




THE OFFICE OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT
TO THE
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
A BRIEF HISTORY



Jamie L. Goodall





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of the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army); (*lower
left*) Munitions Building; (*lower right*) Pentagon destruction, 11
September 2001 (*Department of Defense*)

CONTENTS

| | |
|---|----|
| Foreword | 5 |
| Introduction..... | 7 |
| 1. The Development of the Chief Clerk of the War Department, 1789–1911 | 11 |
| 2. From Chief Clerk to Administrative Assistant, 1912–1931..... | 27 |
| 3. World War II and the Transition to Department of the Army, 1932–1947..... | 33 |
| 4. Army Administration in the Cold War Era, 1948–1979 | 37 |
| 5. Reorganization, Reduction, and Redesign, 1980–2001..... | 43 |
| 6. The Pentagon on 11 September 2001 | 53 |
| 7. Realignment for the Future, 2002–2023 | 59 |
| Conclusion | 71 |
| Acknowledgements..... | 72 |
| Select Bibliography | 73 |
| Appendix A: Chief Clerks of the War Department..... | 74 |
| Appendix B: Administrative Assistants to the Secretary of the War/Army | 75 |
| Appendix C: In Memoriam 11 September 2001 | 76 |
| Appendix D: The Seal of the Office of the Administrative Assistant | 77 |
| Acronyms and Abbreviations | 78 |
| About the Author | 79 |

FOREWORD

The Greek philosopher Heraclitus once posited that the only constant in life is change, a concept the U.S. Army understands all too well. However, in the case of the Department of the Army, Heraclitus is only partly correct. Since its establishment as the War Department in 1789, there has been a second constant working quietly behind the scenes and without fanfare: the Office of the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army (OAA). From a small group of just four personnel under the leadership of the Chief Clerk in 1789 to an office employing thousands under the Administrative Assistant, the significance of the OAA's role in the effective functioning of the Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), has gone largely unrecognized. This brief history is intended as a broad overview of more than two centuries of the OAA's countless contributions.

To better understand the many hats worn by the OAA, this history is organized around three major themes. The first is the many changes to the missions and functions of the OAA before and after the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Before the act, the OAA primarily supported the Secretary. Afterward, it had to provide a wide range of support for the entire headquarters and other Army and Department of Defense organizations. Second are the many unique functions the Chief Clerk/Administrative Assistant has held over the years. From Chief Clerk John Potts's role as a quasi-fire safety inspector in the War Department building to Chief Clerk John C. Scofield's service as the War Department's exhibit specialist for national and international expositions to Administrative Assistant Joel B. Hudson's leadership through the chaos of the 11 September 2001 attacks, assisting the Secretary of War/the Army has required the highest level of professionalism, skill, and flexibility. The third theme is the OAA today with a look toward the office's future within an ever-changing U.S. Army.

For more than 200 years, the OAA has remained committed to its mission to provide HQDA and organizations Army-wide with administrative and management support of the highest caliber. The office and its personnel are vital assets to the effective functioning of HQDA and continue to serve as a bedrock for the U.S. Army.

Mark F. Averill
Twelfth Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army

INTRODUCTION

After years of spirited debate over questions of representation, taxation, and liberty, hostilities erupted between Great Britain and thirteen of the kingdom's North American colonies at the Battles of Lexington and Concord on 19 April 1775. More than a year later, on 12 June 1776, the Second Continental Congress, consisting of delegates from all thirteen colonies operating as a de facto national government, considered a report regarding the need for a war office. General George Washington previously had expressed to Congress the "extreme necessity" of concentrating military authority to streamline the Continental Army's wartime efforts. Military leaders believed that a war office would provide "more speedy and effectual Dispatch of military Business."

On these recommendations, Congress established a five-person congressional committee known as the Board of War and Ordnance, which its president, John




The completed restoration of the historic Fraunces Tavern in New York City, where the departments of Foreign Affairs, Finance, and War had their offices after the American Revolution. Photo taken from the corner of Pearl and Broad Streets, 1907. (*Fraunces Tavern Museum Archives*)



A view of Fraunces Tavern, before its restoration, taken between 1890 and 1906. (*Library of Congress*)

Hancock, referred to as “a new and great Event in the History of America.” The members were responsible for everything from obtaining and keeping an updated register of every officer in the “land forces” to maintaining and preserving all original letters and papers that it received from Congress. As the committee’s list of responsibilities grew, Congress appointed a secretary and clerks to assist it in executing its official business. Although the future War Department was not a direct successor of this congressional committee, it adopted many of its civilian administrative functions.

Today, the Office of the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army (OAA) provides direct administrative and management support to Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA). Incredibly important but often underappreciated, the organization also offers wide-ranging and innovative



Map 1

services to the entire Army. Over the course of more than two centuries, the OAA and its predecessors have experienced many changes in structure and function, as well as a roller coaster of growth and decline. The history of the origins and development of the OAA highlights its many successes and the challenges it overcame along the way.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHIEF CLERK OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT, 1789–1911

On 15 November 1777, the Continental Congress adopted the Articles of Confederation, the nation's first constitution, which created a loose union of sovereign states. Although not ratified until 1 March 1781, the Articles made the position of secretary at war, a congressional appointee, permanent. On 14 January 1782, Secretary at War Benjamin Lincoln wrote to Congress seeking permission to appoint an assistant, a personal secretary, and two clerks, believing these personnel necessary for successful management of the War Department. Congress approved Lincoln's request on 17 January and further resolved that any time the secretary at war was absent, the assistant to conduct any business within the department that the secretary deemed necessary. This meant that the assistant to the secretary of war was also essentially the assistant secretary at war.


Leaders quickly realized, however, that the central government created under the Articles was too weak for the country to function effectively, prompting a Constitutional Convention in 1787. After months of debate, the delegates forged the Constitution of the United States and on 4 March 1789, the new government took effect. One month later,

during its first session, Congress established the Department of War whose principal officer would be the secretary of war. Under the confederation government, Congress had appointed General Henry Knox as the secretary at war after Lincoln's departure and empowered him to appoint a subordinate officer, called the chief clerk. However, ratification of the Constitution conferred the authority to appoint the secretary to the president. President George Washington chose to retain General Knox, his trusted friend and wartime colleague, making him the first U.S. secretary of war.

General Knox initially appointed as chief clerk his younger brother, William, who had been his military secretary during the American Revolution. William served in

It [OAA] was a very large organization in the Army, very prestigious. . . . We worked directly for the Secretary of the Army and . . . we were called the Mayor of the Pentagon for the Army because we basically ran all of the facilities, the funding, the HR [human resources]. We had most of the operating functions of the Army in the Pentagon.


—Angela K. Ritz, director of the Civilian Aides to the Secretary of the Army, Office of the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army



A portrait of General Henry Knox by G. Y. Mattingly, 1945
(National Archives)

this position from September 1789 until June 1790 when President Washington named him consul at Dublin. John Stagg Jr. succeeded to the War Department post and held it from June 1790 to November 1797. From the late eighteenth century until the end of the nineteenth century, the position of chief clerk changed hands frequently, with many serving only one or two years.


In the decades between the conclusion of the American Revolution and the outbreak of the War of 1812 (1812–1815), the U.S. Army faced frequent reorganization. Congress hastily enacted statutes to increase the Army's strength in anticipation of armed conflict. Then it would just as quickly repeal or supersede the laws after the period of crisis had passed. Concerns over maintaining a standing army initially kept the ranks small. For example, in 1789, Congress authorized a force of 840 soldiers,



Map 2

but only 672 were in service. And although it approved an increase in the Army to 35,000 soldiers in January 1812, by summer of that year, only 6,744 were active. The War Department's small staff worked diligently to fulfill the various duties that Congress had assigned to the secretary of war, but they quickly found themselves struggling to manage the ever-growing volume of books, records, and papers under their purview. When General Henry Dearborn left the position of secretary of war in 1809, he declared that the accumulation and pressure of the War Department's business had "increased beyond what the capacity of any one man could perform, and that some aid and assistance was indispensable to the public service."

In addition to being prepared to face external enemies, the War Department also had to handle conflicts with Native Americans and domestic tax revolts. To meet these challenges, the secretary had to raise, equip, and maintain an effective fighting force. Dealing with everything from supply and personnel issues to



Map 3

matters of pay, recruiting, and intelligence, the secretary was overwhelmed with requests from former officers who desperately wanted to work in President Washington’s administration. Additionally, because the U.S. Navy remained too small to warrant its own department, the secretary of war oversaw its

administration. With so many different responsibilities to manage, the secretary increasingly relied on his chief clerk, who worked to create order among the chaos of papers, appointments, and details.

Traditionally, when a cabinet officer relinquished the position, the president would appoint an existing member to take on the vacant position as an additional duty. But President Thomas Jefferson disrupted that custom in 1809 when he appointed Chief Clerk John Smith to succeed departing Secretary Dearborn until James Madison could name his replacement. This was the first time since its inception that the War Department's administrative officer, rather than a cabinet member, became acting secretary of war.

Whenever the secretary of war traveled away from Washington, the chief clerk was instrumental in continuing to direct affairs by maintaining frequent and detailed communication. Correspondence between Secretary of War William Eustis and his chief clerk, John Smith, shows just how critical the subordinate position was in keeping the War Department functional. Fortunately for Eustis, Smith's prior experience with the position of secretary of war made him indispensable in this role. During Eustis's extended absences from Washington, he relied on Smith to relay important letters quickly, write replies when necessary, or take other actions. For example, in September 1810, Smith responded to a letter from William Henry Harrison, territorial governor of Indiana and future president of the United States, on behalf of Eustis. Harrison informed the secretary about his recent meetings with Tecumseh, the Shawnee chief and warrior. Smith assured Harrison that he had received his communique "with its enclosures" in Eustis's absence and it had been "forwarded to him for consideration." Further, Smith conveyed to Harrison several orders from Eustis and noted that the secretary had authorized him, as chief clerk, "to add" that any points from Harrison's dispatch not yet addressed would be considered the next time Eustis met with President Madison. Smith also transcribed Harrison's letter and sent a copy to Madison. Such correspondence kept the War Department running smoothly in the secretary's absence.

There were many other times when the president felt the need to place the chief clerk in the position of acting secretary of war. In 1816, President Madison made Chief Clerk George Graham the acting secretary after William H. Crawford left to become the secretary of state. Graham served in the position for one year while the new president, James Monroe, searched for a permanent replacement. On 20 June 1831, John H. Eaton resigned as secretary of war, forcing President Andrew Jackson to appoint Chief Clerk Philip G. Randolph as the interim secretary. Ten years later, on 12 September 1841, President John Tyler named Chief Clerk Albert M. Lea as acting secretary after the resignation of John Bell. Lea held the position for exactly one month until, on 12 October 1841, President Tyler appointed John C. Spencer as secretary of war. And for just one day, 23–24 July 1850, Chief Clerk Samuel J. Anderson was the acting secretary between the departure of George W. Crawford and the interim

tenure of Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott during the Millard Fillmore administration. Anderson was the last chief clerk to hold the higher-ranking position.

As these examples suggest, if the president felt confident enough to entrust the acting cabinet title to the department's chief clerk, the position must have been highly respected. Not everyone agreed with this assessment. For example, when Christopher Van Deventer sought advice from former Secretary of War John Armstrong Jr. about obtaining an appointment as current secretary John C. Calhoun's chief clerk, Armstrong strongly advised against it. He referred to the chief clerk as "a mere quill driver" whose opportunity for advancement was "rare," whereas if Van Deventer remained in the Army, he would have a much greater chance for progression as even "a blockhead without any sense" could rise to the rank of general. Perhaps Armstrong's own shortcomings affected his judgment of his subordinates. President Madison had, after all, blamed Armstrong for failing to supply soldiers and equipment to protect Washington, D.C., from British occupation during the War of 1812. After the British burned the Capitol on 24 August 1814, Armstrong's unpopularity drove him to resign as secretary of war. Ultimately, Van Deventer who was a prisoner of war for almost two years during the war, undermined Armstrong's dismissal of the position, and became one of Secretary Calhoun's "closest confidants and also . . . one of his military advisors."

By the time that President James Monroe appointed Calhoun secretary of war, the amount of business being conducted in the War Department was so substantial that it employed approximately twenty clerks who all worked under the direction and authority of the chief clerk, Van Deventer. They, especially the senior ranking among them, became well-informed in many areas, including specialized laws, regulations, and War Department precedents. They also managed daily tasks such as correspondence, recordkeeping, and handling the claims and/or accounts of former soldiers.

Although the secretary's office witnessed modest enlargement from its inception, the gradual nature of this development simply could not keep pace with the number of substantive matters that necessitated the secretary's attention. So, between the War of 1812 and the American Civil War (1861–1865), Congress created several subordinate units in the War Department to relieve the secretary's office of some of its obligations. Examples of these sections include the Adjutant General, Ordnance, Pay, Quartermaster, and Engineer Departments. Additionally, the War Department formed some of its own entities, such as an Office of Indian Affairs in 1824 and a Commissioner of Pensions in 1833, which transferred to the newly created Department of the Interior in 1849.

The effect was a reduction in the range of the chief clerk's responsibilities, which decreased further during the Civil War when Secretary Edwin M. Stanton established organizations like the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, the Bureau of Military Justice (precursor to the Judge Advocate General's Department), and the Office of the Commissary General of Prisoners, to name a few. Decentralization

Samuel Cooper was born 12 June 1798 in New Hackensack, New York, to Samuel and Mary Cooper, née Horton. At the age of 14, Cooper's father secured him an appointment in the United States Military Academy at West Point. He graduated on 10 December 1815 and subsequently commissioned as a brevet lieutenant until a vacancy opened. In 1817, he received an official commission as a second lieutenant. Cooper served in several artillery units, where he was promoted to first lieutenant in 1821 and to captain in 1838. By virtue of his marriage to Sara Maria Mason in April 1827, Cooper secured a position as the personal aide to General Alexander Macomb. On 13 March 1837, Secretary of War Joel R. Poinsett appointed Cooper as the chief clerk of the War Department. He held the position until 9 July 1838 when he was promoted to the staff rank of brevet major and assigned as the assistant adjutant general. Subsequently, Cooper served in both the Second Seminole War (1841–1842) and the Mexican-American War (1846–1848) and built a solid reputation for himself in Washington, D.C.

