CHAPTER 28
MANAGEMENT OF INSTALLATIONS

In determining management relationship and methodology for providing resources to installations, it is necessary to understand the evolution of these systems. During the first 125 years of the Army's history, the Army principally supported the internal defense of the United States and westward expansion. This orientation and the fundamental principle of civilian control led to the development of a regional management system with a corresponding resource process. The administration of Army posts was left to the head of territorial departments. While the number of territorial departments, districts, and their names varied over the years, the regional orientation remained consistent. At the post level, commanders operated autonomously and controlled the operations of their garrisons. Accounts of the daily lives of frontier soldiers and their families reflected this command relationship to such an extent that it was even present in the social activities on the post. The 1916 National Defense Act began an evolution which recognized the changing role of the United States in international politics and its Army's mission in that changing role. This act retained the territorial departments, but also created eight corps areas. A short time later, on 20 August 1920, the departments were discontinued, and nine corps areas were created. These corps areas administered, trained, and tactically controlled their assigned units. While still maintaining some of the regional orientation, these corps areas recognized a broader operational aspect of command. In 1932, the Army activated four field armies to oversee the corps areas, and eight years later it created U.S. Army General Headquarters. This new organization represented the first centralized Army command and control organization.

During World War II, the Army created essentially three components—Army Ground Forces (AGF), Army Air Forces (AAF) and Army Service Forces (ASF). The Army designed the ASF to perform support functions, such as installation management, for the entire continental U.S. (CONUS) Army. However, the AAF argued its supporting bases were different from those posts which supported the ground forces. According to the AAF, the important difference centered on the operations of airfields and hangars. They argued that the common post functions were subordinate to these requirements, and as a result the AAF should be the managers of its supporting bases. Army Regulation 170-10, 10 Aug 1942, created a command relationship for installations management which split responsibilities between the two major commands. It gave command of all AAF supporting bases to the AAF, but directed the service commanders of the ASF to supervise fourteen activities. Interestingly, the regulation gave

general court martial jurisdiction to the service commanders. A change to the regulation increased the number of activities, given to the ASF, but medical service and common item supply operations remained under the AAF. To maintain a standard level of performance within the specified activities, both air bases and Army posts had a single set of instructions, the same standards of performance and uniform inspections criteria. However, activities outside the specified list, were the purview of the base commander who was responsible to his ASF chain of command. Despite efforts to avoid duplication in organizations or functions and limit friction between the commands, controversies occurred in most base operations functions. Ultimately, a controversy over the allotment of funds began a series of decisions which led to the downfall of a single command providing base operations support for all CONUS units. In 1944, the AAF recommended that the funds for air bases should be allotted directly to the Commanding General, AAF for subsequent distribution to the AAF installations. The Secretary of War appointed an ad hoc committee, led by Under Secretary Patterson, to study the problem. In September 1944, the Secretary of War approved the committee's recommendation to allot funds directly to the Commanding General, AAF. This decision fundamentally altered the organization of U.S. Army and its garrison operations. Following the war, War Department Circular 138 reorganized the continental forces into six Armies and the Military District of Washington (MDW) under the command of Army Ground Forces. The 1946 reorganization, based on the PatchSimpson Board, eliminated the ASF and divided its functions among the General Staff. On 1 February 1955, the Office of Chief of Army Field Forces became the Continental Army Command (CONARC) with responsibilities for the six Armies and MDW. Two years later AGF was designated CONARC. Under the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act, the Assistant Secretary of Logistics became the Assistant Secretary of Installation and Logistics. This designation was in part a recognition of the lack of overarching policy and installation management as a result of the 1946 elimination of ASF and the division of its functions among the General Staff. In 1961, Army Materiel Command (AMC) replaced the Office of Technical Services under the McNamara directed Project 80 Reorganization. This new command assumed responsibility for depots and other support installations but did not gain the authority that had been given to ASF during World War II.

In 1972, the Army undertook a systematic review of internal installation management. This study of installation management reviewed 27 functional areas and constructed an installation management model to evaluate organizational concepts. The study based its analysis of CONUS installations on three installations (Ft. Lee, Ft. Knox, and Ft. Bragg). It examined three concepts for splitting CONARC installations

and their management between two major commands (Force and D&T Commands). These were:

(1) Type I concept retained the present internal installation relationship and divided CONARC installations between the two major commands. Thus the installations commander would answer to only one commander, but there would be no separation of the primary missions of Readiness and Individual Training at either installation or major command level.

(2) Type II concept also retained the present internal installation relationship, divided CONARC installations between the two commands, but separated the primary mission responsibilities at major command level. The installation commander would be both readiness and training oriented but, accordingly, report to two major commands.

(3) Type III concept released the installation commander from one of the primary missions of readiness and individual training. Those units which were not assigned to the same major command as the installation commander would be tenants on the installation subject to an agreement reached between the two major commands. Such an agreement would balance the unit's requirements to perform its primary mission against its secondary mission—that of supporting the installation commander in his primary mission. (Functional Study of Installation Management April 1972).

The study recommended organizational concept II or III provided that it was acceptable for the installation commander to report to both major command as outlined in Concept II. However, the predominant conclusion of the study dealt with roles of the CONUSAs and a regional approach to installation management. In this areas the report concluded that:

The reduction of management functions at the CONUSA level should increase the rapidity of data flow, enhance responsiveness to directives, streamline command channels, and potentially result in significant manpower savings. (Functional Study of Installation Management, April 1972)

In 1973, in response to Operation STEADFAST, the Army eliminated CONARC and established Forces Command (FORSCOM), Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and Health Service Command (HSC). The creation of these three new commands, further split responsibility for installation management under condition similar to the functional study's Type III concept. Each command assumed responsibility for its unique installation, and a memorandum of agreement outlined support criteria for tenant units. DCSOPS retained responsibility for West Point.

In 1982, the Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG) examined installation operations. Based upon this review, the DAIG recommended the use of an Army Functional Life Cycle Model (see Figure 28.1).



Figure 28–1. Army Functional Life Cycle Model

Previous model had not accurately depicted the major functions in maintaining an Army. The DAIG model recognized the complexity of the process and the interrelationships among activities. Building upon this functional concept, HQDA implemented functional Standard Installation Organization (SIO) Program Development Increment Packages (PDIPs) in 1985. These SIO PDIPs captured the functional activities on Army installations and packaged them in discreet PDIPs with visibility of resources at major command (MACOM) level. Following the formation of SIO PDIP (later SIO Management Decision Packages (MDEPS)), a revision to AR 5–3 Management, Installation Management and Organization, prescribed standard installation management relationships and organizations. With the increased emphasis on Base Operations (BASOPS) and recognizing the need for singular direction at HQDA, the Director of Management was later given staff responsibility for the integration of installation management.

Upon being assigned this responsibility, the Director of Management authorized a study of installation management. This report was completed on 8 March 1988, and it recommended the following:

(1) Designate the Director of Management, OCSA as the DA-level proponent (integrator) for installation policy.

(2) Assign TRADOC to develop installation concepts and doctrine, force development, training and career development, and training execution.

(3) Incorporate into doctrine an integrated installation operational concept that favors authority and flexibility at the installation level and develop wartime role.

(4) Designate the MACOM DCINC or C/OS as MACOM-level proponent (integrator) for installation management, supported with a small staff and a MACOM Installation Steering Committee.

(5) Prototype a concept to establish a professional Garrison City Manager position (integrator) at the installation level with the subsequent development of a career field if successful.

(6) Select Garrison Commanders by centralized selection board.

(7) Define management information requirements at DA, MACOM and installation levels to support a results-oriented integrated operation.

(8) Modify the DA budget process to include the integrated installation perspective and permit greater flexibility to the installation commander in funds expenditure.

Throughout its history, the Army's concept of installation management has followed the overarching changes in its organization and missions. As the Army's role changed from internal defense and expansion west to the present day global mission, its concept for installation management has evolved from a regional to an operational orientation. This process needs to continue.

