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REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY, 1962

By

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PREFATORY NOTE

This study reflects an Army point of view. Based on Army records for the most part, it indicates but incidentally and in very general terms the relevant activities occurring at the level of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. To have attempted a fuller account at that higher echelon would have complicated and expanded an already complex and lengthy story beyond the limitations of time and space apportioned to me; and would, furthermore, have led me into an area beyond the normal confines of Army history. I hope that a more complete narrative, including a broader focus and more distant perspective than mine, will some day be written.

The documentary basis of the study, though adequate, may occasionally fall short of the ideal, inasmuch as files and records were sometimes misplaced or destroyed, not through malevolence but rather because there was little time, during most of the reorganization, for records-keeping by those who had the responsibility for the events taking place. The major files were originally in the Office of the Comptroller of the Army; many of them have now been removed to the Office of the Chief of Military History.

It would have been impossible for me to write on the reorganization without the help of many people, and I wish to make my thanks to them a matter of record. To the following persons I owe a special

debt of gratitude: Brig. Gen. William H. Harris, former Chief of Military History, who was instrumental in initiating historical coverage of the reorganization and who assigned me to the task; Brig. Gen. Robert N. Tyson, Director of Management Analysis of the Office of the Comptroller of the Army, and his Deputy, Col. Albert H. Smith, Jr., who made it possible for me to see the reorganization process in part and who gave me not only access to documents, conferences, and people but also insights into the philosophy and techniques of management; Mr. Leonard W. Hoelscher, who graciously permitted me to interview him and to use his files; Col. Edward W. McGregor, who gave me much of his precious time even when he was heavily involved in current reorganizational responsibilities; Mr. M. O. Stewart of the Office of the Comptroller of the Army, who clarified many difficult points for me; Lt. Col. John H. Cushman, Lt. Col. John A. Kjellstrom, Lt. Col. Charles B. Thomas, Lt. Col. Lewis J. Ashley, Lt. Col. Donnelly P. Bolton, Lt. Col. William P. Craddock, Maj. James A. Rasmussen, and Mr. John Herrick, who spoke to me at length on their participation in the reorganization; and Dr. James E. Hewes of the Office of the Chief of Military History, who assisted in the research.

Martin Blumenson

THE REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY, 1962

The reorganization of the Army in 1962 had its immediate roots in the presidential campaign of 1960. The Democratic Party urged a recasting of the American defense establishment to improve military diversity, balance, and mobility for the purpose of better deterring limited and general aggression, and the Democratic candidate appointed several informal committees to study how the military establishment might be reorganized in the interests of efficiency and effectiveness. To Mr. John F. Kennedy it seemed clear that extensive reorganization of the "cumbersome, antique and creaking machinery of the Department of Defense" was in order.[1]

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[1] Quote is from Annex D, Political Party Positions, n.d., to Twitchell Memo for Members of Army Staff Working Group on Defense

Organization, Draft Study on DOD Organization, 6 Dec 60.

Mr. Kennedy's election to the presidency prompted the Army to examine and analyze again the broad question of Defense organization in the light of the continuing proposals for change since World War II. Considerable pressure for alteration came from political leaders, members of Congress, and others, while the public showed increasing interest as the potential threat to national security mounted and defense costs rose. Some of the favored solutions for improving organization and procedures, the Army found, were "an acceleration of existing trends toward functional commands" and "a budgetary process more consonant with the requirements of modern weapons technology."[2]

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[2] Draft, Department of Defense Organization, n.d., attached to Twitchell Memo, 6 Dec 60.

The basic difficulty of all proposals was how to ascertain in advance of a change whether a proposed substitute was better than an existing system or method -- before a system that worked was discarded or drastically revised. For this reason, the Army felt that "any sudden, drastic reorganization of Defense would be disastrous to current effectiveness, and therefore that attempts to 'improve' the current concept should be carefully studied and implemented only through evolutionary steps."[3]

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[3] Ibid.

According to Army philosophy, organization was never an end in itself but rather the means of accomplishing tasks. An organizational structure had to provide sufficient flexibility to meet current and future threats; be responsive to changes not only technological but also strategic and political, all occurring at a rapid rate; facilitate timely rather than hasty decisions and centralize direction and control while decentralizing execution; and eliminate unnecessary duplications. Though the Army in stating these aphorisms was thinking of the Defense establishment, the propositions applied to the Army as well.

Looking at itself, the Army found that the "present system, characterized . . . by operational decentralization to the Technical Services -- with General Staff supervision and control -- and, above the Army level, by Single Managerships and Single Service Procurement Assignments (DOD-wide)" was efficient and economical, "the result of many years of exhaustive study and accumulation of . . . varied experience."[4]

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[4] Draft, Department of Defense Organization, n.d., and Annexes A through I, attached to Twitchell Memo for Members of the Army Staff Working Group on Defense Organization, Draft Study on DOD Organization, 6 Dec 60.

Yet currents of change were in the air, and certain ideas and phrases were becoming part of the climate of opinion -- "timely decisions," "decentralization and the necessary delegation of authority

to accomplish mission assignments," reducing "an increasingly burdensome administrative process," eliminating "rigid distinction between Research and Development and Procurement and Production organizations," securing "economy in time, money, and motion," and separating policies and plans from execution. These concepts began to permeate the thoughts of those who were concerned with organizational trends in the Defense establishment at the end of 1960, for it appeared certain that the new Kennedy administration would look into the matter of Defense reorganization soon after the inauguration.[5]

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[5] Memo, Director of Management Analysis, OCA to Chief, Coordination Group, OCS, 16 Jan 61, plus Annexes I through VIII, and atchd paper entitled Recommended Army Position on the Symington Committee Report on Defense Organization, n.d.

The direct impetus for change came from the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Robert S. McNamara, who had agreed to serve in that position on 13 December 1960, and who took his oath of office on 21 January 1961.[6]

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[6] Biographical sheet, Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense; see Memo, Brig. Gen. Arthur W. Oberbeck, Chief, Coordination Group, for Army Staff Working Group, Summary of Army Views on Defense Organization, 27 Jan 61, and atchd Memo, Brig. Gen. John L. Throckmorton, SGS, Development of Army Views on Defense Reorganization, 22 Dec 60.

On the tenth day of Mr. McNamara's tenure of office, 30 January, the Secretary designated Mr. Cyrus R. Vance, his General Counsel, to be

responsible for management and organizational planning within the Department of Defense. Mr. Vance was to conduct research, develop plans, and improve managerial practices "to achieve more efficient, economical operation and eliminate unnecessary overlap or duplication of efforts."[7]

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[7] DOD Directive 5145.3, Responsibility for Management and Organizational Planning within the Department of Defense, 30 Jan 61.

Nine days later, on 8 February, Mr. Vance, accompanied by Mr. Solis Horwitz, Director of the General Counsel's Office of Organizational and Management Planning, conversed with the Secretary of the Army, Mr. Elvis P. Stahr, jr., and informed him that Mr. McNamara was appraising the organization, functions, and procedures of the military services. Would Mr. Stahr make his own study of the Army in order to identify problem areas and deficiencies so that corrective action could be instituted? Mr. Stahr, who had taken office less than two weeks earlier, asked for guidance.[8]

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[8] Study of Organization of the Department of the Army, 3 Apr 61, OCA files.

The Guidelines

A day later, on 9 February, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Roswell Gilpatric, complied with Mr. Stahr's request by providing an unsigned paper entitled "Organization of the Department of the Army

Study" and called simply "guidelines." Citing the fact that "no major study of over-all Army organization" had been made since 1955 and pointing out that "significant changes in the Defense environment" had occurred since then and particularly after 1958, the guidelines found that it was "necessary to determine the major changes in the Defense environment as they affect the Department of the Army for the purpose of developing criteria by which to evaluate the current Army organization and procedures." Once criteria were developed, it would be "necessary to analyze the functions, organization, and procedures of the major components of the Department of the Army." The examination and investigation were to include, but not be restricted to, the Office of the Secretary of the Army, the Army General Staff, the Continental Army Command, and the Technical Services. After these areas had been studied, recommended changes "as are deemed necessary" were to be submitted, but to whom was not specified.

The guidelines explicitly stated that the basic provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, would remain in force -- the unified and specified commands would be responsible to the Secretary of Defense in the use of military forces to perform military missions, with each military department responsible for administering and supporting its forces in these commands; the military departments would be responsible for preparing the forces organized, trained, and equipped to perform assigned functions; the functions of the Army would remain unchanged; the Chief of Staff would continue serving as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Assistant Secretaries

of Defense would remain staff advisers to the Secretary of Defense without "operational and line duties in their functional area."[9]

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[9] (Guidelines provided by the Deputy Secretary of Defense), Organization of the Department of the Army Study, 9 Feb 61.

On the following morning, 10 February, Mr. Leonard W. Hoelscher, Deputy Comptroller of the Army, received a phone call from Mr. Horwitz. He had been informed, Mr. Horwitz said, by Brig. Gen. Joe S. Lawrie, Army liaison officer to the Office, Secretary of Defense, that the Secretary of the Army had designated Mr. Hoelscher to represent the Army in a study to be made of the Department of the Army. Mr. Hoelscher knew nothing of this assignment, but promised to find out. He called General Lawrie and learned that he had indeed been selected to work with Mr. Vance's office on a study of the Army organization.

Later that morning Mr. Hoelscher met with Mr. Horwitz and the latter's three assistants: Lt. Col. John H. Cushman (Army), Cmdr. David O. Cooke (Navy), and Maj. Abbot C. Greenleaf (Air Force). Mr. Vance was present briefly.

During the meeting Mr. Hoelscher learned that the contemplated study of the organization of the Army was Project Number 10 of ten studies assigned by the Secretary of Defense to Mr. Vance. Mr. Hoelscher received a copy of the guidelines approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and a memorandum from Commander Cooke, who was Mr. Vance's liaison officer for Project 10. The memorandum suggested certain problem areas requiring particular attention in the study

to be undertaken. Mr. Hoelscher informed Mr. Horwitz he would formulate an approach to the study in accordance with the guidelines and return to discuss the matter once more.[10]

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[10] Hoelscher Memo for Rcd, Study of Organization of the Army, 10 Feb 61.

Commander Cooke, in the memo he had written, explained the rationale for examining the Army's organization -- current Army responsibilities, the "accelerating explosion of technology," and the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 -- and pointed to eight of "many basic areas that need study" -- 1) how could the General Staff improve its a) response to the demands and requirements of higher echelons, b) supervision of the field establishment, and c) support responsibilities to the unified commands? 2) could the relationship between the assistant secretaries of the Army and the General Staff be made more effective and useful? 3) to what extent should the General Staff be involved in operations? -- a) since the Reorganization Act of 1958, did the Army have any operational responsibilities at all? b) should the command elements of General Staff agencies be separated from staff elements? 4) what was the proper relationship between the General Staff and the Continental Army Command (CONARC)? -- a) was there overlap between their roles? b) was CONARC's role as a second Department of the Army justified? c) what alternatives existed? 5) were CONARC and Class II command systems the best way to meet Department of the Army responsibilities for zone of interior training,

research and development, logistics, etc.? 6) what was the future of the Technical Services -- a) should they be subordinated under a Service Command? b) should they be replaced by a Research and Development Command or by a Materiel Command? 7) should zone of interior armies and the Reserves be consolidated or changed? 8) should the Department of the Army continue to perform non-military duties? -- a) should the Department continue to manage the Panama Canal? b) should the Corps of Engineers continue to perform its traditional civil functions?[11]

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[11] Memo, D. O. Cooke to Hoelscher, Department of the Army Organization Study, 10 Feb 61.

On 11 February, the day following his meeting with Mr. Horwitz, Mr. Hoelscher discussed the project with General George H. Decker, the Army Chief of Staff. Mr. Hoelscher proposed to draw a plan to outline how he would go about studying the Army organization, and General Decker agreed with this procedure.

Three days later, on 14 February, Mr. Hoelscher showed General Decker a tentative plan before submitting it to the Secretary of the Army. The Chief of Staff gave his approval, and later that day Mr. Hoelscher presented copies of his plan to Mr. Horwitz and discussed the task with him and his assistants. Mr. Hoelscher recognized how general his outline plan was, but he expected to modify his procedures as the project developed. His most pressing problem of the moment, he acknowledged, was to find Army personnel with suitable qualifica-

tions to help make the study.[12]

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[12] Hoelscher Memo for Rcd 2, Study of Organization of the Army, 15 Feb 61.

Mr. Hoelscher's own qualifications were considerable and impressive. A professional analyst of the organization, functions, and procedures of large business and governmental entities for almost 25 years, Mr. Hoelscher had had wide experience in helping to shape Army policies and programs relating to business management, financial and fiscal operations and services, budget planning and administration, program analysis and evaluation, and the like. Mr. Hoelscher had been Special Assistant to the Comptroller of the Army in 1952, when General Decker had become the Army Comptroller, and General Decker had appointed him to be Deputy Comptroller. In January 1961, he had been working on a critique of Senator Stuart Symington's ideas for reorganizing the Department of Defense and on a paper embodying his own thoughts on organizational matters -- these to be presented to the Chief of Staff. Thus, after Mr. Vance had talked with Mr. Stahr about conducting a study of the Army organization, when Mr. Stahr discussed the matter with the Chief of Staff Mr. Hoelscher's name quite naturally came to General Decker's mind as the most competent individual to perform the task.[13]

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[13] Pertinent Experience of L. W. Hoelscher (biographical data sheet), OCA; Interv w/Col. Edward W. McGregor, 1 Mar 62; Address by

by Mr. L. W. Hoelscher, "The Story of Project 80 and the Reorganization of the Army," [March, 1963].

The guidelines provided by the Deputy Secretary of Defense were, Mr. Hoelscher felt, excellent. They did not direct him to present a plan for reorganizing the Army but simply an analysis of the existing organization, plus whatever recommendations seemed appropriate. Mr. Hoelscher therefore had to determine the major changes in the Defense environment as they affected the Army so that he could develop criteria for evaluating the current Army organization and procedures; then, using those criteria, he had to analyze the functions, organization, and procedures of certain major components of the Army. Mr. Hoelscher identified ten areas as requiring particular attention. He determined the kind of group he wanted to help him make his study -- he would have a director, himself; a project advisory committee of senior Army officers, but including one or two individuals from outside the Army; and a working staff of Army officers and civilians broken into working groups for detailed study. He decided tentatively how to phase his work. And he proposed to report periodically to the Secretary of the Army through the Chief of Staff and to keep Mr. Horwitz advised of his progress.[14] What Mr. Hoelscher intended to

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[14] Memo, Hoelscher for Secretary of the Army, through Chief of Staff, 14 Feb 61, and atchd plan for Study of Army Functions, Organization, and Procedures, 14 Feb 61.

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do was to make an objective study of the Army, to examine and analyze how the Army did its work. He had no intent at the outset to recommend reorganization, nor was he precommitted to change.[15]

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[15] Interv w/Mr. Hoelscher, 27 Feb 62.

Aware of the interest of the Office, Secretary of Defense, in the Technical Services and particularly in the methods of acquiring hardware and weapons systems, Mr. Hoelscher was nevertheless inclined to regard the Army as a whole, as an institution, as an organization devoted to a mission that transcended any particular area such as the one concerned with weapons systems. He therefore broadened his outlook to include all areas. For he believed that the capability of the ground forces was developed and had meaning only within the framework of the Department of the Army and in the light of Army tradition. Not only the hardware used by troops but also tables of organization and equipment, as well as doctrine, shaped the Army capability, and he therefore had to look, he felt, at the entire organization.[16]

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[16] Ibid.

The first thing that Mr. Hoelscher did was to ask the Management Analysis segment of the Comptroller's office to make a preliminary analysis of the Defense environment and a preliminary survey of previous Army organizations, and assist in developing in some detail a plan for organizing, staffing, and conducting the study. Mr. Hoelscher

utilized Management Analysis people not only because they were available but more importantly because they would provide continuity for any changes to be instituted as a result of the study.[17]

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[17] Hoelscher Address.

The Hoelscher Committee

The actual study, Mr. Hoelscher decided, would be made by working groups rather than by a board. To the extent that conclusions and recommendations emerged as unanimous findings, Mr. Hoelscher would present them as the views of the entire study group. Where there were differences, he would make the decisions and present them as his own. But he would include points of variance or disagreement to enable "all significant views to be available without reducing the conclusions and recommendations to a compromise which obscures the issues."[18]

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[18] Hoelscher Plan, 14 Feb 61; Interv w/Mr. Hoelscher, 27 Feb 62; Hoelscher Address.

Though Mr. Hoelscher had originally identified ten problem areas, he decided to have eight working groups, seven to be concerned with specific areas and general functions, the eighth to be concerned with an overall view of the Army: Group A - a co-ordinating group concerned with the overall study and functioning, to refine and synthesize the findings of the other working groups; Group B - Department of the Army headquarters and the general management functions; Group

C - CONARC and training, combat developments, and doctrine; Group D - Technical Services and logistics; Group E - Research and Development; Group F - personnel management; Group G - the Reserve components. Group H, to study the Corps of Engineers and civil functions, was never established.[19] Group I was later added to analyze Army aviation.

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[19] Hoelscher Address; Memo, Hoelscher for Horwitz, Status Report on Project 80, 31 Mar 61; Memo, Maj. Gen. J. L. Throckmorton, SGS, for Hoelscher, 15 May 61, Army Aviation in the Department of the Army Organization.

Although one group numbered eleven members, the average membership of each group was seven, with each containing men of various skills and specialized backgrounds from various branches of the Army. Every group had one professional management analyst. Each of the individual members selected was of the highest caliber and showed evidence in his record of an interest in organizational matters and an ability to take an analytical approach to problems. Each was expected to put aside his personal interests as well as those of his branch or office and to look at the problem of Army organization from the viewpoint of the welfare of the Army as a whole.

Identifying and obtaining the right people was a difficult task that took two months. In this Mr. Hoelscher was assisted by Lt. Col. Charles B. Thomas of the Comptroller's office, who served as his Executive Officer, and by Lt. Col. Edward W. McGregor also of the Comptroller's office, who, after making a detailed study of industrial

management in the fall of 1960, had been detailed to the Chief of Staff's office to study possible Defense changes and their effects on the Army and who now functioned as Mr. Hoelscher's Co-ordinator. Mr. Hoelscher and his immediate assistants inspected more than 400 personnel files and talked with dozens of persons. Eventually, Mr. Hoelscher secured 50 officers and 13 civilians, exclusive of clerical staff. Two officers were generals, most were colonels, several were lieutenant colonels, one was a major.[20]

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[20] The members are listed in OSD Project 80 Study (October, 1961), Part I, Annex A, Appendix 3.

How to attack the problem, or how to formulate the process of analysis, was the second critical feature of Mr. Hoelscher's task. As each member of his study group reported to him for duty, Mr. Hoelscher made it clear that a reorganization of the Army was not necessarily to result from the study to be undertaken. The directive called for analysis, not for a preconceived course of action.