As sectional tension continued to build over the next decade, Cooper realized things were reaching the point of no return. He decided to resign from the Army one month before Virginia seceded from the Union and accepted a position that Confederate President Jefferson F. Davis offered him in the Confederate Army. During the war, U.S. forces destroyed Cooper's home as they constructed defenses near Washington, D.C., and used the materials to help build a fort they dubbed "Traitor's Hill." Despite his defection from the United States, at war's end, Cooper's last official act was to preserve the Confederate Army's official records and provide them to the U.S. government. These records form part of *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*.

of these functions allowed the secretary of war's office to focus attention on matters of broad policy and administration.

General administration was an essential and wide-ranging, but underappreciated, function that fell under the purview of the War Department's chief clerk. For example, in response to the rise in the price of paper by the mid-1860s, Congress included a provision to control the proliferation of public

In the 1860s, the telegraph office was on the second floor of the War Department building located at the corner of Pennsylvania Avenue and Seventeenth Street in Washington, D.C. During the Civil War, Secretary of War Edwin Stanton rarely left the office. He considered the “telegraph service . . . his right arm, [so much so] that the office it occupied adjoined his own, separated only by a door, nearly always left ajar.” On the rare occasion Stanton had to leave, he relied on his chief clerk, John Potts, to keep him informed. President Abraham Lincoln also spent a great deal of time in the telegraph office. Maj. Thomas T. Eckert, head of the office, apparently was known for “breaking soft iron fireplace pokers over his arm, and presumably could do the same with heads.” According to Lincoln biographer John C. Waugh, one day Major Eckert entertained President Lincoln with his skill. The president turned to Chief Clerk Potts and said, “Mr. Potts, you will have to buy a better quality of iron in the future if you expect your pokers to stand the test of this young man’s arm.”

printing in their 14 March 1864 Act to Supply Deficiencies in the Appropriations for the Service of the Fiscal Year. It noted that “hereafter no printing or binding shall be done, or blank books be procured for any of the executive departments of the government without a written requisition” from the department head to the superintendent of public printing. For the War Department, the task of carrying out this new requirement went to the chief clerk, John Potts. The following year, there was concern about fire safety, which required Potts to purchase items like fenders for the department’s fireplaces and leather hoses for fire plugs.

In 1875, it was the responsibility of Chief Clerk Henry T. Crosby to approve any work orders for the War Department building as he had taken on the role of its superintendent. Additionally, Secretary of War William W. Belknap authorized Crosby to take charge of the process to compile the records, of both the United States and Confederate States of America, from the Civil War. It was the chief clerk’s job to tackle such multifarious activities to help ensure effective War Department operations.

In the years after the Civil War, the secretary of war began to leverage his chief clerk as a channel for exerting authority over the various subordinates in the War Department. No one understood this better than Secretary Belknap. By the end of his tenure, Belknap grew concerned about the vast quantity of files held in the War Department and its bureaus, and he appointed a board to examine the current protocols related to the collecting and keeping of records.



The Secretary of War's Reception Room with a large desk, a map of the United States, and portraits on the wall in the State, War and Navy (SWAN) Building, now the Eisenhower Executive Office Building, Washington, D.C., by Frances Benjamin Johnston, between 1888 and 1900.
(Library of Congress)

He also wanted to know how the department and its bureaus presently conducted business. Members reported that most of the current documents either were of no value after a certain period of time or were “never likely, within reasonable probability, to prove of sufficient value to justify the care and expense of their preservation.” With the board’s conclusions in mind, Belknap mandated that by year’s end, all officers under his direct command were to stop keeping record books and instead turn them over to Chief Clerk Potts, who would review them and determine their relative value. When Henry Crosby took the position of chief clerk in 1872, Secretary Belknap tasked him with soliciting any overdue reports to Congress from department bureau chiefs. Belknap also decided that no one employed in the War Department could provide any information about the payment of settlements to individuals unless he or his chief clerk directed the employee to do so.

By the mid-1870s, it became clear that the chief clerk enjoyed much of the power, albeit not the title, of an acting secretary of war in the secretary’s absence. For example, whenever Secretary Belknap found it necessary to be away from the War Department, he empowered his chief clerk to act in his place. He

further clarified the authority of the position in July 1873 when he related that, because all papers submitted to his office went through the chief clerk—in this case, Crosby—he considered the orders given by Crosby to be official. Despite Belknap’s directive, it did not have the weight of law. In his report to Congress in November 1873, Belknap lamented that, should the secretary of war be absent temporarily from office, the department had no personnel “authorized by law to sign the money requisitions upon the Treasury and other papers necessary” to conduct business. He considered the lack of codification for the War Department troubling as “almost all the other Departments of the Government” had one or more assistant secretaries that the law authorized “to perform such duties in the absence of the head of the Department.” Given that the War Department did not have an official “assistant secretary,” he recommended passing an act enabling the secretary of war “to authorize the chief clerk, in case of illness or other temporary absence of the head of the department, to sign requisitions and other papers deemed necessary for immediate signature.” On 4 March 1874, Congress turned Belknap’s recommendation into law, establishing that “when, from illness or other cause, the Secretary of War is temporarily absent from the War Department, he may authorize the chief clerk of the Department to sign requisitions upon the Treasury Department, and other papers requiring the signature of said Secretary; the same, when signed by the chief clerk during such temporary absence, to be of the same force and effect as if signed by the Secretary of War himself.”

Subsequent secretaries of war further demonstrated an increasing dependence on their chief clerk. For example, during his tenure as secretary of war, George W. McCrary dedicated one hour a day to discussing and conducting business with Chief Clerk Crosby. By that time, Crosby had been chief clerk for

John Tweedale was born on 10 June 1841 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. During the Civil War, Tweedale served as a private in Company B, 15th Cavalry, Pennsylvania Volunteers, an independent unit that reported to the headquarters of the Army of the Cumberland. When the Battle of Stones River broke out on 31 December 1862 in middle Tennessee, Tweedale was one of the tens of thousands of soldiers who defended the area around Murfreesboro in the river valley. For his “extraordinary heroism” and “gallantry in action,” Tweedale was later awarded the Medal of Honor on 18 November 1887 while serving as chief clerk of the War Department. He retired as a Colonel in 1905, passed away on 21 December 1920, and is buried in Arlington National Cemetery.

six different secretaries in his ten years of service and was an invaluable resource for McCrary. Another example is the reliance of Secretary Redfield Proctor on his chief clerk, John Tweedale. He was so dependent on Tweedale's assistance that he immediately relocated his chief clerk's office next to his own. Unlike the secretary of war, the chief clerk did not automatically change with the arrival of a new presidential administration—an important continuity and a vital source of information and insight regarding the inner workings of the War Department. Tweedale, for example, served as chief clerk for nearly seventeen years under the leadership of seven different secretaries of war.

As a political appointee, the chief clerk carried out all duties specifically at the discretion of the secretary of war, until the end of the nineteenth century. Before the appointment of John Potts in 1861, fewer than 25 percent of chief clerks served more than four years in the position.¹ One explanation for the high turnover rate is that, before civil service reform

efforts in the late nineteenth century, the American political system was mired in the so-called spoils system. Under this practice of political patronage, those who had supported the winning political party during presidential and legislative elections could be rewarded with government positions. With the chief clerk appointed at the discretion of the secretary of war, there was significant parallel between when the secretary left office and when the chief clerk did. Between 1789 and 1861, there were twenty-six secretaries of war and twenty-eight chief clerks. Reformers lamented that there was “no organization save that of corruption; no



Chief Clerk of the War Department John Tweedale, date unknown (*Office of the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army*)

1. This was Potts's second tour as chief clerk. He previously had been in the position from 5 March 1851 to 9 March 1853.

system save that of chaos; no test of integrity save that of partisanship; no test of qualification save that of intrigue.”

The spoils system reached a point of crisis in September 1881 when a disgruntled office-seeker assassinated President James A. Garfield. Reformers convinced Congress to pass the Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act of 1883—named for the legislation’s sponsor, Democratic senator George H. Pendleton of Ohio—which created a merit-based system for federal employment and forbade the demotion or removal of a civil service employee based on politics or religion. The law required those seeking specific appointments to prove their competency by taking a competitive examination, which created “classified” services. On 7 May 1883, President Chester A. Arthur issued an executive order clarifying which government positions were part of the classification system; at that time, the new competitive structure applied to only 10 percent of federal jobs. Rule XIX of the president’s order excepted “the confidential clerk or secretary of any head of a department or office” from examination, meaning that the chief clerk of the War Department did not fall under this reform.

Government officials believed this civil service reform legislation would improve bureaucratic efficiency by attracting more qualified candidates and increasing employee retention. Unfortunately, highly contentious presidential elections between 1883 and the election of Grover Cleveland in 1892 hindered the speed and effective implementation of the law. To ensure compliance with the regulation, President Cleveland issued an executive order in 1896 amending prior rules governing the act. Important for the War Department was Rule III, which expanded the types of positions that were subject to civil service classification: “all officers and employees, of whatever designation . . . [and] however or for whatever purpose employed” were now part of competitive civil service. The order also made specific reference to those “serving in or on detail from—The several Executive Departments,” which meant that the War Department’s chief clerk was now a competitive civil service employee. In the nearly four decades between the initial reform efforts during the Civil War and the enactment of the new civil service legislation, just three people occupied the position of chief clerk: John Potts, Henry Crosby, and John Tweedale. Their longevity in office indicated the rising influence of the chief clerk, who provided vital continuity to an important agency as secretaries came and went.

Ever since the position’s inception, the chief clerk had been responsible for all clerks and other employees within the office, tasked with everything from assignment, regulation, pay, and promotion to grievances, transfer, and dismissal. Additionally, because of the increased administrative burden during the Civil War, Congress established three assistant secretary positions to support the War Department, thus reducing some of the authority of Chief Clerk Potts. Congress eliminated these jobs at war’s end, and the Civil Service Act of 1883 created new personnel procedures, which subsequently increased the chief clerk’s workload. The War Department was so inundated with business that Congress passed bill S.

1359, “providing for an Assistant Secretary of War” on 4 March 1890, giving the secretary the ability to delegate tasks and duties to this new assistant.

When Congress passed an act on 29 August 1890 empowering Tweedale to administer oaths of office to employees upon their appointment or promotion, his workload increased again. He sustained such pressure until 22 November 1898, when Assistant Secretary of War George D. Meiklejohn ordered the creation of the Appointment Division, to be headed by a separate clerk. Although this new division would take care of anything related to the department’s civilian personnel, such as handling relevant official mail and composing quarterly reports of changes in the roster of departmental employees, Tweedale supervised the appointment clerk. At that time, he was also responsible for the clerk in the Disbursing Division, so, any “reduction” of responsibility was, in effect, minimal. Even the assistant secretary came to recognize the importance of the chief clerk. For example, Assistant Secretary Meiklejohn became so close to Chief Clerk John C. Scofield that, in less than a year, he not only allowed Scofield to open and reply to his confidential and personal correspondence, but also actively encouraged it. The strength of this relationship afforded Scofield a measure of influence, including helping officers obtain the assignments they wanted.

Keeping track of who was responsible for what occupied a significant amount of the chief clerk’s time. For example, initially the disbursing clerk was responsible for issuing pay to civilians and for making payments from various appropriations intended for the maintenance of the civil establishment of the War Department. But when the newly created Appointment Division took over payrolls, distribution of appropriations payments became the Disbursing Division’s sole responsibility.

In 1899, President William McKinley appointed Elihu Root secretary of war. Root entered an office in which a severe lack of coordination and cooperation among the bureaus had been made embarrassingly apparent during the Spanish-American War (1898). He immediately tried to create “classes of business” that each position—secretary, assistant secretary, and chief clerk—would manage so as to combat any confusion about their responsibilities. However, he wanted to codify any consolidation of the myriad departments and divisions. In his March 1902 testimony before the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives, Root urged Congress to pass bill S. 8917, designed to increase the efficiency of the Army. He reiterated the point he had been making ever since he first assumed office: if the United States failed to modify the structure of its War Department, “successful results” in war would be impossible without a “most painful and expensive experience,” which would have “far reaching consequences to the service and the country.”

In the meantime, Secretary Root moved forward with his classes of business model, many of which fell under the purview of his chief clerk, Scofield. In addition to the management of personnel, disbursement, and mail, Scofield also supervised the printing and advertising of jobs across the Army, any printing and



Chief Clerk of the War Department John C. Scofield, date unknown (*Office of the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army*)

binding that needed to be completed for the War Department, and all requisitions or regular business for militia materiel and supplies for all department offices. Further, Scofield directed the answering of routine calls for information found in department records, ensured the publication of decisions and precedents, and supervised “inventory and inspection” reports. To support the expanded workload, Scofield was the first chief clerk to receive a deputy that later morphed into the Deputy Administrative Assistant.

If that were not enough work for one official, Scofield also supported the secretary of war’s office in its duties related to the administration of customs and other civil affairs in Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippine Islands. From taking care of everyday matters of auditing and accounting to the printing and binding of materials, Chief Clerk Scofield handled “all other matters of a purely routine character not involving questions of policy nor establishing precedents, and not

requiring the personal action of the secretary of war or the assistant secretary of war under the foregoing assignments.” Further increasing the volume of his responsibilities, Secretary Root chose Scofield to be the “head of the office of the Secretary of War,” in which he charged the chief clerk with “the administrative action required by law to be taken in connection with the settlement of disbursing officers’ accounts that do not relate to the different staff corps of the Army.” On 22 May 1908, Congress passed an appropriations act for the legislative, executive, and judicial expenses of the government for the fiscal year ending on 30 June 1909, in which it modified the title of chief clerk to “assistant and chief clerk,” perhaps to recognize the position’s growing responsibilities.