28.1 OBSERVATION

While ongoing efforts continue to improve the management of installations and communities, these endeavors must be codified and enhanced to ensure efficient and effective support from the Army's operating bases. Installation Management is frequently viewed as the oversight of housekeeping functions. As such, it lacks an overarching concept of operation or doctrine and standards for force structure.

28.1.1 SCOPE

In conducting the review of installation management, the task force used on-site evaluations; talked with members and former members of the Defense Department and Army Staff; reviewed laws; directives, regulations, studies, congressional records, ta-

bles of distribution and other source material; and created automated analytical tools to model and evaluate activities, force structure, and resources.

The study examined historical and existing guidance, installation functions and activities, force structure, and training levels. From this examination, it sought to determine the adequacy of the present installation management process and to recommend continuation or enhancements of the system.

28.1.2 PROPOSAL

Develop doctrine which conceptualized installations as operating bases in support of readiness, deterrence, transition to war, conduct of the war, and post war reparations.

Determine principles of management or concepts of operation for installation based upon mission, type installations, relative priority of mission, and operational standards.

Create standard Tables of Organization based on specific staffing criteria. Use civilians where feasible. Limit military to specific positions and functions. Develop tables as a tool for determining adequacy of resource levels. Maintain commander's flexibility to balance workyears within installation functions during execution.

Establish a training strategy for installation management which supports career opportunities for successful managers.

28.1.3 CRITERION

The Army, its commanders, and managers must have clear and concise doctrine for installation management. This doctrine must be centrally maintained and fully integrated into the Army's warfighting doctrine, especially its combat service support doctrine. It must recognize installations as operating bases in full support of all Army missions.

Equally important to successful installation management is a set of principles or concepts of operation which are based on mission, type installation, relative priority of mission, and operational standards. This set should guide the garrison commander and his staff in its decision making and assure a relatively uniform quality of life for soldiers and their families. These concepts should be grounded in common business principles of management from both the public and private sector that are applicable to Army installation management.

The creation of standard tables of organization must clearly identify the installation workyears available to the garrison commander to accomplish his mission.

The Army must attain and retain proficiency in installation operations and management through a cohesive training strategy that support a sequential and progressive career development for its installation managers.

28.1.4 ANALYSIS

There are 162 major Army installations (although the Long Range Stationing Study identified 167 major installations) with another 1087 minor installations. Operation of these 1249 installations represents about 11% of the total active Army and civilian workforce. For 1990, base operations (BASOPS) will consume almost 175,000 workyears at a salary cost in excess of 5 billion dollars. In the active Army 25,000 soldiers, representing about 700 million dollars in military pay, perform BASOPS functions. Additionally, the use of Borrowed Military Manpower (BMM) to fill shortfalls within these activities is increasing steadily as civilian and contract workyears are trimmed to meet lower fiscal guidance. With the prospect for continued fiscal constraint and the deleterious effect of BASOPS reductions and BMM on readiness criteria, the Army must adopt a system of management that efficiently distributes BASOPS resources to accomplish installations missions. The creation of an Installation Management Division in the Management Directorate and the efforts of the Base Closure and Long Range Stationing Studies are important steps in continuing this development of a coherent installation management strategy and process.

28.1.4.1 DOCTRINE

Installation operations lacks an overarching doctrine which integrates the BASOPS activities with the tactical and strategic missions that they support. In part this deficiency results from a historical view of installations as administrative, peacetime facilities which perform housekeeping functions for the tactical Army. By contrast, the Air Force and the Navy view their bases as an integral part of their strategic and tactical missions. When these Services compute requirements for Battle Groups or Tactical Wings, BASOPS activities are automatically factored into the requirements algorithm. Aside from marketing value with Congress of including installation activities as a function of Service mission, this approach correctly identifies installations as operating bases from which tactical forces receive support that is essential to their readiness and operations. For its part, the Army needs to develop doctrine which details this relationship and leads to a better understanding of the significant contribution of installations to unit readiness, deterrence, transition to war, conduct of the war, and post war reparations. This doctrine must address the various types of installations, the functions performed at those installations and the impact of location on their mission (see Figure 28–2).



Figure 28–2. Resourcing Criteria

28.1.4.2 MANAGEMENT

While AR 5–3 provides a good basis of experience and validates the standard installations concept. Installation functions, activities, and services have not been uniformly applied across the Army. To date, not all installations have complied with AR 5–3 and interpretation of this regulation varies by command. This lack of uniform application of the regulation reflects the need for refinement in the concept to address different types of missions and geographical locations. The regulation should define installation functions and activities in terms of relative priority and level of effort for specific types of installation based on the criteria in Figure 28–2. These functions and activities should remain when structuring criteria dictate consolidation or expansion of specific directorates (see Figure 28–3.)



Figure 28–3. Manning Criteria are Needed for Continued Implementation of Standard Installation Organization

As an example for certain installations the Security Directorate, the Reserve Component Support Directorate and the Plan, Training and Mobilization Directorate could be combined into a single directorate. In addition to the regulation, Program Budget Guidance (PBG) should include information and guidance on services, operational standards, and other criteria from which HQDA determined its resource levels for installations. A complete review of services and operational standards should be an integral part of each Program Objective Memorandum (POM) build. This practice would allow commanders to understand the Army leaderships priorities, focus resources at activities critical to readiness, and facilitate a minimum standard for all installation activities, especially for the quality of life of solider and their families.

28.1.4.3 STANDARD TABLES OF ORGANIZATION

Installations perform similar functions at relatively equal levels of effort and standards with dissimilar organization and number of personnel and grades. While staffing guides and MS3 have provided some standardization of functions, the nature of the TDA is such that these standards are not uniformly applied and maintained across the Army. Army installations must be standardized by type and other critical variables to ensure effective and efficient support of Army mission worldwide. The reasons for standardization are well documented in AR 5–3.

Standard organizations provide a basis for improving management systems that control the resources allocated to conduct operations and they:

(1) Incorporate the principle of "streamlining," eliminating unnecessary layers of supervision and organizational elements that do not contribute to accomplishing the mission of the major organizations.

(2) Provide the basis for effective training of supervisors and workers.

(3) Facilitate selection and assignment of people who, through a combination of education, training, and experiences, have demonstrated competence in appropriate career programs.

(4) Provide the basis to improve the competitive position of the Government work force when cost comparisons are made to determine whether the work in particular activity should be performed by Government or private sector (contract) workers.

(5) Ensure that the Army has the organizational capability to effectively administer contracts with private sector companies when cost comparisons result in selecting that method of performing work.

(6) Provide the basis for managing resources peculiar to installation operations throughout the planning, programming, budgeting, and budget execution processes.

(7) Are designed to operate effectively and efficiently; to accomplish the right things, in the right quantities, at the right times and to do so with the most prudent application of resources (people, money, materiel, facilities, information, and time).

By using the major variables listed in Figure 28–4 installation structuring criteria can be quantified through a Multiple Attribute Decision Making Program, such as TOPSIS.



Figure 28–4. Major Variables for Standard Installation Organization

Within the major variable, population served is the most easily measured and most frequently used. However, in many cases its is no more important than mission, type installations, physical plant, location, and some of the other major variables. For some installations such as test ranges, population served is significantly less important than these other variables. After determining the overall installation structuring criteria, the algorithm in Figure 28–5 calculates the single activity workyears requirements using MS3 and other empirical data.

SINGLE ACTIVITY WORKYEARS

$$Y_A = \frac{\mu_A}{\mu_T} \left(B_N + \sum C_S * W_I - M_T \right)$$

WHERE: Y_A = ACTIVITY WORKYEAR REQUIREMENT

μ_A = ACTIVITY QUOTIENT

μ_T = THEORETICAL ACTIVITY QUOTIENT

B_N = NORMAL BASE WORKYEARS

C_S = STANDARDS COEFFICIENT

W_I = INCREMENTAL WORKLOAD

M_T = WORKYEARS OF TENANT SUPPORT

Figure 28–5. Calculation for Single Activity Workyears

By summing the activities workyears requirements within a directorate and applying a functional structuring criteria, the Table of Organization for the directorate of a specific installation is determined. This same logic is applied to determine the remainder of the garrison organization. Figures 28–6, 28–7, and 28–8 show examples of garrison organizations for nonspecific types of installations.



