


# NEWS FROM THE FRONT

March 2019



## Lessons in HQs Evolution for Commanders and Staff



## Reorganizing a CJTF-OIR HQs

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE  
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED

## **Table of Contents**

Introduction	3-5
Explaining the Big Picture of a CJTF Evolution	6-8
Actions to Improve a CJTF HQs	8-13
Actions to Sustain a CJTF HQs	13-16
References	17

## Introduction

U.S. led HQs in Iraq have gone through several reorganizations as missions changed. Two such HQs which successfully reorganized are the Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) HQs and a subordinate Combined Joint Force Land Component Command-Iraq (CJFLCC-OIR) HQs. This article provides reorganization lessons from a recent evolution by a CJTF that occurred over a 90 day timeframe from 1 December 2017 to 28 February 2018. In this instance, the CJTF HQs (XVIII ABN Corps) controlled operations during the majority of the fight against ISIS. Subordinate to this CJTF was a U.S. led CJFLCC commanded by 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division leadership. See Figure 1.

Prior to November 2017, the CJTF in Iraq and a subordinate CJFLCC were manned and organized to lead ground combat operations to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS). On or about 8 November 2017, ISIS fell and U.S. higher HQs above this CJTF directed a deactivation of a CJFLCC within 90 days. After receiving the CJTF Commander's guidance and criteria, CJTF staff and remaining CJFLCC staff planned then moved out to meet all transition tasks. All this took place while conducting ongoing analysis of mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time (METT-T). First, newly arriving MG Walter Piatt (10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division Commander) deactivated the CJFLCC then assumed a position as Deputy Commander for Transitions (DCOM-T) within the CJTF. He directed construction and renovation of a room for a transition HQs. Next, he directed the staff to meticulously identify all staff functions and authorities then determine which of those could be eliminated, reduced or moved. Proper sizing of the staff inevitably meant personnel reductions. Third, he directed staff to consider member country mandates and objectives then develop a method to negotiate desired reductions of ground combat forces. These actions spurred additional tasks which officers noted as lessons and best practices. An unprecedented undertaking, this CJTF had to dismantle one of the largest coalitions that has ever been formed in the world to fight a common enemy.<sup>1</sup> It consisted of 72 nations in conflict with ISIS. Once ISIS fell, policy and strategy makers needed CJFLCC assets and resources elsewhere in U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).

After the transition, the CJTF staff requested a study of this headquarters' evolutionary concept to learn from "terminating elements of an operational design and dismantling a large coalition structure."<sup>2</sup> The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) collected observations, insights, and lessons from six CJTF officers from the United States and four officers from allied nations. These officers could see and observe HQs operations during the ISIS fight as well as subordinate echelon planning and adjustments.

This article is intended to help future CJTF and CJFLCC commanders and staff officers understand inherent challenges of eliminating a subordinate component command.

---

<sup>1</sup> Funk, Paul E. LTG, USA, as cited by White, Robert "Pat" MG, USA, End of Tour Oral History Interview, 15 March 2018, p. 15.

<sup>2</sup> Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Planning, 16 June 2017, p. IV-19.




Figure 1. Deployment Cycle for CJTF-OIR 2017 to 2018.

Figure 2 depicts a change in deployment. As planned, XVIII ABN Corps departed the AOR on schedule and III Corps took over the CJTF. Shortly after, the CJFLCC command was to transition to a new commander and staff. However, this could not happen with new orders for CJFLCC deactivation. Therefore, CJTF staff needed a transition plan, a start date, and timeline to deactivate a CJFLCC while retaining land component responsibilities that would have belonged to the CJFLCC had it still been operational. This plan worked well and timelines were appropriate. As anticipated, staff workloads at CJTF increased without the subordinate CJFLCC.




Figure 2. Adjusted Deployment Cycle for 2017 to 2018.

In this report, a CJTF provided valuable views and best practices regarding their experiences with disestablishing a CJFLCC. The staff identified four areas needing improvement and six practices to sustain for future combined joint task forces.

