command and control of what is now INSCOM.

Army Technical Intelligence became divided in the course of carrying out the recommendation of the Ursano Study. Today the Army's Technical Intelligence efforts rest primarily in the Foreign Science and Technology Center (a Field Operating Activity of the DCSINT of the Army), and the Foreign Materiel Intelligence Group (a subordinate command of INSCOM). This division of effort between the two separate organizations has continued the stunted growth of Technical Intelligence. Yet, there has never been a greater need for the maturation of the Technical Intelligence discipline than today. This maturation must continue into the future in order to keep pace with the rapid turnovers in both science and technology. The battlefield of the future will be technology intensive. In order to ensure success on future battlefields Army Component Commands must be provided with information on enemy technical capabilities rapidly. Given the limited manpower resourcing to support Technical Intelligence and the increasing requirement for this type intelligence support to Army Component Commands, the consolidation of the Foreign Science and Technology Center and the Foreign Materiel Intelligence Group seems the only course to take in the near term. This will increase the effectiveness of the Army Technical Intelligence effort now and establish a consolidated structure upon which the Army can build as resources can be diverted. This will provide Army Component Commands with a central consolidated agency from which technical and scientific information can be extracted. This organi-

zation should be under the command and control of INSCOM under missions established in AR 10–87. No space redistribution was identified.

19.2.5 CONCLUSION

The current division of the Army's Technical Intelligence mission between the Foreign Science and Technology Center and the Foreign Materiel Intelligence Group must end. These organizations should be consolidated into a single command structure. Manpower savings from this consolidation should be used within the consolidated organization to expand its capabilities to meet the increasing need for Technical Intelligence by Army Component Commanders and their associated area CINCs.

19.2.6 IMPLEMENTATION

The Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence will develop a plan, by 1 July 1989, to organizationally structure the Foreign Science and Technology Center and the Foreign Materiel Intelligence Group into a single Technical Intelligence Organization under the command and control of INSCOM. Activation of this organization will take place by First Quarter FY95. With limited resources available to support the Army Technical Intelligence mission the consolidation of FSTC and FMIG will provide limited coverage needed in OCONUS theaters.

The Command and Control structure of the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command is valid to meet the needs of the Warfighting CINCs in peace and war. There is no value added to the intelligence support provided to Army Component Commands by placing Theater Military Intelligence Brigades under the Command and Control of those Army Component Commands. If the recommendations in Chapter 8 of this report are accepted and the three Army Component Commands in support of USCINCPAC are consolidated into a single command, INSCOM should activate one of its Theater Support Brigades. The active component units under that Brigade will be assigned to the remaining Brigade. The reserve component units capstoned to this Brigade will be capstoned to the 902nd Military Intelligence Group (to be readjustment as a Brigade) to provide intelligence support to FORSCOM in its Land Defense of CONUS role. Should there remain two or more Army Component Commands in the Pacific Theater, this action will not take place. Technical Intelligence support to Warfighting CINCs is inadequate currently. The mission of TI support is vested in two separate units, The Foreign Science and Technology Center (FOA of DCSINT) and the Foreign Materiel Intelligence Group (a subordinate of INSCOM). The consolidation of these organizations will improve the delivery of TI to consumers worldwide. It will further allow for manpower restructuring to maximize this support to Area Component Commands (see Table 19–1).

TABLE 19-1. MANPOWER AUTHORIZATIONS BY UNIT IDENTIFICATION CODE

	UIC	AMSCO	MILITARY	CIVILIAN	TOTAL
AS	WBU999	381011	-5	-6	-11
		381318	-6	-17	-23
		381321	-15	-15	-30
		385127	-5	-10	-15
		385128	-8	-5	-13
		393401	-1	-0	-1
		395805	-14	-0	-14
			-54	-53	-107

ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 19
MANPOWER AUTHORIZATIONS BY UNIT IDENTIFICATION CODE

ANNEX A
Army Manpower Authorizations by UIC

INSCOM

UIC	Unit Designation	ASGMT	CO Auths	WO Auths	ENL Auths	CIV DHUS	CIV DHFN	CIV INFN
W001AA	BDE 704 MI	AS	142	37	1040	26	0	0
W002AA	ELE USA NSA	AS	48	0	1	0	0	0
W005AA	DET INSCOM MI (C1)	AS	4	4	13	1	0	0
W00YAA	HQ INSCOM	AS	146	16	83	309	0	0
W01AAA	ACT MI BN CI/CE	AS	41	30	113	17	0	0
W01BAA	DET INSCOM MI (C1)	AS	3	1	5	5	0	0
W01KAA	CO 749TH MI	AS	2	1	57	0	0	0
W02RAA	STAUSA FLD BER	AS	35	18	763	10	0	22
W0DRAA	STA USA FLD SINOP	AS	24	10	258	0	0	0
W0KLAA	GRPUSA PROG ANALYSIS	AS	0	0	2	17	0	0
W1J1AA	GRP USA SP SCTY	AS	129	7	310	25	0	0
W1U3AA	CTR USA FLD SPT	AS	153	122	185	382	0	0
W2JBAA	IST ADV RUSS/E EUR ST	AS	6	0	5	10	0	19
W319AA	ACT USA OPS GROUP	AS	67	11	34	36	0	0
W31UAA	STA USA FLD SANAN	AS	8	3	259	3	0	0
W32AAA	BN CI SS SPT	AS	20	48	105	75	0	0
W32BAA	FAC USA CENTRAL SCTY	AS	4	0	9	93	0	0
W35GAA	ACTUSAINSCOM FAA	AS	2	0	7	39	0	0
W36SAA	ACTUSAINSCOM MAINT	AS	1	2	13	0	0	0
W372AA	DET USA FGN AREA OFF	AS	0	1	10	1	0	0
W39CAA	ACT USA FGN CI	AS	11	7	26	17	0	0
W3AGAA	BDE 701 MII	AS	68	38	1573	19	0	118
W3BRAA	STA USA FIELD MISAWA	AS	4	1	119	0	0	1
W3CCAA	ACT AUTO SYSTEM	AS	9	3	59	52	0	0
W3F1AA	BN 751 MI	AS	16	9	229	2	56	3
W3L8AA	GP USA FOREIGN MA	AS	16	0	88	3	0	0
W3NSAA	CTR USA THEATER IN	AS	6	3	31	3	0	0
W3QNAA	ACT USA CRYPTO SPT	AS	3	4	11	0	0	0
W3S2AA	BN USAINSCOM MI	AS	44	19	69	54	0	0
W4DKAA	ACT AUDIOVISUAL	AS	2	0	17	30	0	0
W4E7AA	STA USA FLD KUNIA	AS	40	13	1034	26	0	0
W4FWAA	DET USA ASIAN STUDIES	AS	1	0	7	13	0	83
W4GXAA	ACTUSA INTEL SPT	AS	53	25	213	4	0	0
W4J0AA	STAUSAFS PANAMA	AS	2	2	115	0	0	0
W4J1AA	ACTUSAUNSCOM EI&CM	AS	2	3	63	33	0	0
W4JZAA	CTR INSCOMLAN	AS	3	1	8	3	0	6
W4KKAA	BN US MI (LI)	AS	24	14	170	3	0	0
W4KPAA	U USA INTEL EXEC	AS	9	6	22	48	0	0
W4RMAA	DET USA INTEL SPT	AS	16	0	29	9	0	0
W4U6AA	CO COLLECT EVA1	AS	19	7	20	12	0	0
W4UTAA	ACT CONTRACT SUPPORT	AS	0	0	0	30	0	0
W4V0AA	ACTUSA STU$ANALYSIS	AS	20	3	1	20	0	0
W4VYAA	ACTUSA INSCM FORG MOD	AS	1	0	3	24	0	0
WBU699	AUG MI GRP CI	AS	0	0	3	33	0	0
WBU799	AUG MI BDE EAC	AS	16	7	140	46	0	3
WBU899	AUG MI GRP CI	AS	19	12	124	7	0	0
WBU999	AUG MI BDE EAC(-)	AS	15	4	35	34	0	19
WBVA99	AUG MI BDE EAC	AS	10	3	52	9	0	0
WBVL99	AUG HHS MI BN CI	AS	24	27	210	44	0	54
WBVN99	AUG CO INTERROGATION	AS	0	0	13	10	0	16

WEWV99	ADG MI DET CNTR INTEL	AS	0	0	6	3	0	2
WC0F99	ADG DET MI CI	AS	0	0	0	2	0	9
WC1699	ADG MI BN COLL	AS	16	11	67	11	46	0
WERD99	ADG MI BN	AS	1	0	5	2	0	1
WGS299	ADG CO IMAGERY EXPL	AS	0	0	31	0	0	0
WGS599	ADG MI DET	AS	0	0	1	1	0	0
WH6A99	ADG MI HHC BDE EAC	AS	6	0	40	3	13	0
WH8Q99	ADG HHC BN INTG/EXPL	AS	0	4	7	0	0	0
*** Total ***			1311	537	7913	1659	115	356

CHAPTER 20
FUNCTIONAL COMMAND - CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION COMMAND (CIC)

Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) (also referred to as CIDC) was activated in September 1971. Criminal investigation is part of administering the affairs of the Department of the Army and is a Secretary of the Army function listed in Section 3013 (b) (9), Title 10, U.S. Code. The vertical and centralized control structure of the Criminal Investigation Command is based on repeated direction from the Department of Defense and Department of the Army, and on findings of DOD Review Project Security Shield. This project established the correctness of the separation of criminal investigation activities from the direct control of field commanders.

In March 1971, the Secretary of Defense requested the Secretary of the Army to "develop a Criminal Investigation Division (CID) agency which has vertical control of all CID worldwide".

In May 1980, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Task Force on "Evaluation of Audit; Inspection and Investigative Components of DOD", recommended the Air Force and the Navy adopt a USACIDC vertical structure to avoid undue command influence on operations. This DOD position was restated in May 1983 in the Government Accounting Office (GAO) report "DOD Can Combat Fraud Better By Strengthening its Investigative Agencies". The President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency adopted "Professional Standards for Investigations". This report, which was published in April 1985, stated "to obtain the necessary independence, investigative organizations should exist outside the line/staff of units subject to investigation, and should report direct to the agency head or his deputy".

DOD Instruction (DODI) 5505.3 mandates that criminal investigative organizations have complete independence from support commanders to initiate or terminate investigations and use any legal techniques necessary, without impediment. The Office of the Army Chief of Staff, Management Director report on "CONUS Based Organizations Operating OCONUS" concluded in August 1987: "the present command and control of OCONUS CIDC organizations is in accordance with the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986". Thus, during the time the CIC has been formed as an independent investigative agency, the merit of this command and control structure has proven to be the most effective approach. The Executive and Legislative branches of the Federal Government have endorsed the present Army Criminal Investigation Command structure as being the standard upon which all military investigative services should be run.

20.1 OBSERVATION

The United States Army Criminal Investigation Command is properly organized to accomplish its peacetime and wartime mission (see Figure 20-1).



Figure 20–1. CIC Today

20.1.1 SCOPE

The United States Army will continue to receive the finest possible criminal investigative support from CIC organized as an independent functional command. Any realignment of its command and control structure would be contrary to repeated guidance from higher authority.

20.1.2 PROPOSAL

That United States Army Criminal Investigation Command be maintained as presently configured through 1996.

20.1.3 CRITERION

The mission of CIC is to conduct and control all Army investigations of serious crimes (as defined in AR 195–2), less serious crimes (upon request or as necessary for effective Army law enforcement) and fraud (as defined in DODI 5505.2); maintain knowledge of, and overall responsibility for, Army investigations of offenses involving "controlled substances" (as defined in Section 812, Title 21, U.S. Code); Provide Criminal Investigation Division (CID) support to all U.S. Army elements; conduct sensitive or special interest investigations, as directed by the Secretary of the Army (SA) or the Chief of Staff, United States Army (CSA); and plan for and provide personal security (protective service) for DOD and DA, as tasked by the Director of the Army Staff (DAS).

The CIC does not directly support USCINCs, but supports Army Component Commands in war and peace with the full services stated in its mission. Under the provisions of DODI 5505.3 there exists no command and control relationship between

Army Component Commands and the CIC in order to prevent undue command interference in the investigative activities of the CIC. There is strong Executive and Legislative Branch support to continue this independent vertical command of criminal investigation activities in the Army.