Mr. Hoelscher's method of analysis consisted of twelve steps to be followed in sequence. Each working group had, within its area, to 1) define the Defense environment and the trends within that environment in order to establish the relationship of the Army to the Defense establishment; 2) identify problem areas and areas of deficiency in Army performance; 3) define the Army missions; 4) formulate tentative criteria for judging the Army performance; 5) assemble and analyze facts and circumstances bearing on performance; 6) reach agreement on

the basic considerations or positive conclusions shaping the needs of Army performance -- the controlling criteria, the ideal conditions, the yardsticks that would separate symptom from cause and show whether the problems were really problems and why; 7) list the Army functions and classify the Army missions; 8) project alternative patterns of organization and management; 9) evaluate the alternative patterns; 10) select the preferred patterns; 11) assess the anticipated benefits of change against the ensuing disruption of operations and the resulting costs in temporary human turmoil and organizational instability; 12) decide on the practicality of making beneficial changes in Army organization, functions, and procedures.[21]

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[21] Hoelscher Address.

Formal notice of Mr. Hoelscher's appointment came on 17 February 1961, when the Chief of Staff named him project director and authorized him to examine the organization, functions, and practices of the "entire Department of the Army" as directed by the Secretary of the Army "in agreement with the Office, Secretary of Defense." The study, General Decker announced, had "particular significance at this time," and he himself had a "personal interest in it." He requested the Staff to give "priority support" to the project, including "personnel, information, studies and analyses." And he gave the project director, the Project Advisory Committee, and the working groups the authority "to solicit information directly from any Army organization, irrespective of where it may be located in any Army organizational structure."[22]

[22] Decker Memo, 17 Feb 61.

Meanwhile, Mr. Hoelscher was discussing his project with key members of the Army Staff. By the end of February he had set up a small project research and planning staff manned by members of the Comptroller's office, and this group was establishing personnel requirements for the working groups, setting up time schedules, getting office space, considering approaches to the study, developing criteria, and formulating guidance for the working groups. The DCSPER was "actively assisting" the project by helping to secure people "qualified to achieve the objectives of the assignment."[23]

[23] Hoelscher Memo for Rcd 3, Study of Organization of the Army, 28 Feb 61; Hoelscher Typescript, General Policies and Guidance for the Study of Functions, Organization, and Procedures of the Department of the Army, 20 Feb 61.

By this time some opposition to Mr. Hoelscher's planning had arisen. One member of the Army Staff advised the Secretary of the Army to disapprove Mr. Hoelscher's approach because it gave Mr. Hoelscher and, incidentally, the Office, Secretary of Defense, a blank check to revise the Department of the Army. Another disagreed with the need expressed by Mr. Hoelscher to enlarge the approach to the examination; he wished the study to stay "well within OSD guidelines." A third offered this well-intentioned guidance:

The secretariat should think long and hard before releasing specialized work groups into R&D and Civilian Components. It is also believed the new Secretariat would be doing themselves a dis-service if they did not buy a reasonable period for orientation and adjustment prior to phasing a study of the Office, Secretary of the Army.

The tenor of the warnings and advice was to be cautious.[24]

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[24] Back-up papers for Memo, Stephen Ailes, Under Secretary of the Army, for Chief of Staff, Plan for Study of Army Functions, Organization, and Procedures, 1 Mar 61.

The Under Secretary of the Army, Mr. Stephen Ailes, instructed by Mr. Stahr to monitor the project, signed a cautious endorsement of Mr. Hoelscher's plan of approach. He asked that his "office be advised prior to the origination of any of the ten areas outlined in your study in order that we may exchange any further information which may have developed since the issuance of the directive [by the Chief of Staff authorizing Mr. Hoelscher to proceed]."[25]

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[25] Ailes Memo, 1 Mar 62.

As it turned out, some of the original problem areas were eliminated from consideration by Mr. Hoelscher's committee. Neither the Office of the Secretary of the Army nor the Office of the Chief of Staff came under Mr. Hoelscher's formal scrutiny. And the civil functions performed by the Corps of Engineers were omitted from study because they were judged to have little relationship to the remainder of the study and because they involved other governmental agencies.[26]

[26] Memo for Rcd (McGregor), Briefing of Under Secretary of the Army, 19 Jun 61, dated 21 Jun.

Yet some of these matters would be examined by those responsible for a concurrent OSD study, Project 39A, which would seek to reduce the number of headquarters personnel.[27]

[27] See below, p. (97).

During March Mr. Hoelscher continued to define his task, to limit his problem, to set up his operational machinery, and to secure personnel to staff his working groups. He canvassed principal staff agencies for significant deficiencies or problems, visited CONARC to gain cooperation from that headquarters, and made his first formal report of progress.[28]

[28] Hoelscher Memo for Rcd 4, Study of Organization of the Army, 8 Mar 61; Hoelscher Memo for principal staff agencies, 14 Mar 61; Memo, Hoelscher for Chief, Coordination Group, OCS, 15 Mar 61; Memo, Hoelscher for Horwitz, Status Report, 17 Mar 61.

Early that month Mr. Hoelscher's effort received a new name. The Office, Secretary of Defense, had initially been interested in ten subjects, of which a study of the Army organization had been Number 10. Less than two months after the Kennedy administration came into office, the Office, Secretary of Defense, had expanded its focus of interest

to more than 90 problems and problem areas; eventually the list would grow to about 120 projects warranting investigation. In this new list the study of the Army organization was Number 80, and the Hoelscher effort became known as Project 80. Mr. Hoelscher's working groups became known as the Hoelscher Committee.

The Hoelscher Committee kept close track of the other OSD projects that might affect Project 80. As early as May it seemed that several of these studies might change the Defense structure and environment and consequently influence the Army organization. In June Mr. Hoelscher assigned specific responsibilities to particular working groups for monitoring these Defense studies that might affect their conclusions. Of the 120-odd projects instituted, 43 were at first judged to have some bearing on Project 80, but by July only 10 seemed relevant. By early September the influence of other projects on the Hoelscher Committee deliberations was judged negligible.[29]

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[29] Proj 80 Memo, Thomas to Study Group Chiefs, 5 May 61; Proj 80 Ltr, Monitorship of OSD Study Projects, 15 Jun 61; Working Paper Draft (Colonel Bolton, Study Group B), 20 Jun 61; Memo, Thomas to Norton, 6 Sep 61 -- all in DOD Projects file.

Late in March the Project Advisory Committee (PAC) held its first meeting. Mr. Hoelscher, five general officers, and a consultant from the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, Professor Sterling Livingstone, whose special expertise lay in the field of wholesale logistics management, were among those present -- though in

subsequent meetings the number of participants would vary.[30] After

[30] The members of the PAC are listed in OSD Project 80 Study, Part I, Annex A, Appendix 2.

Mr. Hoelscher explained the rationale of the study, some interesting questions were asked. Was the object of Mr. Hoelscher's exercise to get criticism off the Army's back at that particular time, or were there serious long-range implications in Mr. Hoelscher's work? Did Mr. Hoelscher intend to study only the Army's organization, or would he expand his outlook to include "a questioning of functions, the propriety of which [might be] doubted"? Was the Hoelscher study to consist of self-searching for the benefit of the Army, or merely a study forced upon the Army by the Office, Secretary of Defense? Was the Army working for the Office, Secretary of Defense, and was that office in fact telling the Army how to reorganize itself?

Mr. Hoelscher replied by stating that the Army had been offered the opportunity to study itself, and the Secretary of the Army had agreed to do so. Mr. Hoelscher did not believe that "any purely defensive approach would be advantageous." Changes were taking place in the Defense establishment, and it would be well for the Army to remain in consonance with the managerial philosophy and techniques coming into prominence. Satisfied with these answers, the Advisory Committee accepted the essential seriousness of Mr. Hoelscher's approach, and the members began to explore the avenues by which they might assist.[31]

[31] Minutes of Meeting of Project Advisory Committee, 22 Mar 61.

Mr. Hoelscher looked upon the Project Advisory Committee (PAC) as a valuable adjunct to his study groups, for the members represented the mature judgment of the Army as an institution and not merely the opinions of individuals. Not embroiled in the details of the working group studies, the PAC was useful in challenging or supporting the concepts brought forward by the Hoelscher Committee. In essence the PAC was a sounding board. But whereas Mr. Hoelscher was interested primarily in the fact-finding and analytical processes, the advisers -- and like them, many working group members -- seemed interested immediately in drawing organizational diagrams, charts, and boxes, wishing to know at once how the structure of the Army was to be modified. As the detailed work of the Hoelscher Committee continued through the summer of 1961, the role of the PAC declined in importance. As early as May Mr. Hoelscher informed the chiefs of the working groups that comments by members of the Advisory Committee were "of an advisory nature only," did "not necessarily reflect" the thinking of the project director, and did not constitute "any directive basis for revision" of working group studies.[32]

[32] Interv w/Mr. Hoelscher, 27 Feb 62; Interv w/Col Thomas, 20 Feb 62; Memo, McGregor to Chiefs of Study Groups, 23 May 61.

By the end of March Mr. Hoelscher had collected a variety of

alleged deficiencies in Army performance and a number of reports pointing to problem areas. Excessive control, lack of clear-cut authority and responsibility, fragmentation of effort, inadequate understanding of policies, a managerially unsupportable system, huge and semi-autonomous staff agencies were some of the phrases emerging from the preliminary process of soul-searching.[33]

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[33] Memo, Lang to Hoelscher, 30 Mar 61.

Members of the working groups began to report to Mr. Hoelscher for duty at the beginning of April, and by the 25th, Groups A, B, and C were at full strength; D, E, F, and G had one or two persons present. By the end of the month six working groups were actively engaged in study, and the chief of the seventh had attended several orientation meetings.[34]

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[34] Memos, Hoelscher for Horwitz, Status Reports, 14 and 28 Apr 61.

A host of papers, prepared by the Comptroller's Management Analysis staff, greeted the incoming members of the Hoelscher Committee, papers setting forth general and specific guidance for the working groups, defining concepts, outlining general procedures to be followed, and explaining the latest developments in management. Special lecturers briefed the working groups on complicated problem areas. And a flood of letters, views, comments, and proposals arrived to indicate where and how the Army was deficient in some of its practices.[35]

[35] Hoelscher files, OCA.

A possible complication to the Hoelscher study arose in mid-May when the Chief of Staff instructed the General Staff to develop program packages in connection with the budget for fiscal 1963.[36] How this

[36] Memo, Throckmorton to staff sections, 17 May 61; Memo from Assistant Secretary of Defense, 13 May 61.

might affect the work of the Hoelscher Committee became a matter of some concern. The difficulty was related not only to the question of program packages but also to a larger issue: since the Army was in a continual process of modification, the Hoelscher Committee had to deal with an organization that was in a constant state of flux even while under examination. Mr. Hoelscher's solution to this potential problem was to monitor closely prospective and actual changes in Army procedures.

If there had been any suspicion at the beginning of the study that the Hoelscher Committee might end its work without recommending changes in the Army organization, there was no doubt by mid-June that the study would recommend alterations in the current structure. Secretary Stahr himself made the intent clear in an address to the Project 80 group and the Project Advisory Committee on 13 June.

Mr. Stahr's remarks were to some extent exhortatory, but he also gave his listeners a good indication not only of the project's import-

ance but also its orientation. He said that the current era of great change placed tremendous stress on long established organizations such as the Army, which, with minimum expenditure of resources, had to be ready to meet grave current contingencies while anticipating and preparing to meet future emergencies. To re-shape the Army and give it the most favorable structure to accomplish its current and future roles was the basic task of the Hoelscher Committee. This mission had the highest priority for Mr. Stahr and General Decker.

Expressing his regret because so many officers had to be placed on extended temporary duty for the study, but expressing also his pleasure because the committee members were so well qualified for the task, Mr. Stahr offered seven comments, which were in the nature of guidelines: 1) The study was not a paper exercise. "Unless the Army, itself," Mr. Stahr said, "can demonstrate that it has the proper organizational structure and that it is performing its missions in an outstanding manner, agencies outside the Army will decide the internal organizational problems for the Army." 2) A sense of responsiveness and imagination, the qualities characterizing the President's New Frontier program, had to pervade the study group members for a successful completion of their task. 3) Organizational changes ought to be the last element considered in the study; what primarily interested Mr. Stahr was an analysis of how the Department of the Army was performing its assigned missions. 4) The Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff needed "performance indicators" to enable them to deal with critical reviews of the Army

by the Office, Secretary of Defense, the Congress, and the public. 5) Because of the short time available for the study, the Hoelscher Committee was to concentrate on the most critical areas and on those where the Army was most vulnerable to criticism. 6) The Hoelscher Committee, Mr. Stahr recommended, ought to maintain close contacts with the other services, with the Congress, with major service schools, with industry, with the press, and with the Office, Secretary of Defense. 7) The Army had to be an organization capable of attracting and holding outstanding persons as employees. In conclusion, the Secretary stressed the fact that there were no sacred cows, no areas that were above examination. But neither was there to be any change merely for the sake of change. "Your work will be an opportunity," Mr. Stahr declared, "to show that the Army seeks self-improvement, that it is responsive to changing needs, and that it is capable of the finest staff work anywhere."[37]

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[37] Remarks by Secretary Stahr, 13 Jun 61.

In a memo issued to the chiefs of his working groups on the same day, Mr. Hoelscher underlined what Mr. Stahr said. Mr. Hoelscher had written: "Our job is to get down to cases and identify the basic considerations . . . to consider the various patterns . . . and to point out specifically the practical means by which needed change can best be achieved."[38] The Hoelscher Committee would, from this

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[38] Memo, Hoelscher for Working Group Chiefs, 13 Jun 61.

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time on, be working toward recommending some kind of reorganization of the Department of the Army.

The Operations of the Study Groups

The operations of Group D, which studied the Technical Services and logistics, an area of particular interest to the Office, Secretary of Defense, exemplified how the working groups went about their business. The chief of Group D was Brig. Gen. Ralph E. Haines, who called himself "a cavalryman turned tanker whose staff experience has been almost entirely in the G-3 area."[39] His associates in contrast

[39] Gen Haines briefing to PAC, 28 Jun 61, Group D Basic Studies file.

were specialists in specific logistical areas or generalists in the broad logistics field. On the basis of two memoranda prepared by Mr. Hoelscher to describe what he thought Group D ought to investigate, the members plunged at once into an analysis of the group mission.[40] They scrutinized scope, guidelines, and internal group

[40] Hoelscher Memoranda, 22 and 29 Mar 61, Group D Back-up Papers.

organization and formulated a tentative work schedule. Two days after getting under way officially, Group D ventured to submit to Mr. Hoelscher a draft paper outlining the scope and mission of its projected study. Discussion with Mr. Hoelscher, followed by considerable refinement and revision, turned the draft into a "working paper" that

Mr. Hoelscher approved on 11 May.[41]

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[41] Files of Col Thomas; Proj 80 Rpt, Part IV, Vol. I, pp. 1-2.

Since the Hoelscher Report was due on 1 September -- though the deadline would later be extended one month -- Mr. Hoelscher set 31 July as the date for submitting the Group D report to him. General Haines would then have the month of August to revise his draft report; and he would be able to contribute as well to the conclusions and recommendations of Mr. Hoelscher's overall report. Since time was short, General Haines divided his working group into three teams in order to tackle major subjects and major areas concurrently.[42]

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[42] Group D Working Papers, 25 Apr and 3 May 61; Proj 80 Memo for Group Chiefs, 9 Jun 61.

During May and the early part of June, Group D consulted documents, interviewed approximately 150 persons -- members of the General Staff agencies, the Chiefs of the Technical Services, representatives of industry, and others -- visited 34 field installations in the United States and Europe, and discussed logistical problems with members of the PAC. In the process the working group personnel obtained much advice. According to General Haines, they accumulated many problems "but very few solutions." Though most of the persons who were interviewed admitted the existence of problems, even "major deficiencies in our way of doing business," they "seldom agree[d] on the underlying reasons for the deficiencies or the solutions."[43]

[43] Gen Haines briefing of PAC, 28 Jun 61; Proj 80 Rpt, Part IV, Vol. I, pp. 2-3, and Vol. II, pp. 95-103.

By mid-June the individual teams within the working group had completed their studies, and Group D had prepared working papers on what the members considered to be all the aspects of their subject. After noting certain Defense trends in the field of logistics, the group selected two as bearing most directly on their problem: 1) the tendency to assign all combat forces to the unified and specified commands, which made the Army's logistical mission a very large part of its total responsibilities; 2) the tendency toward integrated supply management and financial control at the Defense level, which, together with increasing technological innovations and greater complexity and costs of weapons systems, was leading to tighter management at the Defense echelon and to increased public and Congressional scrutiny of Defense budgets.[44] Examining the Army's logistical roles and

[44] Group D Working Paper, 9 Jun 61; Proj 80 Rpt, Part IV, Vol. I, pp. 16-19.

missions in the light of these trends, Group D uncovered thirteen organizational and procedural problems. These formed the basis upon which the group developed its basic considerations, alternative solutions, and final recommendations.

Some of these problems were of primary interest to other working

groups within the Hoelscher Committee. Others were outside the framework of Project 80. But six were directly concerned with Army logistics, and they revolved about the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) dual staff and command role and around the relationship among the various aspects and segments of the Army's logistical functions -- development, production, procurement, systems management, inventory management, supply distribution, and services.[45]

[45] Proj 80 Rpt, Part IV, Vol. I, p. 4; Vol. II, pp. 207 - 350.

According to Group D, DCSLOG's command role had come into being during the reorganization of the Army in 1954 in order to curb persistent criticism of the autonomous nature of the Technical Services. Given authority to "direct and control" the activities of the Technical Services, DCSLOG nevertheless shared direction and control with other General Staff agencies in the areas of personnel, training, research, and development. The result was the inability of DCSLOG to assert effective direction and control and the difficulty of the Technical Services to distinguish clearly among several conflicting command lines. To some extent DCSLOG was the victim of circumstances, for every reorganization of the Army since World War II had been half-hearted, piecemeal, unco-ordinated, and frequently contradictory in this particular problem area.[46] On the other side of the coin,

[46] Proj 80 Rpt, Part IV, Vol. II, pp. 207 - 16; Working Group Paper, Previous Studies of Army Organization, 5 Jul 61.

the different supply organizations of the Technical Services comprised a major obstacle to effective supply integration, while the depot system appeared to be an anachronism, and fiscal controls and procedures created unnecessary inventory and supply problems.

From the foregoing analysis, Group D evolved 13 basic considerations, positive statements of ideal conditions. Some were very general in nature, a few were bromides, but five clearly called for a thorough overhaul of Army logistics -- 1) a General Staff agency had to have sole and clear responsibility for developing and issuing broad and basic policies, plans, and programs in the logistics area and for supervising their execution and implementation; 2) below the General Staff level, the Army needed a positive and authoritative control over its wholesale logistical system; 3) development, adoption, and procurement processes had to be closely associated at the General Staff and at subordinate command levels; 4) the wholesale logistical structure had to minimize duplication and to group like or closely related functions without unnecessarily layering supervisory authority; 5) divisive influences engendered by relatively autonomous and self-sufficient major segments of the logistical system had to be abolished.

These basic considerations foreshadowed the Group D conclusions. They indicated Group D's beliefs in the efficacy of separating the General Staff, especially DCSLOG, from logistical operations, in the necessity to take the Technical Services out of the wholesale materiel function, and in the need to create a commodity-oriented organization responsible for both development and production under the supervision

of a single General Staff agency.[47]

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[47] Gen Haines briefing to PAC, 28 Jun 61; Group D Working Paper, Basic Considerations, 28 Jun 61; Proj 80 Rpt, Part IV, Vol. I, pp. 42 - 54.

