



# Director's Notes

Spring has sprung here at Fort Leavenworth and CALL did not wait until March to let the madness begin. Our first major event in early January brought our military analysts (forward) (MAF) back for a week-long discussion to share priority issues from their respective supported commands. We reviewed the fiscal year (FY) 2023 Army Lessons Learned Annual Plan and discussed ways to synchronize collection efforts across the lessons learned community. I see our MAF as a two-way communication channel between CALL and the combat training centers and select Army headquarters. They serve as our scouts out while providing reach back from your organization to the vast support structure here at the Combined Arms Center (CAC). LTG Beagle hosted his second Army Lessons Learned Forum (ALLF) General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC) at the end of January and has developed his vision on how the ALLF GOSC leads the effort to drive change in relation to other three-star-general level CAC discussions. He wants to move away from a transactional exchange of information to a transformational approach that identifies solutions and action plans to implement change. We will address these adjustments in our Action Officer Working Group and Council of Colonels sessions leading up to the 5 May 2023 ALLF GOSC. There is no shortage of issues for discussion in future ALLF GOSCs, so I anticipate LTG Beagle will continue to set the agenda topics based on the urgent need to drive change in a specific functional capability. CALL's audio books are a hit! Our initial effort to expand the dissemination of lessons and best practices with six audio books generated over 24,000 hits for these products on the Central Army Registry in a two-month period. This is more than six times the number of hits on the same digital and print products in the same period. Given

these metrics, CALL will expand the dissemination of lessons using the audio book format. We are reviewing our existing handbooks and products in development for the best candidates for our next audio books. Let us know if you have a CALL product you think would be great in audio book format. No change to CALL's priority efforts. We are still working observations from the conflict in Ukraine and have initiated a collection on establishing the Security Assistance Group Ukraine. Our Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) Warfighter Exercise 23-4 (multinational interoperability) collection and analysis team (CAAT) will observe operations from 13 April to 1 May, and also cover the Division Cavalry Squadron pilot exercise within the same scenario. This is the largest CALL CAAT in recent memory with over 40 subject matter experts from the Centers of Excellence and other proponent agencies. CALL continues to maintain contact with exceptional collection opportunities with U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) and has a CAAT mission ready for Balikatan 23 and Pacific Sentry 23. My bracket didn't make it past the play-in games. I hope your picks lasted a bit longer, and you used the time between rounds to get ready for a busy spring in the business of driving change to forge victory.



COL Scott Mueller

## Recent Publications


[Team Truscott: Operationalizing Division Modernization](#)  
As 3rd Infantry Division (3ID) brigades and Fort Stewart, GA, tenant units entered their modernization windows (in accordance with the Army's Regionally Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model [ReARMM] concept), 3ID task-organized a cross-functional team (CFT) to operationalize modernization in the division headquarters.

[Understanding Army Experimentation](#)  
The advent of the Army 2030 concept combines new concepts, formations, and technologies that require numerous experiments at all levels of warfare. The Army, as a custodian of our nation's resources, must provide key information to senior leaders to make decisions about how the Army should change.

Recent Publications Continued



CTC Trends 2022



Integrating Civil Affairs in LSCO



MCTP in LSCO Key Observations

[Combat Training Center Trends 2022 \(CAC Required\)](#)

The FY2022 CTC Trends publication analyzes the trends (by warfighting function) as seen by OC/Ts at the three combat training centers for FY22. The trends are discussed using the ‘trend, observation, discussion, recommendation’ format and are categorized as a sustain or improve. This handbook provides leaders the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that will allow them to build a better unit training program.

[Embracing a Division Level Approach to Gap Crossing Operations](#)

This paper briefly discusses observations on the common approach divisions use for gap crossing operations, background to the problem, and suggestions to division leaders and planners to better plan, resource, and command and control (C2) what is an inherently complex task.

[Integrating Civil Affairs in Large-Scale Combat Operations: Trends from the Combat Training Centers](#)

This article explores trends related to the integration of civil affairs (CA) capabilities in training for large-scale combat operations (LSCO) at the U.S. Army combat training centers (CTC) and identifies common gaps, best practices, and recommendations provided by observer coach/trainers (OC/Ts) and rotational unit CA staff.

[Command Post Survivability: What’s to Be Done? \(CAC Required\)](#)

The environments Soldiers will operate in will be “highly lethal” and “unlike anything our Army has experienced since World War II.” The U.S. Army knows that its current tactical command posts (CPs) are a major battlefield vulnerability during LSCO against near-peer and peer threats. Catastrophic damage and casualties U.S. forces could receive in future LSCO are a clear and present danger.