20.1.4 ANALYSIS

A review of past studies and reports addressing the structure and command relationships of the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, and that command's submissions to the ROBUST Task Force through Mission Essential Task Lists (METL) and MACOM Resource Update (MRU), indicates that the current structure of CIC is capable of providing the most efficient and effective support to Army Component Commanders in the future. On Site Evaluation Team (OSET) reports on the headquarters and major subordinate commands of the CIC indicate that staffing levels of the CIC are adequate to meet future requirements.

CIC is organized into five CIDC Regions, and four Field Operating Activities (FOA). These FOAs are The U.S. Army Crime Records Center, the U.S. Army Protective Services Activity, the USACIDC Field Investigation Activity and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory.

The mission of providing personal security to select DOD and DA senior persons has strained the CIC capability, as it has become the protective service of choice, over the services of other branches of the military, for many DOD seniors. As this service could be provided by other military services, the Department of Defense should increase authorizations to the Army at the expense of other less used services. This issue is beyond the purview of the ROBUST Task Force. The same is true of Navy and Air Force use of the CIC Criminal Investigation Laboratories worldwide.

The CIC is currently in the process of converting their five CIDC Regions from TDA structures MTOE structures. This will greatly enhance CIC ability to compete for limited resources in the future. Department of the Army should provide proper levels of manpower authorizations to support any increases in mission or tasking given CIC, as current authorizations are only adequate for current mission and tasking levels.

20.1.5 CONCLUSION

Based on a study of Section 3013, U.S. Code; DODI 5505.3; the report on the OSD Task Force on "Evaluation of Audit; Inspection and Investigative Components of DOD"; The President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency report on "Professional Standards for Investigations"; and the CSA Management Directorate report on "CONUS Based Organizations Operating OCONUS", it is concluded the that CIC is properly organized to accomplish its peacetime and wartime mission in support of Army Component Commands. Any change in the structure or manpower of CIC

should be as the result of increased missions rather than the result of redistribution of assets at this time.

20.1.6 IMPLEMENTATION

No implementation schedule is required for this recommendation as a stand alone issue. Should the proposal discussed in Chapter 29 for the establishment of vibrant "centers", the Criminal Investigation Command will transition to a Criminal Investigation Center. This center would absorb the Military Police Center at Fort McClellan with some slight modification in command and control in the years after 1997. Should Department of the Army establish an Assistant Secretary of the Army for Investigations and Audits, Criminal Investigation Command could be included as a subordinate agency of that ASA.

ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 20
MANPOWER AUTHORIZATIONS BY UNIT IDENTIFICATION CODE

ANNEX A
Army Manpower Authorizations by UIC

CIC

UIC	Unit Designation	ASGMT	CO Auths	WO Auths	ENL Auths	CIV DHUS	CIV DHFN	CIV INFN
W2MBAA	LAB USA CRIM INVES	CB	5	20	9	62	0	14
W3FDAA	RGN 7TH USA CIDC	CB	11	44	64	12	40	3
W3KPAA	HQ USACIDC	CB	38	22	38	72	0	0
W3LCAA	RGN 1ST USACIDC	CB	18	88	123	81	0	0
W3LDAA	RGN 3RD USACIDC	CB	11	41	61	42	2	0
W3LFAA	RGN 6TH USACIDC	CB	20	93	155	61	0	0
W3NLAA	RGN 2ND USACIDC	CB	10	27	25	14	0	7
W3NTAA	LAB USACIDC PAC	CB	2	8	5	5	0	4
W3NUAA	LAB USACIDC-EUR	CB	2	9	5	16	0	10
W3Y1AA	CTR CRIME REC	CB	0	4	6	51	0	0
W4KNAA	ACT USAPROTECTIVE SVC	CB	0	23	6	0	0	0
W4VKAA	ACT USACID FLD INVSTG	CB	1	6	2	2	0	0
WBZC99	AUG DET	CB	1	4	7	0	18	0
WBZD99	AUG DET	CB	1	14	23	7	0	22
WBZE94	AUG DET	CB	0	2	2	1	0	1
WBZE95	AUG DET	CB	0	1	0	0	0	0
WBZE96	AUG DET	CB	0	2	2	1	2	0
WBZE97	AUG DET	CB	0	2	3	1	0	1
WBZE98	AUG DET	CB	1	1	2	4	0	0
WBZE99	AUG DET	CB	2	42	59	7	0	37
WBZK99	AUG DET	CB	0	19	21	1	0	29
WCVX99	AUG DET	CB	4	11	33	25	0	0
*** Total ***			127	483	651	465	62	128

CHAPTER 21
FUNCTIONAL COMMAND UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS (USACE)

Although USACE has been a Major Command (MACOM) since 1979, the Chief of Engineers (COE) has been involved in civil works support to the nation since 1824. The Corps of Engineers has been the Army's Military Construction Agency since 1941. The first engineer divisions were organized geographically along major river basins in 1888. During World War II, the newly assigned military construction mission was built on the fixed civil works divisions structure. Today, military construction division boundaries are established along state boundaries in CONUS. A wiring chart of all USACE elements is at Figure 21-1.

Today, USACE has a mixture of 13 divisions (eight with combined military construction/civil works missions, three civil works only, two military construction only) and 38 subordinate districts (14 combined military construction/civil works, 22 civil works only, two military construction only) (see Figure 21- 2). A map of the current military construction division/district boundaries is at Figure 21-3; a comparable map of the current civil works division/district boundaries is at Figure 21-4.

In addition to his civil works and military construction role, the COE/CG USACE is the Department of Defense Construction Agent for the U.S. Air Force and other DOD and federal agencies in the United States and specified foreign areas as identified in DOD directive, 4270.5 Subject: Military Construction Responsibilities, March 2, 1982.

The Engineer Studies Center (ESC), a field operating activity of USACE, has completed three studies on the mobilization efforts of the command. The first, "USACE Work Force Requirements for Mobilization", October 1981, was designed to provide an assessment of military construction requirements during full and total (conventional) mobilization, and the capability of USACE to meet those requirements. The second, "USACE Conceptual Posture for Mobilization", December 1983, presented a conceptual mobilization posture for the command, based on existing National, Army and Corps of Engineers principles. The third report, "A USACE Mobilization Readiness Improvement Program", April 1984, describes a program USACE should follow to improve mobilization preparedness.

In summary, the studies indicate that approximately 42.8 percent of the civil works personnel would be available for mobilization tasks; USACE should organize along Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) boundaries to expedite mobilization coordination; the CONUS division/district structure is the base for mobilization expansion; and existing organizational structure and flag locations perhaps prevent



Figure 21–1. All USACE Elements Today

DIVISION/DISTRICT CURRENT USACE
ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION (MC)
CIVIL WORKS (CW) AND MOBILIZATION LEAD DIVISIONS

DIVISION	MC/CW	NO. OF DIST			REMARKS
		MC/CW	CW	MC	
Europe	MC	NONE			Operational*
Pacific Ocean	MC/CW	0	0	2	Operational MC/CW in Hawaii
Huntsville	MC	NONE			Eng Planning and Design**
Lower Mississippi Valley	CW	0	4	0	
Missouri River	MC/CW	2	0	0	
North Atlantic	MC/CW	3	1	0	M-Lead Division First Army
New England	CW	NONE			Operational*
North Central	CW	0	5	0	M-Lead Division Fourth Army
North Pacific	MC/CW	2	2	0	
Ohio River	MC/CW	1	3	0	
South Atlantic	MC/CW	2	3	0	M-Lead Division Second Army
South Pacific	MC/CW	2	1	0	M-Lead Division Sixth Army
Southwestern Fifth Army	MC/CW	2	3	0	M-Lead Division
Total Div/Dist	MC/CW	8	14		
—	CW	3		22	
	MC	2		2	
Total Div/Dist		13		38	

*OPERATIONAL DIVISIONS HAVE DISTRICT TYPE FUNCTIONS PERFORMED BY DIVISION STAFF.

**HUNTSVILLE DIVISION HAS NO GEOGRAPHIC BOUNDARIES AND NO MILITARY CONSTRUCTION. PERFORMS MILITARY ENGINEERING PLANNING AND DESIGN SERVICES.

Figure 21-2. Current Structure for MC/CW Lead Divisions



Figure 21-3. Military Construction Division/District Map



Figure 21–4. Civil Works Division/District Map

ideal alignment to meet mobilization support requirements. These studies bring focus to the ROBUST Task Force observations and the subsequent proposal.

21.1 OBSERVATION

Six of the ten military engineer divisions in USACE support more than one CONUSA or CINC. Four of the five CONUSA must coordinate with two or more divisions.

21.1.1 SCOPE

USACE has two major missions: civil works (which is outside the ROBUST Task Force charter) and military construction contract management and other engineering services for the Army, Air Force and other Department of Defense Agencies (see Figure 21-5).



Figure 21-5. USACE Today

As identified in ESC "USACE Conceptual Posture for Mobilization", DEC 1983 P.9:

> "USACE is organized to accomplish a peacetime mission. The principle that elements should be organized in peace as they would be in war is generally followed. However, the dual mission of USACE (military construction and civil works or "Federal Engineer") makes that type of organization difficult at best. Further, USACE's responsibility to Congress, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works) and the Army Chief of Staff puts it in a position, at

> times, of having more than one master in peacetime. Still, USACE must structure itself so it is highly responsive to mobilization requirements."

The issue, then, is to realign military construction boundaries for division and district support missions to facilitate the transition from peace to mobilization.

21.1.2 PROPOSAL

Assign military construction responsibility for each army area to one division and realign a single military construction engineer headquarters to each CINC.

21.1.3 CRITERION

USACE manages and executes engineering construction and real estate programs for the Army, Air Force and other federal agencies and foreign governments as assigned. USACE supports the mission of Unified/Specified CINC through tasking by various theater operations and contingency plans under the regional wartime construction management concept to provide engineering and construction support for the Army and Air Force in Europe, the Middle East, Latin America, the Far East, Alaska, the Alleutian Islands and CONUS. USACE provides quality, responsive engineering and construction services (including installation and facility service to the Army, Air Force and other DOD Components), research and development and real estate services. USACE supports national needs in construction industry leadership, environment, infrastructure, water supply, flood control and navigation, nation building, and space exploration. USACE, through its civil works program, has an unusual relationship with Congress. Consequently, any impact on civil works is a matter of congressional interest. USACE has consistently staffed its civil works/military functional activities based on the individual duties of employees. Because of this policy, the tailoring of military functions should not adversely impact residual civil works missions or employees.

21.1.4 ANALYSIS

Historically USACE division/district relationships in CONUS have been with the installation supported. Consequently, it did not matter if it was the Ohio River Division or the South Atlantic Division that supported Fort Campbell or if Fort Campbell was in the Second Army area or in the Fourth Army area. However, the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols act, with the requirement to enhance support to the warfighting CINCs, the designation of Forces Command as a Specified Command and the emergence of the mobilization responsibilities of the CONUSA, as Army Regional Defense Commands, in the land defense of CONUS has changed the importance of the CONUSA/Engineer division boundaries. In the future, the ability to mobilize quickly will become increasingly important, while resources become constrained. At the same

time, new capabilities in communication and data processing will allow greater centralization of management and greater decentralization of execution. Accordingly, it is critical to eliminate redundancy and split responsibilities to the maximum extent.

The South Atlantic Division (Atlanta) provides military construction and other engineering support during peacetime and mobilization for Second Army (except Kentucky and Alaska), Third Army and U.S. Army, South. It executes these responsibilities through three subordinate activities: Savannah District, Mobile District and the Middle East/Africa Project Office (Winchester, VA.).

The Ohio River Division (Cincinnati) provides military construction and other engineering services to Second Army (Kentucky) and to most of Fourth Army. It has one district (Louisville) to execute this mission.

The Missouri River Division (Omaha) provides military construction and other engineering services to parts of Fourth Army, Fifth Army and Sixth Army. It has two districts (Omaha and Kansas City) to execute this mission. It also has the Rocky Mountain Area Office (Colorado Springs) which has the workload and staffing of a small district, minus the overhead structure of a district.

The North Pacific Division (Portland) provides military construction and other engineering services to part of Sixth Army, Second Army (Alaska), U.S. Army forces in Alaska and to USCINCPAC for the Alleutian Islands, except for Adak. It has two districts (Seattle and Alaska) to execute this mission.

The Huntsville Division is an anomaly. Unlike all other engineer divisions, Huntsville provides no military construction services nor does it have geographical boundaries. Originally established to support the SAFEGUARD program, it survives by providing specialized complex engineering design services on a worldwide basis and a plethora of other functions such as centralized program management, large scale procurement and management of the USACE training program. A graphic chart showing the evolution of the Huntsville division workload is at Figure 21-6.