Not all the basic considerations presented by Group D to the larger Hoelscher Committee were immediately accepted. The relationship between the development and production processes was argued at length during July and August, with opposition to Group D coming mainly from Group E, concerned with Research and Development.

Despite the opposition, Group D offered several organizational patterns designed to improve the Army's performance of its logistical functions. The basic proposal was to divide the Army's materiel functions between two major field commands in either of two ways -- 1) by two "sequential" or functional commands, one to deal with development and production, the other with supply; 2) by two "vertical" or commodity commands, one to deal with military hardware, the other with "soft" or bulk goods.

The patterns proposed and the one ultimately recommended had several fundamental features in common. They abolished the autonomous Technical Services; tried to divide command and staff functions between the General Staff and the operating agency levels; separated training, personnel management, and doctrinal functions from the Technical Services and suggested placing these matters under appropriate commands; and left the field commands much as they were but

grouped them along the lines of the Ordnance commodity commands. While recognizing the importance of research and development, Group D inclined toward integrating these functions into a single overall materiel command.[48]

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[48] Group D Working Papers dated 10 Jul 61; Gen Haines briefing to PAC, 27 Jul 61; Memo for Rcd, Discussion of Logistical and Research and Development Organization and Management at Meeting [of Group Chiefs], 26 Aug 61.

The opposite point of view, held most strongly by Group E, feared that research and development would become of subordinate importance in the Group D recommended patterns. Group E saw the Group D patterns as creating the same sort of condition that had prompted the separation of the Chief of Research and Development (CRD) from the DCSLOG in 1954.

General Haines, on the other hand, insisted that it was unwise to split the materiel package. Logistics experts interviewed by Group D members had been virtually unanimous in feeling that research and development should be combined with production and procurement at least at the operating level.

Attempting to clarify the issue, Mr. Hoelscher and members of Group D made visits early in August to several Technical Services field installations. These visits confirmed their belief that development, production, and maintenance engineering of complex weapons systems required close co-ordination best effected within the framework

of a single organizational entity.[49]

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[49] Group A Paper (revised), Some Recommendations and Comments of VIPs, 8 Aug 61; Group D Interview file, especially Memo for Rcd (Zengerle), Visit to Signal R&D Lab and Ord Spec Wpns and Ammo Command, 11 Aug 61.

The Group D recommendation reflected this point of view. Instead of suggesting two materiel commands, Group D proposed a single Systems and Materiel Command, with several subordinate commondity commands and one subordinate functional Supply Command. Mr. McNamara's public announcement on 31 August of the impending formation of the Defense Supply Agency (DSA) facilitated Group D's proposed organizational arrangement.[50] For the DSA would take over from the Army the manage-

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[50] Gen Haines briefing to PAC, 27 Jul 61; Proj 80 Rpt, Part IV, Vol. I, p. 70.

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ment of a large category of varigated supplies common to all the military services and eventually of practically all those supplies not specifically related to weapons systems.

Notwithstanding Group E, which filed what was in essence a minority report, the Hoelscher Committee accepted the basic premise of Group D -- that it was inherently undesirable and impractical to split the "materiel package" at the operating level. Yet the Hoelscher Committee recognized the validity of Group E fears over the future of research and development, and Group D consequently recom-

mended the continued separation of DCSLOG and CRD at the General Staff level, a division reflecting the comparable existences on the Defense level of the Director of Development, Research, and Engineering, and the Assistant Secretary for Installations and Logistics.[51]

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[51] Proj 80 Rpt, Part IV, Vol. II, p. 221.

During the month of September the working groups of the Hoelscher Committee rewrote and refined draft reports, co-ordinated findings and recommendations among themselves, and sought specific comments from General Staff agencies, from the PAC, and from professional managerial experts. Those perhaps most vitally affected by the Hoelscher Committee study, the Chiefs of the Technical Services, were deliberately not consulted. Mr. Hoelscher conceived his report as a monograph, as a special study, not a staff study that could be delayed by or smothered in an avalanche of nonconcurrences.[52]

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[52] Draft Memo for Rcd of Group Chiefs Meeting, 6 Jun 61; Memo for Rcd, Group Chiefs Meeting, 4 Aug 61.

During the middle months of 1961, Mr. Hoelscher had submitted bi-weekly status reports to Mr. Horwitz, with copies to the Secretary of the Army and to the Chief of Staff. He had given occasional briefings to Mr. Stahr and also to Mr. Ailes, the Under Secretary. For example, in mid-June, Mr. Hoelscher and his principal assistants had met with Mr. Ailes and had informed him of the scope of the study, the organization of the project, the role of the Advisory Committee,

and the methodology of analysis. Mr. Hoelscher took the occasion to remind Mr. Ailes that "this Project is basically an OSD project."[53]

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[53] Talking Paper for Meeting with Under Secretary Ailes [on] 19 Jun 61, dated 15 Jun.

In mid-July Mr. Hoelscher briefed Mr. Stahr on the progress of the study, and during their meeting, which lasted more than two hours on 14 July, Mr. Stahr passed along a number of wishes. He wanted Mr. Hoelscher to look into the military assistance programs; to identify Army missions not related to combat; to see whether the Secretary's office could be reduced in strength; to find out where the key decisions in the Army were being made and where they ought to be made; to consider the possibility of creating functional commands in the areas of research, procurement, training, and operations; to keep in mind the need to use more project managers; and to draw a plan on how best to make the transition from the current Army organization to the new one that would be proposed -- and to make that plan even if this prevented Mr. Hoelscher from meeting his deadline of 1 September. Mr. Stahr also noted that a plan to release information to the press and to the Congress would have to be developed with great care. And finally, he wanted Mr. Hoelscher to know that he, Mr. Stahr, would place great reliance on the recommendations submitted, particularly with respect to the preferred solution if several solutions were presented.[54]

54 Memo, Hoelscher for Decker, Meeting with Secretary of the Army regarding OSD Project 80, 18 Jul 61.

Early in August, as the work of the Hoelscher Committee began to show some slippage in schedule, the problem of how long to keep the committee in existence became a matter of some concern. Mr. Hoelscher had expected to review the drafts of each working group and to consider the comments and suggestions of the Advisory Committee around 1 September. Final revisions and reproduction would take some time, but Mr. Hoelscher hoped to have his report ready on 15 September. He would then be able to make the important presentations -- to the Secretary of the Army and to the Chief of Staff, for example -- early in October. There was no reason to expect substantial changes from the PAC because the members had been commenting on the study throughout the duration of the work. Nor did Mr. Hoelscher anticipate required changes from the Secretary of the Army. He expected Mr. Stahr to forward any comments he might have on the report with a letter of transmittal to the Secretary of Defense. Since General Decker wished the Hoelscher Committee to remain in existence until Mr. McNamara's reaction became known, Mr. Hoelscher planned to hold at least his group chiefs until mid-October. Working group members who were not located permanently in the Washington area would be released first and as early as possible. But what if six or eight weeks elapsed between the Hoelscher Committee report and Mr. McNamara's reaction? To hold all the members for that period was wasteful and

not in the best interest of the individuals or of the service. Mr. Hoelscher therefore decided to let any revisions called for by the Secretary of Defense be done by the personnel permanently stationed in the Washington, D.C. area. On this basis some group chiefs decided to start releasing members early in September.[55]

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[55] Proj 80 Master Schedules, 9 Jun and 26 Jul 61; Memo, Thomas to Hoelscher, Phaseout Personnel Plan, 10 Aug 61.

In mid-August the Hoelscher Committee drew up a detailed schedule for presenting segments of the study in progress to various groups, both internal and external. Discussions and briefings would take place between 21 August and 16 September, and on the latter date the PAC would receive a final briefing of the entire report. Any comments that the Advisory Committee wanted to make would have to be in Mr. Hoelscher's hands in writing three days later. The final revisions would then take place between 19 and 22 September. Mr. Hoelscher would submit the report to the Secretary of the Army and to the Chief of Staff on 29 September, with a briefing if desired.[56]

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[56] Proj 80 Schedule, 17 Aug 61.

For each internal briefing and discussion, the project study staff -- Mr. Hoelscher's immediate assistants, Colonels McGregor and Thomas -- drew up detailed agendas in the form of searching questions about the substantive material to be presented by the working group scheduled to make the specific presentation. For example, on Group

F's report and recommended changes, both structural and procedural" concerning personnel management, the agenda listed 22 questions.[57]

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[57] Proj 80 Committee Meeting, 21 Aug 61.

At the meeting, attended by Mr. Hoelscher, Colonel McGregor, and representatives from all the working groups, after Group F presented its conclusions, the Group F study was subjected to the most careful sort of scrutiny by means of these hard questions. The result of the discussion was a request from Mr. Hoelscher imposing additional requirements on Group F -- more study, more thought, more consideration to specific factors, more substantiation for the recommendations.[58]

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[58] Memo for Rcd, 22 Aug, Discussion of OPO, 21 Aug.

In almost daily meetings, with morning and afternoon sessions, the Hoelscher Committee hammered out its work, scrutinized the details, tested the philosophy, and checked its proposals. Each presentation made by a working group uncovered areas requiring further study by other working groups.[59] Perhaps most important, the searching questions

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[59] See Proj 80 Agenda, 24 Aug, and Memo for Rcd, 30 Aug.

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and the ensuing discussion gave the members of the Hoelscher Committee great familiarity with the questions that were bound to be asked by those to whom the report would eventually be submitted for action.[60]

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[60] Proj 80 Questions and Comments -- Group D Study Rpt, 25 Aug; Memo for Rcd, 29 Aug, on meeting 25 Aug, on Special Staff Agencies and

Logistical Matters; and similar memos for record on meetings held between 26 Aug and 7 Sep 61.

By early September Mr. Hoelscher was considering the best way of releasing to the public the material contained in his report. Brig. Gen. Robert F. Seedlock, the Military Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), with whom Mr. Hoelscher consulted, advised holding all information until the Secretary of Defense took final action on the proposals. Since information might be leaked to the press by study group members or departmental personnel "whose interests were being treated contrary to their beliefs," General Seedlock favored preparing "a sanitized, condensed statement highlighting the origin, scope, procedure, conclusions, and recommendations," this to be released if the Secretary of Defense approved the study. Mr. Hoelscher then requested all members of his committee to refrain from publicizing prematurely the work in progress and the report itself.[61]

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[61] Memo, Thomas for all study group chiefs, Release of Information Concerning this Project, 8 Sep 61.

Mr. Hoelscher submitted a draft of his overall study, a synthesis of the working group reports, to the PAC on 13 September and asked that comments be returned to him by the 19th. On 14 September he transmitted several copies of his draft to the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Information, and the Chief of Legislative Liaison.

Meeting with Mr. Hoelscher on 14 September to receive his copy of the draft report, Mr. Stahr raised the question whether the study

ought to be regarded as a committee report or as a product of the Army itself. In either case, Mr. Stahr wished the effort to represent the best the Army could do. Therefore, he felt that he and his Secretariat should have the opportunity of providing input to the study. He also indicated he would seek advice from a group of what he called "distinguished alumni" of the Army, retired officers and eminent civilians, in order to make sure that Mr. Hoelscher's points were clear and feasible. Mr. Hoelscher suggested and Mr. Stahr agreed not to involve the outsiders until comments had been received and evaluated from the assistant secretaries and the PAC. Mr. Hoelscher asked whether Mr. Stahr wanted to talk with Mr. McNamara about the date of submitting the report to the Secretary of Defense -- the deadline was 1 October, but neither the Secretary of the Army nor the Chief of Staff would be available to review the report before then. Mr. Stahr therefore named 10 October as the time for a presentation by the Hoelscher Committee to himself and General Decker, 13 October for a briefing of the distinguished alumni, and 16 October for a presentation to Mr. McNamara. Mr. Stahr informed Mr. Hoelscher that Mr. McNamara found oral briefings very useful but looked with disfavor on "fancy, gilt-edged charts or slides."[62]

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[62] Memo for Rcd (Thomas), 18 Sep, Meeting with the Secretary of the Army.

Review, redrafting, and polishing continued within the Hoelscher Committee to the end of September. On 25 September Group D briefed

the DCSLOG and his principal assistants. On 26 September Group G was still making important changes in its report. Group B was checking its figures on proposed personnel savings. And Group C was coming to some further conclusions on its recommendations.[63]

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[63] Memo for Rcd (Kjellstrom), 27 Sep; Memo, Col Joseph L. Chabot to Hoelscher, 26 Sep; Memos, Col W. F. Winton, Jr., to Hoelscher, 25 and 26 Sep; Memo, Col Edward A. Bailey to Hoelscher, 28 Sep.

On the last day of September, Mr. Hoelscher sent the Vice Chief of Staff, General Clyde D. Eddleman, a summary of the current draft of his overall report for General Decker's information. This was a considerable condensation of his draft report, which itself synthesized six contributory reports. He also notified General Eddleman of his concern over the appearance of a news story in the Army, Navy, and Air Force Journal of 30 September, which carried information on Project 80 despite Mr. Hoelscher's care to prevent the release of information before official release by the Department of Defense.[64]

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[64] Memos, Hoelscher for Eddleman, 30 Sep 61; Memo, Hoelscher for Horwitz, 2 Oct 61.

The Hoelscher Report

Mr. Hoelscher transmitted to Mr. Stahr on 5 October a printed copy of his report. It consisted of the overall report, Part I, and six primary studies, Parts II through VII. Part VIII, concerned with

Army aviation, though issued in the same format, would not be regarded as an integral part of the Hoelscher Committee report and would lead to the Howze Board deliberations during the summer of 1962.

The entire document totaled about 1,900 pages. The form of the report corresponded generally to the sequential steps involved in conducting the study and performing the analysis leading to the conclusions and recommendations. Despite the assistance of many persons, acknowledged gracefully by Mr. Hoelscher, the overall report, Part I, Mr. Hoelscher emphasized, was his own.[65]

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[65] OSD Project 80 (Army), Study of the Functions, Organization, and Procedures of the Department of the Army, Part I, Overall Report, October, 1961.

The Defense environment, Mr. Hoelscher began, showed some significant trends -- an increasing tendency toward centralized control by the Secretary of Defense, which made the Secretary of the Army more an extension of the Office, Secretary of Defense, than an active proponent of strict Army objectives; the likelihood that Defense budgets would be based on program packages designed to provide military capabilities to meet threats rather than on bulk allocations of manpower and funds to the services; the probability that managerial and budgetary procedures would soon be uniformly prescribed throughout the Department of Defense; and the growing emphasis on systems of project management.

Mr. Hoelscher then outlined the roles and missions of the Army,

described the organization of the Army and the functions of the major segments, and delineated how the Army was managed. Having established a picture of the existing organization and its mangerial procedures, Mr. Hoelscher proceeded to his analysis. "Because the study was directed toward improvement," he warned, "the findings are critical." But he explained that deficiencies were natural consequences of growth and of rapid changes during the past several years -- as technology exploded, relationships shifted and managerial techniques advanced. Mr. Hoelscher saw as the major problems: "the growing primary role of the Department of the Army is one of providing necessary support to the Army elements of the unified commands in terms of personnel, materiel, and doctrine. Accordingly, the recommendations of this study are in large measure aimed at improvements in these areas."

Having listed the basic considerations, which had furnished internal guidelines for his committee, having considered alternative patterns of organization, and having chosen as being best those patterns which satisfied most basic considerations, Mr. Hoelscher presented his conclusions as they applied to specific segments of the Army.

In the first segment of his report, concerning the Office of the Secretary of the Army and the General Staff, Mr. Hoelscher listed the strong points of the existing structure. He then presented the deficiencies -- objectives insufficiently defined; a poor relationship between planning and programming and again between programming and missions, tasks, and end products; divisive influences in the

Army Staff, fragmentation in control, conflicts between command functions and staff responsibilities; a defective review and analysis process; and others. He cited examples -- the command function of DCSLOG was in conflict with the staff functions of DCSLOG; the demands of joint activity were so pre-emptive that they overwhelmed the requirements of internal military training and planning; the Army staff was so large, its director-type functions so dominant, and the time available to the Chief and Vice Chief of Staff so limited that the staff lacked cohesiveness and unity. Some shortcomings, Mr. Hoelscher suggested, could be overcome by changing policies and procedures, by modifying the structure of the General Staff, and by changing the operating agency structure. Yet he felt that a more radical alteration would be a better solution.

One alternative pattern of organization presented by Mr. Hoelscher had the Deputy Chief, Staff for Military Operations (DCSOPS) divided into two offices, one (DCS for Strategic and International Affairs) to handle joint strategic and international matters, the other (DCS for Plans, Programs, and Systems) to concentrate on internal Army affairs; a new System Management Office added to the staff; a new Director of the Army Staff who would co-ordinate the activities of the deputy chiefs of staff and relieve the Chief and Vice Chief of part of their administrative burdens; a DCS for Research and Development instead of a CRD; and all General Staff agencies to be divested of major operating or command-type functions to the maximum extent practical.

This pattern of organization, Mr. Hoelscher pointed out, interposed an additional individual, the Director, between the staff agency heads and the Chief of Staff; created another General Staff agency by splitting the Office of DCSOPS and therefore increased the complexity of co-ordinating joint and internal Army planning; and was different enough from the existing organization to induce transitional stresses inimical to stability and continuity. Yet this pattern facilitated clarity and continuity of Army objectives; integrated planning, programming, and budgeting; related programs directly to missions, tasks, and end products; established project or systems management; and created a closely co-ordinated staff devoid of command functions.

Mr. Hoelscher offered another alternative -- three deputy chiefs of staff (for Joint Plans; Operations and Readiness; and Plans and Resources) and eight assistant chiefs (for Personnel, Intelligence, Joint Affairs, Operations, Logistics, Research and Development, Reserve Components, and Comptroller), with a Systems Management Office in direct support of the three deputy chiefs -- which permitted better capability for long range planning and programming, faster decisions on major problems, and rapid responsiveness to the Secretary of Defense. Yet it would make staff co-ordination more difficult, introduce a structural layer between the assistant chiefs and the Chief of Staff, decrease the importance of personnel, research and development, and logistics, and probably isolate and insulate the Chief and Vice Chief of Staff from staff problems.

Moving to the next segment, Mr. Hoelscher outlined the existing

organization of the Special Staff and the operating agencies. His alternative pattern of organization had as its key feature a new Office of Personnel Operations (OPO), which would control the assignments of all military personnel except Medical, Judge Advocate General, and Chaplain officers; staffed with personnel from all the arms and services, OPO would seek to employ military personnel for the benefit of the Army as a whole rather than for the benefit of any particular branch. Three new posts would provide Army-wide services of a technical nature: a Director of Engineer Services, a Director of Communications Services, and a Director of Medical Services. A Chief of Administrative Services would assume most of The Adjutant General's functions, and a Chief of Support Services would handle Quartermaster General functions. The remaining Special Staff agencies would continue their functions, except for two (Chemical and Ordnance), which would no longer be required because most of their functions (personnel, training, and materiel logistics) would be assumed by new agencies.

In his next segment of presentation, concerned with training, Mr. Hoelscher pointed out that CONARC, each of the seven Technical Services, and each of the five administrative services operated its own schools, while some operated training centers. Though CONARC had supervisory control over the school system, the existing structure hindered the development of homogeneity, made duplication of courses and facilities inevitable, and gave expertise a relatively narrow focus.