NOTE: HQ CMD AND PMO ON CMD SPECIAL STAFF

Figure 28–6. Example of Garrison Organization (Less than 10,000 Supported Work Force)



NOTE: HQ CMD AND PMO ON CMD SPECIAL STAFF

Figure 28–7. Example of Garrison Organization (Less than 20,000 Supported Work Force)



NOTE: HQ CMD AND PMO ON CMD SPECIAL STAFF

Figure 28–8. Example of Garrison Organization (Abover 20,000 Supported Work Force)

With the emphasis on using civilians or contractors to perform BASOPS functions, Tables of Organization should document limited numbers of specific military positions and functions. The Table of Organization for a garrison should be a resource guide to the installation commander for specific activities and functions. However, it should serve to limit the overall workyear resources that he has to accomplish his installation mission. This concept for a Table of Organization is analogous to the boundaries and units given to a commander to accomplish a tactical mission. Within the limits of his area of responsibility and guided by doctrine, the commander has freedom to task organize and execute his operation to complete this mission. By

adopting this concept for Table of Organization, the Army leadership will have a tool which assures a linkage of resources and mission. (Also see Chapter 24.)

28.1.4.4 TRAINING AND CAREER DEVELOPMENT

Although some functional areas provide training for their installation managers and personnel, there is not a sequential and progressive training strategy or program for garrison positions. Civilian training programs to teach skills for the garrison position are few and most intermediate level supervisors learn management skills through on the job training. Career development is limited and advancement is slow. Within the military community, soldiers are placed in garrison positions of authority and responsibility with little or no formal training. In many cases, they, especially officers, become supervisors of commercial type activities for which they have little or no practical experience. Additionally, garrison positions are used as a holding pattern for more desirable jobs in tactical units. These practices make it difficult to hire and retain energetic, motivated civilians and soldiers for garrison positions. They also promote inefficient operations, lack of continuity in programs, and a focus on immediate problems at the expense of long term planning and investments. By developing a comprehensive training strategy which support sequential and progressive career development, the Army will grow the experienced supervisors that are required to manage its operating bases effectively and efficiently. With the continued constraint on the number of active military personnel, it is more practical that this training strategy focuses on the civilian managers and a limited number of installation functions for military personnel.

28.1.4.5 SAVINGS

The savings, displayed in Figure 28–9, are derived from a reduction in layering of BASOPS management within the chain of command, elimination of redundant functions, efficiencies gained through standardization, and streamlining the resource management process. At the installation level, space savings would be applied to fill requirements currently being accomplished through BMM. The chart shows a conversion of 6556 military spaces to civilian or contract spaces. This conversion would require an increase in the BASOPS account of about 200 million dollars for civilian pay.

MANPOWER	CURRENT AUTHORIZATIONS	FUTURE AUTHORIZATIONS	DIFFERENCE
MILITARY:	24,419	17,078	-7,341
CIVILIAN:	114,980	121,536	+6,556
TOTAL:	**139,399**	**138,614**	**-785**

ADVANTAGES:

- TAILOR FUNCTIONS TO MISSION
- REDUCE OVERHEAD
- ELIMINATE REDUNDANT FUNCTIONS
- FACILITATE MEASURING EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS
- MINIMIZE ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY
- OBVIATES DA/MACOM AS AN ARBITER

Figure 28–9. Space Redistribution

28.1.5 CONCLUSION

TRADOC should develop doctrine for installation management that conceptualizes installations as operating bases which uniquely support the Army's global missions and that directly relates installation functions with readiness.

HQDA should determine principles of management for installations based upon mission, type installation, relative priority of mission and operational standards. These principles should reflect common business practices from both the public and private sectors. The process should include a review of AR 5–3 and garrison operations to determine functions, activities, services, and operational standards that should be provided within military communities. The review should consider the impact on readiness, geographical location, affordability, type installation, and other major variables.

HQDA should model garrison functions and create standard Tables of Organization based on the major variables shown in Figure 28–4. The use of military personnel should be limited to specific functions and positions. Commanders should retain flexibility to execute manpower resources within garrison activities as necessary to accomplish installation missions.

TRADOC should develop a training strategy which will support a sequential and progressive career pattern for installation managers. Existing courses, facilities and

schools; as well as universities, private institution, and training with industry; should be incorporated in the strategy to reduce new costs.

28.1.6 IMPLEMENTATION

The Installation Management Division, Management Directorate, Office of the Chief of Staff, Army should analyze this proposal with regard to its recommendations on doctrine, principles of management and training strategy. It should prepare an implementation plan no later than 1 March 1989 for execution by the end of FY 90. The recent taskings of TRADOC by the VCSA to complete parts of this proposal, as a result of the Installation Management Study, should be incorporated into this plan.

The Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate, Office of the Chief of Staff, Army, in coordination with the Force Development Directorate, DCSOPS and other HQDA activities, should analyze this proposal with regard to its recommendation on modelling BASOPS force structure and prepare an implementation plan no later than 1 March 1989 for execution at the 162 major installations during FY 92 and the remaining minor installations by the end of FY 94.

Supporting information for completing an implementation plan is found in Annex A to this chapter and in Chapter 7, Annex B.

28.2 OBSERVATION

Base operations consume significant a portion of Army resources without a management tool to determine the adequacy of resources provided to installations or a linkage of these resources to Army readiness. SIO MDEPS are organized to provide information to HQDA at MACOM level of detail for specific functions. By contrast organization MDEPs for tactical units provide detailed information for major organizations at unit identification code level, and provide management tools for linking mission, resources, and readiness. Additionally, because of the functional orientation of SIO MDEPs, the feedback mechanism providing execution information, is inadequate to determine the correct resource levels within SIO MDEPs.

28.2.1 SCOPE

The Task Force examined the current fiscal process by which installations receive resources to determine its adequacy. It reviewed this process focusing on the linkage of resources and readiness, the adequacy of installation resources, the asset capitalization process, and a reduction of resource management overhead.

28.2.2 PROPOSAL

Establish installation MDEPs to link mission, resources and readiness. These MDEPs should parallel the current organization MDEPs for the tactical units.

Model BASOPS resources at HQDA in installations MDEPs providing functional resourcing data by BASOPS code. The model should be available for use by HQDA,

MACOMs, and installations, managers, reinforce and formalize the asset capitalization process, give commanders flexibility to balance their BASOPS resources as required during execution, and provide the commanders information and guidance in the PBG on the services, operational standards and other pertinent data that HQDA uses to determine resource levels.

Refine the current feedback to ensure sufficient information for decision making is available at appropriate levels of command. This feedback process will be essential to maintenance of the model.

28.2.3 CRITERIA

The Army leadership must have a level of confidence that sufficient resources are provided at all levels of command. The process must maintain the flexibility of commanders during program execution. Reduction of resource management and other BASOPS overhead is beneficial. Management tools at all levels are essential to successful installation management.

28.2.4 ANALYSIS

BASOPS and its annual investment accounts consistently represent about 13% of the Army's annual budget. In 1990 Base Operations, to include Army Family Housing Operations, will consume almost 10 billion dollars, and the replacement value of Army facilities will exceed 175 billion dollars. With these significant resources at stake and the relative scarcity of available resources when compared to requirements, it is easy to understand the growth in organizations which manage these programs and the subsequent complexity of the management system to control these resources. By reducing the hierarchical organization, simplifying the resource process, standardizing accounting procedures, and eliminating artificial constraints on the commander, HQDA can create a system of management which will effectively and efficiently resource installations at appropriate levels (see Figure 28–10).