The South Pacific Division (San Francisco) with two districts (Sacramento and Los Angeles) supports part of the Sixth Army area. Prior to the military construction boundary realignment of 1981 it provided military construction and other engineering services to the entire Sixth Army area.

The Southwestern Division (Dallas) supports part of the Fifth Army area with two districts (Fort Worth and Tulsa).

The Europe Division, with no districts, performs its military construction role with eight area offices.



Figure 21–6. History of Huntsville Division Missions

The Pacific Ocean Division (Fort Shafter) provides military construction and other engineering services support for WESTCOM through the Division Headquarters and the Honolulu Area Office, for Eighth Army through the Far East District (Seoul) and for USARJ through the Japan District (Camp Zama).

From the recipient's point of view, Second Army receives support from the South Atlantic Division, the Ohio River Division and the North Pacific Division; Fourth Army receives support from the Ohio River Division and the Missouri River Division; Fifth Army receives support from the Missouri River Division and the Southwestern Divisions; and Sixth Army receives support from the North Pacific Division, the Missouri River Division and the South Pacific Division. In a peacetime environment, this redundancy of support coordination may be acceptable, but during mobilization a more simple and direct relationship is necessary.

USACE has developed a comprehensive mobilization plan. Under a USACE concept, the military construction divisions have the general responsibility for ensuring that USACE mobilization missions are properly addressed in planning efforts and that support to the installations is fully effective during mobilization. The districts charged with military construction execution will provide direct support to all installations within assigned military boundaries. The districts with "Civil Works only" missions will be in general support of assigned installations. Specific taskings must come through the military construction district. In some instances, general support will be provided by Civil Works personnel assigned to military construction districts.

USACE has established a peacetime coordination concept of "Lead Division", with the CONUSA for mobilization. One division coordinates with each Regional Defense Command (Current CONUSA).

Regional Defense Command	CONUSA	Lead Division
Eastern Defense Command	First	North Atlantic
Southern Defense Command	Second	South Atlantic
Northern Defense Command	Fourth	North Central
Central Defense Command	Fifth	Southwestern
Western Defense Command	Sixth	South Pacific

The Lead Division concept addresses, but does not resolve the basic issue of organizing in peacetime as in wartime. The concept's two major weaknesses are the lack of an internal military construction capability within North Central Division and the Division/CONUSA boundary disconnect. It transfers multiple coordination problems from the CONUSA to the USACE divisions with the attendant delays and confu-

sion. The ROBUST Task Force proposal tracks with the lead division concept while eliminating the coordination problem (see Figure 21-7).



Figure 21-7. Future

USACE, primarily because of political sensitivity, is saddled with the burden of excessive overstructuring. When a division or district is established in CONUS, it rapidly achieves the permanency of an installation. Past efforts, most recently in 1981, to close unnecessary districts was met with universal failure because of congressional resistance. However, the effort to "tailor" districts (consolidating functions in fewer districts) was successful. Eliminating military functions from redundant engineer elements is a tailoring exercise rather than a closure action, since the civil works mission remains unchanged.

USACE has long made use of field offices subordinate to a district or division when the need for on-site supervision at remote locations was deemed necessary. The use of these field offices, i.e. Area, Resident, Project, should, because of the advances in automation and communications, be expanded. Use of field offices will dramatically reduce the need for diverting scarce resources to administrative overhead.

THE FOLLOWING REALIGNMENT ACTIONS ARE PROPOSED:

The North Atlantic Division with First CONUSA: Tailor Norfolk District to civil works only. Assign Norfolk military construction mission to Baltimore District. Continue Baltimore District support to MDW. This action will save 66 civilian spaces.

Align the South Atlantic Division with Second Army (acquire Kentucky from the Ohio River Division). Tailor the Middle East/Africa Project Office (MEAPO) away from military construction; assign contingency planning support to Third Army and

residual Foreign Military Sales cases and other military engineering services currently provided by MEAPO to Savannah District. Continue Mobile district support to USARSO. This action will save 9 military and 260 civilian spaces.

Divest Ohio River Division and Louisville District of military construction responsibilities. Transfer field spaces in Kentucky to the South Atlantic Division. Transfer the remainder to North Central Division and the Chicago District along with the responsibility for military construction support for Fourth Army. Align the military construction boundary with Fourth Army. This realignment will yield no space savings but is critical to the USACE mobilization posture and will make North Central Division a lead division, with a significant internal military construction capability.

Divest the Missouri River Division (Omaha and Kansas City Districts) of the military construction mission. Assign field spaces to North Central Division, Southwestern Division and South Pacific Division as appropriate. Maintain the military funded spaces and mission of centralized civilian payroll in Omaha. This action will save three military and 290 civilian spaces.

Align the Southwestern Division with Fifth Army. If deemed appropriate, establish area offices at Omaha and Kansas City under Tulsa District for military construction in Nebraska, Kansas and Missouri.

Divest North Pacific Division and Seattle District of the military construction mission. Transfer the Alaska District with all resources to Pacific Ocean Division in accordance with The Army Plan for the Pacific. Transfer residual division, Seattle District resources and the military construction mission, less identified savings, to the South Pacific Division. This action will save three military and 121 civilian spaces.

Divest Huntsville Division of military engineering. Assign responsibility and resources in support of Space Command to the South Pacific Division (Rocky Mountain Area Office, Colorado Springs). Retain the USACE training program. Assign no new missions to Huntsville Division; redesignate it as an activity with a finite mission. This action will save five military and 146 civilian spaces (see Figure 21-8).

MANPOWER	CURRENT AUTHORIZATIONS	FUTURE AUTHORIZATIONS	DIFFERENCE
MILITARY:	536	516	-20
CIVILIAN:	12924	12041	-883
TOTAL	13460	12557	-903*

*SEE TABLE 21-1

ADVANTAGES

- POSTURE USACE FOR IMMEDIATE MOBILIZATION
- IMPROVE RESPONSIVENESS TO REGIONAL COMMANDERS AND CINCs
- ELIMINATE REDUNDANCY WITHIN EACH ARMY AREA
- IMPROVE RESPONSIVENESS TO FEMA IN NATIONAL EMERGENCIES

Figure 21-8. Space Redistribution

The manpower savings identified above assume a stable military construction workload. The savings were derived through elimination of administrative overhead in tailored divisions and districts and through elimination of redundant supervisory positions in the district technical staffs (see Tables 21-1 and 21-2).

21.1.5 CONCLUSION

USACE is currently organized for peacetime. Great strides have been made to prepare USACE for mobilization; but to more readily evolve to a wartime footing, the USACE engineer divisions' military construction responsibilities must be realigned with CONUSA boundaries (one division for each Regional Defense Command).

21.1.6 IMPLEMENTATION

This proposal should be assigned to HQs USACE for action to be completed no later than end fiscal year 1995; six months to propose a detailed plan for implementation.

The timing of the transfer of the Alaska District from North Pacific Division to the Pacific Ocean Division is tied to the establishment of USARPAC (Chapter 8). The plan should encompass an alternative to transferring the Alaska District to South Pacific Division in the event that "USARPAC" is delayed.

TABLE 21-1. SPACE SAVINGS BY AMSCO/UIC

UIC	DIVISION	610000		63000		67000		671100		671400		722894H		860000		95121290		TOTAL	
		MIL	CIV	MIL	CIV	MIL	CIV	MIL	CIV	MIL	CIV	MIL	CIV	MIL	CIV	MIL	CIV	MIL	CIV
W071AA	NORTH PAC	1	0	0	1	2	84					0	35			0	1	3	121
W25DAA	NORTH ATL	0	22	0	18	0	22					0	2	0	2			0	66
W25BAA	MISSOURI RIV	1	20	0	21	1	167					1	73	0	3	0	6	3	290
W2V6AA	HUNTSVILLE			0	16	5	96					0	34					5	146
W074AA	SOUTH ATL							9	257	0	3							9	260
	TOTAL	2	42	0	56	8	369	9	257	0	3	1	144	0	5	0	7	20	883

TABLE 21-2. USACE BASELINE

	MILITARY				CIVILIAN			
DIVS:	O	WO	ENL	TOTAL	US	FNDH	FNIH	TOTAL
HND	13		1	14	415			415
LMVD			1	1	20			20
MRD	11			11	1,131			1,131
NAD	12		15	27	1,202			1,202
NCD				0	11			11
NED				0	0			0
NPD	11		1	12	682			682
ORD	8		1	9	452			452
SAD	36		5	41	1,548	40		1,588
SPD	8		1	9	989			989
SWD	9		1	10	1,254			1,254
EUD	44	1	3	48	439	6	266	711
POD	33	5	34	72	896	322	92	1,310
SUBTOTAL	185	6	63	254	9,039	368	358	9,765
LABS:								
CERL	3			3	203			203
CRREL	2		3	5	231			231
ETL	4	1	7	12	305			305
WES	3	-	-	3	704			704
SUBTOTAL	12	1	10	23	1,443			1,443
OTHER FOA:								
CEMCO	3			3	16			16
EACA	5		4	9	682			682
EASA				0	56			56
ESC	7			7	49			49
EHSC	11	7	120	138	233			233
HECSA				0	70			70
USATHAMA	7			7	83			83
SUBTOTAL	33	7	124	164	1,189			1,189
TRG	5		5	10	259			259
HQUSACE	12		4	16	268			268
SUBTOTAL	247	14	206	467	12,198	368	358	12,924
MTOE	2	1	67	70				
GRAND TOTAL	249	15	273	537	12,198	368	358	12,924

The ROBUST proposal will reduce the number of USACE Divisions involved in military construction from 10 to seven and the number of Districts from 16 to 12. It aligns the division boundaries to coincide with the CONUSA and FEMA boundaries except for Iowa. The proposal strengthens the USACE "Lead Division" concept by providing a lead division, with an internal military construction capability, for the Fourth CONUSA. Further, it postures USACE for immediate mobilization and maintains the Civil Works work force as a mobilization resource.

ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 21
MANPOWER AUTHORIZATIONS BY UNIT IDENTIFICATION CODE

ANNEX A
Army Manpower Authorizations by UIC

USACE

UIC	Unit Designation	ASGMT	CO Auths	WO Auths	ENL Auths	CIV DHUS	CIV DHFN	CIV INFN
W032AA	LAB COLD REG RSCH	CE	2	0	3	231	0	0
W03DAA	LAB USA ENGR TOPO	CE	4	1	7	312	0	0
W03FAA	AGY FAC ENGR SPT	CE	7	8	123	181	0	0
W070AA	DIV EN N CENTRAL	CE	0	0	0	13	0	0
W071AA	DIV EN N PACIFIC	CE	8	0	1	860	0	0
W072AA	DIV EN OHIO RIVER	CE	8	0	1	510	0	0
W074AA	DIV EN S ATLANTIC	CE	11	1	5	1476	0	0
W075AA	DIV EN S PACIFIC	CE	7	0	1	1068	0	0
W076AA	DIV EN SOUTHWSTR	CE	9	0	1	1372	0	0
W07VAA	DIV EN L MISS VA	CE	0	0	1	20	0	0
W07YAA	DIV EN N ENGLAND	CE	0	0	0	33	0	0
W0JVAA	GRP USA ENGR COMD SPT	CE	14	0	4	266	0	0
W253AA	CIR USA ENGR DATA PRO	CE	0	0	0	91	0	0
W2R2AA	STA WATERWAY EXP	CE	3	0	0	704	0	0
W2SBAA	DIV EN MO RIVER	CE	9	0	0	1352	0	0
W2SDAA	DIV EN N ATLANTIC	CE	17	0	15	1512	0	0
W2SNAA	DIV EN PAC OCEAN	CE	33	5	34	1147	397	66
W2U8AA	CIR USA ENG STU	CE	5	0	0	50	0	0
W2V5AA	LAB CONST ENGR RSCH	CE	3	0	0	203	0	0
W2V6AA	DIV EN HUNTSVILLE	CE	11	0	0	504	0	0
W31RAA	DIV USA ENG-EUROPE	CE	43	1	3	915	6	261
W4EGAA	GRP USA ENGR TECH REV	CE	5	0	4	259	0	0
W4FSAA	ACT USA ENGR CAP	CE	5	0	4	706	0	0
W4KTAA	OFC CDE MISSILE CONST	CE	3	0	0	10	0	0
W4LDAA	CIRUSA HECSA	CE	0	0	0	65	0	0
*** Total ***			207	16	207	13860	403	327

CHAPTER 22
FUNCTIONAL COMMAND - HEALTH SERVICES COMMAND (HSC)

The US Army Health Services Command (HSC) was formally organized in 1973. The formal reorganization placed the Surgeon General (TSG) in an advisory role to the CSA and provided guidance to HSC in those areas for which TSG had responsibility. This relationship acknowledges TSG's responsibility and accountability as the overall manager of the Army Medical Department (AMEDD). Until the formation of HSC, TSG commanded the major medical installations, the service school, and medical supply depots. Formation of HSC consolidated the CONUS health care system. It was designed to provide more responsive management of medical resources, to simplify overall command and control, and to standardize the CONUS health care system. In peacetime, Tripler Army Medical Center (TAMC), MEDDAC Panama, MEDDAC Alaska and the US Army Health Clinic in Puerto Rico are assigned to and commanded by HSC. These facilities support the Army Component Commander of the area, but do not require command and control headquarters in the area, which would duplicate the HSC management structure and create the burden of an extremely demanding peacetime medical support mission on the local command.

