



# HANDBOOK



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## Joint Forces Command Operation United Assistance Case Study

*Lessons and Best Practices*

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# **Joint Forces Command – Operation United Assistance Case Study**

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## Foreword

Speaking before the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention regarding the Ebola outbreak in West Africa on 16 SEP 2014, President Barack Obama stated: “I’m announcing a major increase in our response. At the request of the Liberian government, we’re going to establish a military command center in Liberia to support civilian efforts across the region — similar to our response after the Haiti earthquake. It’s going to be commanded by Major General Darryl Williams, commander of our Army forces in Africa. He just arrived today and is now on the ground in Liberia. And, our forces are going to bring their expertise in command and control, in logistics, in engineering. And, our Department of Defense (DOD) is better at that, our Armed Services are better at that than any organization on Earth.” This Presidential Directive set in motion an operation that was the first U.S. military response to a pandemic since the influenza pandemic of 1918-1919.

The challenges of opening the Liberian theater were somewhat unique to this mission; however, future operations to the continent of Africa, and worldwide, will no doubt benefit from the experiences of U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), U.S. Army Africa (USARAF), and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). This operation demonstrated the efforts and flexibility offered by DOD joint and strategic elements during Joint Forces Command–Operation United Assistance (JFC-OUA).

The unique challenges and obstacles highlighted in this handbook stem from both conducting a large-scale military operation in West Africa and a slightly diminished ability of the U.S. Army to conduct theater-setting activities in an austere, expeditionary environment.

The intent of this handbook is to document how USAFRICOM, USARAF, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), and other DOD organizations were able to safely and effectively complete the missions in Liberia despite conducting operations in one of the highest-risk areas of the globe for infectious disease. The operation presented multiple, positive takeaways, but there also were major challenges and lessons learned

from this experience. These challenges and lessons learned should be re-examined to prepare for the eventual response by DOD elements during future pandemics and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations. Based on information drawn from various sources including after action reports, lessons learned, case studies, umbrella-week visits, and key-leader interviews, this publication highlights some of the successes and unique challenges experienced by members associated with JFC-OUA.

Our hope is that this handbook will serve as a reference guide for future commanders and planners and provide “food for thought” as to types of unique circumstances they can anticipate or encounter, especially when working in austere, expeditionary environments such as Liberia.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Paul P. Reese". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, prominent initial "P".

Paul P. Reese  
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## Chapter 1

# The Army Service Component Command in Operation United Assistance

### Overview

The Department of the Army chose the Southern European Task Force to become the Army component headquarters for U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) in December 2008. Subsequently, U.S. Army Africa (USARAF) was designated as the Army Service component command (ASCC) for USAFRICOM in January 2012. The USAFRICOM commander directed USARAF to focus on four major tasks:

- Supporting ongoing operations
- Fulfilling Title 10, U.S. Code, responsibilities
- Executing theater security cooperation missions
- Deploying joint task force-capable headquarters

USARAF, without assigned forces and the typical theater enablers, was presented a challenge in accomplishing its diverse missions. From its inception, USARAF has been dependent on other organizations, regionally aligned forces (RAF), and the global force management process to accomplish its mission. Operation United Assistance (OUA) provided a good laboratory in which to study the present theater army concept and to consider where it needs adjusting or modification in the future.

The theater army's doctrinal role centering on setting the theater refers to Phase "0" (the shaping phase) of the six-phase joint operation construct. This phase of the geographic combatant commander's theater campaign plan aims to organize and align operations, activities, events, and investments in time, space, and purpose to achieve a strategic effect rather than an operational effect. These shaping operations include joint, multinational, and interagency coordination; military engagement and security cooperation; deterrence; and other shaping or preventive activities. The Army, via the theater army, is the only Service with the capability and capacity to provide the combatant commander with most requirements for setting the theater. These requirements include sustainment preparation of the theater, theater security cooperation, and integration of operational contract support.

USARAF was directed by its geographic combatant command, USAFRICOM, to coordinate logistics, training, and engineering support to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in West

Africa and to assist in the U.S. government's overall foreign humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) efforts to contain the spread of Ebola virus disease (EVD). This was a part of the international assistance effort supporting the governments of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea. The USAID mission to combat the EVD outbreak has been very successful, and the partnering in this unified action should stand as an example of what is possible. U.S. government leadership, with Department of Defense (DOD) support, has encouraged other nations, the international community, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in a global effort to provide assistance. OUA required the rapid response of DOD utilizing the unique skills and abilities of the military, but more importantly, DOD was in a supporting role. The DOD logistics, mobility, and transportation capacities were crucial factors in the ongoing success of what has become the largest U.S. military operation in support of infectious disease control.

### **Supporting Unified Action Partners**

HA/DR missions require Joint and Army forces to operate as a supporting command; being a good follower is critical to achieving success when DOD is not the lead agency. Army and DOD leaders are accustomed to functioning in a supporting role. However, they are not accustomed to being a supporting command for another government agency — this was the case for USARAF as it responded to the Ebola crisis — where they were supporting the Department of State, civilian organizations, other governments, and other government agencies. These organizations and task forces, made up of multinational and interagency organizations, often do not have clearly-defined decision-making processes. This is challenging to military organizations that are accustomed to making decisions and quickly acting. Planning and decision making are military strengths, and there is an opportunity for military leaders to provide leadership in this area without taking over the process. They can identify decision points and provide products to the committee or lead organization to help the process. If ideas and products are presented in a spirit of humility, they often are gladly received, as most members of the group are working toward similar goals and are eager to make decisions and get to work.

Supporting a civilian agency presents unique challenges. Army staffs are trained to operate in a more structured environment. These staffs tend to take a lack of structure as an opportunity to take charge, and this leads to friction with the lead federal agency. In OUA, the command recognized this cognitive dissonance and worked to insert ideas and suggestions in a multi-agency/multinational planning, operational, and execution process with diplomatic skill. It should be noted that this is an art Army leaders do not practice sufficiently (if at all), nor are there formal means of measure. U.S. Army commanders and staffs are used to being in charge and directing activities, not working “behind the scenes” to offer expertise and ideas

in a manner that is not directive or overbearing to the supported agencies and host nation. DOD can assist in synchronizing all of the on-the-ground tactical-type actions in providing an operational framework linked to the host nation's strategic goals and objectives.

The battle rhythm was critical. Managing it to have key leaders from the command team attend all daily engagements with the U.S. Embassy, government of Liberia, NGOs, and other partners was crucial to a successful Ebola response. Key leaders must be posted in the Liberian Emergency Operations Coordination Cell to interact on a daily basis and become a known entity that is relied and called on to shape decisions and actions.

Key points include the following:

- Send proper representatives to all meetings of the country team, disaster assistance response team, and USAID. Army forces needed to understand everything that USAID understands.
- Key leaders should attend the Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Planner's Course held by National Defense University (NDU) prior to deployment. Check with NDU for course description, prerequisites, and availability. For more information, go to <http://jfsc.ndu.edu/Academics/JointInteragencyMultinationalPlannersCourse.aspx>.
- Liaison officers (LNOs) should be the best qualified people with the most experience in these settings, not the most expendable. In planning LNO assignments, the rank structure probably will not follow a traditional modified table of organization and equipment structure. Experience and the ability to work among a group must be key considerations for selecting personnel for this type of mission.

## **Leveraging Joint and Strategic Partners**

OUA required the rapid response of DOD utilizing the unique skills and abilities of the military. The DOD's logistics abilities, specifically in the mobility/transportation vein, set it apart from every other organization in the world. USAFRICOM and USARAF etched a place in history by being part of the largest U.S. military operation in support of foreign infectious disease control. Integral to this effort was "theater opening," an inherent mission under the purview of the ASCC. The ability of the ASCC to accomplish this mission for DOD enables the U.S. government to confront a range of contingencies worldwide in support of the policy.

A critical aspect to theater opening is ensuring that the ASCC is properly structured and resourced to meet the most likely policy requirements for the region. Despite resource challenges, USARAF achieved immediate impact, without subordinate forces, by utilizing joint and strategic partners during OUA to contain this epidemic. In 30 days, while serving jointly as

the ASCC and the Joint Forces Command (JFC), USARAF established two mobile laboratories and the 25-bed Monrovia Medical Unit; laid the foundations for building, managing, and sustaining Ebola treatment units (ETUs); established life support areas; opened aerial and seaports of debarkation; and emplaced the framework necessary to sustain the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) mission without any assigned subordinate forces. The successes and challenges of opening the Liberian theater are somewhat unique to this mission; however, future operations on the continent of Africa and worldwide no doubt will benefit from the efforts of USARAF and the flexibility that DOD, joint, and strategic elements brought to bear.

The Africa area of responsibility (AOR) encompasses 54 countries, numerous governance challenges, significant land mass, harsh weather, limited infrastructure, poor lines of communication, and zero permanently assigned/stationed U.S. logistics forces. USARAF's lack of assigned logistics enablers creates daily requirements for submitting requests for support, assistance, and friendly forces to accomplish complex joint missions throughout the continent. The non-habitual nature of support in Africa limits continuity of effort and familiarity with the nations involved and their procedures, overall complicating and delaying operations during planning and execution. U.S. interests in Africa are extensive in terms of enhancing stability, protecting U.S. personnel and property, and maintaining an ability to react to contingency operations, including epidemic and HA/DR operations. The request for forces process does not allow for the immediate deployment of logistical personnel and units to the continent without going through complex and lengthy request and approval processes. It is essential for a theater opening force to have ready access to logistics enablers early in the operation to set the stage for support of follow-on forces. In the case of USARAF, these enablers were available only through a joint logistics enterprise.

### **Planning**

The USARAF operational planning team (OPT) effectively and efficiently conducted crisis action planning (CAP) in support of OUA. It did this through simultaneous conceptual and detailed planning efforts. This effort also performed the rapid assimilation of sister-Service augmentation planners into the OPT and conducted collaborative planning efforts with various strategic- and operational-level commands. The OPT leveraged intellectual doctrine tools for its use to frame the EVD problem and subsequently provided the commander viable options to accomplish the USARAF mission.

First, the OPT conducted conceptual planning using Army design methodology, executed detailed planning using a hybrid of the military decisionmaking process and the joint operation planning processes, and used the adaptive planning and execution system as the construct for orders production.

Second, USARAF quickly assimilated sister-Service planners into the OPT through efficient integration processes, leveraging planning enablers on station for a Lion Focus-14 exercise, and maximized efforts within the OPT to task-organize planners congruent with subject matter expertise.

Third, the OPT was dynamic in its approach to collaborative planning with strategic- and operational-level commands to organize combat power through force tailoring, task organizing, and the establishment of mutual support.

The USARAF G-35 (political-military staff) established an OPT, 18 AUG 2014, to gather information regarding Ebola in West Africa — specifically, EVD effects on the countries of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea. Reporting during this time frame suggested more than 2,400 men, women, and children were suspected to have died. Additionally, clinics and treatment centers were overwhelmed, with public health-care systems at maximum capacity. According to open-source reports, patients were turned away from treatment centers and people were dying in the streets. As a result, Ebola was characterized as an epidemic never seen before and spiraling out of control. In turn, the OPT commenced an analysis of Ebola's devastation to West Africa; this analysis facilitated conceptual planning.

The OPT lead was identified from the USARAF (G-35) future operations (FUOPS) branch, and the team comprised functional subject matter experts from intelligence, logistics, medical, signal communications, staff judge advocate, operational protection, public affairs, information operations, engineering, human resources, and civil affairs. Problem framing is a precept of conceptual planning, which assisted the OPT with gaining situational understanding and awareness of Ebola's effects on the West African countries of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea. This allowed the OPT to analyze the elements of operational art, as Ebola was an ill-structured and ill-defined problem for the USARAF OPT to define for operational-approach development.

Because there was limited strategic guidance issued during the onset of conceptual planning, the OPT focused on understanding the operational environment (OE) within the EVD-affected countries. The USARAF (G-2) OPT increased understanding of the OE through analyses of the countries' political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure

elements. The OPT focused on creating situational understanding, which was vital for subsequent planning efforts to develop an operational approach. Additionally, the OPT used theory, history, and doctrine to develop a conceptual planning framework to facilitate development of an operational approach to counter EVD.

The OPT transitioned from an ASCC-centric planning element into a JFC-OUA planning team. The USARAF planning team effectively and efficiently conducted CAP in support of OUA through a demonstrated mastery of operational art.

USARAF focused its utilization of operational art constructs through simultaneous conceptual and detailed planning efforts; rapid assimilation of sister-Service augmentation planners into the OPT; and collaborative planning efforts with various strategic- and operational-level commands.

### **Currency Issues in an Austere Environment**

The ASCC logistics/contracting planners should prepare to have currency (cash) on hand in austere environments — having enough trained field ordering officers (FOOs) and pay-agent teams to cover all remote areas and handle potential small purchases was a huge success story. Plan for this in advance of deployment, and organize a training program to bring the right number of personnel, based on mission analysis, up to speed.

In West Africa, it is not unusual for economies to be cash-centric. Most areas of Liberia, especially remote ones, operate on a cash-only basis in U.S. dollars. Operating in remote sites requires FOOs and pay-agent teams trained by contracting and finance, respectively. Sufficient teams must be identified, trained, and appointed prior to deployment to cover all JTF needs. Sufficient cash must be available and movable with necessary safeguards within theater. Even in populated areas, local vendors might not accept electronic-funds transfers; provisions must be made for cash payment in these areas, as well.

### **Permissive Environment Mindset Adjustment**

Operating in a permissive environment in a sovereign nation presents unique challenges. Many Soldiers still have the Iraq or Afghanistan “mindset” in which the U.S. military operates relatively freely in an unconstrained or non-permissive environment. In a permissive environment, U.S. forces do not have the option of going wherever they like and occupying whatever land or facilities the unit wants, out of military necessity. It is essential that the U.S. military secures the necessary permissions from the appropriate authorities (i.e., national ministries, county commissioners, and local government entities) before U.S. forces use or occupy an area. If it is a privately owned or controlled area, U.S.

forces must enter into an appropriate agreement with that private entity. The U.S. Embassy can facilitate linkages with host nation and private entities, as needed.

In the case of land-use agreements for privately owned or controlled areas, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is the initial linkage to contact and negotiate with proper authorities. It is vital that the approval authority is synchronized with the operation and available to make decisions on the same timeline.

It is critical to understand the applicable limitations and constraints when operating in a permissive environment, especially as they pertain to gaining authorities to lease land. When operating in an austere environment and land-lease approval authority is not available to work a solution with the forces, authorities should be delegated to a trained and certified land-lease agreement authority resident within the force. This saves valuable time and effort when both are at a premium. **Note:** Those who conduct joint collaboration services for a geographic combatant command or other exercises have experience in coordinating support in a permissive environment.

## Relationships

Relationships are key to success in an HA/DR operation. Interaction with the U.S. Embassy at all levels is necessary for this type of operation — in fact, the country team is “running the show.” When deploying personnel, equipment, and supplies to a sovereign nation in a permissive environment, there are numerous factors to be considered. In relation to equipment and supplies, the U.S. Embassy general services officer (GSO) is the conduit between DOD and the host nation logistics enablers. The GSO manages physical resources and logistical functions, which include acquisition and supply-chain operations. The GSO facilitates coordination with customs, police, transportation, and the appropriate ministries. All flights and ships require advance coordination to arrive.

Prior to the mission, identify one individual responsible for gathering the senior leader’s impressions from engagements. This individual must have access to the senior leader after each engagement. Based on the senior leader engagement (SLE) process, the senior leader’s impressions must be collated and added to the USAFRICOM senior commander coordination site (SCCS) within 72 hours. Without adequate feedback, this process is hampered and will not allow the staff coordinating the SLE to adequately assess the engagements.

SLEs are planned interpersonal interactions that achieve a specific effect to accomplish specified objectives. As the Army’s primary leader influence capability, SLEs remain a vital component of achieving the commander’s

objectives. Because of joint manning document and other restrictions, the SLE process during OUA, while effective, took on an ad hoc nature that may have resulted in a less than perfect capturing of the Commanding General's impressions.

The insight is that, even if ad hoc, the importance of these SLEs cannot be overlooked. The SLE process is designed to address emerging challenges, adapt operations, and anticipate new requirements. The process must have continuity and consistency. Because the SLE process is a vital component to mission command, its absence causes information gaps and adversely affects the overall mission.

### **Educating the Theater and Players**

Many unified action partners and Army forces were unaware of what exactly Ebola was. The Ebola virus is difficult to spread because it is transmitted only through bodily fluids of symptomatic patients. Panic associated with the Ebola virus is similar to the fear that people had during the initial phases of the acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) epidemic. U.S. forces have minimal risk of exposure because they are not treating or working with Ebola patients. U.S. forces are supporting USAID in logistical and construction projects.

Units should educate personnel and Families on the Ebola virus and its transmission, with emphasis on the fact that U.S. forces are not exposed to Ebola in the assigned operations. USARAF worked to accomplish this through a series of town hall meetings that were open to Families and the local community. Units must develop anti-malaria tactics, techniques, and procedures early and execute them vigorously. Command emphasis and involvement were key to preventing malaria among USARAF personnel.

Liberia was a new operating environment, and many media and senior leaders failed to grasp the true expeditionary nature of operations on the African continent. They mistakenly relied on their experiences in living with Soldiers on forward operating bases during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OEF/OIF). This created a problem with managing expectations, both for media and public affairs officers outside the area of interest. U.S. forces were accustomed to the OEF/OIF model, which exhibited certain OEF/OIF conditions for every contingency. The lack of infrastructure and life support for international forces dictated a very small footprint. Similarly, there were requests from Defense Media Activity and the American Forces Network-Europe to send teams to provide coverage, without sufficient life support. It was too risky to send these Service members, and their presence could have degraded the overall mission. With a lack of units flowing into theater, the whole concept of embedded media personnel did not match expectations that were created in



OEF/OIF. DOD recognized that this operation was an opportunity for good news stories and supported media operations within existing capabilities as long as doing so did not interfere with operations. Based on the operations, support was limited and the media had to provide their own transportation, subsistence, and security in this uncertain crisis environment.

Importantly, and upon arrival, it was quickly determined that the personnel in Liberia's Public Affairs Office (PAO) lacked sufficient training and education to effectively communicate EVD and/or ETU success stories. The USARAF PAO successfully coached and mentored its Liberian counterparts on proper media engagement, reporting, and writing. USARAF also assisted in drafting a Liberian public affairs guidebook to facilitate the coaching of additional Liberian public affairs personnel.

Within the information domain, nobody is better at creating compelling stories and propagating an effective narrative than a nation's own people. A coached or mentored Liberian PAO is more apt to communicate effectively with other Liberians than a well-trained U.S. PAO because of the Liberian PAO's familiarity with the country's institutions, ideas, and integral relationships that exist among the many individuals and groups involved. Sustaining the coaching and mentoring of the Liberian PAO assists in the unit's synchronized efforts to ultimately shape the security environment of Liberia.

Units deploying to Africa may be required to coach host nation partners on effectively executing public affairs operations. Sustain coaching and mentoring activities and further develop a robust military-to-military public affairs education program in support of overall objectives and capabilities (i.e., don't just do it to do it; make sure it serves a useful purpose and is linked to a strategy). Deploying units also should be prepared to assist ongoing operations, activities, and partnerships by other units and provide services in the area if the requisite public affairs personnel are lacking. Units should ensure that the Armed Forces of Liberia PAO is actively engaged and at the forefront of all Liberian operations, to include media engagements, reporting, and writing on local events.

## **Theater-Entry Medical Waivers**

Thorough predeployment medical screening is absolutely essential prior to deployment to Liberia. The country has virtually no functioning Western-standard medical infrastructure. Prior to the Ebola crisis, the U.S. Embassy in Liberia was one of the most medically evacuated U.S. embassies. Liberia's remote location and limited infrastructure make it extremely difficult to treat or evacuate critically ill or injured patients. Medical evacuation generally takes at least 48 to 96 hours.

Ensure that a thorough predeployment medical screening is conducted on all personnel deploying to Liberia. Deployment waivers should not be considered for any pre-existing medical conditions that could become critical or fatal without access to appropriate care (i.e., pre-existing heart conditions, insulin-dependent diabetes, or required treatments with biological infusions or chemotherapy). Do not confuse enthusiasm with capability.

### **Validating Theater Requirements**

USARAF effectively used the Joint Requirements Review Board (JRRB) to validate logistical requirements. It is important to conduct this board as scheduled with all required contributors in attendance. USARAF should conduct the JRRB three times per week or as the mission dictates. One directorate should be identified as the lead agency. Voting members must be formally identified with a backup. The event should follow the battle rhythm and be tracked closely. Business rules also should be identified early on. Standards and any requisites for presenting a proposal or requirement to the board should be established early and followed throughout.

### **Theater Entry Requirements**

USAFRICOM and Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) had specific theater entry and mission preparation requirements for OUA. Such requirements include both medical and non-medical and require time to complete. Historically, U.S. forces have seen difficulty with U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard units gaining access to required vaccinations and medical screenings and receiving funding for additional training requirements to facilitate a smooth deployment. Therefore, ensure that a thorough review of USAFRICOM and HQDA requirements is conducted and a detailed execution matrix is completed to inform the orders process, and ensure that all predeployment and theater entry requirements are met in a timely manner to support the movement of personnel and the mission.

### **Theater Unique Challenges**

USAFRICOM has no assigned or allocated Army forces that can provide long-term operational mission command or set the theater. With impending headquarters reductions, USARAF will lose the capability to deploy a contingency command post in response to small-scale contingencies and other crises.

USAFRICOM requires forces to rapidly deploy and conduct operations into the AOR; this presents a potential challenge to planners. The current RAF concept precludes an assigned or habitually allocated division headquarters that can respond quickly to any emerging operational requirements of the combatant commander (CCDR). Such a headquarters could possess

expertise on the AOR. As in the original or current RAF concept, this headquarters could be better prepared to execute CCDR requirements. The headquarters also would execute steady-state activities such as security cooperation and contingency planning, training, and execution.

USAFRICOM acts as an economy-of-force combatant command, and Army organizations capable of setting the theater are not assigned to it. Importantly, theater reception, staging, onward movement, and integration are critical aspects of the USAFRICOM AOR due to extreme distances and immature infrastructure across the AOR. It is very difficult to support the daily requirements of USAFRICOM components across an AOR three times the size of the continental United States.



## Chapter 2

### Sustainment

#### Transition to Joint Forces Command

Upon notification of deployment to support Operation United Assistance (OUA), the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) G-4 and 101st Sustainment Brigade staff began coordinating with the G-4 of U.S. Army Africa (USARAF). The immediate deployment of liaison officers and a planning team to Italy was beneficial in the following:

- Developing a request for forces and operation orders.
- Generating situational awareness.
- Establishing an initial relationship between USARAF and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault).

Equipment and personnel flow did not effectively facilitate the buildup of humanitarian assistance power and delayed the transition between USARAF and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). The recommended order-of-force flow is:

- Mission command, for the initial Joint Forces Command (JFC) headquarters to establish command and control and interagency/coalition coordination and accountability.
- Medical, for mobile medical labs and training teams for health providers and Ebola treatment units (ETUs).
- Engineers, for site assessments and construction of ETUs.
- Sustainment, for activities such as the JFC, Monrovia medical unit, laboratory, medical training teams, and ETUs.

After mission analysis and course of action development, the sustainment brigade developed the following mission statement and key tasks for OUA:

**Mission Statement:** 101st Sustainment Brigade supports the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and Joint Force Commander in Liberia during Operation United Assistance (OUA) to assist the U.S. government's foreign humanitarian assistance/disaster relief efforts to contain the Ebola virus disease (EVD) by providing theater opening, theater distribution, and sustainment operations.

The purpose of this mission was to provide mission command of theater logistics across the joint operations area (JOA) in support of USAID's humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) efforts.

Key tasks included the following actions:

- Establish logistics support areas (LSAs) in Liberia.
- Conduct—
  - Sustainment.
  - Distribution operations.
  - Intermediate staging base (ISB) operations.
  - Joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI).

Successful end state of the mission was defined as a task force lifeliner — the theater logistics mission command in the JOA. The ISB is the field operations center, and the theater distribution network is established with ISB, LSA, and JRSOI functions fully operational. At the end of mission, all task force lifeliner Soldiers redeployed to home stations safely with all equipment.

### **Lack of Doctrinal Sustainment Mission Command**

Normal sustainment brigade operations consisted of oversight and reporting to and from a theater sustainment command (TSC) or expeditionary sustainment command (ESC) acting as the forward command post of a TSC. This operation saw a divergence from doctrine with the absence of TSC/ESC control and the implementation of direct control and oversight of sustainment operations within elements of the JFC.

The lack of an organic TSC or ESC limited initial USARAF sustainment planning and affected the mission of the division. USARAF does not have an organic TSC or ESC aligned with the region. The 21st TSC, a U.S. Army Europe element, has a secondary mission of supporting USARAF. The lack of these headquarters put all of the responsibility for planning operations such as OUA on the small staff of the G-4.

The lack of a 200-plus person sustainment headquarters greatly reduced the ability of USARAF to plan and coordinate with sustainment enterprise partners such as the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), DLA, the Air Mobility Command (AMC), and others before, during, and after deployment of forces.


