




BULLETIN



NO. 15-16

Lessons and Best Practices

SEP 15

Operation United Assistance



Report for Follow-On Forces

Approved for Public Release
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Operation United Assistance Report for Follow-On Forces

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Foreword

Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations are not new to the Army and the Department of Defense (DOD). We gained experience from Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and the 2010 Haiti earthquake. In the response to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, President Barack Obama announced Operation United Assistance in September 2014, allowing the military to support the United States Agency for International Development. This was the largest role the military had assumed in combating the spread of a disease or virus. The fight against Ebola was on.

The DOD made critical contributions to the fight against the Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa. Chief among these was bringing expertise in mission command, logistics, and engineering to assist in quickly getting health workers and medical supplies into West Africa.

This Center for Army Lessons Learned bulletin is the result of many interviews and data collection activities with the U.S. Army Africa (USARAF) staff. It is not meant to be totally comprehensive, but rather to serve as a quick and easy-to-read guide for follow-on units focusing on selected key areas.

Bradley T. Wolfing
COL, IN
Center for Army Lessons Learned
Senior Embedded Liaison Officer, USARAF

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| Center for Army Lessons Learned | |
|--|--|
| Director | COL Paul P. Reese |
| Strategic Branch Team Chief | Mike Hartmayer |
| CALL Lead Analyst | Donald Haus |
| CALL LNO to USARAF | COL Bradley Wolfing |
| Asymmetric Warfare Group LNOs to USARAF | Dan Gholston Guy “Buck” Davis |

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Introduction

The Department of the Army chose the Southern European Task Force to become the Army component headquarters for U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) in December 2008. Subsequently, U.S. Army Africa (USARAF) was designated as the Army Service component command for AFRICOM in January 2012. The USAFRICOM commander directed USARAF to focus on four major tasks:

- Support ongoing operations.
- Fulfill its Title 10, U.S. Code responsibilities.
- Execute theater security cooperation missions.
- Deploy a Joint task force-capable headquarters.

USARAF, without assigned forces and the typical theater enablers, was presented a challenge in accomplishing its diverse missions. From its inception, USARAF has been dependent on other organizations, regionally aligned forces, and the global force management process to accomplish its mission. Operation United Assistance (OUA) provided a good laboratory under which to study the present theater army concept and where it might need adjustment or modification in the future.

As a supporting command for the whole-of-government approach in OUA, USARAF was directed by its geographic combatant command, USAFRICOM, to provide coordination of logistics, training, and engineering support to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in West Africa to assist in the overall U.S. Government foreign humanitarian assistance/disaster relief efforts to contain the spread of the Ebola virus disease (EVD). This was a part of the international assistance effort supporting the governments of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea. The USAID mission to combat the EVD outbreak has been very successful. The partnering in this unified action should stand as an example of what is possible. The Department of Defense (DOD) support and U.S. Government leadership encouraged other nations, the international community, and nongovernmental organizations in a global effort to provide assistance. OUA required rapid response from the DOD (utilizing the unique skills and abilities of the military). However, it is important to note that DOD was in a supporting role. The DOD's logistics, mobility, and transportation capacities were crucial factors in the success of what became the largest U.S. military operation in support of infectious disease control.

Chapter 1

Insights and Best Practices Summary



Figure 1-1.

The following insights and best practices were collected by the U.S. Army Africa (USARAF) staff from the successful unified action during Operation United Assistance (OUA):

- Conduct the vast majority of planning and work in the unclassified environment. Only use classified systems when absolutely necessary and only for items that are indeed classified. Overclassification is a systemic problem for the Department of Defense.
- The U.S. Army has developed a Warfighter mentality that did not serve USARAF personnel well in a permissive environment (i.e., a sovereign nation). This caused friction and put into motion unnecessary assets, units, and capabilities.
- Be adaptable. U.S. Army leadership is conditioned to utilize digital common operating pictures that facilitate their decision-making. However, OUA was an expeditionary mission and an analog operational environment. Under these circumstances, it was beneficial to use maps and overlays to share information with the host nation and other partners.
- Planning operations to respond to the 24-hour cable news/media reporting cycle was problematic. Do not let the news cycle and pressures from higher headquarters rush the command to failure.
- Create an environment of operational patience. Take time to conduct deliberate planning for greater success.

- Let assessments inform the planning process; make the assessments part of the battle rhythm and enforce it. Simple and partial assessments must be acceptable. Make a deliberate effort “to take a half-step back”; reassess the situation and make adjustments, decisions, etc.
- Task-organize or tailor the force to meet mission requirements. The concept of conflict developed over the past 14 years must be broken.
- Flexibility is key to working with partner nations. Eliminate the mindset of “we are the U.S. Army and this is how we will do business in your country.”
- It is essential that staff elements have the freedom of maneuver below the command level to meet with the U.S. Embassy, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), etc. This freedom comes as a direct result of empowerment, trust, and enablement of subordinates. The USARAF staff in Liberia had the freedom of maneuver that allowed staff members to make connections and build relationships to work and inform actions with the appropriate agencies.
- Ensure the unit has an appropriate community outreach program — go with convoys, talk at town hall meetings, and conduct face-to-face interactions with the local populace.
- Mature the organizations’ knowledge management (KM) process to include the ability to share knowledge and information across domains with other partners, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Africa Command, NGOs, USAID, and the World Health Organization.
- Large PowerPoint presentations or other heavy files and graphics are not suited for expedition-capability bandwidth. Staff procedures, standard operating procedures, and a discipline that supports operations and explains the bandwidth capability/limitations while providing examples of properly-sized presentation files are required. Deployable Army organizations need an expeditionary communications capability. If higher headquarters expects all communications to be aligned with standard Army styling, the organization must request additional bandwidth before deployment.
- Ensure staff products inform decisions. There is a tendency to produce many unused, underused, and/or unnecessary products with no linkage to informed decisions. Strive to eliminate internal pressures to produce a product just to show relevance.
- Utilize lessons learned and after-action reports from Haiti (Operation Unified Response; humanitarian assistance/disaster response to the earthquake) and OUA to prepare for future humanitarian assistance missions.
- Integrate NGOs into planning considerations and KM.



Figure 1-2.

- Deploy a public affairs element and its enablers as soon as possible as a priority fill. Ensure public affairs is annotated on future baseline Joint manning documents. At the onset of OUA, media interest was high and Joint public affairs support element (JPASE) assets were delayed due to logistical problems and competing priorities. Lack of JPASE assets prevented robust media interaction, scheduling, and predictability.
- Strictly enforce the use of hand-washing stations to prevent the spread of the Ebola virus disease. Rates of disease and nonbattle injury (DNBI) were reduced to the lowest levels in the history of warfare during the initial phase of OUA. DNBI was below 1 percent in an area where previously, U.S. units involved in Operation Onward Liberty (OOL) experienced rates of 10 to 15 times higher.
- Place hand-washing stations (using a 0.05% chlorine solution) in front of every building entrance and ensure each station has an adequate supply of sanitizing solution. Require all personnel to use hand-washing stations every time they enter a building. Leaders must set the example; others will follow naturally, which will form repetitive routines. Additionally, computer workstations should be regularly disinfected to prevent disease transmission.
- Use malaria prophylaxis for force health protection. The largest medical threat to the force in Liberia is malaria. Leadership emphasis and rigid enforcement of malaria prophylaxis use resulted in no reported cases of malaria among USARAF OUA members deployed to Liberia. Command influence and observed chemoprophylaxis (administration of the medication) greatly enhanced compliance. The plasmodium falciparum strain of malaria is present in Liberia and is the strain with the most serious medical consequences to Soldiers.

- Subordinate yourself (as appropriate) to the U.S. Embassy leadership whenever possible. This practice should also be communicated visually, audibly, and in all business practices and daily routines. The relationship with the U.S. Embassy is critical on all levels; take time to nurture this relationship.
- Recognize the capacity of numerous other organizations and “actor” operating or located in the Joint operations area. Coordinate and synchronize your efforts with them. These organizations/actors plan and operate differently than DOD, but can be very helpful in coordinating efforts. Do not dismiss these organizations.



Figure 1-3.

Chapter 2

Observations, Discussions, and Best Practices



Figure 2-1.

Observation: Subordinate leadership in a multinational, multiagency environment is challenging.

Discussion: U.S. Army and Department of Defense (DOD) leaders are accustomed to functioning in a subordinate position. However, they are not accustomed to being subordinate to civilian organizations, other governments, and other government agencies. These organizations and task forces, made of multinational and interagency organizations, often do not have a clearly-defined decisionmaking process. This is challenging to military organizations that are accustomed to making decisions and acting quickly. Planning and decision-making are military strengths, and there is an opportunity for military leaders to provide leadership in this area without taking over the process. U.S. military leaders can identify decision points and produce products to provide to the committee or the lead organization to help the process. If ideas and products are presented in a spirit of humility, these ideas/products often are gladly received as most members of the group are working toward similar goals and anxious to make decisions and get to work.

Being subordinate to a civilian agency while maintaining the freedom to insert ideas and suggestions in a multiagency/multinational planning, operational, and execution process is an art. This is an art U.S. Army leadership declines to practice sufficiently (if at all), nor are there formal means of measure.

Army leadership is used to being in charge and directing activities, not working “behind the scenes” to offer expertise and ideas in a manner that is not directive or overbearing to the supported agencies and host nation. DOD can assist in synchronizing all of the on-the-ground, tactical-type actions to provide an operational framework linked to the host nation’s strategic goals and objectives.

Best Practices: It is essential that key leaders from the command team attend all daily engagements with the U.S. Embassy, Government of Liberia, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other partners in the Ebola response. Key leaders must be posted in the Liberian Emergency Operations Coordination Cell to interact on a daily basis and become a known entity that is relied on and called on to shape decisions and actions.

Send proper command team representatives to all USAID meetings. These representatives need to understand everything that USAID understands.

Key leaders should attend the Joint Interagency Multinational Planner’s Course held by the National Defense University (NDU) before deployment. Check with NDU for course availability at <http://jfsc.ndu.edu/Academics/JointInteragencyMultinationalPlannersCourse.aspx>.

Liaison officers (LNOs) are the best people with the most experience in these settings; they are not the most expendable. In planning LNO assignments, the rank structure may not follow a traditional modified table of organization and equipment structure. Experience and the ability to work among a group are important considerations for selecting personnel for this type of mission.



Figure 2-2.

Observation: Areas of Liberia are cash-only.

Discussion: Most areas of Liberia, especially remote ones, operate on a cash-only basis (primarily U.S. dollars). Remote sites must be prepared with field ordering officers (FOOs) and pay agent teams (trained by contracting and finance, respectively). Sufficient teams must be identified, trained, and appointed before deployment to cover all the needs of the Joint task force (JTF). Sufficient cash must be available and movable with necessary safeguards within theater. Local vendors in populated areas may not accept electronic funds transfer. As a result, provisions must be made for payment in cash in these areas.

Best Practices: The deployed unit should ensure it has enough trained FOOs and pay agent teams to cover all remote areas, other potential small purchases, and cash payment venues, as necessary. In advance of deployment, the unit should organize a training regiment.

Observation: Operating in a permissive environment in a sovereign nation is challenging.

Discussion: Many Soldiers still have the Iraq or Afghanistan mindset of operating freely in an unconstrained or non-permissive environment. In other words, many believe the U.S. military can go where it wants and occupy whatever land or facilities it wants or needs because of military necessity, with little or no coordination. Operating in a permissive environment and in a sovereign nation poses a new set of challenges. It is essential to secure the necessary permissions from the appropriate authorities (e.g., government entities, ministries, and county commissioners), before using or occupying an area. If it is a privately owned or controlled area, the appropriate agreement with that private entity is necessary. The U.S. Embassy can facilitate linkage with host nation and private entities.

In the case of land-use agreements for privately owned or controlled areas, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is the initial linkage to gain the proper authorities. It is vital that the approval authority is synchronized with the operation and available to make decisions on the same timeline as the location the operation is being executed.

Best Practices: Forces are trained and mindfully conditioned to operate in a permissive environment before deployment (land usage, country entry requirement(s), passports, immunizations records, etc.). Forces should also be educated in the roles, responsibilities, and capabilities of the U.S. Embassy and Department of State versus only DOD.

It is critical to understand the limitations and constraints when operating in a permissive environment, especially as it pertains to gaining authorities to lease land. When operating in an austere environment and the land lease approval authority is not available to work a solution with the forces, authorities should be delegated to a trained and certified land lease agreement authority, who is resident within the force. This will save valuable time and effort.



Figure 2-3.

Observation: Interaction with the U.S. Embassy is necessary for success.

Discussion: Relationships are key to success. Interactions with the U.S. Embassy at all levels are necessary for this type of operation. Many factors are involved when bringing in personnel, equipment, and supplies to a sovereign nation in a permissive environment. In relation to equipment and supplies, the U.S. Embassy General Services Office (GSO) is the conduit between DOD and the host nation logistics enablers. The GSO manages physical resources and logistical functions, which include acquisition and supply-chain operations. It also facilitates coordination with customs, police, transportation, and the appropriate ministries. Additionally, all flights and ships require advance coordination to arrive.

Best Practices: Maintain engagements at the senior level with the U.S. Embassy. Establish a U.S. Embassy liaison team for all levels of engagement and embed it with the U.S. Embassy.

Observation: It is important to capture senior leader engagement impressions.

Discussion: Senior leader engagements (SLEs) are designed to achieve a specific effect to accomplish specified objectives. As the Army's primary leader influence capability, SLEs remain a vital component of achieving the commander's objectives. During OUA, the SLE process lacked the following two components:

- SLE personnel who were traditionally involved in the process.
- Capturing the commanding general's and senior leader's impressions from the engagements.

The SLE process is designed to address emerging challenges, adapt operations, and anticipate new requirements. The process must have continuity and consistency, because the SLE process is a vital component to mission command; its absence leads to information gaps and adversely affects the overall mission command.

Best Practices: Prior to the mission, identify one individual responsible for gathering the senior leader's impressions from engagements. This individual must have access to the senior leader after each engagement. Based on the SLE process, the senior leader's impressions must be collated and added to the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) senior commander coordination site within 72 hours. Without adequate feedback, this process is hampered and will not allow the staff coordinating the SLE to adequately assess the engagements.

Observation: Task organization must be tailored to the mission.

Discussion: The task organization as set with the current and projected mission may not take into account all aspects of manpower requirements to accomplish the mission effectively and efficiently. Examine task organization from the Joint and interagency perspective, as well as from a maneuver perspective. The OUA mission required a greater quantity of LNOs and contract officer representatives (CORs) than would typically be encountered in a non-humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) mission. Carefully perform a mission analysis with the U.S. Embassy, United Nations (UN), and USAID on how to fill LNO positions.

Best Practices: Review the task organization and consider a detailed "troops-to-task" examination to capture the non-doctrinal and HA/DR OUA mission-specific requirements, along with supporting the existing force missions. Determine what is really needed and tailor the package to support it. Look at what is needed and do not assume that the current Joint manning document is correct. Communicate and coordinate with the U.S. Army Africa (USARAF) staff, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) staff, and previous units.

Observation: Understand Ebola and other disease threats.

Discussion: Many are unaware of what Ebola is exactly. The Ebola virus is difficult to transmit. It is only transmitted through bodily fluids of symptomatic patients. Panic associated with the Ebola virus is similar to the fear that people had during the initial phases of the AIDS epidemic. U.S. forces were not treating or working with Ebola patients and had a very minimal risk to exposure to the virus. U.S. forces were only supporting USAID in logistical and construction projects. The largest disease risk to the force during this operation was exposure to malaria.

Best Practices: Units should educate personnel and families on Ebola and Ebola transmission. Units should emphasize that U.S. forces are not exposed to Ebola in their assigned operations. USARAF worked to accomplish this through a series of town hall meetings, which were open to the command, their families, and the local community. Units must develop anti-malaria tactics, techniques, and procedures early and execute them vigorously. Command emphasis and involvement in malaria prevention were the keys to preventing malaria among USARAF personnel.



Figure 2-4.

Observation: Media must be educated on the challenges of an austere environment.

Discussion: Liberia was a new operating environment. Many reporters and senior leaders failed to grasp the true expeditionary nature of operations on the African continent. They mistakenly relied on their experiences of living with Soldiers on forward operating bases during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom (OEF/OIF). This created a problem of managing expectations, both for media personnel and public affairs officers (PAOs) outside the area of interest. U.S. forces have become so accustomed to the OEF/OIF model that U.S. leadership and Soldiers expect such conditions for every contingency. The lack of infrastructure and life support for international forces dictated a very small footprint. Similarly, there were requests from the Defense Media Activity and the American Forces Network-Europe to send teams to provide coverage without sufficient life support capabilities. It was too risky to send these service members; their presence could have degraded the overall mission. With a lack of units flowing into theater, the whole concept of embedding media personnel did not match expectations that were created in OEF/OIF. DOD recognized that this operation was an opportunity for good news stories and supported media operations within existing capabilities as long as doing so did not interfere with the operations. Based on the operations, support was very limited and the media had to provide their own transportation, subsistence, and security in this uncertain environment.

Best Practices: U.S. forces leadership must ensure that media personnel truly understand the Joint operations area they request to cover. Also, PAOs, senior leaders, and operators must be educated on the risk/reward.

Observation: Sustaining the Liberian public affairs mentor/coach program is important.

Discussion: Upon arrival, it was quickly identified that the Liberian public affairs office was composed of minimally trained public affairs personnel, who lacked the adequate training and education to effectively communicate the Ebola virus disease and/or Ebola treatment unit (ETU) success stories. The USARAF J-39 and PAO should coach and provide mentoring on proper media engagement, reporting, and writing. USARAF assisted in drafting a Liberian public affairs guidebook to facilitate the coaching of additional Liberian public affairs personnel.

Within the information domain, nobody is better at creating compelling stories and propagating an effective narrative than a nation’s own people. A coached or mentored Liberian PAO is more apt to communicate effectively with other Liberians than a well-trained U.S. PAO because of his familiarity with Liberia’s institutions, extensions, ideas, and the integral relationships that exist among the many individuals and groups. Sustaining the coaching and mentoring of Liberian PAOs will assist in the unit’s synchronized efforts to ultimately shape the security environment of Liberia.

Best Practices: Units should expect deployments to Africa to include coaching host nation partners on effectively executing public affairs operations. Sustain PAO coaching and mentoring activities. Further develop a robust military-to-military public affairs education program in support of overall objectives and capabilities (i.e., do not just do it, to do it; make sure it serves a useful purpose and is linked to a strategy). Deploying units should also be prepared to assist ongoing operations, activities, and partnerships by other units and provide services in the area that lacks the requisite public affairs personnel. Units should ensure that Armed Forces of Liberia PAOs are actively engaged and at the forefront of all Liberian operations, to include Liberian media engagements, reporting, and writing on local events.



Figure 2-5.

Observation: DOD is supporting USAID to return Liberian medical capability to pre-Ebola standards.

Discussion: It is not the mission of the Joint force commander (JFC), OUA, to upgrade Liberian medical care to U.S. standards. DOD efforts should support USAID in assisting Liberia in returning its medical infrastructure to the standard that existed before the Ebola crisis. As a general rule, if medical items or equipment cannot be purchased and sustained in Liberia, they should not be provided by the U.S. Government.

Best Practices: The return of the Liberia health-care system is not a DOD task; it belongs to USAID. U.S. forces should not run counter to these efforts. Solutions employed must be local and sustainable. If a health-care capability is not sustainable (e.g., requires fuel for generators, medical maintenance, consumables, etc.), it should not be included in the recovery effort. Having a good understanding of the pre-Ebola level of healthcare will assist in strategy-mapping the road to success. All efforts must be coordinated with USAID and support its objectives.

Observation: Medical waivers should not be considered for personnel deploying to Liberia.

Discussion: Thorough predeployment medical screening is absolutely essential before deploying to Liberia. Liberia has virtually no functioning Western-standard medical infrastructure. Before the Ebola crisis, the U.S. Embassy in Liberia was one of the most medically evacuated. Due to the Liberian infrastructure and the remote location, it is extremely difficult to treat or evacuate critically ill or injured patients. Medical evacuation generally takes at least 48 to 96 hours to complete.



Figure 2-6.

Best Practices: Ensure a thorough predeployment medical screening is conducted on all personnel deploying to Liberia. Deployment waivers should not be considered for any pre-existing medical conditions that could become critical or fatal without access to appropriate

care (e.g., pre-existing heart conditions, insulin dependent diabetes, or required treatments with biological infusions or chemotherapy). Do not confuse enthusiasm with capability.

Observation: Logistics personnel and capabilities must be deployed early.

Discussion: Humanitarian assistance operations are inherently logistics heavy. DOD's interoperability with the host nation, NGOs, the U.S. Embassy, and UN entities is a key task to supporting logistics operations. Logistics personnel have a dual role; they are engaged in the event and are responsible for supporting U.S. forces execution. Logistics personnel must be deployed early to set the condition for follow-on forces. This will enable the establishment of a life support area (LSA) and the requisite sustainment infrastructure in coordination with the projected force flow. To sustain the force and build effective lines of communication, logistics capabilities must be front-loaded in the deployment process.

Best Practices: Logistics planners, the Logistic Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), contracting logistics CORs, and logistics mission command capabilities need to be deployed early. Units should ensure the proper elements are identified on the time-phased force deployment data, and every effort needs to be made to have these elements early in the establishment of the theater. Deploy logistics personnel as part of the advance echelon and torch parties.

Observation: Use the Joint Requirements Review Board to validate logistical requirements.

Discussion: USARAF used the Joint Requirements Review Board (JRRB) effectively to validate logistical requirements. It is important that this board is conducted as scheduled with all the required contributors in attendance.

Best Practices: Conduct the JRRB three times per week or as mission dictates. One directorate must be identified as the lead agency. Voting members need to be formally identified with a backup. The event should be on the battle rhythm and tracked closely. Business rules should be identified early for necessary requisites to present a proposal or requirement to the board. Establish standards early and follow those standards throughout.

Observation: Project managers with current construction management experience and training are critical in this environment.

Discussion: The HA/DR environment encountered in OUA required extensive and simultaneous construction of both medical treatment facilities (Monrovia medical unit and ETUs) and LSAs for JFC OUA forces. Competent project and site management skills are critical in accomplishing engineer tasks in this HA/DR environment. The majority of projects used contracts for labor, equipment rental, and/or supplying bills of material through both Liberian contractors and LOGCAP. Knowledgeable and experienced project managers (PMs), beyond basic trained CORs, are essential to execute construction for both contracted and troop labor. Contact USARAF engineers for additional background and engineer-required skill sets and certifications.

Best Practices: Engineers should conduct sufficient predeployment training of project managers. Deploying units should conduct predeployment coordination with the unit in theater to identify current and projected project management requirements to support the operation's scope. Early identification of noncommissioned officers and officers with construction supervisory experience, training, and education is critical. Engineer technical qualifications such as professional engineer license and Project Management Professional certification are beneficial. Deploying units should

assign experienced personnel as PMs and ensure they receive COR training, project management training (available on Army Skillsoft), and a review of project management training from engineering professional military education courses. Additional skills in using computer-aided drafting, theater construction management standards, and PM software (e.g., Microsoft Project) will benefit execution in theater by allowing on-site design modification.

Observation: Educate Soldiers about LOGCAP.

Discussion: One of the major logistical efforts in OUA is being accomplished with LOGCAP. During humanitarian assistance contingency operations, LOGCAP is a major force enabler. LOGCAP brings an industrial capability that allows the military to focus on other areas and decreases the reliance on U.S. forces to provide logistics support. It is important to know the capabilities of LOGCAP, how it functions, and what the unit responsibilities are in regards to using LOGCAP.

Best Practices: Provide predeployment training on LOGCAP by the target audience — leaders and logistics planners. All Soldiers should be familiar with LOGCAP so they do not commit the government by requesting a service from a LOGCAP provider.

Observation: Train CORs and assistant CORs.

Discussion: Many logistical efforts in OUA were accomplished with individual contracts. With multiple contracts executed in support of OUA, multiple CORs and assistant CORs were needed. Contracts were executed at multiple sites concurrently. Each site needed a U.S.-military-trained and qualified COR/assistant COR; being a COR/assistant COR becomes their primary duty.

Best Practices: Each staff sergeant and above should be COR/assistant COR qualified. The specificity, function, or commodity that they are projected to represent does not have to be identified in advance. The contracting officer is responsible for educating/training the COR on his or her duties and responsibilities. These are all covered as part of the qualification process. Each project should have different CORs. Units need to identify CORs early and understand that, depending on the size of the contract, this may be their primary duty (for example, transportation contract, warehousing contract).

Observation: Contractor oversight and management is critical to mission success.

Discussion: Contract management is critical to mission success, and is best performed by an operational contract support coordination cell (OCSCC). (see Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Publication 4-10, *Operational Contract Support Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*). The requiring activity, which identifies and funds contracting requirements, must supervise the execution of all its contracted requirements. CORs are the method to do this (CORs are Soldiers, who are trained before deployment to manage contractor performance in accordance with the requirements of the contract, on behalf of the contracting officer). Preappointment training can take a month and must be done before deployment. Further, the requiring activity must conduct contractor management via the Synchronized Predeployment Operational Tracker (SPOT); must use Theater Business Clearance (TBC) to manage contractor requirements for training, equipment, and government provided services; and must oversee contractor deployment/redeployment procedures. Vendor vetting is a more complicated process and requires working with USAFRICOM and JTF-United Assistance J-2s to vet contractors and advise the COR on the risk of potential awardees.

Best Practices: During OEF/OIF, each Army brigade had an estimated 70 trained CORs as part of its predeployment preparations; the same concept applies to other contingencies. A JTF must incorporate the concepts and procedures for SPOT and TBC into its plans; designate and hold accountable the appropriate host staff sections; and prepare/resource those staff sections to execute before deployment. The OCSCC coordinates all these activities.

Observation: Be familiar with proper agreements to share goods and services with other nations in a multinational effort.

Discussion: The most common agreement is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 2120.01C, Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), 21 MAY 2015. The substantive legal authority to negotiate or conclude cross-servicing agreements also is provided in applicable U.S. law and may be delegated by the Secretary of Defense to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders. However, the execution of an ACSA order/transaction may be delegated to the lowest practical level.



Figure 2-7.

Best Practices: S-4s and designated logistics personnel should receive ACSA training and certification before deployment. They should understand what an ACSA is and how an ACSA order or transaction is initiated, executed, and completed under the regulatory guidance and agreement authority. Deploying forces should identify ACSA-trained personnel available to the gaining combatant commander for additional training and/or appointment as logistics functional-area managers to execute ACSA orders for logistical support, supplies, or services for sustainment of U.S. forces or partner nation military personnel. All ACSA orders/transactions should be executed and monitored from “cradle to grave” in the ACSA Global Automated Tracking and Reporting System under the oversight of the service component-level ACSA

manager, who reports to the combatant command ACSA manager. Qualified ACSA managers must have the ability to establish and track agreements. In some cases, depending on the size of the requirement, this position may be a full-time task.

Observation: Adapt project designs to meet local material availability as much as feasible to increase sustainability of facilities.

Discussion: Many projects were built and designed to specifications provided or approved by the Government of Liberia and were designed to be sustainable with local resources. This was not always to U.S. standards.

The use of local resources and building methods in the design of structures in support of USARAF operations in Africa deserves serious consideration. Using local building methods capitalizes on the expertise of contractors and skilled labor in the region. As an example, skilled labor in Liberia is very familiar with construction using concrete masonry unit (CMU) block instead of material such as steel and wood. Another example is that secondary roads are typically constructed with laterite instead of concrete or asphalt due to the cost. Although this material does not have the longevity of concrete or asphalt roads, it is easy to construct and maintain in the country.

In both of these examples, skill of the labor and specific type of material such as CMU block and laterite are factors. This material is easily available in the local region, whereas structural steel and asphalt are more difficult and costly. Some other considerations are to examine the quality and availability of lumber, type of electrical and plumbing systems, and other common materials.

Best Practices: It is prudent for leaders to obtain design guidance from units such as USARAF or USACE that have experience in construction in Africa. Units deploying to African countries need to take into consideration the local material available, dimensions of the material (such as English units or international units), and the methods employed in construction in the country. There are two paths for determining what specifications need to be utilized for construction. Construction of a structure that will house U.S. personnel must follow U.S. codes and specifications. Structures designed to be turned over to the local country should be designed to the local code and use material readily available in the country. Using material not available locally will cause maintenance and sustainment issues in the long term.



Figure 2-8.

Observation: Weather can have a significant impact on construction in Africa.

Discussion: Adapt project designs and develop project schedules to meet the local environmental or climatic effects.

During the design and project development phase, the engineering team must take into consideration the factors of the climate in Africa and the availability of material during construction. Projects in the developed world have relatively quick access to specific materials required to complete construction. Case in point, backfill material and crushed rock are available for delivery soon after a requirement is identified. In Africa, transportation and climate seasons impact the availability of this material. In addition, a monsoonal rainfall can severely impact the progress of construction and available time to perform these activities.

Generally, construction in the wet season in these countries is halted due to the extreme difficulty to perform work and have a quality product. There are methods available to work in these extreme environments, but these methods take specialized techniques that are generally not available in the continent and require a significant amount of time to complete. An example of a technique would be the application of an extensive drainage system to remove water from a

low-lying wetland. These types of applications generally take longer and have a significant cost increase. However, the application of a drainage system during the initial part of construction can help remove the runoff from the site to maintain progress.

Best Practices: Units deploying to Africa should take into consideration the climatic effects on potential construction sites in the predeployment phase. If possible, units should schedule work to be coordinated within the ideal period of construction in the country. If that is not possible, engineering teams need to design, up front, structural best management practices to mitigate the climatic impact to the project. USARAF, USACE, and USAFRICOM can provide design guidance and assistance for these projects.



Figure 2-9.

Chapter 3

Additional Considerations: Lessons and Best Practices

Observation: Establish theater property equipment accounts for 100-percent accountability.

Discussion: Property accountability is the essence of a good command supply discipline program. Units need equipment to meet mission requirements; if equipment is missing, this translates to mission failure. The force providers employed to set up the life support area (LSA) must be accounted for and on hand to set up the LSA. They will further be transferred to the theater provided equipment (TPE) database for accountability. These are the most essential aspects of supply discipline — at the right place, right time, and in the right amount.

Best Practices: Establish the TPE early. The property book officer and the property accountability team are by design identified, trained, and dedicated to this function. Commanders' involvement in the process is very critical in achieving the desired goals and 100-percent accountability. The TPE capability needs to be on site early to take control of any equipment (i.e., force providers) that will eventually fall under the commander's control. If the TPE team is not identified and in place early in the process of establishing the area of operations, there is a significant chance equipment will be lost, misplaced, and unaccounted for during the initial establishment of the theater.

Observation: Establish mayor cells in every location where U.S. forces operate.

Discussion: Each separate location where U.S. forces operate will require a mayor cell. This cell should be tailored to that specific location. The mayor cells are not just an ad hoc, on-the-fly headquarters and headquarters company/headquarters and headquarters detachment/headquarters and headquarters battalion-provided capability, but one that needs to be planned and trained.

Best Practices: Identify the composition of the mayor cells and assign personnel these duties and provide training predeployment. This requirement should be mission dependent and not a one-size-fits-all approach.

Observation: Plan and train in advance for adequate food service.

Discussion: Most U.S. forces are accustomed to falling in on an established base where food service is already provided/performed/contracted. Therefore, most Soldiers lack the following experience:

- Food service training
- Providing food service in an austere environment
- Operating a force provider expeditionary triple-container kitchen (ETK)

Planning meals and ration cycles has not been exercised recently because there is very limited space for food service functions in force provider units. The ETK system, however, is designed to feed 150 personnel, three times a day, in a confined space and can be operated by ETK-trained personnel, who are also familiar with meal/ration cycle planning (see Appendix A for more information).

Best Practices: Provide ETK training and conduct meal/ration cycle planning before deployment. Vigorous training will lead to system familiarization and proper use.

Observation: Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) capabilities are critical to humanitarian assistance missions.

Discussion: Having LOGCAP capabilities (i.e., contracts, pre-awarded task orders) on the shelf as part of a planning tool when responding to a humanitarian assistance operation is critical. The ability to rapidly respond to an emerging crisis with a pre-existing LOGCAP capability will significantly decrease the time to build infrastructure as well as place U.S. military boots on ground.

Best Practice: LOGCAP capabilities should be available and ready to leverage within the ground component commander's theater of operations. The ability to leverage this capability rapidly will enable forces to respond quicker to a crisis operation.

Observation: Make sure each team has enough noncommissioned officers.

Use noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and civilians to knock down the barriers for their bosses. Ensure there is a proper mix of NCOs within each team.

Observation: Complete theater-entry requirements early to ensure timely movement.

U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) and Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) had specific theater entry and mission preparation requirements for both theater entry and support of Operation United Assistance. These requirements are both medical and non-medical and require time to complete. Reserve and National Guard units' ability to access required vaccinations/medical screenings and funding for additional training requirements to facilitate a smooth deployment historically has been difficult. Therefore, ensure that a thorough review and scrub of HQDA and USAFRICOM requirements are completed and a detailed execution matrix is completed to inform the orders process and ensure all predeployment and theater entry requirements can be met in a timely manner to support movement of personnel and the mission.

Observation: Leverage strategic enablers to ensure mission success.

OUA was a crisis response operation executed through multiple strategic, operational, and tactical-level enablers. The U.S. Transportation Command's Joint Task Force-Port Opening, Army Materiel Command, Defense Logistics Agency (material and energy), and Contracting Support Brigade were vital to "setting the theater" within 40 days and ensuring mission success for follow-on forces.

Observation: Plan for adequate religious support facilities.

Sacred space to conduct worship, counseling, and other day-to-day religious support activities was unattainable. Shared facilities with Morale, Welfare, and Recreation did not meet the requirement for sacred space.

Discussion: Despite constant requests to bring in a containerized chapel, which is designed for expeditionary operations, the space and life support requirements exceeded the capacity that the J-4 planner was able to accommodate based on the capacity guidelines in the Joint operations area.

Best Practice: Based on mission requirements and constraints, consider including sacred space (containerized chapel) to fit in a force-provider 150 package.

Appendix A

Force Provider Expeditionary Triple-Container Kitchen (ETK)



Figure A-1.

Force provider ETK capabilities include the following:

- Provides three meals per day for a minimum of 150 personnel; operated by two people.
- Each container folds out to 18 feet in length; takes 30 minutes to setup with two personnel.
- On-board sanitation system with grease separator provides full sanitation capability.
- Uses all commercial off-the-shelf appliances:
 - Traulsen, UC2HT 18.5-cubic-foot refrigerator.
 - Groen TDB/6 2.5-gallon steam-jacketed kettle.
 - Wells G13 2-foot griddle.
 - Acc-U-Temp S6 Steam-N-Hold oven.
 - Alto-Shaam 500TH-II cook and hold ovens (two each).
 - Crathco D25 double-bowl beverage dispenser.
 - Bunn CDF-15 coffee brewer with hot water capabilities.

- Environmentally controlled.
- Modular/scalable to meet any mission.
- Easily interfaces with any base camp or operates as a stand-alone system.
- Can support smaller expeditionary units in an austere environment.
- Containerized and preconfigured, facilitating movement by any combination, air and sea.
- Highly mobile, weighs less than 10,000 pounds, sling load, and fork-liftable.

Appendix B

Acronyms

| | |
|---------------|--|
| ACSA | Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement |
| AFL | Armed Forces of Liberia |
| CMU | concrete masonry unit |
| COR | contract officer representative |
| DNBI | disease and non-battle injury |
| DOD | Department of Defense |
| ETK | expeditionary triple-container kitchen |
| ETU | Ebola treatment unit |
| EVD | Ebola virus disease |
| FOO | field ordering officer |
| GSO | General Services Office |
| HA/DR | humanitarian assistance/disaster response |
| HQDA | Headquarters, Department of the Army |
| JFC | Joint Force Commander |
| JPASE | Joint public affairs support element |
| JRRB | Joint Requirements Review Board |
| JTF | Joint Task Force |
| KM | knowledge management |
| LNO | liaison officer |
| LOGCAP | Logistic Civil Augmentation Program |
| LSA | life support area |
| NCO | noncommissioned officer |
| NDU | National Defense University |
| NGO | non-governmental organization |
| OCSCC | Operational Contract Support Coordination Cell |
| OEF | Operation Enduring Freedom |
| OIF | Operation Iraqi Freedom |
| OOL | Operation Onward Liberty |
| OUA | Operation United Assistance |
| PAO | public affairs officer |
| PM | project manager |
| SLE | Soldier leader engagement |
| SPOT | Synchronized Predeployment Operational Tracker |
| TBC | theater business clearance |
| TPE | theater provided equipment |
| TTP | tactics, techniques, and procedures |
| UN | United Nations |

| | |
|------------------|---|
| USACE | U.S. Army Corps of Engineers |
| USAFRICOM | U.S. Africa Command |
| USAID | U.S. Agency for International Development |
| USARAF | U.S. Army Africa |

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
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