NEWS FROM THE FRONT

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CALL

Setting Mission Command in a Geographic Theater U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC)

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Introduction

Establishing mission command systems is an essential component to setting a geographical theater for military operations and is a core function of the Unites States Army Pacific (USARPAC). Doing so in advance of any contingency operation ensures continuous mission command, and allows headquarters and facilities to be identified, emplaced, and systems to be rehearsed routinely in order to seamlessly command and control Army forces throughout a theater. An Army service component command (ASCC) must set the following mission command conditions: clear lines of command, support relationships, and authorities and the physical structure which allows commanders to have the uninterrupted ability to communicate throughout the depth and breadth of the geographic theater. End state is the uninterrupted reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI) of Army forces for employment. This News From the Front (NFTF) discusses how USARPAC prepares for mission command in its theater, controlling Army forces throughout the Pacific. Further, it illustrates how Pacific Pathways, USARPAC's exercise strategy, enables the commander to set and rehearse mission command while Army forces flow in and out of theater, allowing mission command to become second nature to its operations. Finally, it provides insights, lessons, and best practices on cyberspace, networks, and information operations that USARPAC has experienced in its mission command systems throughout the Pacific.

USARPAC Command Authorities and Relationships

The USARPAC Commander has often stated, "Phase 0 is where we want to stay. The minute it starts to go in another direction, we have to work hard to get back to Phase 0."
USARPAC has established mission command authorities and facilities throughout the Pacific Theater. These permanent mission command nodes are anchor points where U.S. forces conducting operations within the region integrate into as they move from one host nation to another. In times of crisis, they will serve as the backbone for Army mission command networks that are established to support the contingency. Figure 1 provides a detailed picture of the command authorities and relationships of Army forces assigned and regionally aligned in the Pacific Theater.

Pacific Pathways is a prime example of how USARPAC's established mission command enables U.S. forces to remain for extended periods of time in theater. During a Pacific Pathways exercise, brigade-sized units and divisional headquarters easily move through the theater conducting a wide variety of engagements in multiple countries for up to 90 days. The combination of established mission command nodes and the Pacific Pathways unit illustrates how mission command can be exercised across USPACOM. For example, in the Pacific Theater has a regional hub node (RHN) in Okinawa. This nodes provide the ability for Army forces, during a Pacific Pathways, to communicate across the region. Army forces deployed in theater used this RHN routinely to gain reach back to Hawaii and to talk to 2ID HQ in South Korea to coordinate for it next leg of the deployment. In addition, the routine deployment of U.S. forces in theater allows an increased understanding of the theater by regionally aligned, CONUS-based follow-on forces. Simultaneously, U.S. partners and allies are able to test the interoperability of their own mission command equipment with USARPAC networks. Finally, the seamless

integration of USARPAC and host-nation forces demonstrates to would be adversaries that smaller nations have tangible assurances of U.S. commitment.

In 2013, USARPAC went from a three-star headquarters to a four-star headquarters in order to better support the national command authority's strategic rebalancing towards the Pacific. This command restructuring provided a greater ability for USARPAC to influence the national strategic objectives in support of USPACOM. In addition to the commander becoming a four star, the chief of staff went from a colonel to a major general, and the G-3 went from a colonel to a brigadier general. USARPAC also gained a U.S. two-star deputy commander and an Australian deputy two star. These additional flag officers and their staffs have made USARPAC a much more capable headquarters, able to affected better mission command across the region.

One of the significant outcomes for the Army in the Pacific was aligning I Corps to USPACOM, with operational control (OPCON) to USARPAC and administrative control (ADCON) remaining with FORSCOM. While I Corps receives funding from FORSCOM, they are assigned to the Pacific Theater. Further, the 25th Infantry Division (ID) is assigned to USPACOM and attached to USARPAC. USARPAC has OPCONed 25th ID to I Corps during a Pacific Pathways exercise. This 25ID and I Corps mission command relationship has freed USARPAC command and staff to focus more strategically in the Pacific and on its core mission of setting the theater.

