

# Team Truscott: Operationalizing Division Modernization

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
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Modern nations wage warfare in every domain (land, air, sea, space, and cyberspace). The competitors and adversaries of the United States continue to make advances in military technology and field new systems capable of outperforming our own legacy equipment. As stated in the 2022 National Defense Strategy, “we will modernize the joint force to be lethal, resilient, sustainable, survivable, agile, and responsive, prioritizing operational concepts and updated warfighting capabilities.”<sup>i</sup>

In accordance with the 2019 Army Modernization Strategy (AMS), the Total Army transforms into a multi-domain force by 2035 to meet its enduring responsibility as part of the Joint Force to provide for the defense of the United States, and to retain its position as the globally dominant land power. Enroute to becoming a multi-domain ready force by 2035, the Army modernizes to become a multi-domain capable force by 2030. The first two “periods of rapid change” (Fiscal Year (FY) 20-22 and FY23-25, as outlined in the 2019 AMS) include fielding the signature platforms of the Army’s Cross Functional Teams and incorporating the modernized equipment required to execute multi-domain operations (MDO).<sup>ii</sup>



**Figure 1. The 3rd Infantry Division fields modern platforms and systems to become the Army’s most modernized Division by the Summer of 2023.**

As a part of the broader Army strategy, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division (3ID) at Fort Stewart, Georgia, modernizes to deliver increased combat capability to combatant commanders in future contested environments. The Marne Division divests its legacy platforms and fields modern systems, becoming the Army’s most modernized Division by the summer of 2023. These newly fielded systems feature enhanced lethality (enhanced direct and indirect fire precision), mobility (improved range / ability to operate in dynamic restricted terrain), and survivability (upgraded protection for crews and capabilities).



**Figure 2. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division Modernization Cross-Functional Team is founded on initiatives to operationalize the Division’s approach to modernization, solve problems, and share lessons learned with the Army.**


**Form and Function**

As 3ID Brigades and Fort Stewart, GA (FSGA) tenant units entered their modernization windows (in accordance with the Army’s Regionally Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model (ReARMM) concept), 3ID task-organized a Cross-Functional Team (CFT) to operationalize modernization in the Division headquarters. The intent behind this operational initiative is to establish and maintain a common operational picture (COP) across echelons and warfighting functions, eliminate stovepipes in knowledge and coordination, and flatten communications across the modernization enterprise. Through operationalization, each member of the enterprise is enabled to identify and solve problems collaboratively.

The Marne Division Modernization CFT (named “Team Truscott,” after legendary 3ID Commander General Lucian Truscott)<sup>iii</sup> facilitates collective contingency planning, the early identification and mitigation of points of friction, and leverages the Division staff and supporting enablers to synchronize planning and execution of modernization activities for subordinate and tenant units undergoing modernization.

The core members of Team Truscott are 3ID staff planners, representing each warfighting function (WFF). These core members integrate with adjacent and higher HQs, subordinate and tenant unit modernization planners, Program Managers (PMs), and

U.S. Army Garrison enabling agencies (such as the Directorate of Plans, Training, Mobilization, and Security (DPTMS), Directorate of Public Works (DPW), and Directorate of Human Resources (DHR) to synchronize efforts and achieve results.



**Figure 3. The Team Truscott concept**

### ***Battle Rhythm & Reporting***

Team Truscott executes two standard synchronization events each week, as part of an established battle rhythm (see Figure 5). On Mondays, the core members of TM Truscott congregate in the Division HQ and work through a standardized agenda. This meeting includes modernization focused updates on short-term and long-term calendars (G3 Modernization); equipment arrivals and fieldings (G3 Modernization); legacy equipment divestitures (G4); pilot, test, and evaluation programs (Innovation); force-management (G5 Force Management (FM) and DPTMS FM); personnel (G1); finance (G8); facilities (Division Engineer (DIVENG)); platform and system specific updates (by WFF); modernization gaps and solutions (by WFF); and a review of the TM Truscott decision support matrix (see Figure 4). Subordinate and tenant unit representatives are invited, but not mandated, to attend Monday synch events (which are also accessible on Army 365).