A recent study of Army Medical relationships is the US Army Medical Department Command and Control Study completed in June 1987. The study encompassed OTSG, CONUS based AMEDD TDA medical assets, organizational structures, staff relationships, operating procedures and functional responsibilities. Seven weaknesses were identified in the AMEDD command and control structure. They were:

(1) TSG's authority not commensurate with responsibility,
(2) Unclear lines of authority,
(3) Duplicate functions,
(4) Broad span of control,
(5) Inadequate strategic planning,
(6) Inadequate programming of resources, and
(7) Misalignment of Academy of Health Sciences (AHS) and Army Environmental Hygiene Agency (AEHA) under HSC.

Recommended structural changes would retain all fiscal resources under the command and control of OTSG. Congressional, Chief of Staff policy, and other considerations prevented formal realignment at that time.

TSG has recently conducted a study leading to a modernized medical force designated Medical Force 2000 (MF2K). This study is directed toward the MTOE medical elements in support of OCONUS warfighting CINCs. Basic tenets of the study

recommend a reduction of type medical command and control headquarters as well as types and size of health care facilities. The proposals design and allocate hospitals based upon patient workload, focus on returning soldiers to duty, and better support Air Land Battle concepts. All studies since 1973 have supported a Medical MACOM in CONUS which provides consolidated command and control of all health care facilities in CONUS and technical guidance from TSG to selected OCONUS locations (see Figures 22–1 and 22–2).



Figure 22–1. HSC Staff and Field Operating Activities



Figure 22-2. HSC Today

22.1 OBSERVATION

No medical support organization exists to directly support FORSCOM/USARFOR in its mission of land defense.

22.1.1 SCOPE

The formation of HSC resulted in the consolidation of the CONUS health care system. It provides health services and/or health service (Medical, Dental, and Veterinary) support to the United States Army in CONUS, Panama, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, The Trust Territory Pacific Islands (TTPI), and, when directed by DOD, to successor political jurisdictions of the TTPI. Facilities commanded include: 7 Medical Centers (MEDCENs), 29 Medical Department Activities (MEDDACs), 4 Area Dental Laboratories, 37 Dental Activities (DENTACs), and three garrisons. HSC also commands the Academy of Health Sciences and the US Army Environmental Hygiene Agency (see Figure 22-3).



Figure 22-3. HSC Today

All CONUS facilities subordinate to HSC are organized as TDAs. TSG has programming responsibility while HSC is the executing headquarters responsible for CONUS health care delivery. The proposal will provide for technical guidance and resource allocation priorities for OMA and P8 mission funds for health systems support at department (OTSG). HSC retains responsibility for health care delivery while TSG is responsible for standards of care. TSG is assigned full responsibility for policy, doctrine, training, combat developments, and RDTE.

22.1.2 PROPOSAL

Upon mobilization, convert Health Services Command (HSC) into a MTOE Medical Command (MEDCOM) in CONUS subordinate to FORSCOM. Redesignate HSC as a Health Services Center (see Chapter 29).

22.1.3 CRITERION

HSC provides command, control, communication, quality assurance oversight, and AMEDD policy execution for all HSC activities IAW Public Law, DOD Policy, and AR 10-87. The command's subordinate units provide quality health care, training, and services to all eligible beneficiaries in support of CINCs worldwide. Support to the CINC is maintained through conduct of the assigned peacetime missions including implementation of approved mobilization plans. The Commander HSC reports to HQDA. The CG, HSC is authorized to communicate directly with HQDA and its subordinate elements on health services and other matters of mutual interest. In matters for which TSG has Army staff responsibility, TSG issues directives, policy, and guidance to CG, HSC. HSC units provide health services support on an area basis to

all eligible beneficiaries from assigned installations of the MACOMs in CONUS, Alaska, Panama, and Hawaii. These units, activities, and agencies are dependent upon the other technical and specialized MACOM for specialized and base operations support.

The CG, HSC maintains the command readiness posture by conducting mobilization and operations planning, readiness training, and exercises, and by publishing a command mobilization plan IAW HQDA guidance; is prepared to transition and execute the wartime mission of the command; establishes with FORSCOM the annual training mission and CAPSTONE mobilization mission to be assigned to the USAR medical training center; and supervises and evaluates the performance of other reserve component AMEDD units when training with HSC activities.

Much congressional interest has been expressed about such highly visible programs as Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), Exceptional Family Member Program, CHAMPUS Reform Initiative, Alcohol and Drug Abuse and Prevention Program, and the Safety Program. All of these require extensive coordination and programming effort in conjunction with congressional committees, ASD (HA), and other military service Surgeons General. Congressional members from Texas have expressed concern about reducing the size of HSC or the possibility of moving the headquarters from FT Sam Houston in San Antonio, Texas.

22.1.4 ANALYSIS

HSC was formed to consolidate the CONUS health care system and create equitable resource distribution among types of hospitals. Today the Army Environmental Hygiene Agency (AEHA) and the Academy of Health Sciences (AHS) (which contains the Army medical personnel proponency mission), and mobilization planning responsibility for the AMEDD are assigned to HSC. The wide span of control in CONUS far exceeds that which is doctrinally provided in any type theater. In a theater of this size, a hospital center (HOSP CEN) subordinate to the MEDCOM will normally be assigned command and control of two to eight General Hospitals or their equivalent. At least five of this type organization would be necessary to provide the regional command and control of CONUS hospitals and eliminate the burden of span of control. The TDA structure of HSC and its subordinate hospitals (MEDDACs and MEDCENs) creates the impression of a totally peacetime force. In fact HSC and the health care delivery facilities under its command are constantly planning, training for and actually performing a wartime mission for the Army Component Commander. The command mobilization missions of continued area medical support, expanding capabilities to serve the increased mobilization base in CONUS and receiving OCONUS casualties, must be met while losing approximately 70% of the professional staff in Army facilities as

Professional Officer Filler System (PROFIS) designees to medical units in overseas theaters are scheduled for deployment upon mobilization. TSG is held responsible for health care delivery Army wide, however, he has no authority over any medical facilities in technical matters or in establishing priorities for health care (see Figures 22–4). For an explanation of Technical Control see Chapter 24.



Figure 22–4. Future Medical Support Organization

22.1.5 CONCLUSION

Convert HSC into a MTOE MEDCOM subordinate to FORSCOM upon mobilization. TSG should be assigned technical control for health care delivery Army wide. This concept will allow TSG access to the AHS, AEHA and WRAMC, which are the essential elements to his role as combat developer for health services. Further study is necessary to determine the need and actual structure for regional command and control organizations to reduce the broad span of control of the CONUS MEDCOM.

22.1.6 IMPLEMENTATION

HSC provide an implementation plan no later than 1 June 1989 for implementation of conversion to a HQDA center during 1991 (see Chapter 29).

22.2 OBSERVATION

A mix of TDA/MTOE organizations perform the same mission in peace and war in support of PACOM. The theater MEDCOM is subordinate to EUSA in Korea.

22.2.1 SCOPE

The current MTOE Medical Command (18th MEDCOM) in Korea is designed as a command and control headquarters for the 121st Evacuation Hospital and provides personnel and equipment in the performance of peacetime functions/ missions (including the operation of health clinics in isolated areas) that are not included in the base TOE and support, as appropriate to USFK personnel. The command is directly subordinate to the commander USFK/EUSA. The commander advises the USFK/ EUSA commander on medical, dental, veterinary, and preventive medicine, and liaison with Korean government and civilian medical agencies.

Tripler Army Medical Center (TAMC), Hawaii is subordinate to Health Services Command (HSC) in CONUS. TAMC is the Regional Medical Center for the Pacific theater providing specialty referral services to all services in the region and operating several specialty graduate medical education (GME) programs as a teaching center. Current mobilization plans assign TAMC to USARPAC upon mobilization. The MEDDAC in Alaska and the Health Clinic in USARJ are both responsible for providing area medical support to the geographic area to which assigned. MEDDAC Alaska is assigned to the Joint Task Force in Alaska upon mobilization (see Figure 22-5).



Figure 22-5. Today—A Mix of TDA/MTOE Organizations Perform the Same Mission in Peace and War in Support of Army Component Commanders

22.2.2 PROPOSAL

Reorient 18th Theater Army MEDCOM to USARPAC (WESTCOM/EUSA); formalize "Technical Control" from The Surgeon General to all OCONUS Medical Commands which support Army Component Commanders.

22.2.3 CRITERION

The 18th Medical Command (MEDCOM) provides command and control, planning and supervision of medical, dental, and veterinary activities engaged in health services support to HQ USFK/EUSA. Support to the CINC is maintained through conduct of the assigned peacetime missions including implementation of approved mobilization plans. The Commander 18th MEDCOM serves as EUSA Command Surgeon and reports to the CG USFK/EUSA. The 18th MEDCOM units provide health services support on an area basis to all eligible beneficiaries from assigned installations within Korea and maintain preparedness to transition and execute the wartime mission of the command. (see Figure 22-6).



Figure 22-6. Future TDA/MTOE Organization

22.2.4 ANALYSIS

A Medical Command directly subordinate to USARPAC can assume command and control of all the peacetime medical facilities in Hawaii, USARJ, Alaska and Korea. This combination of all medical resources in theater under the 18th MEDCOM will enhance support to the warfighting CINC and facilitate mobilization planning and

implementation. The 18th MEDCOM headquarters in Korea, would be subordinated to USARPAC and moved to Hawaii. There is only one division in Korea and one hospital. There is a need for command and control of all resources within the Pacific theater under the Theater Army Component Commander. This will include units assigned in Alaska, Korea, and USARJ. The 18th MEDCOM is currently authorized at an authorized level of organization (ALO) 7. This does not provide the appropriate staffing to assume the increased responsibilities of two TDA Hospitals, a TDA Health Clinic, and the expanded medical logistical support of a Theater Army.

Assuming the mission and support requirements will be proportionately the same as the 7th MEDCOM in Europe, the headquarters should be staffed to accomplish the mission (see Table 22-1).

TABLE 22-1. MEDCOM RESOURCE COMPARISON

MANPOWER	7TH MEDCOM	18THMEDCOM	DIFFERENCE
MILITARY	2,280	2,318	+38
CIVILIAN	5,004	1,477	-3,227
TOTAL	7,284	3,795	-3,189

MANPOWER TO BE ASSIGNED TO 18TH MEDCOM IS EQUIVALENT TO 52% OF THAT ASSIGNED TO 7TH MEDCOM.

MANPOWER	7TH MEDCOM TDA/TOE	18TH MEDCOM TDA/TOE	DIFFERENCE TDA/TOE
MILITARY	113/84	58/4	-55/-80
CIVILIAN	0/138	0/36	0/-102
TOTAL	113/222	58/40	-55/-182

AUTHORIZATIONS AT 18TH MEDCOM ARE EQUIVALENT TO ONLY 29% OF THOSE AUTHORIZED AT 7TH MEDCOM.
THE EQUIVALENT STAFFING FOR 18TH MEDCOM WOULD REQUIRE AN ADDITIONAL 63 SPACES @ 33 MILITARY AND 30 CIVILIAN.