Figure 28–10. Efficient and Effective System of Installation Management

28.2.4.1 INSTALLATION MDEPs

The current SIO MDEPs do not provide a linkage of mission, resources, and readiness. The functional orientation of these MDEPs do not provide the Army leadership adequate information to view the integrated affect of their decision on Army installations, readiness, and the quality of the force. As a result, POM decisions frequently are incremental and the value of the decision in terms of its impact on the Total Army are not known until years after the decision has been implemented. In many instances, the functional determination of resources can not correctly identify requirements, and implementation of POM decision are significantly more or less costly then originally estimated. Further, the PBG lacks the specificity for commanders to understand the level of resources and HQDA intent for specific activities by installations. As result, budget execution differs among the MACOMs, and resources for simi-

lar sized activities vary among installations. This process makes assuring minimum standards in readiness and quality of life difficult and maintaining a relatively uniform standard among Army's installations near impossible. The creation of installation MDEPs will allow the Army leadership and commanders at all levels the opportunity to understand the integrated affects of their decisions on installations, readiness, and quality of life. It will provide them a tool to determine with reasonable confidence that they have provided adequate resources to accomplish assigned missions. Coupled with installation guidance in the PBG, it will provide commanders an understanding of Army leadership priorities and intents (see Figure 28–11).



Figure 28–11. Installation MDEP

28.2.4.2 RESOURCE MODEL

The criteria for the allocation of dollar resources among installations is not adequately defined in terms of installations missions. Since each HQDA proponent defends his own programs and BASOPS resources are viewed functionally, resource decisions are made without an understanding of the overall impact on mission accomplishment. The mission of the installation and its impact on readiness should drive the allocation of BASOPS resources. Additionally, increases in pay and other nondiscretionary programs have significantly reduced the leaderships flexibility during POM

building. The rapid advancement in technology, the demand for more sustainment, the enormous value of investment accounts and fiscal constraints have created increasing pressure to accurately target resources to mission and to assure the most efficient use of all resources. By modelling BASOPS resources in the programming and budgeting process, HQDA can describe total installation resources in terms of missions, activities, functions, services, and standards. Correct application of modelling techniques will offer a unique opportunity to manage resource both efficiently and effectively (see Figure 28–12).



Figure 28–12. Correct Application of Modelling Techniques

In providing the model down to installation level, HQDA will facilitate POM building, budget formulation, budget execution, and "what if" drills. Most importantly, the model will provide the chain of command a better understanding of BASOPS requirements and the Army leadership's intent during the building of the program and budget. By providing information and guidance in the PBG on services, operational standards and other pertinent data, HQDA will further facilitate the efficient and effective management of installation assets. During budget execution, commanders, understanding the Army leadership's intent, should be free within legal

requirements to distribute his BASOPS resources as necessary to most efficiently accomplish his missions and leadership's intent.

Installation dollar resources can be modelled using the basic equation as shown in Figure 28–13.

RESOURCE MODEL

$$D_I = \sum D_1 + D_2 + D_3 + D_4 + D_5 + D_6 + D_7 + D_8 + D_9$$

WHERE:
- D_1 = DPCA $ RQMT
- D_2 = DSEC $ RQMT
- D_3 = DPTM $ RQMT
- D_4 = DOL $ RQMT
- D_5 = DEH $ RQMT
- D_6 = DOIM $ RQMT
- D_7 = DRCS $ RQMT
- D_8 = DRM $ RQMT
- D_9 = DOC $ RQMT

Figure 28–13. Basic Equation for Dollar Resources

Within an activity, resource requirements are computed as a function of the major variable as previously discussed in paragraph 28.1.4, a local index, the base cost, the incremental cost, the value of tenant support, and the capitalization of activity assets (see Figure 28–14).

SINGLE ACTIVITY COST

$$R_A = \frac{L_I * \mu_A}{\mu_T} (B_N + \sum C_S * W_I * U_C - V_T) + A_C$$

WHERE:

R_A = ACTIVITY RESOURCE REQUIREMENT

L_I = LOCAL INDEX

μ_A = ACTIVITY QUOTIENT

μ_T = THEORETICAL ACTIVITY QUOTIENT

B_N = NORMAL BASE COST

C_S = STANDARDS COEFFICIENT

W_I = INCREMENTAL WORKLOAD

U_C = UNIT COST

V_T = VALUE OF TENANT SUPPORT

A_C = ASSET CAPITALIZATION

Figure 28–14. Single Activity Cost Equation

In addition to the fixed and incremental costs, it is essential that asset capitalization be an integral part of all resource decisions. Currently, there is no formal process during the building of the program and budget which assures the revitalization of installation facilities or equipment consistent with their expected life cycle. As an example, the Army in 1990 will have facilities with a replacement value in excess of 175 billion dollars. A simplistic analysis would indicate a requirement for an annual investment of about 3.5 billion dollars. The Army final budget will fall far short of this requirement. As a result the backlog in maintenance will grow across the program to 2.8 billion dollars.

28.2.4.3 FEEDBACK MECHANISM

Models are dynamic and must be modified as experience dictates and technology changes. A feedback mechanism must be available to measure model efficiency and effectiveness. It also serves an analytical tool to evaluate the entire process. The feedback mechanisms should identify deviations from model predictions and facilitate an analysis and evaluation of the root causes of the deviations. As an example, larger than expected expenditures at particular type of installations could signal a need for changes in doctrine, standard organizations, the model or cost factors. Deviations at a single installation could indicate a misalignment of missions, over or under population or antiquated facilities. A feedback mechanism should also include the ability to evaluate the effectiveness of specific programs at installations, groups of installations, or Armywide. This aspect will facilitate the flow of resources and services to where they are required. The Output Oriented Resource Management System (OORMS) provides a preliminary tool for some aspect of this feedback mechanism. However, refinements within OORMS and uniform application of the process are required to make it an effective tool for future installation management. Additionally, a feedback at the appropriate levels of command on the effectiveness of specific BASOPS programs is required. Information from this system must be targeted at specified levels of detail to the appropriate points within the chain of command to ensure programs have their desired affect.

28.2.5 CONCLUSIONS

HQDA should establish installation MDEPs to link mission, resources, and readiness.

BASOPS resources should be modeled at HQDA, and the model should be available to MACOMs and installations. Within the model, assets capitalization should be formalized. The PBG should provide written information and guidance on services, operational standards, and other pertinent data used to determine resource levels. Commanders should maintain flexibility, consistent with legal parameters, during execution to balance their resources and requirements.

HQDA should refine its feedback mechanisms and require universal application of these systems.

28.2.6 IMPLEMENTATION

The Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate should analyze this proposal in coordination with the Management Directorate, the Director of the Army Budget, and other HQDA activities. It should prepare an implementation plan no later than 31 March 1989 for execution beginning with the POM 92-97.

ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 28
REVIEW OF
U.S. ARM GARRISON TDAs
FORSCOM DIVISIONAL INSTALLATIONS
AND
TRADOC SCHOOL/TRAINING INSTALLATIONS
NOVEMBER 21, 1988

THE BDM CORPORATION

1711 Central Texas Expressway, Suite 310, Killeen, TX 76541 • (817) 634-2228

Review of

U. S. Army Garrison TDA's

FORSCOM DIVISIONAL INSTALLATIONS

AND

TRADOC SCHOOL/TRAINING INSTALLATIONS

November 21, 1988

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I. Executive Summary

Executive Summary

The review of military TDA authorizations at FORSCOM Divisional Installations and TRADOC School/Training Installations indicates that a significant savings of military positions can be accomplished by converting to civilian authorizations.

BDM conducted a study limited to USAGs (BASEOPS) at FORSCOM Divisional Installations and TRADOC School/Training Installations based on authorizations contained in the ROBUST database. The baseline for this revision was established by reviewing the current Fort Hood TDA Authorizations.

Those positions that should or must be filled by military were converted into an aggregate of officer, warrant officer and enlisted then applied against other installation authorizations.

Study results for FORSCOM Divisional Installations indicate that of the 4718 military authorizations in these TDAs, 3750 could be filled by civilians, thus releasing 80% of the current TDA military manpower for assignment to TOE requirements. TRADOC School/Training Installations show 5323 authorizations, with 4154 spaces identified for possible civilianization.

Requirements were neither validated or evaluated, and only TDA positions which can be civilianized were identified.

Although not a part of this study a cursory look at Mobilization TDAs (MOBTDAs) indicates there is little commonality between installations.

Specific recommendations are that the Department of the Army conduct an indepth study of all active Army TDAs for possible

conversion from military to civilian, and that a further review of current MOBTDAs be conducted to ensure manning requirements are consistant with mobilization missions.