The division relieved the USARAF staff, and the G-4 and 101st Sustainment Brigade staff were required to operate without the support of

these higher headquarters. USARAF, or any other Army Service component command (supporting geographic combatant commands), requires the support of a TSC or ESC to plan and conduct expeditionary operations. The lack of a TSC or ESC required the 101st Brigade to coordinate directly with strategic elements for support in OUA. The 101st Brigade provided area support to all forces in the OUA area of operations. With no TSC or ESC in theater, the 101st Brigade staff had to coordinate directly with USTRANSCOM, the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), AMC, and DLA to ensure that supplies and materiel were in the pipeline to support OUA. In many cases, junior warrant officers and noncommissioned officers worked directly with strategic agencies to mitigate shortages or issues with the quality of supplies coming into theater. This placed a great strain on the unit and impeded the efficient and economical flow of supplies into theater. Sustainment brigades are not organized or manned to perform the role of a TSC or ESC in deployed operations. Future operations require proper doctrinal deployment of sustainment organizations.

### **Leveraging Strategic Partners**

The ability to synchronize operations among the enterprise partners was a key function of single sustainment mission command. The need to plan, execute, and synchronize operations among the partners was a key lesson learned from Iraq and Afghanistan. In turn, enterprise partners established forward capabilities to tie in with the TSC/ESC. The enterprise partners and their forward deployed elements included the following:

- Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff.
- USTRANSCOM.
- AMC, SDDC Director of Mobility Forces, Joint Task Force-Port Opening.
- DLA.
- Army Materiel Command.
- Army Sustainment Command (Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, 405th Army Field Support Brigade) and 414th Contracting Support Brigade (CSB).
- USAFRICOM (channel request process).
- Headquarters, Department of the Army; U.S. Army Forces Command.
- Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (incorporated into the lead service for contracting [LSC] staff).



**Figure 2-1. Bridging strategic to tactical.**

OUA involved an unusual situation in which a sustainment brigade, which normally provides area support to tactical units, reached out directly to the strategic level of the sustainment community to support an operational mission and coordinate use of nongovernmental organization (NGO) forward logistics bases. (See Figure 2-1) The JFC took advantage of World Food Programme (WFP) logistics bases to stage personal protective equipment and non-medical supplies prior to the development of ETUs. This proved advantageous due to the poor highway infrastructure in Liberia (some sites took nearly two weeks to reach over dirt roads) and lack of in-transit visibility of shipments. By coordinating to use WFP’s bases, the JFC avoided any need to establish and man its own forward stockage and distribution points and reduced the uncertainty of whether stocks would be at an ETU in time for the facility to open. One should note that WFP also agreed to last-mile delivery from a forward logistics base to an ETU. A best practice for this type of mission is to tie in with the WFP log cluster and look for efficiencies with existing NGO support systems. Many NGOs, like WFP, have existing facilities and supply systems inside impoverished countries that DOD units can leverage in an HA/DR operation.



## Operational Contract Support

The overall assessment of leaders and staff was that operational contract support (OCS) was successful in providing necessary support to OUA. The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and 101st Sustainment Brigade coordinated for mobile training teams from Fort Lee, VA, to provide contracting officer representative (COR) training to personnel at Fort Campbell, KY, prior to deployment. This training, as well as planning done between the G-4 and 101st Sustainment Brigade OCS teams, was key to preparing for the operation. The 414th CSB in Italy coordinated with the teams and prepared the CORs and 922nd Contingency Contracting Battalion (CCB) at Fort Campbell for deployment. In theater, the division (under the leadership of the assistant division commander-support) established a Joint Requirements Review Board (JRRB) that thoroughly reviewed and prioritized requirements for contracted support. The initiative of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and 101st Sustainment Brigade in preparing OCS and COR personnel for deployment was key to an overall successful contracting process in OUA. Excellent support from the 414th CSB and 922nd CCB also was noteworthy.

The JFC elected to use host nation transportation assets for the following reasons:

- **Familiarity with routes.** On multi-day transits (ETUs were located in the far southwest of the country), these drivers could provide for their own lodging, fuel, food, and security. Use of military assets would require cleared areas to remain overnight and access fuel points, would require additional security, and would increase the risk to forces due to vector-borne disease and unpredictable driving habits.
- **Size and type of host nation assets.** Local vehicles were better suited for the road network than larger, tactical trucks organic to the JFC sustainment brigade. Bridges and mud roads proved a challenge for larger vehicles, and more than once the JFC was obligated to repair “maneuver damage” to roads due to tactical vehicle traffic.
- **Local driving habits.** Given Service members’ unfamiliarity with the driving habits of the Liberians, employing host-nation carriers negated the chance that a military convoy would be involved in an accident with a civilian automobile.



After being alerted for an HA/DR mission, determine availability and dependability of host-nation assets during the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process to minimize requirements for transportation assets, drivers, life support, and security needed to perform long-haul convoy missions.

Two major best practices emerged on the employment of OCS:

- Implementation of the JRRB was a single-source manager for contract requirements.
- The 414th CSB commander served as the senior contracting official, Installation Support Office, USARAF/Southern European Task Force (part of LSC).

## Operational Contract Support in Operation United Assistance

Training provided by the Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology-Integration Office included integration with the Operational Contract Support Integration Cell, roles and responsibilities of OCS team members, effective contract management procedures, market research, ethics, COR management, field ordering officer, and pay agent overview. The training provided the foundation for the 101st Sustainment Brigade’s OCS to develop policies and procedures for contracting management and deliver oversight while operating in the theater. (See Figure 2-2)

 <b>Contracting / OCS</b> 	
<b>DOTMLPF p</b>	
<b>Observations, Insights, Lessons</b>	<b>Recommendations:</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Trained contracting officer representatives (CORs); more is better</li> <li>• Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid funding restraints</li> <li>• Developing Joint Requirements Review Board (JRRB) processes</li> <li>• Operational Contract Support (OCS) training for predeployment</li> <li>• Logistics civil augmentation program (LOGCAP)-COR reporting requirements</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Flexible COR/OCS mobile training teams for short-notice deployments</li> <li>• Follow-on 3C course for Combined Logistics Captains Career Course (CLC3)</li> <li>• Developing JRRB processes</li> <li>• Additional skill identifier management</li> <li>• Document JRRB processes and standard operating procedure</li> </ul>

**Figure 2-2. Contracting/OCS.**

## **Medical and Mortuary Affairs Training**

The overall assessment of leaders was that the predeployment medical training provided to all personnel was excellent. The training on use and removal of personal protective equipment ensured that Soldiers had confidence in the equipment and their ability to operate with it in theater.

Once in theater, the 101st Sustainment Brigade established relationships with other agencies and was able to enhance the training of mortuary affairs specialists by having public health service personnel provide additional training on handling contaminated remains and establishing mortuary affairs stations that minimized the potential for Ebola transmission. The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and 101st Sustainment Brigade provided outstanding predeployment and in-theater training in medical and mortuary affairs.

## **Low-Density Military Occupational Skills**

Certain expeditionary skills need to be emphasized for enhanced deployability. During the past years of war, units have deployed with only portions of the modified table of organization and equipment property (primarily transportation and ammunition tracking) and have fallen in on theater-provided equipment. This type of deployment significantly reduces transportation and load-planning tasks normally performed by brigade mobility warrant officers and unit movement officers. The division transportation officer (G-4) was challenged with translating data in the Transportation Coordinator-Automated Information Management System (TC-AIMS) and inserting unit movement lists (UMLs) into the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System, which could be used by strategic planners at USTRANSCOM. Unit-level data was not always entered to standard or accurate, which required plans to be redone numerous times. Therefore, unit-level deployment exercises should emphasize the accuracy of TC-AIMS and UML data.

Restrictions in the continental United States (CONUS) limit the effectiveness of training for some low-density military occupational skills. These CONUS restrictions, and the limitations of some installations, prevented effective predeployment training for water and fuel-handling specialists in the 101st Sustainment Brigade. For example, the reverse-osmosis water purification units cannot be used at Fort Campbell due to a lack of lakes or other bodies of water. Additionally, certain chemicals used in treating water and fuel cannot be used in CONUS. As a result, training was required after Soldiers arrived in theater, which was conducted quickly and efficiently by leaders in the 101st Brigade. Although there was no significant impact on the mission, future operations should involve a way

to train these Soldiers prior to deployment to alleviate any unforeseen problems once in theater. Identifying training requirements that cannot be conducted at home station prior to deployment, and finding ways to mitigate this, is important to expeditionary operations.

Understanding the operational environment is critical to sustainment operations in underdeveloped countries. Although the 101st Sustainment Brigade expected problems with water and fuel quality in West Africa, brigade personnel experienced a worst-case scenario in finding acceptable water sources after arriving in country, even with the use of the brigade's reverse-osmosis water purification systems.

Fuel sources also proved to be problematic, in spite of strong support by DLA — the quality of vehicle and aviation gasoline was substandard. Fuel handlers had to do extensive testing and treatment of fuel to ensure that it met required standards for use in U.S. military vehicles and aircraft.

When planning for water and fuel operations in underdeveloped nations, expect the worst and prepare for even worse standards of quality. Only well-trained water and fuel specialists, with proper testing and treatment capabilities, can sustain the force in these environments.

## Chapter 3

### Mission Command

“Our mission was to support the lead federal agency, USAID, by providing our unique military capabilities to help contain the virus and reduce the spread of Ebola in Liberia, and to execute our tasks with speed and flexibility that would not only help build confidence among Liberians that the virus could be defeated, but also to help garner the support of the international community to also assist in the fight against this disease.”

— MG Gary J. Volesky, Commanding General,  
101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)

#### Mission

Joint Forces Command-Operation United Assistance (JFC-OUA) supported the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in Liberia to assist the U.S. government’s foreign humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) efforts in containing Ebola virus disease (EVD) and preventing it from spreading outside of the region. U.S. efforts also alleviated human suffering and promoted internal and regional stability.

The primary purpose of this operation was to support the U.S. government’s EVD response effort to increase the ability and capacity of the government of Liberia (GOL) to educate and care for its citizens and create conditions for the GOL and other stakeholders to assume responsibility for a sustainable EVD response.

JFC-OUA was not the supported command; the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) instead was supporting the USAID/Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) effort, and those agencies in turn supported the GOL. The division operated in a collaborative atmosphere, building trust and confidence among the international community, GOL, and unified action partners (UAPs).

Critical to the effort was implementing force health protection measures to prevent U.S. personnel in Liberia from becoming exposed to EVD and other infectious diseases. Training a sufficient number of health-care workers to operate Ebola treatment units (ETUs) was the line of effort (LOE) that allowed the U.S. government to work itself out of a job. Providing oversight of construction and resupply of up to 19 ETUs enabled these trained health-care workers to get the job done.

Army laboratories conducted blood-sample testing with reduced testing result times. This enabled the command to get ahead of trends, transition support activities to designated entities, and redeploy, which set the stage for mission accomplishment.

In the end, the Commanding General wanted conditions set for U.S. government agencies, the host nation (HN), and other international organizations to effectively manage the Liberian EVD response.

Operations




Figure 3-1. Operational planning approach.

The buildup of forces began 19 SEP 2014, and the transition of authority between U.S. Army Africa (USARF) and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) was initiated 25 OCT 2014. Force strength peaked at 3,600 Soldiers by late December 2014.

USARAF determined the people of Liberia as the center of gravity (COG). The premise was to reduce the number of people dying from EVD. USARAF established four objectives to reach its COG (see Figure 3-1, Page 23):

- Support base established and functional.
- All requested ETUs constructed and functional.
- Medical training established and functional.
- Conditions set for JFC transfer.

USARAF also established four lines of operation to achieve its objectives:

- Mission command
- Engineering support
- Medical (training) support
- Sustainment

The phasing construct, however, was not viable as operations were conducted simultaneously versus sequentially along LOEs. Additionally, the main effort in time and space was the establishment of medical laboratories (i.e., the Monrovia Medical Unit) and ETUs.

Figure 3-2 (next page) depicts the operational concept of the mission.






Figure 3-2. Operation United Shield concept.

The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) G-3 enhanced information exchange and understanding by pushing liaison officers (LNOs) from the G-3 staff to USARAF and U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) within 10 days of receiving the warning order (WARNORD) that included aviation, operations, logistics, and engineer representation. The G-3 also sent 11

LNOs to the USARAF main headquarters in Vicenza, Italy, and two LNOs to USAFRICOM headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany.

A key aspect of the training addressed information sharing with mission partners, especially the need to write for unclassified release of information and using open networks to both communicate and coordinate missions among the stakeholders.

The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) also sent personnel to USARAF as staff embeds shortly after receiving the WARNORD. Two weeks later, a team from the embedded personnel was sent to Liberia. The team included an aviator, an operations officer, an engineer, a logistics officer, and the operations sergeant major. This team was sent forward to coordinate with the Office of Security Cooperation within the U.S. Embassy. Tasks included identifying and securing permission for the location of the JFC headquarters and subordinate units.

The commander set conditions early on, ensuring the staff understood that the JFC was in support of the lead federal agency (USAID) in an HA/DR operation. Several factors helped the staff throughout the operation, including the commander's guidance to maintain focus on the end state and a clear understanding of the JFC mission. Additionally, USAFRICOM's actions clearly nested the JFC's operations with the GOL and lead federal agency objectives. When the JFC staff interacted with USAID/DART, staff members acknowledged USAID as the lead agency. Further, the staff was proactive in taking steps to determine what the staff was doing well and what should change to improve integration and synchronization with mission partners.

The three most important aspects of working with UAPs are building a team, gaining consensus, and communicating. If these are done well, almost every other issue or problem can be dealt with. USAID was the JFC's primary mission partner as JFC-OUA was in support. The planning efforts were synchronized through mission tasking matrix requests at the daily JFC-OUA synchronization and requirements meeting.

The Liberia Ministry of Health (MoH) established the National Ebola Command Center (NECC). The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) used operations and civil affairs (CA) team members as LNOs within the NECC to collaborate and share information with UAPs. Division leadership recognized that the multitude of mission partners and stakeholders all had a different understanding of the operational environment (OE), primarily the infection and death rates from EVD. Because tracking infection and death rates was central to demonstrating a successful response to EVD, the division focused its efforts on how to develop a common understanding of the data across mission partners.

The biggest hurdle initially was “normalizing the data”; that is to say, getting the data to function as a tool of understanding instead of confusion and disagreement. Getting up-front consensus among stakeholders on the baseline data to be used is critical. The focus was on normalizing the data among UAPs so it was usable and understandable. The division intelligence officer was charged with managing and normalizing the data and successfully gained consensus among UAPs.

Educating the staff was a good start to identifying what the knowledge gaps were and filling them. Techniques to educate the staff included, but were not limited to, the following:

- Formal academics (i.e., Mission Command Training Center; Center for Army Lessons Learned).
- Training teams from the division staff.
- Primaries giving “block and tackle” session to subordinates.
- Smart books.
- Special topic classes.
- Use of LNOs to close gaps.
- Leveraging senior leader experience.

Setting the theater refers to a broad range of actions necessary to employ land power before and during a crisis. The most important activity the Army Service component command (ASCC) conducts is theater assessment. Other important ASCC activities included development of bases; theater opening; reception, staging, onward movement, and integration; Army support to other services; Department of Defense (DOD) combatant command support agent requirements; and other sustainment-related support in the area of responsibility (AOR).

## **Command**

Finding current data on Liberia and the situation was problematic. The latest available detailed information was from U.S. Marine Corps operations in 2008. Subsequently, the division, during its planning phase, decided to “go large” in terms of personnel and equipment in order to be prepared for any situation. For example, initial intelligence drove considerations for developing an intermediate staging base course of action due to a lack of space at the Monrovia airport. After further assessments, however, it became apparent that the necessary space needed for aircraft at the airport was available.

USARAF (the ASCC) facilitated situational and key personnel awareness with Liberian politicians and military leadership as well as the U.S. Embassy, helping to set the theater.

There were many unknowns during the early stages of planning. For example, what type of communications package would be needed to ensure reliable communications within and outside of theater? USAFRICOM had coordinated for the Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) to mitigate communications equipment issues, giving the command team an immediate communications capability.

The role of the command group and commanding general took on a strategic leader focus. Engagements with strategic leaders (GOL and the region) were critical to building trust, rapport, and teamwork. As an informational technology tool, the All Partners Access Network (APAN) worked well to provide situational awareness to the UAP team.

Academics throughout the division stress the importance of conveying the message that the DART, under USAID, was in the lead of the overall conduct of operations in countering Ebola and that this was done with the sovereign and well-functioning GOL. Academics also helped to open joint interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM)/nongovernmental organization (NGO)-to-DOD lines of communication prior to arrival of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) in the joint operations area (JOA).

The COG, where collective and collaborative decisions were being made, was the NECC (a three-story building that was converted to an operations center). For the most part, the NECC was the equivalent of a national-level civil-military operations cell (CMOC) or a humanitarian operations center (HOC) and performed as the clearinghouse for all UAPs and those with shared equities in the fight against Ebola.

The HN possessed leadership and real capability, and the United States leveraged these so that wherever possible the HN was in charge, allowing the UAP/international community to focus on working more efficiently together. The MoH meetings at the NECC were very successful. In reality, Liberia was a high-functioning state that was able to pull together the numerous partners and focus efforts for the collective good. Strong Liberian leadership was perhaps the driving factor in the success of the mission.

USARAF and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) worked together, and support to the division was well-received. USARAF leveraged its strengths to support the 101st, such as relationships with strategic leaders and the U.S. ambassador, as well as the use of LNOs in key positions.

The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) made extensive use of LNOs, using experienced and knowledgeable personnel to fill the positions. The

importance of LNOs cannot be overstated in an austere environment and theater in keeping the ASCC “in the loop” when acting as a JFC and thus working directly for the geographic combatant commander. The ASCC still has Army Forces responsibilities and assists the JFC in a number of ways, especially with AOR expertise.

Most unique was the number of LNOs sent from the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) headquarters to other headquarters. Approximately 24 LNOs were sent to USAFRICOM, USARAF, the U.S. Embassy, GOL, NECC, and United Nations (UN). In turn, the division also received 12 LNOs from various other organizations.

Upon notification to deploy, the command element must thoroughly review the joint manning document (JMD) to assess its fit for the operation. In the case of OUA, fewer tactical elements and more public affairs, human resources, contracting, medical, legal, and CA elements were required.

The early entry team must be on the ground quickly to assess the current situation and link up with the HN, and UAPs. The early entry command post (EECP) should be tailored to the specific needs of command and deploy within 72 hours after notification, especially in an austere AOR. It is essential that requirements are identified to include logistics, transportation, communications, land management, and any security concerns. For future planning, the EECP should include staff members from contracting, the G-4, Class A agents (G-8), G-6, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (for ports), engineers, and UAP LNOs.

The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) conducted a mission rehearsal exercise facilitated by the Army’s Mission Command Training Program (MCTP). The MCTP gathered several agencies and retired generals with experience as joint force commanders conducting HA/DR operations in support of a lead federal agency. The training provided the staff insight into UAPs and the UN cluster system for coordinating operations. The staff developed a clear understanding that USAID was the lead federal agency and that the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), as the JFC, would be in support. The training helped to clarify USAID and GOL LOEs and campaign objectives.

The previous work developing and training on command post (CP) processes to include battle rhythm, terms of reference, staff duties and responsibilities, the military decisionmaking process, and targeting process paid off in preparing the staff for proficient CP operations.

Once in country, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) G-2 and Chief of Staff recognized the Ebola virus as the main threat instead of traditional threats. With that understanding, analysts’ efforts were refocused. Analysts

were allocated to the NECC, where they produced products and assessments used by the GOL and all the way to Washington, D.C. Because of the vast planning effort, the Chief of Staff would bolster both the future operations (G-35) and plans shops (G-5).

## Knowledge Management

**Observations.** Unclassified multi-agency and joint operations required a public facing portal.

Public facing portal: Establishment of a portal that can be accessed by UAPs and subordinate units is essential; this should occur prior to deployment to facilitate planning.

All Partners Access Network (APAN): The command made a conscious decision to develop an Ebola common operating picture. The division used the All Partners Access Network, at <https://www.apan.org>. (This unclassified website tool can be used for exercises, foreign HA/DR, and conference or work group activities.) The APAN website provided a rapid, real-time communications medium that facilitated information sharing, enhanced situational awareness, and decreased response times for all UAPs participating in OUA.

Further, the Commanding General and the command group enhanced their strategic leader focus by conducting key-leader engagements to improve situational awareness and information sharing. Engagements with strategic leaders (GOL officials and military, the U.S. Ambassador, U.S. government officials, and UAPs) were critical to building trust, rapport and teamwork, foundations to collaboration, and synchronization of lines of effort to achieve common goals.

Knowledge management representatives: All sections had knowledge management representatives to post and maintain section data for sharing and distribution of information.

Quality control: Data posted to sites with agency and public access needed to be checked for accuracy.

After action reports: As a best practice for the U.S. Army, after action report requirements and procedures consistently produced positive results.

**Discussion.** APAN needs be the primary knowledge-sharing site for all HA/DR missions. Combatant commands (COCOMs) should maintain an APAN site/site template ready for disaster response within the AOR. This would enable COCOM staff to have trained and proficient site owners to become familiar with APAN prior to receipt of mission. Integrate APAN, both the site and APAN tech team, into training exercises (i.e., CP exercise, warfighter exercise, etc.). This enables COCOM site owners and staff to refine the APAN standard operating procedure and its use prior to the high operational tempo of a disaster response mission (HA/DR).

Intelink provided a common access card (CAC)-enabled SharePoint platform to collaborate and disseminate information across the JFC JOA. Any personnel with a DOD CAC card can view the JFC-OUA portal. This allows reachback capabilities to the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) rear staff in the continental U.S. (CONUS) for information sharing and collaboration.

**Lesson Learned.** Operations that occur in an unclassified environment and require information sharing with UAPs, governmental organizations, and NGOs benefit from web-based systems that provide easy access to information otherwise restricted to DOD.

### **U.S. Army Africa Portals — Knowledge Management Officer**

**Observations.** The internal portal systems currently meet the needs of the USARAF staff for planning, but are inadequate for supporting operations on the African continent. The current system does not allow for easy reachback, and this creates systemic challenges in the often non-digitized landscape of the African continent.

Additionally, there are new tools that can be developed to meet the needs of the staff (such as business intelligence for G-9). However, the multiple layers of protection isolated portals from the operation and had a decidedly negative effect on information sharing and mission command.

U.S. forces were unable to seamlessly share information with either higher headquarters (USAFRICOM domain), partner headquarters (CONUS domain), or interagency and HN partners. This placed a disproportionate weight on LNOs to access information and then populate through the various information networks. The SIPR-to-NIPR transfer requirements further exacerbated this problem and quickly overwhelmed foreign disclosure officer (FDO) processes.

Available alternate tools did not match the functionality of steady-state systems and were, in some cases, culturally avoided by the audiences with whom U.S. forces desired to share information.

**Discussion.** SharePoint is the system of choice across DOD for use as an information collaboration tool. USARAF has created Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router (NIPR) and SECRET Internet Protocol Router (SIPR) portals for use as a collaborative system for the staff.

**Recommendation.** Humanitarian assistance missions should be planned from inception on the NIPR portal. This significantly reduces FDO requirements and makes any disclosure releases for sharing information more manageable. It also brings partner agencies and HN leaders into the process early, while retaining a degree of security.

The Defense Information Systems Agency authentication services also should be used to enable all CAC users access to the appropriate portals. This action greatly enhances mission command and allows steady-state processes to seamlessly feed the operational requirements as U.S. forces arrive. As a result, all forces will be able to access the NIPR portal.

### **Staff Collaboration — Knowledge Management Officer**

Primary tools for staff collaboration are working groups and operational planning teams as captured by the battle rhythm with priorities enforced by the Joint Operations Center (JOC) under the authority of the Chief of Staff (COS). The primary collection site for products is the operational site portal with the primary responsibility of ensuring flow of information and products to facilitate decision making by the USARAF knowledge management officer.

**Discussion.** USARAF staff collaboration was affected by the following issues during the operation:

- Network domain issues that fractured information storage and retrieval.
- Lack of a battle rhythm event to synchronize the JOC forward element and the JOC rear element (unity of effort).
- Unequal collaboration on working groups between the forward and rear elements.
- Rapid decision-making cycles that quickly outstripped the decision boards normally used to synchronize staff processes.

This combination of elements resulted in a series of ad hoc briefings to key decision makers rather than measured presentation of information and guidance to synchronize the staff. Although U.S. forces had a senior staff that could take the commanding general's intent and develop high-quality results, the ability to better synchronize the staff's abilities enhances future results.

**Recommendation.** The JOC director must own the current operations time frame and be the primary enforcer/delineator of staff efforts. The JOC must have one director for both forward and rear mission command elements who enforces the timeline and collection of products for working groups and serves as the decision-making authority for battle rhythm events that take priority during the operation. Whether this capability is based forward or rear will be dictated by the operational requirements, but the sole JOC director must be the focal point of priority between both elements. Establish a daily event for mission command priority battle rhythm events facilitated by the JOC director with appropriate command leadership in



attendance. Use the decision boards as a clearinghouse for future operations and approval of efforts in a systemized fashion. Proponents also should clear events through the JOC director or COS for inclusion into the board process.

Information portals must be established at the onset of the operation with NIPR or SIPR designated as the primary, and the portals should have universal access whenever possible. This action ensures prioritization of staff actions and synchronization of staff actions, and emplaces a check on critical information, which in turn ensures leader approval and implementation.

### **Communications — Flow of Signal Assets (G-6)**

**Discussion.** Lack of readily available communications support assets and the inability to move the deployable joint command and control (DJC2) into theater early in the operation delayed and limited the establishment of mission command for the joint forces.