From the time Scofield entered the position of chief clerk in 1899, he spent a notable amount of time supervising many of the United States’ exhibitions, which Scofield interpreted as part of the “other matters of a purely routine character.”



A color lithograph stereoview of the War Department Exhibit at the Louisiana Purchase Exposition by T. W. Ingersoll, 1904. (*St. Louis Public Library Digital Collections*)

For example, Scofield acted as the War Department's representative on the U.S. Government Board of the Louisiana Purchase Exposition, which convened in St. Louis, Missouri, from May to December 1904 to commemorate the centennial of the purchase of the Louisiana Territory from France. He helped create the War Department's exhibits, closely managing their costs, staffing, preparation, design, construction, shipment, and installation.

Immediately following the Louisiana Purchase Expedition, Scofield served as the War Department's agent for the Lewis and Clark Centennial Exposition (June–October 1905) held in Portland, Oregon. For the next several years, Scofield worked with the Isthmian Canal Commission to clear land in Panama to make room for exposition exhibits (October 1906–December 1908); represented the War Department on the U.S. Government Board for the Jamestown Tercentennial Exposition (April–November 1907); was the War Department's spokesperson for the Alaska-Yukon-Pacific Exposition in Seattle, Washington (June–October 1909); and was in charge of the entire U.S. exhibit at the Insular Fair held in San Juan, Puerto Rico (December 1911).

Despite his tireless involvement in these various exhibitions, Chief Clerk Scofield continued a wide range of tasks. One such example was the Keep Commission, appointed by President Theodore Roosevelt in June 1905. Roosevelt charged the five-member panel of subcabinet officials (none of them from the War Department) with recommending administrative improvements in the federal government. It was the first sign that the executive desired to take the lead in administrative advancements. Scofield joined one of the subcommittees, hoping to use his influence to support his department's needs.

From 1906 to 1907, Scofield's subgroup was responsible for personnel issues, which included salaries, promotions, reductions, dismissals, hours of labor, and sick and personal leave. Although Congress initially sought to focus their efforts on individual agencies, reformers under executive leadership took a broader view of federal administration.

FROM CHIEF CLERK TO ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR, 1912–1931

At the turn of the century, the War Department prioritized consolidation and reform to ready itself for future conflict. An arms race raged, and armies were expanding in a Europe rumbling with political unrest. In 1906, the British launched a newly designed battleship, HMS *Dreadnought*, which revolutionized maritime power and added fuel to the naval competition with Germany. Recognizing that it could not compete with Great Britain's accelerating ship construction program, Germany began shifting military expenditures from the navy to the army in 1911. Russia was reeling from a double blow: an embarrassing defeat in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) and the outbreak of revolution (1905). Fortunately for Russia, a political-military alliance with France from 1894 provided some economic reprieve in the form of significant French capital



State, War, and Navy (SWAN) Building (South Façade), southeast corner of Pennsylvania Avenue and 17th Street NW, Washington, D.C., by Ronald Comedy, ca. 1933 (*Library of Congress*)

investment in Russian industry, which improved the nation's railways and transportation infrastructure. As tensions mounted, the six major European powers increased their defense spending by more than 50 percent between 1908 and 1913.

When Lindley M. Garrison assumed the position as secretary of war in 1913, he did so with Europe on the brink of hostilities. Although Secretary Garrison emphasized the need to overhaul the structure of the nation's Army, which he felt was woefully unprepared if the United States had to abandon its neutral position, he immediately turned his attention to the organization of his office and the administrative changes of his predecessors. In May 1913, Garrison issued a series of orders that revised the chief clerk's duties. For example, Scofield was no longer responsible for issues relating to militia supply and insular affairs. His new tasks included supervision of the War Department telephone and telegraph service and authentication of bureau chiefs' signatures, which was formerly the purview of the assistant secretary. In contrast to Secretary Root's understanding that the chief clerk was directly accountable for personnel and civil service matters pertaining only to "clerical personnel of the office of the Secretary of War," Secretary Garrison broadened the scope of Scofield's area of responsibility. Garrison believed his chief clerk should also supervise "appointments, promotions, and transfers in the

John Cowles Scofield was born on 27 December 1860 in Pittsford, Vermont, to Clark N. and Chastina Scofield, née Buffum. At the age of 16, he enrolled in Middlebury College, graduating in the Class of 1880. Scofield was a law student at Columbian University (now George Washington University) before briefly taking a job as principal of the Eastman Academy in Georgia between 1883 and 1884. Scofield then embarked on a forty-six-year career in the War Department in Washington, D.C. He began as a clerk in the surgeon general's office from 1884 to 1889. For the next decade Scofield took on several different roles within the department: clerk in the secretary of war's office as well as stenographer, private secretary, and chief clerk to the assistant secretary of war. In 1899, Scofield reached the pinnacle of his career when Secretary of War Elihu Root appointed him chief clerk of the War Department. He served in the position for thirty-one years under sixteen different secretaries of war before retiring. Scofield passed away at the age of 83 on 21 January 1944. He is buried in Arlington National Cemetery.

civil service and other matters affecting the civil force of the War Department, the Army departments at large, or field service of the War Department,” which previously were the charge of the assistant secretary. At that time, the chief clerk was a subordinate of the assistant secretary. Now, Scofield answered directly to the secretary.

Tensions in Europe reached a head in June 1914 when an extremist Bosnian Serb assassinated the presumptive heir of the throne of Austria-Hungary, Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Ferdinand was traveling through Sarajevo, capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina, provinces that the Austro-Hungarian government had annexed in 1909. When World War I erupted in response to this politically motivated slaying, the United States initially remained neutral. Many Americans, including President Woodrow Wilson, opposed the idea of entering “foreign wars.”

However, developments between 1915 and early 1917 shifted public opinion and forced America’s hand. First, devastating battles like Verdun and the Somme led to a bloody stalemate on the Western Front, threatening a breakdown of the British and French governments. Second, Russia’s internal revolution caused the nation to collapse, meaning that millions of German troops on the Eastern Front could be shifted to the west. Third, the Germans adopted a policy of unrestricted submarine warfare, which threatened American lives and commerce at sea. Fears were realized on 7 May 1915 when a German U-boat sank a passenger ship, the RMS *Lusitania*, sailing from New York to Liverpool, killing 128 Americans on board. Lastly, in January 1917 British intelligence intercepted a coded message, known as the Zimmermann Telegram, from German foreign secretary Arthur Zimmermann to the German ambassador to Mexico instructing him to propose a military alliance between Germany and Mexico. Germany would help Mexico reclaim territory lost in the Mexican-American War if it would declare war against the United States should America enter the war.

When President Wilson named Newton D. Baker secretary of war on 9 March 1916, the nation was advancing closer to a declaration of war. He inherited a War Department in crisis resulting from some tumultuous reorganization attempts and political infighting. Scofield, who already had served as chief clerk for nearly two decades, was prepared to help Secretary Baker make sense of the bureaucratic chaos. Scofield also relied on one of his most trusted clerks, J. B. Randolph, who had worked in the War Department from the moment he enlisted in June 1862, to assist Baker. The abundance of institutional memory and administrative experience of people like Scofield and Randolph were instrumental to the secretary’s ability to lead the department through World War I. Despite Scofield’s support, the secretary’s hands-off approach to management created administrative lapses, resulting in preventable delays and unnecessary deaths.

In the period immediately after World War I, the War Department urged Congress to maintain a larger permanent Regular Army and establish a universal

military training system, enabling the Army to expand quickly should another major war break out. Congress, faced with an American public that was wary of such a proposal, rejected the department's request. Leaders believed that another large-scale war was highly improbable given the devastation of World War I and that, if war did come to fruition, it would be primarily naval. Thus, the Army remained a small "mobilization army," whereas the War Department focused primarily on maintaining enough personnel to handle domestic disturbances, guard the Mexican border, and prepare for expansion in the event of another conflict.

Organizational changes in the War Department between 1920 and 1939 primarily affected the General Staff, whose role during World War I had greatly strengthened its political sway. Congress reinforced these changes with the passage of the National Defense Act of 1920. The law specified that responsibility for management of industrial procurement fell to the assistant secretary of war, and the chief of staff and General Staff would supervise all military aspects related to mobilization strategies and readiness. Increased duties related to personnel matters also changed the title of the Appointment Division to the Civilian Personnel Division. In December 1930, after more than thirty years' service as chief clerk—a tenure that remains unrivaled—Scofield retired from active service at the age of 70.



Secretary of War Patrick J. Hurley presenting Chief Clerk John C. Scofield with a watch during Scofield's retirement ceremony in 1931. *Left to right: General Douglass MacArthur (Chief of Staff), Col. F. H. Payne (Assistant Secretary of War), Secretary Hurley, and Mr. Scofield. (Office of the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army)*

WORLD WAR II AND THE TRANSITION TO DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, 1932–1947

Upon Scofield's retirement, Secretary of War Patrick J. Hurley appointed his own former executive assistant, John W. Martyn, to be his new "Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of War." In addition to "the duties heretofore assigned to the Assistant and Chief Clerk," Hurley charged his newly appointed administrative assistant with taking on "other responsibilities." However, Hurley failed to identify what those "other responsibilities" entailed. Although Hurley effectively eliminated the title of chief clerk, its use continued in the department's congressional relations, persisting in both the *Directory* and the *United States Government Organization Manual* until 1952.

Martyn assumed his role during a period of crisis. The United States was in the early throes of the Great Depression (1929–1939), Central Europe was on the brink of financial collapse, and far-right ideology was gaining traction throughout Europe and Asia. Between 1933 and 1936, Japan occupied Manchuria, left the League of Nations, and terminated its obligations under the post-World War I arms control treaties. At the same time, Adolf Hitler took power in Germany, rejected the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, began to rearm the military, and occupied the demilitarized Rhineland. By the time war erupted in Europe in 1939, Martyn had served in the Office of the Secretary of War for eight years. Although the United States maintained neutrality at the beginning of World War II, the growing preparations for the possibility of entering the war meant that Martyn, much like his predecessor Scofield had during World War I, saw the volume of responsibilities in the War Department increase.

As the threat of war loomed in the United States, President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed Henry L. Stimson secretary of war on 9 July 1940. Secretary Stimson immediately informed Martyn that he did not want to be bothered with details, preferring to delegate authority so that he could turn his attention to matters he considered more important. Stimson had already been secretary of war once, from 1911 to 1913, and was secretary of state between 1929 and 1933. Because of the secretary's hands-off approach, Martyn found himself charged with directing all the official mail within the office, distributing as much as he could to the other assistants. Additionally, Martyn oversaw the various divisions and organizations that performed a multitude of functions. For example, the Coordination and Records Division kept the central files of the Office of the Secretary of War and documented the circulation of policy papers in the department. The Office of the Personnel Manager dealt with the office's internal personnel matters. And the Civilian Medical Division administered first-aid treatment to civilian employees of the War Department in Washington. Expenditure of contingent funds and the procurement of general supplies and services for the department had once been



Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of War John W. Martyn (*left*) shaking hands with retired Chief Clerk of the War Department John C. Scofield (*right*), 6 January 1931.
(*Office of the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army*)

major functions of the administrative assistant's office. Now the Procurement and Accounting Division, which managed these tasks, controlled departmental forms, accounting methods, and departmental printing by the Government Printing Office, the adjutant general's office, and contract printers. Perhaps the largest of the administrative assistant's new responsibilities was the creation of policies and procedures related to the department's civilian employees, which was done through the Civilian Personnel Division.

Administrative Assistant Martyn provided some oversight of the Civilian Personnel Division. It had started to work with the General Staff as early as October 1939 on mobilization plans for the number and types of civilian employees required for the department to operate effectively during wartime. The United States became embroiled in World War II when the Japanese attacked American forces in Hawai'i on 7 December 1941. By the end of 1941, it was clear to General George C. Marshall, the Army's chief of staff, that the current organizational structure of the War Department hindered any mobilization effort.

John Wesley Martyn was born in 1890 in Washington, D.C., and lived nearly his entire life in the district.¹ Once referred to as “one of the most determinedly anonymous men in Washington,” little is known of Martyn’s life before he began working in the War Department. In 1914, Martyn was employed as a stenographer-typist on Capitol Hill when Senator John W. Weeks hired him as a personal secretary. He followed the senator to the War Department when President Warren G. Harding appointed Weeks to be secretary of war in 1921 and, by 1930, had worked his way from general clerk to administrative assistant.

Martyn, who, in 1946, had not spent more than two consecutive days away from his desk since taking office, came to be known as “Mr. War Department,” lunching daily in Secretary Robert P. Patterson’s private dining facility. Although more than twenty top executives and generals dined there, the secretary kept arrangements informal, with no assigned seating. But Martyn always took the same seat in a corner with his back against the wall. Everyone knew this was “Martyn’s seat”; not even Secretary Patterson would sit there. One day, someone dared General Dwight D. Eisenhower to take the seat, but he refused even though he knew that Martyn was gone for the afternoon.

One tidbit about his life that Martyn was proud to discuss was using his background as a tenor soloist in his church to organize a forty-eight-person choir to sing at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, which he did in response to General John J. Pershing’s praise for a choir he heard at the British Unknown Soldiers’ Tomb.

1. The only exception was when Senator Weeks brought Martyn to Massachusetts between sessions, once lasting long enough for Martyn to establish legal residence there.

General Marshall advised President Roosevelt to abandon the vertical pattern of military command and adopt the traditional horizontal pattern of bureaucratic coordination, which would allow the Army staff to focus on larger issues such as planning strategy, allocating resources, and directing global military operations.