Despite this prudent mission command choice, the Army has continued to give the 25th ID commander dual roles. The first of these is as the senior Army commander (ARFOR) in Hawaii, thus giving him and his staff responsibilities in addition to preparing the division for forward deployment. The USARPAC Commanding General has made his intent very clear that he wants I Corps to provide operational-level mission command, to include many of the responsibilities 25th ID incurs through the ARFOR mission. In addition, the Stryker brigade combat team (BCT) and Airborne BCT in Alaska will remain under U.S. Army Alaska (USARAK) for training oversight. However, when they are operationally employed, they will be under I Corps OPCON unless assigned to a division headquarters.

The 7th ID has become a more operational headquarters, with a regional alignment in the Pacific. This has had a significant positive impact on mission command in the Pacific Theater, future Pacific Pathways exercise opportunities, and the overall ability for USARPAC to meet the National Command Authority's rebalancing objectives. While the regional alignment of I Corps has generated some growing pains throughout USPACOM, overall it has been a positive evolution enhancing USARPAC's ability to set the theater in Phase 0. For example, I Corps has been instrumental in the effort to operationalize Pacific Pathways. While a division headquarters has planning capabilities, it is still a tactical unit. The corps, on the other hand, is designed for the kind of operational-level planning and execution that is required to synchronize the units that conduct the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) process. It is also the lowest level headquarters that can provide a mission command node to synchronize a theater-level operation and, if necessary, conduct crisis action planning at the joint level. Significant to I Corps' ability to do this is the addition of the 593rd Expeditionary Support Command (ESC), which has been aligned to I Corps headquarters. This ESC will greatly enhance I Corps' ability to conduct mission command throughout all phases of an operation.

Figure 1: Command authorities and relationships of Army forces assigned and regionally aligned in the Pacific Theater.

Fixed Command Facilities and Nodes

The U.S. Army has had fixed mission command nodes mostly on the periphery of the Pacific area of operations for decades. Figure 2 provides the current disposition of fixed command facilities and nodes of Army forces assigned and regionally aligned in the Pacific Theater. USARPAC and 25 ID are in Hawaii. U.S. Army Japan (USARJ) with I Corps forward are in Japan. I Corps is located at Joint Base Lewis-McChord and USARAK is in Alaska.

Figure 2: Current disposition of fixed command facilities and nodes of Army forces assigned and regionally aligned in the Pacific Theater.

Pacific Pathways extends mission command into the sub-regions of the Pacific where there are no fixed bases and assists USARPAC to remain engaged within the area of responsibility (AOR) basis. USARPAC does this by positioning a divisional (-) command post forward during any given Pacific Pathways. In addition, this helps to operationalize the nine traditionally separate theater security cooperation exercises into a single yearlong operation.

For example, Pacific Pathways 15 consisted of the following exercises: Cobra Gold (CG) in Thailand, Foal Eagle (FE) in the Republic of Korea, Balikatan (BK) in the Philippines, Hamel

(H) in Australia, Garuda Shield (GS) in Indonesia, Keris Strike (KrS) in Malaysia, Khaan Quest (KQ) in Mongolia, and Orient Shield (OS) with the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces. Via this exercise plan, USARPAC was able to have a continual presence in regions where normally only a week or two per exercise was spent. As a result, each deployed task force provided continuity and unity, delivering a strategic message over three months rather than a week. This also provided an additional capability and flexibility to the USPACOM Commander when responding to contingencies.


Figure 3: A typical Pacific Pathways mission command task organization for these exercises.

As Pacific Pathways matures, one of the goals is to establish expeditionary mission command in these austere sub-regions of the PACOM AOR on an extended and routine basis. For example, starting with Pacific Pathways 16-02, USARPAC deployed an ARFOR Early Entry Command Post (EECP) in the Philippines (see figure 4) for three months. The mission of this ECCP is to effect coordination, mainly logistics, transportation and host nation interaction, for the Pacific Pathways unit so it can focus on the engagements with the host nation Army. This mission command node was manned by the 25th ID. This was a proof of principle providing forward in-

theater mission command for Army activities during future Pacific Pathways regardless of divisional alignment. If necessary, this command post (CP) could provide mission command for a contingency operation. Building these relationships is important as they shape the kind of trust and confidence required for access in regions where no fixed U.S. headquarters exists.