[MCTP Key Observations FY22](#)

This publication is a highlight of the Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) observations from Army training in a LSCO environment. These observations were written by a collaborative group of experienced officers, noncommissioned officers, and chief warrant officers working in conjunction with highly qualified expert senior mentors (HQE-SMs).

[Company Leadership Audio book Starter Pack](#)

Company leaders are the decisive element in developing a professional Army. They are at the forefront, developing future leaders to attain the high standards of the Army profession. CALL has compiled the following list of audio books and publications as a quick reference to assist leaders to maneuver through their rewarding careers as

company-level leaders, preparing them for the next step in their profession.

[Team Truscott White Paper: An Army Engineer’s Perspective on the Modernization Program at Fort Stewart, Georgia](#)

Team Truscott was an installation-level, cross-functional team that would operationalize the division’s approach to modernization, identify and solve problems, and share lessons learned with the rest of the Army.

[Military Police Support of the BCT \(CAC Required\)](#)

Understanding the military police combat support companies’ purpose, structure, and equipment will enable a BCT to effectively employ this enabling force within the large-scale ground combat environment and achieve victory over its competitors. This article seeks to build a greater understanding of what these capabilities are and to provide solutions to strengthen the relationship between the BCT and military police combat support companies.

[Tactical Deception \(CAC Required\)](#)

This article focuses on the physical means of deception - selecting and integrating decoys and equipment devices into LSCO within the BCT. The division is the first echelon with a military deception officer (MDO) assigned to the staff; therefore, a simplified method for decoy selection criteria is also provided as “a way” to identify which organic systems.

[Learning to Fly Drones in the Russian-Ukrainian War \(CAC Required\)](#)

The implications of drone use in Ukraine are likely to be long-standing, far-reaching, and multidimensional. Regulation and security challenges related to commercial unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) were imminent before the war began, but the pointed and intensely watched application of this technology in Ukraine will amplify them. Keen observers will not repeat Russia’s mistake. They will take notes and adapt now, whether in doctrine, tactics, or defense.

[Twelve Months of War in Ukraine Have Revealed Four Fundamental Lessons on Urban Warfare \(CAC Required\)](#)

Ukraine is a vast country of almost a quarter of a million square miles. And yet it is the small percentage of Ukrainian territory covered by cities that has disproportionately characterized the conduct of the war over the past year. The lessons offered up by the past twelve months of the war in Ukraine must be identified, and they must inform the ways the U.S. military conceives of, plans, prepares for, and conducts urban warfare.





## Joint Readiness Training Center

In March 2023, the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) celebrates 30 years of training formations at Fort Polk to win the first fight in combat. Although operational environments and threats evolve, synchronizing warfighting functions in time, space, and purpose always has been and always will be hard. Combined arms at echelon remains fundamental, and the quality of its execution determines victory on the battlefield. Assessments from recent conflicts reinforce this. A combat training center deployment is the closest a unit and individuals can come, short of combat, to experiencing the friction, uncertainty, and privation of war; their ability to learn faster than the enemy is the key to winning. Units are exposed to a controlled, operational environment that drives them to adjust their behaviors based on positive and negative reinforcement. A combat training center deployment is a crucible experience for both organizations and individuals building generational layers of expertise for the Army.

The JRTC is the antidote for winning America's first battles because it accounts for distinct traits of current global conflicts while retaining its focus on fundamentals at echelon. It innovates, evolves, and modernizes to challenge units in the most realistic and demanding battlefield environment, and now to enable the Army of 2030. Throughout the past 30 years, the JRTC observer/coach trainers (OC/Ts) cadre observed trends across units—some of these trends have been contextual to certain periods of time such as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and some have been omnipresent. These trends fit in three categories: those that have been and always will be hard, those that are not entirely the brigade's problem to solve, and those on which a unit or Army have not focused.

**Hard and Has Always Been Hard.** For example, survivability on an increasingly transparent battlefield. The requirement to preserve combat power is not new. Units must still disperse, camouflage, and dig survivability positions to survive. The increasing threat of unmanned-aerial systems and long-range artillery only changes the context. It is not a gap in equipment, doctrine, or personnel, however, it requires practice under realistic conditions to gain proficiency and then achieve mastery. The experience of doing these difficult tasks as a leader and as units is the only way to get good at it. It is much like hitting a golf ball straight, it may look and sound easy, however it takes practice.