Upon Marshall’s recommendations, Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9082, “Reorganizing the Army and the War Department,” which shifted many of the



Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of War John W. Martyn,
date unknown
(Office of the Administrative
Assistant to the Secretary of the
Army)

Civilian Personnel Division's responsibilities to the three major commands—Army Ground Forces, Services of Supply (later Army Service Forces), and Army Air Forces. Although the division lost many of its functions, it maintained its general policy supervision over the recruiting, training, classification, promotion, transfer, and administration of all civilian employees in department headquarters and in field establishments and installations. General Marshall's reorganization also reduced Martyn's oversight of the Civilian Personnel Division's functions. The conclusion of World War II resulted in termination of the Army Service Forces and the civilian personnel functions it had assumed, such as preliminary training of civilian employees, were once again the responsibility of the administrative assistant.

The war's end brought many new changes, especially for the War Department. Rather than return to its prewar policy of isolation, the United

States recognized that ensuring global peace meant fully engaging in world events. Unlike the end of World War I, when America elected not to join the League of Nations, the United States was a founding member of the United Nations (UN) chartered in 1945. Additionally, the 1946 *Official Register of the United States* recorded the Office of the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of War as a distinct office within the secretary's for the first time rather than just listing the position. In July of the following year, Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947, which created a National Security Council as well as the National Military Establishment consisting of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Department of the Army replaced the Department of War, less the U.S. Air Force, which was now an independent service. The act redesignated the secretary of war as the secretary of the Army and left the changing of other officers' titles up to the secretary. Kenneth C. Royall, who was secretary of war in 1947, became the first secretary of the Army and he opted to retain the position title of administrative assistant. Martyn was now the administrative assistant to the secretary of the Army.

ARMY ADMINISTRATION IN THE COLD WAR ERA, 1948–1979

The years immediately after World War II were far from tension-free. In addition to conducting a series of war crimes trials in Germany and Japan, the Allied Powers developed a common occupation policy during conferences at Yalta and Potsdam in 1945. Leaders agreed to accept joint authority over Germany with American, British, French, and Soviet forces overseeing separate zones. Because Berlin, the German capital, fell within the Soviet zone, the Allies agreed to divide the city in a similar manner. To handle national concerns such as “central economic administrative agencies, political parties, labor organizations, foreign and internal trade, currency, and land reform,” the commanders of the occupying troops established an Allied Control Council. Problems arose immediately because the council could only act if decisions were unanimous and the Soviet Union frequently dissented, resulting in zones with separate administrative organizations and economic plans, making German reunification difficult. In 1947, the British and Americans combined their zones, and the French added their sector to create a unified three-zone administration in 1948. In May 1949, the three western occupying powers established a parliamentary republic known as the Federal Republic of Germany, colloquially referred to as West Germany. In their region, the Soviets created a Communist state called the German Democratic Republic, known as East Germany.

The postwar occupation of the Korean Peninsula exacerbated friction between the United States and the Soviet Union. At the end of World War II, the Allies had agreed to grant Korea full independence from Japanese rule after a temporary period of military occupation, with the Soviet Union taking control north of the 38th parallel and U.S. forces moving into the southern half of the country. The same disagreements that marked the division of Germany placed Korea in a precarious position. The UN hoped to prevent escalation of tensions and sent a commission to oversee free elections in the country, but the Soviet Union rejected it. In August 1948, the intergovernmental organization supported the creation of the Republic of Korea, or South Korea, below the 38th parallel in which an elected government ruled. To counter this democratic influence, the Soviets established a Communist state known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or North Korea, the following month.

War broke out in June 1950 when North Korea invaded the south. The United States and other member countries of the UN quickly intervened to maintain South Korean independence. Before that conflict, the administrative assistant's functions, such as supervising matters affecting civilian personnel in the Department of the Army (DA), remained much the same as they had been since 1916. However, as the war continued, the secretary of war felt that



Secretary of the Army Frank Pace (*right*) is pictured as he addresses the Army Loyalty Security Board in the Pentagon. Boards from the six Army Districts and the Military District of Washington attended the meeting, the first of its kind. Future Administrative Assistant John G. Connell Jr. sits in front row (*far right*). All others are unidentified, 26 September 1951. (*Truman Library*)

organizational changes were necessary, part of which meant amending Martyn's duties. Under the Army Reorganization Act of 1950, Congress confirmed the secretary's right to administer departmental business and gave him the power to determine the size and capacity of the Army's combat arms and services. Exercising his recently codified authority, Secretary of the Army Frank Pace Jr. decided to relocate the Civilian Personnel Division from his immediate office to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower & Reserve Affairs) on 27 May 1952. Pace believed this action would result in maximum wartime efficiency because all personnel policy would be concentrated in a single office. The decision proved to be a significant change for the OAA, having managed all Army civilian personnel for more than fifty years.

Since 1947, the organization and functions of the Army had undergone many changes. To clarify what these tasks were and to whom they belonged, HQDA issued Army Regulation (AR) 10-5 *Organization and Functions, Department of the Army* on 22 May 1957. After nearly thirty years as administrative assistant to the secretary of the Army, the scope of Martyn's role had ballooned, but

Prestigious Civilian Awards Named for Former OAA Employees

Bonds of friendship forged during World War II were very important, even to those working behind the scenes. Shortly after the war ended, a small group of dedicated Army civilians in the Civilian Personnel Division, the secretary of war's office, and related headquarters organizations—William H. Kushnick, John W. Macy Jr., Charles F. Mullaly, and Robert H. Willey—established an informal association for civilian personnel where they could honor and recognize their achievements. Each of them went on to have lengthy and distinguished careers as civilians in the federal government and armed services. Willey even served briefly as Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army from 1960 to 1961.

By 1967, the group had grown enough in size that they were hosting sponsored dinners and became officially known as the Office of the Secretary of War/Civilian Personnel Division Alumni Association. Their first action as an organization was establishing the William H. Kushnick Award to recognize "the most outstanding singular achievement of an Army employee in civilian personnel administration . . . which resulted in material improvement in service, substantial financial savings, or significant social or technological progress." Secretary of War Stanley R. Resor honored Henry B. Frazier III with the first Kushnick Award in 1968.

Nearly a decade later, the traditional award luncheon had evolved into an annual banquet. In the mid-1980s, the organization changed its name to the Army Civilian Personnel Alumni Association because membership had become open to all Army civilian personnel. In 1988, the association created another award, named for John W. Macy Jr., to acknowledge "demonstrated excellence in the leadership of civilians by an Army military or civilian supervisor," especially those with a record of accomplishments that "reflect extraordinary leadership of civilian personnel over a sustained period."

now his duties and authority became more clearly outlined. According to the regulation, the administrative assistant would act for the secretary “in an extensive variety of day-to-day matters, when consistent with known attitudes of the Secretary, oral delegations, or precedents of long standing.” Put more specifically, Martyn now managed policy matters dealing with administrative services by and for HQDA; supervised control of general-purpose space in the Washington area; directed the operations of the Defense Telephone Service and the Defense Supply Service in Washington; and acted for the secretary on matters related to employee grievances within the department. He also took charge of overseeing the Army’s civilian personnel security program, acting in accordance with the Assistant Secretary of the Army’s (Manpower, Personnel, & Reserve Forces) direction. Additionally, as the employment policy officer, Martyn enforced the department’s conformity with federal rules in that area. He was to perform all of these functions in addition to the “traditional responsibilities” of the position: the administration of personnel, oversight of correspondence and records, and generally managing activities within the secretary’s office.

When Martyn retired in 1960, Robert H. Willey stepped in briefly as the administrative assistant, just long enough to see Secretary of the Army Elvis J. Stahr Jr. revise AR 10–5 on 5 May 1961, which clarified these “traditional responsibilities.” To provide effective administration for the Office of the Secretary of the Army, Willey needed to establish “comprehensive management programs,” coordinate any secretarial-level actions for efficiency, and conduct studies and analyses as directed. Secretary Stahr appointed James C. Cook administrative assistant upon Willey’s departure in late 1961. Cook had joined the War Department in 1917 in the Office of the Adjutant General and later served as the deputy administrative assistant under Martyn between 1942 and 1960. He was well prepared to take on his new role. On 2 January 1963, Secretary of the Army Cyrus R. Vance amended AR 10–5, modifying the responsibility of civilian personnel administration for better “employment coordination for the Washington, D.C. Commuting Area” and removing any references to grievances and the administrative assistant’s role as the employment policy officer.

Another revision of the regulation in May 1965, under Secretary of the Army Stephen Ailes, made the administrative assistant responsible for handling the Army’s Committee Management Program. These organizational changes between 1960 and 1965 occurred at a time when the United States was expanding its advisory and support efforts in South Vietnam. The U.S. Army’s strength went from approximately 850,000 troops to nearly one million and it added five combat divisions. The number of American military personnel in Vietnam expanded from fewer than 700 in 1960 to more than 24,000 by the end of 1964, which increased the demand for better communications technology and stronger medical, logistical, and administrative support. In 1965, as the situation



Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army John G.
Connell Jr., date unknown
(U.S. Army)

deteriorated, President Lyndon B. Johnson deployed U.S. ground combat troops to Vietnam.

When Cook left the office in December 1965, John G. Connell Jr. became the acting administrative assistant for a few months before Secretary of the Army Stanley R. Resor made Connell's appointment official in April 1966. Much like Cook, Connell was prepared fully to take on his new position. He had worked in the OAA for more than two decades as the assistant for security and personnel before assuming Cook's former position as deputy administrative assistant. Secretary Resor revised AR 10-5 in 1968, adding security as a facet of his office, thus expanding the administrative assistant's charge once again. At this point, the United States had been involved in military operations in Vietnam for nearly eight years, with American forces reaching their

peak at 543,000 in March 1969. Meanwhile, the Army deployed units stateside frequently to help enforce federal civil rights legislation, suppress riots, and restore public order. Over the course of his thirteen-year term as administrative assistant, Connell witnessed many more adjustments to the position's charge because of the impact of the Vietnam War on the Army. For example, in 1972, Secretary of the Army Robert F. Froehlke appointed Connell as the DA's point of contact for the Federal Executive Boards and delegated policy responsibility for administration of the HQDA Welfare Fund and Recreation Program to him. In 1975, Secretary of the Army Howard H. Callaway revised the regulation to require the administrative assistant to be accessible to the undersecretary of the Army and other principal officials of the secretary's office, authorizing Connell to act in his stead when necessary.

Over the next several years, changes in management emphases, the law, and technology meant new directions for Administrative Assistant Connell, which necessitated yet another revision of AR 10-5 in 1978. Perhaps the most important aspect of this modification is that for the first time it described the administrative assistant as a "senior career official." Before this designation, the position was known as the highest paid career civilian post in the Army. One of

the new responsibilities prescribed in the update included acting for Secretary of the Army Clifford L. Alexander Jr. by managing administrative services to organizations and activities in which the secretary served as the administrative or executive agent to help maintain efficiency and economy of operations. Connell also now provided continuity of operations planning for HQDA, which ensured that the headquarters could continue to perform its mission-essential functions during wide-ranging emergencies. Lastly, Alexander charged Connell with overseeing matters concerning the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts on behalf of his office.

New questions about the expectations and limitations of administrative matters arose when, on 1 October 1977, Defense Secretary Harold Brown quietly established a new agency in the Pentagon—Washington Headquarters Services (WHS). Some viewed the realignment as a ruse for Brown to retain his personal administrative workforce while asking each of the armed services to reduce their staffs. According to Brown, he created WHS to “provide consolidated administrative and operating support to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and other Department of Defense activities in the national capital region,” removing these functions from his direct command so that his office could focus solely on issues of policy analysis and oversight matters. The new organization would deal with everything from budget and accounting to personnel management, designated common services in the Pentagon and the National Capital Region (NCR) to security and records management. At that time, many of the Pentagon shared amenities, such as the Pentagon library and motor pool, belonged to the U.S. Army Service Center for the Armed Forces (USASCAF) under the commanding general of the Military District of Washington (MDW). It would take more than four decades for these services to be consolidated fully under WHS.

Over the course of nearly five decades, the administrative assistant’s sphere of influence had grown dramatically. To continue delivering effective oversight for the secretary, the administrative assistant needed to supervise comprehensive resource and general management programs, budgeting, organizational review and coordination, and automated data processing service support. They were also designated to provide staff assistance to key officials on projects that involved general organization, administration, and management practices, techniques, and methodology; to conduct studies of these procedures as required; and to deliver and monitor management improvement activities, services, and information.

REORGANIZATION, REDUCTION, AND REDESIGN, 1980–2001

When the United States ended direct participation in the Vietnam War in January 1973, the Army faced a range of troubles. The Army had lost the trust of the public, who laid equal blame on the military and civilian policymakers for the war. Returning soldiers often faced hostile or apathetic receptions, struggled with drug addiction, and suffered severe post-traumatic stress disorder.

In years after the end of the conflict, the U.S. Army underwent a period of modernization and reform. This was most evident in the transition to an all-volunteer force, the establishment of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, and the development of the “Army of Excellence” throughout the 1980s. An important part of a broader defense reorganization and buildup in the United States, Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh Jr. made “excellence” the theme of the service in 1983. When Milton H. Hamilton assumed the position of administrative assistant in March 1980, he inherited a wide range of responsibilities and authority. In a report on the organization and functions of his office, Hamilton noted the breadth of these duties by highlighting the services provided not only to the secretary of the Army, but also to the secretariat, the Army staff, the DA as a whole, and to the Department of Defense (DoD).

Throughout the first half of the 1980s, the OAA continued to experience growth in its area of authority. When Secretary Marsh issued General Order (GO) 1985–15 on 12 June 1985, he expanded the administrative assistant’s role, placing Hamilton in charge of providing “management processes and administrative services” for HQDA; supervising control of general-use Army space in the NCR; serving as the Army employment coordinator for Washington, D.C.; operating the Defense Telephone Service–Washington and the Defense Supply Service–Washington; and managing the



Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army Milton H.
Hamilton, date unknown
(U.S. Army)

HQDA Welfare and Recreation Fund. Further, he tasked Hamilton with providing administrative, logistical, and financial support for any activities for which Secretary Marsh was the executive agent; made him responsible for implementing any policies that affected the Pentagon Motor Pool; and charged him with acting on his behalf on matters related to heraldry and military history within HQDA. The many revisions to AR 10-5 and GO 1985-15 established the basis of the duties and responsibilities for the OAA for the next two decades.