Early Entry Command Post

The 25th ID EECP deployed in June and redeployed in August at the completion of Pacific Pathways 16-02 (Figure 4). It maintained a small footprint providing a forward-positioned mission command capability throughout the region. It provided limited planning but had reachback to the full division staff supporting from afar or, if needed, could surge forward to an established CP. It served as the element that could begin the planning while receiving and integrating the remainder of the division staff.


Figure 4: EECP deployed in June and redeployed in August at the completion of Pacific Pathways 16-02

Figure 5 depicts the 25th ID's EECP manning for Pacific Pathways 16-02. Based on its mission command requirements at the time, it was task-organized heavy in logistics and current operations.

An Example of an Early Entry Command Post Manning

G-1 (2)
SFC G1 OIC
SPC G1 Clerk

Medical (1)
CPT Medical Planner

Aid Station (2)
CPT Physician Asst
SGT Medic (HHBN)

PAO (1)
SGT PAO

G-2 (2)
MAJ G2 OIC
SGT G2 NCOIC

MFIT (3)
CW2 OIC
SFC CI Agent
SSG CI Agent

Linguist (2)
SGT Linguist
PFC Linguist

CUOPS (7)
LTC CHOPS
CPT Battle Captain
MSG CUOPS SGM
SSG Night Battle NCO
SSG Operations Sergeant
SGT CPOF Operator
SPC CPOF Operator

LNO (6)
1LT 2-2ID LNO
CW2 25CAB LNO
CW2 & SSG 593 ESC LNO
(CIV) AMC LNO 62542
(CIV) JCR LNO
(CIV) DLA LNO

G4 (2)
CPT G4 OIC
MSG G4 NCOIC

Contracting (3)
CPT Contracting Officer
SFC Contracting NCO
SFC Contracting NCO

Protocol (1)
SGT Protocol NCO

JAG (1)
CPT SJA

G-6 (11)
CPT G6 OIC
1LT G6 Signal PL
SSG G6 NCOIC
SGT Transmission NCO
SPC Transmission Operator
CPL Network System NCO
SPC Network System Ops
SGT Retrans NCO
PFC Retrans Ops
SPC Help Desk NCO
PV2 Help Desk Ops

STF (14)
MAJ STF OIC
SFC STF NCOIC
CPT Logistics OIC
SGT MCT NCO
SGT MCT NCO
SPC MCT Operations
PFC MCT Operations
2LT Postal OIC
CPL Postal NCOIC
CPL PAT NCOIC
SPC PAT Operations
SSG Camp Supply NCOIC
SGT Camp Supply NCO
SGT Food Service NCOIC
SGT Vehicle Mechanic
SPC Generator Mechanic

P2C2 MDAT (18JUN-6JUL)
P2C2 MDAT (18JUN-6JUL)
P2C2 MDAT (18JUN-6JUL)
Salaknib MDAT (24JUN-6JUL)
Salaknib MDAT (24JUN-6JUL)

HHBN	**36**
25SB	**14**
413CSB	**2**
411CSB	**1**
DIVARTY	**1**
2-2ID	**1**
25CAB	**1**
593ESC	**1**
AMC	**1**
JCR	**1**
DLA	**1**
TOTAL	**60**

Figure 5: Division level EECP manning for Pacific Pathways 16-0

In addition, a sustainment task force (STF) was formed as a force package enhancement to coordinate RSOI activities at the multiple sea and air points of debarkation, as well as customs operations and various host-nation contracting functions. However, EECP, like any unit, can be task-organized to meet mission requirements.

25th ID EECP Considerations in the Pacific Theater:

Positioning the EECP: The 25th ID forward CP was positioned in the Philippines. The units in theater executing Pacific Pathways operated in three countries. It was a challenge to provide mission command to a BCT from a different country and in a theater with significant maritime terrain. It would be better to have the EECP deployed to the same country. For example, positioning the EECP at each port of entry would provide the EECP staff the ability to interact and deal with the issues of customs to deal with country team and contracting issues so the deployed BCT would be free to focus on its mission. Doing this would require additional/dedicated airlift or possibly sealift and a more mobile CP than what was currently deployed.

Communications Platforms: The 25 ID EECP deployed both its WIN-T platform and its GATR-TAMPA expeditionary communications platform. This provided redundant capability which was demonstrated when it initially deployed the WIN-T system, while moving by air was damaged. The GATR-TAMPA was set up and provided the required communications package on a smaller scale, but the CP was up and running while it repaired the WIN-T. Also, this combination of WIN-T and GATR-TAMPA provides the ability to echelon the CP during movement to a different location without a break in mission command. This communications platform combination should be the standard for all divisional headquarters.

The 25 ID EECP was essentially an ad-hoc staff. The G-3 previously identified positions to man its EECP. The other G-staffs and identified essential enablers had not. Also, there was no identified standard package of equipment associated with this EECP which caused some issues when it was preparing to deploy because no one knew what equipment was needed or where it would come from. A best practice is to identify and battle roster an (A) and (B) staff team and establish a minimal standard set of equipment for an early entry, no-notice deployable CP. This type of readiness posture is not new but similar to the ready brigade construct the Army has had before. These staffs should also come together to train as well as inspect their equipment during regular exercises. This will allow the EECP to maintain a high state of readiness.

Mission Command: Cyberspace/Networks/Information Operations

This section provides insights, lessons and best practices to how USARPAC sets and enabled its communication networks.

Regional Hub Nodes (RHNs) are primary communication structures enabling mission command systems, in a theater, to talk to each other. RHN's are the largest transport nodes for the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) network. Strategically located at five Department of Defense Standard Tactical Entry Point (STEP) locations globally, they enable the Army to deploy forces anywhere in the world in support of contingency operations, disaster relief, or national emergency response. USARPAC's RHN is located in Okinawa, Japan. In addition to this structure, divisional and brigade size units deployed during Pacific Pathways have employed an expeditionary communications package (TAMPA microwave satellite terminals and GATR-inflatable and back packable antenna system) which provided capabilities/features supporting their mission during Pacific Pathways. These systems also provide a redundant communication capability if the WIN-T were to become non-operational and will be discussed later in this section.

Building Network Support Relationships. Planning/coordinating and building relationships is critical when establishing and maintaining networks in support of theater operations. The 311th Signal Command understood the importance of building relationships with its subordinate commands in order to understand the support requirements. The 311th Signal Command as well as 25 ID G-6 put a lot of effort in the development of relationships with units and agencies that provide communications support within and external to the command. This was key in understanding the communications support requirements for the 25 ID. The division G-6 officer established a liaison officer (LNO) system with those agencies by putting a warrant officer at the regional hub node to help engineer and establish communications links as well as troubleshooting. This relationship ensured there was an understanding on the communications requirements, network support, and troubleshooting to units engaged in contingencies. This worked well in establishing and troubleshooting links for the 25th ID during Pacific Pathways.

The division identified multiple challenges in standing up the network to support mission command for the Pacific Pathways exercise. 25 ID planners have to deal with a vast area of operations, over one million square miles as well as interoperability with joint/coalition forces. During the planning process, the division identified the capabilities, and requirements and coordinated with different agencies for support. The division did not have authority or permissions to adjust network configuration with most of the network supporting the AOR, so the coordination and relationship building was key. The division sent a LNO to the regional hub node (RHN) in Okinawa to build relationships and to assist RHN in establishing the connection. The LNO was placed at the RHN to ensure understanding on the unit's communications requirements and for connectivity. In addition, the relationship with the RHN organization assisted with professional development of Soldiers and officers.

Throughout the command, the division established relationships with its signal support, USARPAC, 311th Signal Command, and 516th Theater Signal Brigade to better understand their requirements and assist in troubleshooting. Providing LNOs helped with the introduction of new

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capabilities, an expeditionary communications package, and configuring the network to support division operations. Units deploying into the Pacific AOR should seek to replicate this relationship-building prior to entry.

Cyberspace Activities

Over the last decade of war, we have experienced the impacts of cyberspace activities on operations. Cyberspace activities affected military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pacific, and Europe. Cyberspace electromagnetic activities (CEMA) is a complex joint enabler that is often misunderstood by commanders and staffs. This creates a challenge for commanders and staffs to effectively employ and manage cyberspace capabilities in support operations. Electronic warfare (EW) is a force multiplier that is not limited to just defense of networks, but also includes all aspects of offensive and defensive cyberspace capabilities. CEMA must be controlled to deny/exploit systems/networks used by our adversaries while protecting friendly systems/networks. USARPAC, through multiple exercises, has mitigated the impacts of cyberspace threats on its operations through training and establishing cyberspace standard operating procedures.

Cyberspace SOP. Units with established cyberspace SOPs have mitigated the effects of phishing attempts. Battle drills ensure units can respond to phishing attempts as well as report and employ the regional cyber center's capabilities in support of division operations. Units (corps/div/BCT) have limited capabilities to combat the threat within the network and must rely on procedures and processes (SOPs) to provide the first line of defense in cyberspace. An effective SOP integrates the capabilities of the regional cyber center to assist and provide the required tools and skill sets to identify, isolate, extract, and monitor the threat within the network and cyberspace. Observations from Yama Sakura and Pacific Pathway exercises showed the benefits of developing cyber/EW SOPs to address threats. The unit was able to mitigate the threat while continuing operations through its SOPs and battle drills.

CEMA Working Group. Conducting CEMA working groups in a multinational environment is a best practice for units. CEMA working groups are key in developing situational awareness of the cyberspace as well as synchronizing CEMA efforts in support of the mission. Working groups enhance the unit's ability to integrate and synchronize cyber capabilities into the operations. The units were able to track cyber activities and determine the threat to operations as well as request additional support from the regional cyber center (RCC). Developing an allied/partner unit CEMA working group enhanced the unit's ability to integrate cyberspace capabilities into operations and was part of the battle rhythm. The CEMA working group, led by the CEMA cell, should include elements from the staff, network operations (NETOPS), information operations (IO), spectrum management, staff judge advocate (SJA), other staff elements as well as partner units. CEMA workgroups provide a good forum to conduct bilateral information sharing. The working group should cover overall operations for situational awareness and orchestrate cyber capabilities to support the following:

- Nomination of targets in support the operations
- Covered target guidance

- List priority of targets in support of operations
- Synchronized targets
- Cyber update on threat, social engineering (phishing). During the working group, the NETOPS member recommended upgrade to cyber threat due to social engineering attempts

Regional Cyberspace Center (RCC). Units must coordinate for RCC support to the exercise or operation. The RCC is an enabler that can provide tools and skills to enhance the unit's defensive cyberspace operations (DCO) and offensive cyberspace operations (OCO). The RCC provides support to the exercise play as well as monitoring the real-world threat.

- Regional Cyberspace Center Pacific (RCCP) established a good working relationship with the USARJ and I Corps through Yama Sakura and Pacific Pathways exercises. RCCP brings cyber tools and skills sets to monitor, isolate, and extract threats in the network. In addition, the RCC can provide/coordinate for offensive cyber capabilities. The RCC is part of the networks operations section in the G-6's network operations control (NOC), providing cyberspace capabilities (tools) and expertise in the defense of the networks as well as reachback capability with agencies. Coordination and collaboration is key in identifying the resources needed to address the requirements to support the exercise. During all exercises like Yama Sakura, the network that supports the operations provides an opportunity for the adversary to learn our processes and procedures. We must ensure cyberspace support for all exercises takes this possibility into account and protects the network.

- The RCCP involvement is key and factors influencing its support are:
  - Building relationships between the RCCP and units requiring cyberspace support.
  - Consistent involvement in theater exercise and integration into operations, not just major exercises.
  - Standard tool kit does not meet all requirements, tailorable cyber tool package required to meet requirements for the mission.

Network Architecture Support.

Units must establish a network that can support the CP when operating over vast distances and provide reachback capability to home-station installation through the RHN. Managing the network over vast distances creates challenges with connectivity, interoperability, and defense of the network. Identifying communications and information requirements will assist the unit's G-6 in building the network to support operations and obtain additional resources. To assist in network management, units must understand the importance of building relationships with their subordinate commands in order to understand the support requirements and how to manage the network. This is key in understanding the communications support requirements and standing up an effective NETOPS.

Network Operations (NETOPS) Updates. NETOPS updates with partner units provides a good vehicle to manage and synchronize communications assets in support of the unit's mission. The

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NETOPS updates provides a good forum for sharing information and teaching our partners. The updates should assist units in gaining situational understanding of the network and cyber activities throughout the AOR. Challenges the unit faces include system interoperability, network management, information sharing, and security policies. Tools used to manage the network must address the different networks used to support the operation. In most cases, the partner units will go to a common ground network or system to provide situational awareness information and enhance understanding.

Partners' NETOPS updates provide situational awareness of the network and updates on support to operations. An update with a visual display provides clarity to issues, statuses, and troubleshooting. The update should cover the overall operations situation and network/cyber statuses in support of the operation. The cyberspace section should brief cyber activities during the last 24 hours as well as action taken against the threat. The cyber section provides analysis of social engineering activities/phishing attempts and makes recommendations that address information operations condition (INFOCON) status.

Collocated NETOPS. Collocated NETOPS provide better control and situational awareness of the network. Collocated partners' NETOPS will enhance information sharing on network operations, network troubleshooting, and defensive cyber operations (DCO). The collocation of RCC elements in the NETOPS provided a good capability for network/ cyber monitoring capabilities. The RCC element provides tools for network monitoring as well as tools to enhance situational awareness of the network. The bilateral NETOPS enhanced collaboration and coordination between U.S. and Japanese forces. In addition, bilateral NETOPS provided a good vehicle to educate the NETOPS section on U.S. and Japanese processes and procedures.

Spectrum Management. Spectrum management coordination and working with the host nation is critical in identifying frequency requirements and parameters in which units will have to operate. Planning, collaboration, and coordinating as early as possible with the host nation will ensure the unit's success operating in a constricted frequency environment.

I Corps spectrum manager plans and coordinates with the host-nation counterpart to provide spectrum management expertise to work any frequency conflicts. Spectrum managers participate in unit working group meetings that require frequencies for operations as well as electronic warfare. The spectrum management team provides reports on spectrum activities and frequency management operations to NETOPS and CEMA workgroups.

The spectrum management team provides spectrum updates to include a current spectrum interference report with the range of frequencies that impact forces. In addition, they provide frequency ranges to operate to avoid interference and support operations.

I Corps spectrum manager explained the frequency management process and showed the impacts of the frequency spectrum on the operation and systems. This enhanced understanding and provided a good environment for mentorship/education of staff and partners.

Data Exchange. To avoid conflicts with information flow and understanding, units must address data exchange/information sharing requirements with our partners. Identifying the

communication network used with our partners in advance of any deployment will assist the unit in establishing requirements for sharing information. There are common networks used to share information between the allied partners. CENTRIX-J provided the common operational picture for the allied/joint partners and a tool for staff work. Web and SharePoint applications provide useful platforms to conduct staff work and share information between allied partners.

Expeditionary Communications Package. Integrating the expeditionary communications systems/package into the unit's operations for early entry was a best practice. To address the challenges of supporting movement into country and over vast distances, the G-6 at the division used an expeditionary communications construct to establish a communications network to build on as communications assets arrived into the units AOR. The expeditionary communication package provided quality NIPR/SIPR and voice communications for the DTAC moving into location.

The division leveraged Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) and RHN assets to provide the backbone and reachback capabilities for the exercises. The expeditionary communications construct provided reachback for services, reducing the number of personnel needed forward. The expeditionary package was small enough to be commercial air deployable, providing flexibility and reducing resources to set up and maintain. Due to the size of the package, it can easily fit on a C-17 (U.S. Air Force cargo airplane) to support the DTAC and BCTs. The expeditionary communications package provided connectivity from the units located in remote areas (Indonesian and Malaysia) to the RHN and reachback to Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, for services.

The expeditionary communications package (TAMPA microwave satellite terminals and GATR-inflatable and back packable antenna system) provided capabilities/features that supported the division's mission during Pacific Pathways exercises. Expeditionary communications package (TAMPA and GATR) provided communications support and benefits to the unit:

- User owned/ operated, easy to operate by Soldiers of all MOSs
- Training on placing systems into operations simple - no field service representative
- Used existing capabilities from DISA which supported reachback to home station (Hawaii)
- Leveraged DISA and RHN assets
- Provided the division with reachback capabilities to services
- Mobile: deployable via commercial/military air
- Package can be tailored to meet the unit's missions
- Easy to use, less people required forward
- More flexible for CP operations and movement

Figure 6: Tampa and GATR microwave satellite terminals

Communication Security (COMSEC). COMSEC in a multinational environment is challenging for units due to incompatibility with COMSEC versions and radio systems. Tactical communication in support of operations must be encrypted to provide OPSEC and share information in a secure manner. Unit G-3 and G-6 staffs should ensure COMSEC requirements are understood by all participating units/countries and tested prior to exercise/operations.

Best Practices to Support Network Troubleshooting and Enhance Helpdesk Operations

Network Coordination. Units must know who can assist in fixing network issues in their AOR. Units must be aware that elements/units/agencies that can make the network functional and adaptive are not in the unit's chain of command. Therefore, unit commanders and chiefs of staffs should ensure they conduct coordination with these entities as early as possible in the planning process as soon as possible. When interfacing with partner's or host nation's communications networks, units should coordinate to ensure access (configuration, permissions and policies) is possible.

LNOs. Place LNOs at supporting units/agencies that provide network support. LNOs help units develop and maintain relationships with supporting agencies. This facilitates the establishment of reachback capabilities with subject matter experts (SMEs) to support help desk operations and network troubleshooting.

Relationships. The G-6 conducts key leader engagements with senior signal leaders of supporting agencies to make them aware of the division's priorities. The unit should use LNOs and personal relationships with the RCCP, RHN, and DISA to enhance support and bring all elements to an understanding of the division's communications requirements. Corps / USARPAC staff should encourage and facilitate this process for any operations within the

Pacific AOR. In all cases, participants should seek to develop these relationships in a manner that will also expedite wartime networks' establishment.

Chat Rooms. A 24/7 chat room for troubleshooting links and systems assisted the unit in establishing and maintaining links. The chat room provided access to SMEs within the NETOPS or SMEs located in Hawaii for assistance with various problems (e.g., link issues, switch/router configurations, mission command systems, etc.). With reachback to home station, the unit can access capabilities to assist in troubleshooting and other communications challenges. LNOs placed at the help desk back at Hawaii assisted in troubleshooting as well as providing understanding to home-station personnel on the unit's operations and communication needs.

IO in support of the theater operations:

Country Teams/Embassy. While operating in a foreign country, units must coordinate with the country team and embassy prior to deployment for assistance in identifying the host nation's information operations parameters. Therefore, it is essential to coordinate with the country team to ensure the commander's themes and messages are not in conflict with existing information operations campaign plans.

Restrictions. Restriction of IO in country is challenging for units. During Pacific Pathways, each country had a unique information environment. The rules and authorities governing each nation reside with the U.S. Ambassador to that country. In order to achieve nonlethal effects (MISO, CA, PAO, and COMCAM operations), the unit must gain approval from the chief-of mission prior to its deployment. Coordination with the embassy and country team is critical in these areas prior to a unit's deployment/rotation to gain the right approval and resources. The country teams can provide tangible, real-world effects with regards to easing restrictions while maintaining exercise fidelity.

IO Working Group. Partner units conducted a joint information operations working group which enhanced information operations for the exercise. Developing a partner unit IO working group will enhance the unit's ability to integrate information-related capabilities (IRC) into operations. Allied/partner IO working group meetings synchronize/coordinate IRC activities and are an integral part of the unit's daily battle rhythm. The IO working group, led by the IO officer, should include elements from the staff, CEMA, NETOPS, spectrum management, staff judge advocate (SJA), other staff elements as well as partner units. IO workgroup provides a good forum to conduct information sharing.

The workgroup covered an overall operations situation and IRC statuses in support of the operation. In addition, the workgroup discussed messaging and the timing of the messaging to support the commander's intent. The workgroup's update covered overall operations situation and IRC statuses in support of the operation as well as the following:

- Running estimate of information related capabilities
- The working group synchronized IO efforts with the ongoing operations.
- Past 24hrs/next 24hrs activities
- Targeting

Conclusion

Setting the theater for military operations is an ASCC's core function. Mission command is an essential element of that responsibility and has second and third order effects across all warfighting functions. The USARPAC Commander sets the conditions for mission command by establishing clear lines of command, support relationships, authorities, and the physical network infrastructure which allows commanders to have the uninterrupted ability to communicate throughout the depth and breadth of the geographic theater. Since 2014, the USARPAC Commander has also developed and leveraged Pacific Pathways into a more comprehensive theater engagement exercise program which clearly sets and rehearses the Pacific theater mission command systems to achieve the end state of uninterrupted reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI) of Army forces for employment anywhere in theater.