**Not (entirely) the BCT's Problem to Solve.** This is a problem that the brigade combat team (BCT) can influence, but it is not primarily responsible for the solution. The combat training centers expose the BCT to operational effects to drive appropriate behaviors, reporting, and adaptation to influence the resolution of difficult problems at echelon. Continuity of command and command-post survivability are prime examples. The BCT table of organization and equipment (MTOE) is a reality; the BCT can adjust the type of command-post facility and how it divides its people and equipment across its area of operations, but it cannot doctrinally abdicate responsibility for air control, make Army-wide decisions on information technology (IT) solutions, or remove a

percentage of its assigned personnel. Finally, there are emerging challenges that the Army is still addressing, such as counter-unmanned aerial systems.

**The Unit or Army Did Not Focus on It.** In this case, a unit has the authorized personnel and equipment, and doctrine enables the unit to do the task; however, the unit or the Army did not put leader emphasis on it. During the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Army did not routinely employ artillery as doctrinally intended; therefore, unit proficiency at those tasks atrophied. The technique of massing artillery fires is different in diverse environments and for unlike units. The severely restricted terrain of the Louisiana swamp forces units to bring the effects of artillery closer to maneuver battalions, changing the battlefield geometry. Growth in artillery employment at JRTC is enabled through the employment of a constructive task organization simulating the division as the principle tactical formation. During force-on-force, constructive-adjacent brigades allow peer commander-to-commander dialogue and the distributed readiness exercise allows an integrated BCT command-post exercise repetition from home station. A BCT understands that a division may task it to secure a position area for artillery (PAA) for the division or support an adjacent brigade with indirect fires. The principal training brigade employs its artillery within the construct of a division problem set. Through concerted focus, the Army is on the path to regaining mastery.

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audio books

- Building Cohesive Teams
- The First 100 Days of Company Leadership
- The First 100 Days of Platoon Leadership
- Commanders and Staff Guide to Rehearsals
- How to Master Wargaming
- Preparing for Large-Scale Combat Operations

JUST RELEASED

## JRTC continued

Stagnation in unit proficiency has been in the three following areas: units' struggle at all echelons, conducting detailed planning, and attaining the level of synchronization required to mass fires in support of maneuver. Staff sections are unable to develop thorough and complete course of action analysis that produces effective orders and fighting products. Units are unsuccessful in their endeavor to establish an effective common operating picture (COP) that is driven by commander's information requirements and is utilized at echelons across the BCT. The establishment and ability to maintain networks that facilitates effective command and control (C2) across the entire force remains a significant point of friction at all echelons. Units fail to emphasize the importance of establishing a simple yet detailed and executable sustainment and casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) plan.

The JRTC team has seen an incremental increase in proficiency in commander's and staffs' ability to move from conceptual to detailed planning for part of the operations, but planning still lacks sufficient details by all warfighting functions. Units fail to plan in detail to, on, and past the objective and instead become solely focused on the objective. Command nodes are either functional, agile, or survivable, but rarely all three. Leaders are unable to consistently maintain a predictable battle rhythm with timely and accurate reporting requirements, which greatly affects their ability in seeing themselves clearly throughout the conflict. Units routinely bring all their chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) detection and protection equipment but lack proficiency in employment.

There has been an exponential increase in proficiency in BCTs operationalizing the reception, staging, onward-movement, and

integration (RSOI) phase with the BCT staff taking ownership of the process.

Units lead with fires onto the objective instead of simply employing direct fire against the enemy. Units consistently and effectively integrate external enablers into the BCT. Brigade combat teams and special operations forces (SOF) have both prioritized conventional force- SOF interdependence, interoperability, and integration (I3) efforts. Units at all levels, have focused on the basics and increased their proficiency in warrior tasks and drills (WTD), specifically in relation to 'react to contact' battle drill. Leaders at the company, battery, and troop level have demonstrated an increase in their understanding of troop leading procedures and routinely deliver operation orders (OPORDs) to their subordinates. At echelon, units have prioritized protection efforts for critical nodes and assets.

Enjoy JRTC's newest strategic outreach effort, *The Crucible* – The JRTC Experience podcast. This podcast isn't an academic review of historical vignettes or political-science analysis of current events. This is a podcast about warfighting and the skillsets necessary for America's Army to fight and win on the modern battlefield. You can find it wherever you listen to podcasts as well as watch it on YouTube.

**Information divergence and mass media campaign.** In an effort to bring information to the end user while making it easy to use, the JRTC has begun an information divergence campaign. Using Link-Tree as the hub for our information, end users will be able to either follow the link or use a QR code to find the various hubs, such as YouTube or Instagram, where we're posting the latest and greatest from the JRTC. You can follow us on social media via our [Link-Tree account](#).