Although the broad functional responsibilities of the administrative assistant were not altered all that much between 1985 and the early 2000s, the OAA underwent several organizational changes. According to Angela K. Ritz, director

Milton Holmes Hamilton was born to Henry Alexander and Bessie Alice Hamilton, née Zickefoose, on 17 June 1925 in Elkins, West Virginia. He graduated on 4 June 1946 with a bachelor of science from the U.S. Military Academy a year early because of the war. A member of the last class to receive horseback training, he received a commission as a second lieutenant in the Army. He then attended a branch-immaterial class, the infantry course, and airborne and glider training at Fort Benning, Georgia.¹ Joining the 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division, in Salzburg, Austria, he lived temporarily on the former von Trapp family estate, one of several Austrian villas the Army had converted into Bachelor Officers' Quarters. In 1948, Hamilton married Martha Loving Towler and had three children.

In the fall of 1951, Hamilton worked as an instructor at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, for the 11th Airborne Division. His unit was one of those sent to the Nevada Test Site for Operation DESERT ROCK as part of the first troop tests of atomic bombs. As a company commander, Hamilton experienced two different atomic explosions, observing from approximately 5 miles away from ground zero. The first exercise was a damage effects test where soldiers staged the site to determine how a nuclear detonation could affect military equipment and field fortifications. In the second, troops were put through tactical maneuvers after the explosion followed by psychological evaluations to determine their reactions to witnessing a nuclear

1. On 11 May 2023, Fort Benning was renamed Fort Moore upon recommendation of the congressionally mandated Naming Commission.

of the Civilian Aides to the Secretary of the Army program, the office during that period was “always reorganizing. And a lot of it made sense . . . a lot of it was placing stuff where it needed to be. OAA was a huge ash and trash organization . . . and it’s because we were very respected . . . if you needed to get something done, give it to OAA.” Before the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, the OAA primarily supported the Army secretariat, whereas the adjutant general through the Adjutant General Center (TAGCEN) held parallel responsibilities and performed similar functions for the Army staff. The new law, designed to strengthen the role of civilian authority and improve administration in the DoD, required the Army to get rid of duplication of efforts between the

detonation. Afterward, Hamilton did a year-long tour in Korea with the 3d Infantry Division. From 1954 to 1957, he was on the faculty of the United States Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, and was a member of the Army General Staff in Washington, D.C., between 1959 and 1963.

Hamilton earned his master of business administration from Syracuse University in 1959, followed by a master of arts in international affairs from George Washington University in 1965. He then did a one-year tour with the 25th Infantry Division in Vietnam. He again served on the Army General Staff between 1967 and 1968. After retiring from active duty in 1972, Hamilton became a project director and principal scientist for General Research Corporation until 1975, then worked as a foreign affairs specialist for Africa in the OSD until 1977 when he graduated from the Federal Executive Institute in Charlottesville, Virginia. From 1977 to 1980, Hamilton was the deputy director for programming in the chief of staff’s office before Secretary Alexander appointed him administrative assistant to the secretary of the Army in 1980. In 1985, he graduated from the Program for Senior Managers in Government at Harvard University, retiring from the OAA in 1995.

During his military career, Hamilton earned several awards including the Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, Army Commendation Medal, and Air Medal. Hamilton also received numerous awards as a civilian, such as the Distinguished Civilian Service Medal and Meritorious Civilian Service Award from the U.S. Army, the Presidential Meritorious and Presidential Distinguished Executive Award, and the Distinguished Public Service Medal from the DoD.

secretariat and staff. The DA achieved these goals by increasing the size of the secretariat relative to the staff and reducing “the excessive span of control” of the service chief. For example, the Goldwater-Nichols Act limited the number of deputy chiefs of staff to five and assistant chiefs of staff to three, ultimately leading to the disestablishment of TAGCEN. The OAA eventually assumed many of TAGCEN’s functions such as the gift and fund-raising programs; Freedom of Information Act and privacy; records management and declassification; Central U.S. Registry; publications and printing; heraldry; and the Environmental Support Group (ESG).

Meanwhile, the OAA also took on the administrative responsibilities once belonging to the office of the Army’s chief of staff, which meant Hamilton and his personnel had to provide unassisted support for the entire headquarters and oversight of HQDA’s base operations. The practical effects were significant. For example, before 1986 the director of Management Support Services in the OAA provided computer support *only* for the secretariat. After the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the director had to provide the same support for the entire headquarters. When Secretary Marsh issued GO 1987–29 on 15 June 1987, moving USASCAF—and its responsibility for Pentagon common services—from the MDW to the Headquarters Services–Washington, he further expanded the OAA’s purview. Marsh also moved the Army Staff Civilian Personnel Office and the Army Staff Personnel Security Office from the MDW’s Civilian Personnel Directorate and the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Security, respectively, to the Headquarters Services–Washington (under the control of the OAA at that time). Just one year after the OAA assumed charge of the Pentagon common services, Army leadership established Task Force ROBUST (Redistribution of BASOPS [Base Operating Information System]/Unit Structure within Tables of Distribution and Allowances [TDA]). Task force members analyzed TDA organizations of all active and reserve components, ensuring that each was properly configured and staffed to support the warfighting combatant commands and accomplish vital mobilization missions.

One of the ROBUST study’s observations was that no MDW organization was assigned to act as HQDA’s commandant. The report noted that because each staff element and each command within the NCR tended to establish separate support arrangements, the perception was that multiple installations existed in the MDW geographic area, creating confusion and mismanagement. The task force determined that the OAA, which had taken on the role of headquarters commandant to the Army staff, secretariat, and the secretariat’s field operating agencies as well as administrator of BASOPS support elements, did not have the means to effectively oversee these resources. Its recommendation was to consolidate civilian personnel offices, BASOPS support elements, and other common services for units in the NCR under Headquarters–MDW, which would significantly improve the quality of resource management.

While these organizational changes took place, the national security scene was evolving. Tensions between the United States and the Soviet

The DoD realized the need for military reform after failed or disjointed operations in the early 1980s. The ill-fated Operation EAGLE CLAW, on 24 April 1980, was one of the first examples. When thousands of militant students seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran, Iran, on 4 November 1979 and took more than sixty Americans captive, the United States immediately began negotiations with new Iranian leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Although the militants released thirteen hostages in the first few weeks of the siege, diplomatic negotiations stalled for five more months. Meanwhile, commanders from all four branches of the U.S. armed services put together a joint military mission to rescue the hostages. Despite their careful planning, a catastrophic sandstorm forced leaders to abort the mission without freeing any hostages, but not before eight service members lost their lives. An after action assessment of the failed operation revealed serious structural problems within the DoD. The experiences of the Army and the Marine Corps during Operation URGENT FURY in October 1983 reinforced those structural concerns. In response to a violent left-wing coup on the small Caribbean island of Grenada, compounded by possible interference from Cuba, the United States invaded the island to depose the coup's leaders. Although the operation was considered successful, a review found that the two U.S. services essentially conducted parallel operations in isolation on each half of the island. Because their radios were not interoperable, Army and Marine commanders in the field could not communicate with each other unless they used commercial telephones.

The potential extent of the reforms deeply divided the DoD and military leaders. The secretary of defense, Caspar W. Weinberger, with the backing of the Navy and Marine Corps, actively opposed any significant legislative changes. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David C. Jones, with support from the Army and Air Force, pushed for a major overhaul. By a one-vote margin, the Armed Services Committee voted for serious reform. The result was the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

Union slowly decreased over the course of the 1980s, leaving senior Army leaders looking ahead to what this shift in relations might mean for the service. Anticipating being asked to decrease their forces, they launched Project QUICKSILVER in 1989, planning a 25 percent reduction of Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) units.² VANGUARD Task Force followed in 1990, which was supposed to do the same for TDA elements.³ Congress sought to reinforce these efforts, passing the National Defense Authorization Act of 1991, which mandated an annual cutback of no less than 4 percent of the DoD's "management headquarters" personnel between 1991 and 1995. It used the end of the Cold War, marked by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the pending reunification of Germany, as justification for downsizing.

The final report of the VANGUARD Task Force illustrated a general appreciation for the OAA's responsibilities. The authors recommended no reorganization within the OAA, appealed for no more than a 20 percent decrease in any of the office's subordinate elements, and advocated that certain vital activities should not have any cutbacks at all. It is important to note that when the task force released the VANGUARD report, the nation was entrenched in the Gulf War crisis, the circumstances of which certainly affected the authors' conservative propositions. Their advocacy for minimal reduction throughout OAA suggests that they considered the work conducted in the office too important to cut personnel by 25 percent.

The Army continued its efforts to refine its headquarters organization by using the Shannon-Reimer HQDA Transformation Study (1993) to "design a headquarters organization for the Army of the future." Based on the study's recommendations, Secretary of the Army Michael P. W. Stone established a Directorate of Information Management within the OAA, which would be responsible for streamlining the measures required for the effective collection, storage, access, use, and disposal of knowledge at both HQDA and its supporting elements. Secretary Stone believed that by shifting some of the functions of the Management Support Services to this new agency, headquarters would develop a

2. The TO&E is a document that establishes the number of officers and service members of each unit, "the grade and job of each, the proportion of various occupational specialists, the arrangement of command and staff and administrative personnel, the means of transport and communications, the provisions for supply, maintenance, construction, and medical care, and the kind and quantity of individual and unit armament, together with the relationship between supporting weapons and consequently the tactics of the unit."

3. Unlike TO&E units, which are composed solely of military personnel and considered deployable, TDA elements are organized to perform specific or unique missions for which there are no appropriate TO&E units. Those in TDA elements can include a mix of both military and civilian personnel, are considered nondeployable, and the units are discontinued once any assigned operations are completed.

more efficient and consolidated computer support structure. Lastly, Stone made Administrative Assistant Hamilton accountable for all personnel surveys for all organizations the OAA supported and reallocated the role of White House liaison to the Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison.

The 1990s held several other changes for the OAA. In 1994, Secretary of the Army Togo D. West Jr. took two executive agent functions away from the office as a matter of administrative convenience: the Mexican-American Defense Commission and the Latin American Defense Commission. He shifted them to the MDW because both were on Fort McNair, home of Headquarters–MDW. In response to Gulf War veterans’ health claims, which increased in the late 1990s, Secretary West redesignated the U.S. Army Joint Services ESG as the U.S. Armed Services Center for Research of Unit Records, remaining under the purview of the OAA.

After fifteen years witnessing many fluctuations within the OAA, Hamilton retired. Joel “J. B.” Hudson became acting administrative assistant for six months before Secretary West selected Yvonne M. Harrison for the position. She served just five months, at which point Hudson resumed his role as acting administrative assistant until West made his appointment permanent on 3 April 1996. Hudson was the perfect person to assume the position, having served more than thirty years in federal public service, twenty of which he spent in the OAA.

During his tenure, Hudson guided his office through the ebb and flow of many changes. For example, after the disestablishment of the U.S. Army Information Systems Command, the OAA received the U.S. Army Publications and Printing Command. The following year, the HQDA Redesign Task Force report prompted a 10 percent reduction of personnel in the OAA and its field operating agencies and the assumption of executive agent support for the U.S. Military Postal Service Agency from U.S. Army Personnel Command. In 1997, Secretary West moved the single agency manager for Pentagon Information Technology Services from U.S. Army Signal Command to HQDA under



Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army Joel B.
Hudson, 9 January 2001
(U.S. Army)

In the summer of 1990, Iraqi president Saddam Hussein deployed approximately 30,000 troops to the Iraq-Kuwait border. Saddam grew increasingly upset about Kuwait disrespecting OPEC's (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries') oil production quotas and believed the Kuwaiti government's quota violations were a deliberate attempt to sabotage the Iraqi economy. He hoped this show of force would pressure Kuwait to limit its oil output and to pay the Iraqi government \$10 billion in reparations for lost revenue. Meanwhile, the U.S. naval fleet in the Persian Gulf was on high alert. Although Kuwait agreed to limit production to 1.5 million barrels per day (down from 2 million barrels per day), Saddam viewed the Kuwaiti government's counter of \$500 million insulting. On 2 August 1990, Iraqi troops bombed Kuwait's capital and invaded the country. The United States immediately launched Operation DESERT SHIELD, a buildup of U.S. military forces in conjunction with a thirty-five-nation coalition to defend Saudi Arabia and liberate Kuwait.

Defense turned to offense with an aerial and naval bombardment on 17 January 1991, transitioning from Operation DESERT SHIELD to Operation DESERT STORM. Nearly 700,000 U.S. service members deployed to the Persian Gulf for the Gulf War (1990–1991). In the late 1990s, approximately one-quarter of Gulf War veterans began to report health issues such as chronic headaches, gastrointestinal distress, problems with memory and concentration, and widespread pain. Some even reported that, after their deployment to the Persian Gulf, they had children suffering from various birth defects. The U.S. Army, the Central Intelligence Agency, and Congress each began conducting their own official investigations to determine if exposure to nerve agents such as sarin, which was released into the air during coalition bombing of Iraqi chemical weapons facilities, could be to blame for what became known as Gulf War Illness.

One of the critical issues to be addressed was which veterans had been in areas or situations where they would have been exposed to sarin. Historically, organizations had unit clerks who provided daily status or impact reports, including things like troop movement, combat engagements, soldiers killed or wounded, or other incidents of note. A suborganization of the OAA's Policy and Plans

Directorate—Safety, Security and Support Services—Washington—was home to the ESG, which was responsible for validating veterans’ claims for certain healthcare benefits by confirming military service and/or conflict engagements. During the Gulf War, however, there were serious record-keeping problems. For example, there was a significant lack of unit records or daily impact reports, making it incredibly difficult for the ESG to validate claims of Gulf War Illness. As part of the Army’s investigation, the secretary of the Army created a research board, which included himself, Deputy Secretary of Defense John P. White, Surgeon General Lt. Gen. Ronald R. Blanck, the director of the OSD’s Strategy Plans and Policy Directorate Maj. Gen. Howard J. von Kaenel, and the director of Policy and Plans Fritz Kirklighter.