PACIFIC RESOURCES AVAILABLE

WESTCOM 2 MIL AND 2 CIV	= 4 SPACES
USARJ 1 MIL AND 1 CIV	= 2 SPACES
TOTAL	= 6 SPACES

TABLE 22-1. MEDCOM RESOURCE COMPARISON (CONTINUED)

FOR THE RELATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF SPACES FROM HSC WHEN THE UNITS IN THE PACIFIC ARE REASSIGNED TO 18TH MEDCOM THE TOTAL WILL EQUAL:

MIL	4 SPACES
CIV	7 SPACES
TOTAL	11 SPACES

THE TOTAL SPACES AVAILABLE FOR REDISTRIBUTION TO 189TH MEDCOM ARE:

	HSC	USARJ	WESTCOM
MIL	4	1	2
CIV	7	1	2
TOTAL	11	2	4

THE GRAND TOTAL = 17

THE REMAINING 46 SPACES WOULD BE A BILL TO ARMY FOR THE RE-ALIGNMENT OF 18TH MEDCOM TO WESTCOM WITH SUBSEQUENT ASSIGN-MENT OF TRIPLER ARMY MEDICAL CENTER AND MEDDAC ALASKA AS SUBORDINATE UNITS ALONG WITH THE EVAC HOSP IN KOREA AND MEDI-CAL CLINIC IN USARJ.

The combined population of 18th MEDCOM would be 52% of 7th MEDCOM. Current staffing is only 29%. While not on as large a scale, the mission of a theater MEDCOM would still require an increase in staffing of approximately 39 military and 37 civilians for a total of 76 spaces. If all units in the Pacific theater are subordinate to USARPAC, then the medical staffs at WESTCOM and USARJ (3 military and 3 civilians = 6 spaces) would provide a portion of this requirement. Likewise, Headquarters HSC would provide 4 military and 7 civilians (a total of 11 spaces) due to the loss of mission and supported facilities to 18th MEDCOM. The additional 59 spaces required for 18th MEDCOM would be provided from resources designated for redistribution from other army units. The Commander 18th MEDCOM would be dual hatted as USARPAC Surgeon and would perform that mission using the MEDCOM Staff. There is a need to formalize the technical control from The Surgeon General to all OCONUS Medical Commands which support Army Component Commanders (see Figure 22-7).

MANPOWER	CURRENT AUTHORIZATIONS	FUTURE AUTHORIZATIONS	DIFFERENCE
MILITARY:	62	101	+39
CIVILIAN:	36	73	+37
TOTAL	98	174	+76

ADVANTAGES:

- HEALTH SERVICES COMMAND IS REMOVED FROM COMMAND AND CONTROL OF OCONUS HEALTH CARE FACILITIES.
- A SINGLE MEDICAL AUTHORITY SUBORDINATE TO USARPAC.

Figure 22-7. Space Redistribution

22.2.5 CONCLUSION

The COMMZ level evacuation hospital in Korea and the peacetime fixed hospitals in Hawaii and Alaska, and the facility in USARJ, should be subordinated to 18th MEDCOM in peacetime and mobilization. The 18th MEDCOM should be subordinate to USARPAC rather than EUSA. This will facilitate the formalization of technical control from The Surgeon General to an OCONUS MEDCOM.

22.2.6 IMPLEMENTATION

USARPAC (WESTCOM) in coordination with EUSA complete implementation plan by 1 June 1989; command and control changes to begin in FY 90 and end in FY 91. The implementation plans must address the effect this reorganization will have on Graduate Medical Education (GME) programs at TAMC and the DOD directed CHAMPUS test program. A full explanation will also be necessary for exact staffing requirements with the added missions.

This chapter is driven by the ROBUST Task Force goals of orienting the TDA Army to support the warfighting CINCs and rationalizing the mobilization concept. The basic observations point to the fact that there is no medical command and control organization directly responsive to the Commander FORSCOM who in mobilization is the CONUS CINC. While, the 18th MEDCOM in Korea is directly responsive to Commander EUSA, there is no organization which has command and control of the medical units responsible for peacetime and mobilization medical support in the Pacific theater. The proposals presented provide for converting Health Services Command to a TOE MEDCOM directly assigned to FORSCOM under mobilization and assignment of 18th MEDCOM from EUSA to USARPAC as Command and Control elements of all TDA and TOE COMMZ level health care facilities in peace and war. "Technical

Control" provides The Surgeon General complete policy, combat development, and resource priority determination authority. This will require the assignment of the Academy of Health Sciences and the Army Environmental Hygiene Agency as FOAs to The Surgeon General. The increased missions directed to The Surgeon General's Office and 18th MEDCOM will require additional manpower authorizations through a redistribution of resources from the Army.

ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 22
MANPOWER AUTHORIZATIONS BY UNIT IDENTIFICATION CODE

ANNEX A
Army Manpower Authorizations by UIC

HSC

UIC	Unit Designation	ASGMT	CO Auths	WO Auths	ENL Auths	CIV DHUS	CIV DHFN	CIV INFN
W03HAA	AGY USA ENV HYGENE	HS	114	0	52	383	0	0
W07CAA	CIR TRIPLER ARMY MED	HS	678	3	947	1063	0	0
W0EEAA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	132	3	399	85	0	0
W0Q1AA	CIR MADIGAN ARMY MED	HS	520	3	658	1067	0	0
W0Q2AA	CIR FITZMN ARMY MED	HS	510	1	637	1424	0	0
W0Q3AA	CIR BEAUMONT ARMY MED	HS	525	4	794	1057	0	0
W0Q4AA	CIR LETTERMN ARMY MED	HS	492	5	572	754	0	0
W0ISAA	ACT USA REG DEN	HS	3	0	54	37	0	0
W0IUAA	ACT USA REG DEN	HS	3	0	58	27	0	0
W0XNAA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	102	0	224	226	0	0
W1MLAA	ACT USA MEDDAC	HS	209	8	468	628	0	0
W1U5AA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	52	1	119	196	0	0
W2BFAA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	80	4	195	807	0	0
W2DHAA	CIR WRAMC	HS	1012	4	1537	2857	0	1
W2DJAA	ACT USA RGN DEN-WRAMC	HS	3	0	21	24	0	0
W2DNAA	CIR BROOKE ARMY MED	HS	669	5	840	0	0	0
W2DQAA	ACT USA RGN DEN	HS	3	0	33	7	0	0
W2FIAA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	51	1	102	208	0	0
W2H8AA	ACT USA MED DEPT USMA	HS	87	1	192	172	0	0
W2JJAA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	75	2	165	207	0	0
W2JRAA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	165	7	331	400	0	0
W2K1AA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	93	5	263	251	0	0
W2KRAA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	173	5	372	500	0	0
W2L3AA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	236	13	411	798	0	0
W2L6AA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	304	14	485	752	0	0
W2L8AA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	187	5	361	584	0	0
W2LAAA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	210	9	392	644	0	0
W2LFAA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	168	5	283	328	0	0
W2LMAA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	75	5	175	258	0	0
W2M5AA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	326	2	511	767	0	0
W2MJAA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	174	7	389	427	0	0
W2MLAA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	95	5	177	262	0	0
W2MQAA	CIR USA AEROMEDICAL	HS	115	2	221	224	0	0
W2MSAA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	166	6	373	370	0	0
W2NKAA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	173	3	305	410	0	0
W2NVAA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	202	11	388	472	0	0
W2P0AA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	151	4	294	446	0	0
W2P1AA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	182	1	321	539	0	0
W2P4AA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	92	1	161	202	0	0
W2Q4AA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	235	4	482	515	0	0
W34RAA	ACTUSA PNT ADM SYS&BI	HS	11	0	2	154	0	0
W398AA	ACT USA HEALTH CARE S	HS	60	0	50	171	0	0
W3HVAA	GAR HQ USA FT DETRCK	HS	6	0	21	423	0	0
W3QMAA	CIR USA EISENHOWR MED	HS	500	10	650	883	0	0
W3VYAA	HQ USA HLTH SVCS COMD	HS	125	3	47	298	0	0
W3VZAA	ACD USA HEALTH SCIENC	HS	388	19	1198	614	0	0
W4FFAA	OFCUSAMEDDAC FT IRWIN	HS	69	0	179	69	0	0
W4KQAA	ACT USA HCS&CLIN INV	HS	23	0	3	13	0	0
W4RJAA	ACTUSA MED DEPT	HS	29	0	82	100	0	0
W4U2AA	ACT USA MED DEPT	HS	60	2	111	151	0	0

*** Total ***	10113	193	17105	23254	0	1

CHAPTER 23
FUNCTIONAL COMMAND - U.S. ARMY INFORMATION SYSTEMS COMMAND (USAISC)

USAISC provides information services to the U.S. Army. As a service provider, USAISC develops systems that are efficient, cost effective, and capable of providing service that is essentially transparent to the users of the service. USAISC's mission is complicated by the fact that rather than starting from a zero baseline, it has been assigned the responsibility for integrating existing fragmented, and often incompatible systems. USAISC exists only to serve others, in much the same manner that Health Services Command provides medical services to the Army.

USAISC and its predecessor organizations were all created on the principle of achieving economies and efficiencies for the Army through centralized management of systems and facilities in support of Army-wide users of the services involved.

USAISC evolved from the U.S. Army Communications Command, which itself had been created from the U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command. The U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command (STRATCOM) was created in 1964 to engineer, acquire, install, operate, and maintain strategic systems for the Army. This mission included the Army assigned portion of the Defense Communications System (DCS), and special Army systems which were not part of the DCS.

STRATCOM's success in systems integration and the operation and maintenance of total signal systems in the overseas theaters led to the decision in 1972 to assign to the command the broader mission of operating and maintaining the signal systems which supports the posts, camps, and stations in CONUS. STRATCOM became the Army Communications Command (USACC) in 1973. Under Project "STEADFAST," USACC inherited the fragmented post, camp, and station signal facilities from the U.S. Continental Army Command and its CONUS Armies. In addition, the command was also assigned a similar mission for air traffic control systems and facilities.

During the period 1973 through 1980, USACC performed its engineering, integration, acquisition, installation, operation, and maintenance mission; arriving with a 1980 end strength of 3,500 less than it started with in 1973. The reduction was partially achieved through integration and consolidation efforts and partly through directed decrements.

The information explosion of the 1970's was the catalyst for the eventual creation of the Information Systems Command. During this period, automated systems proliferated Army-wide. Each system had a specific, meaningful purpose, but there

was no apparent overall goal of system integration or interoperability. Also, there was no centralized organization in DA looking at the overall procurement of computers and the impact on the Defense Communications Systems and other dedicated communication systems around the world. The proliferation of these diverse systems and the need for communications to handle the data transfer requirements led to the following Army studies during the 1970's and early 1980's:

(1) Single Army Staff Element (1978),
(2) Study of Management - Automation and Communications (SOMAC) (1979),
(3) Study of Alignment of Automation and Communications Functions of Army Agencies and Commands (SAACFAAC),
(4) Arlie House General Officer Action Planning Conference (1981),
(5) CSA Approved Concept - Merger of Automation and Communications Management (1981),
(6) Implementation Plan - Integration of Communications and Automation (INCA) (1982), and
(7) Bickston Study (1983).

Each of the above studies reached the conclusion that the integration of the disciplines was highly desirable, but none were able to resolve the conflictive and sometimes competitive systems.

Seeing beyond the parochial issues involved, General John Wickham, the Army Chief of Staff, directed that the Army embark on an effort to integrate the information management disciplines. In May 1984, General Wickham created the Information Mission Area (IMA); which included telecommunications, automation, records management, printing and publications, and visual information. He also created an Assistant Chief of Staff for Information Management on the Army Staff and directed the consolidation of USACC and the U.S. Army Computer Systems Command into the U.S. Army Information Systems Command.

A principle reason for creating the IMA was the existence of worldwide operating and maintenance organizations of USACC which were providing telecommunications services throughout the Army. With the command structure in place, the facilities, functions and personnel of the other IMA disciplines were functionally integrated over a period of time. Establishing the information management organizational structure led to the creation of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Information Management (DCSIM) and the Director of Information Management (DOIM) which are dual-hatted in the same manner as the Staff Communications Electronics Officers are under USACC.

Integrating the five IMAs was not an easy task due to initial reluctance by some MACOM Commanders to accept the IMA concept. The Army Signal Corps was hesitant to embrace a new and poorly understood concept, and were vocal in their resistance to the changes. The automation community, on the other hand, had always expected that their small size would lead to their eventual interaction into a larger signal organization.

As a result of the IMA realignment, USAISC's mission was vastly expanded. However, MACOMs transferred only those spaces directly associated with the operations of DPIs, print plants, visual information facilities not associated with training, the DOIM/DCSIM staffs, and records management. HQs USAISC did not gain any spaces to accommodate the added planning, programming, policy and oversight of the new mission areas, nor did its subcommands receive the overhead and support spaces previously devoted to managing the functions transferred. These resources stayed with other Army MACOM's. This has caused USAISC to administer the growing IMA mission with administrative support used previously only for communications. USAISC feels that mission support would be greatly enhanced with the authorization of those personnel (see Figure 23-1).