## NTC



## National Training Center

The National Training Center (NCT) continues to lead the way in adapting to multidomain operations. The NTC is testing units to operate on a transparent battlefield, to take advantage of windows of convergence, and to understand their role in a division and corps fight.

During Rotation 23-04, operations group hosted 3rd Infantry Division (3ID) in a scenario centered around the division as the primary tactical echelon. The scenario design incorporated a partner force supported by security force assistance brigade (SFAB) advisors. 3ID with a division artillery headquarters and combined aviation brigade headquarters provided command and control (C2) for rocket artillery and aviation battalions that supported the partnered force. This rotation provided valuable feedback on the friction of operating a division command post in a realistic battlefield geometry that stressed C2 systems and required aligning the planning and targeting processes of multiple echelons.

During Rotation 23-05, 3ID provided a rear area command post to C2 the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of 2nd Brigade, 3rd ID. The brigade fielded the new Abrams M1A2 SEPv3 (System

Enhanced Package) Main Battle Tank (MBT), which greatly increased its combat power. It also tested the Raptor Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) that tethers to its M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFV). The Raptor provided greatly enhanced reconnaissance capabilities for the brigade.

Units must understand how to counter UAS through a variety of means. The NTC opposing force, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (11th ACR), fields a diverse array of UAS systems including the TS-M800, which operates in a swarm. The NTC provides units with the new mobile, low, slow, unmanned aircraft integrated defeat systems (M-LIDs) to replicate cutting edge capabilities to counter UAS. Soon, the NTC will be publishing a paper on the best practices for Skyview, which provides front line units with a method to rapidly detect and target UAS launch sites.

Operations Group will also be sharing additional lessons for how to conduct multidomain operations with its upcoming podcast, *Thinking Inside the Box*, and its video series Tac Talks. Soon to come is our *A Way to CAR* Tac Talk, which will highlight the best practices for how to conduct combined arms rehearsals (CAR).



## Joint Multinational Readiness Center

*Joint Multinational Readiness Center's (JMRC's) robust, theater informed, realistic multidomain training environment serves as the "laboratory" to test, demonstrate, and train U.S. military and multinational ally and partner interoperability. A fundamental way to train this partnership is through the Leadership Training Program.*

### Planning Leadership Training Program for Partner Nations

Leadership Training Program (LTP) is an effective tool to train brigade staffs before deployment. LTP planners and trainers should design the training using the JMRC's five multinational interoperability (MNI) keys to success:

1. Use liaison packages.
2. Understand capabilities.
3. Prepare in detail.
4. Establish critical standard operating procedures (SOPs).
5. Establish the common operating picture (COP).

Brigades train on integrating these five fundamentals into their internal operations processes, and LTP planners succeed when they do the same for MNI operations.

### Use Liaison Packages.

Planners create liaison packages with the training audience immediately after mission notification. Partner nations can have different approaches to training management, ranging from highly constrained training managed at the strategic level to more permissive training set up by tactical commanders. In either case, planners synchronize training objectives and commander visualization before developing the LTP. This is essential to creating an LTP's program of instruction (POI) that accomplishes the unit's training objectives. Planners can serve as liaison officers (LNOs) during the planning process and can transition LNO duties to a current operations LTP trainer after the plan is complete. An inherent duty of LNOs is to speak on behalf of their parent units to set up priorities and allocate planning resources. LNOs use caution to accurately present the Army's running estimates without committing either unit to courses of action until commanders can mutually agree to the plan.

### Understand Capabilities.

Once a liaison is designated, planners understand partner capabilities and inform the partner of our own training capabilities. The Army has far more capabilities than most partners, but this actively degrades the planning process if miscommunicated. Army planners present an intelligent menu of capabilities tailored to the unit's primary training objectives and mitigate the risk of training distractors for low-density specialties. Otherwise, partner planners tend to over-ask for resources and training that their formations are not prepared to use. As an example, partner battalions and higher echelon units often receive information about Army command post exercise (CPX) simulation capabilities and request to layer CPXs over existing smaller unit training. However, those CPXs can be de-synchronized from the rotational unit's (RTU)'s home station staff training and readiness. When CPXs are hastily planned, RTUs tend to arrive at JMRC with insufficient staff training to conduct collective simulation training. A better technique in this case is



Griffin Brigade (Lithuania) receives their commander's planning guidance during Allied Spirit 23 Leader Training Program, 05 DEC 22 (photo by Major Samantha Hoxha, JMRC)

to plan individual staff warfighting function training to prepare the staff for later collective training at a different event. Planners narrowly define training capabilities against existing partner readiness to maximize training at the point of contact and mitigate training distractions.