DP #	Decision	Considerations / Criteria / Conditions	Action(s)	Risk
--	What decision must be made?	Criteria is condition(s) that, when met, require decision to be made	Actions to be executed	Mission / Force / Monetary
1	When does 1ABCT begin divesting of their M109A6 and M1A2 platforms?	1ABCT is complete with gunnery. Units identify MX status and plan to meet CC and equipment harvest instructions.	Planning ICW 1ABCT to assess risks and impacts to mission with delay in divestiture beyond planned dates.	Increased demand on workload, man-hours, ASL, and personnel end strength to maintain two fleets if not divested prior to fielding.
2	When does 1ABCT begin divesting of their M2A3 and M3A3 platforms?	1ABCT is complete with gunnery and conditions met for 10/20. 278 <sup>th</sup> ACR postured to receive. MDRS-Stewart postured to inspect and induct.	Planning ICW 1ABCT and 278 <sup>th</sup> ACR to develop phased transfer plan. Planning ICW MDRS-Stewart to assess risks impacts to MDRS during divestiture window.	If vehicles are not serviced w/ 120 days nor meet 10/20 standards of divestiture, MDRS may not accept. Long lead time for CL IX parts push inspection to the right. Not enough space at MDRS to inspect/induct company sized element.
3	Spartan NTC requisites and outcomes	Spartan NTC rotation shifted right. T2 NTC outcome only requires PLT LFX pre-NTC LFX. T1 NTC outcome requires CO CALFX pre-NTC LFX.	(T1) Spartan may need to CO CALFX one BN at FICA during RSOI to meet NTC LFX prerequisites.	RTM (T1): NTC LFX may be in jeopardy for one BN. RTM (T2): N/A
4	Raider maintainer availability	Maintainer troops to task during periods of friction (Spring 2022)–gunnery, AMPV IOT&E, divestiture	Raider / DIV G4 plan & track maintainer troops to task during periods of friction / request for assistance where needed	If not properly manned / tasked, Raider may struggle to maintain simultaneous efforts

**Figure 4. An Example of the Team Truscott Decision Support Matrix.**

On Wednesdays, TM Truscott executes its weekly “roadshow” event, and physically visits a different subordinate unit HQ on a rotational basis. Wednesday synchronization meetings serve to provide updates from the Division staff to subordinate and tenant unit’s modernization planners (representatives from units not physically visited that week attend virtually on Army 365). Additionally, Wednesday synchronization meetings provide opportunities for subordinate and tenant units to provide updates on significant modernization events from the last week, upcoming events in the next two weeks, points of friction, requests for assistance or decision, and lessons learned and after-action review (AAR) comments from ongoing or completed modernization efforts. Importantly, these weekly “roadshow” events have also proven to facilitate considerable lateral coordination between subordinate and adjacent units (they are indispensable forums for crosstalk and problem solving. See Solving Problems for more on this).

MON	TUES	WED	THURS	FRI
DIV Staff Internal Sync (Core Members mandated / units & enablers invited)	Core Members coordinate by War-Fighting Function with units / enablers	"Road Show" Sync with BDEs – Core members visit Subordinate Commands on rotational basis	Modernization Working Group with DPTMS / USAG Force Management Planners	Weekly Truscott SITREP submitted to Commanding General

**Figure 5. The Team Truscott battle rhythm.**

On Thursdays, TM Truscott representatives physically visit the Fort Stewart DPTMS Force Management HQ to participate in their Force Integration Working Group. This bi-monthly working group serves as a forum where 3ID modernization planners and DPTMS FM officers integrate directly with higher HQ Force Managers and Program Managers to execute detailed coordination for future and ongoing modernization events in a collaborative workgroup setting. The result of this bi-monthly meeting is a hard copy update that illustrates, by platform or modernization initiative, dates and coordinating details of upcoming events. This information feeds back into systems managed by TM Truscott core members (such as the 3ID Modernization Execution Matrix (EXMAT) that function to maintain situational awareness and drive decision-making in the 3ID Command Group.

By close of business each Wednesday, subordinate unit modernization planners submit their weekly Situation Report (SITREP) (to a specified location on A365) to TM Truscott. These unit SITREPs feed directly into the weekly TM Truscott Modernization Exercise Summary (EXSUM) to the 3ID Commanding General. This EXSUM details key updates and talking points from the week's synchronization meetings and highlights significant modernization events from the current and next week. In part, these EXSUMs help to inform the Division Top 6, Staff primaries and deputies, and prepares the Commanding General for modernization themed conversations with the XVIII Airborne Corps Commander.