Figure 23-1. USAISC Today

The integration of IMA was focused on telecommunications and automation with the latter consuming most of USAISC's capability. Manpower constraints placed upon USAISC have hindered or delayed the integration of all IMA disciplines. The

result is an immature command striving for mission accomplishment in the face of personnel shortages, poor organization and strong opposition from competing agencies.

The IMA was a reorganization and merger of some functional areas to assure more efficiency and better control over emerging programs. The IMA integration has enhanced USAISC's ability to go to war significantly since it is more ready, robust, and capable to transfer and share resources and do things which could not have been done before.

The following comments/recommendations were included in the CONUS Based Organizations Operating OCONUS Study Report concerning the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986:

> "The OCONUS organizations of the U.S. Army Information Systems Command (USAISC) do not appear to perform a function of the Secretary of the Army listed in Section 3013(b), Title 10 U.S. Code, which would exempt USAISC from assignment to and command by the unified combatant commander of a geographic area. USAISC provides both peacetime and wartime support to the unified combatant commander and other DOD and government agencies in a theater. The OCONUS USAISC organizations are commanded by USAISC and under the operational control of the Army component command. Army doctrine recognizes this deviation from the basic doctrine of having the Theater Army commander command all Army forces in theater in recognition of economy-of-scale, interoperability, and efficiency of operations in Army communications worldwide. Assigning the USAISC OCONUS elements to the unified combatant commander of a geographic area would not provide the commander with any more operational control than under the present command and control arrangement. However, it may burden the unified combatant commander with significantly increased management and procurement responsibilities and could defeat the effectiveness and efficiency of single worldwide management of the Army's portion of the Defense Communications System. The study concluded that the present command and control of the USAISC OCONUS organizations best served the interests of DOD and the unified combatant commander and is in accordance with economy-of-scale management considerations which would merit exception by the Secretary of Defense based on the discretionary authority granted in the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986."

The following is an extract from an article to be published in the December 1988 issue of the Communicator; titled "A Definition of the Complex IMA Domain." It was written by a Mr. Gerald W. Holshouser, Office, Chief of Signal, Fort Gordon.

> "Since the announcement of IMA in 1984 and the redesignation of the U.S. Army Communications Command to the U.S. Army Information Systems Command, ISC has faced an identity crisis. As USACC, they were perceived as the "Signal Communications" unit of the Army. When the redesignation to USAISC occurred, perceptions did not change. Rather, it was assumed that IMA was synonymous with Signal Corps, and therefore all parts at all levels were now a Signal Corps mission. As USAISC, they have become "larger than Signal." They are no longer the Army's "Signal Unit." They are now the Army's "Information Systems Unit," with expanded operational responsibilities within the sustaining base. In this new role USAISC retains their historic "Signal Corps" responsibilities but has assumed many new responsibilities historically associated with other branches of the Army."

23.1 OBSERVATION

Complex information system support exists worldwide between ISC and Army Component Commanders OCONUS through a mix of MTOE and TDA organizations.

23.1.1 SCOPE

Refine delivery of information systems support to the warfighting CINCs by having a MTOE Theater Communication Command (TCC) for each Army Component Commander in a theater with an Area of Responsibility (AOR). In CONUS the IMA services differ significantly from OCONUS Unified Commands in that it must facilitate the accomplishment of critical mobilization missions. Army Component Commanders supporting the CINCs should be provided DA standards for automation and telecommunications; technical assistance for automation control and policy compliance; required Defense Communication System (DCS) interface; enhanced DA Area Networks; and MTOE operational signal units (see Figure 23-2).



Figure 23–2. Today Complex Information System Support Exists Worldwide Between ISC and Army Component Commanders OCONUS Through a Mix of MTOE & TDA Organizations

23.1.2 PROPOSAL

Reconfigure USAISC to provide a MTOE Theater Communication Command (TCC) for each Army Component Commander in a theater with an assigned Area of Responsibility (AOR).

23.1.3 CRITERION

The mission of USAISC is to provide information systems and services for the Army; plan, engineer, acquire, install, test, operate, and maintain assigned Army information systems and the Army portion of the Defense Communications System (DCS); assess and develop requirements for sustaining base fixed station portions of strategic information systems; serve as material developer; provide program/project/product management support; and test and evaluate selected information systems. As the DA Information Mission Area Manager and Systems Integrator, USAISC provides IMA services to CINCs to include critical strategic, EAC tactical, and sustaining base combat support C4 information systems during peace, contingencies, mobilization, and war to enhance warfighting ability. The Commander, USAISC is under the supervision of the CSA and commands all organizations assigned to USAISC, including those that may support other commands.

23.1.4 ANALYSIS

The U.S. Army Information Systems Command is a functional major command of the Army. USAISC has subordinate organizations located and operating in the geographic areas assigned to Unified Combatant Commanders. USAISC OCONUS organizations provide peacetime and wartime support to Army Component Commanders, Unified Combatant Commanders, and other DOD and government agencies. They are located as tenant units in proximity to the supported commands and agencies. The OCONUS organizations remain in the theater in wartime. The command and control arrangements for the USAISC subordinate organizations located in the geographic areas of Unified Combatant Comanders is acknowledged in Army doctrine (FM 100-16). Doctrine states that the USAISC subordinate element in a theater of operations is the Theater Communications Command - Army (TCCA). The elements of the TCC(A) function under the command of USAISC and under the operational control of the Army Component Commander in the theater.

Presently USAISC is supporting the Army Component Commanders through a mix of MTOE and TDA organizations. The current USAISC organizational structure has either a signal command/brigade or an ISC-organization OPCON to an Army Component Commander with an area of responsibility in OCONUS. However, in CONUS the 7th Signal Command is not OPCON to FORSCOM. Putting 7th Signal Command OPCON under FORSCOM causes problems in providing IMA support to non FORSCOM units in CONUS. During a discussion with the ISC Staff on 1 November 1988, they strongly expressed their concerns that it would not be feasible/practical to fragment the IMA mission in the CONUS Theater. It was suggested that 7th Signal Command should not be placed under OPCON to FORSCOM during peacetime. However, the ISC-FORSCOM element which is presently OPCON to FORSCOM should be integrated with the FORSCOM DCSIM to form a 7th Signal Forward to provide necessary policy and planning for theater. Only upon mobilization would the 7th Signal Command be OPCON to FORSCOM.

The Far East/Latin American On Site Evaluation Team (OSET) visited the 1109th Signal Brigade in Panama on 25 August 1988. This brigade has the mission of supporting USARSO. During the OSET visit, headquarters layering was identified as a problem area. The present chain of command is layered by having the 7th Signal Command between the 1109th and HQs USAISC with no value added. This OCONUS mission of supporting USARSO through the 1109th Signal Brigade should be transferred from the 7th Signal Command to HQs USAISC.

Applying doctrine of having a TCC(A) support Army Component Commanders without an area of responsibility (MTMC, USARSPACE and 1st SOCOM) would not be

practical. This is due to limited USAISC resources available and that these Army Component Commanders do not have theater Army type responsibilities or subordinate O&M units. These three Army Component Commanders plus functional commands which operate OCONUS (ACE, CIDC and INSCOM) should receive their C3 support from operational TCC within prescribed area of responsibility.

The 335th Signal Command (USAR), a CAPSTONE organization of USAISC, is the TCC(A) to support 3rd Army in Southwest Asia. To better support the mobilization mission, the command of the 335th Signal Command and other USAR EAC signal units should be transferred from FORSCOM to USAISC.

The 261st Signal Command, Delaware Army National Guard, a CAPSTONE organization of USAISC, is the TCC(A) to the Pacific Command. To enhance the mobilization mission in this theater, ISC-WESTCOM should be converted to an MTOE subset of the 261st Signal Command OPCON to USARPAC.



* NOTE: 335TH SIG CMD (USAR) UNDER COMMAND OF USAISC.

** NOTE: 261ST SIG CMD, DARNG; RETAINS ARNG LEADERSHIP; FORWARD ELEMENTS ARE AC (ISC-WESTCOM)

Figure 23-3. Future Information System Support

The above organizational changes would not result in manpower savings. A small increase in manpower is required by Headquarters, USAISC to handle these mission changes (see Figure 23-4).

MANPOWER	CURRENT AUTHORIZATIONS	FUTURE AUTHORIZATIONS	DIFFERENCE
MILITARY:	12,265	12,290	+5
CIVILIAN:	22,976	22,996	+20
TOTAL	35,261	35,286	+25

UIC: W4NHAA AMSCO: 393998

ADVANTAGES:

- ENHANCES C3 FOR FIGHTING CINCS
- FACILITATES INTERCONNECTIVITY IN MOBILIZATION SCENARIO
- PROVIDES MORE TIMELY AND RESPONSIVE SERVICES
- REDUCES LAYERING

Figure 23–4. Space Redistribution

Manpower constraints placed upon USAISC have hindered/ delayed the integration of the IMA disciplines. The result is an immature functional command striving to make the IMA work while at the same time receiving opposition from Army commands concerning the overall IMA concept. In order for USAISC to provide the most effective and efficient organization to support the warfighting CINCs and support the critical mobilization mission, the command needs to be reconfigured to provide an MTOE Theater Communication Command for each Army Component Commander in a theater with an assigned area of responsibility.

23.1.5 CONCLUSION

(1) Transfer USARSO mission from the 7th Signal Command to HQs, ISC through the 1109th Signal Brigade.

(2) Transfer command of the 335th Signal Command (USAR) from FORSCOM to USAISC.

(3) Convert ISC-WESTCOM to TOE subset of the 261st Signal Command (ARNG) OPCON under USARPAC (WESTCOM).

(4) Consolidate FORSCOM-DCSIM and ISC-FORSCOM to MTOEsubset of the 7th Signal Command Forward; OPCON under FORSCOM, to provide IMA support and mobilization planning for FORSCOM area of responsibility. Upon mobilization the 7th Signal Command would be OPCON under FORSCOM.

23.1.6 IMPLEMENTATION

USAISC propose a detailed plan for implementation by 1 June 1989 and begin implementation by 1991 to be completed by 1992. Associated with this proposal are related issues pertaining to: the increased span of control of HQs USAISC, as a result of transferring the mission of USARSO; Regional Data Centers and strategic communications being operated by the Theater Communications Commands; and the transferring of TDA/TDA Augmentations to MTOE for each Theater Communications Command.

23.2 OBSERVATION

The 7th Signal Command has multiple missions and a complex command and control relationship with the Army Component Commander in CONUS.

23.2.1 SCOPE

Refine delivery of the Information Mission Area (IMA) support provided by the 7th Signal Command to the CONUS Theater; by transferring the mission of supporting the HQDA Staff and MDW to HQs, USAISC. The span of control of this command is large having a massive mission with limited resources.



Figure 23–5. Today the 7th Signal Command Has Multiple Missions of Complex Command and Control Relationships with the Army Component Commander in CONUS

23.2.2 PROPOSAL

Consolidate National Capital Region (NCR) ISC units (highlighted in Figure 23–5) which have the mission of supporting either the HQDA Staff or MDW.

23.2.3 CRITERION

The 7th Signal Command is responsible to provide information systems and services for CONUS, Alaska, Panama, and Puerto Rico; provide IMA support at 150 installations, eight MACOMs, and the Army staff; plan, engineer, acquire, install, test, operate, and maintain assigned Army information systems; provide CONUS strategic communications; and function as the Theater Communication Command (TCC) for the CONUS Army Component Commander. The 7th Signal Command is a subordinate command of USAISC and commands 19 intermediate commands and direct reporting units to include Fort Ritchie.

23.2.4 ANALYSIS

Since the announcement of the Information Mission Area consolidations in 1984, the 7th Signal Command has grown by 69 percent or 7,220 people. The command now has a massive mission to provide IMA support at 150 installations in the western hemisphere. The 7th Signal Command has a complex chain of command in order to support eight CONUS MACOMs and numerous activities.