CHAPTER II. Methodology

METHODOLOGY

- STUDY LIMITED TO USAG'S (BASEOPS) AT FORSCOM DIVISIONAL INSTALLATIONS AND TRADOC SCHOOL/TRAINING INSTALLATIONS. GORDON AND RUCKER NOT IN DATABASE
- ALL INSTALLATION AUTHORIZATIONS RETRIEVED FROM ROBUST DATABASE
- FORT HOOD TDA REVIEWED TO ESTABLISH STAFFING BASELINE; BASELINE THEN APPLIED TO OTHER INSTALLATIONS IN TWO WAYS:
  - AGAINST AGGREGATE INSTALLATION MILITARY TDA AUTHORIZATIONS
  - AGAINST SELECTED INSTALLATION SIO FUNCTIONAL AREAS (ROBUST DATABASE INCOMPLETE IN SOME FUNCTIONAL AREAS)
- DID NOT EVALUATE OR VALIDATE REQUIREMENTS; FORT HOOD TDA POSITIONS THAT CAN BE CIVILIANIZED WERE IDENTIFIED
- POSITIONS THAT SHOULD/MUST BE FILLED BY MILITARY WERE CONVERTED INTO AGGREGATE OF FILL FOR OFFICERS, WARRANT OFFICERS AND ENLISTED. THESE PERCENTAGES WERE APPLIED AGAINST OTHER INSTALLATION AUTHORIZATIONS
- TIME DID NOT PERMIT DETAILED REVIEW OF OTHER INSTALLATION TDA'S
- POSSIBLE MILITARY TO CIVILIAN SPACE CONVERSIONS NOT COORDINATED WITH FORT HOOD FORCE DEVELOPERS

CHAPTER III. Results

RESULTS

- REVIEW OF FORT HOOD TDA AUTHORIZATIONS IDENTIFIED 598 MILITARY SPACES (80%) THAT CAN BE CIVILIANIZED. SAVINGS BY GRADE CATEGORY:

OFFICER	31	(55%)
WARRANT OFFICER	1	(10%)
ENLISTED	566	(84%)

- APPLYING FORT HOOD PERCENTAGES TO OTHER FORSCOM DIVISIONAL INSTALLATIONS REVEALED THAT 3750 MILITARY TDA SPACES CAN POTENTIALLY BE CIVILIANIZED. THE RESULTING RECOMMENDED AGGREGATE MILITARY STAFFING BY INSTALLATION IS AT APPENDIX A. WHEN APPLIED AGAINST TRADOC INSTALLATIONS 4154 SPACES CAN BE CIVILIANIZED. RECOMMENDED TRADOC STAFFING IS AT APPENDIX B.

- ROBUST DATABASE DID NOT PERMIT A COMPLETE BREAKOUT OF SAVINGS BY SIO FUNCTION. MILITARY SAVINGS FOR SELECTED SIO FUNCTIONAL AREAS BY INSTALLATION ARE SHOWN AT APPENDIX C; TRADOC INSTALLATIONS ARE AT APPENDIX D.

- NOTE: IN REALITY FLAT PERCENTAGES CAN NOT BE APPLIED ACROSS THE BOARD, BUT THE RESULTS INDICATE THAT SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY/CIVILIAN SPACE CONVERSIONS CAN BE ACHIEVED IF ALL TDA'S ARE CAREFULLY SCRUTINIZED.

CHAPTER IV. Conclusions

CONCLUSIONS

- CIVILIANIZING MILITARY TDA POSITIONS RELEASES MILITARY MANPOWER TO FILL TOE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

- MOST MILITARY TDA POSITIONS (BASOPS) AT CONUS DIVISIONAL INSTALLATIONS AND TRADOC SCHOOL/TRAINING INSTALLATIONS CAN BE CIVILIANIZED WITHOUT DEGRADING MISSION CAPABILITIES

- SIGNIFICIENT SAVINGS IN MILITARY MANPOWER CAN BE ACHIEVED BY CIVILIANIZING TDA POSITIONS/FUNCTIONS

- ADDITIONAL SAVINGS IN MILITARY MANPOWER CAN BE ACHIEVED IF ALL ARMY TDA'S ARE SCRUTINIZED

- CURRENT TAADS DATABASE CAN BE USED TO CONDUCT FUTURE TDA REVIEWS

- WHILE NOT PART OF THIS STUDY, A CURSORY LOOK AT MOBTDA'S INDICATES THERE IS LITTLE COMMONALITY BETWEEN INSTALLATIONS AND THAT A TOTAL REVIEW OF MOBTDA'S IS REQUIRED. MOBTDA AUTHORIZATIONS BY INSTALLATION, ARE SHOWN AT APPENDIX E.

CHAPTER V. Recommendations

RECOMMENDATIONS

- THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY CONDUCT AN IN-DEPTH STUDY OF ALL ACTIVE ARMY TDAs FOR POSSIBLE CIVILIANIZING OF MILITARY POSITIONS

- THAT A TOTAL REVIEW OF ALL ACTIVE ARMY MOBTDAs BE CONDUCTED TO ENSURE MANNING REQUIREMENTS ARE CONSISTENT WITH MOBILIZATION MISSIONS; CIVILIANIZE WHERE POSSIBLE

SPACE REDISTRIBUTION

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MANPOWER	FORSCOM INSTALLATIONS	TRADOC INSTALLATIONS
MILITARY:	-3750	-4154
CIVILIAN:	+3750	+4154
TOTAL MILITARY TO CIVILIAN CONVERSION:	3750	4154

28-A-26

APPENDIX A. Recommended Staffing (FORSCOM)

FORSCOM DIVISIONAL INSTALLATIONS

SUMMARY OF MILITARY SAVINGS

	OFFICER	WARRANT OFFICER	ENLISTED	AGGREGATE
HOOD	31	1	566	598
BRAGG	25	0	407	432
LEWIS	16	1	430	447
POLK	18	0	228	246
CARSON	22	1	337	360
ORD	28	1	457	486
STEWART	14	1	338	353
RILEY	16	0	274	290
CAMPBELL	19	1	322	342
DRUM	11	0	186	197
TOTAL	200	5	3545	3750

FORSCOM DIVISIONAL INSTALLATIONS
TDA AUTHORIZATIONS



FORT HOOD
TDA AUTHORIZATIONS



FORT BRAGG
TDA AUTHORIZATIONS



FORT LEWIS
TDA AUTHORIZATIONS



FORT POLK
TDA AUTHORIZATIONS



FORT CARSON
TDA AUTHORIZATIONS



FORT ORD
TDA AUTHORIZATIONS



FORT STEWART
TDA AUTHORIZATIONS



FORT RILEY
TDA AUTHORIZATIONS



FORT CAMPBELL
TDA AUTHORIZATIONS



FORT DRUM
TDA AUTHORIZATIONS



APPENDIX B. Recommended Staffing (TRADOC)

TRADOC TRAINING INSTALLATIONS
SUMMARY OF MILITARY SAVINGS

	OFFICER	WARRANT OFFICER	ENLISTED	AGGREGATE
BENNING	23	2	360	385
BLISS	22	1	345	368
DIX	27	0	547	574
EUSTIS	19	2	433	454
JACKSON	30	1	456	487
KNOX	26	1	517	544
SILL	25	2	484	511
LEAVENWORTH	17	1	151	169
HARRISON	35	0	247	282
LEE	7	0	104	111
McCLELLAN	15	1	253	269
TOTAL	246	11	3897	4154

TRADOC TRAINING/SCHOOL POSTS
TDA AUTHORIZATIONS



FORT BENNING
TDA AUTHORIZATIONS



FORT BLISS
TDA AUTHORIZATIONS



FORT DIX
TDA AUTHORIZATIONS



FORT EUSTIS
TDA AUTHORIZATIONS



FORT JACKSON
TDA AUTHORIZATIONS



FORT KNOX
TDA AUTHORIZATIONS



FORT SILL
TDA AUTHORIZATIONS



FORT LEAVENWORTH
TDA AUTHORIZATIONS



FORT BENJAMIN HARRISON
TDA AUTHORIZATIONS



FORT LEE
TDA AUTHORIZATIONS



FORT McCLELLAN
TDA AUTHORIZATIONS



APPENDIX C. Savings by SIO Functional Areas (TRADOC)