### Prepare in Detail.

Preparing in detail requires the majority of an LTP planner's time. Technical differences between equipment across all six warfighting functions require that planners conduct separate working groups for all technical integration. Planners always begin planning by using existing checklists, available from the JMRC planning section, to ensure that both they and the RTU have adequately prepared for each technical integration of communication platforms; class of supply delivery and consumption; life support contracting; artillery mission data processing; engineer running estimates; and maneuver planning. The timing of preparation is just as critical as the detail. Many Army training assets, like spectrum allocation or external evaluator support, require 180 days to coordinate. It is essential that planners transition their understanding of the RTU's capabilities and training objectives into complete coordination with external units. A best practice is to organize the LTP planning team with several assistant planners specializing in each warfighting function. As a general rule, allocate a separate planner to each of the following: sustainment, command and control (C2), intelligence, and fires. Movement and Maneuver and Protection share enough tactical specifications and procedures to share one assistant planner.

### Establish Critical SOPs.

This fundamental of MNI success typically applies to MNI operational units creating critical reporting, marking, and fire control SOPs. This

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**JMRC Continued**

is an equally successful technique for LTP planning. The most critical SOP to establish right away is the frequency, duration, and participation of planning touchpoints. Planners approach RTUs with a baseline course of action in place to anchor the rest of the conversation on. Planners can copy JMRC’s method of setting up daily touchpoints between planners on email and cellular contact; weekly product updates via email; monthly remote meeting touchpoints; and three planning conferences leading up to training (including the initial planning conference [IPC], main planning conference [MPC], and final planning conference [FPC].)

Each planning conference serves a specific role in the planning process. The IPC is the planners’ and RTU’s first opportunity to solidify training location; initial training objectives; the upper limit for support requirements and initial coordination; the maximum number of training participants; and points of contact for each partner nation. During the IPC, ensure that each nation’s planner agrees to the planning SOPs. The MPC acts as the planning course of action analysis. The MPC usually occurs 6 months before training and therefore within the planning horizon for external resources. Planners communicate this requirement to partners at the IPC so that they arrive at the MPC ready

to commit to training—and officially cancel any initial training requests that no longer fit within the commander’s planning guidance. The FPC acts as the final opportunity for units to complete the plan and receive coordinating instructions for execution. RTUs must arrive at the FPC with their full commander approval of the plan or risk de-synchronizing LTP. Planners must communicate this requirement to RTUs during the MPC and during each product update leading up to the FPC. Together, these techniques synchronize planning efforts making the training easier and better for everyone.

**Establish the Common Operating Picture.**

Planning is complicated. Planners can manage this complexity by using simple, detailed products to capture plans. As much as possible within classification restraints, planners maximize cloud services like Microsoft Teams to allow partners to complete products on their individual battle rhythms. Planners include graphical depictions of the training (exactly like in an OPORD) in the planning conferences to help mitigate language barriers.

JMRC’s five keys to MNI success reinforce the CTC approach to the three domains of interoperability: human, procedural, and technical.

**Army Lessons Learned Highlights**

**Army Lessons Learned Synchronization Workshop**

CALL will host the Army Lessons Learned Synchronization Workshop from 23-25 May 2023. The workshop will include invited colonels and action officers from Army staff, Army commands, Army Service Component Commands, Direct Reporting Units, Centers of Excellence, and other force modernization proponents – approximately 150 attendees from 40 plus organizations.

The purpose of the workshop is four-fold:

- Integrate, synchronize, and prioritize FY24 Army collection topics
- Develop Collection and Analysis Teams (CAATs) for the Army
- Build a Program of Action and Milestones for execution
- Enhance the overall Army Lessons Learned Program.

The workshop collaboration will produce the FY24 Army Lessons Learned Annual Plan (ALLAP) which HQDA G-3/5/7 will publish as an execution order on or about 1 August 2023.

**Preparing Theater Army Headquarters for Multi-Domain Operations**

Application of FM 3-0 doctrine requires staff planning capability and capacity at Theater Army Headquarters for emerging multidomain operations (MDO) enabling formations (Theater Space Effects Group, multidomain task force, Theater Fires Command, cyber warfare battalion, Theater Information Advantage Detachment, and Military Intelligence Brigade - Theater). Theater Army force Design updates (FDU) will address the required MDO connective tissue though FDU’s that introduce new sections, which include a G39 Headquarters, a G39 information influence Section, and a G39 information warfare section. The new sections are designed to plan, manage, coordinate, and synchronize information advantage activities, psychological operations, civil affairs, cyber-space operations, electronic warfare, space operations, and special technical operations.



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