### Actions to Improve in CJTF HQs (page 8)

Understanding Life Span of Billets within Task Force HQs  
Understanding Staff Dispersions and Flexibility  
CJTF Transitions Cannot Degrade Support to Tactical Units  
Deactivation of a CJFLCC Requires a Study of both Requirements and Joint Manning Documents

### Actions to Sustain in CJTF HQs (page 13)

Transition Teams Need Dedicated Leadership  
Transition Operations Require a New Operational Name  
Challenges Exist when CJFLCC Requirements Flow Up to CJTF HQs  
Deliberate Steps Allow Orderly Disestablishment CJFLCC HQs in Sequence  
Knowledge Management Officers (KMOs) Provide Common Pictures of Complex Administration  
Microsoft VISIO Gives Greater Ease in Diagramming Joint Manning Documents

The CALL website has several CJTF related publications and News From The Front (NFTF) articles covering lessons and best practices as HQs transitioned over time.

Here is a short list of publicly released documents:

18-33 Transition to a Joint Force HQs - Planning Insights for Echelons Above Brigade Handbook  
16-10 ARCENT Transition to CJTF-OIR Lessons and Best Practices  
NFTF: CJTF-OIR Operation and Targeting Board  
NFTF: Knowledge Management in CJTF-OIR  
NFTF: Commander's Perspective CJTF-OIR Operations in Iraq and Syria  
NFTF: Filling Operational Capability Gaps in Theater  
NFTF: The "By, With, Through" Approach: An ASCC Perspective

For a larger perspective on transitioning CJTFs for the past 17 years, search with government issued CAC card at the CALL restricted site for "CJTF."

<<https://usacac.army.mil/organizations/mccoe/call>>

## Explaining the Big Picture of a CJTF Evolution

“[An] establishing authority typically establishes a JTF for a focused and temporary purpose and disestablishes it when the JTF achieves its purpose and is not required for other operations.”—Joint Publication 3-33, *Joint Task Force HQs*.

In early November 2017, coalition forces under control of the CJTF-OIR were conducting Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations to destroy ISIS.<sup>3</sup> LTG Paul Funk (III Corps) led the CJTF, while MG Walter Piatt (10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division) was just arriving to lead the CJFLCC. Then, both CJTF and CJFLCC HQs had a big surprise. They did not anticipate the speed at which coalition forces would accomplish ISIS destruction. As summed up by one staff officer, ISIS had catastrophic failure in the ground campaign. There was no longer a need for a joint land component HQs. CJTF leaders directed HQs staff, namely J-5 plans officers, to develop plans in one day for transitioning current operations to missions of Security Cooperation and Deterrence. CJTF leadership and staff weighed courses of action (COAs) to reduce land force footprint and higher HQs without impeding tactical and operational plans. With CENTCOM approval, CJTF could start a process to deactivate the land component command, yet preserve gains in this area.

Establishing authorities approved the elimination of a CJFLCC within this contingency joint operational area (CJOA) but with conditions.<sup>4</sup> However, it meant the CJTF would perform double duty for an unknown period of time. This was no easy task—to plan then execute double duty within a coalition’s organization. The CJTF had to reduce military components and elements under an organizational construct whose functions supported Operation Inherent Resolve covering the country of Iraq consisting of over 438,319 square km (169,235 square miles).<sup>5</sup> Beginning on 22 November 2017, operational planning teams (OPTs) and leaders in the CJTF prepared plans with several COAs. The following day, they conducted a decision brief and gained LTG Michael X. Garrett's (ARCENT CDR) approval, with the resulting implementation plan to start within the next thirty days.<sup>6</sup> 1 December 2017 was the start. See Figure 2.

The CJTF staff realized early measured steps in a phased approach would preserve Iraq’s independence and maintain the coalition’s operational tempo. They envisioned a phased approach to downsizing and disestablishing the CJFLCC. This approach had specific requirements:

---

<sup>3</sup> US Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations, Chapter 1, October 2017, p.1-1.

<sup>4</sup> Authority to Establish. In accordance with the National Security Act of 1947 and Title 10, USC, and as described in the UCP, CCMDs are established by the President, through SecDef, with the advice and assistance of the CJCS. Commanders of unified combatant commands may establish subordinate unified commands when so authorized by SecDef through the CJCS. Joint task forces (JTFs) can be established by SecDef, a CCCR, subordinate unified commander, or an existing JTF commander. Joint Publication 1, Doctrine of the Armed Forces, Chapter 1, p. xviii, 12 July 2017.

<sup>5</sup> NOTE: Note, the distance from Kuwait to the Syrian border by automobile is 1,105 km (687 miles).

<sup>6</sup> Gaydon, Patrick L, Colonel US Army, Personal Interview, 10 June 2018.

- Ensure a transition while consolidating gains<sup>7</sup>
- Shift an Army division’s HQs staff back to home station and establish a rotational pool for other deployments and contingencies
- Time ARCENT’s need to shift Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) funds to base funds<sup>8</sup>

Planners conducted functional analysis and then determined “must do” functions based on Army regulations and doctrine. The CJTF and CJFLCC staffs then identified those functions that could be terminated. Requirements and “must do” actions would remain throughout all evolving phases of HQs 1.0, 2.0, and 3.0. Topping the priorities was advising and assisting six Iraqi Operational Centers for regional security. Additionally, the CJTF had to balance Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTO&E) and force tracking numbers (FTN) through these deliberate steps. The III Corps HQs (LTG Funk) would provide 51 percent of needed personnel while newly arriving 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division (MG Piatt) would provide the remainder for a specific period of time. To give emphasis to this transitional period, LTG Funk appointed MG Piatt as the DCOM-T. Without the CJFLCC, the CJTF had to command subordinate brigades and would do so until the operational environment met conditions to further downsize as described in joint doctrine. With the CJFLCC disbanded, officers of the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division would stay to support CJTF through named phases and goals:

- HQs 1.0. Goal: Plan HQs 2.0 and HQs 3.0 by 24 November 2017.
- HQs 2.0. Goal: Build HQs 2.0 “the bridge” then disestablish HQs 1.0 in 90 days from 1 December 2017 to 28 February 2018 with leadership by MG Piatt (DCOM-T) plus officers from the 10<sup>th</sup> MTN Division.
- HQs 3.0. Goal: Achieve end state, disestablish HQs 2.0 by 1 March 2018.

This CJTF also considered battle rhythms within both CJTF and CJFLCC on 24 November 2017. Planners from both staffs recommended ways to consolidate battle rhythms while meeting existing requirements and those “must do” functions and tasks.

Planners from both staffs recommended ways to consolidate battle rhythms while meeting existing requirements and those “must do” functions and tasks.

Also, a single battle rhythm had to support Operation Reliable Partnership (ORP) to advise and assist operation with Iraqi leaders and soldiers. CJTF achieved this merging of battle rhythms by 1 March 2018 as well as other evolving and consolidating moves. This unique experience of reorganizing a CJTF to serve as both a CJTF and land component HQs, provides an example of improvisation for future combined joints staff forces. However, some plans, thoughts, and

<sup>7</sup> US Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations, October 2017, p.5-22.

<sup>8</sup> Awadi, Jason, Colonel, US Army, Personal Communications, 19 July 2018.

actions need improvement while others should be sustained. We record those here for the benefit of future HQs commanders and staff.

## **Actions to Improve a CJTF HQs**

### **Understanding Life Span of Billets within Task Force HQs**

Observation. Every CJTF is a temporary organization. However, some CJTF officers often believe task force billets are fixed and will exist for the remainder of their individual deployments.

Discussion. General officers and colonels in the CJFLCC were reluctant to give up authorities and responsibilities during downsizing steps leading to a CJFLCC deactivation. Supporting the coalition from allied nations, they had significant troop contributions in the CJFLCC mission and area of operations. Their governments recruited available leaders and soldiers to deploy for a full tour. Downsizing shortens tours by returning leaders and soldiers to home stations without any significant accomplishments to add to their professional military experience. HQs requirements to reorganize will not necessarily align with individual tours of duty.

Recommendation-Improve. CJTF leadership should manage expectations and anticipate conditions that will eventually lead to downsizing of HQs and staff. CJTF leaders should communicate military needs and procedures to diplomats, the Joint Staff, or coalition officials early to explain or describe temporary natures of these assignments because mission might change. Military officials of partner nations should write orders, especially for coalition forces, staffs, and augmented personnel, to read for example, “These orders may terminate early...deploy for a period between three to nine months...you are assigned billet XX123 CJFLCC, subject to mission needs and adjustments. At any time during your deployment, CJTF leaders may determine an end to some mission requirement and your specialized billet. Or, CJTF may leave your billet vacant following your departure.”

### **Understanding Staff Dispersions and Flexibility**

Observation. CJTF leaders divided HQs staff between Union III in Baghdad, Iraq and at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait to better support both OIR and ORP.

Discussion. Dividing a CJTF staff in two has both positive and negative effects. Normally CJTF staff work in a single location. However, commanders often dispatch officers to secondary command posts in order to spread out authorities and make officers available for key leader engagements.

Commanders often dispatch officers to secondary command posts in order to spread out authorities and make officers available for key leader engagements.
--



One star general officers (GOs) and colonels are best at representing a CJTF commander by further explaining the commander's intent to other leaders at outlying command posts and task forces. GOs and colonels sent outside the main HQs can sense operating environments first hand, offer suggestions to subordinate staff officers, and serve as a direct conduit between a CJTF commanding general and other command posts and brigade HQs. However, when CJTF leadership reassigns GOs and colonels to secondary locations, it reduces direct contact with a CJTF commander. They may lose awareness about the primary HQs' environment, shifts in priorities, and concurrent staff actions. In addition, those relocated may experience declining communication with the CJTF commander and key staff who support the commander. They may feel out of place and cut off from the CJTF commander and other officers preparing courses of action and decision briefs at the primary CJTF HQs.

Recommendation-Improve. Communicate early and often to one star general officers and colonels from coalition partners in remote areas using secure video conferencing, secure telephone, or personal visits. Leave time for one-on-one discussions. Avoid overreliance on Email.

### **CJTF Transitions Cannot Degrade Support to Tactical Units**

Observation. The CJTF Chief of Staff gave specific guidance that he would not allow any risk to subordinate tactical units during deactivation of the CJFLCC.<sup>9</sup>

Discussion. A CJTF has standard tasks and reporting requirements up the chain of command. For example, BG Kenneth Kamper used the phrases "up and out" and "down and in" to describe how to handle reports and report preparation. Up and out referred to reports for higher HQs and organizations outside the HQs. Preparation of these reports could not, however, delay communication and support to subordinate tactical leaders and units (down) and operating (in) the Combined Joint Operating Area (CJOA). BG Kamper specified a tactical focus as a primary effort; he would direct all available HQs resources downward to tactical units needing support in permissions, supplies, transportation, or medical services. It is unusual for a CJTF to perform CJFLCC tasks after an elimination of a CJFLCC. In this instance, the CJTF staff was too few in number and ill equipped to perform CJFLCC tasks—even in transition. "A Commander and Staff at a CJTF HQs, assigned to numerous land component tasks, make poor substitutes for a disestablished Combined Joint Force Land Component Command (CJFLCC) HQs; a Commander and Staff at a CJFLCC HQs, assigned with higher echelon tasks and authorities of a CJTF HQs, make poor substitutes for a disestablished CJTF HQs."<sup>10</sup>

A Commander and Staff at a CJTF HQs, assigned to numerous land component tasks, make poor substitutes for a disestablished Combined Joint Force Land Component Command (CJFLCC) HQs; a Commander and Staff at a CJFLCC HQs, assigned with higher echelon tasks and authorities of a CJTF HQs, make poor substitutes for a disestablished CJTF HQs.

<sup>9</sup> Dugger, Andy, LTC, USA, personal interview with MAJ Elliot Miles, 25 July 2018, p. 4.

<sup>10</sup> Gaydon, P. *ibid.*

Recommendation-Improve. When deactivating a CJFLCC, give more emphasis to staff officers at CJTF HQs to track, manage, and support ground forces with rapid communication and clear guidance. Consider addressing this staff capability in ATP 3-92 Corps Operations, Chapter 2, Section II Subordinate Forces, Divisions.<sup>11</sup>

### **Deactivation of a CJFLCC Requires a Study of both Requirements and Joint Manning Documents**

Observation. CJTF officers reported requirements can be linked to general officers and colonels on joint manning documents. The deactivation of CJFLCC billets usually results in reassignments of general officers and colonels to other positions in the CJTF.

Discussion. Reassigning personnel on joint manning documents requires not only an educated guess but also convincing staff to cease work on lesser important tasks then accept new requirements. Still, some CJTF officers believe greater precision and efficiencies with requirements and joint manning documents lay in new techniques and methods existing, but not widely taught, within schools and centers for field grade officers. Unfortunately, officers in task force (TF) formations or component commands practice HQs management by using MS PowerPoint and MS EXCEL to graphically represent and list objectives, requirements, tasks, condition based timelines, condition based end states, and task organizations.

Similarly, from a strictly personnel side of management (G-1), use of MS PowerPoint and EXCEL helps to graphically represent and list Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA), Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE), Modification of Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE), and the Common Table of Allowance (CTA) 50-900. Joint Manning Documents contain column headings of command, activity, department, line number, billet title, duty description, grade, skill/specialty, security clearance, source type, service, location, latest arrival date, and tour length.<sup>12</sup>

Situation reports (SITREPs) in MS Word from subordinate units frequently flow into HQs sections then HQs officers consolidate these MS Word documents with MS EXCEL reports—then again into a MS PowerPoint file. This manual process feeds and supports a Commander’s Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) but introduces errors as staff officers transpose all data into MS PowerPoint.

Quite often, these same officers are quickly adjusting timelines, changing major HQs sections, managing additions or cuts in a HQs’ resources, proposing billet reorganizations, and redirecting personnel assignments. During periods of great change in compressed timelines, a variety of analytical skills and data collection will make transitions logical and painless. HQs staff officers should make full use of techniques found in Operations Research/Systems Analysis (ORSA), Lean Six Sigma, or Project Management Principles (PMP) to effectively and efficiently handle multiple sources of disparate data from MS EXCEL spreadsheet cells or online databases.

---

<sup>11</sup> US Army ATP 3-92 Corps Operations, April 2016.

<sup>12</sup> Joint Publication 1, Joint Personnel Support, May 31, 2016, p. III-2.

HQs staff officers should make full use of techniques found in Operations Research/Systems Analysis (ORSA), Lean Six Sigma, or Project Management Principles (PMP) to effectively and efficiently handle multiple sources of disparate data from MS EXCEL spreadsheet cells or online databases.

With these analytical skills, HQs staff would experience fewer difficulties managing objectives, requirements, tasks, condition based timelines, condition based end states, and task organizations. To illustrate, consider a CJTF-OIR HQs situation in November 2017 (Figure 1). The CJTF grappled with a rapid deactivation of a CJFLCC possessing distinct requirements and tasks. TF formations and component commands are management centers that often terminate 50% of resources abruptly when directed to do so.

TF formations and component commands are management centers that often terminate 50% of resources abruptly when directed to do so.

During downsizing operations, personnel depart assignments quicker than ending of requirements and tasks. With a 50% reduction in HQs, staff are often challenged to quickly shift or consolidate resources, billets, and personnel. The complexity of this task in military HQs management requires a variety of analytical skills to objectively analyze all factors of risk or unknowns as well as funding considerations.

One such analytical framework is *ORSA Handbook for the Senior Commander*.<sup>13</sup> Within this handbook, a practitioner will learn to apply ORSA Methods and Tools for a CJTF HQs. Figure 3.

---

<sup>13</sup> ORSA Handbook for the Senior Commander, March 2008. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. This publication is prepared by the Center for Army Analysis (CAA). It reflects the current thought of this agency and conforms to published Department of the Army doctrine as closely as possible.

<b>ORSA</b>	<i>Data analysis</i>
	<i>Campaign assessments</i>
	<i>Risk mitigation</i>
	<i>Decision models</i>
	<i>Wargaming</i>
	<i>Simulation</i>
	<i>Resource allocation</i>
	<i>Survey design and analysis</i>
	<i>Data / info management</i>
	<i>Nodal or flow modeling</i>
	<i>Interview techniques</i>
	<i>Qualitative assessments</i>
	<i>Cost/benefit analysis</i>
	<i>Probability assessment</i>
	<i>Trending and forecasting</i>
	<i>Geospatial analysis</i>
<i>Effects assessment</i>	
<i>Logistic support analysis</i>	

Figure 3. ORSA Methods and Tools for CJTF HQs.

If so used, officers assigned project management-like duties and tasks would need early communication with leaders to understand a leader’s risk tolerance and maintained access to critical information across all HQs sections. Second, officers need several analytical templates and mathematical formulas to analyze, weigh, link and assign values to military HQs data.

Lean Six Sigma is another analytical framework for officers to manage HQ information. Six Sigma consists of using statistics and methods to improve processes and reduce defects in outputs.

A third framework for analysis is Project Management Principles (PMP). It would address military needs but uses a different lexicon. A staff officer would simply replace the word “project” with the military word of “task.” For example, use of Classical Project Management Principles and templates in a military setting would read something like this:

- a) Save staff officers time and work.
- b) Update task status, share documents, and communicate on operations

- c) Record time spent on tasks and time spent on non-tasks linked to financial costs and other mission tasks of Strategic, Operational, or Tactical levels.
- d) Plan tasks with familiar scheduling tools like Gantt charts and built-in customizable templates
- e) Track and monitor mission/operational health including everything from reduction of forces/downsizing charts to funding
- f) Assign resources to tasks and request and lock in subordinate military elements
- g) Manage demand by capturing and evaluating task ideas from anywhere in the organization through a standardized process
- h) Use advanced analytics to choose task proposals that best align with strategic goals and honor constraints
- i) Ensure optimal allocation of resources across tasks
- j) Use standard reports about tasks to gain performance insights

Recommendation-Improve. Operational level tasks are complex and require officers to use skillsets with analytical agility. More instruction using ORSA, Lean Six Sigma, or PMP templates and other analytical techniques in Army school houses for field grade officers would benefit future HQs commanders and staff. These analytical approaches, used in whole or part, would give greater management, skill, cognition, and efficiencies (time and funds) in Mission Command, and leadership especially in joint command HQs.

## **Actions to Sustain a CJTF HQs**

### **Transition Teams Need Dedicated Leadership**

Observation. Two consecutive commanders for CJTF-OIR assigned a two star general officer as DCOM-T that oversaw a *Commander's Initiatives Group (CIG)*.

Discussion. In December of 2017, the outgoing CJFLCC Commander (MG Walter Piatt) cased his colors then quickly assumed duties as the DCOM-T for CJTF-OIR. Although he was scheduled to depart, MG Piatt quickly saw a need to stay behind after CJFLCC deactivation. At that time, the CJTF with soldiers from the now defunct CJFLCC consisted of 51 colonels, and 17 generals representing 72 coalition countries.<sup>14</sup> With this top heavy lineup of senior military leaders, the rank and experience of a two-star general officer proved essential for making the transition successful among so many stakeholders who represented allied countries and allied

---

<sup>14</sup> Gaydon, P. *ibid*.

policies. Also critical was the transition staff composed of three experienced plans officers from CJ-5 (O-6s or O-5s) who were assigned to the CIG.<sup>15</sup>

Recommendation-Sustain. Assign and use a DCOM-T, at any echelon such as joint task forces, corps, division, or brigade, to lead and manage major transitions in HQs or military structures. Officers, handpicked by a deputy commander, should form around the DCOM-T as a CIG to research and action decisions.

### **Transition Operations Require a New Operational Name**

Observation. CJTFs signify operational transitions by assigning new operation names.

Discussion. Operation Reliable Partnership (ORP) signaled a new mission under Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). The CJTF developed ORP to build resilience, security, and sustainment capabilities. This new operation would also maintain the growing air enterprise and enhance security policy and operations, intelligence and counterterrorism.”<sup>16</sup>

Recommendation-Sustain. CJTF planners, future operations (FUOPS), and current operations (CUOPS) should prepare mission names in advance for anticipated changes in the operational environment followed by new strategic aims.

### **Challenges Exist when CJFLCC Requirements Flow Upward to CJTFs**

Observation. Due to the disestablishment of a CJFLCC (division led) in December 2017, the CJTF (corps led) had to absorb a long list of division level tasks.

Discussion. With a quick deactivation of a CJFLCC and staff, the CJTF had to compensate by forming a temporary HQs section in order to prioritize, reassign, and determine future disposition of a large task list.

With a quick deactivation of a CJFLCC and staff, the CJTF had to compensate by forming a temporary HQs section in order to prioritize, reassign, and determine future disposition of a large task list.

For this reason, 20 officers from the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division originally scheduled for assignments within CJFLCC were transferred to the CJTF for additional 90 days following disestablishment of the CJFLCC.

Recommendation-Sustain: Use staff officers from deactivated CJFLCCs to compensate for staff shortages in CJTFs.

<sup>15</sup> Piatt, Walter E. MG, USA, 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division, OIR, After Action Review, 1 July 2018, p. 3.

<sup>16</sup> Cronk, Terri M., Operation Roundup in Syria Continues to Target ISIS Terrorists, DoD News, Defense Media Activity, <<http://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/News-Article-View/Article/1542487/operation-roundup-in-syria-continues-to-target-isis-terrorists/>> 5 June 2018.

### **Deliberate Steps Allow Orderly Disestablishment CJFLCCs in Sequence**

Observation. A small staff successfully planned and deactivated a CJFLCC in 90 days.

Discussion. The CJTF (corps led) was smaller in size and number than its subordinate CJFLCC (division led). To merge both, the CJTF established a methodology to deliberately and incrementally absorb CJFLCC's ground combat role and mission command responsibilities for subordinate units and other coalition task forces. Included in these steps was CJTF absorbing current projects, transferring personnel, and keeping momentum through transitional steps.

Recommendation-Sustain. CJTFs should continue using sequential steps to disestablish a CJFLCC while at the same time preserving staff actions affecting subordinate leaders and units. Officers taking small deliberate steps in staff actions allow for a retroactive return—if necessary to a previous step should circumstance favor it.

### **Knowledge Management Officers (KMOs) Clarify Common Pictures of Complex Administration**

Observation. Knowledge Management (KM) officers within CJTFs reported great success in sharing and managing HQs information via NIPR and SIPR networks.

Discussion. Having a comprehensive KM plan, identifying key metrics for tracking, and having emphasis by the commander were key factors for CJTF success. KM officers gather data and metrics about all topics in a CJTF then post to the Microsoft SharePoint site. Topics include staff assignments from joint manning documents (JMDs), staff rosters, recent orders, FRAGOs, OPORDs, SITRPTs, and calendars within the HQs. SharePoint simultaneously shares information with coalition officers in HQs as well as subordinate brigades and task forces. Finally, it reduces email and other redundant messaging systems.

SharePoint simultaneously shares information with coalition officers in HQs as well as subordinate brigades and task forces. Finally, it reduces email and other redundant messaging systems.

Recommendation-Sustain. Comprehensive KM plans that incorporate key administrative metrics needed by the commander are key factors in a providing visibility of staff actions, assignments, and responsibilities within large leadership structures.

### **Microsoft VISIO Gives Greater Ease in Diagramming Joint Manning Documents**

Observation. CJTFs experienced great efficiencies in creating, managing, and modifying line and block charts when using Microsoft VISIO software.

Discussion. MS PowerPoint is merely word art and not an efficient diagramming software. Microsoft VISIO is a superior diagramming and vector graphics application (APP) that makes line and block charts agile and scalable. See Figure 4. Military leaders need graphical representations to quickly visualize complex command relationships and weights of importance. A better choice



is using administrative software designed for quickly altering relationships and weights of importance. This need is especially important with decisions to reorganize military forces in large combat areas and strategic areas of responsibility (AORs). Current JMDs in the US Army (CJTF-OIR and CJFLCC-OIR each had separate JMDs) are flat databases of line numbers and, to the untrained users, vague codes representing personnel fills or vacancies, and characteristics of billet positions. Needs to analyze and reorganize are greatest when HQs have requirements to change JMDs out of cycle because previous modifications to JMDs may be in work or incomplete outside of the command and HQs. Alterations to JMDs out of cycle impact requests for forces (RFF), theater coordinated assets, and coalition partner agreements. Commercial off the shelf software (COTS) can help. MS VISIO uses qualitative properties about staff positions thereby providing leaders with ways to qualify billet positions in relation to mission requirements and staff functions.




Figure 4. Sample MS VISIO Organization Chart.

Recommendation-Sustain. Continue use of MS VISIO Software in Army led CJTFs for managing requirements, tasks, resources, and personnel especially during complex reorganizations.



## References

US Army ATP 3-92 Corps Operations, April 2016.

US Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations, October 2017.

Awadi, Jason, Colonel, US Army, Personal Communications, 19 July 2018.

Center for Army Analysis (CAA) Fort Belvoir, VA., ORSA Handbook For The Senior Commander, 1 March 2008.

Cronk, Terri M., Operation Roundup in Syria Continues to Target ISIS Terrorists, DoD News, Defense Media Activity, <<http://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/News-Article-View/Article/1542487/operation-roundup-in-syria-continues-to-target-isis-terrorists/>>, 5 June 2018.

Dugger, Andy, LTC, USA, personal communications with MAJ Elliot Miles, 25 July 2018.

Gaydon, Patrick L COL, USA; Naumann, Scott, COL, USA; Priddy, Andrew T., COL, USMC, Personal Communication, 10 June 2018.

Joint Publication 1, Doctrine of the Armed Forces, July 12, 2017.

Joint Publication 3-33, Joint Task Force HQs, 31 January 2018.

Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Planning, 16 June 2017.

Piatt, Walter E. MG US Army, 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division Operation Inherent Resolve After Action Review, 1 July 2018.

White, Robert "Pat", MG US Army, End of Tour Oral History Interview, Transcribed by Steven Frank, Command Historian, III Corps. 15 March 2018.

# Lessons in HQs Evolution for Commanders and Staff



## Reorganizing a CJTF-OIR HQs