Members of the board and their staffs contacted commanders and operations officers of major units to find out what kind of records they may have and where those documents might be. The ESG sought out anyone who kept personal diaries during their deployment in an attempt to locate where units were on the battlefield. However, because of the way many of the files were kept, the staff under the OAA had difficulty in making precise identifications. For example, what about transportation units located in Saudi Arabia that crossed the battlefield? Although soldiers in these units had not technically been on the battlefield, they could have been exposed as they traveled between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Another issue was that the U.S. military and government had been concerned during the war about the potential cost of expanding benefits. For example, if the Army had transferred a soldier from the Illinois National Guard to the 82d Airborne Division for deployment to the Gulf, it might have meant providing Permanent Change of Station benefits to the soldier’s family, moving them more than 800 miles from Illinois to Fort Bragg, North Carolina.¹ Instead, the military issued temporary reassignments, which made it difficult to determine who served in a unit. The experience impressed upon the OAA and senior Army leaders the need for updated guidance on records keeping and management.

1. On 2 June 2023, Fort Bragg was renamed Fort Liberty upon recommendation of the congressionally mandated Naming Commission.

the supervision of the OAA, hoping to create a joint agency for Pentagon visual information services despite resistance from other services.


A year later, the secretary removed the U.S. Army Visual Information Center from the authority of the single agency manager and placed it under the leadership of the OAA, reporting directly to the deputy administrative assistant. The OAA also took control of the Network Infrastructure Services Agency, which oversaw all the wiring and cabling in the Pentagon, the “behind the wall” work associated with computers. It also meant assuming the mission of the Central United States Registry, supervising communications security (COMSEC), and maintaining the Army’s nuclear surety program.

In May 2001, Secretary of the Army Thomas E. White established a Realignment Task Force to eliminate duplication of efforts and streamline staff operations by integrating the Army secretariat and staff as much as was legally possible. In doing so, he created considerable efficiencies in time and resources. White divided the process into three phases, each focusing on a specific group: HQDA, field operating agencies, and major commands. The task force got to work on phase one in June and had largely completed a plan for HQDA’s realignment by early fall 2001, when Hudson would see the OAA through one of its most difficult periods beginning that September.

THE PENTAGON ON 11 SEPTEMBER 2001

On the morning of 11 September 2001, nineteen al-Qaeda operatives hijacked four commercial airliners to carry out coordinated suicide attacks. The terrorists crashed two of those planes—American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175—into the World Trade Center towers at 8:46 a.m. and 9:03 a.m., respectively. Administrative Assistant Hudson was on vacation in Florida when his wife paged him “around 9:14 that morning” alerting him to the Twin Towers attacks. Hudson immediately called his office at the Pentagon and spoke with Deputy Administrative Assistant Sandra R. Riley, who told him everything was okay and that John Chester, chief of the Defense Protective Service, had “increased the security outside the building, the grounds of the building and they were doing all they could. They didn’t expect anything. [But t]hey had no protection against aircraft.” Twenty-three minutes after Hudson received the message from his wife, terrorists flew the third hijacked plane—American Airlines Flight 77—into the west side of the Pentagon, causing a partial collapse of the building. The fourth hijacking—United Airlines Flight 93—targeted a federal building in Washington, D.C., but was thwarted when passengers and crew fought back. The terrorists managed, however, to crash the plane in a field in Stonycreek Township, Pennsylvania, at 10:03 a.m.

Of the 125 fatalities at the Pentagon, the Army bore 60 percent of them: 47 civilians, 6 civilian contractors, and 22 soldiers. The OAA was—by mere chance—affected disproportionately, losing forty dedicated employees. Beginning in the 1990s, the Pentagon had approved a renovation plan to address deteriorating




Two frames showing the hole in the west side of the Pentagon resulting from the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. Taken by Scott J. Ferrell, 13 September 2001. (*Library of Congress*)



An aerial view of the destruction at the Pentagon caused by a hijacked commercial jet that crashed into the side of the building during the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. Photo by Air Force Tech. Sgt. Cedric H. Rudisill, 13 September 2001. (*Department of Defense*)

structural conditions. The plan divided the building into five separate “wedges,” each of which encompassed approximately one million square feet. Repairs and reconstruction would occur one wedge at a time because each had to be stripped to its base structure to remove asbestos and install numerous updated systems, including information technology, security, and blast-resistant windows. Wedge 1 was the part of the Pentagon accessed by the third and fourth corridors, the exterior of which faces the southern half of the heliport and western half of the south terrace side of the building. Riley recalled that before the Pentagon Renovation Program, “most of OAA’s employees were squeezed in tiny, cut up spaces. The prime real estate went to the Army secretariat and Army staff elements with OAA’s space squeezed into the inner B–D Rings [of the Pentagon], and usually not together on a single site.” With the renovation of Wedge 1 scheduled for completion on 16 September 2001, Riley saw an opportunity to secure “better office space for the OAA functions which needed to remain in the Pentagon.” Leadership in the office felt that Resource Services–Washington, the Information Management Center, and the Military Personnel Division were the elements most needed in the Pentagon.

According to Riley, they had just moved into their new space when the 11 September attacks occurred. The plane destroyed the C–E rings of Wedge 1



Map 4

and spread fire and smoke throughout the building, damaging the remaining two rings, A and B. Most of those who perished in the attack were in offices on the first and second floors of the Pentagon between the fourth and sixth corridors. Laverne V. Berry, who at the time worked in OAA’s Re-Engineering Planning Office (later renamed the Strategic Planning Office), recalled that her director, Leon Alexander, had scheduled a meeting in the conference room of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel Lt. Gen. Timothy J. Maude for the morning of 11 September 2001. The room was located at the apex of the fifth and sixth corridors on the second floor in Wedge 2. She received a call from Alexander before the meeting, informing her that they had been “kicked out” of General Maude’s space and would instead be convening in the Defense Telecommunications Services–Washington conference room at the OAA office located in Arlington. Shortly after they began conducting their business, those in the building were told about the crash at the Pentagon. Berry recalled that you could see the smoke billowing in the distance. She later learned that General

In the days and weeks after the terrorist attacks, letters laced with the spore-forming bacteria *Bacillus anthracis*, which causes a serious infectious disease called anthrax, began circulating through the U.S. Postal Service. In mid-October, Senator Thomas A. Daschle unwittingly opened an envelope in his Washington, D.C. office containing anthrax spores. Several of the postal employees who worked at the facility that processed the letter developed pulmonary anthrax. Immediately, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recommended halting all federal government mail handling and delivery in the district until screening processes could be implemented. During the initial quarantine, workers found another anthrax-laden letter, this time addressed to Senator Patrick J. Leahy.

At that time, the OAA was responsible for overseeing the Pentagon mail room and thus took the lead in developing anthrax screening for the building. Employees packaged all mail and stored it in a series of semitrailer trucks as the OAA worked with contractors to develop downdraft tables produced in a remote facility. Contractors wearing biohazard suits would then work at two large downdraft tables for four hours at a time. After they had screened all mail for the day, they placed the letters and packages into containers, putting them back into the truck where they were originally quarantined. The contractors then packaged and sealed the filter of each downdraft table and sent them to a lab in Richmond, Virginia, for culture analysis. After forty-eight hours, if the culture showed no signs of anthrax present, the trailer containing the processed mail would be released to the Pentagon mail clerks for distribution. Other government agencies adopted similar screening measures. By the end of 2001, twenty-two people—including twelve mail handlers—developed either cutaneous or pulmonary anthrax. Five of those who developed the pulmonary form died because of their infection. The OAA maintained oversight of the Pentagon mail room and its anthrax screening process for nearly a year before the mail room was transferred to WHS.



Lights begin to illuminate the National 9/11 Pentagon Memorial as the sun sets in Arlington, Virginia. Taken by U.S. Coast Guard PO2 Patrick Kelley, 10 September 2014. (DVIDS)

Maude had been holding a conference in the very room she was scheduled to be in when the attack occurred, and everyone present perished.

In the immediate aftermath, Hudson spent the entire day trying to get in touch with his team while those OAA employees present at the Pentagon, including Riley, began calling “every organizational element, telling them to evacuate the building and to keep track of their employees.” Riley recalled being on the Mall Terrace entrance lawn watching “the first responders enter the building to rescue others, and saw many OAA employees throughout the day, helping each other and fellow Pentagon mates.” She “remained on that grassy slope for hours, counting noses and worrying about those we had not heard from” and “later [saw] that several OAA members joined the first responders, helping to rescue injured personnel, with several sustaining life-time health issues from inhaling the jet fuel fumes.” Riley also witnessed firsthand “the efforts of the Information and Technology personnel who stayed in the burning building throughout to keep the Pentagon’s communications functioning.”

In the days following, Riley “learned that the fire came within feet, if not inches, of the Pentagon’s communication hub. Had the communication hub been damaged, the Pentagon and Department of Defense would have experienced a catastrophic failure to our defense communication system.” Raymond W. “Wes” Blaine, director of Space and Building Management Services, noted that he and

A building—something happening to a building, a fire, burst pipes, things like power outages and things like that, that is all stuff, things. Faced with the human suffering that went with this and knowing that the folks that are doing all of this work [to] put things back together are really hurting. They lost a lot of good friends and colleagues . . . and it's hard because you loved all of these people so that's the biggest challenge.

—Joel B. Hudson, Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army

his team were back in the building by 5:00 a.m. the next day “trying to figure out what in the world” they were going to do, working “minimum sixteen hours a day for the next month or two, at least.”

REALIGNMENT FOR THE FUTURE, 2002–2023

Despite the hardships endured because of the 11 September 2001 attacks, the OAA persevered and accomplished many of the items the Realignment Task Force recommended. By the end of 2002, with the approval of Secretary White, the office had transferred the Civilian Personnel Management Intelligence System and the accounting function of the Defense Telecommunication Service–Washington to the Defense Finance and Accounting Service. Additionally, between 2002 and 2003, Administrative Assistant Hudson increased the contractor mix at Defense Telecommunication Service–Washington, the Network Infrastructure Support Agency–Pentagon, and the Defense Contracting Command–Washington.

Further, Hudson tried to outsource the Self-Service Supply Centers, the Military Personnel Service Center, and the U.S. Army Publishing Agency Warehouse functions, but the realignments were never executed. The last major changes for the office at this time included the transfer of the Executive Communications Control and the Correspondence Analysis and Processing Branch functions to the director of the Army staff. By centralizing these functions, which previously had been divided between the Army staff and the secretariat, senior Army leaders hoped to make them more efficient. The OAA also relinquished the Pentagon carpentry shop and library to WHS in the OSD. The office planned for the transfer of the Army Executive Dining Facility to the OSD, but the defense secretary decided against consolidating them. The OSD and service executive dining facilities did, however, agree to memoranda of understanding that would prevent overlap and duplication of roles.

Considering the Realignment Task Force review, Hudson decided to reorganize his office along functional lines, grouping all of OAA's activities into three categories, which he referred to as "pillars:" the Services and Operations Agency, the Resources and Programs Agency, and the

The big thing that we realized after [11 September] was that we needed to have things more electronically available. Because besides us having to rebuild where we were in the funding system to know where we were, we had no idea what documents were out there that may have not been entered into the official accounting system that we weren't aware of.

—Sandy Stillerman, Director of Resource Services–Washington, Office of the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army

Information Technology Agency. Each answered to a deputy and a separate, smaller office staffed with the administrative assistant and a few additional assistants would supervise them. The three-pillar model went into effect in October 2003 and became official the following year. Amid this reorganization, Hudson received operational control of the U.S. Army Priority Air Transport Command (USAPAT), formerly known as U.S. Operational Support Airlift, on 1 March 2004.

The office's assumption of the command reflects how Army leadership saw the OAA, frequently using it as a stopgap until the Army could find the most appropriate location for a function. For example, in October 2004, the Institute of Heraldry, which provides heraldic services to the armed forces and other governmental agencies, joined the OAA under its Resources and Programs Agency. As the office gained one organization, the Army removed another. In September 2005, the USAPAT and its subcomponents shifted to the operational administrative control of the MDW, after only a year with the OAA's U.S. Army Services and Operations Agency.

After Hudson retired, the acting secretary of the Army, R. Leslie "Les" Brownlee, selected Hudson's deputy, Riley, to replace him. Riley brought a wealth of institutional knowledge, having joined the OAA in 1980 as an employee relations specialist in Personnel and Employment Services-Washington. She climbed the civilian career ladder during her twenty-six years employed in the OAA. Although her tenure as administrative assistant was brief, Riley oversaw several organizational shifts and realignments. Just one year after assuming her new role, Riley's office took responsibility for the Records Management and Declassification Agency, whose functions had already been transferred several times, moving from the adjutant general's office to the Information Systems Command, then back to the adjutant general before ending up in the OAA.

On 14 February 2006, the DoD established the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization to help consolidate and coordinate the department's counter-improvised explosive device efforts, appointing Secretary of the Army



Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army Sandra R. Riley, 24 March 1997
(U.S. Army)

Francis J. Harvey as its DoD executive agent. Secretary Harvey immediately delegated this responsibility to Riley who, per AR 10–90, was already the focal point responsible for coordinating all matters related to the secretary’s new executive agent assignments. When she departed the office just two weeks later, acting administrative assistant, Larry Stubblefield, maintained the charge until Harvey appointed Joyce E. Morrow as his new administrative assistant on 6 March. The OAA supported the joint organization by managing civilian and military personnel programs, providing an operating budget, overseeing administrative functions, offering legal support, and creating, maintaining, and disposing of documents. Shortly after Morrow assumed her role, the OAA ceded control over the internal review function to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management & Comptroller), which took effect on 1 October 2006.