USARAF relies on ad hoc and a request for forces (RFF) for communications support, resulting in no standardized communications support. For this operation, there were not enough communications support personnel and equipment front loaded to handle requirements due to USARAF's lack of manning and resourcing and the lag time for the RFF process to obtain additional assets. The only assets that arrived quickly were the contingency CP shipboard non-tactical automated data processing system terminal and the JCSE rapid-reaction kit teams. These assets had to support all growing requirements until RFF forces could arrive. As a result, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) was unable to set the theater for mission command with flexible and scalable communications. Additionally, the DJC2 and RFF forces were mistakenly delayed due to competing lift assets.

**Recommendation.** The Army needs to field and man a modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) communications capability that bridges the gap between a Blackberry and a WIN-T. This should include an initial entry capability that is transportable by individuals on a commercial airline ticket. It should be able to expand to provide increased support as mission requirements grow to build a theater communications network that is flexible and scalable.

Without these capabilities, mission command in Phase 0 through Phase 2 continues to rely on ad-hoc solutions of uniquely purchased equipment that is manned by personnel who have a completely different primary mission than training to deploy with the equipment. Also, communications support assets should always be among the first in and the last out to ensure end-to-end mission command.

The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) deployed into Liberia without unclassified access to its UAPs in an environment that would require unclassified information sharing between the United States, military forces, governmental organizations, and NGOs. USAFRICOM made the operational and technical adjustments to extend its unclassified coverage to the JOA so that during the initial entry into Liberia, communications could be established among all agencies.

In preparation for deployment, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) tactical command post (TAC) and tactical operations center (TOC) had to be augmented with additional communications assets that would enable them to communicate in a joint environment. USARAF provided JCSE TAC and TOC packages to facilitate communications. Initial entry into the JOA showed that there were limited land lines for communications within country; however, there was an extensive cellular network covering all areas of the country. Since communications were unclassified, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)/JFC found that by purchasing cellphones and tablets, mission command could be conducted without major satellite communication needs. After a request/approval process, the division received 400-plus cellphones for use during the operation.

Unclassified networks were used at capacity, and the JFC communications officer received approval for Internet service within Liberia as the primary means of unclassified digital communications. This provided access to other Web-based systems that supported the operation and enabled mission command procedures.

### **Civil Affairs Operations**

**Discussion.** While standard individual and collective predeployment training is critically important, it is equally important to provide leaders and Soldiers with an understanding of Liberian cultural, civil, economic, military, and governmental information as well as an appreciation of the OE, which included myriad joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) agencies and organizations. The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) leadership and staff conducted JIIM training to prepare for conducting operations in the Liberian OE, considering the numerous and disparate U.S. government, international, nongovernmental, and private sector agencies and organizations supporting the Ebola fight. The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) conducted a two-day seminar at Fort Campbell, KY, bringing together USAID, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Department of State, political advisers, previous U.S. ambassadors, the UN, the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, and the U.S. National Institutes of Health, as well as numerous representatives to enhance the staff and leadership's knowledge and understanding of interorganizational relationships.

Past operations, particularly OEF and OIF, in the U.S. Central Command joint area of operations demonstrated the importance of training for the complexity of the modern battlefield and achieving closely coordinated actions in the JIIM OE. Previous deployments and experiences of the G-9/J-9 staff, to include supporting CA units, who served in Iraq, Afghanistan, Africa, and other similar locations provided a foundation for planning and conducting operations in OUA.

The CA assets provided initial and continual connectivity between the numerous aid organizations and the respective commanders with whom the assets were task-organized. For example, as the Army Ebola lab teams (i.e., 1st Area Medical Lab Unit) were establishing a footprint, the teams helped identify opportunities in acquiring space, accommodations, and movement, and generally provided civil liaison duties among the local leadership. Further, with the additional LNO touch points desired, captains were sent to coordinate with the UN mission for the Ebola emergency response, UN mission in Liberia, and the NECC. Gary J. Volesky, Commanding General of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), stated: “Our civil affairs liaisons, having recent experience in Africa, provided the strategic connectivity that I was looking for as well as providing the staff with valuable situational awareness.”

While the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) did not establish a CMOC, the GOL did this through a unifying process termed the Incident Management System, a clearinghouse of meetings and decisions made at the NECC. The NECC is analogous to a national-level CMOC or HOC. Thus, in having shared equities, the entire JIIM/NGO/economic sector came together during this process, becoming a stronger and distinct force.

**Recommendation.** A commander should dedicate mature and knowledgeable liaisons to provide two effects:

- Provide insight to the gaining unit through command messaging with a strategic voice.
- Receive notable information to bring back to the parent organization to maintain situational awareness and a sensing of the pulse of plans, operations, initiatives, and decisions of the other JIIM organizations and agencies in theater.

While the experiences, lessons learned, and best practices gleaned from previous deployments provide a foundation for effectively operating in a JIIM OE, interpersonal skills, open-mindedness, and “working friendly” are key ingredients to achieving success. Another important take-away the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) G-9/J-9, supporting CA teams, and LNOs used to facilitate communication, collaboration, and cooperation in theater was the ability to have an objective viewpoint and develop a fresh look when working with the many UAPs of dissimilar backgrounds.

Early deployment of CA assets with the advance party can provide commanders and their staffs situational awareness; communication links with UAPs and HN civil, governmental, and military agencies and organizations; visibility of the OE; running estimates of current operations; lodgment locations and facilities; and other critical information requirements.

Timely communications with key Liberian leadership and international agencies and their representatives are essential to facilitate collaboration, coordination, and synchronization of operations along common LOEs.

### **Space Operations — Blue Force Tracking (G-6)**

**Discussion.** At the onset of OUA, additional time was required to obtain adequate blue force tracking (BFT) coverage of just the five-country JOA in West Africa. This required repositioning satellites and repurposing satellite missions at an additional cost.

**Recommendation.** Department of the Army must ensure that BFT coverage across the African continent is fully resourced. Inability to locate and track personnel will decrease situational awareness and degrade mission command.

### **Information Operations**

Information operations (IO) personnel and enablers were involved in every planning meeting, prepared briefings at town halls, and ensured other staff members were communicating effectively within their areas of expertise.

The IO team forward in Monrovia coordinated messaging efforts through the U.S. Embassy and with the Liberian Ministry of Information, Cultural Affairs, and Tourism. This process was coordinated during the weekly coordination/synchronization meetings hosted by the U.S. Embassy and occasional phone calls. Since USAID was the lead federal agency for messaging efforts, the embassy provided oversight of all U.S. government messaging. Getting people out to visit and assess towns and villages to understand how each location actually received and processed information was vitally important. This information was captured in a PowerPoint slide assessment that was divided into the cognitive, information, and physical domains of the information environment.

The primary target audiences included HN populations, military participants, and international organizations/NGOs. The lead federal agency already had procedures in place with the GOL to disseminate radio and print products (i.e., billboards, posters) about Ebola safety. Determining how to communicate Ebola sanitation and prevention measures to affected communities as well as communicating facts about Ebola transmission to families of deployed Service members was a significant portion of the supporting effort of the operation.

The first group of individuals to be informed were Liberian government officials and stakeholders such as military leaders (the U.S. Embassy led the introduction and engagement process). The second group of individuals were at county and local levels. Due to a lack of available information, the IO team (forward) in Liberia had to rely on U.S. Embassy contacts and USAID workers to identify the appropriate individuals. The IO team (forward) made contact and conducted senior leader engagements in conjunction with ETU site surveys in Tubmanburg, Bopolu, Cesto City, Sinje, and Barclayville.

## Public Affairs

**Discussion.** GEN Martin E. Dempsey, 18th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, broadcast messages on YouTube to educate Soldiers, Families, and military communities regarding Ebola.

Open dialog with Families, the community, and the press provided confidence in the military's ability to train for an HA/DR mission as well as protect Soldiers, Families, and the community from any possibility of bringing back an infectious disease. The Public Affairs Office (PAO) remained focused on messaging at home station, minimizing fears through town hall meetings, press releases, and websites.

The PAO also emphasized that DOD was in a supporting role (to USAID). Efforts to reinforce this included the following:

- Always talking to USAID or a UAP while circulating or conducting meetings.
- Knowing and emphasizing lead-agency objectives.
- Inclusion in all meetings.
- Including USAID in all press engagements (speaking with one voice).

The local population was more trusting of local personnel who were trained, who spread the necessary messages, and interacted with the population as needed.

Other examples of public affairs initiatives included the following:

- Trained local mobile teams to train local treatment personnel.
- Use of local personnel to spread the word about treatment locations and signs of illness.
- A communications campaign (that was Army assisted and UAP based) that was delivered by locals.
- Pushing PAO enablers forward during the initial start of OUA. (**Note:** PAO enablers were limited and there was a concern about PAO enablers being positioned forward too rapidly.)

**Recommendation.** Solidify mission requirements and work with planners early. Ensure that PAO enablers are annotated on future USARAF on-the-shelf baseline JMDs.

**Discussion.** There was an absence of formal guidance from higher headquarters (USAFRICOM PAO). Information was lacking at the onset of the mission, which contributed to delays in receiving public affairs guidance (PAG), posture guidance, and general administration (GENADMIN) support. Direct contact between the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and JFC PAOs was problematic because USAFRICOM often was bypassed when relevant information was distributed.

PAG was never formally approved and daily updates contributed to version-control challenges. Every few days USAFRICOM would update the PAG and make changes. The only way to differentiate between the updates was by date/time group designations. This made the process confusing, especially when differentiating between outdated PAGs and the latest vision. Ultimately, top-down PAG was less useful and less accurate than information known to the JFC.

**Redeployment/Reintegration Guidance.** The information that flowed from USAFRICOM (such as OSD's policy on predeployment, deployment, and post-deployment) was delayed, leaving an absence of formalized guidance to USARAF in a timely manner.

**Request for Global Response Force.** The formalized request for Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE) assets was very confusing. Authorization for the use of a JPASE was done via a GENADMIN message at USAFRICOM.

There also was confusion as to who should generate the GENADMIN and who approved the document authorizing use of JPASE for mission requirements.

**Release Authority/Public Affairs Posture.** At the onset of the mission, OSD held the release authority. USARAF requested release authority via USAFRICOM as MG Darryl A. Williams assumed the role of JFC Commander. USARAF PAO was successful as a clearinghouse for all products, but considerable time was taken to share the same products with multiple partner agencies. Not having release authority, but having an active public affairs stance, can be problematic even with PAG. With release authority not designated to the JFC PAO, it was difficult to take a full, active posture, send out messages, and conduct engagements.

**Redeployment/Controlled Monitoring.** The redeployment of the command team presented a challenge to the JFC rear public affairs team. The question became: How to communicate the topic of redeployment and reintegration to various audiences in a controlled monitoring environment?

Prior personnel redeploying, to include U.S. Air Force personnel, returned to theater without formal guidance on controlled monitoring. The JFC command team returned to Italy on 27 OCT 2014 from the JOA. OSD/Joint Staff guidance was not produced prior to the redeployment of USARAF personnel. Ultimately, Families learned that controlled monitoring had been implemented for personnel redeploying through media channels instead of from the command. The only guidance on redeployment for the USAFRICOM PAO was based on the Undersecretary of Defense Guidance for Personnel and Readiness memorandum, dated 10 OCT 2014. Ultimately, there was a misperception that USARAF command leadership made the decision to institute controlled monitoring because no formal public announcement was made prior to the team's arrival in Italy.

Following is the sequence of events leading up to the institution of controlled monitoring:

- On 10 OCT 2014, Undersecretary of Defense Guidance for Personnel and Readiness released a memorandum outlining post-deployment monitoring, stating, "Once individuals depart the Ebola outbreak area, regardless of any previous monitoring in theater, they will be monitored for 21 days IAW the following guidance." Furthermore, the memorandum stated that if Soldiers had no known exposure, "appropriately trained DOD personnel (e.g., unit leaders, health-care personnel) will conduct a face-to face interview to review clinical symptoms and perform a temperature check twice daily during the 21-day monitoring period. As long as the individuals remain asymptomatic, they may return to work and routine daily activities with Family members."
- During the third week of October, the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) led a think tank discussion and provided direction on controlled monitoring. Unfortunately, there were no communicators involved in the high-level discussion, leaving OSD/USAFRICOM PAO unaware that the decision had been made to implement controlled monitoring. Formal guidance from the CSA was as follows: "The Army Chief of Staff has directed a 21-day controlled monitoring period for all redeploying Soldiers returning from Operation United Assistance. He has done this out of caution to ensure Soldiers, Family members, and their surrounding communities including HNs are confident that we are taking all necessary steps to protect their health."
- On 25 OCT 2014, the JFC transfer of authority ceremony occurred between USARAF and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), and the JFC command group arrived back in theater on 27 OCT 2014. Upon arrival, the Commanding General was contacted by CNN and other media outlets with questions on implementation of controlled

monitoring. As a result, the OSD PAG released a statement on the CSA directive about implementing controlled monitoring. The OSD statement, dated 29 OCT 2014, stipulated: “This morning, Secretary Hagel signed an order that validated a recommendation from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to place all U.S. Military Service members returning from Ebola response efforts in West Africa into a 21-day controlled monitoring regimen. This order will apply to all Military Services that are contributing personnel to the fight against Ebola at its source.”

- On 07 NOV 2014, a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction released the first formal written guidance, which addressed controlled monitoring of “All DOD Service members who are assigned, deployed, or transited through the EVD outbreak area in West Africa as declared by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and DOD Service members exposed to EVD asymptomatic or symptomatic persons within CONUS.”

**Recommendation.** Directly communicate with the lead organization (USARAF) for clear communication flow. Improve the public affairs posture in order for the executing units to provide current imagery and enable the ground commander to engage media in conjunction with the lead agency. In requesting general response force assets, USAFRICOM should establish standard operating procedures for making requests. Involve communicators in think tank discussions, and provide release of that information as appropriate to provide top cover to executing JFCs. PAOs need to be included in senior-leader discussions to ensure effective communication of efforts.

## **Intelligence — Understanding the Operational Environment**

**Discussion.** Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*, defines the OE as a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. The OE includes physical areas (air, land, maritime, and space domains) and the information environment, which includes cyberspace. An OE for any specific operation is not just isolated conditions of interacting variables that exist within a specific AO. It also includes interconnected influences from the global or regional perspective (for example, politics and economics) that affect conditions and operations. (Source: Army Doctrine Reference Publication [ADRP] 2-0, *Intelligence*)

The analysis of the broad aspects of an OE in terms of the operational variables provides relevant information that senior commanders use to understand, visualize, and describe the OE. These operational variables are political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, and physical environment and time (PMESII-PT). Upon receipt of a WARNORD or mission, Army leaders filter relevant information and



narrow their focus to six mission variables. These mission variables are mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). These variables are used during intelligence analysis and facilitate situational understanding. (Source: ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*)

Seventy-two hours after the President announced that DOD would support the fight against EVD in West Africa, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) received notification of a possible mission to serve as a joint task force (JTF) in support of USAID (the lead federal agency) in Liberia.

The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) quickly addressed the task of assessing the OE in Liberia. Assisted by USAFRICOM, USARAF, and numerous other military and U.S. government organizations, the division completed its OE assessments and conducted intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) assessment. Unfortunately, when the division arrived in Liberia, it found that some of the country data that had been collected and considered during its predeployment planning operations was dated and could have negatively affected operations in country. However, these information shortfalls were quickly identified and addressed, and coordination was established with various organizations to obtain subject matter expertise and current information to fill these intelligence gaps and obtain updated data.

**Lessons Learned/Insights.** The prospect for future U.S. Army deployments in support of HA/DR operations, noncombatant evacuation operations, and civic assistance in military operations other than war is a reality and requires organizations to be prepared to act on short notice.

In order to prepare for such contingencies, organizational planners must have an in-depth understanding of country-specific mission variables from readily available, accurate, and timely PMESII-PT and METT-TC information and country or regional assessments to conduct accurate IPB. Various U.S. government organizations have conducted country studies and published extensive reports; however, this valuable information does not reside in one central repository for immediate access by deploying military units. When responding to an HA/DR situation under time constraints, units lack the time and expertise to search out these various resources.

## **Situational Awareness and a Shift in Mission Focus**

**Discussion.** Upon arrival in Liberia, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) G-2/J-2 section's mission required an adjustment from a traditional threat/force protection (FP) role to one of analytical support to epidemiology understanding. The security situation in Liberia was extremely stable and showed no indications of changing in the near term, and the U.S. Embassy confirmed the absence of a violent extremist threat in Liberia and the disposition of the populace against extremism.

Prior to deploying, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) conducted country studies and provided information briefs and threat-intensive IPB. It was stated that the region is considered low priority for intelligence collection and that most of the information available was threat concentrated. The disparity in predeployment assessments relative to the OE was attributed to the lack of foundational information pertaining to Liberia and an over-emphasis of the threat environment in available information. The J-2 section subsequently identified and refocused on the most critical intelligence gap — the epidemiological spread of EVD.

Grasping an understanding of the already available EVD data became the most important task. As the J-2 tried to understand the true spread of EVD in the AO, one of the most common issues encountered was that most EVD data was portrayed cumulatively. This fact inherently meant that the data would never get better, only worse. The J-2 knew this was not the case as Liberia did have true success stories. The J-2's first task was to understand the EVD trends and find a way to best portray those trends and data in such a way that the commander could make decisions and recommendations to USAID on the placement and utilization of DOD assets and capabilities. This recognition and ability to receive multiple data streams, analyze the data, and present that information to the commander allowed the intelligence warfighting function to drive operations within Liberia.

There was significant confusion over EVD data within the counter-Ebola response community at the time of the division's arrival: what the data was, where it came from, and what it meant. There were multiple entities looking at and reporting the same data in different ways, which led in some cases to double counting the data and only further clouding the true EVD picture. Based on the assessment of this situation, the division identified the need to embed J-2 analysts with backgrounds in data management and analysis at the MoH, the final destination for all EVD data, and at the NECC to facilitate centralized reporting and common understanding of the Ebola data collected. The first was a signals intelligence (SIGINT) warrant officer who had an analytical background in data-basing sectarian violence trends in Iraq and was well-versed in managing large amounts of data from both Iraq and Afghanistan. The second was an all-source intelligence analyst experienced in targeting and improvised explosive device trends in Afghanistan. Both were directed to rapidly understand how Ebola-related data was compiled, reported, and disseminated on a daily basis.

The analysts recognized that data management presented a major challenge at the MoH as employees struggled to improve and develop procedural systems. Although Ebola case definitions existed, interpretations varied and inconsistencies led to duplicate and inaccurate reporting of Ebola-related data. The decentralization of Ebola case information presented to the county health teams produced multiple reporting formats and inconsistent practices,

creating information gaps that prevented clear representation of the Ebola data. Based on this knowledge, the J-2 analyst embeds advised the MoH staff to follow clear criteria for case definitions and centralize the reporting of confirmed cases based on laboratory results. The efforts of all parties resulted in an improvement in the accuracy of reports and an increase in communications among ETUs, laboratories, and county health teams. Furthermore, the MoH data became the central repository for Ebola reports, increasing the accuracy of the daily situational report.

Key to the analysts' ability to advise MoH data managers was the adaptation of intelligence principles to improve Ebola case situation reports. Critical thinking and thorough fusion analysis of the data allowed the MoH to identify trends, patterns, and problem areas requiring action. Additionally, the J-2's experience in presenting intelligence information enabled them to assist and improve the MoH's methods in displaying the data as a graphical representation across both space and time. Finally, the J-2 ensured the proper dissemination of data and facilitated the sharing of this information with both governmental and nongovernmental partners and health volunteers in order to increase situational awareness and focus continued efforts toward improved effectiveness.

Choosing an analyst embed for the NEOC proved just as important. In the NEOC, the J-2 placed an all-source intelligence technician because of the flexibility and agility in the military occupational skill, which also assisted in technically managing the integration of a geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) analytical capability into the NEOC to coordinate with the Liberian Geospatial Information Services team that supported the counter-Ebola effort.

The MoH created the NECC to be the focal point of Ebola response and to be held accountable for rapidly responding to and isolating EVD outbreaks in the country. Although more than 120 multinational organizations worked within the NEOC, the lack of managerial oversight and prioritization was apparent. The NEOC analyst embed's initial assessment identified the need to develop courses of action that mitigated operational obstacles. Clusters and pillars worked tirelessly to identify and discuss problems, but meetings often concluded without recommendations on how to solve the problems. With the support and implementation of additional working groups specifically focused on rapid isolation of Ebola and decision making, these organizations were able to focus on a COP while simultaneously supporting logistics and medical attention. The NEOC analyst embed worked with international organization leaders from Europe, China, the United Kingdom, and Africa to distribute guidance on international crisis priorities and integrate these into a model that nested with the Liberian President's overall strategy on isolating and defeating the Ebola crisis.




Figure 3-3. Analytical requirements. (Source: 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) G-2 presentation, 11 MAR 2015)

**Lessons Learned/Insights.** The division J-2 section demonstrated organizational flexibility and agility, and employed personnel in traditional roles who were able to excel in ambiguity. Although the J-2 analysts assigned at the MoH and in the NEOC were not specifically trained to

work with epidemiological information, they were able to adapt the skills they had learned while conducting traditional analysis and apply those skills to assist the Liberians in understanding trend analysis, data integrity, compilation, and dissemination. (See Figure 3-3, Page 44)

Placing analysts in these two critical locations was extremely helpful in two primary ways:

- Given their strong analytical background, these analysts were accustomed to sifting through large volumes of information and organizing and formatting this data for presentation to commanders.
- These analysts were able to understand the data they were reviewing, cross-talk and share information, and add nuance and context that was being lost in daily operations.

These actions served as a conduit and facilitated collaboration between the focal point of EVD data (the MoH) and counter-EVD operations at the NEOC. Additionally, the placement of these analysts provided the division's J-2 section and its partners, from around the DOD military intelligence community, the ability to rapidly react to a crisis situation and produce timely, accurate, and relevant products to the JFC Commander, which enabled him to effectively support USAID.

The J-2 section's ability to apply traditional analytic methodology to a nontraditional problem also enabled them to identify and overcome deficiencies in the collection and portrayal of pre-existing data to better understand the spread of EVD in the AO. They subsequently assisted OUA partners in EVD data collection, deconfliction, analysis, and planning to effectively drive HA/DR operations within Liberia. Ultimately, they provided clarity to EVD trends and portrayed the analysis in such a way that it enabled the Commander to make informed decisions and recommendations to USAID on the placement of DOD assets and capabilities.

## **J-2 Task Organization in Support of the Mission**

**Discussion.** The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) deployed with a small intelligence capability forward and utilized a larger reachback capability for production of intelligence summaries (INTSUMs) and slow-turn products. (See Figure 3-4, next page)

Initially the JMD authorized the division G-2 section to deploy with 237 personnel. That number was subsequently reduced to 33 personnel. In addition to its 22-person J-2 staff, the division brought one-half of its Air Force staff weather officer contingent, a human intelligence (HUMINT) team from 4th Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, and two Naval Criminal Investigative Service teams for counterintelligence (CI) operations. The




Figure 3-4. JTF-OUA J-2 forward organizational chart and essential tasks. [Source: 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) G-2]

division’s deployed J-2 section was designed to give shallow depth in GEOINT, HUMINT, CI, systems control, and plans, while providing slightly more depth in all-source fusion. The unit left behind a robust 64-person reachback cell that provided the division with an analytical and

production capability it lacked forward. The reachback cell was responsible for a comprehensive GEOINT and long-term analytical projects, the base INTSUMs, all SIGINT support (if required), and the bulk of collection management responsibilities. (See Figure 3-5, next page)

Based on predeployment planning, the G-2 section initially organized as it would for combat operations due in large part to the lack of guidance from higher headquarters, gaps in U.S. Army doctrine, and the ambiguity of available information. However, once the section established operations and further assessed the OE, it was able to adjust its intelligence focus from FP/security to one of Ebola epidemiology analysis and reporting.

**Lessons Learned/Insights.** As a result of its refocused mission, the J-2 was able to clarify and refine the information and production requirements and reduce the size of its reachback capability to less than 15 personnel. Included in this team were the G-2X with “on call” SIGINT capabilities, a condensed GEOINT structure, and a reduced all-source capability. Despite this reduction in reachback capabilities, the J-2 was able to maintain its collection management capability.

The division G-2 determined that this mission required an intelligence structure able to track and provide clarity to epidemiological trends, shareable with NGOs, intergovernmental organizations, and international partners in an unrestricted, unclassified format. The G-2 successfully embedded intelligence analysts into a system that is historically suspicious of DOD intelligence personnel and operations.

## **Human Intelligence and Counterintelligence Support**

**Discussion.** The initial guidance from USARAF to the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) G-2X was broad in scope and did not provide adequate detail regarding roles, responsibilities, expectations, authorities, or coordination. HUMINT and CI assets thus organized and prepared to support operations from a tactical and threat-oriented perspective.

Upon arriving in theater it became apparent to the J-2 section that the security situation had not been accurately assessed and that the political environment was not conducive to traditional HUMINT and CI operations. This was contrary to predeployment planning considerations of operating in an elevated threat environment and conducting source operations to answer corresponding intelligence requirements. Collaborative meetings and open lines of communication with U.S. Embassy entities provided up-to-date threat information.

Due to political sensitivities, the potential for operational compromise, and authorities governing source operations, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) was restricted from conducting source operations. Collection assets




Figure 3-5. JTF-OUA J-2 reachback chart and essential tasks.  
 [Source: 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) G-2]



were subsequently directed to support HA/DR operations through passive collection against operational variables to assist analysts in understanding EVD trends relative to the OE and EVD data.