A simple solution, according to Mr. Hoelscher's first alternative pattern, was to extend the responsibility of CONARC -- called in this pattern Force Development Command (FDC) -- over all the schools and training centers. But this, Mr. Hoelscher conceded, was probably too large a function for a single headquarters to perform. Another pattern would have FDC concerned with unit training and an Individual Training Command (ITC) concerned with schools and training centers, each reporting directly to Headquarters, Department of the Army. But a split was likely to develop between the two types of training, and complications in funding might ensue. Still another alternative would have individual and unit training under FDC, with a subordinate ITC, and installations to be commanded by zone of interior armies. This too had its disadvantages.

Mr. Hoelscher's next segment concerned the combat developments system -- the research, development, and early use of new doctrine, organization, and materiel to secure the greatest combat effectiveness with the least expenditure of men, money, and materiel. The existing organization, Mr. Hoelscher explained, consisted of 11 CONARC combat development agencies, 14 DA agencies, and the Army components of 5 unified commands, plus 7 CONARC boards for materiel service tests; the 7 Technical Services and the 5 administrative services had no uniform combat developments function -- some employed agencies forming part of their schools, others used boards, and still others agencies within the chief's office. Fragmentation of effort, loose co-ordination, slow and cumbersome developments, the difficulty of fixing responsibility and of dealing with the long-range future, and

duplication were some of the disadvantages. In Mr. Hoelscher's words, "there is a built-in bias toward conservatism and relatively minor improvement rather than toward significant innovation."

An alternative pattern was to combine the CONARC combat developments function under a separate agency directly subordinate to the Headquarters, Department of the Army in order to pull together the varied work done in many dispersed agencies and in order to present integrated results to the General Staff. To prevent this agency from becoming too theoretical, a Combat Developments Agency (CDA) might be placed under FDC to give it access to troop units.

In his next segment, logistics, Mr. Hoelscher pointed out that the advantage of the existing logistical system lay in the fact that it was a going concern and operating efficiently much like industry. The disadvantages were that the system was top heavy, burdened with heavy reporting requirements, compartmented at the Washington level, and duplicative; cutting across traditional organizational lines was difficult; no common procurement organization and operation existed; though the system was user-conscious, it was not user-oriented, and fractionalization made it inconvenient to the user.

To achieve a consolidation, Mr. Hoelscher proposed a Materiel Development and Production Command designed to perform the earlier phases of the materiel cycle -- research, development, testing, initial production, and procurement -- for all classes of supplies and equipment, and all production for more complex items such as missiles; he proposed a Supply and Distribution Command to perform the later phases

of the cycle -- procurement, storage, distribution, maintenance, and disposal. Another pattern would have a commodity-oriented structure with two major field commands assigned parallel or concurrent materiel responsibilities rather than sequential responsibilities, one for hard, the other for soft goods. Still another had a single field command with a group of subordinate commodity commands to perform development, procurement, and production, and a subordinate Supply Command. This new organization, named Systems and Materiel Command (SMC), would make for uniform policies, procedures, and reporting systems; clearly defined areas of responsibility; and better responsiveness. On the other hand, SMC would perhaps be too large a command with too much control over Army resources. Activating SMC would prompt problems of personnel dislocation, difficulties with respect to costs, and disruptions of operations during the transitional period of reorganization.

In the final segment of his presentation, Mr. Hoelscher discussed research and development matters. Hopefully, he believed that creating SMC would ameliorate problems in the development area.

Mr. Hoelscher then made his recommendations. His preferred pattern of organization would have SMC perform not only the wholesale materiel functions then assigned to the Technical Services but also the service test functions then assigned to CONARC; FDC to handle individual and unit training (except medical, legal, and chaplain); CDA to establish the doctrine then a responsibility of CONARC, the Technical Services, and others; OPO on the Special Staff to give central

control to career development and personnel assignment; the General Staff relieved of command-type and operating functions; and finally, "improved policies, practices, and procedures, to include mission-oriented programs projected over five and ten year periods, and a budget supporting the approved programs." In this pattern, Mr. Hoelscher had ITC subordinate to FDC and responsible not only for individual training but also for tables of organization and equipment, training literature, and current doctrine; the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) to retain the manpower management function, while OPO performed the personnel management; The Adjutant General (TAG) operations to be deprived of extensive personnel operations; Military History and Quartermaster heraldry to be transferred to the Chief of Administrative Services; a new Director of the Army Staff to act as the principal staff assistant to the Chief and Vice Chief of Staff; and DCSOPS to be divided into two separate staff sections.

This new structure would, Mr. Hoelscher believed, decentralize operations to field commands or agencies; enhance control and direction by combining elements into functional areas that would prevent dispersion of responsibility; relate resources readily to missions and tasks; and facilitate flexibility in expanding or contracting the size and the tasks of the Army as needed. Though additional field facilities would be required, the General Staff would become smaller and more cohesive, and the Department of the Army would be better able to supervise each critical phase of the materiel cycle.

Despite these and other favorable results expected, was change really warranted? Change could not be rejected, Mr. Hoelscher believed, simply because it involved costs and risks. More pertinent were the questions on how much change was needed, how much could be paid in terms of dislocation and disruption, and how the best time to change could be determined. To Mr. Hoelscher it was clear and definite that the Army ought to make the basic changes he recommended and that the changes ought to occur in a phased series of actions rather than immediately and concurrently in all areas -- for it was vital to keep the Army performing at the highest practical level of efficiency at all times, and particularly so in the fall of 1961, when the Army was rapidly expanding its forces in response to the latest Berlin crisis.

The pattern of organization that was satisfactory in the early days of the Army's existence, he felt, no longer gave the Army sufficient flexibility for future growth. The Army needed better long-term guidance, greater unity of purpose and effort, more closely related programs and resources, greater unity of purpose and effort, more closely related programs and resources, decentralized operations, more flexible personnel actions, an improved development process, a better organized development-procurement-production area, a single supply system and improved supply service, better co-ordinated individual and unit training, better guidance to Reserve units, a readjustment of the ROTC program, and better relations with higher authority, industry, and the scientific world. The changes he

proposed in the Army's organization would, he believed, strengthen the Army and improve its performance and operations.

This was the written report, and on 11 October, Mr. Hoelscher and key members of his committee briefed Mr. Stahr, Mr. Ailes, Generals Decker and Eddleman, and other key members of the Secretariat and General Staff. The briefing document, numbering about fifty typed pages and supplemented by vu-graphs, presented the major points of the Hoelscher Committee findings. Summarizing the proposals for change, the Hoelscher Committee briefers envisaged 1) a more efficient and better supported Secretary and a reduced but more responsive General Staff; 2) a Special Staff providing administrative and technical services without duplication of effort; 3) a decentralized command for materiel functions; 4) a consolidation of training; and 5) increased ability to develop operational, organizational, and materiel concepts. In the opinion of the committee, the changes could be made easily -- if the Secretary of Defense approved, if he then submitted the proposals to the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and the House, and if there was no adverse reaction by either house of Congress.[66]

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[66] Memo for Rcd (McGregor), 13 Oct 61; [Original Project 80 Briefing, 10 Oct 61], Group D files.

During the discussion that followed, Mr. Hoelscher explained that the recommendations were broad and general. The specifics as displayed in the organizational boxes of the various charts accom-

panying the presentation, he said, were merely indicative, not exact. The changes were a few basic proposals with respect to materiel logistics, training, combat developments, personnel management and operations, and the organization of Headquarters, Department of the Army. The proposed changes, he hoped, would be examined in the light of their feasibility and practicality.

But how should the Army determine whether the results of Mr. Hoelscher's study were relevant, cogent, and practical? Mr. Stahr stated his belief that the Project 80 report ought not be submitted to the Secretary of Defense without prior consideration in the "Army family." After several persons present spoke on some of the recommendations, the Vice Chief of Staff suggested that a "senior General Staff Committee" study the report, for though the study was "a magnificent job," it still had, he felt, "lots of bugs" in it; what he personally favored to increase the efficiency of the Army was to "simplify the present system." Mr. Stahr expressed his pleasure over the report, which, he said, had "some really good concepts." But further clarification seemed necessary in order to "simplify things."

Additional discussion made it evident that the immediate reaction to the work of the Hoelscher Committee was one of distinct reservation verging on opposition. At this critical moment General Haines spoke. He talked directly to some of the questions that had been raised and assured his listeners that the reorganization would give the Army increased efficiency and effectiveness, particularly in the logistical area. When he finished, the atmosphere of coldness had

thawed perceptibly.

In the ensuing discussion the point was recognized that the recommendations of the Hoelscher Committee were conceptual in nature and that a reorganization would have to be built detail by detail after further work.

Finally, the meeting turned to a discussion of how the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff might handle the report before sending it to the Secretary of Defense. Should another meeting be held to discuss the action to be taken? Was it desirable to study the report another month even though the deadline had already twice been extended? Should the report be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense with a note explaining that the comments of the Secretary of the Army and of the Chief of Staff would be dispatched in 30 days? Was it wise to forward the report unless it generally represented the ideas of the Secretary of the Army? Could a cover memorandum make clear that the proposals contained many desirable features but at the same time deficiencies that required careful analysis? Should agreement be reached on the basic concepts of the study before forwarding the document?

Mr. Stahr wanted to have the report reviewed within the Army but did not see how he could withhold sending the report to Mr. McNamara any longer, particularly since he believed that the Secretary of Defense would be concerned only with the broad organizational concepts, not the details. Deciding that Project 80 was essentially complete insofar as the working groups were concerned and that there were no further requirements for a new report, Mr. Stahr gave permission for

the personnel who had worked with Mr. Hoelscher to be released as soon as possible. Follow-up action would entail nothing more, he believed, than comments on the report.[67]

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[67] Memo for Rcd (McGregor), Presentation of Findings and Recommendations, 11 Oct 62, dated 13 Oct 62; Interv w/Lt Col Kjellstrom, 22 Mar 63.

A month earlier General Decker had decided not to subject the Hoelscher study to the formal analysis of normal staffing but rather to refer the report to the deputy chiefs of staff. He had asked them for comments, which he said would receive "every consideration."[68]

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[68] General Staff Council Minutes, 12 Sep 62; see also Ibid., 21 Sep.

To assist the deputy chiefs, Mr. Hoelscher had informally discussed with them portions of his report.

A day after the Hoelscher Committee made its formal oral presentation, the General Staff Council discussed the question of whether to send the Hoelscher study to the Secretary of Defense at once or to hold it for thirty days of consideration and review. Pending the decision, Mr. Stahr asked the deputy chiefs of staff, including the Chief of R&D and the Comptroller, all of whom were familiar with the report, to study its recommendations and to submit comments to him by 14 October, these comments to be funneled through the Chief of Staff. One of several items that particularly interested and bothered

General Decker was what he found to be an inconsistency in the Hoelscher report that established a functional structure for management while retaining some features of the existing organization; if the Hoelscher Committee wished to advocate a functional structure for the Army, General Decker believed, the Committee should have gone all the way. This and other aspects of the report, he felt, needed "thorough examination."[69]

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[69] Ibid., 12 Oct 61.

On the following day, 13 October, the DCSLOG, who had been absent from the previous briefing, and the Chiefs of the Technical Services received the same formal presentation by Hoelscher Committee briefers. The major concern of those present was the loss by the Technical Services of their personnel management and training functions. The DCSLOG explained that the Hoelscher report was not to be staffed in normal fashion and that comments from the Chiefs of the Technical Services were not desired at that particular time.[70]

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[70] Interv w/Kjellstrom, 22 Mar 63.

The Traub Committee

The decision on how the Army would handle the Hoelscher Committee report became apparent on 14 October, when General Decker appointed a committee of senior officers "to develop and recommend to the Chief of Staff the views of the Army General Staff on Project 80 (Hoelscher

Study)." Headed by the Comptroller of the Army, Lt. Gen. David W. Traub, and with Col. Leo Benade as Secretary, the committee was to consider "as a minimum" the organization of the Department of the Army staff and the need for, as well as the missions, functions, and locations of, the SMC, FDC, and CDA. Assuming that these elements would become parts of a reorganized Army, General Decker directed supporting studies to be made to develop recommendations on their internal organizational structures -- DCSLOG to study SMC, DCSOPS to study FDC, and CRD to study CDA; these supporting studies were to be submitted to the Traub Committee not later than 1 November. The Traub Committee was to prepare recommendations for a plan of how to implement the Army's reorganization and submit its report to the Chief of Staff before 15 November. Finally, General Decker cautioned "all concerned" to prevent "premature disclosure of information concerning the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Project 80 study."[71]

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[71] Memo, SGS (Throckmorton) for Deputy Chiefs of Staff, etc., Study of Army Organization, 14 Oct 61.

Since the Secretary of Defense was expecting the Hoelscher report on the promised date, 16 October, Mr. Stahr informally transmitted the Project 80 study to Mr. McNamara, even though the Army had formulated no position on the report. While Mr. McNamara studied the recommendations for change, the Army itself would be coming to grips with the proposals suggested by Mr. Hoelscher's committee and trying

to reach some kind of consensus in the following thirty days.[72]

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[72] Interv w/Kjellstrom, 22 Mar 63.

The Traub Committee was to be the official instrument and the focal point of the Army's examination of the Hoelscher report. Yet while members of the Traub Committee met periodically to discuss and refine the Hoelscher Committee concepts, specific committees from the Offices of the DCSLOG, DCSOPS, and CRD were also reviewing the Hoelscher Committee findings, the General Staff agencies on the topmost echelons were discussing the implications of the recommended changes, and the General Staff Council was coming to an understanding and appreciation of the meaning of the proposals. Since General Decker wished to present an Army position to Mr. Stahr -- for further transmittal to Mr. McNamara -- by 15 November, it was necessary for all concerned to work quickly.[73]

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[73] See General Staff Council Minutes, 19 Oct 61. The members of the Traub Committee are listed in the Traub Committee Report.

The discussions held in the General Staff Council during the last two weeks of October best mirrored the concerns of the Army's principal officers. Though the talks were for the most part inconclusive, and though no decisions were reached in council, the meetings indicated the trend of developing thought. For example, if the Hoelscher study actually intended to dismember the Technical Services, were the branches also to be eliminated? Would the proposed CDA be

oriented toward CRD, DCSOPS, or CONARC?[74] How would the zone of interi-

[74] Ibid.

or armies tie in with the ITC? Could FDC do a better job of school training than the Technical Services chiefs who knew their own requirements better than anyone else? Could the General Staff eliminate duplication by modifying the procedure of supervision rather than through organizational change? As for the idea of creating a Director of the Staff, General Decker said simply, "We do not need him." The DCSOPS suggested that instead of splitting his office as recommended, the Traub Committee look into the matter of seeing how the Assistant DCSOPS for International Affairs might be relieved of some of his work load so he could spend more time on Army problems.[75]

[75] Ibid., 24 Oct 61.

On 26 October, after General Traub briefed the General Staff Council on the proposed distribution of functions among CONARC, CDA, and the Research and Materiel Command (formerly SMC), General Decker had some questions. Might CDA become an ivory tower organization? And how should the ITC be established -- as a separate command under the Department of the Army, as a subordinate command of CONARC, or as an agency within CONARC?[76] On the last day of the month, when the

[76] Ibid., 26 Oct 61.

General Staff Council discussed the problem of where to put the

doctrinal function, the conversation was to a large extent desultory.[77]

[77] Ibid., 31 Oct 61.

For by then the focus of consideration had moved outside the Army periphery. By then, the Secretary of Defense was making his wishes felt.

Mr. McNamara had reacted promptly to his receipt of the Hoelscher Committee report. As some observers had anticipated, he asked immediately for additional details -- the internal organizations of the proposed commands and their subordinate agencies, commands, and installations; the locations envisaged for the new agencies; the span of control projected for the newly proposed commanders. He also wanted more alternative organizational patterns. And he expressed concern over the relationship of development and production, the disposition of test and evaluation agencies, the future of research laboratories, and the responsibility for supply control.[78]

[78] OSD Memo for Rcd (Col Harry W. O. Kinnard), 1 Nov 61; Presentation to General Decker on 8 Nov 61; Memo for Traub (Brig Gen James M. Illig), Secretarial Requests for Information, 21 Nov 61; Memo for Traub (Paul R. Ignatius), 18 Nov 61 -- all in Kjellstrom Briefing files.

The burden for providing the information requested by the Secretary of Defense, as well as by his General Counsel and Mr. Horwitz's office, fell upon the members of the Hoelscher Committee who remained

assigned or attached to the Comptroller's Office upon the dissolution of the committee. At the same time these persons were receiving heavy demands for information, clarification, and additional detail from the Traub Committee. Personnel shortages, including clerical help, and short deadlines soon created an atmosphere of frantic, sometimes confused, activity. Stringent security restrictions and the lack of time for normal staff procedures impeded efforts to obtain the information requested. Yet the work somehow proceeded.[79]

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[79] Interv w/McGregor, 10 Sep 62.

In mid-November, Mr. McNamara requested alternative organizational patterns for the Research and Materiel Command, which had by then been renamed once more, this time as the Materiel Development and Logistics Command (MDLC). In compliance, the Traub Committee, aided by the Hoelscher Committee veterans, submitted five patterns, while Mr. Vance submitted one. Mr. McNamara accepted Mr. Vance's solution to the problem of compressing the span of control of the MDLC commander, and the eight subordinate commodity centers earlier recommended were reduced to four. Mr. Ailes then directed the Traub Committee to acquiesce in this organizational structure.[80]

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[80] General Staff Council Minutes, 16 Nov 61.

Thus it came about that the Traub Committee report, submitted to the Chief of Staff on 22 November, contained input not only from the Army staff but also from the Secretary of Defense. The report

numbered 302 pages, including the plans drawn by DCSLOG, DCSOPS, and CRD as directed by the Chief of Staff. A DCSLOG task force under Brig. Gen. James M. Illig, assisted by representatives from CRD and the Technical Services, had prepared a preliminary study of MDLC. Similarly, DCSOPS, through a group headed by Col. Chester H. Anderson, had contributed a staff study on the training function, helped in part by advice rendered in a CONARC staff paper. CRD had done the same in a study made of combat developments by a committee under Col. Wilson R. Reed.

General Traub noted in his report that his committee had presented the Hoelscher Committee findings to the General Staff through the medium of the General Staff Council meetings. He noted that the General Staff had modified Mr. Hoelscher's study, but he made no mention of Mr. McNamara's contributions. The Secretary of the Army had then approved the Hoelscher Committee recommendations as modified and as presented by the Traub Committee.[81] What the Traub Committee

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[81] The following is based on the Report of the Committee Appointed to Develop and Recommend to the Chief of Staff the Views of the Army General Staff on Project 80, November, 1961 (Traub Committee Report).

Report represented, then, was the Army reaction and response, plus reaction and response by the Secretary of Defense, to the Hoelscher Committee recommendations. Now the Secretary of Defense would approve the conclusions or recommend further modifications.