The DA conducted a series of Army headquarters reorganization studies between 2005 and 2006, which senior Army leaders believed could help them identify ways to increase the efficiencies of the Army staff and secretariat. They could also help indicate where to limit redundancy in their component offices and sharpen the scope of the organizations. For example, Secretary of the Army Preston M. “Pete” Geren transferred authority over the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) from the director of the Army staff to the OAA on 14 March 2007. Simultaneously, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Environment) took operational control of the National Museum of the United States Army project, which began in September 2000 as a joint undertaking between the Army and the Army Historical Foundation to preserve and display a comprehensive history of the Army. Meanwhile, CMH accepted custody of museums on Forces Command installations and became a fourth pillar in the OAA’s functions-based organizational concept. On 1 October 2007, WHS assumed control over the Pentagon Library and Conference Center.

Sometimes if you look at the compendium of all these missions and functions, you would say, how did all these end up in the same organization? But, over the years, it appears that more and more, or when there was a mission that didn’t clearly fit somewhere or that was overarching, it often came to OAA. And I think... I just kind of viewed it as kind of confirmation that the Secretary had confidence in me and our organization that we could deliver and help in that particular area.

—Joyce E. Morrow,
Administrative Assistant to
the Secretary of the Army

And Secretary Geren redesignated the Services and Operations Agency, a field operation agency of the OAA, as the U.S. Army Headquarters Services Agency on 11 October.

Between 2009 and 2011, Morrow and her office worked with HQDA and the Army Basing Study Group to implement recommendations from the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005 report in the NCR. The DoD led the BRAC study after it conducted an analysis of facility inventory and determined it had an excess capacity of 24 percent. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld directed senior civilian and military leadership in each military department to analyze and suggest ways to reconfigure its operational base structure for greater efficiency and better support of its forces in the United States. To enhance security, reduce costs, and bring organizations into compliance with Force Protection Standards, the Army's BRAC Senior Review Group recommended that the Army relocate personnel from leased buildings to military installations and the Pentagon.

Consequently, the Army decreased the number of leased buildings from fifty-six to twenty-nine, or approximately 1.28 million square feet of office space, a 35 percent decrease in rented space throughout the NCR. The entire process from recommendation to implementation lasted six years and affected more than 3,300 personnel. The OAA assisted in the planning, documentation, and execution of facility renovations and tenant relocations. It also had direct responsibility for readying twelve buildings on Fort Belvoir in Virginia for displaced personnel, including thirteen directorates from their own office, several of which had moved to rented spaces in the NCR because of the Pentagon Renovation project. Many OAA



Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army Joyce E. Morrow, 1 March 2006 (U.S. Army)

To be an effective AA, you have to be a leader and a doer.

—Joyce E. Morrow,
Administrative Assistant to
the Secretary of the Army

personnel relocated from multiple buildings throughout northern Virginia, including the Taylor Building in Crystal City and the Rosslyn Metro Center in Arlington, and were divided between two adjacent buildings on Fort Belvoir before being fully consolidated into Building 1458 in 2016.

As part of another realignment in 2010, Secretary of the Army John M. McHugh transferred the Civilian Aides to the Secretary of the Army Program Office from his central office to the OAA. Given that program's high profile, Morrow kept the secretary regularly updated. McHugh also acknowledged that the decentralized control over Army conferences resulted in inconsistent implementation. He tasked Morrow with consolidating management of the Army conference program and expanding the program's oversight from an HQDA-centric focus to an Army-wide mission. Army Directive 2011–20 offered recommendations for hosting and attending conferences. Meanwhile, the OSD continued to emphasize management of conference-related matters, issuing Implementation of Conference Oversight Requirements and Delegation of Conference Approval Authority, a new policy for DoD conferences, on 29 September 2012. Secretary McHugh released interim guidance on implementing the new OSD policy within the Army on 17 October 2012 and authorized Morrow to manage Army conferences on his behalf. Ultimately, the new rule led to the extraction of the “conference team” from the Special Programs Office to

I was very excited to work for an organization that was led by a woman, especially as large of an organization as OAA was and continues to be. So that was exciting 'cause . . . the administrative assistant, that's the senior career civilian in the Army and as a career civilian, that was really enticing to me to . . . see that . . . a female could rise to . . . that level of rank.

—Karan Reidenbach, director of the Resource Operations Center, Office of the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army

[It was] wonderful to work for a very strong woman [Morrow] in a very big civilian heavy organization with a lot of senior women too. Which was a little rare across the Army.

—Angela Ritz, director of the Civilian Aides to the Secretary of the Army, Office of the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army

create the Army Conference Management Directorate, increasing the number of personnel and expanding its responsibilities.

Given her growing responsibilities, Morrow believed that her office's Information Technology Agency needed its own realignment to improve efficiencies and customer satisfaction. Beginning in 2012, the agency worked to simplify communications, centralize functions, and improve processes, positioning it for future advancement in a rapidly evolving environment. Another important modification that year was the redesignation of the Security and Safety Directorate in U.S. Army Headquarters Services Agency as the Directorate of Mission Assurance. Designed to support the emerging Army Protection Program, Morrow signed a memorandum appointing the directorate as the Office of Primary Responsibility to implement the HQDA Protection Program.

The OAA experienced additional changes in May 2012. In response to a DoD order, the Army established the Army Civil Liberties Program, which would be responsible for drafting Army policy; developing training mechanisms for senior leadership, managers/supervisors, and the workforce; and establishing complaint procedures and reporting quarterly to the Defense Privacy and Civil Liberties Division. The deputy administrative assistant to the secretary of the Army took on the additional role of being the Army's chief civil liberties officer.

In 2013, Congress noted a serious problem in document collecting: the official Army records from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were either missing or incomplete. It asked Secretary McHugh to address the issue, so he delegated the task of collecting and assessing the completeness the operational records of these wars to CMH. At this time, the Center was still under the purview of the OAA. Even though maintenance of such files was not a function of CMH, Administrative Assistant Gerald B. O'Keefe determined that unit efforts to retain valuable operational material were inadequate. To rectify the situation, O'Keefe encouraged field historians and military history detachments to collect all documentation and forward it to CMH. By the end of 2013, the Center held nearly 70 terabytes of material, creating the beginnings of an Army operational records collection. Secretary McHugh then ordered all Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units to consolidate a copy of all respective subordinate unit files for Operations ENDURING FREEDOM, IRAQI FREEDOM, and NEW DAWN and transmit them to CMH. O'Keefe was also instrumental in centralizing management of all Army museums into the Army Museum Enterprise and moving the National

What I learned from being sent to business school was the Army is not a business. You can't run it like one.

—Richard P. Lawson,
Program Analyst, Office of
the Administrative Assistant
to the Secretary of the Army

Museum of the United States Army project forward.

The following year, senior Army and DoD leaders initiated a plan to reduce the size of headquarters across the entire force. At HQDA, the Army aimed for a 25 percent cut. Fortunately for the OAA, because its customer base extended beyond headquarters and supported all military services, the office's share of the reduction was only 10 percent. In the process, however, the OAA had to validate its vision, mission, and customer base, which revealed a need to reorganize the office to ensure its ability to meet mission requirements. Although the restructuring began in October 2015 during O'Keefe's tenure, he departed before the process concluded. Secretary of the Army Mark T. Esper then named Kathleen S. Miller administrative assistant, leaving her to inherit the reorganization mid-implementation.

Some of the alterations within the OAA also resulted from the transition to a new presidential administration after the election of President Donald J. Trump. Although the federal government as a whole adjusted its priorities and welcomed new leadership, the OAA faced the task of out-processing eight presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed officials; supporting the preparation of confirm-

I've been . . . in the . . . top two positions here in OAA now for almost eight years and I don't think I've had remotely the same day twice.

—Gerald B. O'Keefe,
Administrative Assistant to
the Secretary of the Army



Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army, Gerald B.
O'Keefe, 29 July 2013
(U.S. Army)

ing four new Senate nominees; the in-processing/onboarding of four political appointees serving as principal officials; the in-processing/onboarding of one Senate-confirmed official; and significant coordination efforts with the president-elect's Agency Review Team. This was typical of each change of administration.

Additionally, one of the OAA's most visible and important day-to-day support functions,

In December 2019, an outbreak of a highly contagious and potentially deadly virus in China quickly developed into a global pandemic. By March 2020, the SARS-CoV-2 virus, which causes the COVID-19 infection, put the functions and operations of the U.S. Army to the test. Army senior leaders immediately began to develop new procedures that would protect soldiers and civilians from the disease without sacrificing readiness. On 10 March 2020, Administrative Assistant Miller and Director of the Army Staff Lt. Gen. Walter E. Piatt issued a memo for the principal officials of HQDA with planning guidance. Three days later, General Piatt and Miller released a memo to direct principal officials' response to COVID-19. What followed was a series of policy decisions and actions designed to mitigate the impact of COVID-19 on the Army, including a halt to change-of-station moves; maximum use of telework under the Office of Personnel Management's new guidance; restriction of access to the Pentagon and leased spaces in the NCR; updated communications plans; review of all mission functions; and creation of social distancing plans for mission-essential personnel.

As the outbreak worsened, General Piatt and Miller announced that HQDA was elevating the Health Protection Condition (HPCON) level to Charlie—the second-highest threat level, indicating a substantial public health emergency—across all Army installations in the NCR. Miller based her approach on the belief that adapting to the new COVID environment was an operational, rather than policy, problem.¹ With infections on the rise throughout the

1. HPCON levels range from Zero to Delta, with Delta being the most restrictive because of widespread community transmission of a pathogen. At the time that HQDA raised the HPCON level to Charlie, the Army reported 288 confirmed cases of COVID-19.

the motor pool, underwent fundamental changes during its relocation to a new facility and its establishment as a forward element at the Pentagon. The Directorate of Executive Travel had the task of fully implementing the transition and refining its operating procedures during Fiscal Year 2018. In another reduction effort, the OSD directed the Army Headquarters Services Agency to continue work on consolidating and decreasing rented space as it had done successfully with the close out of the lease for the Hoffman Building

United States, Army senior leaders recognized the need for a secure and accessible tool for tracking COVID-19 reporting. Miller tasked her office's Human Resources Management Directorate (HRMD), under director Monica L. Vazquez, to take the lead on developing an application that would enable the Army to track COVID-19 cases and to restrict movement of soldiers and civilian personnel. Vazquez and HRMD leveraged the capabilities of OAA's Information Technology Management Office to create the Army Pandemic Accountability Reporting Tool (APART), a Common Access Card-enabled website that could not only track infections and restrictions of movement, but also worked in conjunction with the DD Form 3112 Personnel Accountability and Assessment Notification for COVID-19 exposure.

The Army concluded its legal review of the APART in early June and by 12 June 2020, the U.S. Army Network Enterprise Technology Command's cybersecurity directorate recommended a ninety-day authority to operate for the APART, which Miller approved three days later. Between 31 July and 31 August, developers released versions of APART to HRMD for testing, which it concluded on 8 September. The next day HRMD released a user guide and by 15 September, it made APART available for HQDA use. On 2 February 2023, HQDA published FRAGO 38 to HQDA EXORD 225-21 Covid-19 Steady State Operations, ending Annex D (COVID positive and restriction of movement tracking) reporting requirements. A few days later, the OAA informed case managers to cease entering new cases in APART and to close any open cases. After just two-and-a-half years, on 17 February, HRMD deactivated all APART accounts and the Information Technology Management Office had APART deleted from the Army Portfolio Management Solution five months later.

in Alexandria, Virginia. The office also ceded control of the Information Technology Agency to the Defense Information Systems Agency as the Army continued to learn and adjust the information technology support structure and related processes. Further, the OAA needed to bring a higher percentage of administrative publications into compliance with the five-year currency standard and to terminate Army directives as they were incorporated into Army regulations. Lastly, the office maintained a crucial



Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army, Kathleen S. Miller, 30 March 2021
(U.S. Army)

role in the continued preparation for, training, implementation, and execution of the Defense Performance Management and Appraisal System.

Effective 1 October 2019, Secretary of the Army Ryan D. McCarthy transferred CMH, including all its authorities, missions, personnel, facilities, equipment, property, funding, and resources, from the OAA to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The Institute of Heraldry, however, remained under the purview of Administrative Assistant Miller. According to Army officials, making CMH a subordinate of TRADOC would better promote history education “from trainees in basic combat training to officers at staff colleges.” The following year, Secretary McCarthy issued GO 2020–12, which reassigned the Passport Services Division, Media Distribution Division, and Print-

ing Management subcomponents of Army Headquarter Services—part of the OAA—to U.S. Army Materiel Command effective 1 October 2020.

By 2020, leadership in the OAA determined that its front office staff should be reduced in size and scope to allow the organization to focus on senior leader support, moving all other functions to more appropriate agencies. During her tenure, Miller established a series of offsites, or reform meetings, which she held in the Fort Belvoir Officers’ Club. Getting her directors out of their offices and away from distractions, Miller sought to develop guidance for the office redesign, considering things such as balancing the workload across field operating agencies, establishing effective information technology capabilities, and trimming the number of staff in the front office. She divided the working group into four teams

The Administrative Assistant [to the Secretary of the Army] job is a mile wide and a couple miles deep.

—Kathleen S. Miller,
Administrative Assistant to
the Secretary of the Army

(Diamonds, Ovals, Triangles, and Circles), with each one examining the pros and cons of various organizational models to develop a sustainable yet flexible system for the OAA.

When Miller departed the office to take the position of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) in early August 2021, her deputy, Mark F. Averill, became the acting administrative assistant. On 18 August, Averill, issued a memorandum to the OAA executive directors and agencies in which he expressed his thoughts about the future organization of the office. He noted that OAA had undergone significant structural and mission-related changes since 2018 and that senior leadership had worked hard to configure the remaining suborganizations and missions in a more coherent way, enabling the office to better serve its customers and maximize its resources, including personnel.