**Lessons Learned/Insights.** There are numerous factors when considering the implementation of a tactically focused approach to G-2X operations in support HA/DR. This method was partly attributed to the absence of a clearly defined G-2X mission, an overstated threat environment, and a perceived lack of U.S. Army doctrine addressing the implementation of HUMINT in HA/DR. Another contributing factor is a doctrinal training focus concentrated on combat operations, which had been further engrained through numerous combat deployments.

After deploying and identifying the need to refocus intelligence operations, it became apparent that predeployment information gaps in understanding the OE could have been satisfied through prior coordination with U.S. agencies and organizations operating in Liberia. Additionally, guidance on roles, responsibilities, authorities, and how to task-organize to effectively provide intelligence support to HA/DR would have been useful during the planning process.

## **Intelligence Architecture**

**Discussion.** The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) requirements were seemingly easy, if non-traditional. First, the division needed systems that could work on the “dirty” Internet, unencumbered by the restrictions of a NIPR network. This was extremely important and probably the division’s most critical requirement given that UAPs would not be other DOD entities, but rather Department of State organizations, NGOs, and partner nations that did not work within a NIPR construct.

Secondly, the division’s geospatial tools needed to be Google Earth-based because all of the division’s existing systems were ArcGIS-based. While ArcGIS is compatible with Google Earth, the systems needed to work on the same platform as the UAPs, who were all using Google Earth, often on personal computers and tablets.

The requirement to be completely unclassified was one of the lessons learned from Haiti, which the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) used as a base planning assumption, and it proved completely correct. Because of that preplanning, the division’s GEOINT operations and COP functioned seamlessly in theater.

The division’s third and final requirement was that anything built needed to be simple and expeditionary. The division was entering an immature theater that had no existing information technology infrastructure to support JFC operations, and the division lacked the time to create a complicated architecture. Additionally, the division needed to establish this architecture




Figure 3-6. Intelligence architecture, requirements, and partners.

with no field support representative support. Only two U.S. Army Soldiers from the G-2 intelligence systems maintenance section were available in country. This architecture was inherently different from anything the division previously had used. The architecture’s primary function was to

share information with UAPs, virtually none of whom had access to the Army's standard information networks. As the division considered what was needed in country, it became evident that the architecture would have to be built because a standard unclassified HA/DR COP toolkit did not exist in the DOD inventory.

However, the division was able to re-purpose equipment meant for classified use (i.e., the Distributed Common Ground System-Army [DCGS-A]) to meet its needs. The DCGS-A program manager (in concert with the Training and Doctrine Command's Capabilities Manager-Sensor Processing section and the Intelligence and Security Command) was able to acquire, ship, and build a "fly-away" kit of unclassified DCGS-A servers and laptops that gave the JFC a robust capability in Liberia and Fort Campbell (where the reachback node operated). (It is also important to note that because this was accomplished using existing infrastructure and manning, the cost to the U.S. Army was minimal.)

The most useful data the division was able to share with its partners was the location and status of the labs, ETUs, community care centers, and helicopter landing zones. The division also posted that data and the COP on the APAN, a website built for collaboration in an HA/DR environment. Using APAN also allowed the division to leave behind a sustainable COP that could be transitioned to a non-military entity for further development or use. Posting this information onto a website in near-real-time was incredibly useful for the UAPs because the partners did not have a COP or any ideas on how to build one. The division tools gave the UAPs a foundation on which to build and greatly assisted in focusing efforts in a common direction. (See Figure 3-6, Page 50)

**Lessons Learned/Insights.** The J-2 section clearly demonstrated its ability to drive operations in an HA/DR response, but doing so requires organizational flexibility and agility. The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) G-2/J-2 section and its partners from around the Army's military intelligence community were able to rapidly react to a crisis situation and provide timely, accurate, and relevant products to the Joint Forces Commander, enabling him to support the lead federal agency (USAID).

## **Force Protection**

**Discussion.** HN security assistance during OUA proved to be very resourceful. The HN resources provided assistance to protect friendly forces and installations, secure routes, and develop quick reaction plans within the AO. Liberian National Police (LNP) and Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) were the primary HN security support for all humanitarian assistance operations. U.S. forces should establish clear lines of communication and develop a plan with HN security assets as soon as possible.

AFL and LNP elements provided internal and external security to U.S. operations within established bases of operation. All aerial and sea ports of debarkation received either AFL or LNP security resources to complete JOA missions. The security augmentations allowed DOD assets to continue the mission without straining personnel.

The U.S. Embassy and Liberian government were against U.S. personnel carrying weapons in the JOA. The intent behind the weapons policy was to give a fair balance between Soldiers' inherent right to defend themselves against a hostile threat and compliance with Embassy policies and recommendations.

The guardian angel approach to weapons posture was implemented for OUA. The policy authorized one person per every three JFC-OUA personnel operating together to carry a concealed weapon with an appropriate allotment of ammunition. This ensured that personnel were capable of employing lethal force in accordance with applicable rules of engagement.

### **Host Nation Security Support**

**Discussion.** U.S. Soldiers are accustomed to being the occupying force and providing the necessary protection for the force. This was not the case, however, in West Africa, where carrying a weapon in a virus-infected environment was not warranted. As a result, there was a high level of stress associated with having another entity provide layers of protection that U.S. forces normally are more than willing and able to provide.

**Recommendation.** U.S. forces must build solid HN security relationships to establish a response plan for all DOD personnel. Once a communication plan is in place with HN security elements, DOD personnel can use contact information provided from the JOC. Afterward, the following steps can be implemented:

- The JOC calls HN police in the area of the security violation.
- HN police respond to the scene.
- The security force on site briefs the situation to the on-scene HN police.
- HN police respond and resolve the issue and communicate all details to the JOC.

### **Engineer Operations and Coordination**

**Discussion.** USACE did not coordinate with USARAF effectively in providing assets, capabilities, and information to the JFC, even with a USACE LNO collocated in the JFC rear.

The USACE Office of the Chief of Engineers initially coordinated with the USAFRICOM J-44 and the USARAF deputy chief of staff, engineers (DCSENG), in a secure video teleconference to discuss engineer troop support at the beginning of the operation. The teleconference turned into a briefing of engineer operations to USACE, chaired by the USACE G-3. While mostly productive, some issues could not be immediately resolved.

The DCSENG requested a list of available engineer units and capabilities that could be deployed in support of OUA to enhance situational understanding of the depth of engineer assets available and identify any shortfalls. However, USACE was unable to provide the information and suggested the DCSENG request required capabilities. The USACE did list a few capabilities to deploy in support of the operation, however, such as a Contingency Contracting Team for construction contracts to assist the 414th CSB.

USACE later attempted to insert itself into engineer operations without checking with DCSENG whether those capabilities were required. In developing the JMD, USACE also inserted a position for an LNO to deploy forward without coordinating with DCSENG. This required an inordinate amount of effort by DCSENG to clarify with USACE.

Additionally, USACE inserted several capabilities in the USARAF RFF that were not requested, such as a well-drilling team, a quarry platoon, and additional prime power assets. Most of these assets reside with the U.S. Army Reserve, however, and could not have deployed in time to affect the operation.

USACE also attempted to deploy additional LNOs to Vicenza, Italy, without coordinating with DCSENG. The first attempt was during the initial phase of the operation. The proposed LNO informed the DCSENG real estate officer, not the USACE LNO or the DCSENG leadership, of a pending arrival without providing any details of the task or purpose. The second attempt was initially to replace the USACE LNO to the JFC, who was planning to go forward. Once it was determined that the LNO was not going forward, that person was supposed to serve as a second USACE LNO. This also required an inordinate amount of time to clarify.

USACE developed a SharePoint site, "REDi," for the operation on both the NIPR and SIPR networks. This site was not published to the JFC or the engineer regiment. This site is accessible to anyone with a CAC card and would have been of great benefit for sharing JFC engineer products with USACE, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) engineers, 36th Engineer Brigade, or anyone else affected by the USARAF SharePoint firewall. The site contained briefings and orders in support of the operation. While DCSENG does not need to be involved in every meeting or product USACE develops in support of the operation, there were several times when

DCSENG involvement would have resolved friction points. Several of the briefings to general officers contained out-of-date or inaccurate information.

During the USACE coordination meeting and the engineer worldwide SVTC in September 2014, DCSENG articulated to the command the need to have design capabilities deploy immediately. DCSENG specifically requested a forward engineer support team-advance (FEST-A) with real estate and environmental augmentation to support the establishment of the life support areas (LSAs), design of the ETUs and Monrovia Medical Unit (MMU), and any other requirements that the JFC encountered. The USACE LNO initially informed DCSENG that USACE did not have a FEST-A available for deployment. DCSENG requested a latest arrival date of 01 OCT 2014 in the RFF submission. USACE countered with a latest arrival date of 25 OCT 2014 that DCSENG had to concur with if it wanted USACE to provide that asset. USACE hastily formed a FEST-A and was able to provide the real estate augmentee before the rest of the team. However, the FEST-A arrived at the beginning of the transition with the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) after most of the ETU and LSA planning was complete. The amount of time required to deploy the FEST-A was also noted in the XVIII Airborne Corps lessons learned documentation from Operation Unified Response (the Haiti earthquake response operation).

DCSENG has the capability to develop the 30-percent design and specification for construction projects. The USACE Reachback Operation Center (UROC) provides the engineer regiment with the ability to utilize various engineers to produce 100-percent designs for technical projects. DCSENG used the UROC to design the plumbing, waste water, and electrical systems for the ETUs and MMU. It took a couple of conversations to develop a good relationship and understanding that the JFC, and more specifically the AFL engineers, needed simple designs that could be used in Liberia and that the designs did not need to meet stringent U.S. standards.

**Recommendation.** USACE needs to coordinate actions that affect the JFC either directly with DCSENG or through its LNO. Its focus needs to be on providing the capabilities requested; providing recommendations or information briefs on capabilities that might be beneficial to the operation, for the JFC to decide; and coordinating with DCSENG for personnel movement to the JFC. USACE also needs the capability to deploy its FEST-A in a responsive time frame during the initial phases of an operation to be most effective for the JFC. USARAF needs to maintain a habitual relationship with the UROC and develop a relationship with other reachback teams to establish a cohesive working relationship before a disaster happens.

## Engineer Force Sharing with U.S. European Command

**Discussion.** OUA quickly evolved into a mission centered around three LOEs — engineering, sustainment, and training. The initial task to build an engineering capability in Liberia was one of the only explicit tasks to USARAF from the Joint Staff. The need for construction capability in country became increasingly apparent as missions to build medical facilities and LSAs began to take shape. Initially the number of contracted construction assets was uncertain, and USARAF has no assigned or aligned engineer construction assets.

USARAF submitted an RFF for 1,800 engineer troops in September 2014, but those forces would not be realized until mid- to late-October 2014 and the need for construction was immediate. Plus, the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) did not have the resources to either meet required timelines or take on all construction sites.

During an operation in 2013, the Joint Staff authorized force-sharing between the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) and USAFRICOM as long as both commanders approved. Although never executed, this agreement set precedence for the utilization of Europe-based forces in the USAFRICOM AOR without the need to go through the entire global force management process. During the early phase of OUA, it was repeatedly expressed that this capability should be requested and utilized as a bridging method until traditional RFF forces could arrive. Although not initially authorized, a directive was received on 17 NOV 2014 for the sharing of USEUCOM forces for 30 days until the requested forces could arrive.

The USAFRICOM J-44 assisted with coordinating sourcing with USEUCOM, USAREUR, and U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE). The initial capability requested was a contracting officer's representative (COR) to complete the remaining 50 out of 65 Seabees (U.S. Naval Construction Force) previously requested. USAFE was able to source 11 civil engineers from various installations around Europe. The engineers deployed on commercial flights to Liberia in early October and provided the JFC J-7 with the capability to begin construction support to AFL engineers.

After it became apparent that contractor capabilities were not sufficient to provide all construction, the JFC J-4 drafted an automated message handling system request for 44 Soldiers from the 15th Engineer Battalion, Grafenwoehr, Germany, to assist with LSAs. When USARAF DCSENG/JFC J-7 was notified of this action, the message was re-written to emphasize mission requirements for a more appropriate utilization of construction engineers. (Mission planning was focused on the primary mission of ETU construction with a be-prepared-to mission of LSA establishment.)

Although originally advertised as being on 96-hour alert, the reality was that the unit had not been informed of the mission and required 10 days for preparation. The 44 Army engineers provided the first true DOD construction capability and proved more reliable and capable than much of the contracted effort.

**Recommendation.** In the future, if engineer forces are not already assigned to USARAF, authority to use USEUCOM forces is one of the only ways to provide a rapidly available capability. This arrangement between USEUCOM and USAFRICOM should be documented in a revision of the current memorandum of agreement, or at least requested from the Joint Staff at the start of mission planning.

### Engineer Required Skill Sets and Certifications

**Discussion.** OUA required the USARAF DCSENG to utilize technical engineer certifications, skills, computer-aided drafting software, real estate agreements and leasing, and construction contracting support. USARAF requires additional training and resources to adequately meet this requirement for future operations supporting HA/DR, contingency construction, and crisis action planning in Africa.

USARAF DCSENG formed the initial JFC-OUA J-7 engineer cell, initially performing the duties of a U.S. Army engineer brigade, survey and design team, USACE FEST-A, and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) engineer section while operating as the theater, operational, and tactical-level engineer mission command element with forces provided through a force sharing agreement with USEUCOM.

The DCSENG, serving as the JFC-OUA J-7, performed the following tasks:

- Conducted real estate and environmental operations.
- Performed construction designs and master planning.
- Prepared technical contract documents.
- Provided CORs for the construction of ETUs, the MMU, and multiple LSAs and repairs to the Monrovia airport runway.

An ASCC does not traditionally perform construction design, and the management of multiple concurrent projects (required by JFC-OUA) strained the technical capabilities of the USARAF DCSENG section. The DCSENG was successful during OUA due to the technical capability and experience of the personnel, which is not defined on the current MTOE and training and data acquisition structure for military and civilian positions.



OUA demonstrated the critical requirement to have both technically proficient engineers and project managers as well a robust design capability, especially if the ASCC is required to serve as a JTF or JFC in the future. OUA identified automation and software shortfalls in the DCSENG with a need for computer-aided drafting (CAD)-capable computers, additional licenses, and training for CAD and the theater construction management system (TCMS). The lack of licenses and current versions of CAD required most of the design work to be completed by the USARAF DCSENG in Italy. The ability to perform design modifications at the project site could have saved time and work for the engineers in Liberia. Technical licenses and certifications for the following proved to be invaluable:

- Professional engineers (PEs)
- Project management professionals (PMPs)
- Architects
- CORs

OUA also required a real estate specialist with delegation authority to execute leases and land-use agreements.

OUA construction was executed partially through contracting and LOGCAP. Therefore, more familiarity with LOGCAP, the Armed Forces Contract Augmentation Program, and contracting (to include preparing performance work statements and CORs) would have improved efficiency with the 414th Contracting Command and LOGCAP. Contracting knowledge would also result in quicker contract document preparation and modifications.

**Recommendation.** USARAF DCSENG should conduct a complete review of the required certifications, licenses, skills, and experience by duty position. If required, these position descriptions and requirements should be added to create a demand for technical engineers in certain positions. Add the new engineer officer skill identifiers to the MTOE for PEs, PMPs, environmental engineers, and general engineers (with college degrees). DCSENG should receive a real estate delegation from the qualified real estate staffing within USARAF. Additionally, USARAF should continue a dedicated program to maintain and acquire professional licensing and certifications for its professionals. DCSENG should also provide training opportunities at USACE, PMP, COR, LOGCAP, and/or other professional development courses. Finally, automation upgrades are required for DCSENG to acquire CAD and TCMS/Joint Construction Management System-capable computers and an expansion of licensing for CAD, MS Project, etc.

## JFC-OUA Ebola Treatment Units Best Practices

In order to promote a shared understanding among the partners fighting to contain EVD, the following lessons and best practices were developed by the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) based on its experience building ETUs in Liberia.

### Topic of Discussion: Laboratory Site Reconnaissance

**Background of Initiative.** Having the appropriate personnel to cover all aspects of the laboratory site selection process.

**Recommendation.** To ensure the lab site selection process is smooth, members from each of the following specialties are recommended to cover the different areas needed in the selection process:

- **Subject matter experts for laboratory reconnaissance.** The microbiologist and laboratory technician team discusses the building layout for how and where to set up their equipment for cold, warm, and hot zones, and ensures that adequate space is available to store equipment and supplies to allow operations to run in a fluid manner.
- **Engineers (electrical, carpenter, plumbing).** Engineers work with the lead microbiologist to ensure that power is run to the necessary rooms and that there is enough power generation to support all the lab equipment and any additional requirements for operations. The carpenter makes a diagram of the building and creates a list of building materials needed to support any improvements and/or modifications to the building for lab-specific operations. The plumber ensures that all fixtures are functional and available for lab personnel to access as needed (i.e., showering after removing PPE).
- **Contracting officer.** Negotiates the price, payment method, and payment frequency with the building owner; gathers local hotel/ lodging quotes and services in the area to assist in the selection of the best location with suitable services for living quarters. If needed, vehicle services should also be negotiated. This allows other personnel to concentrate on laboratory setup.
- **Civil affairs.** Provides the communication bridge between the unit and local officials in the area of the visit. Relays building layout requirements for microbiologists and laboratory technicians so locations can be identified before they arrive. Ensures that the appropriate decision makers from the local population are present to authorize site approval (often, the county health official is the approving authority). Civil affairs also interacts with the local population to obtain a consensus regarding the establishment of a laboratory in the area.

- **Force protection.** Conducts a security assessment of the laboratory location as well as the surrounding area to determine the threat level and risk.

### **Topic of Discussion: Design of Ebola Treatment Units**

**Background of initiative.** The 36th Engineer Brigade approached the design with parallel efforts from USACE, USARAF, the AFL, and a government contractor, with the intent to obtain a product as quickly as possible. Obtaining a good set of specifications from the customer up front did not happen, causing an ETU design failure and incorrect bill-of-materials package. For example, the construction crew was unaware of the requirement for a “snow fence” and latrine, which resulted in last-minute design modifications and adjustments to project timelines.

**Lessons and best practices.** Involve the customer’s decision authority during the design process to ensure that the final design meets all specifications before purchasing materials in bulk.

### **Topic of Discussion: Acquisition of Materials for ETU Construction**

**Background of Initiative.** The DLA initially procured ETU construction materials from an incomplete design, causing material shortfalls, especially in electrical components. DLA acquired electrical materials below Western standards for two main reasons. First, detailed specifications for required materials were lacking due to the incomplete design. Second, quality control was a concern during the receipt of materials. Inferior materials were either accepted or substituted for materials requested per the design. The success of the Gbediah ETU project is a direct result of the control the constructing unit had over the materials. The unit ensured that engineers inspected all materials received at Gbediah prior to delivery.

**Lessons and best practices.** Integrate engineers into the acquisition process to provide quality control.

### **Topic of Discussion: Timeline Planning**

**Background of initiative.** There is always a notion that Americans operate on a strict timeline whereas host countries typically take a more relaxed approach to time.

**Lessons and best practices.** Leaders must realize that construction will face many challenges due to the nature of the OE, especially when reliant upon civilian contracted workers, supplies, and equipment. Timeline planning must take this into account in order to manage expectations. Development entities at all levels must stay flexible, adaptive, and patient, and be ready to support solutions provided by those working on the ground.

### **Topic of Discussion: Force Protection**

**Background of initiative.** Force protection was augmented by AFL partners during some ETU construction, which worked well. The AFL gave local residents a familiar face and language to direct questions, helping them to feel at ease with the foreign project. Force protection was never a major issue as local residents witnessed the transparency of construction, which led to their support of the ETU project. The local population provided quick labor for tasks such as welding, hole digging, and metal cutting.

**Lessons and best practices.** As with all operations in HNs, it is important to build positive relationships with the local people. Contact the governing body to address construction needs and determine local capability. If possible, all skilled and unskilled labor should come from the local area.

### **Topic of Discussion: Armed Forces of Liberia Partnership**

**Background of initiative.** The 62nd Engineering Battalion partnered with AFL engineers during the Sinje and Gbediah ETU projects. AFL advice was invaluable in developing the battalion's understanding of ETUs. AFL engineers were critical to selecting the Gbediah ETU site and negotiating with contractors. The success is a direct result of partnership with the AFL.

**Lessons and best practices.** Partnering with host nation military engineers is a key method to understanding construction operations in the region, which helps planning.

### **Topic of Discussion: Ebola Treatment Units Transition Agreements**

**Background of initiative.** The only official transition requirement is a memorandum of understanding and release of liability between the United States and the accepting NGO. It requires three signatures: one from the COR, one from the accepting NGO, and one from a USAID representative. In Buchanan, upon completion of the construction project, the accepting NGO conducted several periodic quality assurance inspections, which generated preliminary checklists and informed the NGO of outstanding contracts and pending issues. This enabled a smooth transition of the site as all parties involved were aware of the site's progress.

**Lessons and best practices.** The contract and construction scope of work should address periodic (50 percent, 75 percent, 90 percent, etc.) quality assurance inspections with the customer. During final hand-over, the NGO inventories all serial-numbered items to include generators, air conditioning units, and washers and dryers. The lack of precise transition requirements leaves gaps that some important aspects of the project contract could fall through. For instance, all site contracts (including equipment, lighting, and services) need to be closed out at the time of turnover.

## Chapter 4

# Interorganizational/Intergovernmental Relationships

### Introduction

This chapter begins with a review of key concepts that relate to interorganizational and intergovernmental relationships. It concludes with a synopsis of how the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) facilitated these relationships with collaborative solutions and synchronized capabilities during Operation United Assistance (OUA). OUA participants included the Armed Forces of the United States, U.S. government departments and agencies, foreign military forces and government agencies, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and private volunteer organizations (PVOs).

### Coordination and Control

“The crux of interorganizational coordination is in understanding the civil-military relationship as collaborative rather than competitive. While the military normally focuses on reaching clearly defined and measurable objectives within given timelines under a command and control (C2) structure, civilian organizations are concerned with fulfilling changeable political, economic, social, and humanitarian interests using dialogue, bargaining, risk taking, and consensus building. Civilian organizations also may be more adept at negotiation, bargaining, and consensus decision making, thus becoming agents of change within that society.” (Joint Publication [JP] 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*)

**Foundations of interorganizational coordination.** A commitment to interorganizational coordination helps to achieve desired end states by facilitating cooperation in areas of common interest or avoiding unintended negative consequences when working in the same space as other participants. Interorganizational coordination aids in this by enabling participants to do one or more of the following:

- **Facilitate unity of effort.** Achieving national strategic objectives requires the effective and efficient use of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power supported by interorganizational coordination. The translation of national strategic objectives into unified action is essential to unity of effort and ultimately mission success. Unified action is “the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort.” (JP 3-08) The unified actions of military and

civilian organizations in sharing information, cooperating, and striving together to accomplish a common goal is the essence of interorganizational coordination that makes unity of effort possible.

- **Achieve common objectives.** Successful interorganizational coordination enables the U.S. government to build international and domestic support, conserve resources, and conduct coherent operations that more effectively and efficiently achieve common objectives. Joint and multinational operations must be strategically integrated and operationally and tactically coordinated with the activities of participating U.S. government agencies, IGOs, NGOs, host nation (HN) agencies, and the private sector to achieve common objectives. (JP 3-08)
- **Provide common understanding.** Interorganizational coordination is critical to understanding the roles and relationships of participating military commands and relevant stakeholders as well as common interests, equities, and insight into the challenges faced. Sometimes the joint force commander draws on the capabilities of external organizations; at other times, he provides capabilities to those organizations or deconflicts activities with them. It is important that the Department of Defense speak with a single voice in exchanges with other stakeholders to minimize confusion. (JP 3-08)

The U.S. Army and Service components are accustomed to operating in supported and supporting roles and are quite adept at conducting the requisite coordination and control to ensure mission success. The U.S. military does not routinely operate in supported or supporting roles with other U.S. agencies, IGOs, NGOs, and PVOs for the purpose of achieving a common objective. However, this is exactly the operational environment in which U.S. Army Africa and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) were tasked by the U.S. Army to support the U.S. government's efforts to contain Ebola virus disease (EVD) in Liberia. Establishing comprehensive command, coordination, and control structures that account for all activities in the joint operations area is critical to mission accomplishment. Developing common lines of effort to synchronize complementary activities to achieve common objectives is equally important.

The U.S. government designated the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) as the lead federal agency (LFA) for the American response in Liberia. DOD supported USAID with communication, coordination, logistics, and engineering capabilities and expertise. U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), the geographic combatant command, initially established Joint Forces Command-Operation United Assistance (JFC-OUA), with its Army Service component command, U.S. Army Africa (USARAF), forming the core of the JFC. JFC-OUA transitioned to the

101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) on 26 OCT 2014. The mission states that 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) (JFC-OUA) supports USAID in Liberia to assist the U.S. government's foreign humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) efforts to contain EVD, to prevent it from spreading outside of the region, alleviate human suffering, and promote internal and regional stability; on order, transition the JFC to designated entities.