DIRECTORATE OF PERSONNEL & COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES

SIO: DPCA/AG

RECOMMENDED MILITARY STAFFING: 2 OFFICERS

	OFFICER		WARRANT OFFICER		ENLISTED		AGGREGATE	
	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS
HOOD	6	4	0	0	237	237	243	241
BRAGG	3	1	0	0	200	200	203	201
LEWIS	2	0	0	0	25	25	27	25
POLK	3	1	1	1	74	74	78	76
CARSON	2	0	0	0	75	75	77	75
ORD	5	3	2	2	90	90	97	95
STEWART	2	0	0	0	93	93	95	93
RILEY	6	4	0	0	84	84	90	88
CAMPBELL	2	0	0	0	55	55	57	55
DRUM	6	4	0	0	58	58	64	62
TOTAL SAVINGS		17		3		991		1011

DIRECTORATE ENGINEERING AND HOUSING

SIO: DEH

RECOMMENDED MILITARY STAFFING: 1 OFFICER; 1 ENLISTED

	OFFICER		WARRANT OFFICER		ENLISTED		AGGREGATE	
	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS
HOOD	3	2	0	0	3	2	6	4
BRAGG	1	0	0	0	2	1	3	1
LEWIS	1	0	0	0	2	1	3	1
POLK	1	0	0	0	2	1	3	1
CARSON	2	1	0	0	8	7	10	8
ORD	1	0	0	0	3	2	4	2
STEWART	2	1	0	0	5	4	7	5
RILEY	1	0	0	0	1	0	2	0
CAMPBELL	1	0	0	0	2	1	3	1
DRUM	1	0	0	0	3	2	4	2
TOTAL SAVINGS		4				21		5

DIRECTORATE OF SECURITY

SIO: DSEC

RECOMMENDED MILITARY STAFFING: NONE

	OFFICER		WARRANT OFFICER		ENLISTED		AGGREGATE	
	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS
HOOD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
BRAGG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LEWIS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POLK	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CARSON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ORD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
STEWART	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
RILEY	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
CAMPBELL	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
DRUM	(NO DATA AVAILABLE)							
TOTAL SAVINGS		0		0		2		2

DIRECTORATE OF CONTRACTING

SIO: DOC

RECOMMENDED MILITARY STAFFING: 1 OFFICER

	OFFICER		WARRANT OFFICER		ENLISTED		AGGREGATE	
	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS
HOOD	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
BRAGG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LEWIS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POLK	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CARSON	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
ORD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
STEWART	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
RILEY	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CAMPBELL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DRUM	2	1	0	0	0	0	2	1
TOTAL SAVINGS		1		0		0		1

DIRECTORATE RESERVE COMPONENTS

SIO: DRC

RECOMMENDED MILITARY STAFFING: 1 OFFICER

	OFFICER		WARRANT OFFICER		ENLISTED		AGGREGATE	
	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS
HOOD	2	1	0	0	2	2	4	3
BRAGG	2	1	0	0	4	4	6	5
LEWIS	0	0	0	0	4	4	4	4
POLK	1	0	0	0	2	2	3	2
CARSON	2	1	0	0	5	5	7	6
ORD	2	1	0	0	4	4	6	5
STEWART	1	0	0	0	1	1	2	1
RILEY			(NO DATA AVAILABLE)					
CAMPBELL			(NO DATA AVAILABLE)					
DRUM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL SAVINGS		4		0		22		26

DIRECTORATE OF LOGISTICS

SIO: DOL

RECOMMENDED MILITARY STAFFING: 2 OFFICERS

	OFFICER		WARRANT OFFICER		ENLISTED		AGGREGATE	
	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS
HOOD	15	13	7	7	39	39	61	59
BRAGG	1	0	0	0	12	12	13	12
LEWIS	1	0	0	0	34	34	35	34
POLK	1	0	0	0	8	8	9	8
CARSON	3	1	0	0	4	4	7	5
ORD	2	0	1	1	59	59	62	60
STEWART	2	0	0	0	7	7	9	7
RILEY	1	0	0	0	9	9	10	9
CAMPBELL	2	0	0	0	5	5	7	5
DRUM	1	0	0	0	5	5	6	5
TOTAL VINGS		14				182		)4

28-A-64

PROVOST MARSHAL OFFICE

SIO: PMO

RECOMMENDED MILITARY STAFFING: 2 OFFICERS; 20% ENLISTED AUTHORIZATIONS

	OFFICER		WARRANT OFFICER		ENLISTED		AGGREGATE	
	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS
HOOD	2	0	0	0	217	173	219	173
BRAGG	3	1	0	0	84	67	87	68
LEWIS	6	4	0	0	174	139	180	143
POLK	7	5	0	0	89	71	96	76
CARSON	6	4	0	0	131	104	137	108
ORD	5	3	0	0	1451	112	146	115
STEWART	7	5	0	0	153	122	160	127
RILEY	5	3	0	0	146	116	151	119
CAMPBELL	6	4	0	0	199	159	205	163
DRUM	2	0	0	0	72	57	74	57
TOTAL SAVINGS		29		0		1120		1149

DIRECTORATE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

SIO: DRM

RECOMMENDED MILITARY STAFFING: 1 OFFICER

	OFFICER		WARRANT OFFICER		ENLISTED		AGGREGATE	
	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS
HOOD	3	2	0	0	18	18	21	20
BRAGG	4	3	0	0	15	15	19	18
LEWIS	1	0	0	0	4	4	5	4
POLK	3	2	0	0	4	4	7	6
CARSON	5	4	0	0	20	20	25	24
ORD	2	1	0	0	11	11	13	12
STEWART			(NO DATA AVAILABLE)					
RILEY	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CAMPBELL	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DRUM	2	1	0	0	5	5	7	6
TOTAL AVINGS		13		)		77		10

APPENDIX D. Savings by SIO Functional Areas (TRADOC)

DIRECTORATE OF PERSONNEL & COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES

SIO: DPCA/AG

RECOMMENDED MILITARY STAFFING: 2 OFFICERS

	OFFICER		WARRANT OFFICER		ENLISTED		AGGREGATE	
	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS
BENNING	1	0	2	2	78	78	81	80
BLISS	1	0	3	3	154	154	158	157
DIX	0	0	0	0	97	97	97	97
EUSTIS	0	0	2	2	111	111	113	113
JACKSON	2	0	2	2	173	173	177	175
KNOX	1	0	2	2	92	92	95	94
SILL	0	0	2	2	173	173	175	175
LEAVENWORTH	0	0	1	1	29	29	30	30
HARRISON	0	0	1	1	65	65	66	66
LEE	0	0	1	1	50	50	51	51
McCLELLAN	0	0	4	4	74	74	78	78
TOTAL		0		20		1096		1116

DIRECTORATE ENGINEERING & HOUSING

SIO: DEH

RECOMMENDED MILITARY STAFFING: 1 OFFICER; 1 ENLISTED

	OFFICER		WARRANT OFFICER		ENLISTED		AGGREGATE	
	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS
BENNING	1	0	0	0	1	0	2	0
BLISS	2	1	0	0	1	0	3	1
DIX	1	0	0	0	2	1	3	1
EUSTIS	1	0	0	0	1	0	2	0
JACKSON	2	1	0	0	3	2	5	3
KNOX	20	19	0	0	2	1	22	20
SILL	1	0	0	0	4	3	5	3
LEAVENWORTH	1	0	0	0	1	0	2	0
HARRISON	1	0	0	0	1	0	2	0
LEE	1	0	0	0	1	0	2	0
McCLELLAN	1	0	0	0	1	0	2	0
TOTAL		21		0		7		28

DIRECTORATE OF SECURITY

SIO: DSEC

RECOMMENDED MILITARY STAFFING: NONE

	OFFICER		WARRANT OFFICER		ENLISTED		AGGREGATE	
	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS
BENNING	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
BLISS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DIX	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
EUSTIS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
JACKSON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
KNOX	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SILL	0	0	0	0	9	9	9	9
LEAVENWORTH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HARRISON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LEE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
McCLELLAN	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL		0		0		9		9

DIRECTORATE OF CONTRACTING

SIO: DOC

RECOMMENDED MILITARY STAFFING: 1 OFFICER

	OFFICER		WARRANT OFFICER		ENLISTED		AGGREGATE	
	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS
BENNING	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
BLISS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DIX	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
EUSTIS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
JACKSON	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
KNOX	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SILL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LEAVENWORTH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HARRISON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LEE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
McCLELLAN	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL		0		0		1		1

DIRECTORATE RESERVE COMPONENTS

SIO: DRC

RECOMMENDED MILITARY STAFFING: 1 OFFICER

	OFFICER		WARRANT OFFICER		ENLISTED		AGGREGATE	
	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS
BENNING	0	0	0	0	4	4	4	4
BLISS	0	0	0	0	3	3	3	3
DIX	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2
EUSTIS	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2
JACKSON	0	0	0	0	4	4	4	4
KNOX	0	0	0	0	12	12	12	12
SILL	0	0	0	0	8	8	8	8
LEAVENWORTH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HARRISON			(NO DATA AVAILABLE)					
LEE	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
McCLELLAN	0	0	0	0	3	3	3	3
TOTAL SAVINGS		0		0		39		39

DIRECTORATE OF LOGISTICS

SIO: DOL

RECOMMENDED MILITARY STAFFING: 2 OFFICERS

	OFFICER		WARRANT OFFICER		ENLISTED		AGGREGATE	
	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS
BENNING	1	0	2	2	121	121	124	123
BLISS	0	0	3	3	30	30	33	33
DIX	1	0	1	1	16	16	18	17
EUSTIS	0	0	1	1	6	6	7	7
JACKSON	0	0	1	1	8	8	9	9
KNOX	0	0	0	0	35	35	35	35
SILL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LEAVENWORTH	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
HARRISON	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
LEE	0	0	0	0	9	9	9	9
McCLELLAN	0	0	1	1	3	3	4	4
TOTAL SAVINGS		2		9		230		241

PROVOST MARSHAL OFFICE

SIO: PMO

RECOMMENDED MILITARY STAFFING: 2 OFFICERS; 20% ENLISTED AUTHORIZED

	OFFICER		WARRANT OFFICER		ENLISTED		AGGREGATE	
	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS
BENNING	5	3	0	0	109	87	114	90
BLISS	4	2	0	0	111	89	115	91
DIX	3	1	0	0	122	98	125	99
EUSTIS	5	3	0	0	94	75	99	78
JACKSON	5	3	0	0	101	81	106	84
KNOX	6	4	0	0	181	145	187	149
SILL	4	2	0	0	179	143	183	145
LEAVENWORTH	2	0	0	0	72	58	74	58
HARRISON	3	1	0	0	57	46	60	47
LEE	2	0	0	0	32	26	34	26
McCLELLAN	2	0	0	0	98	78	100	78
TOTAL SAVINGS		19		0		926		945

DIRECTORATE OF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

SIO: DRM

RECOMMENDED MILITARY STAFFING: 1 OFFICER

	OFFICER		WARRANT OFFICER		ENLISTED		AGGREGATE	
	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS	AUTH	SAVINGS
BENNING	4	3	0	0	5	5	9	8
BLISS	4	3	0	0	22	22	26	25
DIX	3	2	0	0	35	35	38	37
EUSTIS	3	2	0	0	20	20	23	22
JACKSON	3	2	0	0	3	3	6	5
KNOX	(NO DATA AVAILABLE)							
SILL	5	4	0	0	3	3	8	7
LEAVENWORTH	4	3	0	0	5	5	9	8
HARRISON	2	1	0	0	19	19	21	20
LEE	3	2	0	0	8	8	11	10
McCLELLAN	3	2	0	0	33	33	36	35
TOTAL SAVINGS		24		0		153		177

APPENDIX E. MOBTDA Authorizations

FORSCOM DIVISIONAL INSTALLATIONS

MOBTDA AUTHORIZATIONS

	OFF	WO	EN	MIL AGR	CIV	AGR
HOOD	241	47	1787	2048	4713	6761
BRAGG	177	35	1231	1443	1479	2922
LEWIS	164	24	1460	1648	3218	4866
POLK	141	24	798	963	2438	3401
CARSON	165	20	1059	1244	2426	3670
ORD	172	22	1045	1239	1751	2990
STEWART	0	1	4	5	273	278
RILEY	77	8	329	414	1917	2331
CAMPBELL	125	28	1031	1184	3178	4362
DRUM	131	14	565	710	2221	2931

TRACOC SCHOOL/TRAINING INSTALLATIONS
MOBTDA AUTHORIZATIONS

	OFF	WO	EN	MIL AGR	CIV	AGR
BENNING	143	51	1025	1219	6263	7482
BLISS	176	33	912	1121	4824	5945
DIX	61	12	831	904	2341	3245
EUSTIS	145	43	978	1166	1490	2656
JACKSON	681	48	4384	5113	2083	7196
KNOX	160	22	1225	1407	3360	4767
SILL	148	33	1132	1313	3694	5007
LEAVENWORTH	60	3	211	274	1158	1432
HARRISON	279	22	681	982	1485	2467
LEE	59	10	211	280	1567	1847
McCLELLAN	287	1	951	1239	318	1557

CHAPTER 29
MANAGEMENT OF CENTERS

The 1962 HQDA reorganization created the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command (USACDC), a three-star command with headquarters at Fort Belvoir. USACDC was responsible for combat developments and CONARC retained control of training and, therefore, of the school system.

By 1972, even though USACDC had its own network of developers located at the various schools, coordination between the combat development community and the training community required improvement. On 15 May 1972 Task Force ATLAS was formed under the auspices of the STEADFAST committee to develop a plan for forming three integrating centers. They published their final report in August 1972. STEADFAST split CONARC into TRADOC and FORSCOM, provided visibility to headquarters and unintentionally sponsored the growth of functional MACOMs. TRADOC again united combat developments and training. Within that framework, Task Force ATLAS advocated forming a Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, a Personnel and Administration Center at Fort Benjamin Harrison, and a Logistics Center at Fort Lee. These three integrating centers would "...interject a strong middle management organization of what is currently called "combat development between a higher and lower headquarters." Initially, they coordinated the activities of their related schools (see Figure 29-1).



Figure 24-1. Task Force ATLAS Study

In the late '70s the three-star Deputy Commander of TRADOC moved to Fort Leavenworth, and the integrating centers subsequently evolved into their present form. From 1983 to 1986 the TRADOC CG successfully advocated moving doctrine and force proponency from DA to the branches. Thus, the "functional centers" assumed a major role in combat developments.

The integrating centers develop issues which entail more than one functional center. Some functional centers share proponency. Armor and Infantry share proponency for the mechanized battalion task force doctrine subsequently approved by CAC, then the TRADOC CG and finally the Chief of Staff. The essence of the system ensures that doctrine and training are fully coordinated and that all the components of the combat development process are intertwined.

Within the Army Cohesion and Stability Study (ARCOST), 1980- 1981, General E. C. Myer, then CSA, proposed that personnel proponency be moved from the Army Staff to School Commandants. Subsequently AR 600-3, Personnel Proponency, and AR 5-22, The Army Proponent System were published. The intent behind Proponency was to decentralize the integration of all "Developmental" functions to the lowest practicable general officer level, the Chief of (Branch) (see Figure 29-2).



Figure 29-2. Developmental Integration

29.1 OBSERVATION

There is a relationship between the Integration of Developmental functions and "Centers".

29.1.1 SCOPE

Centers as a TDA Building Block; consistency of Development of TOE and TDA within a center; Proponency and Definition of Centers.

29.1.2 PROPOSAL

Convert some MACOMs and some Field Operating Agencies to "Centers".

29.1.3 CRITERION

Support the Warfighting CINC, Discipline and Focus the Developmental Process for both TOE and TDA, and establish Command and Control Relationship for Centers.

29.1.4 ANALYSIS

The building blocks of the TDA Army are the Departmental Headquarters (anchored in the FY 86 DOD Reorganizational Act and the HQDA Reorganization of 1987; Chapter 24, HQDA), Installations (anchored in AR 5-3, Installation Management and Organizations; Chapter 28, Installation Management) and MACOM Headquarters. Some MACOM Headquarters are operational MTOE Commands (Volume II, Section A) and some MACOM manage the HQDA Management Functions from CONUS (Volume II, Section B). Further, some field operating agencies are so large or sensitive that they are treated as if they were MACOMs. This category includes Troop Support Agency (TSA), United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC), Military Entrance Processing Command (MEPCOM), United States Army Finance Center (USAFAC), and numerous personnel field operating agencies, - for example, Total Army Personnel Agency (TAPA) and the Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN)

Apparently over the past 15 years some functional MACOMs, Field Operating Agencies and Centers have defied organizational definition. AR 310-25, The Dictionary of Army Terms, reflects four definitions for Center.

(1) CENTER (AR 310-25) A specifically designated group of functionally correlated organizations which are collocated in order to facilitate coordination and/or cooperation of effort (see OPERATING ACTIVITY CENTER, SCHOOL CENTER, TRAINING CENTER).

(2) OPERATING ACTIVITY CENTER (AR 310-25) A center authorized and designated by Headquarters Department of the Army to perform, in a single location, a group of functionally related operational activities (see CENTER).

(3) SCHOOL CENTER (AR 310-25) A center authorized and designated by Headquarters, Department of the Army to accomplish combat developments and to accomplish and/or provide guidance for education and

training within a clearly delineated branch or specialty area within the Army (see CENTER).

(4) TRAINING CENTER (AR 310-25) A center authorized and designated by Headquarters, Department of the Army to conduct basic individual training, combat support training, and/or other specialized training (see CENTER).

Essentially there are two organizational kinds of Centers: one which is subordinate to HQDA and one which is subordinate primarily to TRADOC. DA Circular 10-1 identified these in 1973 (see Figure 29-3).

TRADOC's Centers are further subdivided: One set focuses on Branch Schools and one set focuses on integration of numerous branch schools. Regarding integration of branches, Operation STEADFAST (1973) reinforced Project ATLAS (1972) and recommended establishment of Integrating Centers: Combined Arms, Logistics and Soldier Support Centers. The latter is still transitioning toward a viable integrating center. In fact, the ROBUST Task Force recommended "directed coordination" be formally established between the integrating centers (Chapter 18). Consistent with the CSA's Charter to support the Warfighting CINCs, who have developed Theater Operations Plans, we contend that the doctrinal and force development basis within TRADOC rests with the Combined Arms Center (OPLANS and Combat/Combat Support Arms) and the Logistics Center (Log Annex and Combat Services Support).



Figure 29-3. TDA Structure

Additionally, TRADOC has branch related (AR 10-5, Branches of the Army) School Centers, for example, Infantry Center, Signal Center, Intelligence Center. To further integrate branch related TOE (SRC) and TDA (BRC, Chapter 30) force development, the School Centers should be responsible. It is reasonable, then, to progress toward a 1996 "Center" organization which consolidates the Signal Center and the USA Information Systems Command at Ft. Gordon; the Engineer Center and the USA Corps of Engineers at Ft. Leonard Wood; the Intelligence Center and the Intelligence and Security Command at Ft. Huachuca (see Figure 29-4).

Some elements of these functional MACOMs and other functional MACOMs are so specialized, sensitive, or of worldwide importance that they should be directly responsive to HQDA.



Figure 29-4. TRADOC Centers

Operational missions of USAISC, responsive to Defense Communications Agency; Civil Works mission of USACE, responsive to ASA (Civil Works); and operational missions of INSCOM, responsive to National Security Agency should be retained as Field Operating Agencies at HQDA under the DISC4, ASA (Civil Works) and DCSINT respectively. The Troop Support Agency is already subordinate to the DCSLOG. The USA Finance and Accounting Center (USAFAC) is already subordinate to HQDA (ASA for Financial Management) but should subsume the Finance School. The Community and Family Support Center is primarily oriented at Installa-

tion Level and should oversee Installation Management under the newly created DCS for Authorizations and Programs (which has responsibility for Installations Management, Chapter 25). The Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN) recently organized as the provisional Total Army Personnel Agency, should remain as a Personnel Center under the DCSPER and subsume the Adjutant General School, the Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN) and all personnel related Field Operating Agencies. An alternative to an Army Personnel Center is the Army Personnel Command, the personnel equivalent of the Army Materiel Command, which was not pursued by the Task Force because of a 1987 disapproval of that recommendation. An alternative to subordinating the Adjutant General and Finance Schools to MILPERCEN and USAFAC is to subordinate them under the Personnel Service Support Center of TRADOC.

The Military Entrance Processing Command (MEPCOM) should likewise become a Center, under the DCSPER, performing its DOD executive agent role with an additional mobilization planning role and coordination with the CONUSA.

The Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) should subsume the Military Police School and become a Center. However, there is really no staff agent at HQDA to oversee its mission. Interestingly enough, the ASA (Installation and Logistics) is chartered to perform functions which the DOD Reorganization Act identified for the ARSTAF and not the Secretariat. If those functions were transferred to the ARSTAF (DCSxxx and DCSLOG), an Assistant Secretary billet for Inspections and Audits could be established to oversee the CIC, The Inspector General (TIG) and The Auditor General (TAG).

The remaining Functional MACOM, Health Services Command, should also convert to a Center, continue to respond to the Surgeon General and subsume the Academy of Health Sciences. It should continue to oversee the graduate medical education of Medical Centers (MEDCEN) worldwide (see Figure 29–5).



Figure 29–5. HQDA Centers

To a large degree special staff functions which have grown into functional MACOMs would be disciplined within the "Center" concept and return to their historical role. So too, the TRADOC Centers would truly become TOE and TDA integrators of all of the "Developmental" functions. Finally, the Army Management Headquarters Account (AMHA) would be reduced and organizationally disciplined.

29.1.5 CONCLUSION

Adopt Centers as a replacement for some functional MACOMs and Field Operating Agencies.

29.1.6 IMPLEMENTATION

TRADOC, HQDA Director of Management and Secretary of the Army Administrative Assistant analyze this proposal and prepare an implementation plan no later than 1 May 1989 for implementation from 1991 through 1997.

To ensure definitional clarity during implementation, the following definitions apply and must be included in AR 310–25.

(1) CENTER. A specifically designated group of functionally correlated organizations which are collocated in order to facilitate coordination and/or cooperation of effort (see FUNCTIONAL CENTER (HQDA); INTEGRATING CENTER, SCHOOL CENTER, TRAINING CENTER (TRADOC)).

(2) FUNCTIONAL CENTER. A center authorized and designated by Headquarters, Department of the Army; to perform in a single location a

group of functionally related operational activities at the departmental level. May be treated as Major Command. (New Definition)

(3) INTEGRATING CENTER. A center authorized and designated by Headquarters, Department of the Army, to integrate a group of functionally related developmental activities of more than one school center within TRADOC. (New Definition)

(4) SCHOOL CENTER. A center authorized by Headquarters, Department of the Army, to accomplish combat developments and the integration of doctrine, training, materiel, personnel and force development; and to accomplish and/or provide guidance for education and training within a clearly delineated branch or specialty within the Army. (New Definition)

Towards a 21st century goal of fewer MACOM, the Task Force envisions AMC and TRADOC, within the sustaining base, and the Army Component Commanders (Commands within Volume II plus USARFOR) as the remaining MACOM. This goal, coupled with the operant concept of "TECHCON" (see Chapter 24), would regularize command relationships throughout the world. Essentially, management in the field would be transferred from the functional commands to the warfighting CINC.

A secondary effect of this alternate design would be to discipline and reduce the growth of authorizations within Field Operating Agencies and Army Management Headquarters Activities. (See Chapter 27.)

Finally, Centers within TRADOC would be capable of integrating combat developments for both TOE and TDA organizations within the Army.