The ROBUST On Site Evaluation Teams (OSET) visited ten of the 7th Signal Command's subordinate units. During these visits, headquarters layering was identified as a problem area in seven of the units. Comments such as the following were received from the visited units:

(1) There is no value added by having the 7th Signal in the chain of command.
(2) The 7th Signal should be eliminated as a layer.
(3) Going through the 7th Signal causes protracted delays.
(4) Lack of responsiveness from the 7th Signal.
(5) The funds flow through the 7th Signal is a bottleneck.
(6) 7th Signal is an excessive layer in the chain of command.
(7) 7th Signal serves no useful purpose.

On 1 November 1988, a discussion was held with the ISC Staff concerning having non FORSCOM ISC-units, such as ISC-AMC and ISC-TRADOC, report directly to HQs, USAISC. The ISC staff felt that it would not be practical to fragment the IMA support in the CONUS theater. However, the ROBUST Task Force still sees the mission of supporting the HQDA Staff and the MDW area should not be a mission of the 7th Signal Command. It should be transferred to HQs, USAISC. This change would reduce the 7th Signal Command's span of control and eliminate headquarters layering for the ISC units supporting the HQDA Staff and MDW area.

Presently there is a combination of seven intermediate commands or direct reporting units of the 7th Signal Command which are providing IMA support to the

HQDA Staff and the MDW area (ISC-Finance Center, ISC-PERSINSCOM, ISC-Pentagon, ISC- Carlisle Barracks, Operations Command (less strategic communication mission), RDAISA, and the Visual Information Center). The above units, with the exception of ISC-Finance Center and PERSINSCOM, should be consolidated and placed under the command of a ISC-NCR. This new organization would be OPCON to the Commander, MDW and report directly to HQS, USAISC. Making this organizational change would provide a single manager responsible for providing IMA in the NCR area, encourage total system integration, and allow a single manager to apply the efficiencies through consolidation of missions throughout the NCR area. ISC-Finance Center and PERSINSCOM would not fall under ISC-NCR due to the IMA support being provided is primarily outside the NCR. They would report directly to HQs, USAISC (see Figure 23-6).



Figure 23-6. Future Organization Structure

Serious consideration should be given to contracting the operation and maintenance of government owned IMA facilities located in CONUS, only if it is found to be cost effective and in accordance with AR 5-20. The ROBUST Task Force proposes that the operation and maintenance of two of Operations Command's subordinate units (East Coast Telecommunications Center and the Northeast Telecommunications Switching Centers) be considered for contract.

The organizational changes discussed above could result in a manpower savings of approximately 395 individuals. It should be noted, that these savings are based on successfully contracting the mission of the East Coast Telecommunication Center and

the Northeast Telecommunication Switching Center, and a projected increase in manpower required within HQs USAISC to support these mission changes (see Figure 23–7).

MANPOWER	CURRENT AUTHORIZATIONS	FUTURE* AUTHORIZATIONS	DIFFERENCE
MILITARY:	4,057	3,772	-285
CIVILIAN:	14,485	14,375	-110
TOTAL	18,542	18,147	-395

ADVANTAGES:

- REDUCES LAYERING
- REDUCES 7TH SIGNAL COMMAND'S SPAN OF CONTROL
- ENCOURAGES TOTAL SYSTEM INTEGRATION
- ALLOWS A SINGLE MANAGER TO APPLY EFFICIENCIES OF CONSOLIDATION THROUGHOUT THE NCR AREA.

Figure 23–7. Space Redistribution

23.2.5 CONCLUSION

Manpower constraints placed upon USAISC have delayed the integration of the IMA disciplines. The result is an immature functional command striving to make the IMA work while at the same time receiving opposition from Army commands concerning the overall IMA concept. This problem is compounded due to the massive CONUS mission of the 7th Signal Command. The user community continually indicates headquarters layering between 7th Signal Command and HQs USAISC as a problem area. Many of these problems will be taken care of over a period of time as USAISC matures and the five IMAs are fully integrated. However, USAISC must implement the following changes:

(1) Consolidate ISC units in the NCR which have the mission of supporting either the HQDA Staff or MDW; report directly to HQs, USAISC.

(2) Transfer from Operations Command to ISC–MDW, the mission and supporting resources for the DCSIM–MDW and ISC–Site R.

(3) Contract out the mission of the East Coast and Northeast Telecommunications Centers.

(4) Transfer the mission of supporting ISC–Finance Center and PERSINSCOM from 7th Signal Command to HQs USAISC.

23.2.6 IMPLEMENTATION

USAISC propose a detailed plan for implementation by 1 May 1989, begin implementation by 1991 and complete by 1992. Associated with this proposal are related issues pertaining to: reducing the span of control of 7th Signal Command and increasing the number of units reporting directly to HQs USAISC; and transferring the MTOE MP Company, responsible for providing security for Site R, from 7th Signal Command to ISC-MDW.

The information explosion of the 1970s was the catalyst for the eventual creation of the Information Systems Command. USAISC was established on the principle of achieving economies and efficiencies for the Army through centralized management of systems and facilities in support of Army users. The current USAISC is an immature command with a massive mission and limited resources. Progress continues to be made in fully integrating the five IMAs and in providing a viable service throughout the Army. However, problems exist and commands in the field feel that USAISC is "broken". Most of these problems will be resolved over time as USAISC matures and the five IMAs are fully integrated. In order for USAISC to provide the most effective and efficient organization to support the fighting CINCs and the mobilization mission, the command must reconfigure to provide a MTOE Theater Communications Command for each Army Component Commander in a theater with an assigned area of responsibility and the 7th Signal Command IMA support must be refined by consolidating and transferring the mission of supporting the DA staff and MDW to HQs USAISC (see Table 23-1).

TABLE 23-1. TO OBSERVATION 23-2

UIC	ORGANIZATION	AMSCO	MILITARY	CIVILIAN	TOTAL
W4HNAA	HQs USAISC	39998	+7	+19	+26
W3GZAA	Northeast Telecommunications Switching Center	393126	-	-65	-65
		395895	-	- 5	- 5
WOPBAA	East Coast Telecommunications Center	393111	- 24	- 2	- 26
		393126	-112	-41	-153
		393142	-153	-12	-165
		395895	- 3	- 4	- 7
			-292	-59	-351
	TOTAL DECREASE		-292	-129	-421
	NET CHANGE		-285	-110	-395

ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 23
MANPOWER AUTHORIZATIONS BY UNIT IDENTIFICATION CODE

ANNEX A
Army Manpower Authorizations by UIC

USAISC

UIC	Unit Designation	ASGMT	CO Auths	WO Auths	ENL Auths	CIV DHUS	CIV DHFN	CIV INFN
W065AA	HQ GARRISON	CZ	14	1	175	338	0	0
W0B5AA	PRINT & PUB EUR	CZ	0	0	11	19	6	147
W0LAAA	ACT USARD&A INFO SYS	CZ	6	1	6	101	0	0
W0PBAA	CTR USAISC EC TELE	CZ	10	3	314	80	0	0
W0PUAA	STA USAISC STATCOM	CZ	2	1	75	26	0	0
W0PKAA	AGY ISC-CARLISE BK	CZ	2	0	46	57	0	0
W0PTAA	ACT COMM FLD STA	CZ	2	2	90	0	0	0
W0PUAA	AGY USAISC-SOUTH	CZ	14	5	327	171	0	0
W0QCAA	CTR USA VISUAL INFO	CZ	16	0	116	196	0	0
W0R5AA	CO 4038 LER SV SIG CN	CZ	0	0	0	0	0	149
W0S5AA	AGY USAISC-WA1NWRI	CZ	1	0	21	34	0	0
W0S6AA	AGY USAISC ALASKA	CZ	6	1	68	81	0	0
W0SXAA	ACT USAISEC SPT	CZ	3	0	26	53	0	0
W0ZQAA	GAR HQ USA FT HUACHA	CZ	21	2	317	918	0	0
W13LAA	CO USAISC SVC-WOR	CZ	2	0	18	0	0	0
W15AAA	AGY USAISC-HAWAI	CZ	8	5	161	191	0	0
W15BAA	ACT USAISC-JAP SIG	CZ	2	0	66	18	0	97
W15DAA	ACT USAISC JAPAN SI	CZ	13	1	187	26	0	13
W1SEAA	AGY USAISC PENTAGON	CZ	40	3	330	590	0	0
W1TTAA	GRP 6981 CIV LER GP	CZ	0	0	0	0	0	49
W1TUAA	GRP 8563 CIV LER CO	CZ	0	0	0	0	0	128
W1TVAA	GRP 8564 CIV LER CO	CZ	0	0	0	0	0	146
W1TWAA	GRP 8565 CIV LER CO	CZ	0	0	0	0	0	149
W1WTAA	CTR USA THTR COMSEC	CZ	4	4	113	4	0	0
W207AA	BN INFO SYS INSTL	CZ	8	0	402	36	0	0
W21KAA	AGY USAISC-MTMC	CZ	1	0	0	219	0	0
W21LAA	AGY USAISC-EASTERN	CZ	0	0	0	154	0	0
W21MAA	AGY USAISC-WESTERN	CZ	0	0	0	146	0	0
W21PAA	AGY USAISC-SUNNY P	CZ	0	0	0	16	0	0
W248AA	CMD USAISEC	CZ	41	7	160	459	0	0
W2Y2AA	AGY CMPT SYS-SEL&ACQ	CZ	16	0	4	102	0	0
W31LAA	AGY CMD CTL SPT	CZ	10	0	56	15	0	0
W33TAA	DET USAISC WEST POINT	CZ	2	0	7	53	0	0
W341AA	OFC USA COML COMM	CZ	0	0	10	51	0	0
W35SAA	CMD USAISC OPERATN	CZ	11	1	64	56	0	0
W35TAA	CTR USAISC SITERTE	CZ	4	1	216	85	0	0
W35WAA	CTR USA AG PRINT PUB	CZ	0	0	3	5	64	0
W37BAA	CMD USAISC-USAREC	CZ	2	0	67	88	0	0
W38TAA	ACT USAISC-SAUDI A	CZ	1	0	29	0	0	0
W3ADAA	GRP USACSC SPT PAC	CZ	2	0	5	21	0	0
W3BDAA	CTR USAISSSC DEV FT L	CZ	46	1	141	340	0	0
W3GZAA	CTR NE TELECOM-USACC	CZ	0	0	0	75	0	0
W3H8AA	USAISEC-EUROPE	CZ	33	4	180	97	0	75
W3HJAA	AGY USACEEIA-CONUS	CZ	5	0	134	179	0	0
W3HUAA	ACT TV AUDIO SPT	CZ	1	0	7	79	0	0
W3LWAA	CTR USA CDPC JAPAN	CZ	0	0	1	18	0	44
W3MAAA	AGY USAISC-CIDC	CZ	7	0	17	21	0	0
W3N9AA	HQ USAISC-JAPAN	CZ	8	2	23	52	0	40
W3P5AA	DET USAISC FT GREE	CZ	2	0	15	10	0	0
W3QPAA	AGY USAISC HSC	CZ	9	0	3	61	0	0