U.S. military forces are not the primary U.S. government means of providing HA/DR. U.S. military forces normally support the activities of the U.S. government and foreign government authorities, IGOs, NGOs, and PVOs. USAID is the principal agency for U.S. bilateral development and HA/DR to foreign countries and interagency coordination; USAID acts as the lead federal agency for U.S. government foreign HA/DR. Although a separate agency from the Department of State (DOS), USAID shares administrative functions with DOS and reports to and receives overall foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State. Within USAID, the Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation provides the focal point for USAID interaction with U.S. and foreign militaries. The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is the primary office within USAID delegated the responsibility of providing HA/DR and coordinating the U.S. government's response to declared disasters in foreign countries. (OFDA is discussed further in Chapter 5.)

OFDA formulates its policy in coordination with other U.S. government departments and agencies. OFDA also coordinates with other U.S. agencies to provide relief supplies and funding for implementing partners (e.g., United Nations agencies, IGOs, NGOs, and the American Red Cross) to provide direct support.

Additionally, OFDA develops and manages logistical, operational, and technical support for disaster responses. Besides its coordination activities within the U.S. government, OFDA carries out these response options in coordination with the affected state, other donor countries, the United Nations, IGOs, NGOs, and PVOs. OFDA also assigns advisers to each geographic combatant command to coordinate responses involving DOD assistance, provide training, and advise planning.

With the concurrence of the U.S. Ambassador to the respective country, OFDA may deploy a disaster assistance response team (DART) to the crisis area to assist coordination of the HA/DR effort and activate an on-call response management team based in Washington. A DART provides specialists trained in disaster relief skills to assist U.S. embassies and USAID missions with the management of the U.S. response to a foreign disaster. The DART also works closely with the U.S. military when it is participating in HA/DR operations. DART personnel assess and report on the disaster situation and recommend follow-up actions. The team also processes, validates, and coordinates external requests for U.S. assistance.

In most cases, the DART uses the mission tasking matrix (MITAM) to identify tasks to be executed by the appropriate organization or agency, including the U.S. military. The JFC can use the MITAM as a record of requests for assistance that will become JFC and component-level tasks. Although the DART represents USAID/OFDA, which is the U.S. government's lead for the HA/DR response, the JFC should be aware that the U.S. Ambassador of a country is the Chief of Mission and in charge of all U.S. government activities in the disaster-affected country. (See Chapter 5 for further discussion of MITAM and DART.)

A JFC may establish a civil-military operations center (CMOC). The CMOC is a mechanism for the coordination of civil-military operations that can serve as the primary coordination interface and provide operational- and tactical-level coordination between the JFC and other stakeholders. Despite its name, the CMOC generally does not set policy or direct operations. Conceptually, the CMOC is the meeting place of stakeholders. For foreign operations, the CMOC may be the focal point where U.S. military forces coordinate any support to U.S. and foreign government authorities, NGOs, IGOs, and PVOs. In certain instances, the establishment of a U.S. forces CMOC may not be required. This is especially true if the HN has competent leadership and establishes a functional, cohesive CMOC-like organization where collective and collaborative decisions are made.

Because of the myriad U.S. government and nongovernmental entities involved in foreign HA/DR activities, mission command relationships outside DOD command structures may not be clearly defined. To achieve unity of effort, U.S. military forces should employ effective, timely coordination and cooperation. The challenge for combatant commanders/joint forces commanders and staffs is to understand and comply with various existing DOD policies and program guidance for foreign HA/DR and determine the right place and time to access interagency and other coordination networks. This is required to achieve the combatant commander's objectives and common goals of all the interorganizational stakeholders, including those of the HN. Difficulties arise from the fact that many U.S. government departments and agencies, civil and military authorities, foreign governments, IGOs, and NGOs may be conducting assistance activities concurrently within the same operational environment.

U.S. military planners must remain cognizant that these various agencies fall outside the military C2 system. Coordination and collaboration are essential when operating with these organizations. The strategic goals or operating procedures of all concerned may not be identical, or even compatible; however, with thorough collaboration and planning, cooperation and understanding, and synchronized support along complementary lines of effort, the potential for successful operations is greatly improved.



## **Communications**

The U.S. government provides top-down strategic guidance for using the informational instrument of national power in specific situations. Implementing strategic guidance and synchronizing communications are facilitated through defense support to public and military diplomacy activities. This type of communication demonstrates that U.S. involvement in foreign HA/DR operations can be extremely valuable to the image of the United States and supports the achievement of United States goals and the geographic combatant commander's theater campaign plan.

Activities that support communication synchronization also inform affected populations about ongoing efforts and assist in achieving joint task force objectives.

Communication activities are key to achieving strategic objectives in the region by reinforcing themes and messages regarding U.S. goodwill, evidenced by ongoing foreign HA/DR operations. Care should be taken not to raise expectations about the speed or amount of assistance that may be provided, as U.S. involvement in an operation could create unrealistic expectations of assistance among the population. Unmet expectations may result in suspicion, resentment, and mistrust of humanitarian assistance providers. As a result, many NGOs prefer to avoid perceptions of being aligned or affiliated with DOD forces.

Likewise, geographic combatant commanders/joint forces commanders and staffs must exercise care in communication so that in the attempts to demonstrate DOD responsiveness, concern, and assistance, the authority of the HN political leadership is not preempted and unwarranted credit for successes is not given at the expense of other contributing parties. Effective coordination and collaboration among all the information-related capabilities are necessary to ensure unity of effort and consistency in the information being disseminated.

The U.S. Ambassador, as the senior U.S. representative in each HN, controls the release of official U.S. information in country. To facilitate unity of effort and coordinated content, the U.S. military public affairs staff also should coordinate all themes, messages, and press releases concerning HA/DR operations through U.S. Embassy channels.

## **Liaison Officers**

Liaison is that contact or communication maintained between elements of military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. Various types of liaison coordination models may be used, depending on level of commonality between stakeholders (Is a relationship cooperative or based on coexistence?) In establishing the LNO relationship, the joint forces commander should be clear on LNOs'

roles and authorities, and their ability to speak for their home agency or organization. LNOs should not replace standing DOD processes, especially at the strategic level, but they can help to flatten bureaucratic structures by streamlining information flows. LNOs can assist by providing advice and information, translation between organizational cultures, and reachback to a home agency or organization. Regionally aligned civil affairs (CA) personnel are well-suited for liaison tasks.

Direct, early liaison with the United Nations and other humanitarian relief agencies is a valuable source of accurate, timely information about many aspects of the crisis area. U.S. government, United Nations, IGO, or NGO involvement is likely to precede that of U.S. or multinational forces and presents an opportunity to significantly enhance early force effectiveness.

A key additional benefit is the opportunity to build working relationships based on trust and open communication among all organizations. For that reason, ongoing liaison with other multinational forces participating in the operation is equally important.

Early in the operation, foreign HA/DR planners should ensure that sufficient, competent linguists are available for translation and interpretation requirements by the HN and the multinational forces.

### **Relationship Building**

There are challenges associated with unified action and interagency coordination. The players recognize that there will not be pure “unity of command” with one single authority and clearly defined roles and responsibilities. They acknowledge that absolute unity of effort is often difficult. Interagency and unified action partners often do not have the funding, number of personnel, or the capacity of the U.S. military. Further, their perspectives on a situation and possible solutions can be very different from U.S. entities. There is also the simple friction of working together with the different cultures of other agencies and organizations. Most agencies use different planning and decision-making processes than U.S. military commands, and interagency coordination is just not as easy as one would like it to be. That said, the U.S. military observes a continuing recognition and effort toward integration of complementary lines of effort toward common goals. Some of the key insights to facilitate relationship building in achieving common goals and ease interaction include the following:

- Personal relationships are key to coordination and unity of effort.
- Focus on common goals and objectives to attain unified action.
- Command, control, cooperation, coordination, and collaboration thinking is more appropriate to gaining unity of effort than terms like “command and control.”
- Including, not excluding, external stakeholders is important during

planning, execution, and assessment. Inclusion allows better understanding of the situation and the broader problem (beyond a military-only perspective), leading to better whole-of-government solutions.

- Understand the different roles, authorities, missions, cultures, and processes of external stakeholders.
- Coordination and execution with numerous stakeholders in this complex environment are extremely challenging and need continuous effort to keep on track.
- Recognize and mitigate the classification and information sharing implications.
- Effective relationships, coordination, and collaboration with all stakeholders are key to achieving common goals.

The military relies on structured and hierarchical decision-making processes; detailed planning; the use of standardized tactics, techniques, and procedures; and sophisticated C2 systems to coordinate and synchronize operations.

Civilian agencies may employ similar principles, but may not have the same degree of structural process as the U.S. military; civilian agencies' organizational structure is more horizontal. Decision processes may be more ad hoc, collaborative, and collegial. Cooperation between IGOs, NGOs, and the private sector is often based on a perceived mutually supportive interest, rather than a formalized agreement. Many NGOs are signatory to various codes of conduct, which includes the responsibility to share information for effectiveness, safety, and other reasons. Private sector entities might only coordinate if it supports the appropriate business model. A continuous information exchange among engaged UAPs is necessary to avoid confusion over objectives, differences in procedures, resource limitations, and shortfalls or overlaps of authorities.

The bottom line is: Action will follow understanding; and building relationships facilitates understanding, leading to collaborative accomplishment of goals. The U.S. military usually does not expect anything in return other than cooperation. Most civilian organizations do not operate in this manner. Many civilian organizations may have never worked with the U.S. military; however, they may have worked with other nations that have negative or ambivalent perceptions of civilian cooperation with a military force.

Interpersonal communication skills that emphasize consultation, compromise, and consensus contribute to relationship building and obtain unified action in a military-civilian effort. Building personal relationships to inspire trust and confidence is a win-win for commanders and their staff.

The challenges of gaining consensus and creating synergy between the engaged U.S. government agencies and multinational partners are greater because there are no clear authorities directing the relationship. Commanders and their staffs can help meet these challenges by developing personal relationships, using liaison elements, and making conscious decisions on the degree of reliance on those stakeholders for critical tasks. Personal relationships are essential. Inspiring trust and confidence is a conscious act that does not just happen — it must be planned, actively built through words and actions, and continually reinforced. Development of strong personal relationships is key to receiving the requisite trust and confidence of the engaged stakeholders when they are expected to help accomplish common goals.

### **Interoperability**

It is likely that U.S. government departments and agencies, civilian and HN agencies, and multinational entities will have unique communications networks. These may include commercially leased circuits and satellite services as well as high-frequency radio equipment.

JFCs should be equipped with communications equipment that facilitates collaboration with all participants. The need for interoperability of communications equipment in foreign HA/DR operations also may necessitate using unclassified communications.

U.S. military forces may face challenges in conducting operations via unclassified means in order to promote interorganizational coordination and synchronization. The use of classified and unclassified modes of communication are both necessary, as classified modes are routinely used to relay militarily significant information to military recipients while unclassified modes are needed for communication with nonmilitary entities. Foreign HA/DR operations, more often than not, employ unclassified modes of communication and rely heavily on the Internet.

### **Information Sharing**

Information sharing is critical to the efficient pursuit of a common humanitarian purpose. Although many different groups and authorities can (and should) work in parallel, a collaborative information environment (CIE) facilitates information sharing. Constructing a CIE is not primarily a technology issue — effective, low-cost network equipment and data management systems exist today, and more are being developed. Rather, the challenges are largely social, institutional, cultural, and organizational. These impediments can limit and shape the willingness of civilian and military personnel and organizations to openly cooperate and share information and capabilities.

The components of civil-military coordination consist of information and task sharing and collaborative planning — all of which depend on communications and management of data and information. The following issues, however, often complicate effective civil-military coordination:

- Lack of understanding about the information culture of the affected nation.
- Suspicions regarding the balance between information sharing and intelligence gathering.
- Tensions between the military’s need for classification of data (which implies secrecy) versus the civilian need for transparency.
- Differences in C2 between military operations versus civilian activities.
- The compatibility and interoperability of planning tools, processes, and civil-military organization cultures.

The sharing of information is particularly critical because no single responding entity — whether it is an IGO, NGO, assisting country government, or host government — can be the source of all of the required data and information. Making critical information widely available to multiple responding civilian and military elements not only reduces duplication of effort, but also enhances coordination and collaboration and provides a common knowledge base so that critical information can be pooled, analyzed, compared, contrasted, validated, and reconciled. Civil-military collaboration networks need to be designed to dismantle traditional institutional “stovepipes” and facilitate the sharing of information among civilian and military organizations. Web-based tools such as the All Partners Access Network (APAN) can facilitate this information-sharing process.

### **101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) Operations in Liberia**

The outbreak of Ebola in West Africa had potentially global implications. On 16 SEP 2014, President Barack Obama announced a plan to deploy U.S. military forces to Liberia to support USAID as the lead federal agency in the Ebola fight. With the President’s announcement, USAFRICOM and USARAF initiated operational planning, conducted on-the-ground assessments, developed a request for forces, and identified support mechanisms. Most importantly, USAFRICOM and USARAF worked closely with USAID/OFDA/DART, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the Defense Logistics Agency to synchronize U.S. military planning efforts. USARAF also played a vital role in facilitating situational awareness and developing working relationships with government of Liberia (GOL) officials, the Liberian military, the U.S. Ambassador to Liberia and other U.S. Embassy officials, as well as IGOs, NGOs, and PVOs. The relationships that USARAF established served as

the entry point for the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) (JFC-OUA) in furthering collaboration, communication, and synchronization to achieve a common goal.

### **Predeployment Training**

The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) planned and conducted a comprehensive pre-deployment training program for leaders and Soldiers to prepare them for operations in Liberia in the “fight” against Ebola.

Leaders and Soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and supporting units from 16 stateside locations required more than the individual/collective tactical training that is conducted in standard predeployment training scenarios. They also needed Ebola information briefings and training on protection measures against exposure.

The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) G-9/J-9 also developed and provided interagency, intergovernmental, and Liberia cultural information briefings to 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) leaders and Soldiers and provided briefing products for presentation to units external to Fort Campbell, KY. The G-9/J-9 developed a leader book, *101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) Liberian Response Support Force: Operation United Assistance – Liberia*, based on information derived from the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center that provided an in-depth description of the Liberian operational environment, IGOs, maps, biographies of key Liberian and international figures, military and civilian leader biographies, and a wealth of information designed to enhance understanding of the operational environment. Additionally, the G-9/J-9 developed a Liberian operational environment test to measure the learning of leaders/Soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and supporting organizations. Based on the results of the test, additional training was conducted in those areas requiring improvement.

The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) leadership and staff conducted joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) training to prepare for operations in Liberia. This training was essential, considering the numerous and disparate U.S. government, IGO, NGO, multinational, and private sector organizations supporting the Ebola mission.

Earlier, in the spring of 2014, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) focused on preparations for its December 2014 Warfighter exercise (WFX) 15-02, conducted by the Mission Command Training Program (MCTP). The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) used its Eagle Talon II training series to prepare the division staff for WFX 15-02; simultaneously brigades focused on leader/Soldier individual and collective training.

About the same time, XVIII Airborne Corps contacted the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) to incorporate JIIM training (also known as work with unified action partners [UAPs]), in the WFX 15-02 scenario.

“Unified action partners are those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector with whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations.”

—Army Doctrine Reference Publication  
3-0, *Unified Land Operations*

Including JIIM staff training in Eagle Talon II provided the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) insight into Phase 4 (stabilize) and Phase 5 (enable civil authority) of a campaign or operation and working with UAP. Additionally, XVIII Airborne Corps informed the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) that there might be merit to conceptually plan for supporting a foreign HA/DR mission potentially deploying to Africa.

Subsequently, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) chief of staff and G-9/J-9 led a division staffing effort with all staff leads in the summer of 2014 to conceptually support a foreign HA/DR mission on the African continent. This staffing effort was termed the humanitarian assistance survey team (HAST) concept. (JP 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*, and ATP 3-57.20, *Multi-Service Techniques for Civil Affairs Support to Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*) Conceptual planning for the HAST provided the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) leadership and staff a framework for a non-warfighting contingency mission and helped prepare the staff for operations to combat Ebola in Liberia.

The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) staffing effort also included an educational approach to learning about Ebola itself, the culture and leadership of Liberia, and the operational environment. The staff reached out to USAID and interagency partners, OFDA, the CDC, as well as various international governmental organizations (i.e., United Nations Mission for the Ebola Emergency Response and the World Health Organization).

To further educate the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) command and staff, a two-day Interagency Academics Seminar was developed by MCTP and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) chief of staff and G-9/J-9. This two-day seminar conducted at Fort Campbell brought together USAID, OFDA, CDC, DOS-DART, political advisers, previous U.S. ambassadors, the United Nations, the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, and the U.S. National Institutes of Health, as well as numerous representatives from the interorganizational community. The interagency seminar greatly enhanced 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) command and staff knowledge and understanding of interorganizational relationships, and the respective academics helped prepare for a different mission and mindset (transitioning from a WFX 15-02 force-on-force scenario to a foreign HA/DR mission).

While the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) interagency seminar proved extremely valuable, the guidance provided by the division commander focused the capabilities of the division on supporting the GOL and USAID along common lines of effort in accomplishing a common objective — win the Ebola fight. The catalyst to synchronizing the efforts of the myriad organizations was that the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) Commanding General continually highlighted the narrative theme that the DART, under USAID, was the lead federal agency of the overall conduct of operations in the Ebola fight in the sovereign and well-functioning GOL. The collaboration and coordination between the DART and JFC-OUA resulted in complementary lines of effort and were synchronized with the U.S. Ambassador in Monrovia.

### Commander's Guidance

The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) Commander continually emphasized the following key themes within JFC-OUA:

- **Chain of command.** Understand the roles of all the military organizations.
- **Strategic link.** Commanding General conducts key leader engagements with a strategic leader focus.
- **Speak with one voice.** Synchronize communications.
- **Nested lines of effort.** Focused on supporting USAID/DART in their support to the GOL.
- **Mission Command.** Exploit the power of the division to enable success in other stakeholders and produce products that enhance all UAP activities and operations.
- **Shared Understanding.** Emphasis on information sharing, combined meetings/working groups, and unclassified networks and information systems.

The division's command group focus exploited the power of the division in support of the GOL and USAID/DART. The command's initial focus was to explain the unique skill sets of the division and ask USAID/DART leaders and planners to exploit them. Predictive analysis and the planning capabilities of the division were harnessed, as well, in this initial effort.

### Civil Affairs Operations

The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) effectively employed civil affairs planning teams (CAPTs) and LNOs as a line of communication to facilitate understanding of the operational environment between the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) leadership/staff and UAPs in the development of collaborative solutions and employment of synchronized capabilities to conduct complementary operations.



USAFRICOM and USARAF together developed the requirement to U.S. Army Forces Command for a CA company, regionally aligned to the African continent, as well as a CAPT to assist in augmenting the G-9/J-9 staff. These teams were USAFRICOM-oriented, rapidly deployable, and had significant African experience with foreign language qualifications (i.e., Arabic and French).

The teams were under operational control to the JFC/101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). Upon their arrival, the CA company and JFC staff worked with the DART to determine the most efficient means of employment and utilization. There were clear Ebola threats in the populace that restricted interpersonal engagement; however, the CA assets provided initial and continual connectivity with the numerous aid organizations to their respective commanders with whom they were task-organized. For example, as the Army Ebola lab teams (1st Area Medical Lab Unit) were establishing a footprint, CA helped identify opportunities in acquiring space, accommodations, and movement, and generally provided civil liaison duties among the local leadership.

Further, with the additional LNO touch-points desired, CAPTs were sent to coordinate with the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response and the National Ebola Command Center (NECC).

An additional asset brought to the JFC was the civil information management (CIM) cell capability. The CIM cell helped establish file management on the APAN. The CAPT processed the volumes of civil information derived from open-source data, the Liberian Ministry of Health, IGOs, NGOs, and PVOs and posted the information in a logical method on APAN for all interested communities to share, read, and collectively understand the Ebola mission.

In addition to data collection on APAN, the CIM cell also used the Civil Information Management Data Processing System (CIMDPS) as a repository of all gathered Liberian civic data. CIMDPS is a program of record, managed by the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne) at Fort Bragg, NC, and, much like APAN, is a user-friendly military data repository.

“Our civil affairs liaisons, having recent experience in Africa, provided the strategic connectivity that I was looking for as well as providing the staff with valuable situational awareness.”

— MG Gary J. Volesky, Commanding General,  
101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)

## Supporting Elements

Further, USAFRICOM coordinated with the U.S. Transportation Command/ Joint Enabling Capabilities Command to deploy a joint communications support element (JCSE) into Liberia. The JCSE provided the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) with a communications planning team that established command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence architecture for immediate joint communications capability.

Cohesive, knowledgeable, and experienced LNO teams provided the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) the capability to collaborate effectively with the NECC, USAID, DART, the United Nations mission in Liberia, Armed Forces of Liberia, CDC, USAFRICOM, USARAF, and other entities to enable synchronization of operations along complementary lines of effort. LNOs were critical to the support the division provided — if the division needed to communicate with a UAP, there was an LNO on location to facilitate the communication — and by being “on the ground” at USAFRICOM and USARAF headquarters, the LNOs quickly made up for any lack of knowledge in theater.

The division used the principle that “communication comes first, then coordination, followed by collaboration, and finally synchronization of effort.” The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) employed experienced and knowledgeable LNOs to enhance collaboration with the NECC, USAID (DART), the United Nations mission in Liberia, Armed Forces of Liberia, and other agencies and organizations in theater.

In addition to the six CAPTs employed throughout Liberia, the CAPT also assisted the G-9/J-9 cell in essential staff actions. The DART had experienced civilian-military LNOs, and JFC-OUA contributed experienced and competent psychological operations LNOs, who had previous exposure to interagency and U.S. Embassy operations.

While the division did not establish a CMOC, the GOL was able to do this through a unifying process that was termed the Incident Management System, which was a clearinghouse of meetings and decisions made within the NECC. The NECC is essentially analogous to a national-level CMOC or humanitarian operations center. Thus, in having shared equities, the entire JIIM/NGO/economic sector came together during this process and became a stronger and distinct force.

The center of gravity where collective and collaborative decisions are being made is within the NECC. If the GOL had not had competent leadership, a unified and logical approach would have been significantly more difficult. Had the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) established a CMOC, it would have been counterproductive and probably confused the international community. In certain instances, the establishment of a U.S. CMOC is not

always required. This is especially true if the HN has competent leadership and establishes a functional, cohesive CMOC-like organization where collective and collaborative decisions can be made.

The previous deployments and experiences of the G-9/J-9 staff, supporting CA units into Iraq, Afghanistan, Africa, and other locations, provided a foundation for planning and conducting operations in OUA. Relationships and trust among the G-9/J-9 staff and leaders/Soldiers assigned to the CA company from the 82nd Civil Affairs Battalion and CAPTs from the 85th Civil Affairs Brigade had been established during previous deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan, Africa, and other locations. These relationships and trust, coupled with lessons learned and best practices from previous deployments, provided a foundation to facilitate common themes in the liaison, communication, collaboration, and cooperation with the many and disparate UAPs supporting OUA.

The CA teams and LNOs provided strategic connectivity and situational awareness to the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) leadership and staff. While the positive actions of the CA teams/LNOs significantly enhanced the division's situational awareness, understanding, planning, and operations, the cooperation and collaboration of the international community cannot be overlooked. In short, since working many operational and combat missions abroad, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and CA community had never seen cooperation and collaboration to the degree as experienced in Liberia.

There is usually a degree of dissention and competing agendas among the many disparate organizations participating in an operation. Simply described, this was not observed in Liberia. The many JIIM agencies and organizations involved came to assist Liberia, having one goal in mind — stop the spread of Ebola. A very functional and competent GOL took the lead in harnessing the resources, the funding, the numerous aid workers, and the implementation of a strategic health care plan.

While the experience, along with lessons learned and best practices, gleaned from previous deployments provided a foundation for effectively operating in a JIIM operational environment, the interpersonal skills, open-mindedness, and “working friendly” attitudes were key ingredients to achieving success. Another important take-away that the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) G-9/J-9, supporting CA teams, and LNOs used to facilitate communication, collaboration, and cooperation in theater was the ability to have an objective viewpoint and develop a fresh look when working with the many UAPs having dissimilar backgrounds.

The G-9/J-9 developed a comprehensive contact list for Liberian governmental/civil leadership/officials and supporting international officials and agencies with whom the 101st Airborne Division (Air

Assault) communicated. If the division's leadership and staff needed to operate in any given area of Liberia, the G-9/J-9 had the names and contact information for multiple government officials, staff members, and agencies operating there. The ability to conduct timely communications with key Liberian leaders, international agencies, and other governmental/nongovernmental representatives was essential to collaborate, coordinate, and synchronize operations along common lines of effort, and this extensive contact list made it possible.

## Chapter 5

# U.S. Agency for International Development and Department of Defense Cooperation

### Introduction

Each year, the U.S. government responds to approximately 80 natural disasters across the globe. The Department of Defense (DOD) lends support to 10 to 15 percent of these disasters by way of the Department of State (DOS) and the lead federal agency — U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Responses to these disasters vary, ranging from delivery of supplies in isolated incidents to full-scale deployment of a brigade-size or larger task force. Examples of disasters include earthquakes, landslides, tsunamis, hurricanes, cyclones and typhoons, tornadoes, wildfires, floods, volcanic eruptions, and pandemics. Although Operation United Assistance (OUA) was in response to the Ebola pandemic, many of the issues experienced by the Joint Forces Command (JFC) and detailed in this chapter could be applicable to any disaster response and should be considered by commanders and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) planners in the development of their operational plans.

### USAID Policy and DOD Cooperation

In June 2015, USAID updated its July 2008 Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy, which builds on lessons learned from working with the military in an array of challenging environments.

This policy reflects a new way of doing business — one grounded in harnessing innovation, local leadership, and public-private partnerships to deliver real results. As part of that effort, we are embracing creative development of solutions that we can implement alongside our military partners. We worked hand-in-hand with military personnel to tackle the Ebola epidemic in West Africa. Military engineers oversaw the building of new Ebola treatment units; military logisticians directed the deployment of life-saving resources from across the globe; and military doctors supported the brave men and women who treated patients every day. Just 10 months after the first U.S. government personnel deployed, cases were cut down by 80 percent. ...

(Continued on next page)

USAID’s mission is to partner to end extreme poverty and to promote resilient, democratic societies while advancing our security and prosperity. USAID-DOD cooperation is an essential condition for the achievement of U.S. development and defense objectives. More specifically, USAID and DOD personnel must have an understanding of and respect for each other’s roles and responsibilities, policies and strategies, and plans and programs. In the past, the absence of mutual understanding has sometimes led to confusion about roles, duplication of effort, and disappointing outcomes. This revised policy seeks to address this overarching lesson, which is captured in each of the principles articulated in this document.

It is USAID policy for its personnel to cooperate with DOD in order to support the agency’s mission and advance its objectives. USAID will invest its cooperative efforts in areas with the greatest potential for positive results.

Alfonso E. Lenhardt  
Acting Administrator, USAID

As outlined in this new policy, the following operating principles guide USAID personnel in their ongoing processes with DOD:

- Guiding principles for implementing this policy:
  - Mutual understanding of each other’s roles and responsibilities is the basis for USAID-DOD cooperation.
  - USAID applies selectivity and focus to its engagements with DOD.
  - Cooperation with DOD occurs in different degrees depending on context.
  - USAID may serve as a liaison between DOD and USAID’s implementing partners.
- Operating principles:
  - Collaborative organizational structures and personnel exchanges provide the foundation of effective cooperation at all levels.
  - USAID cooperates with DOD across —
    - \* The USAID program cycle.
    - \* Many environments, sectors, and issue areas.

For more information on the specifics of each of these operating principles, review the June 2015 USAID Policy on Cooperation with the DOD on the USAID website at <https://www.usaid.gov/policy/dod-cooperation>.

## **USAID and DOD Roles in Foreign Disaster Response**

USAID is an independent agency that provides economic, development, and humanitarian assistance around the world in support of the foreign policy goals of the United States. USAID's Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (USAID/DCHA) manages a broad range of critical development and life-saving emergency-response activities and provides technical leadership and expertise in coordinating USAID's democracy programs; international disaster assistance; emergency and developmental food aid; aid to manage and mitigate conflict; military liaison; and volunteer programs. DCHA also provides technical leadership, support, and advice in developing policy and programs to assist countries transitioning out of crisis and administers disaster assistance, preparedness, and mitigation.

Within DCHA, the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is responsible for facilitating and coordinating U.S. government emergency assistance overseas. OFDA provides humanitarian assistance to save lives, alleviate human suffering, and reduce the social and economic impact of humanitarian emergencies worldwide. The OFDA has a staff of approximately 250 personnel worldwide and responds to approximately 50 emergencies annually. The staff also helps formulate and oversee rehabilitation and disaster mitigation programs.

### **How OFDA Responds to a Disaster**

When a rapid-onset disaster occurs, OFDA's duty officer is alerted and DCHA/OFDA personnel are placed on stand-by to respond. In the case of complex humanitarian emergencies, such as conflict or food insecurity, DCHA/OFDA personnel closely monitor the humanitarian situation to determine timing for an effective response. If conditions warrant, DCHA/OFDA disaster experts deploy to further assess the humanitarian situation and determine priority needs.

DCHA/OFDA coordinates closely with the U.S. Embassy or USAID mission in the affected country to determine if and when U.S. government humanitarian assistance may be appropriate. When an emergency arises, the U.S. Ambassador, who is the Chief of Mission, or the Assistant Secretary of State responsible for the region can declare a disaster if the event meets the following criteria:

- The disaster exceeds the host country's ability to respond.
- The affected country's government either requests or is willing to receive U.S. assistance.
- A response to the disaster is in the U.S. national interest.

The office responds with funds and/or other assistance only after a disaster declaration is made by the appropriate U.S. government official.

## **Other U.S. Government Offices that Provide Humanitarian Assistance**

Although DCHA/OFDA is the lead U.S. government agency to coordinate international disaster response, the office coordinates assistance with other parts of USAID, as well as other agencies and donors, such as the following:

- The USAID Office of Food for Peace provides food commodities to implementing partners to address both emergency food needs and food security development activities.
- The USAID Office of Transition Initiatives facilitates the transition from crisis and conflict to peace and stability by aiding in the implementation of peace agreements or developing democratic governance and media structures within the affected country.
- The USAID Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation supports early responses to address the causes and consequences of instability and conflict, and seeks to integrate conflict mitigation and management into USAID's programs.
- Other parts of USAID, such as regional bureaus, support longer-term development programs that complement DCHA's activities.

DCHA/OFDA also coordinates with various other U.S. government agencies that provide significant humanitarian assistance. For example, DOD possesses unique capabilities that can overcome the serious logistical challenges that often occur following disasters. In collaboration with DCHA/OFDA, DOD coordinates and directs the utilization of military assets, including personnel, supplies, and equipment, for humanitarian assistance overseas. The USAID Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation (USAID/CMC) is the focal point for USAID interaction with DOD. The Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation is responsible for enabling effective working relationships with DOD, including maintaining emergency response readiness; coordinating planning; and developing joint training, education, and exercises.

## **The Role of the Military in Disaster Response**

For the U.S. military to become involved in a humanitarian assistance operation, special conditions must apply. When lives are in immediate danger and the command is in a position to render timely life-saving assistance, a military commander has the authority to act on his/her own to render immediate aid. Outside this immediate situation, any response from DOD is part of a comprehensive U.S. government approach in which DCHA/OFDA is the lead agency.



As described in an Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) message, a request for DOD assistance is transmitted in an official executive secretary memorandum from DCHA/OFDA through DOS to DOD (see Figure 5-1, next page). This memorandum preserves visibility and decision-making authority for OSD on the use of DOD assets and personnel, and helps ensure that any request for assistance (RFA) has been properly vetted and validated through senior management at USAID and DOS. The official memorandum also allows humanitarian assistance managers in OSD to review the request against other potential demands on limited DOD disaster response resources.

In the event of military involvement in a large disaster response, DOD and USAID will exchange liaison officers (LNOs) with the joint task force (JTF) deployed in the field, the Joint Staff, and/or the affected combatant command headquarters. The LNO mission is to convey assessments and resource requirements and provide a current operations status and future plans for relief operations. In most circumstances, the disaster assistance response team (DART) will be collocated with the JTF. Due to public diplomacy sensitivities, the names of responding DOD assets are occasionally changed to lessen the military image.

With its ability to deploy assets rapidly, the U.S. military is in an ideal position to provide significant transportation, logistical assets, personnel, and communication assistance to disaster responders. However, because the military is uniquely situated to move large assets, DCHA/OFDA generally recommends that DOD assets be used in a “wholesale” capacity, supporting smaller and more agile implementing partners, United Nations agencies, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), which deliver the actual “retail” assistance to beneficiaries and can work hands-on with affected populations.

During disaster operations involving U.S. military assistance, DCHA/OFDA’s role is to coordinate how and when military support is required with NGOs, international organizations, and United Nations agencies. In previous disaster responses, examples of military support requested included heavy- and medium-lift helicopter support, cargo handling, security briefings and information sharing, assessment coordination, access to remote areas, assistance with opening sea and air ports, and liaison assistance with another nation’s military.

Some NGOs work more easily with the U.S. military than others, depending on the organization’s philosophy and outlook. Some NGOs have expressed concern that the military tries to dominate the humanitarian response. Other NGOs fear compromising core values of impartiality and neutrality, or they fear that the presence of the NGO will be misused to collect intelligence. Through the DART in general, and the DCHA/OFDA operations liaison unit in particular, DCHA/OFDA is able to bridge the gap and assist both NGOs and the military to cooperate in disaster relief operations.




Figure 5-1. Interagency coordination flow when USAID/OFDA and DOD respond. (Source: GTA 90-01-030)

## **Lessons Learned/Insights**

In any disaster or complex emergency, the U.S. military has a specialized skill set and assets that can greatly assist the delivery of U.S. humanitarian assistance. Both USAID and DOD, together with the rest of the interagency, are regularly improving coordination in humanitarian responses through mutual participation in both USAID and DOD training, exercise events, and each military Service's officer education program. In this way, all actors are cooperating not only to execute what is in the U.S. national interest, but also to do the greatest good for the host nation(s) and population affected by disasters.

## **USAID and the Mission Tasking Matrix**

It is important to note that neither the DART nor the JFC is subordinate to the other; a successful relationship is based on close coordination and mutual understanding of each element's respective mission. Both have a common purpose and accordingly have much to gain through close coordination and unity of effort. In some cases it will be appropriate to have a DART member attached to the JTF/JFC headquarters. An exchange of personnel can bring clarity to a situation where planning and execution are met with the fog of operations. In most cases, the DART will use the mission tasking matrix (MITAM) to identify tasks to be executed by the appropriate organization or agency. The JTF can use the MITAM as a record of RFAs that will become JTF and component-level tasks. Although the DART represents OFDA, which is the U.S. government lead for the foreign disaster response, the JFC should be aware that the Chief of Mission is in charge of all U.S. government activities in the disaster-affected country.

The MITAM system was established by the military and USAID for use by the DART to facilitate coordination for humanitarian assistance operations and ensure the operations are conducted appropriately. Simply put, MITAMs are orders based on RFAs. Normally, these RFAs are issued by civilians working at OFDA, the United Nations, NGOs, or by military officers in the field.

This system has been successfully used to facilitate civilian-military coordination during numerous disaster response efforts, and the MITAM system is thoroughly briefed to U.S. military participants in the Joint Humanitarian Operations Course taught by OFDA personnel.

## **Mission Tasking Matrix Process**

The MITAM process begins when an affected country initiates an RFA to USAID/OFDA. IF DOD possesses a unique capability and/or assets are available to fulfill this need, USAID/OFDA representatives request DOD support. The USAID/OFDA representatives, in coordination with the J-9,




Figure 5-2. RFA to MITAM process. (Source: USAID/OFDA Joint Humanitarian Operations Course Briefing at [http://phtpacific.org/.../USAID.OFDA%20CivMil%20Brief\\_PHT\\_%202012\\_BH.ppt](http://phtpacific.org/.../USAID.OFDA%20CivMil%20Brief_PHT_%202012_BH.ppt))

develop the MITAM request (see Figure 5-2, Page 84). This request is then processed by the JTF in the following five phases:

- **Phase 1: MITAM receipt.** The JTF, typically the battle watch captain and orders officer, receives the MITAM from USAID/OFDA and staffs it with the MITAM working group (WG). Then, the MITAM WG analyzes whether it is feasible for a JTF to conduct the mission.
- **Phase 2: Staffing.** The MITAM WG comprises key JTF planners and unit representatives, and is led by the J-9 in coordination with the J-3 (the J-3 is the tasking authority). The MITAM WG validates the MITAM, identifies units and resources capable of performing the mission, and issues a warning order. The battle watch captain develops a tracking mechanism for MITAMs and tracks the tasks using USAID/OFDA assigned numbers for each task.
- **Phase 3: Orders development.** The orders officer writes an execute order (EXORD), identifying a list of corresponding tasks, including the MITAM number for tracking; the EXORD is issued to the tasked unit.
- **Phase 4: Mission execution.** The tasked unit executes the assigned mission, and the battle watch captain tracks MITAM progress.
- **Phase 5: Closure.** This phase captures resource requirements (i.e., personnel, equipment operational costs, and consumables associated with mission execution).

## Unique Issues/Challenges During Operation United Assistance

One of the more confusing aspects of OUA was the MITAM process, by which the JFC received tasks from the DART in Liberia. What occurred prior to the JFC deployment relating to MITAM and what occurred after the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) deployment with the MITAM are critical data points that may lead to a more dynamic and refined tasking process in the future.

The MITAM is an Excel spreadsheet that tracks support requirements. Historically, MITAM was a tactical-level tool used between deployed DARTs and deployed JTFs. The DART has the responsibility to protect the JTF from frivolous requests from NGOs and similar organizations. After a request is validated by DART, the request is passed to the JTF/JFC for analysis and confirmation, after which it is sent back to the DART.

When looking back at the timeline of OUA, there was a process breakdown that took the MITAM away from its purpose as a local coordination tool to more of a strategic policy approval tool. Difficulties in translating

requirements from the DART to the response management team, to the Joint Staff, to U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), to the U.S. Army Africa (USARAF) tasking scheme became apparent as JFC-OUA established itself in Monrovia. (It is important to note that part of this confusion could be attributed to the fact that there were no DOD forces on the ground in Liberia when the first MITAM request was received.)

Both the DART and the JFC understood the process and assumed that the MITAM would occur as it historically was used: DART to the JTF/JFC to validate the request, and the JTF would execute the task. This did not occur, at least entirely. The JFC initially assumed that it needed to wait for a USAFRICOM EXORD for each task (as had occurred up to this point), even though the DART and JFC staff suggested that this was incorrect and no longer necessary and, in fact, extended the response time for DOD support.

Compounding this was the fact that USARAF continued to be tasked via an EXORD as opposed to JFC-OUA; in other words, the USARAF steady-state operations center was still managing the receipt of EXORDs from USAFRICOM.

That is not to say that JFC-OUA did not have situational awareness of the MITAM requests. Within days of standing up, the forward headquarters (the J-9) drafted the MITAM WG charter and procedures as a JFC boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups entity and battle rhythm event. So, MITAM meetings did occur on a daily basis, but most tasks, due to concerns about funding and authority to support the DART requests, were sent up to USAFRICOM, and some were sent back to the Joint Staff for action.

At the end of the day, there was some clarity about what the JFC could do on its own. Low-cost, non-controversial tasks, such as providing gravel for an NGO site, were routinely approved by the JFC. Other tasks, such as non-medical management of Ebola treatment units (ETUs), support of Public Health Service personnel, and the purchase of personal protective equipment (PPE), were contentious and were either modified or disapproved by the Joint Staff and USAFRICOM.

There were many overlaying issues associated with the process. Some assumed that the tasks from the DART to DOD were less about relying on the military's unique capabilities in order to build the 25-bed hospital, the 17 ETUs, and the mobile testing units, and more about misunderstanding how to transfer U.S. government appropriated funds back to an entity more appropriately designed and experienced in combating infectious diseases and providing required support.

In other words, DOD was not actually needed for its unique capabilities, but rather for its money. This assumption was technically incorrect. The transfer of funds outside of DOD is not within USARAF's purview; that authority lies with Congress and the President. DOD brought engineering capabilities, contracting capacity, and large-scale logistics planning (transportation, distribution, and medical logistics), not just money.

## Lessons Learned/Insights

- **A policy related to the MITAM process needs to be prepared.** The use of the MITAM when there was no tactical force in the country created confusion about whom to task and who approves execution, and time delays in approval or disapproval of requested support from the JFC.
- **Mission analysis and preparation of the operational environment must be conducted prior to implementation.** There were assumptions made for U.S. forces required in theater based on incomplete knowledge of the capabilities of the business and private sectors in Liberia to respond to the enormity of the contracting that was anticipated. There was really very little that the JFC could not contract, lease, or buy in the area of responsibility. Prior knowledge of the civil sector, its capabilities, markets, and reliance, need to be known ahead of the commitment of forces. An active and ongoing series of programs aimed at “real time” economic, market, and business analysis of high-risk countries needs to be implemented.
- **USAID/OFDA/DART need to be clear on “unique capabilities.”** Many things asked of DOD could have been procured elsewhere and in a similar time horizon. DOD procurement of PPE was such a case — what is unique about DOD ability to buy commercial PPE? Aircraft are another such case. While it is true that DOD sent six helicopters to Liberia in 45 days, multiple vendors made it known that they had readily available fleets of aircraft in Senegal. A validation of “unique” must occur in a politically detached manner and/or when DOD obligates funds to a certain emergency.
- **Be thoroughly aware of DART operations and the MITAM process.** Units preparing for future HA/DR operations must ensure that key staff members gain a thorough working knowledge and understanding of DART operations and the MITAM process. In particular, personnel need to comprehend the idiosyncrasies associated with the U.S. government funding process in support of HA/DR operations. For more information, see the USAID site at <https://www.usaid.gov/dive> for educational opportunities.

**The following are requests submitted to the DART and processed using the MITAM process during OUA:**

**MITAM 1**

Type of service/goods requested: A 25-bed hospital unit with the ability to complete basic care as well as electrolyte management, complete blood count, intravenous fluids, blood transfusions, pressor drugs, and kidney dialysis.

Why is this requested of the military? A 25-bed hospital unit with the ability to complete basic care as well as electrolyte management, complete blood count, intravenous fluids, blood transfusions, pressor drugs, and kidney dialysis.

**MITAM 1a**

Type of service/goods requested: The advanced echelon (ADVON) team to assist in the placement and planning for the 25-bed U.S. military hospital to be located in Monrovia, Liberia. As part of the ADVON team.

Why is this requested of the military? A U.S. military ADVON team is needed to prepare for the 25-bed military hospital: logistics, personnel planning, and hand-over training.

**MITAM 1b**

Type of service/goods requested: Medical planner to assist in the placement and planning of the 25-bed U.S. military hospital to be located in Monrovia, Liberia. As part of the ADVON team.

Why is this requested of the military? A U.S. military medical planner is needed to prepare for the 25-bed military hospital: logistics, personnel planning, and hand-over training.

**MITAM 2**

Type of service/goods requested: One logistics planner; one horizontal/civil engineer; one air planner to assist the government of Liberia (GOL), the DART, and the HA community as they respond to the Ebola outbreak.

Why is this requested of the military? The U.S. military is uniquely suited to provide expertise in these areas in a timely manner.

**MITAM 3**

Type of service/goods requested: Purchase and deliver 1,200 cots. Specs: 74.8in x 25in x 16.5in.

Why is this requested of the military? The U.S. military is uniquely suited to provide these supplies as speed is paramount.

**MITAM 4**

Type of service/goods requested: Two mobile Ebola virus testing labs to assist the GOL's ETUs in Bong and Montserrado counties.

Why is this requested of the military? U.S. military labs are currently ready to deploy, and are uniquely suited to fulfill this specific task.



## Chapter 6

### Joint Enabling Capabilities Command

The Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC) is a subordinate joint command of the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) tasked to provide joint enabling capabilities to combatant commanders for emergent and other requirements.


JECC consists of three subordinate joint commands: the Joint Planning Support Element (JPSE), the Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE), and the Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE). (See Figure 6-1, next page)

During Operation United Assistance (OUA), JECC deployed personnel from all three subordinate commands to five countries and supported the headquarters elements of U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), U.S. Army Africa (USARAF), and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). JECC's task was to provide mission-tailored, joint capability packages to combatant commanders to facilitate rapid establishment of joint forces headquarters, fulfill global response force execution, and bridge joint operational requirements.

JPSE provides rapidly deployable, tailored, joint planners who bring the expertise to accelerate the formation and increase the effectiveness of a joint forces headquarters during emerging operations. JPSE provides expertise in the following joint capabilities:

- Plans to leverage joint expertise and use current best practices to ensure the integrated employment of land, air, maritime, and information operations capabilities.
- Operations to enhance situational understanding and facilitate the execution of current and future operations.
- Logistics to integrate, coordinate, and implement joint logistics operations and planning.
- Knowledge management (KM) to develop and implement plans and processes to provide increased situational awareness across the command and support/enhance the commander's decision cycle.
- Intelligence support to coordinate, manage, and synchronize intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination.

JPSE deploys on short notice to assist joint forces commanders for the entire range of military operations. In addition to the joint capabilities, all joint planners from JPSE provide expertise in the Joint Operation Planning



**Figure 6-1. U.S. Transportation Command's component commands and responsibilities.**

Process (JOPP) to seamlessly integrate with and/or lead joint forces headquarters planning teams.

JCSE provides rapidly deployable, scalable, en route and early-entry communications capabilities across the full spectrum of operations to enable rapid formation of the joint forces. JCSE is composed of joint active duty, National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve personnel who can globally deploy

within hours of notification to provide communications packages tailored to the specific needs of a full joint task force (JTF) headquarters and a joint special operations task force.

As a joint airborne, deployable communications organization, JCSE offers the following capabilities:

- Expeditionary (can deploy in hours)
- Early entry for a 40-seat joint command and control node
- Commercially air transportable
- Seamless support from an early entry package to a full joint forces headquarters
- Access to a full range of Department of Defense (DOD) and commercial networks
- A robust, 24-hour, seven-day-a-week reachback capability

JCSE's rapid deployment capability and lightweight equipment footprint also enable timely, secure, and reliable communications service delivery during all phases of joint forces headquarters operations.

JPASE provides ready, rapidly deployable joint public affairs professionals who can plan and implement the commander's communication strategy upon arrival to help lead the public information effort. They provide the only expeditionary, globally deployable, combat-ready joint public affairs capability in DOD to combatant commanders to enable the rapid establishment of joint forces headquarters and bridge emergent operational joint public affairs requirements.

During OUA, JECC provided a JPSE that performed the following operational support:

- Provided cross-function, cross-service joint planners, enabling USAFRICOM, USARAF, and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) to conduct joint crisis action planning on extremely accelerated timelines to bridge gaps in planning capability during the emergent crisis.
- Quickly and accurately assessed the operational environment (OE) and resources needed to meet the mission, minimizing the personnel and logistical footprint deployed.
- Anticipated redeployment challenges and planning requirements, enabling timely coordination with external agencies.
- Rapidly assessed the OE to establish and institutionalize KM processes critical to mission success.

## **JPSE Integration at U.S. Africa Command**

Six JPSE planners deployed to USAFRICOM headquarters as part of a JECC mission-tailored package (MTP) to assist with OUA planning efforts. JPSE planners formed a cross-functional operational planning team (OPT) within the J-35 that included a JPSE logistics planner from the J-4 staff and was integrated with the KM infrastructure. Accomplishments of the MTP included the following:

- Developed the OUA force flow and capabilities slides for the National Security Council Principals Committee, based on inputs from USARAF planning products.
- Developed the “plan-to-plan” timeline for USAFRICOM’s OUA order and authored multiple planning products as part of USAFRICOM’s OUA order-development working group.
- Established three OPTs to develop and brief mission analysis for USAFRICOM’s regional OUA branch plans.
- Integrated with USAFRICOM’s KM infrastructure and aided the development of the Ebola common operational picture on the All Partners Access Network (APAN). This integration helped refine USAFRICOM’s battle rhythm, to include OUA-oriented events, and updated its KM/information management (IM) plan.

## **JPSE Integration at USARAF**

Nine JPSE planners deployed to USARAF headquarters for OUA after the OUA warning order. Initial sourcing for this MTP was from a JECC exercise package that was already “boots-on-ground” to support the USARAF headquarters during Exercise Lion Focus. Accomplishments of the MTP included the following:

- Developed the plan-to-plan for the OUA response. Led the USARAF OPT for OUA, participating in all steps of the JOPP. Provided mission-critical refinements to all staff estimates and supporting concepts.
- Participated in multiple touch points with the USARAF commander, establishing a “trusted agent” relationship of the JECC and fully integrated JECC personnel on the USARAF staff.
- Developed the OUA execution synchronization matrix and developed decision support matrices for each identified decision point.
- In coordination with the USARAF staff, developed the joint manning document, request for forces (RFF), and requests for support on accelerated timelines to meet deadlines established by the National Security Council, Joint Staff, and USAFRICOM.

- Finalized the operation order for Joint Forces Command (JFC)-OUA to include all relevant annexes, appendices, and tabs.
- Assisted in the development and hand-off of the JFC-OUA transition plan to the G-3 for execution.
- In coordination with USAFRICOM's knowledge management officer (KMO), developed the approach to synchronize battle rhythms between both headquarters.
- Developed a weeklong chart of the JFC-OUA battle rhythm and advised the KMO on how to hand off to the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault).
- Developed a SharePoint tool to enable cross-directorate review and approval of requirements packages to the Operational Contracting Support Integration Cell.
- Provided key insights of the utility of APAN for joint, interagency, interorganizational, and multinational operations for the USARAF Commander based on recent employment during operations in Haiti, Japan, and the Philippines.
- Developed the staff utilization matrix for OUA boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups and facilitated the battle rhythm transfer to the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault).
- Supported numerous OPTs in the continued refinement of engineering, medical, sustainment/logistics, and mission command efforts.
- Developed JFC-OUA medical redeployment/reintegration courses of action (COAs) from headquarters guidance and briefed the USARAF Commander.
- Developed the branch plan operational design and mission analysis for civil disorder/noncombatant evacuation operations and briefed the USARAF G-3/5/7.
- Developed branch plan mission analysis products for countering violent extremist organizations and briefed the USARAF G-3/5/7.

### **JPSE Integration at the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)**

Following identification of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) to serve as the JFC headquarters, three JPSE planners deployed to Fort Campbell, KY, to assist with OUA planning efforts. Sourcing for this MTP was from the USAFRICOM (one operations planner) and USARAF (two logistics planners) JECC teams.

Accomplishments of this MTP included the following:

- Integrated with the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) crisis action planning team to refine the OUA mission analysis, operational approach, and COAs development from a divisional perspective with particular emphasis on phase transition, force-flow prioritization, risk management, and integration of supporting concept of operations (CONOPS) with higher headquarters guidance. Experience on the USAFRICOM and USARAF planning teams significantly aided the development of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) planning products.
- In coordination with the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) crisis action planning team, JPSE planners led the development of the division's OUA CONOPS brief to the USAFRICOM Commander. This was the JECC team's main touch point with the division's Commanding General (CG) and G-3, and provided them with a cohesive brief that included key planning insights and experience at USAFRICOM and USARAF.
- Helped develop KM/IM processes to integrate emergent guidance and parallel planning efforts at USARAF and USAFRICOM into the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) crisis action planning team.

### **Joint Communications Support Element**

**Communications Bridging.** The JCSE established the initial communications architecture to support the Ebola humanitarian effort in Western Africa. Four rapid response kits (RRKs) and one early entry package (EEP) were deployed as the advanced echelon (ADVON) utilizing the JCSE global architecture, the Defense Information Systems Network-Tactical Edge (DISN-TE). These nodes were the only communications assets in theater capable of providing immediate broadband secure services. The deployable joint command and control (DJC2) core was further configured to provide USAFRICOM-specific domain services to the JFC-OUA headquarters.

**Joint Planning Expertise.** Planners provided functional and technical expertise in command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence planning, tactical satellite communications, networks, voice and ground reconnaissance equipment tunneling to USARAF and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault).

**Global Network Operations.** The Joint Network Operations Center (JNOC) established day-to-day network management of service to OUA.

## JCSE Integration at USARAF

- Developed communication support plan for JFC-OUA mission command requirements for the headquarters, medical training facility, Ebola treatment unit support, TF engineers, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) sustainment brigade, and the intermediate staging base (ISB), Dakar, Senegal.
- Drafted the Joint Command and Control Next Generation OPORD 15-003 and JCSE Annex K 15-003 for the DJC2 core deployment.
- Coordinated with USAFRICOM, USARAF, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), and the DJC2 core personnel for full network visibility and monitoring.
- In coordination with the USARAF staff, developed RFFs for communication assets on accelerated timelines to meet suspense established by the Joint Staff, USAFRICOM, and the principal's committee.
- Validated network and satellite architecture with USAFRICOM and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault).
- Completed all satellite access requests and gateway access requests through USTRANSCOM to the Defense Information Systems Agency.
- Provided USARAF the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, movement, and load-plan information for movement to the African continent.
- Coordinated ground movement of the entire core from Italy to Germany for airlift.
- Reconfigured cargo from ground movement to air movement and completed joint inspection at Ramstein, Germany.
- Provided classified and unclassified data and voice services to the torch party, ADVON, and main body.

## JCSE Integration at JFC-OUA

- Deployed JCSE and DJC2 communications packages for JFC-OUA, TF Rugged, TF Eagle Medics, TF Sustain, and the Senegal ISB core (Barclay Training Center, Liberia) — RRK-13 (Dakar, Senegal); RRK-14 (Firestone, Liberia); RRK-15 (Spriggs-Payne Airfield, Liberia); RRK-16 (National Police Training Center, Liberia); and EEP-57 (Monrovia, Liberia).
- Integrated the local Internet service provider, which expanded DJC2 bandwidth capability.

- Provided the following:
  - Installation and infrastructure support to the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) G-6 to establish additional workspace in buildings and CG/deputy CG quarters.
  - Fork lift support at Barclay Training Center for the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), engineers, military police, and the force-provider team.
  - A tactical arms room for all weapons on Barclay Training Center.
  - A ground/air task-oriented radar and high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle for internal sustainment transportation within the cantonment area.
  - Network monitoring, bandwidth utilization statistics, and technical support by JNOC personnel.
- Developed and executed the communications transition with JFC-OUA headquarters, including training incoming TF personnel and transferring property.
- Conducted TF headquarters site survey to assess and validate terrain, dimensions, and force protection measures.
- Repaired environmental control units and generators at the Royal Palm Hotel and force provider tentage to ensure that consistent power was available for equipment and life support.
- Extended USAFRICOM services to JFC-OUA headquarters (this had never been done in the DJC2 core).
- Selected three JCSE personnel to participate in a telephone conversation with the President of the United States and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) CG, MG Gary J. Volesky (the President thanked them for their service).

### **Joint Public Affairs Support Element**

Initially, JPASE personnel deployed to USAFRICOM from Exercise Lion Focus and the continental United States (CONUS) to perform an initial assessment of the situation in Liberia and determine follow-on support requirements. As the situation developed, the JPASE team advised and developed the JFC public affairs organization in coordination with the USARAF Public Affairs Office. Ultimately, the JPASE team developed the JFC public affairs planning support of the commander's communication strategy issued by USAFRICOM, the Joint Staff, the U.S. Embassy in Liberia, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).



USAFRICOM mission and capabilities analyses revealed a requirement for JPASE to assist the establishment of a JFC PA organization that included a media operations center (MOC) in support of USARAF. To meet this requirement, additional JPASE personnel deployed from CONUS, arrived at USARAF, and forward-deployed to Liberia. Following arrival in Monrovia, Liberia, the JPASE JFC-OUA MOC became operational on 07 OCT 2014, and provided a reachback capability to conduct PA planning from USARAF headquarters in Vicenza, Italy.

The five-person MOC conducted operational support, media support, interagency synchronization, and media desk support; provided responses to media queries; and performed media-assessment activities.

### **JFC MOC Operations**

The JFC MOC facilitated more than 120 local and international media outlets, including contact with every major U.S. media outlet within the first three months of its establishment. These engagements included conducting press conferences (live and remote) and media visits to the ETUs and the Monrovia Medical Unit; aerial and seaport debarkations; the health-care workers training facility; and military support bases and nodes.

The MOC established media ground rules, procedures, and embed processes through coordination with the Liberian President's Public Affairs Officer, the U.S. Department of State, USAID, the U.S. Public Health Service, USAFRICOM, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs, and the Armed Forces of Liberia Public Affairs Office.

In addition to producing multiple products including press releases, media summaries, future engagement calendars, daily media clips, fact sheets, media engagement trackers, media ground rules, and media hold-harmless agreements, the MOC developed and executed a 96-hour media engagement push, having the JFC Commander and interagency leadership engage numerous outlets to provide a positive press response and momentum to OUA.

JPASE also developed and briefed the JFC Commander regarding a two-week media plan to address his concerns, such as the following:

- Media engagements that were reactionary in nature
- A lack of media coverage of the U.S support to the mission prior to the arrival of JPASE in the joint operations area.

The JPASE also developed and organized tracking products ensuring that the JFC Commander had accurate media/communication representation to support his decision-making process.

## **Transition**

Once the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) was identified as the JFC headquarters, JPASE facilitated the relief in place/transfer of authority between the division and USARAF. During this time, the JPASE senior PAO led PA activities as the interim JFC PAO, until the division became fully operational. The JPASE team also provided the following:

- PA guidance and messaging in coordination with the JFC PAO on USARAF redeployment.
- Coordination in the RFF to sustain long-term operations including justification for a mobile PA detachment as mission critical to augment JFC and relieve/replace JPASE personnel.
- PA planning guidance in support of JFC-OUA medical redeployment/reintegration COAs, mission analysis, and operational design.

## **JECC Lessons Learned/Observations**

### **Areas to Sustain**

- Inclusion of JECC members at every operational-level command during crisis formation to engage with supported command(s).
- JECC subordinate commands and associated enabling capabilities involvement in OUA, which enhanced overall effectiveness of supported headquarters and JECC.
- JCSE capabilities that were crucial in establishing initial mission command networks and enabling forward elements of OUA in theater.

### **Areas for Improvement**

- Identification of follow-on forces to provide capabilities that JECC personnel establish. JECC personnel are normally limited to no more than 120 days unless the lengthier RFF process is utilized.
- Identification of requirements for deployment and re-integration of contract personnel.

### **Areas for Future Consideration**

Maintain dialogue between the JECC and potential joint forces headquarters before crises occur.

## **Integration of Combatant Command Network Services into the DISN-TE Portal**

**Issue.** JECC's presence at all OUA operational-level commands filled key planning gaps during an emergent crisis and provided "connective tissue" between multiple planning teams at different commands.

**Observation.** JECC personnel were deployed as part of USAFRICOM, USARAF, and 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) staffs and the JFC-OUA in five countries and at multiple command elements. This enabled JECC members to rapidly and effectively address emergent concerns and collaborate across commands and lines of effort to better assist the supported commands during an emergent crisis. Planners from all three JECC subordinate commands were essential in providing key capabilities to establish a joint headquarters.

**Lessons Learned/Insights/Recommendation.** Continue to include JECC members in every key operational-level command during an emergent crisis to engage with the supported command(s) across as many areas as required. This enables JECC members to successfully engage with counterparts while maintaining lines of communication with other JECC members across directorates and commands, effectively assisting with the overall effort.

**Issue.** JECC personnel deploy on short notice and are designed to immediately enable joint capabilities with "boots on ground."

**Observation.** Arriving JECC personnel often incur delays in accessing computers, having sufficient workspace, and integrating with "J Code" points of contact upon arrival, which limits and delays JECC benefits in crisis development.

**Lessons Learned/Insights/Recommendation.** A potential joint forces headquarters should develop standard operating procedures on how to rapidly integrate JECC personnel into the staff structure. Refinement of these procedures can occur in normal interactions with the JECC during JECC-supported exercises and other engagements.

**Issue.** Authorities associated with JECC deployments limit the time that JECC personnel are available to provide capabilities to a joint forces headquarters.

**Observation.** JECC deployments give a joint forces headquarters time to establish permanent manning solutions for joint capability gaps. Unless JECC support is sourced through the formal RFF process and the Secretary of Defense authorizes a JECC deployment in excess of 120 days, JECC personnel must redeploy within 120 days.

**Lessons Learned/Insights/Recommendation.** JECC personnel and supported headquarters must proactively identify permanent capabilities required in the joint forces headquarters provided by the JECC that must be sourced through other methods prior to JECC redeployment.

**Issue.** Deployment and re-integration of contract personnel.

**Observation.** The theater was unprepared to accommodate contract personnel and had no plan for re-integration of contract personnel. Much of the technical aspect of the DJC2 system can only be addressed through contract personnel. JCSE required contract technicians on the ground in Liberia to assist in the daily management and configuration of critical communications systems. Those personnel were deployed into theater on military aircraft, the only option available at the time. During redeployment, attempts were made to prevent those same personnel from boarding military aircraft to return to home station. Also, required isolation procedures were available only to military personnel and not to contract personnel.

**Lessons Learned/Insights/Recommendation.** Use of contract personnel (JCSE, JPASE, and JPSE) will be required in future operations. The theater must address this through a refined policy that protects both the contractor and the supported units, while still allowing sufficient flexibility for mission support.

For more information about JECC, go to <http://www.jecc.mil/About/MissionCapabilities.aspx>.

## Chapter 7

# Staff Judge Advocate in a Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief Operation

### Background

Joint Publication (JP) 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*, describes the joint task force (JTF) staff judge advocate (SJA) as the principal legal adviser to the combined joint task force (CJTF), with responsibility for the training, equipping, and employment of legal personnel assigned or attached to the JTF. The SJA provides the full spectrum of legal services to the CJTF and staff and coordinates with the supported combatant commander's SJA to optimize legal support. The SJA should have direct access to the CJTF; his advice should not be filtered through an intermediary. The general responsibilities of the SJA include the following:

- Task-organize the SJA office to meet JTF mission-specific requirements. The office must be joint and must provide the necessary mix of legal subject matter experts to fully support the CJTF. The task organization will vary depending on the JTF mission.
- Provide legal advice and support to the CJTF and staff in the following areas:
  - International and operational law (including law of armed conflict, rules of engagement [ROE], rules for use of force [RUF], rule of law operations, law of the sea, airspace law, intelligence law, cyberspace operations, detention operations, international agreements, concepts and regional issues concerning national sovereignty, and general international law).
  - Military justice (including uniform policies to maintain good order and discipline, disposition for misconduct, and supervision of the military justice process).
  - Claims (including Personnel Claims Act, Military Claims Act, Foreign Claims Act, Status of Forces Agreement claims, tort claims, admiralty, solatia payments, Article 139 claims, and affirmative claims).
  - Administrative law (including environmental law, federal employment law, investigations, Freedom of Information Act, and the Privacy Act).
  - Contract and fiscal law.

- Legal advice to the entire JTF staff.
- A single point of contact for component SJAs regarding legal matters affecting forces assigned or attached to the JTF.
- The CJTF point of contact with non-Department of Defense (DOD) agencies, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the execution of rule of law operations.
- Drafting command policies, orders, and international agreements.
- Plans, ROE, RUF, policies, and directives, ensuring consistency with DOD law of armed conflict (law of war) program and domestic and international law.
- Drafting Appendix 4 (Legal) to Annex E (Personnel) of the operational plan (OPLAN), operation order (OPORD), or campaign plan (legal services support plan) and overseeing execution of the legal services support plan at the JTF and component levels (component SJAs primarily are responsible for the execution of the legal services support plan, except as it applies to JTF staff members).
- Development, review, and drafting of general and restrictive orders (e.g., General Order No. 1).
- Development, review, and drafting of Appendix 8 (ROE) to Annex C (Operations), as well as requesting modification of ROE or RUF. Standing ROE/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for U.S. Forces (SECRET).
- Development, review, and drafting of Appendix 1 (Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Other Detained Persons) to Annex E (Personnel).
- Review of OPLAN, OPORD, or campaign plan for legal sufficiency.
- Target and weapons plans for compliance with the law of armed conflict. In this regard, the SJA or a representative should be a member of the Joint Targeting Coordination Board, if one is established.
- Development of Appendix 8 (Contingency Contracting) to Annex E (Personnel).
- Resolution of claims for compensation by foreign personnel within the joint operations area (JOA). The SJA also must consider similar circumstances for JTFs conducting domestic operations.

- Resolving cases where foreign authorities assert criminal jurisdiction over U.S. forces within the JOA. The SJA also must consider similar circumstances for JTFs conducting domestic operations.
- Joint legal lessons learned, issues, and significant observations from training events and operations, providing input to the appropriate lessons learned organization.

Additional information regarding legal organizations, mission and functions, legal support to joint operations planning, and legal support to the JTF can be found in JP 1-04, *Legal Support to Military Operations*.

The JTF is the most common type of organizational structure used by DOD for foreign disaster relief. However, during Operation United Assistance (OUA), the JTF designation was changed by U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) to a joint forces command (JFC). Regardless of this designation, the unique aspects and challenges of legal operations in an austere environment while working with interagency, IGOs, and NGOs required extensive coordination and collaboration and therefore necessitated that the JFC's Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (OSJA) be especially flexible and responsive.

## **Legal Challenges in Operation United Assistance**

OUA presented dynamic and unique legal issues in each of the core competencies of the military legal profession. No matter what warfighting function OSJA was supporting, the attorneys who deployed in support of OUA were called on to develop solutions to legal considerations unique to the mission. This section highlights some of the lessons learned by OSJA during OUA.

### **Fiscal and Contract Law (Sustainment, Movement and Maneuver, Mission Command)**

**Land use agreements.** The JFC was tasked with opening and closing a theater without the benefit of an established footprint. As such, OSJA had to execute a number of land-use agreements around the country to accommodate movement, missions, personnel, and supplies. At times, executing the agreements required negotiations with both private and public entities. It was imperative that terms of any land-use agreements accounted for mission flexibility, as it was difficult to predict how long U.S. forces would be in theater. In accordance with existing diplomatic notes, as well as the explicit permission of the President of Liberia, JFC-OUA had the option of using government of Liberia (GOL) land utilizing an "Implementation Agreement" in lieu of a lease. These land-use agreements gave the JFC maximum flexibility with minimal commitments and requirements.

**Lessons learned/insights.** When entering a theater lacking a significant DOD footprint, use of implementation agreements with host nation government entities is preferable to private land-use agreements.

**Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) funds.**

The primary funding source for OUA was OHDACA. This particular source of funding has significantly more restrictions on expenditures than the operations and maintenance funding typically used in contingency operations. A key component to success was working closely with the JFC J-8 and contracting elements to ensure that mission spending was within the parameters of the authorization. The JFC also appointed a Joint Requirements Review Board (JRRB) to validate OUA requirements, including transportation contracts, generators, personal locator devices, and tent set-up costs. Members of the JRRB included J-4, contracting, J-7, J-3, J-8, and SJA. The JRRB was chaired by the JFC deputy commanding general. This allowed thorough review of proposed expenditures before commitments were made to ensure that funds were being spent in accordance with OHDACA limitations.

**Lessons learned/insights.** Early training for deploying personnel on OHDACA limitations will help manage expectations and avoid any misrepresentation to the host nation as to what the JFC can and cannot provide. Establish a JRRB for comprehensive review of proposed expenditures before commitment of funds.

**Property disposition at theater closure.** Although the JFC had no way of knowing the exact length of the deployment before arrival, there were indications that the U.S. presence might not be long-term. Therefore, OSJA had to start planning for theater closure almost as soon as office personnel arrived, understanding that the JFC needed to have a disposition plan for each piece of property purchased and used throughout the deployment, and that the plan would have to be approved at the DOD level. OSJA reviewed foreign excess personal property procedures used in Iraq and Afghanistan to develop a closure plan and adapt as necessary. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) assisted with screening and disposing of excess property. Close coordination with DLA, the USAFRICOM Office of Legal Counsel, the JFC J-4, and the USAFRICOM J-4 was necessary at every step of the process.

**Lessons learned/insights.** Begin planning for theater closure prior to departure on rapid-response missions. Find a way to incorporate DLA into the theater closure planning process, and ensure frequent communication with combatant command counterparts during planning process.



## **Operational and International Law (Mission Command, Protection, Movement and Maneuver, Intelligence)**

**International and diplomatic relationships with the host nation and third-party nations.** Given the remote locations and limited DOD presence in the region, it was imperative during the planning process that the JFC understood the terms of the diplomatic notes and agreements not only between the United States and the host nation, but also between the United States and neighboring countries in West Africa.

The existing agreements with the GOL established a mutual waiver of claims, fees, and taxes, and also assigned a legal status to U.S. personnel in country equivalent to civilians working at the U.S. Embassy. Prior to deployment of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), these baseline terms were supplemented by mission-specific terms; for example, confirming blanket landing clearance for aircraft in theater.

The United States did not have existing diplomatic notes or Status of Forces Agreements with some countries in the JOA, and it was determined during the planning process that entry into those countries would require coordination with the U.S. Department of State.

Communication with the U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. European Command, USAFRICOM, and third-party nations like Spain and Italy that were typically used for deployment air routes, through which the JFC relied on previously existing blanket landing clearance for route planning, was crucial early in the deployment process. Blanket landing clearance in some countries had been revoked out of concern for “contaminated” aircraft leaving Liberia, and monitoring the communication between the lead commanders and countries helped the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) rear detachment and the JFC to plan for delayed route-to-origin times.

**Lessons learned/insights.** International agreements and diplomatic relations will directly influence a JFC’s ability to conduct operations within, outside of, and into a JOA, and need to be considered as part of the key facts and assumptions during the planning process.

**Rules of engagement and weapons posture for a humanitarian mission.** Because Liberia was a permissive environment, the ROE for OUA were crafted to emphasize de-escalation, and escalation-of-force training was given regularly by legal personnel throughout the JOA.

The JFC held a working group to decide what, if anything, should be designated as “protected” for ROE and collective self-defense purposes. The participants of the working group include representatives from the J-3, J-33, J-35, SJA, Protection, J-2, J-4, and the Criminal Investigation Division (CID), among others.

The ROE reinforced the combatant command policy on weapons posture for the theater, which gave the JFC commander the decision authority on who could carry weapons and when. This authority was used sparingly throughout the mission. Crew-served weapons were not used in theater, per combatant command policy, and the overwhelming majority of OUA personnel were unarmed for the entirety of the operation. In practice, the ROE, while widely distributed, trained, and followed, did not have as much of an operational impact as did fiscal constraints and force health protection considerations.

**Lesson learned/insights.** Ensure that Soldiers are well-trained on ROE tailored for a humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) mission, but understand that there are other supplementary rules besides the ROE that will dictate planning as much as, if not more than, the ROE.

### **Other Legal Considerations (Mission Command)**

**Military justice and legal assets during controlled monitoring.** Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 4220.01A required that Service members undergo 21 days of controlled monitoring upon redeployment from an Ebola virus disease “outbreak area.”

When the JFC developed its redeployment plan, OUA personnel were divided into multiple separate redeployment time frames spanning four months. Within those time frames, personnel were divided again into cohorts of 50 to 75 each to live in separate, secluded facilities and undergo 21 days of “controlled monitoring.” The requisite seclusion of the cohorts from the outside world, as well as from other cohorts, presented unique challenges to all staff sections as OSJA attempted to maintain a garrison-style operational tempo. OSJA had to ascertain during the cohort planning how it would account for any necessary separation of sexual assault/harassment victims and alleged perpetrators, as well as how any Sexual Harassment and Rape Prevention Program or equal opportunity incidents that might occur during controlled monitoring could be properly handled.

In addition, JFC planners needed to confirm with the controlled monitoring host facilities (Fort Lewis, WA; Fort Bliss and Fort Hood, TX; Fort Bragg, NC; and Fort Eustis, VA) that there would be a plan in place if any personnel required access to trial defense services or had to be held in pre-trial confinement, or if CID intervention were necessary.

**Lessons learned/insights.** Staggered redeployment plans and force management for controlled monitoring must account for legal considerations and required assets.

**Mission-specific command policies.** At the opening of any theater, mission-specific command policy letters must be widely published and distributed. During OUA, the most publicized threat to the force was a contagious disease; thus, arguably two of the most important policy documents were the JFC-OUA General Order No. 1 and the Force Health Protection Policy. Language on uniform policy, personal hygiene, and interactions with the local populace was contained in both. Both documents were punitive in nature, which meant that a violation of either could result in action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Policies had to account for Department of the Army civilians, contractors, and Soldiers. These documents proved the most efficient vehicle for the JFC-OUA Commander to enforce strict measures in the interest of protecting the force against the health threat in the region.

**Lessons learned/insights.** For a mission in an area with the risk of contagious disease or other significant health threats, incorporating strict preventive measures in a punitive general order helped the command's ability to enforce and oversee its directives. Consistency between, and wide dissemination of, general orders and the Force Health Protection Policy are key to success.

## **Conclusion**

When planning for an HA/DR mission, particularly with a mission set that involves helping a host nation contain an infectious disease, integration of SJA assets into the military decisionmaking process and throughout the execution of the mission is essential for mission success.



## Chapter 8

# Special Considerations for a Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief Operation

### Introduction

Although Operation United Assistance (OUA) formed in response to the Ebola pandemic, many of the issues and challenges experienced by participants in Joint Forces Command–Operation United Assistance (JFC-OUA) and detailed in this chapter could apply to any disaster response. This chapter highlights some of the topics and issues that should be addressed by commanders and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) planners in the development of operation plans and in pre-deployment training for any HA/DR response. Also included are recommended solutions and lessons related to these unique challenges from the participants of OUA.

### Cultural Awareness

Cultural awareness is a critical ingredient in any HA/DR mission, the success of which may be diminished, negated, or otherwise significantly affected due to cultural insensitivity if exhibited by U.S. forces. Cultural awareness involves understanding the history, local and regional customs and traditions, and social norms of the affected state(s) and assisting organizations.

Additionally, understanding the regional culture and how the affected state(s) and other participants perceive the actions of the joint task force (JTF)/JFC and those of the United States in general is a key element of situational awareness. Participants in relief operations should be prepared to convey a non-judgmental attitude toward local customs, beliefs, and practices. Neither insensitivity nor extreme nationalism is acceptable by Department of Defense (DOD) personnel.

In preparation for deployment, the JTF/JFC should consider consulting with the following organizations/individuals to enhance cultural understanding and awareness of the respective joint areas of operations:

- The U.S. Embassy’s country team in the affected state(s)
- The regional and/or country desk officers of the geographic combatant command
- Foreign area officers
- U.S. Army, U.S. Navy (USN), and U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) civil affairs teams

- U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) permanent party and its disaster assistance response team (DART)
- Bilingual and bi-cultural advisers
- Intergovernmental organization/nongovernmental organization (IGO/NGO) personnel
- Military information support operations personnel
- Unit chaplains, as they may serve particularly well in liaison to indigenous religious leaders, and many cultures hold religious leaders in high esteem
- Affected state key leaders

The following areas of the Liberian culture either had an impact on or the potential to impact operations in varying degrees. Although some of these topics may be unique to Liberia, these are all areas that could be considered as potential challenges when operating in any foreign environment. Much of the information on the following pages is taken from the *Soldiers' Culture Guide to Ebola Affected Areas: Liberia*, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Culture Center, November 2014.

- **Family.** The Liberian people tend to have large extended and closely-knit families, with frequent daily interactions among family members, sometimes facilitating the spread of diseases. Liberians place emphasis on group achievement rather than on personal achievement. It is an “us” and not a “me” society. The eldest male is the leader and decision maker for the family group; however, most decision makers also seek advice and input from councils of women elders. In Liberia, both monogamy (one man having one wife) and polygamy (one man having more than one wife at a time) are permitted and practiced. The Liberian family unit is very flexible; people often refer to someone who is not biologically related as “brother” or “cousin.”
- **Greetings.** Verbal greetings are common and, in Monrovia, sometimes accompanied by a double-cheek kiss or handshake and snap of the middle fingers. However, as a result of the Ebola outbreak, these customs are much reduced.
- **Communications.** Liberians tend to talk frankly and informally, but are often uncomfortable to admit or display a lack of knowledge in certain situations. Consequently, a “yes” should not always be taken for a “yes” as it can sometimes mean a “no.” The person is simply being polite or avoiding embarrassing himself, a guest, or someone of higher status. Liberians frequently nod or do a quick intake of breath to agree with the speaker.