### ***Solving Problems***

Since its inception, TM Truscott has continually worked to identify points of friction, develop contingency plans, and implement timely solutions to avoid delays in modernization execution. Some instances of our efficacy in collaborative problem solving have been attributable directly to the execution of the established TM Truscott battle rhythm (Figure 5). In other words, simply by having regularly scheduled venues for maintaining shared understanding and flattened communications, modernization action officers at the brigade and below can socialize their identified problem-sets in real time. Likewise, representatives of the entire 3ID and Fort Stewart modernization enterprise can immediately collaborate to develop and implement solutions. For example, when TM Truscott planners discovered that the PM provided JLTV OPNET training scheduled for one Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) would be numerically

insufficient, previously certified JLTV License Instructors / License Examiner (LI/LEs) from another ABCT were quickly tasked to fill the gap and ensure their sister Brigade's readiness.

As a second example, when 1/3 ABCT rapidly deployed in support of European Command (EUCOM) contingency operations, TM Truscott was in position to integrate with PMs, Army Test and Evaluations Command (ATEC), and Operational Test Command (OTC) to rapidly transition responsibility for the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV), Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) to 2/3 ABCT. Without the operationalization of TM Truscott's core membership (Division Staff reps by WFFs), the handover between BCTs could have been extended by as much as several months. With the IOT&E already funded by the FY22 budget, an unmitigated delay would have cost the Army several million dollars, and at worst, could have put the entire program at risk of going unfunded in future budgets.

TM Truscott representatives have also been successful in coordinating with DPTMS FM planners and PMs to leverage assets early (prior to new equipment training / fielding) to ensure that associated legacy platforms are functional, and that prerequisite requirements are met. As an example, prior to one BCT's Joint-Assault-Bridge (JAB) fielding, TM Truscott planners identified that the BCT had not been able to exercise its legacy bridges for many months, having previously divested its legacy launchers. Subsequently, TM Truscott and DPTMS planners coordinated to have the PM ship a launcher (with associated Field Service Representative (FSR) support) to Fort Stewart so that the BCT could exercise its legacy bridges months ahead of JAB fielding. Absent this solution, non-serviceable bridges would not have been identified until the JAB fielding was underway, and delays to the fielding would have been almost certain. These delays, in turn, would affect the Division's readiness and modernization timeline.

Finally, TM Truscott planners have worked closely with DPTMS and PMs to serve as the honest broker of modernization practices, and as the advocate, and sometimes protector, of subordinate unit interests like training calendars. As an example, TM Truscott representatives identified early on that some PMs were not properly fielding equipment to units in the Global Combat Support System-Army (GCSS-A). Because these PMs did not have GCSS-Army accounts, the requisite supply actions did not occur, and Property Book Officers were subsequently obligated to record the newly issued pieces of equipment as "found on installation." This practice, if allowed to continue, would have problematic effects on company property books for years to come, caused by the initial miscoding of fieldings within the Army's accountability system of record (GCSS-A). TM Truscott and DPTMS representatives worked closely with Forces Command (FORSCOM) and Corps planners to identify the PMs in violation and bring them in compliance with DA mandated supply processes, thus preventing myriad company-level property accountability problems in the future.

## **Sharing Lessons Learned**

One of the most important functions of Team Truscott is to share best practices and lessons learned with the force writ large. To date, this has included direct collaboration with other Division HQs to share lessons learned by modernization effort, in-person-

visits with FORSCOM and Corps planners to socialize the Modernization CFT concept, and the establishment of an enduring relationship with the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). By warfighting function, Truscott representatives maintain and socialize platform specific modernization After Action Reviews (AARs). These and other products (to include TM Truscott warfighting products (EXMAT, Synchronization Matrix (SYNCMAT), etc.) are available by request (point of contact information at article end). Additionally, TM Truscott works with CALL representatives to establish a 3ID modernization Community of Practice on the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS), which will serve as a repository for 3ID modernization lessons learned, as well as tools and systems that other units can immediately adopt or modify for use.