In his report General Traub warned that many important aspects of the proposed reorganization remained to be worked out in detail. Special planning groups would be required to implement the changes. And further study was necessary -- to locate the new commands, to determine the extent of site preparation in each case, to decide the best internal organizational structures of the new commands and agencies as well as their personnel staffing requirements, and to work out the budgetary implications of the overall reorganization. To facilitate the necessary continuing study, General Traub recommended that copies of his report be made available to the General Staff agencies for information and advance planning, but that utmost care be exercised to insure "no premature disclosure" of information. The reorganization, if approved, had to be planned carefully and phased gradually to insure the effective continuation of the Army's current operations. Most important, the Traub Committee accepted the general Hoelscher Committee concepts, a position probably predictable in view of the clearly indicated desires of the Secretary of Defense.

As a general principle, the Traub Committee recommended retaining current titles wherever possible. More specifically, the committee seconded the Hoelscher report and recommended approving the establishment of OPO and divesting the General Staff of command-type functions if the proposed subordinate commands were, in fact, created; dividing DCSOPS into two separate offices, but not in the immediate future; transferring responsibility for the troop program from DCSPER

to DCSOPS; transferring the functions of the Chief of Ordnance and of the Chief Chemical Officer to other staff agencies and to MDLC; elevating the Chief of R&D and the Comptroller to deputy chiefs of staff; transferring the functions of military history and heraldry to The Adjutant General; and realigning General Staff responsibilities for co-ordinating the Special Staff.

Disagreeing with the Hoelscher report, the Traub Committee saw no need for a Director of the Staff, and recommended: strengthening and improving program co-ordination and control by means of a Director of Programs in the Office of the Chief of Staff; establishing an appropriate office in DCSOPS to insure a focal point for chemical, biological, radiological, and special weapons planning; and making the Chief of the Army Audit Agency a member of the Special Staff with dual responsibility for staff and command in view of the growing importance of the post audit function.

The Traub Committee preferred retaining the name CONARC instead of changing the headquarters to FDC; establishing a Directorate of Individual Training in the headquarters of CONARC instead of creating an ITC; and keeping the training centers under zone of interior armies, which were subordinate to CONARC, instead of transferring their control to ITC. CONARC should gain responsibility for training centers and schools currently assigned to the technical and administrative services, but should lose responsibility for combat developments, tables of organization and equipment, doctrine, and field manuals -- these to be transferred to a proposed Combat Developments Command (CDC);

while test boards and materiel development responsibilities should be reassigned to MDLC.

The MDLC commander should have responsibility for all phases of the materiel cycle from research to wholesale supply and maintenance; be the focal point for all operations pertaining to development, testing, production, and the wholesale supply of materiel, including the operation of laboratories, arsenals, proving grounds, test ranges, depots, and transportation terminals; and be responsible for delivering equipment and supplies to installations in the continental United States, to overseas commands, to military assistance program recipients, and to other military service and government agencies.

CDC should have responsibility for developing organizational and operational objectives and concepts, materiel objectives and qualitative requirements, war gaming, field experimentation, selected operations research studies, and certain cost effectiveness studies; and should develop doctrine, prepare tables of organization and equipment, and write field manuals.

Having made its recommendations on the substance of the reorganization, the Traub Committee offered five guidelines for planning how to implement the reorganization: 1) To preserve the Army's effectiveness and efficiency, responsibilities had to be transferred gradually even though this might result in dual staffing in many areas during the transitional period. 2) Though undue haste in changing had to be avoided, unduly prolonged transition would bring on exaggerated problems and unacceptable personnel turbulence. 3) Transfer of

responsibilities had to be accomplished in a variety of ways according to what was best suited in each individual case. 4) To avoid confusion over which command or agency was responsible to the Chief of Staff for a specific function at any time, specific times had to be established when one agency was divested of a responsibility and another was to assume it. 5) Changes were to be managed at the highest echelon of each command or agency affected.

The transitional period, the Traub Committee recommended, ought to start with a planning phase, to begin within thirty days after the Secretary of Defense approved the reorganization. Success in the planning phase would depend in large measure on early designation of new commanders and chiefs. An activation phase would begin when the new commander assumed responsibility for the newly assigned functions. A final phase would occur when the internal structures of the new agencies and commands would be modified and when mid-management and field organizations would be structured. The Traub Committee also offered a sequential order of reorganization activities and an information and congressional notification plan.

The Traub Committee Report not only modified the Hoelscher recommendations but also condensed the Hoelscher Report. In some instances repetitive of the Hoelscher findings, the Traub Committee Report remained tenative. No firm decision had yet been made on whether to implement the reorganization of the Army and no firm basis beyond a conceptual framework yet existed to shape an actual reorganization effort.

The Decision

One of the early steps taken toward a decision was in the direction of General Maxwell D. Taylor, former Army Chief of Staff who had become Special Assistant to the President, in effect Mr. Kennedy's military advisor, and who would have much to say in helping the President decide on whether to implement the proposed reorganization. Mr. McNamara requested General Taylor's views on "the reorganization of the technical services," as the request was put, and in reply General Taylor asked to be briefed on the specific provisions of the intended reorganization.[82]

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[82] Memo for Rcd (Kjellstrom), Briefing of General Maxwell Taylor, 24 Nov 61. The quote above is quoted in Colonel Kjellstrom's memorandum.

Mr. Hoelscher had met with General Taylor at the end of May to explain the reorganization mission, the guidelines, and the organization of his committee; and to ask the general whether he had any comments to contribute to the study. General Taylor had agreed that all the military services needed examination in the light of the developing Defense establishment; stated that the foremost requirement was "to serve the people who do the fighting"; stressed the "need for stability in a great organization like the Army"; "decried change for change sake"; discussed the need "for a good logistics organization," but "saw no need for a major overhaul" of the Technical Services.[83]

[83] Group A Memo for Rcd (Col John A. Ord), Meeting with General Maxwell D. Taylor, 31 May 61, dated 2 Jun 61; Group A Paper (revised), Some Recommendations and Comments of VIPs, 8 Aug 61.

Six months later, on 22 November, when Mr. Hoelscher and some of the principal members of his defunct committee made a 30-minute presentation to him, General Taylor appeared much impressed by the proposals for change but was unwilling to commit himself on so radical a reorganization after so short an interview. The catalogue of deficiencies in the Army's logistical system surprised him and evoked the wry comment that he had not known "the Army was so bad off." Primarily concerned with strategy and military operations, he warned that any logistical reorganization had to be geared to supporting troops in the field. Stressing the need for continued stability in the Army and opposing changes that might disrupt current operations, he pointed out the importance of tradition to the Army. But he wished more detailed information on the functions of the General Staff, on personnel management and training, and on the expected impact of the reorganization on the Army's military posture. He also asked what views the Technical Services chiefs held with respect to the proposals. Finally, he commented that the "recommendations were an ingenious solution which would probably solve many problems, but at the same time set up others not recognized." Some of his briefers came away convinced that the general did not altogether favor the results of the study.[84]

[84] Memo for Rcd (Kjellstrom), 24 Nov 61; Interv w/McGregor, 10 Sep 62.

With General Taylor having indicated his interest in the comments of the Technical Services chiefs, Mr. McNamara assembled them on 8 December, a day that would later be known in some circles as "Black Friday." He informed them that he had decided to recommend reorganization to the President, but he was nevertheless interested in their comments.

The reaction of the Technical Services chiefs showed their general unfamiliarity with the details of Project 80. Their response gave at least one observer the impression that they believed that Project 80 would differ little from previous organization proposals and "they didn't appear to know it was for real" this time.[85] General

[85] Interv w/Lt Col Ashley, 21 Sep 62.

Hinrichs, the Chief of Ordnance, objected vigorously, calling the recommendations change for the sake of change. Other chiefs doubted that OPO could provide the highly personal attention to career management that characterized the personnel and training functions of the Technical Services, questioned whether CONARC could provide the specialized training required in the Technical Services, wondered whether the concepts were too general in nature, and asked whether the reorganization would really correct the alleged deficiencies. In contrast with other negative reactions, General Besson, the Chief

of Transportation, admitted that the decision-making process up the chain of command resembled a stovepipe rather than a pyramid; conceded that a decision for a new type of trousers sometimes received as much attention as that for a new tank; cited needless delays and excessive lead-time in developing new weapons; and hoped that the reorganization would correct these deficiencies.

Having listened to the comments, Mr. McNamara stated that he hoped the chiefs would not weaken the Defense establishment by indulging in public controversy over the reorganization. If the President decided to reorganize the Army, Mr. McNamara wanted everyone to help make the decision effective.[86]

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[86] Memo for Rcd (McGregor), Discussions with Chiefs of Technical Services, 8 Dec 61; Memor for Rcd (M. O. Stewart), 8 Dec 61.

In actual fact, the Technical Services had not been altogether in the dark. Representatives of the Technical Services had been members of the Hoelscher Committee. Technical Services chiefs had forwarded their views on logistical problems to the Hoelscher Committee, and working groups had interviewed them and key members of their organizations.[87] Furthermore, after receiving a briefing from

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[87] See Group D files, folders marked "Problem Areas" and "Briefings."

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a member of his staff on 2 August on the tenor of the preliminary proposals of the Hoelscher Committee, the DCSLOG had assured the

Technical Services chiefs that he favored continuation of the existing structure; and after stating categorically that he did not endorse the new concepts, the DCSLOG informed the Technical Services chiefs not only what the Hoelscher Committee seemed to be doing but also what his position was.[88] The chiefs or their representatives had also

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[88] Memo for Rcd (Manuel Garcia), Briefing of the DCSLOG on the Reorganization of Logistics Establishment within the Department of the Army, 3 Aug 61, and attached material prepared by the Management Division, Transportation Corps, 7 Aug 61, from Briefing on Project 80 Proposal at DCSLOG, 4 Aug 61, OCMH files.

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attended the briefing held for the DCSLOG and for them on 13 October.

Yet the boldness and rapidity of Mr. McNamara's decisions were probably surprising and perhaps disconcerting to the Technical Services chiefs. The principal feature of Project 80 was the unprecedented functional reorganization of the Technical Services, and the General Staff, presumably aware of Mr. McNamara's desire for action, had not followed normal staff procedures. The Technical Services chiefs had not been asked for their comments in a formal staff manner. Expecting to be asked before a decision was made, they were still waiting when they learned they were to have little or no say in the decision. Rather than endorse solutions wrapped in labored staff actions, Mr. McNamara had explored alternative solutions personally, in a way so unorthodox and alien to traditional staff procedures that the members of the Army General Staff were also somewhat taken by surprise.[89]

[89] See Robert S. McNamara, "Committees are of Value only for Exchanging Ideas," Armed Forces Management, vol. VIII, No. 2 (November 1961), pp. 22 - 24; Interv w/Ashley, 21 Sep 62; General Staff Council Minutes, 16 Nov 61.

Mr. Stahr and the General Staff had hoped to have at least a month to reach agreement on the reorganization proposals, but Mr. McNamara's intervention telescoped the decision process, for Mr. McNamara had requested information, reached decisions, and issued directives to the Traub Committee while the latter strove to agree on recommendations.[90]

[90] Talking Paper for General Traub to be used at an Appropriate Time during the Course of a Meeting of his Committee, undated anonymous draft, early November 1961, Kjellstrom's Briefing files on the Subordinate Structure of the Department of the Army; General Staff Council Minutes, 12 and 16 Oct, and 16 Nov 61; Interv w/McGregor, 10 Sep 62.

With Mr. McNamara satisfied with the concept of the Army's reorganization, though he had had little time to look at anything except MDLC, a brief statement explaining the content of the reorganization became necessary. During late November and early December, several former members of the Hoelscher Committee, notably Colonel McGregor, wrote a further refinement of the Hoelscher and Traub Committees' reports. A new paper, known as the Green Book, came into

being, and this set forth the conceptual framework of the recommended reorganization of the Army.[91]

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[91] Report of the Reorganization of the Department of the Army, 10 Dec 61.

On 10 December, Mr. Stahr submitted to Mr. McNamara the Green Book, along with a letter of transmittal explaining the genesis and course of the reorganization work. He explained that the Green Book did not have "unanimous concurrence by all consulted" but reflected "the considered views of the Chief of Staff, myself and the great majority of the senior and junior officers and members of the Secretariat who participated in the study and review." The Green Book, he added, incorporated "most of the principal proposals for change" recommended by the Hoelscher Committee. The "significant organizational changes" included establishing a Materiel Development and Logistic Command "to perform the materiel functions currently assigned to the Technical Services," organizing a Combat Developments Command, assigning an expanded individual and unit training function to CONARC, modifying the Army Staff "to permit greater emphasis on planning, programming, policy-making, as well as over-all responsiveness," to consolidate personnel management, and to make some alterations in the Special Staff agencies. Further "adjustment and refinement" of the "basic structure set forth in the proposed reorganization" would be necessary as detailed plans were developed. Though the reorganization was "broad and far-reaching," it was expected to have little impact on the major

installations, on the general stability of the Army, or on the morale of Army personnel. Before recommending finally the proposed reorganization of the Department of the Army, Mr. Stahr added a statement on the savings that could be anticipated from the reorganization -- it was difficult, he wrote, "to predetermine the personnel and funding economies that may result" for thoughts of this nature "were not included in the basic considerations." However, Mr. Stahr said, he hoped that "eventual economies" would be realized after the period of transition from the existing structure to the proposed one.[92]

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[92] Ltr, Stahr to McNamara, 10 Dec 61.

Fundamentally, the letter was only a matter of form. Later that month, on 21 December, when General Taylor received a second and more detailed briefing on the proposed reorganization, Mr. Vance stated clearly at the outset that Mr. McNamara and his staff "fully supported the reorganization plan."[93]

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[93] Memo for Rcd (Ashley), Briefing of General Maxwell D. Taylor, Special Assistant to the President, 26 Dec 61.

This briefing of General Taylor was presented by a small band of Hoelscher Committee alumni, who had prepared detailed answers to the questions previously raised by the President's Special Assistant. After the presentation, when General Taylor asked what alternative organizational patterns had been considered for Army logistics and why they had been rejected, Mr. Vance answered, giving the several

other patterns and the disadvantages that had prompted their elimination. Going further, Mr. Vance gave Mr. McNamara's belief that separating the functions of personnel management, training, and combat developments from the Technical Services constituted "radical surgery"; consequently, it was better "to go all the way" and realign the Technical Services completely along functional lines. As for the reactions of the Technical Services chiefs, the DCSLOG, Lt. Gen. Robert W. Colglazier, Jr., who was also present, stated that the chiefs were reluctant to relinquish their personnel management and training functions but less so after their briefing earlier that month.

At the conclusion of the meeting, General Taylor said that the overall plan was excellent. In presenting the case to the President, he would try, he said, to outline both sides of the reorganization as fairly as possible. Yet he gave the impression that he would endorse the reorganization, and this seemed to signal the President's approval.[94]

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[94] Ibid.; Agenda for Discussion with General Maxwell D. Taylor on OSD Project 80, 21 Dec 61, DARPO files; Interv w/McGregor, 10 Sep 62.

Two days later General Taylor passed to Mr. Kennedy the recommendation for reorganizing the Army. The absence of objection on General Taylor's part implied his concurrence in the plan.[95]

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[95] Memo, Taylor for the President, 23 Dec 61.

On 10 January 1962, Mr. McNamara sent the President his formal letter recommending reorganization of the Army according to the provisions of the Green Book. If Mr. Kennedy approved, the Armed Services Committees of the Congress would need to be notified. Under the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense by the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, a Department of Defense Reorganization Order would be necessary. To the letter he sent the President, Mr. McNamara attached copies of a proposed order and of letters he was mailing to the Chairmen of the Armed Services Committees, Senator Richard B. Russell and Representative Carl Vinson.[96]

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[96] Ltr, McNamara to the President, and inclosures, 10 Jan 62.

The McCormack-Curtis amendment to the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 granted the Secretary of Defense authority to reorganize non-combat agencies within the Department to gain more efficient management. The act itself made it possible for reorganizations of this nature to become effective if the Congress did not object within thirty days.[97] Thus, swift Congressional approval was possible,

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[97] Memo, Col William R. Desobry for Comptroller of the Army, Attn: Col Benade, Plan for Notification of Congress on Army Reorganization, 21 Nov 61, DARPO Congressional Briefing files; DARPO Question and Answer Binder (Kjellstrom); Paul C. Means, "The Speaker Speaks Out on Defense," Armed Forces Management, vol. VIII, No. 6 (March 1962), p. 7.

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and careful Congressional liaison by the Army made it practical. Expecting occasional individuals to be apprehensive of what the reorganization might do to their agencies and thus to write to their Congressmen for information, Hoelscher Committee veterans, in co-operation with the Army's Public Information Office, prepared a lengthy index of possible questions and provided answers for use in dealing with Congressional and public inquiries.[98] But the master plan to

[98] CINFO DF, Army Reorganization Information Checklist, 29 Dec 61; Memo, Maj Gen Charles G. Dodge, Chief of Information, for Secretary of the Army (SAOPI), Information Plan in Support of the Reorganization of the Department of the Army, n.d. (about 1 Jan 62), and enclosures, DARPO Congressional Inquiries file.

secure Congressional approval was the careful and, as it turned out, highly effective work of Mr. Horwitz.

Perhaps the thorniest question involving Congressional inquiries concerned the proposed merger of the Chemical Warfare Service with the projected Munitions Command of MDLC, which brought letters from Senator Kenneth B. Keating of New York and a protest from Representative Robert Sikes of Florida. Though these instances temporarily ruffled the situation, they did not, in the end, affect the reorganization.[99] When Senators and Representatives from Michigan protested

[99] See DARPO Congressional Inquiries file, correspondence with Senator Keating in December 1961, and with Representative Sikes in

January 1962.

early in February that serious unemployment would occur in the Detroit area if functions were transferred as contemplated from the Ordnance Tank-Automotive Command to the Weapons and Mobility Command at the Rock Island Arsenal, this was a protest against a detail of the reorganization, which had by then been virtually approved. Mr. McNamara solved the specific problem by splitting the single proposed command into a Weapons Command and a Mobility Command, leaving both in their current locations.[100]

[100] Round Robin from Senators and Congressmen from Michigan to Secretary McNamara, 7 Feb, and Mr. McNamara's reply, 24 Feb 62, DARPO Congressional Inquiries file; AMC Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1963 (1 Nov 63).

In the meantime, Mr. Stahr and others had briefed Senator Russell and Representative Vinson on 11 January, a day after Mr. McNamara had sent his formal letter to Mr. Kennedy.[101] Five days later, on 16

[101] DARPO Congressional Briefing files.

January, the President announced his approval of the Army reorganization. On the same date, Mr. McNamara's Reorganization Order was placed before the Armed Services Committees of the Congress. On that date also, Mr. Stahr briefed the press on the reorganization,[102] and the Adjutant General distributed within the Army copies of the Green Book,

[102] Vance Memo, Plan for the Reorganization of the Department of the Army, 9 Jan 62; DARPO Questions and Answers for Secretary of the Army Briefing.

which had "been approved by the Secretary of Defense and the President," and which was to be used as the basis for informing key personnel and interested members of the press, industry, and the public of the projected reorganization.[103] One month later, the Congress having made

[103] TAG Ltr, Reorganization of Department of the Army, 16 Jan 62.

no objection in the interim, the reorganization was approved for implementation.

It had taken almost exactly one year from inception to approved reorganization plan. Now the problem was to transform the idea into fact.

The Implementation

Secretary McNamara's Reorganization Order abolished the Chief Signal Officer, the Adjutant General, the Quartermaster General, the Chief of Finance, the Chief of Ordnance, the Chief Chemical Officer, and the Chief of Transportation as statutory officers, and transferred their functions to the Secretary of the Army; also transferred military duties performed by the Chief of Engineers to the Secretary; and gave Mr. Stahr the authority to transfer those

functions further to any other officer or office, agency or employee. Though the order was to go into effect on 16 February, the Secretary of the Army, in the interest of preserving and maintaining the Army's efficiency and effectiveness, could delay beyond the effective date of the order the abolition of any office or the transfer of any function.[104] Thus, the order, though absolutely clear in the Secre-

[104] DOD Reorganization Order, 10 Jan 62.

tary's eventual intent, was not to prevent or impede an orderly and gradual transition. The Secretary of the Army immediately authorized the interim continuance of these officers.

The Hoelscher Committee had suggested that the proposed Director of the Army Staff carry out the approved changes.[105] But disapproval

[105] Proj 80 Study, Part I, p. 157.

of a Director made it reasonable for the Chief of Staff himself to implement the reorganization. Yet the contemporary Berlin crisis and call-up of troops engaged the Chief's attention. The Vice Chief of Staff, also deeply involved in current activities, was soon to retire, actually in March 1962, and would, therefore, be unable to carry the reorganization to completion. The Secretary of the General Staff, considered by the Traub Committee, was rejected because his two-star rank, the Committee thought, might make it difficult to deal effectively with the more senior heads of the General Staff agencies. The Traub Committee therefore turned to and recommended the Comptroller

of the Army, an officer of three-star rank and head of the General Staff agency charged with affairs concerning the management and organization of the Army. What made the Comptroller particularly appropriate was the fact that his office was among those agencies least affected by the proposed reorganization.[106]

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[106] Traub Committee Report; MRP Memo for Rcd, 20 Sep 62.

General Decker assigned the Comptroller "General Staff responsibility for planning and coordinating the implementation of the reorginazation," thus by inference retaining responsibility for himself. He also authorized the Comptroller to establish a "project office" in order to maintain "current information on the progress of the planning or execution" and to "serve as the focal point for all coordinating, periodic reports, and information required prior to and during the transition." The other General Staff agencies, the Chief of Staff made it known, were expected to assist as necessary in their particular "functional areas."[107]

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[107] C/S Memo, Implementation of Study of Army Organization, 27 Nov 61.

The Project Office named to assist the Comptroller was staffed at the outset by several members of the defunct Hoelscher Committee. In response to pressure from staff agencies and commands, which desired to retain the members they had contributed temporarily to the Hoelscher Committee, the individuals temporarily assigned to the Committee had

been released to their parent organizations, and, consequently, the persons remaining conveniently at hand were six officers and one civilian who were permanently assigned to the Office of the Comptroller.[108]

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[108] Ltr, Hoelscher to Lt Gen Barksdale Hamlett, DCSOPS, n.d., Proj 80 Admin files; Interv w/Ashley, 14 Sep 62.

During the last three months of 1961, these individuals responded to requests from the Traub Committee and from the Secretary of Defense for additional information and performed an exceptionally heavy schedule of briefings. They were assisted by two ad hoc committees, one from DCSLOG, the other from CRD, set up to furnish the Traub Committee with further details in these areas of consideration.[109]

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[109] Proj 80 Briefing files; Intervs w/Thomas, 15 Oct 62, and w/McGregor, 10 Sep 62.

Though actively involved in the problems of the reorganization, these individuals were scattered through the Management directorate of the Comptroller's Office. Brig. Gen. Robert Tyson, the Director of Management, had for some time wanted to establish a new division within his office for basic research in management, for long-range planning, and for improving the application of advanced managerial techniques to the Army, and the former Hoelscher Committee members seemed exactly suited for the assignment. Yet if the Hoelscher alumni were incorporated into a new division under General Tyson for reorganizational matters, the research and planning the general envisaged

would have to await completion of the reorganization. Since General Tyson had no objection to postponing his long-range aims, and since grouping the former Hoelscher Committee members within the framework of a regular organization was preferable to an ad hoc status if only to alleviate problems of administrative support, these individuals were brought together within the directorate in an Office of Management Research and Planning headed by Col. Edward R. McGregor, recently promoted. Though the primary function of this office was "to furnish staff advice and assistance . . . on matters dealing with the reorganization of the administrative structure of the Army," Colonel McGregor's organization actually became the "project office" designated by General Decker later that month.[110]

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[110] Reorganization [of Office of the Director of Management, OCA], Briefing of General Traub to Division Chiefs, 24 Nov 62, Col. Albert H. Smith, Jr.'s files; MRP Memo for Rcd, 20 Sep 62; Interv w/Col Smith, 26 and 27 Sep 62; ODMA Office Memo 1, Organization, 7 Nov 61; C/S Memo, Implementation of Study of Army Organization, 27 Nov 61.

With his small staff preoccupied in fulfilling the heavy requests for briefings and additional information, Colonel McGregor requested Lt. Col. Lewis J. Ashley to look into the matter of building a suitable machinery for implementing the reorganization. Colonel Ashley found that previous Army reorganizations offered little guidance, for officers concerned with them in the past had been assigned these responsibilities in addition to their normal duties and had, as a

consequence, kept few records; furthermore, none of the reorganizations since the end of World War II compared in scope with Project 80. Yet one lesson seemed clear as Generals Traub and Tyson and Colonels McGregor and Ashley examined the problem and discussed alternative possibilities: a full-time planning office, with no other responsibilities or diversions, was required, and this would have to be the Project Office.

While considering the functions and responsibilities of the Project Office, the four principal planners had the idea of establishing planning groups, each to be concerned with a specific area of reorganization. Since two new commands and one new staff agency were to be created, and since the changes would have a major impact on another, existing, command, the planners decided to form a planning group for each of these areas: MDLC, CDC, OPO, and CONARC. While discussing the relationship of the Project Office to these planning groups and to the Army General Staff, the planners decided to establish a fifth planning group, this one to be concerned with the effect of the reorganization on the Department of the Army headquarters.[111]

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[111] Interv w/Ashley, 21 Sep 62; MRP Memo for Rcd, 20 Sep 62.

Early in December, at Colonel McGregor's direction, Colonel Ashley drafted a preliminary directive that was hardly more than a conceptual framework -- listing the general objectives of the reorganization, assigning tasks to the planning groups, outlining how

General Staff agencies might support the planning groups, and setting up a rough schedule for a transitional period of three phases -- planning, activation, and operational.[112] Further discussions indi-

[112] Draft Implementation Plans (one of 5 pages, one of 8 pages), about 1 Dec 61, Col. Ashley's files.

cated the need for more detailed plans leading eventually to an operations order complete with annexes. Even though final approval had not yet been given to the reorganization, the assumption had to be made for planning purposes that the reorganization would be approved. To that end a planning staff was a necessary adjunct to the Project Office. Colonel McGregor turned for assistance to Col. Albert H. Smith, Jr., Deputy Director of the Management directorate, who had been assigned responsibility by Generals Traub and Tyson to provide administrative support, and together Colonels Smith and McGregor assembled for this purpose a staff of seven officers, three of whom had been members of the Hoelscher Committee, all of whom represented a variety of experience and background.[113]

[113] Memos, McGregor to Tyson, 21 Dec 61 and 12 Jan 62, Weekly Activities Rpts; Planning Group Roster, n.d., DARPO files; DARPO Directory, 14 Mar 62.

The President's approval on 16 January 1962 of the reorganization signaled the official opening of plans to implement the changes, and soon afterward a document drafted by the Project Office to establish

the machinery of the reorganization was issued as a warning order.[114]

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[114] TAG Ltr, Reorganization of the Department of the Army, 26 Jan 62; Intervs w/Ashley, 27 Sep 62, w/McGregor, 1 Oct 62, w/Lt Col Bolton, 6 Oct 62.

This paper designated the Comptroller of the Army, General Traub, as Project Director "for the detailed planning and conduct of the reorganization," with authority to set up planning requirements, to obtain administrative support, and to make the necessary arrangements "to direct and coordinate the implementation of the reorganization"; named General Tyson the Deputy Project Director and Colonel McGregor the Assistant Project Director; authorized General Traub to establish a Project Office, actually already in being, for the "overall direction and control of the reorganization"; included a list of the planning groups that would be responsible for the detailed reorganizational planning, including implementation and, where relevant, activation plans, in the five major areas involved; and named the chairmen of the planning groups who had been selected by the Chief of Staff: General Traub for the planning group devoted to the Department of the Army headquarters; Maj. Gen. Richard D. Meyer for CONARC; Lt. Gen. John P. Daley for CDC; Maj. Gen. Frank S. Besson, Jr., for MDLC; and Maj.Gen. George E. Martin for OPO.

What explained the appointments was the principle that those who made the decisions should be responsible for their consequences. In other words, those who had vested interests in the success of the

reorganization were placed in charge of that part of the implementation applying to their particular interest. It was generally understood that Generals Daley and Besson would command the new organizations their planning groups would activate. General Meyer was representing the CONARC commander. General Martin, who was not in good health and who would soon retire, would give way in April 1962 to Maj. Gen. Stephen R. Hanmer, who would become the first chief of OPO.

As determined by the Project Office, each planning group originally numbered between 20 and 50 persons, who were secured by levy from appropriate General Staff agencies and who were expected to become the nuclei of the new commands and the staff agency to be activated. Civilian clerical personnel numbered forty in all, and they were obtained from staff agencies and from the technical and administrative services. By 17 February, 121 officers and professional experts, plus all clerical and enlisted personnel, had reported for duty.[115] Obtaining office space for the planning groups was a

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[115] See C/S Memo, Reorganization of the Department of the Army -- Personnel and Administrative Support for Planning Groups, 6 Feb 62.

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difficult process, but eventually the planning groups were located in the Pentagon, in Temporary Buildings A, B, and C near Fort McNair, in Temporary Buildings I, J, and K near the Lincoln Memorial, and in Temporary Building 7 at Gravelly Point near the National Airport.[116]

[116] See Memo, Tyson for Hout W. Randolph, Director of the Army's Space Management Services, Reorganization of the Department of the Army -- Space Requirements, about 1 Feb 62, Col. Smith's files; Memo, Randolph for Traub, 15 Feb 62; Interv w/Smith, 26 Sep 62.

A few days after the thirty permissible days following the President's announcement of his approval, the Project Office issued the administrative procedures to be followed by the planning groups, and for the first time referred to itself as DARPO, the name it would come to be known by.[117] A small organization of 12 to 18 people,

[117] Department of the Army Reorganization Project Office (DARPO), Admin Memo 1, 23 Feb 62.

DARPO had a Plans Office under Lt. Col. Donnelly P. Bolton and an Operations Office under Lt. Col. Charles B. Thomas, later Lt. Col. John A. Kjellstrom. Mr. M. O. Stewart was the Executive Director, and Lt. Col. Toxey A. Sewell, detailed from the JAG, served as legal advisor.[118]

[118] Organization Chart, Incl 1 to DARPO Admin Memo 1, 23 Feb 62.

Designed to co-ordinate the activities of the five planning groups, DARPO was, in effect, the Secretariat of General Traub, the Project Director. The great strength of DARPO was the intimate familiarity of many of its members with the Hoelscher Committee deliberations, for

the key members of DARPO had taken part in the study and had absorbed the philosophy, the procedures, and the hopes of the Project 80 director.

When the chairmen of the planning groups met in conference, they were known as the Planning Council. Originally regarded as purely advisory, the Planning Council in actuality became an organ with the power to recommend decisions to the Chief of Staff after majority vote, a procedure that was thought would carry more weight than a decision by the Project Director.[119]

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[119] DARPO Admin Memo 2, 8 Mar 62.

Toward the end of March 1962, the General Counsel of the Army, Mr. Powell Pierpoint, was made a member to represent the Secretary of the Army.[120] His addition was significant, for he was familiar

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[120] Amendment 1 to DARPO Admin Memo 2, 30 Mar 62.

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with the reorganization work, having frequently sat in on the Hoelscher Committee deliberations and having closely read the written report. He would prove to be a valuable link of information and persuasion to the Army Secretariat and to Mr. Vance.

Serving as "the principal means of communication and control" between the Project Director and the planning group chairmen, the Planning Council usually met once a week to 1) review and analyze the progress of the reorganization, 2) resolve differences of opinion among planning groups, and 3) exchange information, guidance, and

advice.[121] Though Mr. Hoelscher had gone on leave in November 1961,

[121] DARPO Admin Memo 2, 8 Mar 62.

after his arduous work on the report, his occasional presence at Planning Council meetings in his capacity as Deputy Comptroller and his assumption of the chairmanship in General Traub's absence helped to assure continuity in the reorganization effort.

One of the most equivocal aspects of the reorganization machinery and one which became obvious during Planning Council meetings was the position of General Traub who wore no less than three hats -- 1) as Comptroller of the Army, head of the General Staff agency responsible for organizational and managerial matters concerning the Department of the Army; 2) as Project Director, head of the reorganization effort and in that capacity chairman of the Planning Council; 3) as Chairman of the Planning Group, responsible for the changes to be made in the Department of the Army headquarters. Though it was sometimes difficult for others to distinguish among the hats, General Traub clearly saw the distinctions. For example, when the Chief of Finance sent a request for additional headquarters personnel through the Office of the Comptroller, General Traub endorsed the request to himself as chairman of his planning group, then as Project Director turned himself down.[122]

[122] Memo, DARPO for Chief of Finance, 8 Jun 62, and incls.

Because General Traub was both Project Director and Planning Group Chairman, planning group activities with respect to the Department of the Army headquarters were relegated, almost by default, to General Tyson, who was General Traub's deputy in both capacities, and to General Tyson's assistant, Col. Frederick B. Outlaw, a member of General Tyson's directorate in the Comptroller's office. Neither General Tyson nor Colonel Outlaw had sufficient rank vis-à-vis the chairmen of the other planning groups to make felt a strong position on matters affecting the Department of the Army headquarters. Staff agencies, consequently, sometimes preferred to use their normal channels of communication to the Chief of Staff in resolving differences arising out of the reorganization.

Another difficulty leading to some friction was the fact that though General Traub as Project Director represented the Chief of Staff, the General Counsel represented the higher authority of the Secretary of the Army; and though the Project Director was the senior officer of those in the reorganization machinery, the chairman of the CONARC Planning Group represented the more senior CONARC commander, an officer of four-star rank. No wonder the Project Director preferred on occasion to act cautiously, even circumspectly, rather than take strong positions in the Planning Council discussions.

Functioning like a legislative body, the Planning Council was a forum where problems of the reorganization were aired and voted upon. It also acted like a court, for it heard arguments presented by staff agencies, which questioned some of the premises or factual findings

of the Hoelscher Committee and which were convinced that certain aspects of the reorganization, substantive or procedural, were impractical or dangerous; and it reached judgments on whether the arguments had validity. For example, the Planning Council decided, after listening to a cogent explanation of why this was necessary, to retain the Office of Military History as a separate Special Staff section instead of transferring it under the aegis of TAG. In support of the Planning Council, DARPO co-ordinated the activities of the planning groups on the operating level, resolved differences of opinion, and exercised not only a stabilizing influence on the course of the reorganization but also a continuous impulse to get things accomplished.

Receptive to all suggestions that might help control and co-ordinate the numerous actions in a delicate period of transition, DARPO sought to employ the Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT), a sophisticated technique of management developed by the Navy and designed to impose order on a highly complex sequence of events. Since PERT had been applied successfully to facilitate the development of military hardware, General Tyson suggested and DARPO agreed that PERT might be useful in the reorganization.

Since the most time-consuming part of using PERT is the prior determination and arrangement of individual tasks or events, and since work on the PERT graph started only in February, the detailed PERT chart of events required to transform the Army into the desired image was not ready until early in April. At that time DARPO issued a planning directive, which defined the PERT network in detail, outlined

the schedule of actions, and designated the periodic reports required from those involved in the reorganization.[123] In compliance, subordi-

[123] DARPO Reorganization Planning Directive 335-1, Army Reorganization Management System Reports, 10 Apr 62.

nate planning groups set up their own PERT networks to help them mesh their activities with the master graph monitored by DARPO. Unfortunately, by the time the PERT system was ready for operation, the implementation of the reorganization was under way. PERT was therefore out of date from the beginning, and to this basic difficulty were soon added others.

Probably the most important obstacle to the successful use of PERT was the divorce between those who made the decisions and those who operated the PERT graphs. The actions designed to transform the Army had been approved as set forth in the Green Book. But the Green Book was no more than a blueprint, and many decisions on many details had yet to be made. Since General Traub regarded his role as that of a co-ordinator rather than of a director and decision-maker, he adopted the bargaining process and operated by majority rule as expressed in the Planning Council meetings. For behind the structure of the ad hoc Planning Council was the formidable organization of the General and Special Staffs, which enjoyed access through normal channels to the Chief of Staff. Decisions, therefore, were complicated and often took much time. Slippage occurred. Yet pressure was being exerted from the highest echelons of the Departments of

Defense and the Army to expedite the changes. In this situation General Traub had no time for PERT, and PERT was lost from sight. Removed from the locus of decision, lacking a strong manager with authority to chart a firm course, and competing with traditional staff procedures, PERT became little more than an extra and burdensome reporting system, imposing with little practical effect its own requirements on the many already harried agencies involved in the reorganization.

By mid-May PERT had been shunted aside. Except possibly for having provided in advance of the reorganization a detailed outline of the critical events during the transitional period and an advance recognition of the critical decisions that would have to be made, PERT had no appreciable effect on the execution of Project 80.

The Hoelscher Committee had believed that the reorganization would take 12 months to accomplish, while the Traub Committee had felt that even 18 months was an optimistic assessment. The Green Book accepted the 18-month figure, and the Project Office followed the Green Book, envisioning reorganization completed 18 months after the effective date of the Department of Defense Reorganization Order, that is, 16 February. To provide an orderly shift from one organizational structure to the new posture in order to maintain combat effectiveness and high morale for both military and civilian personnel, a smooth transfer of responsibilities by major functional area was required, and this had to include personnel, funds, facilities, and other resources. DARPO therefore envisaged four phases in the

transitional period: 1) a month-long pre-planning phase to begin on 16 January upon the announcement of the reorganization by the Secretary of the Army, during which an overall planning directive would be prepared and issued, possible site locations for the new organizational entities would be inspected, chiefs of the new entities would be designated, and planning groups would be oriented on their assignments; 2) a planning phase beginning 16 February to last 3 months in the cases of OPO and CDC planning groups, 6 months for the others, in which there would be detailed planning for activating the new organizations and for reshaping and realigning the others, the Project Office would review all plans, and the Secretary of the Army would approve them; 3) an activation phase, in which the new organizations would be created, personnel moved to them, functions transferred, and, at the end, their responsibilities assumed; 4) a modification phase, when internal adjustment of organizational elements, functions, and procedures would be made as required.[124]

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[124] Proj 80 Study, Part I, p. 162; Traub Committee Rpt, p. 18; Green Book, pp. 35 - 36, and Fig. 23; [DARPO] Schedule of Major Events for DA Reorganization, about 1 Jan 62.

The orderly progress envisioned did not materialize. OSD officials wanted quicker action, decision-making was somewhat dilatory on the Army level, and the operating personnel, the members of the Project Office, were frantically caught up in the aftermath of the reorganization's approval. While the planning groups were being

assembled in January and February, DARPO personnel made presentations on the projected reorganization to a variety of audiences of widely varying ranges of interest -- conducting in that period 77 major briefings, and assisting and participating in other presentations and conferences for Defense personnel, the White House staff, the Bureau of the Budget, the Congress, Army elements, other military services, civilian organizations, foreign military representatives, and other U.S. agencies -- besides providing substantial input to the Chief of Information for press releases, speeches, and statements by key officials.[125]

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[125] OCA Summary of Major Events and Problems, 1 Jul 61 to 30 Jun 62.

DARPO nevertheless sent a draft order to the Chief of Staff on 6 February in anticipation of final Congressional approval. This was a detailed planning directive, which was to initiate the planning phase. General Decker forwarded the paper to the Secretary of the Army for approval on 15 February, a day before the 30-day period of Congressional consideration terminated. Under the pressure of other duties, Mr. Stahr did not approve the paper until 13 March. Six days later the planning directive appeared, although in actuality the machinery of the reorganization had been in operation for almost a month and the Planning Council had met three times.[126]

[126] DARPO 10-1, Reorganization Plan, 19 Mar 62; DARPO Weekly Activities Rpts, 9 and 16 Feb; Memo, Stahr for Decker, Reorganization of the Army, 13 Mar 62.

Between the end of January, when the chairmen of the planning groups were appointed, and 19 March, when DARPO authorized the detailed planning to start, much pre-planning was accomplished. The MDLC Planning Group, for example, made basic decisions respecting the relationships the headquarters would establish with superior, subordinate, and collateral commands, and embarked upon a study of how to streamline the decision-making problems that stemmed in the main from their lack of specific knowledge of what General Staff functions were to be transferred eventually to the new organizations.[127]

[127] AMC Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1963, 1 Nov 63.

The difficulties soon multiplied. The basic problem lay in the fact that the Green Book, which had been approved as the basis of the reorganization, was a conceptual and condensed version of what the reorganization was to be. A host of decisions, large and small, remained to be made, and no one on the decision-making level of the Army seemed anxious or had time to make them. Consequently, the planning groups were hampered and delayed in their work.

For example, guidelines on personnel matters, financial management, and site selection did not arrive in time to orient the planning groups. No policy statements were made to retain key personnel, both

military and civilian, who were essential to the new organizations and who in too many cases were reassigned in the normal course of their careers and thereby lost to the affected segments. Not until 16 May did the Secretary of the Army freeze reassignments, promotions, recruitment, and reclassification of civilian personnel in those elements of the Department of the Army involved in the reorganization. There were no firm tables of distribution for the new organizations, not even authorization to assign at least key personnel to the new organizations -- which resulted in an increased expenditure of funds because of the necessity to retain personnel of the planning groups on TDY. Nor were the new commands and the new agency able to requisition for persons scheduled to return from overseas or for graduation from the service schools. Though it was difficult enough to identify personnel spaces for transfer, that is, to locate the functions and the incumbents for transfer to the new organizations, it was particularly difficult to identify personnel engaged in station complement or overhead functions. And, finally, no one had made a firm delineation of which operating and command functions were to be shifted from the General Staff.[128]

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[128] OCA Summary of Major Events and Problems, 1 Jul 61 - 30 Jun 62.

The first task of the planning groups was to formulate Preliminary Implementation Plans, or PIPs, as they were called. These plans were submitted to DARPO toward the end of April, and DARPO approved them all by 16 May.[129] Yet the delay in site selection, to take one

[129] Ibid.

example, adversely affected the ability of the planning groups to develop facilities requirements and cost estimates of activation. The Chief of Staff had directed DCSLOG on 9 February to co-operate with the chairmen of the planning groups of CDC, MDLC, and CONARC in determining what sites were available for the new commands. Since funds for new construction were not available, planning proceeded on the assumption that existing facilities would be used. After reviewing 17 installations and facilities that were potentially useful, DCSLOG determined that the most suitable accomodations for MDLC were temporary buildings in Washington, D.C., the best for CDC were at Fort Belvoir, Va. But not until May were the decisions made.[130]

[130] AMC Hist Sum, 1 Nov 63.

The failure of the Army to name the commanders for the subordinate commands of MDLC also hampered the reorganization. Not until 11 April were the MDLC mid-management commanders announced. Briefed on the MDLC PIP on 17 April and receiving guidance at once for their own planning, they had to recommend sites for their headquarters, estimate the costs of establishing their communications, of making minimal alterations of their facilities, of procuring equipment and supplies, and of moving people to staff their offices.[131]

[131] Ibid.

Meanwhile, the Secretary of Defense was applying pressure on the Army to quicken its reorganization effort. In March Mr. McNamara requested Mr. Stahr to keep him informed on the progress of the reorganization and further to let him have, as they were developed, the detailed reorganizational plans, particularly in the MDLC segment, so he could approve them rapidly. For he wanted the activation of MDLC to be accelerated, to the extent of having MDLC in full operation by 1 July 1962 instead of February or March 1963, as scheduled.[132]

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[132] Memo, McNamara for Stahr, Army Reorganization Transition Plan, 20 Mar 62.

This request created considerable turmoil. Thoughts on the Army reorganization had originally envisaged very detailed planning, including the preparation of procedural regulations and operating policies, before any implementing actions were taken. The MDLC Planning Group was envisioned as operating independently and apart from the operations of the Department of the Army, while the logistics functions to be transferred eventually to MDLC continued to be performed under existing policies and procedures of the General Staff and of the various chiefs of the Technical Services. Somewhere around November or December 1962, MDLC was expected to begin operations; not before March 1963 at the earliest was MDLC anticipated to be fully operational. The sudden requirement to have MDLC operational no later than 1 July 1962 was a drastic acceleration that reduced by about nine months carefully developed and approved

planning and activation phases.

Yet earlier activation was desirable because it would decrease the risk of difficulties in current operations resulting from parallel developments in MDLC, CDC, and CONARC and from changes resulting from the establishment of the Defense Supply Agency, which was already rapidly absorbing a large proportion of OQMG personnel and some from DCSLOG and the other Technical Services, which had been concerned with single manager functions. The Technical Services, still in the chain of command, were losing personnel to MDLC and could make no replacements, and this too promoted an increasing ineffectiveness. An accelerated take-over by MDLC would diminish personnel turbulence and confusion by resolving uncertainties, and a take-over on 1 July would coincide with the beginning of the fiscal year, be responsive to the wishes of the Secretary of Defense, overcome inertia in the Army, and satisfy concern at the Defense level over delays in implementing the reorganization plans.[133]

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[133] AMC Hist Sum, 1 Nov 63.

At the same time MDLC had to be capable of controlling the entire logistics system of the Army before it accepted responsibility for that system and before the existing machinery was destroyed. This meant that in addition to erecting the new machinery and attaching its working parts to the larger Army apparatus, the MDLC Planning Group had to solve complex civilian personnel problems involved in merging into a single organization the individuals performing similar

functions for eight separate organizations.

An accelerated activation of MDLC, there was no doubt, would seriously disrupt current operations and create extreme personnel problems, as became clear in discussions by the Army Policy Council, the Planning Council, and other agencies. But since there was no alternative, General Besson proposed a three-phased plan: 1) establish a control nucleus of about 200 professional military and civilian personnel to provide a basis for continued operations and at the same time activate the headquarters of MDLC and the headquarters of its subordinate commands; 2) assume operational responsibilities on 1 July 1962, by taking over in place the various materiel elements of the Technical Services, leaving relations with all other agencies unchanged; 3) make within MDLC the adjustments needed for MDLC to become completely responsible for its installations and activities by the end of 1962. General Traub and Mr. Stahr in turn approved General Besson's plan; and with some misgivings, but hoping for an extension of time, Mr. Ailes informed Mr. McNamara that MDLC could be ready to take over its operational responsibilities on 1 August. The Secretary of Defense agreed, and on 25 April formally approved the accelerated schedule. Thirteen days later, on 8 May, the Army activated the MDLC headquarters under its new name, revised for clarity and simplicity, Army Materiel Command (AMC); and on 23 May, the subordinate command headquarters were activated.[134]

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[134] Ibid.; Army Policy Council Minutes, 4, 18, and 25 Apr 62; Memo for Rcd (Kjellstrom), 23 Apr 62, DARPO Correspondence File; Notes

on Reorganization for Army Policy Council Meeting, 2 May 62, atached to 10th Planning Council Meeting (1 May) folder; see DARPO folder marked "Early Activation of MDLC."

AMC assumed control on 1 July 1962 of its programming, budgetary, and fiscal responsibilities for fiscal year 1963. Five days later General Besson submitted the detailed AMC activation plan to the Project Director. On the designated date, 1 August, AMC assumed the wholesale materiel functions and responsibilities of the Army, took over from the Chiefs of the Technical Services in whole or in part their logistical and materiel staff functions, and took command of field installations and activities.[135] At the same time the Technical

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[135] AMC Hist Sum, 1 Nov 63.

Services were reorganized; the Offices of the Chief of Ordnance and of the Chief Chemical Officer were inactivated; the offices of other Technical Services chiefs remained in modified existence in accordance with Mr. McNamara's Reorganization Order, which authorized the Secretary of the Army to continue them in being beyond the effective date of the reorganization in the interest of convenience.[136]

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[136] Additional Details on Reorganization Actions Pertaining to the AMC, 29 Jan 63.

The basic reorganizational actions for AMC, originally scheduled for completion in September 1963, were substantially terminated by the end of 1962. In effect, the activation and modification phases

of the transitional period were compressed into one. Between 1 August and 31 December 1962, AMC made several organizational adjustments -- for example, consolidating two procurement offices in Pasadena, California, two in San Francisco, and three in Chicago; and establishing at the outset 31 project managers for specific complicated and urgently needed projects in the process of development. During that period AMC also took control of 265 installations and activities.

One of the major difficulties of creating AMC was the length of time it took to assign civilian personnel permanently to firm job positions in the headquarters of AMC and of the subordinate commands. At the end of 1962, personnel actions designed to accomplish this ranged between 19 and 93 percent of completion in the specific segments of AMC, and not until 15 April 1963 was the AMC headquarters expected to be completely staffed by permanently assigned civilian personnel. By then, the headquarters would have to undergo an overall reduction of personnel, this to be effective by the end of fiscal year 1963.[137]

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[137] Ibid.

The problems of activating AMC, which inherited the bulk of personnel from six Technical Services, excluding those from the Medical Service, were somewhat different from those of CDC, an entirely new organization, of CONARC, which was already in existence, and of OPO, a new staff agency. All these organizations at one time or another during the early months of 1962 found themselves in conflict, one with the other.

For example, CDC and CONARC differed over the precise functions and personnel that were to be transferred from CONARC to CDC. Though the Traub Report and the Green Book, unlike the Hoelscher Report, clearly assigned CDC responsibility for developing tactical doctrine and for preparing tables of organization and equipment and field manuals -- which involved transferring functions and personnel from CONARC -- the CONARC commander, General Powell, protested to the Chief of Staff on 8 February that this procedure would disrupt and destroy the school system; he proposed to prepare tables of organization and equipment and field manuals for CDC. General Daley, the CDC commander, disagreed, pointing out that these responsibilities were clearly assigned by the reorganization documents to CDC. Though DARPO rejected General Powell's argument, the Planning Council discussed the problem at its first meeting on 26 February. General Traub decided to have General Meyer, who represented General Powell as head of the CONARC Planning Group, and General Daley, the CDC Planning Group chairman, present their opposing views in detail at the second meeting of the Planning Council to be held on 5 March. After the presentations were made, the Planning Council voted 4 to 1 in favor of General Daley's point of view. General Traub presented the Planning Council recommendation to the Chief of Staff, who endorsed it on the following day.[138]

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[138] Planning Council Minutes, 26 Feb and 5 Mar; Msg, Powell to Decker, 8 Feb 62; DARPO Weekly Activities Rpt, 8 Mar 62.

But how were the functions, personnel spaces, and the actual

individuals performing those functions in those personnel spaces to be identified and transferred? In other words, how could the CDC Planning Group identify not only where combat development functions were being performed within the United States but also which functions were being performed? how could the Planning Group identify the personnel not only performing but also supporting these functions? The basic difficulty -- apart from those combat development elements within the offices of the chiefs of technical and administrative services -- was that the function of preparing current doctrine was fragmented among CONARC school personnel whose primary responsibilities were in training; thus, in many instances, the same individuals performed both training and doctrinal functions, and sometimes staff functions in addition. How separate them and how reach agreement on how many and precisely which individuals were to be transferred? Unable to agree, the CONARC and CDC Planning Groups appealed to DARPO, which sent a 3-man team to visit several schools and investigate the problem. The team then made recommendations, which the Project Director approved and put into effect.[139]

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[139] Memo, DARPO to CONARC and CDC, 6 Aug 62, and enclosures; Memo, DARPO to DCSPER, Adjustment of Personnel Spaces (DA Reorganization), 31 Aug 62; see also The U.S. Army Combat Development Command: First Year, June 1962 - July 1963, dated Aug 63.

Another conflict concerned that of CONARC and OPO over who was to control the flow of enlisted trainees from induction through basic

training to future assignment and career development. OPO, supported by DCSPER, wished to have responsibility for and detailed control over assigning trainees from their induction, as previously exercised by TAG. CONARC wished to control assignments from induction through the CONARC training centers.[140] Unable to agree, OPO and CONARC requested

[140] Planning Council Minutes, 10 and 11 May, and attached DF from DCSPER concerning CONARC PIP.

General Traub to appoint a task force to analyze the problem and recommend a solution. General Traub complied. The committee he appointed recommended that OPO exercise staff supervision and CONARC exercise operation responsibility over trainees from induction through basic training; after training, OPO was to exercise responsibility for assignments. CONARC and OPO agreed to the solution, and the Project Director ordered its adoption.[141]

[141] Memo of Understanding signed by OPO and CONARC Planning Groups, 18 May; OCA Rpt of the Committee Appointed to Study the Control of the Flow of Trainees through the Training Base, 12 Jun 62.

Some problems raised by the reorganization involved the disposition of functions and responsibilities discharged by several agencies. For example, who was to be responsible for operating and maintaining petroleum distribution systems? At the Project Director's request, the QMG prepared a study, which recommended assigning the responsibility to AMC, and the Planning Council approved the recom-

mendation.[142] Another, a complaint by the Atomic Energy Commission

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[142] DARPO Memo, DA Petroleum Logistical Function, 21 Jun 62.

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that nuclear responsibilities were fragmented within the Army, set off discussion and study that lasted six months. Finally, the Secretary of the Army designated DCSOPS as "the single focal point for all Army nuclear activities."[143]

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[143] See TAG Ltr, Assignment of Nuclear Responsibilities within the Army Reorganization Plan, 5 Oct 62.

The most difficult problem of the reorganization concerned personnel. DARPO had anticipated that the transfer of functions, spaces, and personnel would be a major problem, particularly when it concerned the transfer of operating functions from the Army Staff to the field commands. Before functions or spaces could be transferred, detailed organizational plans were needed. These the planning groups developed during March and April. But the new deadline set by Mr. McNamara made it necessary to speed up the actual reassignment of functions and personnel. To this end, DCSPER prepared a directive providing general guidelines and instructions, including provisions authorizing bulk personnel allocations and assignment of personnel to holding detachments before the actual activation of the new organizations. Beyond this, DCSPER offered no assistance on how to reach decisions in cases where losing and gaining organizations could not agree on the functions and personnel to be transferred.

As a matter of policy, DCSPER acted only when agreement had been reached because DCSPER did not wish to become involved in the actual reorganization operations; with General Decker in agreement, DCSPER therefore limited his role to offering advice and to issuing transfer orders for personnel upon the request of DARPO.[144]

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[144] DCSPER Personnel Planning Guidelines, DA Reorganization, 17 Apr 62; General Staff Council Minutes, 15 May; Planning Council Minutes, 11 May.

But a major problem was how to separate operations from staff functions on the Army Staff and how to identify not only the operating functions that were to be transferred but the personnel performing these functions -- for these matters concerned personnel spaces and ultimately individuals. DARPO had set up personnel allocation boards in order to balance resources with requirements, but the recommendations of these boards often encountered disagreement within the Planning Council. During Planning Council meetings in April and early May, complaints and grumbles were heard that the General Staff appeared to have no intention of relinquishing its functions to the field agencies. General Besson believed that the entire issue of General Staff relations with the reorganized field commands would require a major policy decision by the Chief of Staff, and as late as 23 May, he was wondering precisely which command functions of the General Staff agencies were to be transferred to AMC.

At General Daley's suggestion, DARPO established committees that

became known as Daley Boards. These boards met to work out solutions on a compromise and bargaining basis. The areas in dispute involved many issues -- how to separate command and staff functions, how to locate hidden field spaces in headquarters agencies, how to allocate spaces for administrative support, how to identify individuals with spaces, how to determine the grades of the persons to be transferred, how to resolve instances where a single individual performed several functions belonging, under the reorganization, to several organizations. The Daley Boards laboriously worked out solutions, not always on the basis of logic but often on the basis of quid pro quo, and made their recommendations to the Planning Council.

The question then became, how to secure a decision on whether to accept the recommendations. The DARPO Planning Branch suggested one of two alternatives to the Project Director -- refer the matter to the Planning Council for decision, which would save time and conform with planning procedures even though the Staff would probably resist the Planning Council decision; or, preferably, refer the matter to the Vice Chief of Staff, which would take longer but would result in a firmer decision, for the Staff would acquiesce because this was the normal way of doing business. General Traub accepted the latter alternative and discussed the affair with the Vice Chief, but only after securing the informal indorsement of the Planning Council, which had no desire to quarrel with Daley Board solutions reached with difficulty and by compromise. The Vice Chief accepted the solutions, approved revised personnel ceilings for Army staff agencies, and made

it possible to release spaces to the new organizations.[145]

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[145] Planning Council Minutes, 2 Apr, 5 May, 8 May (and Incl 5, Memo, Daley for Traub, Proposal for Identification of Spaces in Certain Special Staff Sections of the Department of the Army Staff, 7 May), 15 May, 23 May, 15 Jun (and Incl 1, DA Planning Group Weekly Status Report, 11 Jun); Bolton Memo on Army Staff Ceilings, 15 May; General Staff Council Minutes, 15 May; Army Policy Council Minutes, 16 May.

The distribution of general officers also prompted considerable activity, discussions on this subject probably consuming more time than any other topic. The fundamental difficulty stemmed from new requirements imposed by the reorganization as opposed to the statutory regulation limiting the number of general officer spaces. During March and April the Planning Council devoted a great deal of time to off-the-record discussions. In addition to its regularly scheduled meetings, the Council held five special meetings in April on the subject of general officer requirements and assignments. When the Council reached agreement on how general officers ought to be allocated, General Traub forwarded his recommendations to DCSPER for decision.[146] That the Planning Council, an agency outside normal

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[146] Memo for Chairman, Headquarters DA Planning Group, Requirements for General Officers, 25 Apr 62; Memo, DARPO for DCSPER, Requirements for General Officers, 8 May 62.

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staff channels, and not DCSPER had concerned itself with this personnel problem caused some resentment among some of the General Staff agencies.

The Planning Council and DARPO were not always consulted by staff agencies that disputed their solutions. For example, the Chief of Engineers appealed directly to the Vice Chief of Staff in a controversy over civilian personnel management. The Vice Chief of Staff might have referred the matter back to the reorganization machinery, but instead took action himself. Though he supported the DARPO position in this instance, he set a precedent that other staff agencies sometimes followed.[147]

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[147] Memo, DARPO for Chief of Engineers, 28 Mar 62; Intervs w/Bolton and Ashley, 29 Jul 63.

CDC, CONARC, and OPO assumed their new responsibilities on 1 July 1962. Most personnel transferred to these organizations were assigned in bulk to holding detachments in the new commands and agency, pending a final decision on their future status, hopefully to be completed some time in 1963.[148] DARPO ended its operations on 30 September,

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[148] DARPO Briefing, Progress Rpt on the Reorganization of the Army, July 1962; Additional Details on Reorganization Actions Pertaining to U.S. AMC, 29 Jan 63.

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and after that date adjustments and internal rearrangements were made by normal staff procedures.

By 31 December 1962, the reorganization was formally complete even though the permanent reassignment of civilian personnel was still unfinished. To a certain extent this was so because of the personnel reductions ordered by Mr. McNamara's Project 39A on top of the reorganization.[149]

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[149] OCA Summary of Major Events and Problems, 1 Jul 61 - 30 Jun 62, dated 2 Jan 63; DARPO Rpt for Mr. Ignatius, 29 Jan 63; DARPO Memo, Bi-Weekly Progress Report, 31 Aug 62.

Project 39A

Though personnel and dollar savings had not been among the original motives and premises of Project 80 but rather had been somewhat surprisingly and unceremoniously attached to the reorganizational recommendations made by the Secretary of the Army on 10 December 1961, Mr. McNamara had indeed been interested in effecting economies within the military establishment. Project 39A had the aim of decentralizing major operating functions from headquarters to field commands in order to attain a net reduction in headquarters strength of about 19 percent. The Project 80 reorganization accomplished some of the principal objectives of 39A, but study and examination of Department of the Army headquarters continued beyond the completion of Project 80 -- to accelerate and improve the decision-making process, to insure that headquarters staffs performed no functions that might better or even equally well be done in field commands and agencies, to improve

internal organization and procedures for efficiency and effectiveness, and to estimate the extent of personnel and dollar savings possible to achieve. By the fall of 1962, the Army had conducted several studies of these matters, the Secretary of the Army had reached certain decisions regarding them, and the Army had taken or was about to take action to achieve some of these goals.[150]

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[150] This and the material immediately following are from Department of the Army Report, Project 39A, 15 Oct 62.

Though Project 80 decreased the strength of Headquarters, Department of the Army between 31 May and 1 September 1962 by about 2,500 spaces -- from 13,697 to 11,090 -- by decentralizing major operating functions to the field commands, Army-wide net savings were not immediately obtained. Future savings were anticipated through efficiencies resulting from a consolidation in the field commands of functions formerly performed in numerous agencies, but the extent of the potential savings could not be estimated. For concurrent with the transfers out of the headquarters were certain increases in departmental staffing, the result of greater emphasis on some departmental functions and the absorption of some activities formerly assigned to field agencies.

To develop additional reductions under Project 39A, staff agencies were asked to assume a reduction of 15 percent in their post-Project 80 strengths. They were to do so, not by eliminating essential functions, but by initiating procedural changes, consolidating

functional elements, eliminating personnel being retained for the transitional phase of Project 80, reducing administrative personnel and nice-to-have elements, and avoiding operational tasks that could be handled by subordinate headquarters.

Between 1 July 1961 and 31 May 1962, the creation of the Defense Supply Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency resulted in the transfer of functions and personnel from the Army staff. Yet at the same time, actions in connection with the Army build-up, special warfare, Strike Command, civil defense, family housing, fair employment policy, Project 80, and increased operational requirements in southeast Asia created additional workloads within the headquarters. The Army staff was nevertheless reduced in size. Specifically, 1) general support, supply requisitioning, financial support, and the programming and legal functions of the OQMG were transferred to DSA; 2) the intelligence reconnaissance function was shifted from ACSI to DIA; 3) spaces were moved from the Army Staff to the DOD and JCS; and 4) data processing was decentralized from TAG to the field. Though Project 80 had proposed no major changes in the organization or procedures of the Office of the Secretary of the Army, certain duplications there were evident and could be eliminated -- what was described as "a discernible tendency to maintain in the Secretariat an 'in-house' staff capability beyond that required if maximum use were made of the Army staff."[151] In early 1963, an effort would be made to

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[151] Ibid.

eliminate this inclination.

By the autumn of 1962, the Army was also following the Hoelscher recommendation -- concurred in but postponed by the Traub Committee -- to split DCSOPS in order to counterbalance what had been an over-emphasis on the joint aspects of planning. The reorganization of the Office of the DCSOPS into an Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations and an Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development (ACSFOR) would make for better balance between joint and Army planning. For force development planning translated the broad concepts and requirements established in strategic planning into an expression of the forces and systems the Army needed to provide for joint usage within the limits of resources available and projected -- in essence, the basic mission of the Department of the Army within the Department of Defense.[152]

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[152] Ibid.

In February 1963, ACSFOR came into being to develop Army forces for the best possible balance of operationally ready units within the constraints of available manpower and budget. Four directorates were originally created -- Army aviation, materiel requirements, doctrinal organization and training, and plans and programs; a fifth was later added by the retiring Chief Chemical Officer for CBR and nuclear operations.[153]

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[153] Joe Wagner, "ACSFOR: How the Army General Staff Copes with the McNamara Defense Management," Armed Forces Management (March 1964),

pp. 21 - 23.

Preliminary Appraisal

By the early part of 1963, the Project 80 reorganization had been accomplished. It had brought into being three new operating agencies and had modified a fourth, each responsible for part of the Army mission: CDC to establish doctrine, to determine how the Army would fight, and to decide what kind of equipment it needed; OPO at the Department of the Army headquarters level to be responsible for providing manpower at the proper places; AMC, absorbing the materiel functions of six Technical Services -- Quartermaster, Ordnance, Chemical, Signal, Engineer, and Transportation -- to provide and maintain the equipment required; and CONARC to be responsible for training. In addition, the reorganization had made certain changes in the Army staff, divesting the General Staff of some command functions and giving greater autonomy to the Special Staff.

In contrast to the Defense Supply Agency, which was managing at the wholesale level supplies common to all the armed services and some common services formerly performed by the Technical Services and particularly the Quartermaster, AMC controlled the Army's wholesale materiel operations and was responsible for all the operational aspects of development, testing, procurement, production, supply, maintenance, and for the operations of several laboratories, arsenals, proving grounds, depots, testing facilities, and procurement activities and offices. Of its seven subordinate commands, five were oriented toward

specific commodity areas; the other two were concerned with testing and evaluation and with supply and maintenance.[154] DCSLOG, divested

[154] Remarks by Lt. Gen. Frank S. Besson, Jr. to the Washington Post, American Ordnance Association, 21 Nov 63; see also Lt. Gen. Frank S. Besson, Jr., "The Army Materiel Command," Defense Supply Association Review (March-April 1963), pp. 2 - 31.

of its operating functions as Technical Services overseer, remained responsible for determining policies and procedures in the field of Army logistics.

Despite certain problems incident to the activation and functioning of AMC -- the difficulty of changing procedures because former Technical Services personnel had been indoctrinated in other methods, the personnel turbulence, the newness of the organization, and the changing aspects of the Army-Defense managerial systems -- AMC revised procedures with respect to 1) inputs to Army-Defense programs resulting from requests and requirements placed by Headquarters, Department of the Army; 2) the development and publication of a Five-Year Base Program in consonance with the Department of the Army Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Program; and 3) guidance for and review of programs of major subordinate commands and project managers.[155]

[155] AMC Hist Sum, 1 Nov 63.

CDC, which had had great difficulty obtaining military and civilian personnel of ability, education, and experience, established its

headquarters and six major subordinate field agencies in mid-1962. One year later CDC had modified its internal organization and had seven major subordinate field agencies.[156]

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[156] The U.S. Army Combat Development Command: First Year, June 1962 - July 1963, dated August 1963.

For CONARC the first year of the reorganization was largely one of internal organizational and procedural rearrangements and some external adjustments. CONARC gained responsibility for a number of schools formerly under Technical Services control; separated doctrinal functions from the school system, not always easy to determine; split its G-3 staff section into two separate sections, one for individual training, the other for unit training; and worked toward establishing a smooth relationship among the CONARC headquarters, the zone of interior armies, and the schools.[157]

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[157] Interv w/Dr. Brooks Kleber, Chief Historian, CONARC, 3 Jun 64.

The accomplishment of the reorganization coincided with the entrance of a new team to direct the Army. Mr. Stahr resigned in the summer of 1962 and was replaced by Mr. Vance, who had been largely responsible for seeing that Mr. McNamara's wishes with respect to the reorganization had been carried out. Not long afterward, General Decker retired as Chief of Staff. At about the same time General Traub, the Army Comptroller who had implemented and executed the reorganization, also retired.

One of the outstanding characteristics of the reorganization was the use of the task force or ad hoc structure to achieve the changes eventually implemented. The Hoelscher Committee, the Traub Committee, DARPO, the Planning Council, and the Planning Groups were all of that nature, organizations formed outside the normal structure to perform a specific task. The advantages of that form of organization included the ability to concentrate on the assigned task, without diversion from the requirements of the normal press of business and the normal course of duty, and without disrupting that normal business and duty; an organization of that form could also be expected to take a more objective viewpoint from its position deliberately apart from current responsibilities; and might well have a certain perspective that would otherwise be lacking. The disadvantages, in addition to the problems created in gaining administrative support -- office space, clerical help, and the like -- included the absence of traditional channels of communication through the normal command structure. Consequently, there was sometimes resentment among those who felt that their position within the normal structure was being jeopardized by a group not even part of the structure. On the other hand, a task force or ad hoc organization could be more quickly responsive to the wishes of those on higher echelons who could make direct contact precisely because the normal channels of communication did not apply.[158]

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[158] General Traub may not have been thinking of the reorganization when he said: "Experience over the past years certainly indicates the need for assigning projects to properly organized divisions as

opposed to creating task groups outside the organizational structure." Reorganization [of Office of the Director of Management, OCA], Briefing of General Traub to Division Chiefs, 24 Nov 61; see also General Bruce Clarke, Military Review, September 1963.

The conservatism of the Army, or at least the reluctance of some elements to make changes, had been in sharp contrast with the drive for change by the Secretary of Defense. Both viewpoints were understandable. On the one hand, the Army was highly conscious of its need to continue discharging its responsibilities and very much aware of the potential effect that any organizational disruption would have on its ability to perform its mission. On the other hand, the election of the Democratic administration in part was a mandate to modify the existing military structure, and Mr. McNamara was responding to that need. The result of the low-key clash was a dilution of the original impulse as the proposals for change passed through the successive stages of consideration, and the rather thoroughgoing reforms that were proposed came to fruition only after they were somewhat modified.

In one perhaps oversimplified sense the reorganization of the Army represented a different method of slicing the functions of the Technical Services. For example, instead of having a single Technical Service to handle all Signal matters, the Army gave Signal personnel management to OPO, Signal training to CONARC, Signal doctrine and combat development to CDC, and Signal materiel development and procurement to AMC.[159]

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[159] See chart, Armed Forces Management (May 1964), p. 58.

The Hoelscher Committee proposals for reorganization represented the best professional thinking of the Army's managerial experts, and their thought was in consonance with Mr. McNamara's desires. Yet those charged with implementing the reorganization were the Army's generalists and traditionalists, those who had vested interests in the existing organization and who found it difficult to fault or to challenge the inertia of a going concern. Not only was this true of the Traub Committee; it marked the proceedings of the Planning Council. For example, the Planning Council never approved the activation plans drawn by the planning groups, mainly because the accelerated implementation and the consequent lack of time precluded a close look at anything except the wholesale logistical apparatus, which, so far as Mr. McNamara was concerned, comprised the heart of the reorganization. Since the Secretary of Defense was keeping close watch over that development, the Planning Council had little more to do than recommend to the Chief of Staff approval of the fiscal chapter of the AMC activation plan -- a necessary prerequisite for the new command to function. As a result of this method of operation, the activation plans nullified by default perhaps as much as up to 50 percent of the Hoelscher concept, for the implementers did not know so well as the professional experts what the new principles of the reorganization were. Yet probably as much as 85 percent of the recommendations relating to organizational structure were adopted, for these were easily and quickly comprehended. And perhaps less than 50 percent of the possibilities envisaged -- those relationships and managerial principles unable to be represented on a chart --

were dismissed for lack of understanding or, simply, of time.

In one observer's view, the major immediate result of the reorganization was disruption of the Army's performance. The major defect of the reorganization process was the continual inclination to delegate authority for it. In part this was due to the pressing demands made on the Army by the world situation and its crises. But if it is true, as a high-ranking officer has said, that the Army Staff is a somewhat loose federation of independent republics, then it can be co-ordinated and directed effectively only by authority at the very top of the Army structure, in the person of the Chief of Staff.[161]

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[161] Comments by Mr. M. O. Stewart, 2 July 1964. The statement characterizing the staff is attributed to Lt. Gen. C. H. Bonesteel, III, Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff.

Some observers early in 1964 had reservations about the value of the reorganization, for, as one said, "troublesome adjustments, only some of which were predictable," plagued the Army during what was conceded to be still a transitional period. Among the unpredictable turbulences were the far-reaching effects of 1) introducing the DOD Programming System, 2) extending the project manager system, and 3) establishing STRICOM. But more important, the Department of the Army headquarters was not fully reorganized as envisioned -- COA, CRD, CORC, and ACSI remaining practically untouched -- and the headquarters consequently continued to react to incidents and other immediate stimuli rather than to manage with respect to anticipated requirements

and long-range policies and plans primarily because, except for the wholesale logistics function, the staff was not significantly changed.

Furthermore, not fully appreciated before the reorganization was the extent to which 1) the General Staff had leaned on the Technical Services, 2) the Technical Services had integrated the personnel-training-doctrine-hardware system, 3) the Technical Services had contributed to the combat developments area, and 4) the Technical Services had provided stability to field operations in the critical supply and maintenance areas. The expected gain in the wholesale logistics area, obtained by abolishing the Technical Services, "may be worth every bit the price Army is paying in other areas," a professional analyst observed, but he was haunted by the thought that the price, in terms of organizational and procedural disruption, might be too high.[162]

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[162] M. O. Stewart, "A Backward Look at the 1962 Army Reorganization," 28 Jan 64, a private paper written to organize his own thoughts.

But the movement and shifting of organizational boxes on organizational charts never accurately reflect the actual relationships within an organization, both horizontally and vertically. It takes time for people to understand and work out areas of endeavor in the interest of eliminating overlap and establishing job boundaries. Administrators in a large and complex organization like the Army need time to establish the tacit agreements that make an organization run smoothly.[163]

163 Comment by Mr. Kenneth Wisner, 31 Jan 62.

A distinguished Army officer put it this way. Before the reorganization of the Army, he wrote,

> we did not have a system for the development of our tactical doctrine and its logistical counterpart. . . . In the absence of a system there was no complete, orderly plan for procedure. The ultimate decisions were directed verdicts whereby the nature of the desired solution was practically directed by precepts from the top. The basic work was done by a relatively small group of officers subject to day-to-day pressures and for whom the task was but one of many. The time allowed was ridiculously short. Little, if any, advantage was taken of research and analysis methods. . . . These [and other] circumstances prevented comprehensive consideration of the full scope of problems and the full range of possible solutions and denied to the project[s] the vast wealth of experience and knowledge which could have been brought to bear.
>
> The recent reorganization of the Army has done much to correct the errors of the past. We have come a long way during the past two years, but we are still in the process of evolution and have a long way to go before a completely effective system is in operation. We now have a potentially effective system whereby men, materiel, organization, tactics and logistics will be developed in relationship to each other. The system shows great promise of being successful in bringing the Army's total capabilities into better balance with advances in technology and materiel. . . .
>
> We are headed in the right direction to permit it [the Army] to carry out its mission properly but our progress is not as solid or as rapid as it could be. We must appreciate the requirement for balanced development and the necessity for steady progress free of short-range interferences. If we do not, we will find we have an orderly system in theory but a fire brigade in practice. 164

164 Ltr, Lt Gen Garrison H. Davidson to CG CONARC, Development of Combat Potential, 20 Feb 64.

Whatever improvement the reorganization of the Army represented, the re-shaping of the Army made it conform better to the precepts of

the most advanced developments in managerial technique and brought it into consonance with the desires of those who directed the military establishment. Reorganization continues, for the Army is an ever-changing institution designed to function in an ever-changing world. But the changes that occur daily are usually evolutionary, gradual, and hardly perceptible, and the readjustments they make necessary are normally quiet and automatic. The reorganization of 1962 brought upheaval and dislocation, but, somewhat surprisingly, occasioned the Army but little loss of efficiency and effectiveness in performing its current missions.

GLOSSARY

ACSFOR	Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
ACSI	Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
AMC	Army Materiel Command
CBR	Chemical, Biological, Radiological
CDA	Combat Developments Agency
CDC	Combat Developments Command
CG	Commanding General
CINFO	Chief of Information
CONARC	Continental Army Command
CORC	Chief of Organized Reserve Corps
CRD	Chief of Research and Development
CS	Chief of Staff
DA	Department of the Army
DARPO	Department of the Army Reorganization Project Office
DCS	Deputy Chief of Staff
DCSLOG	Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics
DCSOPS	Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations
DCSPER	Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DOD	Department of Defense

DSA	Defense Supply Agency
FDC	Force Development Command
ITC	Individual Training Command
MDLC	Materiel Development and Logistic Command
Memo for Rcd	Memorandum for the Record
MRP	[Office of] Management Research and Planning [OCA]
OCA	Office of the Comptroller of the Army
OCMH	Office of the Chief of Military History
OPO	Office of Personnel Operations
OQMG	Office of the Quartermaster General
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PAC	Project Advisory Committee
PERT	Program Evaluation and Review Technique
PIP	Preliminary Implementation Plan
QMG	Quartermaster General
R&D	Research and Development
ROTC	Reserve Officers Training Corps
SGS	Secretary of the General Staff
SMC	Systems and Materiel Command
STRICOM	Strike Command
TAG	The Adjutant General
TDY	Temporary Duty
VCS	Vice Chief of Staff

CHART 1 — ORGANIZATION OF THE HQS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, 1 JANUARY 1961



* THE CHIEF OF PUBLIC INFORMATION ALSO SERVES AS CHIEF OF INFORMATION

CHART 2 — DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY MAJOR COMMAND STRUCTURE, 1 JANUARY 1961



* Includes Army Security Agency, Army Audit Agency, United States Military Academy, Army War College; Army Personnel assigned to Defense Atomic Support Agency, National War College, Defense Supply and Telephone Services; and other activities in support of the Office, Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Unified and Specified Commands.

CHART 3 — ORGANIZATION OF HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, 30 JUNE 1963



CHART 4 — DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY MAJOR COMMAND STRUCTURE, 30 JUNE 1963



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ASDIRS No: 0130

Study Category: Army Studies

Study Sub-Category: Management & Admin

Initiated By: OCMH

Starting Date: February 1962

Study Sponsor: OCMH

Completion Date: September 1964

Study Agency: OCMH

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