W3R0AA DET USAISC FT LEWIS	CZ	1	0	51	192	0	0
W3R3AA DET USAISC FT DRUM	CZ	1	0	4	121	0	0
W3R4AA DET USAISC FT BUCH	CZ	0	0	2	21	0	0
W3R7AA DET USAISC FT DEVNS	CZ	0	0	18	61	0	0
W3R8AA HQ USAISC-TRADOC	CZ	14	0	18	133	0	0
W3R9AA AGY USAISC FT MONROE	CZ	2	0	46	174	0	0
W3RNAA U USAISC FORCOM	CZ	3	0	6	84	0	0
W3RPAA AGY USAISC FT MEADE	CZ	0	0	32	190	0	0
W3RQAA AGY DET USAISC FTB	CZ	1	0	35	232	0	0
W3RRAA DET USAISC FT CAMP	CZ	1	0	12	126	0	0
W3RSAA DET USAISC FT STEWRT	CZ	1	0	24	107	0	0
W3RTAA DET USAISC FT MCPR	CZ	1	0	90	133	0	0
W3RUAA AGY USAISC FT HOOD	CZ	8	0	50	164	0	0
W3RVAA AGY USAISC FT RILEY	CZ	3	0	15	127	0	0
W3RWAA DET USAISC FT MCCLD	CZ	0	0	0	73	0	0
W3RXAA AGY USAISC PRESIDI	CZ	1	0	25	162	0	0
W3RZAA DET USAISC FT CARSN	CZ	2	0	6	110	0	0
W3SAAA DET USAISC FT SHERIDN	CZ	1	0	26	78	0	0
W3SBAA DET USAISC FT BELVR	CZ	1	1	87	163	0	0
W3SCAA DET USAISC FT EUSTN	CZ	1	0	13	179	0	0
W3SEAA AGY USAISC FT BENING	CZ	1	0	13	144	0	0
W3SFAA AGY USAISC FT LEE	CZ	1	0	15	114	0	0
W3SGAA AGY USAISC FT RUCKER	CZ	2	0	19	161	0	0
W3SHAA DET USAISC FT HARRSN	CZ	4	0	27	279	0	0
W3SJAA DET USAISC FT DIX	CZ	1	0	10	91	0	0
W3SKAA DETUSAISC FT JACK	CZ	2	0	2	76	0	0
W3SLAA DET USAISC FT POLK	CZ	1	0	18	78	0	0
W3SMAA DET USAISC FT L WOOD	CZ	1	0	14	94	0	0
W3SNAA AGY USAISC FT KNOX	CZ	1	0	10	156	0	0
W3SPAA AGY USAISC FT GORDN	CZ	3	0	57	134	0	0
W3SQAA DET USAISC FT MCLE	CZ	1	0	7	73	0	0
W3SRAA AGY USAISC FT BLISS	CZ	3	0	19	130	0	0
W3SSAA AGY USAISC FT SILL	CZ	2	0	15	150	0	0
W3STAA AGY USAISC FT ORD	CZ	1	0	36	107	0	0
W3SUAA AGY USAISC FT LVNWD	CZ	9	0	68	247	0	0
W3SZAA AGY USAISC FT HOUSTN	CZ	0	0	34	138	0	0
W3T0AA DET USAISC-LEIKY	CZ	0	0	0	253	0	0
W3T1AA DET USAISC-LEX BG	CZ	0	0	0	81	0	0
W3T2AA DET USAISC-NEW CUM	CZ	0	0	0	151	0	0
W3T4AA DET USAISC-RED-RIVER	CZ	0	0	0	101	0	0
W3T5AA DET USAISC-SACRMNT	CZ	0	0	0	122	0	0
W3T7AA DET USAISC SENECA	CZ	0	0	0	38	0	0
W3T8AA DET USAISC SHAPE	CZ	0	0	0	92	0	0
W3T9AA DET USAISC-SIERRA	CZ	0	0	0	33	0	0
W3TTAA HQ USAISC-DARCOM	CZ	4	0	4	189	0	0
W3TUAA DET USAISC BUSH HI	CZ	1	0	0	126	0	0
W3TVAA DET USAISC-NATICK	CZ	0	0	1	77	0	0
W3TXAA DET USAISC-ANISTN	CZ	0	0	0	105	0	0
W3U3AA AGY USAISC FT HUACHA	CZ	2	0	65	270	0	0
W3UAAA DET USAISC-TOBYHAN	CZ	0	0	0	130	0	0
W3UBAA DET USAISC-TOOELE	CZ	1	0	0	130	0	0
W3UFAA DET USAISC-MICOM	CZ	0	0	13	394	0	0
W3UGAA DET USAISC-CECOM	CZ	0	0	15	404	0	0
W3UHAA DET USAISC-TACOM	CZ	0	0	0	325	0	0
W3UJAA DET USAISC-AVSCOM	CZ	1	0	7	414	0	0
W3UNAA DET USAISC DOVER	CZ	0	0	0	196	0	0
W3UPAA DET USAISC PINE BL	CZ	0	0	0	34	0	0
W3UQAA DET USAISC RKY MTN	CZ	0	0	0	10	0	0
W3URAA DET USAISC ABERDEEN	CZ	1	0	6	191	0	0

W3USAA	DET USAISC DUGWAY	CZ	0	0	3	70	0	0
W3UTAA	DET USAISC JEFFERS	CZ	0	0	0	19	0	0
W3UUAA	AGY USAISC WHITE SNDS	CZ	2	0	70	412	0	0
W3UVAA	DET USAISC YUMA	CZ	0	0	28	52	0	0
W3UWAA	DET USAISC ROCK ISLND	CZ	0	0	0	435	0	0
W3UXAA	DET USAISC WATERLI	CZ	0	0	0	57	0	0
W40UAA	CMD INF SYS TST ACT1	CZ	6	4	9	24	0	0
W40VAA	ACTINF SYS TEST ACT1	CZ	20	26	372	0	0	0
W4A0AA	DET USAISC HAWTHORN	CZ	0	0	0	13	0	0
W4A2AA	DET USAISC MCALEST	CZ	0	0	0	35	0	0
W4AHAA	DET USAISC INSCOM	CZ	4	1	17	30	0	0
W4AJAA	DET USAISC A H STA	CZ	1	1	53	8	0	0
W4AKAA	DET USAISCVINTHILL	CZ	1	0	27	11	0	0
W4ALAA	DET USAISC INSCOM	CZ	2	1	104	0	0	0
W4AMAA	DET USAISC INSCOM	CZ	3	2	126	0	0	7
W4ANAA	DET USA INSCOM PYO	CZ	1	1	52	0	0	0
W4CBAA	ACT USAISC WESTRN	CZ	4	0	3	42	0	0
W4CKAA	DET USAISC LABCOM	CZ	1	0	0	90	0	0
W4DAAA	DET FLT OPS	CZ	2	3	24	0	0	0
W4EYAA	CIR USAISSSC DEV ATL	CZ	3	0	2	20	0	0
W4EZAA	U 1ST RSCH USAIRM	CZ	6	0	0	15	0	0
W4FCAA	U USAISC FT IRWIN	CZ	2	0	58	45	0	0
W4FHAA	DET USAISEC	CZ	29	0	27	306	0	0
W4GRAA	U USAISC FT MEPCON	CZ	0	0	0	3	0	0
W4KHAA	DET UNITED KINGDOM	CZ	4	1	96	0	24	0
W4NHAA	HQ USAISC	CZ	56	2	27	652	0	0
W4PAAA	ACTCONUS COMM SPT A	CZ	31	25	294	39	0	0
W4PBAA	ACT MGT ENG	CZ	0	0	0	54	0	0
W4TDAA	ACT COMM SYS TEST	CZ	12	15	267	0	0	0
W4TEAA	USAISEC-PACIFIC	CZ	5	0	26	14	15	0
W4ULAA	CMD PERS INFO SYSTEM	CZ	24	2	36	358	0	0
W4UMAA	U USAISC-RSRCH INST	CZ	1	0	0	24	0	0
W4URAA	CIR USAISC-ARPERCEN	CZ	6	0	7	314	0	0
W4USAA	CIR USAISC-MILPERCEN	CZ	10	1	70	171	0	0
W4VMAA	OFC PM RCASRLVIOR	CZ	0	0	0	65	0	0
W4YQAA	AGY STAMMIS PEO	CZ	34	0	11	186	0	0
W4YAAA	CIR USAISC-WRAMC	CZ	7	0	38	107	0	0
W4YBAA	CIR USAISC-FAMC	CZ	1	0	9	61	0	0
W4YCAA	CIR USAISC-FT DETRICK	CZ	1	0	18	57	0	0
W4YLAA	FACUSAUCS-AMSF PA	CZ	2	0	22	17	0	40
W4YRAA	ACTUSAISC SENA	CZ	6	0	0	37	0	0
W4YYAA	AGY NETWORKS PEO	CZ	19	0	28	163	0	0
W4YZAA	AGY CMIS PEO	CZ	18	0	0	86	0	0
WA7399	AUG AG U	CZ	0	1	32	5	0	7
WA7Y99	AUG AG DET PROC U	CZ	1	0	106	6	0	41
WCD399	AUG SC HHD BN	CZ	2	1	57	14	0	33
WCD499	AUG SC HHD BN	CZ	4	0	49	9	0	39
WCD799	AUG SC HHD BN	CZ	3	0	13	2	15	0
WCD999	AUG SC HHD BN	CZ	3	0	75	23	0	59
WCDR99	AUG SC HHD BDE	CZ	1	0	17	0	0	0
WCDX99	AUG HHD GRP	CZ	9	0	104	40	0	83
WCDY99	AUG SC HHD BDE	CZ	7	0	19	12	0	22
WCE399	AUG SC SPT CO	CZ	0	0	1	28	70	0
WCE699	AUG SC CO DCS OPS	CZ	1	0	90	8	0	45
WCE799	AUG SC CO DCS OPS-128	CZ	1	2	163	0	0	16
WCE899	AUG SC CO DCS OP	CZ	1	0	83	1	27	0
WCEB99	AUG ARMY AREA	CZ	9	0	84	1	0	6
WCEE99	AUG SC HHD BN	CZ	0	0	2	9	24	0
WCEF99	AUG SC HHD BN	CZ	0	0	3	9	48	0

WCEL99 AUG SC HHD BN	CZ	0	1	0	0	0	0
WCEQ99 AUG SC HHD BN	CZ	1	0	28	5	0	9
WCES99 AUG BN CORPS AREA SIG	CZ	0	0	99	0	1	0
WCEX99 AUG SC CO DCS OP	CZ	1	0	51	4	0	77
WCEY99 AUG SC CO DCS OP	CZ	1	1	174	0	0	0
WCFE99 AUG SC CO DCS OP	CZ	2	1	168	9	0	62
WCFU99 AUG SC CO DCS OPS-181	CZ	1	0	137	14	0	68
WCFM99 AUG SC CO DCS OP	CZ	1	1	69	11	0	114
WCFN99 AUG SC CO DCS OP	CZ	1	0	83	0	0	2
WCFR99 AUG SC CO SUPPORT	CZ	0	0	1	1	31	0
WCFW99 AUG SC CO DCS OPS-532	CZ	3	0	117	7	0	43
WCFZ99 AUG SC CO DCS OP	CZ	1	5	132	35	0	85
WCGD99 AUG SIG CO-DCS OPS	CZ	0	0	23	0	37	0
WCIT99 AUG AG U	CZ	1	0	38	19	0	124
WCY799 AUG 581 SIG CO-DCS OP	CZ	1	0	127	6	0	47
WCZA99 AUG AG U	CZ	1	0	27	149	0	0
WD4X99 AUG AG U	CZ	3	0	38	51	0	0
WDFM99 AUG SIG CO-DCS OPS	CZ	3	0	118	14	0	69
WDFQ99 AUG SC CO JCS CONT	CZ	1	0	82	0	0	0
WDMA99 AUG SC HHC BDE ARMY	CZ	6	1	73	72	55	0
WDNW99 AUG SC CO DCS OP	CZ	0	2	110	1	17	0
WDQ099 AUG SC BN	CZ	8	0	91	0	0	8
WDQ199 AUG SC HHD BN	CZ	2	0	57	7	0	9
WDQZ99 AUG SC HHD BN	CZ	2	0	29	5	0	13
WDWD99 AUG SC CO	CZ	0	0	50	0	0	0
WDWF99 AUG SC CO DCS OP	CZ	2	2	198	2	0	7
WEWN99 AUG 298 SIG CO-DCS OP	CZ	0	1	92	13	0	55
WFGN99 AUG SC HHD	CZ	1	0	8	0	0	8
WFGR99 AUG SIG CO-DCS OPS	CZ	0	0	7	0	68	0
WFH899 AUG SC CO DCS OP	CZ	0	0	17	39	65	0
WFT199 AUG SC BN HHD	CZ	0	1	0	0	0	0
WFTX99 AUG SC CO DCS OP	CZ	1	2	167	1	0	27
WG8699 AUG SC HHC CMD	CZ	56	4	165	222	0	123
WGQA99 AUG SC CO DCS OPS	CZ	0	6	106	3	0	1
WH3H99 AUG SIG CO-DCS OPS	CZ	0	0	0	1	102	0
WH3J99 AUG SIG CO-DCS OPS	CZ	0	0	1	1	83	0
WH4U99 AUG SC HHC CMD	CZ	20	4	130	343	0	0
WHFA99 AUG SC CO DCS OP	CZ	0	4	129	7	17	0
WHKT99 AUG SIG CO-DCS OPS	CZ	0	0	0	1	61	0
WHST99 AUGSC BN AREA(TA)	CZ	0	1	64	0	0	0
WHSV99 AUG SC CO DCS OP	CZ	1	0	60	11	0	99
WHU299 AUG SC CO DCS OP	CZ	1	0	76	8	0	64
WHU499 AUG SC CO DCS OP	CZ	2	0	99	26	0	104
WHUG99 AUG SIG CO-DCS OPS	CZ	0	0	1	0	111	0
WHUZ99 AUG 7 SIG BDE	CZ	4	1	48	2	0	24
*** Total ***		954	173	11158	19358	941	2677