The two proposed field operating agencies of the OAA would be organized so that one, the Enterprise Services Agency, focused on Army-wide missions and functions. The other, the Headquarters Support Agency, would focus on HQDA direct support. The OAA directorates could then be assigned to the two agencies as appropriate. Additionally, Averill reassigned the Special Programs Directorate from his front office to the Army Headquarters Services (AHS) Agency; shifted the Institute of Heraldry from Resources and Programs to AHS; moved Real Estate and Facilities–Army from AHS to Resources and Programs; and transferred the Army Executive Dining Facility from AHS to Resources and Programs.

On 2 January 2022, Averill transitioned from acting to permanent administrative assistant when Secretary of the Army Christine E. Wormuth, the first woman to hold the role, appointed him to the position. Throughout 2022, Averill was able to engineer the final reductions of OAA to what were essentially its core competencies of human resources, resource management, equal employment opportunity, facilities management and safety/security support to only HQDA customers. A few specialty programs remained in the organization's front office and Special Programs Division such as con-



Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army, Mark F. Averill, 15 February 2022
(U.S. Army)

ference management, gift acceptance, the Civilian Marksmanship Program, and Civilian Aides to the Secretary of the Army. These final reductions were realized primarily through three significant reassignments. The first of these was the transfer of the Pentagon Motor Pool to WHS. The other two were intra-headquarters reassignments of the Army Multimedia and Visual Information Directorate to the Office of the Chief of Public Affairs and the Army Enterprise Services Agency (ESA) to the Chief Information Officer. Lesser moves such as the reassignment of the Institute of Heraldry to G1, Production Acquisition Division to MDW and Executive Air Scheduling to MDW would reduce OAA to its smallest size since roughly 1986.

Concurrent with the reassignment of organizations, roles, and missions, Averill renamed much of the organization to describe more clearly its functions and customer bases. On 26 September 2022, Secretary Wormuth issued GO 2022-16 that officially redesignated the U.S. Army Resources and Programs Agency as the U.S. Army Headquarters Support Agency while at the same time redesignating the U.S. Army Headquarters Services Agency as the U.S. Army Enterprise Services Agency (ESA) based on Averill's 18 August 2021 memo. The redesignations better aligned the organization names with the headquarters direct support and Army enterprise level missions each was responsible for executing.

With the transfer of ESA to the Chief Information Officer, OAA had gone full circle and returned to a "one FOA [Field Operating Agency]" construct as it had been in 2000 before expanding to the multiple FOA configuration under Hudson. The number of authorized military and civilians assigned to OAA decreased from 2,199 in 2000 to only 244 by the end of 2023—a staggering 89% overall strength reduction. The ESA transfer also completed the last major reform "big rock" for OAA, with only the smaller transfer of the Pentagon Auditorium to WHS remaining.

CONCLUSION

The history of the OAA from 1789 through 2023 clearly illustrates how crucial the administrative assistant and the office have been to the U.S. Army. Despite the many changes the office has experienced over the past two centuries, it remains steadfast in its mission to provide HQDA and organizations Army-wide with essential administrative and management support. From the early core functions of overseeing civilian personnel, dispersing, building management and records, papers and book management within the office of the secretary to a much broader set of missions after Goldwater-Nichols, the administrative assistant has been a key enabler for HQDA's ability to function effectively.

Looking to the future, the administrative assistant will remain responsible for seven primary functions:

1. Overseeing the U.S. Army Headquarters Support Agency, a field operating agency assigned to OAA.

2. Facilitating political transitions between administrations as the Army Transition Assistance Coordinator.

3. Providing direct support to HQDA, including, but not limited to, financial management, human resource management, safety and security, facilities management, executive dining, and equal employment opportunity advisory services.

4. Providing administrative and management services in support of the Civilian Aides to the Secretary of the Army Program.

5. Performing liaison activities with the Corporation for the Promotion of Rifle Practice and Firearms Safety, which supervises, controls, and does business as the Civilian Marksmanship Program.

6. Authenticating, on behalf of the secretary of the Army, Department of the Army, administrative publications.

7. Developing policy for and overseeing the Army Gift Program, the Army Conference Program, the Army Federal Advisory Committee Management Program, the DA Intergovernmental and Intragovernmental Committee Management Program, official representation funds of the secretary of the Army, fundraising within the DA, the HQDA Welfare Fund, secretary of the Army delegations of authority, DoD-level responsibilities or secretary of the Army executive agent designations, the Army Museum Enterprise and the Army Historical Program.

Today, the OAA may have a smaller footprint than it had in previous decades. But by continuing to provide vital and wide-ranging administrative support, the office remains a cornerstone of the Department of the Army.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Although the stereotype of a historian toiling away, alone, in a quiet archive researching or typing away in an office makes for great storytelling, it is hardly accurate. I thank my many colleagues at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. In the HQDA Studies and Support Division, my gratitude goes to Katherine E. Mooney, Bradley J. Sommer, Florian S. Kardoskee, and Maj. Sandy E. Knoll for their research assistance; to William M. Yarborough for his guidance and oversight of the oral histories conducted for the manuscript; to William M. Donnelly for sharing his expertise and insight; and to Stephen J. Lofgren for his unwavering support, patience, and constructive criticism. Additionally, I thank Deborah A. Stultz and Shannon L. Granville for their editorial eyes, Matthew T. Boan for creating the excellent maps in the manuscript, Gene Snyder for the wonderful layout, and Cheryl L. Bratten for her leadership and guidance in the production phase. And for his keen eye and helpful review of the manuscript at various stages, a special thanks to Jon T. Hoffman.

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This brief history of the Office of the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army would not be possible without the tireless assistance from the many individuals in the OAA. I am especially grateful to Sondra Machelie Eitnearn for her collection of many of the portraits and photographs within the manuscript and to Fritz W. Kirklighter for his can-do attitude and support. And last, but most certainly not least, an immense thank you goes to Administrative Assistant Mark F. Averill. His enthusiasm for, dedication to, and steadfast support of this project has helped to bring the manuscript to fruition.

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APPENDIX A: CHIEF CLERKS OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT

| | | | |
|-------------------------------|-------------------|----|-------------------|
| William Knox | 11 September 1789 | to | 15 June 1790 |
| John Stagg Jr. | 16 June 1790 | to | 15 November 1797 |
| John Caldwell | 1 December 1797 | to | 31 May 1800 |
| John Newman | 1 June 1880 | to | 31 December 1801 |
| Joshua Wingate Jr. | 1 January 1802 | to | 1804 |
| John Smith | 1804 | to | 28 April 1811 |
| Daniel Parker | 1 July 1812 | to | 23 November 1814 |
| George Graham | 15 March 1815 | to | 21 October 1816 |
| Christopher Vandeventer | 10 December 1817 | to | 19 February 1827 |
| Charles J. Nourse | 20 February 1827 | to | 2 May 1829 |
| Philip G. Randolph | 4 May 1829 | to | 19 June 1831 |
| John Robb | 11 July 1831 | to | 19 October 1833 |
| Daniel Kurtz (acting) | 20 October 1833 | to | 31 January 1835 |
| Carey A. Harris | 1 February 1835 | to | 4 July 1836 |
| John T. Cochrane | 5 July 1836 | to | 12 March 1837 |
| Samuel Cooper | 13 March 1837 | to | 9 July 1838 |
| John T. Cochran (2nd tour) | 10 July 1838 | to | 31 March 1841 |
| Albert Miller Lea | 11 April 1841 | to | 31 October 1841 |
| Daniel Parker (2nd tour) | 1 November 1841 | to | 31 March 1846 |
| Archibald Campbell | 1 April 1846 | to | 12 April 1849 |
| Samuel J. Anderson | 13 April 1849 | to | 17 August 1850 |
| John D. McPherson (acting) | 18 August 1850 | to | 15 September 1850 |
| George T. M. Davis | 16 September 1850 | to | 4 March 1851 |
| John Potts | 5 March 1851 | to | 9 March 1853 |
| Archibald Campbell (2nd tour) | 10 March 1853 | to | 3 March 1857 |
| John Potts (acting) | 4 March 1857 | to | 31 March 1857 |
| William R. Drinkard | 1 April 1857 | to | 15 February 1861 |
| John Potts (acting) | March 1861 | to | 3 March 1861 |
| John Phillip Sanderson | 4 March 1861 | to | 14 May 1861 |
| James Lesley Jr. | 1 July 1861 | to | 31 October 1861 |
| John Potts (2nd tour) | 1 November 1861 | to | 24 July 1872 |
| Henry T. Crosby | 25 July 1872 | to | 30 June 1882 |
| John Tweedale | 1 July 1882 | to | 7 March 1899 |
| John C. Scofield ^a | 8 March 1899 | to | 31 December 1930 |

^a Title changed to Assistant and Chief Clerk of the War Department in 1908.

APPENDIX B: ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY OF WAR/ARMY

| | | | |
|------------------------------|-------------------|----|-------------------|
| John W. Martyn ^a | 1 January 1931 | to | 31 January 1960 |
| Robert H. Willey | 1 February 1960 | to | 15 October 1961 |
| James C. Cook | 16 October 1961 | to | 30 December 1965 |
| John G. Connell Jr. (acting) | 31 December 1965 | to | 9 April 1966 |
| John G. Connell Jr. | 10 April 1966 | to | 30 December 1979 |
| Roswell M. Yingling (acting) | 31 December 1979 | to | 29 March 1980 |
| Milton H. Hamilton | 30 March 1980 | to | 3 April 1995 |
| Joel B. Hudson (acting) | 4 April 1995 | to | 10 September 1995 |
| Yvonne M. Harrison | 11 September 1995 | to | 2 February 1996 |
| Joel B. Hudson (acting) | 3 February 1996 | to | 2 April 1996 |
| Joel B. Hudson | 3 April 1996 | to | 3 November 2004 |
| Sandra R. Riley | 4 November 2004 | to | 27 February 2006 |
| Larry Stubblefield (acting) | 27 February 2006 | to | 5 March 2006 |
| Joyce E. Morrow | 6 March 2006 | to | 19 May 2013 |
| Gerald B. O'Keefe (acting) | 20 May 2013 | to | 7 July 2013 |
| Gerald B. O'Keefe | 28 July 2013 | to | 7 July 2018 |
| Mark F. Averill (acting) | 8 July 2018 | to | 27 October 2018 |
| Kathleen S. Miller | 28 October 2018 | to | 10 August 2021 |
| Mark F. Averill (acting) | 11 August 2021 | to | 1 January 2022 |
| Mark F. Averill | 2 January 2022 | to | Present |

^a Title changed to Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of War in 1931 and to Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army in 1947.

APPENDIX C: IN MEMORIAM 11 SEPTEMBER 2001

Resource Services-Washington

Carrie R. Blagburn
Donna M. Bowen
Angelene C. Carter
Sharon A. Carver
Ada M. Davis
Amelia V. Fields
Cortez Ghee
Brenda C. Gibson
Carolyn B. Halmon
Sheila M. S. Hein
Jimmie I. Holley
Peggie M. Hurt
Brenda Kegler
David W. Laychak
Samantha L. Lightbourn-Allen
Teresa M. Martin
Ada L. Mason-Acker

Molly L. McKenzie
Diana B. Padro
Maj. Clifford L. Patterson Jr.
Rhonda Sue Rasmussen
Martha M. Reszke
Cecelia E. Richard
Edward V. Rowenhorst
Judy Rowlett
Robert E. Russell
Marjorie C. Salamone
Janice M. Scott
Antoinette M. Sherman
Donald D. Simmons
Edna L. Stephens
Willie Q. Troy
Sandra L. White

Information Management Support Center/Support Services

John J. Chada
Lt. Col. Dean E. Mattson
Robert J. Maxwell

Teddington H. Moy
Scott Powell
Michael L. Selves

Policy and Plans

Meta L. Waller

APPENDIX D: THE SEAL OF THE OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT



Symbolism: Red, white and blue are our national colors; the shield represents the Army and a strong defense. The antique cannons and swords represent the function of support and custodianship fulfilled by the Administrative Assistant's office. The eagle and inescutcheon symbolize the United States; the fasces denotes authority. The sprigs of laurel and oak represent achievement and strength. The scroll displays the date "1789" commemorating the creation of the Office of the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army.

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|---------|---|
| AHS | Army Headquarters Services Agency |
| APART | Army Pandemic Accountability Reporting Tool |
| AR | Army Regulation |
| BASOPS | Base Operating Information System |
| BRAC | Base Realignment and Closure |
| CMH | Center of Military History |
| COMSEC | communications security |
| DA | Department of the Army |
| DoD | Department of Defense |
| ESA | Enterprise Services Agency |
| ESG | Environmental Support Group |
| EXORD | execute order |
| FOA | Field Operating Agency |
| FRAGO | fragmentary order |
| GO | General Order |
| HMS | His Majesty's Ship |
| HPCON | Health Protection Condition |
| HQDA | Headquarters, Department of the Army |
| HR | human resources |
| HRMD | Human Resources Management Directorate |
| MDW | Military District of Washington |
| NCR | National Capital Region |
| OAA | Office of the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army |
| OPEC | Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries |
| OSD | Office of the Secretary of Defense |
| RMS | Royal Mail Ship |
| TAGCEN | The Adjutant General Center |
| TDA | Tables of Distribution and Allowances |
| TO&E | Table of Organization and Equipment |
| TRADOC | U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command |
| UN | United Nations |
| USAPAT | U.S. Army Priority Air Transport |
| USASCAF | U.S. Army Service Center for the Armed Forces |
| WHS | Washington Headquarters Services |

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Jamie L. Goodall is a historian in the HQDA Studies and Support Division with the U.S. Army Center of Military History. She earned a master's degree in public history/museum studies from Appalachian State University in 2010 and a PhD in history from the Ohio State University in 2016. Before joining the Center, she taught history at Stevenson University for five years.

Dr. Goodall has published three books on Golden Age Atlantic world piracy with The History Press as well as a National Geographic bookazine on the history of global piracy. She is a member of the *Journal of Military History* Editorial Advisory Board and coedited/authored *The United States Army and the COVID-19 Pandemic: January 2020–July 2021* (U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2021).



HQDA STUDIES AND SUPPORT DIVISION CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY

