


NEWS FROM THE FRONT



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NEWS FROM THE FRONT

Senior Advisor Training Building the Ready Bench

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Front cover: HOHENFELS, Germany - U.S. Marines with 6th Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company Force Headquarters Group, Marine Forces Reserve, and soldiers with the 31st Georgian Light Infantry Battalion, discuss troop movements over a terrain model after conducting a patrol during the Georgia Deployment Program - Resolute Support Mission. MARFORRES Marines play a key role in the partnership with the Georgian Armed Forces, preparing the 31st Georgian Light Infantry Battalion to deploy to Afghanistan in support of Operation Freedom's Sentinel, and deploying alongside them. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Kimberly Aguirre/Released)

Senior Advisor Training: Building the Ready Bench

This News from the Front article discusses the purpose and outcomes of the Senior Advisor Training Working Group held 16-20 October 2017 hosted by the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA). The article discusses the background on the senior advisor training problem, the three topic areas the working group considered, and the working group's recommendations.

Introduction to SFA

From Joint Publication (JP) 3-20, Security Cooperation, SFA is defined as "Department of Defense activities that support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions."¹ SFA is a subset of Security Cooperation (SC) in that it fulfills one of the SC tenants to "develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities" (JP 3-20)². Common terms associated with SFA include Train, Advise, Assist (TAA), Building Partner Capacity (BPC), and Defense Institution Building (DIB) when SFA is conducted at the ministerial/department, military staff, or service headquarters levels. Based out of Fort Leavenworth, KS, JCISFA is a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) controlled activity (CCA) that reports to the Joint Staff J7 Joint Force Development. Their primary mission is to support the integration of SFA capabilities into the current and future Joint Force in order to

SFA: -"Department of Defense (DOD) activities that support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions." (JP 3-20)

advance joint warfighting capability.

Across all geographic combatant commands (GCCs), advisors from all Services carry out SFA. SFA activities are often used to shape the operating environment or assist a partner nation in defending against internal and external threats to security or stability. Additionally, SFA activities are conducted across the range of military operations and across the conflict continuum (from peace through war) supporting Service and joint operations/missions. SFA advisors perform duties at all levels of a foreign security force (FSF), from being a tactical advisor at the battalion level to a senior advisor at the ministerial or component level.

Background on the Problem

In 2016, the Joint Staff J7 Force Development Vice-Director, Major General (MG) John Charlton, noted that it appeared senior advisors did not receive the preparation necessary to excel in the advising billets to which they were assigned. JCISFA began a yearlong "deep dive" study to examine the issue, conducting collection engagements with key stakeholders within the community of advisors to develop recommendations. The study team confirmed MG Charlton's observations that training and preparation of senior advisors is inadequate. The team concluded that additional training composed of

specialized advisor classes from organizations with subject matter expertise in advising would not resolve the problem without fundamental changes to the existing advisor training and selection framework. The team's main recommendation was to create a development "pipeline" to develop potential advisors over the course of their career, which in turn will build the ready bench of senior advisors.

The JCISFA study team found that existing preparation of advisors generally was constrained by the identification of a senior level advisor relatively close in time to the advising deployment. To mitigate this short period of preparation, senior advisors are selected based on previous command experience, subject matter expertise, or "just in time" training before deployment. Unclear advisor missions or end states further aggravated the challenge of adequately preparing advisors. Without a clear mission for the advisor, the DoD is unable to focus training resources to teach the needed capabilities that an advisor requires, and wastes resources training personnel on generalized topics related to advising but not on tailored training essential to success.

Many U.S. individual augmentees (IA) deploying as advisors as part of Resolute Support (RS) in support of NATO ministerial level advisor requirements received no advisor training.

A year later in June 2017, General (GEN) John Nicholson, Commander of Resolute Support (RS), revealed a similar issue regarding senior advisors. He noted to the Secretary of Defense that the majority of U.S. individual augmentees (IA) deploying as part of NATO's RS mission, including ministerial level advisors, received no advisor training. The Secretary of Defense responded that this was an urgent and unsatisfactory issue, which resulted in a moratorium on deployments until all individual augmentees deploying to Afghanistan in advisory roles were trained. To make the most of the collective Subject Matter Experts' (SMEs) knowledge within the limited timeframe, the working group's efforts were divided into three topic areas to discuss and develop recommendations to solve the identified issues.



Figure 1: FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS – An instructor of the Lessons Learned/Knowledge Management Division of JCISFA conducts the out brief of the first Senior Advisor Training Working Group on October 20, 2017.

(JCISFA photo by Jessica Meyring, Lessons Learned/Knowledge Management Division)

Working Group Topic #1

Senior advisors are not adequately trained prior to deploying to Afghanistan. How does the U.S. better prepare and train individual senior level advisors for service in Afghanistan in accordance with RS Commander's intent?

On day 1 of the working group, RS Command Sergeant Major (CSM) David Clarke discussed GEN Nicholson's intent to better prepare and train individual senior level advisors for service in Afghanistan. CSM Clarke conveyed that GEN Nicholson's preferred pre-deployment training option for Train Advise Assist Command (TAAC)-West, TAAC-North, and "some" Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (MoI) advisors is to attend NATO Joint Force Training Center (JFTC) in Bydgoszcz, Poland. This set the conditions for Topic #1 sub-working group.

In the sub-working group for Topic #1, SMEs from the following agencies included: : United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), NATO, Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA), 3rd Battalion (BN), 353rd Regiment - Joint Readiness Training Center, RS, Marine Forces Command (MARFORCOM), Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and Afghanistan-Pakistan (AFPAK) Hands. Based on CSM Clarke's comments, the working group defined the population of "some" Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry

of Interior (MoI) advisors as U.S. individual augmentees (IA) at the grade of O-6 serving on the RS Headquarters (HQ) staff.

The sub-working group developed updated USCENTCOM training guidance mandating that senior advisors arrive in Afghanistan with specified advisor training. The working group focused on programming the targeted O-6 IA senior advisors into a summer of 18 Training Event at the NATO Joint Force Training Centre (Poland) (JFTC). The Army is the largest force provider of these senior advisors and as such, the proposed pre-deployment training cycle was based on a June 2018 graduation of the Army's Senior Service College.

Consistent with GEN Nicholson's intent, additional U.S. pre-deployment training platforms to train advisors were identified:

- Army: 3rd BN, 353rd Regiment – Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, LA
- Air Force: U.S. Air Force Expeditionary Center – Air Advisor Course at McGuire AFB, NJ
- Marine Corps: Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group (MCSCG) – Marine Advisor Course (MAC) at Fort Story, VA
- OSD: Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) at Camp Atterbury, IN
- Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA): Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies (DISCS) at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH

After three days of collaboration, the Topic #1 participants produced two recommendations for review by Headquarters RS. The first recommendation proposed changes to the Central Command (CENTCOM) and RS training guidance. The changes consisted of adding a directive for all U.S. individual augmentees serving in Crisis Establishment (CE) billets or supporting RS HQ shall receive advisor training (including ministerial level specific Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs)). The recommendation included guidance that U.S. individual augmentees serving in CE billets at the ministerial level shall attend NATO Joint Force Command (JFC) joint training or JFC Key Leader Training held in Brunssum, the Netherlands, as required by the CE document.

The second recommendation proposed a ten-day training model that combines current aspects of 3rd BN, 353rd Regiment – JRTC and MoDA senior level advisor curriculum. The model is designed to address the requirements directed by the Secretary of Defense and the RS Commander to ensure all advisors deploying to Afghanistan are properly trained. The ten-day course employs a building block approach designed to place students in learning environments, increasing in complexity, e.g., from classroom instruction, to practical exercises, to vignettes carefully tailored to evaluate proficiency in required advisory tasks. The course includes the following training lessons for students from across the Joint Force and the DoD:

3 rd BN, 353 rd JRTC Training Week 1	MoDA Training Week 2
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • History of Advising/Advisor Fundamentals • Use of Interpreter and Engagement Process • Language Training • Insider Threat Training • Regional Country Overview • Negotiation Concepts and Techniques 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resolute Support Overview • DoD & DoS Policy Overview • Afghan History and Geography • Islam and Afghanistan • Afghan Ethnic/Tribal Breakdown & Culture • Contemporary Afghan Gov't and Politics

Figure 2: Training

Working Group Topic #2

Currently no common lexicon (terminology) exists for referring to and describing Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) that advise the Executive and Generating Functions of a Foreign Security Force (FSF).

Two separate sub-working groups were formed for Topic #2 each had various SMEs participating from the following agencies: MARFORCOM, Joint Staff J-5, DSCA, United States Army Africa Command (USAFRICOM), Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), AFPAK Hands, Defense Governance Management Team (DGMT), Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), USCENTCOM, Yale University, Air Education and Training Command (AETC), and Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group (MCSCG). These participants were tasked to develop a common lexicon for referring to and describing Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) that advise the Executive and Generating functions of a FSF. JP 3-20 explains that FSF perform three generic functions: executive, generating, and operating (EGO). The executive function includes strategic direction that provides oversight, policy, and resources for the FSF generating and operating functions. FSF generating forces refer to the capacity and capabilities of the FSF to organize, train, equip, and build operating force units. FSF operating forces form operational capabilities through the use of concepts similar to the U.S. joint functions to achieve FSF security objectives.³

Foreign Security Forces perform three generic functions: executive, generating, and operating. (JP 3-20)

The Senior Advisor Working Group proposed a fourth function that is not doctrinal for inclusion to the EGO structure: the governance function. The governance function provides a partner nation government the means to organize and utilize a FSF by way of laws and policy, and to provide necessary resources to the FSF. Typical instruments within this function include general law and annual authorizations enacted through a partner nation's governmental processes. This proposed addition turns the "EGO"

functions into the Governance-Executive, Generating, and Operating, or “G-EGO” functions. The working group also laid out 21 core processes that are typical to the G-EGO functions. The first product of Topic #2 was a standardized lexicon of the G-EGO functions and the 21 associated core processes, which can be found in the figure below.




Figure 3: G-EGO 21 Core Processes

To reiterate, the outcome of Topic #2 was to develop a common lexicon for referring to and describing SMEs that advise the Executive and Generating functions of a FSF. Across the joint force, numerous terms are used to identify SMEs that advise at the Executive and Generating levels of a FSF. Such terms also provide the basis to drive selection, training, and utilization of these SMEs. These terms have no doctrinal underpinning or standardized framework to support understanding and decision-making to advance joint force readiness.

Terms such as **Ministry Advisor**, **Senior Level Advisor**, **Institutional Advisor**, **Executive Level Advisor**, and **Strategic Level Advisor** all refer to advisors aligned to either the Executive or Generating function of a FSF. With the exception of Ministry Advisor, the other terms are ambiguous and do not specifically indicate in what capacity the SME will advise or what FSF counterpart the SME will advise. For example, the term Senior Level Advisor infers a select few SMEs that are general officers or senior field grade officers that advise senior ranking individuals at the ministry or component level of a FSF.

Reference	Qualifier	Advising Descriptions (General)
Executive	Senior	An ability to advise principals on managing, controlling, and resourcing one or more core processes in a ministry (e.g. MoD or MoI) of a FSF. Includes an ability to advise principals on how to inform elected officials in the Governance function.
	Advanced	An ability to advise process owners on how to organize, man, train, and equip a particular core process (e.g., HRM, FM, etc.) for which the counterpart has formal responsibility in a ministry of a FSF.
	Basic	An ability to advise “other FSF SME ” on carrying out specific tasks or operate and maintain systems in a particular core process in a ministry of a FSF.
Generating	Senior	An ability to advise principals on managing, controlling, and resourcing one or more DOTMLPF core processes in a component (e.g., air, land, maritime) of a FSF.
	Advanced	An ability to advise process owners on how to organize, man, train, and equip a particular core process (e.g., doctrine, materiel, etc.) for which the process owner has formal responsibility in a component of a FSF.
	Basic	An ability to advise “other FSF SME ” on carrying out specific tasks or operate and maintain systems in a particular DOTMLPF core process in a component of a FSF.
Operating	Senior	An ability to advise principals on leading, controlling, and resourcing one or more core processes in a FSF tactical formation or across multiple FSF tactical formations. Typical core processes in a FSF tactical formation include the joint functions – <i>Command and Control, Intelligence, Fires, Maneuver, Protection, and Sustainment</i> .
	Advanced	An ability to advise process owners on how to organize, man, train, and equip a particular core process (e.g., C2, Fires, Sustainment, etc.) for which the process owner has formal responsibility to perform. Process owners in FSF tactical formations normally include J/G/S staff directorates or officers.
	Basic	An ability to advise “other FSF SME ” on carrying out specific tasks or operate and maintain systems in a particular core process (e.g., Fires, Sustainment, etc.) in a FSF tactical formation.

Figure 4: Relevant Terms and Qualifiers for Advisors of FSF

The working group developed a common lexicon for referring to and describing SMEs that advise at the executive, generating, and operating functions of a FSF, as seen in Figure 4. The use of practical terms and qualifiers strengthen selection and training approaches within the joint force to prepare SMEs to serve as advisors at the appropriate level. Furthermore, the lexicon places all DoD advisors in an appropriate context within the EGO construct of an FSF. By using qualifiers such as Basic, Advanced, and Senior, this serves as benchmarks to describe the required experience and/or training that SMEs need to serve as FSF advisors within each respective level of the EGO construct.

Working Group Topic #3

Develop advisor-training topics (e.g. terminal learning objectives (TLOs)) across training and education domains in short, mid, and long term planning horizons.

Composed of the same SMEs as Topic #2 and divided into two sub-working groups, Topic #3 participants were tasked to create training and education requirements for advisors through standardized terminal learning objectives across all institutional domains. The working group first considered desirable skills and attributes of successful advisors, on the premise that advisors need to possess a variety of individual skills to properly perform their assigned mission. Next, the working group agreed that advisors should initially be selected based on subject matter expertise in the function or core process that they will advise. Technical proficiency, however, does not equate to

proficiency as an advisor. Advisors must be able to teach, coach, and advise the FSF. Successful advisors are proficient in his or her respective area of SME, combat, advising, and possess situation specific skills, as seen in Figure .

The working group first considered desirable skills and aspects of successful advisors, on the premise that advisors need to possess a variety of individual skills to properly perform their assigned mission.

The below figure depicts the five block model of individual advisor skills. It is important to understand that the five block model is not a process model. The five blocks do not depict sequential training and education of advisor skills, but rather independent training and education efforts. During the working group, combat and advisor skills (blocks two, three, and four) were not addressed. Generally, blocks two, three, and four pertain to individual skills that apply to all advisors regardless of their area of subject matter expertise or at what level (EGO) advisors will serve. Block one, SME skills, are defined as those skills learned through experience, education, or training. Selecting someone who does not have the correct subject matter expertise does not automatically result in mission failure, but it puts that individual at a severe disadvantage. Block five, situation specific skills are determined based on the operational environment (OE), the specific mission, and include cultural and regional understanding and language.




Figure 5: Five Block Model

After the working group participants agreed to adopt the five-block model and only focus on blocks one and five. The next task was to organize the training topics or terminal learning objectives (TLOs) into training and education domains. In order to define and distinguish the different levels of human cognition to be achieved at each TLO, the working group used Bloom’s Taxonomy as a framework. The six major categories of Bloom’s Taxonomy can be found in Figure 6. Unlike the five block model, Bloom’s Taxonomy is a process model.

Bloom's Taxonomy	
Create	Produce new or original work (design, assemble, construct, conjecture, develop, formulate, author, investigate)
Evaluate	Justify a stand or decision (appraise, argue, defend, judge, select, support, value, critique, weigh)
Analyze	Draw connections among ideas (differentiate, organize, relate, compare, contrast, distinguish, examine, experiment, question, test)
Apply	Use information in new situations (execute, implement, solve, use, demonstrate, interpret, operate, schedule, sketch)
Understand	Explain ideas or concepts (classify, describe, discuss, explain, identify, locate, recognize, report, select, translate)
Remember	Recall facts and basic concepts (define, duplicate, list, memorize, repeat, state)

Figure 6: Six Major Categories of Bloom's Taxonomy

The working group then discussed the various training and education platforms that could utilize the TLOs. Training platforms were described as collective training that prepares units, teams, and individuals for a specific mission or job as Advisors at the Executive or Generating levels of a FSF. Pre-deployment training models such as individual (JRTC or DISCS), home station, Combat Training Center (CTC), Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (JRSOI), as well as resident and non-resident approaches were also considered. Education was described as platforms for uniformed and civilians at the junior (e.g. Lieutenant, Sergeant), mid (e.g. Major, GS-13), senior (e.g. Colonel, GS-15), and executive (General Officer/Flag Officer, Senior Executive Service) levels. Other training and education platforms considered were entry and pre-commissioning approaches and resident (e.g. Senior Staff College) and non-resident (e.g. Joint Knowledge Online) opportunities.




Figure 7: Individual Advisor Skills and Categories of Knowledge

The working group participants then used Figure 7 to organize TLOs. The TLOs were broken down into four categories: professional military education (PME), specialty training (which includes simulation, training or experience in blocks one, and OE training and experience in block five), pre-deployment, and in-theater/in-country. Further, by tying each of these TLOs to Bloom's Taxonomy, it strengthens the requirement descriptions, training of advisors, and even the selection of advisors. This is because the six major categories of Bloom's Taxonomy can also be thought of as the knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSA) that an advisor must possess.

Currently, there are risks in how uniformed personnel are progressed and trained to serve as advisors at the senior level, because there is no standardized progression of training and education for advisors, as there is for other military occupational specialties (MOSs). This lack of standardization creates uncertainty when evaluating an advisor's career progression. By implementing the below TLOs in all of the training and education platforms, this would provide the basis of knowledge for advisors and lessen or potentially eliminate the risk as it would create a standardized progression for advisors.

Professional Military Education (*PME*) TLOs

- O-3 and E-7: Understand the Operating Function from the G-EGO construct (see Figure 4) and leadership model within the function.

- O-4 and E-8: **Analyze** the generating function from the G-EGO construct (see Figure 4) – for example, through case studies. **Understand** leadership model within the generating function.
- O-5/O-6 and E-9: **Analyze** the executive function from the G-EGO construct (see Figure 4) – for example, through case studies. **Understand** governance function from the G-EGO construct and the role of DoS and USAID. **Understand** leadership model in the executive function.

Specialty Training TLOs

- Ability to **Analyze**, **Evaluate**, and **Create** solutions in a situation specific condition (e.g., Military Advisor Training Academy (MATA), MoDA, DISCS, Army Security Cooperation Planners Course (ASCPC), Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group (MCSCG)).

Pre-Deployment TLOs

- Ability to **Analyze**, **Evaluate**, and **Create** solutions that are partner nation specific (e.g., 3-353rd, MATA, MoDA, MCSCG).

In-Theater/In-Country TLOs

- Ability to **Analyze**, **Evaluate**, and **Create** solutions based on updated and current partner nation context (e.g., Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (JRSOI), Staff Onboarding, Advisor Billet).

Way Forward

The primary finding from the Senior Advisor Training Working Group was that the solution to the training and education gap cannot be training alone, but rather a cohesive joint solution that applies to the entire advisor enterprise. The working group recommended that a development pipeline for advisors be established as part of military career-field development. The development pipeline would introduce members to military advisor training during progressive rank-based training and education beginning at the accessions phase of a potential advisor's career. Regardless of timing, this development pipeline relies on a clear advisor mission and clear advisor requirements towards which to train. Additionally, this development pipeline requires changes to current policy and doctrine dealing with the training and education of military advisors. The working group concluded with the following recommended changes to policy and doctrine, which JCISFA has since taken the lead on implementing.

Policy (Direction and Guidance):

- Establish joint training standards for inclusion within PME.

- Institute manpower management for an advisor capability in DoD (e.g., Active, Guard, Reserve and Contractors).
- Improve coordination and unity of effort of assorted advising efforts in some partner nations.

Doctrine:

- Revise Five Block Model to eliminate perception that it is a process model (Advising Multi-service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (MTTP) for Advising Foreign Security Forces).
- Codify senior advisor lexicon in JP 3-20, Security Cooperation, to strengthen requirements descriptions, training, and selection.
- Propose language for Defense Institution Building (DIB) inclusion across the joint leadership development continuum (e.g. Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP)).

The senior advisor capability gap requires both short and long-term solutions, which targets institutions providing joint PME, service-level training venues providing advisors, and talent management mechanisms that allow for the identification of available resources and maintaining capacity to meet emerging requirements of advisors at the executive and generating functions. The joint force must not only develop a solution to mitigate the current training problem but also create a ready bench of senior advisors to effectively fill the current and future demand for senior level advisors.

¹ Joint Publication 3-20, Security Cooperation, p. vii, 23 May 2017.

² Joint Publication 3-20, Security Cooperation, p. GL-5, 23 May 2017.

³ Joint Publication 3-20, Security Cooperation, p. B-5, 23 May 2017.