Following the publication of this article, TM Truscott planners will work with CALL to publish subsequent articles, each focusing on a different niche theme of modernization. Proposed themes include modernization at the brigade and below (unit perspective), the art of personnel management during ReARMM, the unforeseen costs and effects of modernization, and others.

### ***Key Takeaways (thus far)***

Since the foundation of TM Truscott, three broadly applicable takeaways have been apparent to 3ID modernization planners. First, though modernization will happen in the absence of operationalization in the Division HQs, stovepipes will inevitably occur, and they will be enduringly problematic. Naturally, Program Managers prefer to communicate directly with fielding units, and this usually cuts the Division staff out of the process. As a result, the General Staff loses situational awareness, is unable to maintain shared understanding with its subordinate units, cannot effectively intervene to act as the Brigades' advocate and address institutional or enterprise friction when it arises and fails to inform Commander-to-Commander dialogue and the Commanding General's decision-making process. To defeat stovepipes, maintain a common operating picture, ensure flattened communications, and overcome friction and obstacles, Divisions undergoing modernization should operationalize their approach.

Additionally, plans change regularly. Myriad factors (to include the surprising effects of weather upon manufacturing, or unexpected changes to supply chains and contracts) can affect modernization timelines. Division modernization planners must integrate closely with their counterparts in higher, adjacent, and subordinate HQs, and must work diligently to build enduring relationships with enablers (such as DPTMS FM planners) and PMs. These relationships have proven essential in the Marne Division's ability to identify and react to unforeseen changes to modernization plans, and rapidly collaborate to develop contingency courses of action. Absent these processes, unmitigated and significant negative impacts to the Division's ReARMM glide path, and mission readiness, are likely.

Finally, the second and third order effects of modernization can be substantial and warrant careful consideration. For example, the modernized ABCT fleet is, in many cases, physically larger than the legacy fleet (AMPV vs. M113, etc.). This simple fact places increased demands on facilities space (motor pools, maintenance bays, wash racks, etc.). Installations with physical space limitations may have detailed planning to



do to make modernization transitions as smooth as possible. If units must move motor pools to gain space, for example, where are those new motor-pools in relation to the unit barracks? DFAC? How will the moves affect traffic flow on the installation? These questions, if not answered through detailed planning, may introduce significant complications.

## **Conclusion**

The TM Truscott organization and methodology is critical to establishing and maintaining a common operational picture (COP) across echelons and warfighting functions, eliminating stovepipes in knowledge and coordination, and flattening communications across the 3ID and Fort Stewart modernization enterprise. This model is tailorable and exportable and can be modified to become fit for purpose across the force. Through operationalization of their modernization processes, Divisions across the Army will have the appropriate framework for success in remaining “lethal, resilient, sustainable, survivable, agile, and responsive.”<sup>iv</sup>

## **Author Bio**

MAJ Jennings is an Armor Officer and the 3rd Infantry Division Chief of Operations (CHOPS). His previous assignments include 3ID Modernization Team Chief, National Training Center (NTC) Observer-Coach/Trainer (OC/T), Stryker Battalion HHC Commander, Stryker Infantry Company Commander, Aide-de-Camp, Tank Company Executive Officer, and Tank Platoon Leader. He is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and holds a master’s degree in security studies from Kansas State University.

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## **ENDNOTES:**

<sup>i</sup> Page 21 of the National Security Strategy, October 2022. Similar verbiage is found in the NSS conclusion, which states, “by modernizing our military... we will have strengthened deterrence in an era of increasing geopolitical confrontation, and positioned America to defend our homeland, our allies, partners, and interests overseas, and our values across the globe” (page 48).

<sup>ii</sup> The 2019 Army Modernization Strategy can be found at:  
[https://www.army.mil/e2/downloads/rv7/2019\\_army\\_modernization\\_strategy\\_final.pdf](https://www.army.mil/e2/downloads/rv7/2019_army_modernization_strategy_final.pdf)

<sup>iii</sup> For more on General Truscott, read, *Dogface Soldier: The Life of General Lucian K. Truscott, Jr.* by Wilson A. Heefner.

<sup>iv</sup> Page 21 of the National Security Strategy, October 2022.