- **Personal space.** Liberians may appear to be physical, yet they are merely being nice and friendly. They will touch you several times over or hold your hand during a conversation. The manner of touching also depends on the level of a relationship. Personal space, as most Americans understand it, is virtually non-existent, but even this is changing because of Ebola.
- **Respect.** Liberia is an honor-sensitive society, and any sign of disrespect, real or perceived, is taken seriously. For example, Liberians are proud of their age and personal titles, making them sensitive to actions that may undermine these personal achievements. Disrespect could therefore be the final straw to sever a relationship.
- **Relationships.** Liberians focus on building and maintaining relationships, as personal connections are considered the road to success. Family status and personal connections are often more important than formal status (e.g., academic qualifications).
- **Saving face.** Many Liberians would shape the truth in order to save face and maintain a harmonious relationship. Therefore, it is important to read the meaning behind some of the words being used.

### **Tribal Beliefs (Religion and Spiritual Views)**

About 86 percent of Liberia's population is Christian, and 12 percent are Muslim. However, traditional beliefs and practices remain deeply entrenched in the country. Many Liberians practice both elements of scriptural religions (Christianity and Islam) and traditional religious practices.

Liberians see the world as a complex system of relationships among the living, the dead, and supernatural forces. They believe that these forces intervene in human affairs. Consequently, ancestors are venerated, and their presence in the community is frequently acknowledged and honored through after-life rituals and cultural festivities.

Beliefs in destiny are equally popular. Liberians believe that the past, present, and future are controlled by divine forces. As a result, fatalities are often seen as having been willed by God. God's will, along with superstition, are the ways Liberians would explain or cope with an unfortunate event or situation.

### **Health-care Challenges and Ebola**

Liberia's poor health-care infrastructure suffers from an acute shortage of hospitals, trained medical staff, and supplies. Providing good health care could also be a major challenge for a population that has a high rate of illiteracy, a limited knowledge of disease and modern medicine, and a popular belief in traditional medicine.

Stopping the cultural practice of consuming “bush meat” (wild game) is a big challenge. Many Liberians, especially those living in the villages, depend on bush meat as a source of protein despite warnings that it may be the source of the deadly Ebola virus.

Daily human interactions in Liberia often involve close contact, as personal space is not a norm. In villages or in cities, Liberians generally live in close quarters, with many family members or friends sharing a single room. The cramped conditions, along with limited sanitation, can facilitate the spread of diseases.

### **Liberian Beliefs About Health and Illness Causation**

Liberians view good health as a balancing act between the physical and supernatural worlds; some do not believe in the “germ theory of disease” or the idea that the human body is a machine that must be “tuned up” through exercise.

Liberians believe that both supernatural forces and human beings with special powers cause illnesses in retaliation for violation of a social norm, a religious taboo, or out of jealousy. Additionally, some Liberians consider illnesses as punishment for disrespecting and not organizing proper rituals in honor of ancestors.

Diseased persons are expected to be given proper burial and funeral rites, as it is believed that a relative who is not buried properly becomes a wandering ghost and a danger to living relatives. Traditional doctors hold sway on medical matters in most of Liberia’s villages. They are trusted because in a majority of cases, they are relatives of the sick. Many villagers are scared of modern medication for fear that they will be used as guinea pigs to test the efficacy of a medication.

Liberian customs entail close physical interaction with the sick. This involves frequent bedside visits by friends and family to sympathize with the sick. Friends and family will care for the sick without protective equipment. Quarantining the sick is not a norm.

### **Death and Burial Customs**

For Liberians, as for many African people, life does not end with death. Death is seen as a journey into another realm, a journey for which the individual needs personal belongings that will be useful to him or to others in the spiritual realm. Death and burial customs in Liberia are very ritualistic, though there is evidence of shorter and more hygienic burials because of Ebola. Liberians normally do not cremate the dead, though even this has gained wider acceptance lately. Liberians prefer earth burials in the belief that this preserves their ancestors.



Ancestors are believed to live in the spirit world and still have powers over the living. They are honored and appeased by naming newly born babies after them and through after-life cultural ceremonies.

Burial customs involve washing, clothing, and exposing a corpse for hours on end for public viewing and traditional rites. The belief, notably in the villages, is that if the “correct” death and burial rites are not performed, the diseased person will come back to trouble the living. The continuation of life after death is, therefore, a strong Liberian worldview that dictates how corpses must be handled and buried. However, the Ebola epidemic has exposed the risks of some of these beliefs and practices, and the government of Liberia and NGOs are working to stop the practice or to combine tradition with safe burial practices.

### **Ebola in the Media and the Rumor Mill**

Some skeptical Liberians viewed the Ebola virus as an invention by the government, intended to leach funding from unsuspecting foreign governments, while others believe that Ebola is a curse by the gods for moral and socio-economic corruption.

### **Foreign Language**

The continent of Africa is larger than Europe, the continental United States, India, China, and Japan combined and consists of 54 countries and 54 diverse challenges. More than 2,100 native languages are spoken in Africa. In Liberia, three distinct linguistic groups exist — Mande, Kwa, and Mel (although the unofficial language is English). Among these groups, some 20 ethnic group languages also exist, few of which can be written or used in correspondence. Local dialects vary widely, and finding reliable translators can be difficult.

### **Lessons Learned/Insights**

Linguists provide a critical language and cultural awareness capability to ensure that strategic messages reach the local audience. The JTF/JFC commander should ensure that assigned units have adequate linguistic support by performing the following:

- Requesting the deployment of linguists as early as possible.
- Collocating linguists with liaison officers and detachments.
- Seeking assistance from local first responders or other participants from the region, who may be able to help with specific dialects.
- Drawing on the language skills and local-area familiarity of personnel attached to the JTF/JFC, particularly in remote areas.

- Directing subordinate commands to identify personnel with language skills and background.
- As advised by USAID/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and the country team, consider the use of pictures, “pointee-talkee” cards, and other graphics as a means of communicating with the local population in the absence of qualified interpreters/translators.

Members of the JTF/JFC should be extremely sensitive to the use of military jargon. Some terms commonly used in military operations may have meanings or negative connotations that may be misinterpreted and/or misunderstood by individuals within the affected state(s) and by IGOs and NGOs.

### **Predeployment Training**

While standard individual/collective pre-deployment training remains critically important, it is equally important to provide leaders and Soldiers with an in-depth understanding of the affected country’s cultural, civil, economic, military, and governmental information. It is also important to recognize that the operational environment includes myriad joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational organizations and volunteer agencies.

### **Lessons Learned/Insights**

In preparation for deployment to Liberia, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) planned and conducted a comprehensive pre-deployment training program for leaders and Soldiers to prepare them for operations in the “fight” against Ebola and to sensitize them to the Liberian culture. The division leadership realized that the leaders and Soldiers from the division and supporting units from 16 stateside locations required more than the individual and collective tactical training of standard pre-deployment training scenarios.

In addition, the division developed Ebola information briefings and protection measures for incorporation into the pre-deployment training. The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) G-9/J-9 also developed and provided interagency, intergovernmental, and Liberia cultural information briefings to leaders and Soldiers and provided briefing products for presentation to units external to Fort Campbell. Additionally, the G-9/J-9 developed a leader book, *101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) Liberian Response Support Force: Operation United Assistance-Liberia*. This book was based on information derived from the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, Monterey, CA, and provided an in-depth description of the Liberian operational environment, IGOs, maps, key Liberian and international figure biographies, and military/civilian leader biographies.

Also included in this publication was an overview of Liberian society, which examined ethnic groups and languages, ethnic conflict and reconciliation, religion, gender issues, traditional dress, overall traditions, cuisine, and folklore. It was designed to enhance understanding of the operational environment. Additionally, the G-9/J-9 developed a Liberian operational environment test to measure the learning levels of division and supporting organizational leaders and Soldiers and, based on the test results, focused additional training in those areas where improvement was required.

The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) staffing efforts included an educational approach to learning about Ebola itself, the culture and leadership of the country, and the operational environment. The division reached out to USAID/OFDA, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and various international organizations, including the United Nations Mission for the Ebola Emergency Response and the World Health Organization.

To increase awareness, a two-day Interagency Academics Seminar was developed by the G-9/J-9 according to the Mission Command Training Program and conducted at Fort Campbell. The seminar was attended by previous U.S. ambassadors and personnel from USAID, OFDA, CDC, Department of State, DART, political advisers, United Nations, U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the U.S. National Institutes of Health, and the interorganizational community. The seminar greatly enhanced 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) command and staff knowledge and understanding of interorganizational relationships, and the academics prepared the participants for a different mission and mindset.

Ultimately, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and other U.S. government organizations working in Liberia and interacting with the local population held great respect for cultural and traditional norms, a challenging balancing act that helped lead to mission accomplishment.

### **U.S. Diplomatic Mission, Ambassador, and Country Team**

A U.S. diplomatic mission is an integrated structure, led by an ambassador or chief of mission (COM), who serves as the personal representative of the President of the United States. The title of COM is generally applied to the senior diplomat (to include the ambassador) who is assigned to head the mission. The terms ambassador and COM are used interchangeably in this handbook. In smaller embassies, the *chargé d'affaires* functions as the COM.

**Chief of Mission.** The COM, with the title of ambassador, minister, or chargé d'affaires, and the deputy chief of mission (DCM) head the mission's country team of U.S. government personnel. The team's responsibilities include the following:

- Speaking with one voice on U.S. policy and ensuring that mission staff do likewise, while providing expert guidance and frank counsel to the President and Secretary of State.
- Directing and coordinating all executive branch offices and personnel (except for those under the command of a U.S. area military commander or another COM).
- Cooperating with the U.S. legislative and judicial branches so that U.S. foreign policy goals are advanced; security is maintained; and executive, legislative, and judicial responsibilities are carried out.
- Reviewing communications to or from mission elements.
- Taking direct responsibility for the security of the mission, including security against terrorism, and protecting all U.S. government personnel on official duty (other than those personnel under the command of a U.S. area military commander) and their dependents.
- Carefully using mission resources through regular reviews of programs, personnel, and funding levels.
- Reshaping the mission to serve American interests and values and to ensure that all executive branch agencies attached to the mission do likewise.
- Serving Americans with professional excellence, the highest standards of ethical conduct, and diplomatic discretion.

**Country Team.** The country team is the heart of the embassy's operational decision making in virtually all posts overseas, including consulates outside the capital. The country team guides the mission throughout the country, issues directives to consulates, tasks action items, and works to balance and deconflict all agency programs and priorities within the context of the embassy's strategic plan for that country.

The ambassador chairs the country team meetings, held at least weekly. In his or her absence, the meetings are chaired by the DCM. In countries with a combatant commander, individual elements of the country team work daily with military counterparts and report updates to the country team.

The DOD also may have liaison officers, defense attachés, or security assistance officials assigned to the country team under COM authority, independent of the combatant commands.

The country team includes the heads of all embassy sections and each U.S. government agency at the mission. The members report to the ambassador on activities and the next steps for their office. The ambassador resolves any differences and seeks guidance from Washington if course corrections appear necessary. The country team formulates the mission strategic plan that spells out detailed U.S. government interaction in that country.

The country team conducts the following responsibilities:

- **Consular affairs.** Whether in a U.S. Embassy or a consulate, consular officers are the State Department employees whom American citizens overseas and foreign nationals are most likely to meet. Consular officers protect U.S. citizens abroad and their property. Consular officers provide emergency loans to U.S. citizens who become destitute while traveling abroad; search for missing Americans, at the request of their friends or family; visit arrested Americans in prison; maintain lists of local attorneys; act as liaison with police and other officials on matters that affect the welfare of American citizens; re-issue lost or stolen passports; assist in resolving parental child abduction cases; help next of kin when Americans die abroad; and generally provide various types of assistance to U.S. citizens abroad. Consular officers also perform non-emergency services such as dispensing information on absentee voting, Selective Service registration, and acquisition and loss of U.S. citizenship; providing U.S. tax forms; notarizing documents; issuing passports; and processing estate and property claims. U.S. consular officers also issue nonimmigrant visas to foreign nationals who wish to visit, work, or study in the United States and immigrant visas to those who wish to reside here permanently.
- **Commercial, economic, and financial affairs.** By helping American businesses abroad, this department helps Americans at home. State and Commerce Department officers specialize in the following four areas:
  - **Commercial officer.** Advises U.S. businesses on local trade and tariff laws, government procurement procedures, and business practices. The commercial officer also identifies potential importers, agents, distributors, and joint venture partners, and assists with resolution of trade and investment disputes.
  - **Economic officer.** Advises U.S. businesses and provides information on the local investment climate and economic trends; negotiates trade and investment agreements to open markets and level the playing field; analyzes and reports on macro-economic trends and trade policies and the potential impact on U.S. interests; and promotes adoption of economic policies by foreign countries that further U.S. interests.

- **Resource officer.** Counsels U.S. businesses and provides data on issues of natural resources (including energy and minerals) and analyzes/reports on local natural resource trends and trade policies and their potential impact on U.S. interests.
- **Financial attaché.** Analyzes and reports on major financial developments as well as the host country's macro-economic condition.
- **Agricultural and scientific matters.** Agricultural officers promote the export of U.S. agricultural products and report on agricultural production and market developments in their area. Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service officers from the U.S. Department of Agriculture are responsible for animal and plant health issues that affect U.S. trade and the protection of U.S. agriculture from foreign pests and diseases. These officers also expedite U.S. exports affected by technical sanitary and phytosanitary regulations. Environment, science, technology, and health officers analyze and report on developments in these areas and potential impacts on U.S. policies and programs.
- **Political, labor, and defense assistance issues.** Political officers analyze political developments and potential impacts on U.S. interests; promote adoption by the host country of foreign policy decisions that support U.S. interests; and advise U.S. business executives on the local political climate. Labor officers promote labor policies in countries to support U.S. interests and provide information on local labor laws and practices, including wages, non-wage costs, social security regulations, political activities of local labor organizations, and labor attitudes toward American investments.
- **U.S. Security Assistance Office.** Security assistance officers are responsible for defense cooperation in armaments and foreign military sales. They also function as the primary in-country point of contact for the U.S. defense industry and U.S. businesses.
- **Administrative support and security functions.** Administrative officers are responsible for normal business operations of the post, including overall management of personnel, budget, and fiscal matters; real and expendable property; motor pools; and acquisitions.
- **Information management officer.** Responsible for the post's unclassified information systems, database management, programming, and operational needs. The information management officer also is responsible for the telecommunications, telephone, radio, diplomatic pouches, and records management programs within the diplomatic mission and maintains close contact with the host government's communications authorities on operational matters.

- **Regional security officer (RSO).** Responsible for providing physical, procedural, and personnel security services to U.S. diplomatic facilities and personnel. The RSO also provides in-country security briefings and threat assessments to business executives. This officer also oversees U.S. government efforts to reform law enforcement/rule of law organizations.
- **Public affairs.** Public affairs officers, information officers, and/or cultural affairs officers of U.S. missions serve as press spokespersons and administrators of official U.S. exchange programs. They also direct the overseas U.S. speakers program and international electronic linkages.
- **Legal and immigration matters.** Legal attachés serve as Department of Justice representatives on criminal matters.
- **Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services officer.** Responsible for administering the laws regulating the admission of foreign-born persons (aliens) to the United States and for administering various immigration benefits.
- **U.S. Agency for International Development mission director.** Responsible for USAID programs including dollar and local currency loans, grants, and technical assistance. USAID also provides humanitarian assistance during natural or man-made disasters. Helping other countries develop through foreign assistance programs helps American business. As other countries develop, they import goods from abroad; this accounts for one-third of all U.S. exports and more than one-half of America's farm exports.

## **Senior Defense Official (SDO)**

The SDO is the senior defense representative for the combatant commander. In the past, the SDO was referred to as the senior military representative. In most cases, the SDO will be the DATT or senior SAO in the USAID Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation; the DATT may serve as both the SDO and the SAO. For example, in the case of a large military mission such as Baghdad or Cairo, where the SAO is a general officer, the SAO is the SDO.

## **Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC)**

The ODC is the security force assistance entity for the mission, and varies according to the relationship with the host nation as represented in security cooperation agreements. Like USAID, with its ties to the host nation's ministries, ODC tends to be situated outside the mission compound or at least in a separate facility to encourage reciprocal relationships. In smaller missions, the ODC may be under the U.S. Defense Attaché Office or, if there is no formal defense office, under the political section.

## Lessons Learned/Insights

Understanding the organizational hierarchy within the U.S. Embassy and the roles and responsibilities of all organizations represented on the country team is paramount to achieving success during HA/DR operations. Relationship building with members of the U.S. Embassy staff at all levels is essential in order to facilitate coordination, cooperation, and mutual mission understanding and accomplishment.

For example, when bringing personnel, equipment, and supplies into a sovereign nation in a permissive environment, there are many factors involved. In relation to equipment and supplies, the U.S. Embassy's general services officer (GSO) is the conduit between DOD and host nation logistics enablers. The GSO manages physical resources and logistical functions, which include acquisition and supply-chain operations. The GSO also facilitates coordination with customs, police, transportation, and the appropriate ministries. Additionally, all flights and ships require advance coordination and diplomatic approval to enter the sovereign territory of the host nation. Aircraft overflight and landings clearance and port clearances are required and must be coordinated with the DATT/SDO.

## Recommended Tasks

There are no established training tasks for interagency coordination in a foreign country; however, the following are recommended as tentative tasks, which should be considered by the JTF/JFC commander during pre-deployment training for any HA/DR operation.

Identify and explain the following:

- Functional areas of a typical U.S. Embassy
- Legal authorities and functions of the following:
  - U.S. ambassador
  - U.S. consular affairs officer
  - U.S. RSO
  - U.S. senior defense officer or DATT
  - U.S. SAO

To learn more about the U.S. State Department and its overseas operations, go to the following website: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/dos/436.htm>.



## Force Health Protection

Force health protection (FHP) is defined in Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, as “measures to promote, improve, or conserve the behavioral and physical well-being of Service members to enable a healthy and fit force, prevent injury and illness, and protect the force from health hazards.”

The need for FHP is arguably greatest while conducting theater opening operations. The Army operating concept lists setting the theater as a core competency the Army must be able to accomplish as part of a joint force.

The challenges highlighted in this handbook stem both from the conduct of a large military operation in West Africa and a slightly reduced ability of the U.S. Army to conduct theater-setting activities in an austere environment. The intent is to demonstrate that despite conducting operations in one of the highest-risk areas of the globe for infectious disease, JFC-OUA was conducted safely and effectively.

**Lessons Learned/Insights.** The Army Medical Department exists to support the warfighter and, in the case of public health, protect the force: specifically, providing timely force health protection information and recommendations to the commander in a manner that supports his decision cycle. The force health protection plan for OUA succeeded due, in large part, to the command’s influence and time spent supporting prevention methods.

## Health Risks to the Force in an Immature Theater

The Defense Intelligence Agency’s National Center for Medical Intelligence rates Liberia as a very high-risk country for infectious disease. The first U.S. forces for OUA touched down in Liberia in mid-September 2014, including the U.S. Army Africa (USARAF) Commander and select members of his primary staff, including the command surgeon. USARAF, the Army Service component command (ASCC) to the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), served as the initial JFC headquarters element for OUA.

Within the first 45 days, the population at risk for infectious disease totaled over 500 people, yet the early observed trends of common illnesses affecting Service members in an austere environment was markedly diminished.

Medical support is accomplished through the two distinct portions of the Army health system: health service support (HSS) and FHP. The primary responsibility of FHP is to conserve the fighting strength of the force. Specifically, this includes providing timely FHP information and recommendations to the commander in a manner that supports his decision cycle. The FHP plan for OUA was successful due, in large part, to the command influence and time spent supporting prevention methods.

## **Ebola Prevention**

JFC-OUA faced a unique force health risk in the form of the Ebola virus. During the operation, U.S. military personnel were not working in direct contact with patients suffering from Ebola virus disease (EVD). However, many of these personnel were in frequent contact with local nationals, who may have been exposed to the disease from sick friends and family members. Elevated concern surrounding Ebola in the United States and throughout the world meant that a single case of EVD in a U.S. Service member would have significantly affected the entire mission.

Exposure of U.S. personnel to Ebola was mitigated through ongoing education and command emphasis. The prevention strategy included twice-daily temperature checks and hand-washing stations outside every building, which proved highly beneficial.

Additionally, JFC-OUA worked with contract service providers to ensure that drivers, hotel staff, cooks, etc., were monitored daily for signs of illness and that strict sanitation standards were enforced. In addition to the human cost, business owners recognized the negative financial impact that a case of Ebola would have on their business and employees, thereby motivating them to comply strictly with requested measures. As a result of these precautions, there was not a single case of Ebola among U.S. military personnel during the operation.

USARAF as the ASCC was an operational-level headquarters, and doctrinally was not expected to field the full complement of equipment required to execute the tactical mission. One of the benefits of having an ASCC to conduct theater-setting activities was, as a senior-level staff, the amount of experience each staff section brought to bear in support of the mission. Also, by nature of being the ASCC for the theater, the staff was already prepared and experienced in facing multiple challenges inherent in operating in West Africa. The ability to conduct tactical operations while understanding the operational and strategic implications was a key strength for USARAF staff throughout the mission. Some of the primary staff officers were former brigade-level commanders, their supporting staffs had already served as company commanders and first sergeants, and many of them had experience on Service-level and joint staffs.

Given the limited ability to support force structure early in the operation, it became necessary for each member of the team to assume multiple responsibilities. The USARAF surgeon's directorate operates with an understanding that each member is first a Soldier, who also happens to be an officer or noncommissioned officer (NCO), who happens to have a medical specialty. This mindset and practice earned the force a great deal of trust from the commander and, with that trust, flexibility to move at the speed of war.

## **Malaria**

Contrary to public opinion, the number one infectious disease risk for Service members deployed in support of OUA was not Ebola, but malaria. The USARAF Commander and Command Sergeant Major understood the malaria risk and emphasized prevention protocols through JFC-wide video teleconferences, meetings, and leadership channels. Leadership at every echelon understood the malaria risk to participants in JFC-OUA and enforced multiple programs to ensure compliance with FHP protocols. These preventive measures included malaria chemoprophylaxis, bed nets, insect repellent on the skin, and permethrin-treated uniforms. Upon arrival into theater, each Service member received a briefing that included simple tools to prevent disease, injury, and illness.

## **Gastrointestinal Illnesses**

Another high risk to the deployed force was the consumption of food and drinking water from unapproved sources. Prior to the arrival of JFC-OUA, USMC maintained a constant presence of around 40 personnel in Liberia for Operation Onward Liberty (OOL). The USN medical staff that supported USMC had a planning factor of two gastrointestinal illnesses per Marine, per month. This was obviously a significant rate and would have a negative effect on mission accomplishment for OUA if these rates were applied to a force of 3,000.

Early in the establishment of JFC-OUA, many of the first 100 Service members in theater lived and worked in local hotels; this included eating in the hotel restaurants. Drinking water was shipped in from an approved source and was the sole source of drinking water for JFC-OUA personnel. One of the primary focuses for the FHP mission was to evaluate and improve kitchen operations within the primary hotels where U.S. Service members consumed food. The initial point of contact for these inspections was the U.S. Embassy staff, including the RSO and the SDO; in this case, the DATT, who provided points of contact at each facility. Working with the hotel kitchen staffs, health professionals were able to identify and correct several poor hygiene and sanitation practices on the spot or within a short period of time. This resulted in a much lower rate of gastrointestinal disease (under 1 percent) among Service members during OUA than was experienced during OOL.

## **Lessons Learned/Insights**

The early phases of this operation demonstrated clear and striking examples of the required level of command involvement and influence in FHP and the subsequent achievable successes. The use of experienced officers and NCOs early in theater-opening operations facilitated conditions for the smooth transition between USARAF and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) headquarters.

This high level of command influence must be sustained throughout all operations, clearly prioritizing the importance to the Service members and conserving the strength of the force. USARAF's initial response was not without challenges; the rapid establishment of living areas without the ability to sample or provide any quantitative feedback remains an issue in Liberia today. The rapid planning and response timelines for any mission of this type will often not allow ideal FHP conditions. However, during this operation, the difference was the people, the U.S. Service members as part of JFC-OUA, working together to ensure a safe and successful mission.

### **Force Health Protection Issues Experienced by the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)**

During OUA, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) command surgeon team and the U.S. Army 1st Area Medical Laboratory (AML) identified the following critical issues that should be considered when preparing to participate in pandemic-related or other related HA/DR operations.

#### **Issue: Determination of Medical Capabilities**

**Discussion.** Immature theaters of operations with limited inter-theater medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) platforms require additional diligence in planning. For OUA, the determination was made to not bring a Role 3 capability. A Role 3 capability treats a patient in a medical treatment facility staffed and equipped to provide care to all categories of patients, to include resuscitation, initial wound surgery, damage control surgery, and postoperative treatment. This role of care would expand the support provided at Role 2 (see Field Manual 4-02, *Army Health System*) specifically to a combat support hospital or Naval vessel due to humanitarian concerns for treating the local population (with a high suspicion of EVD). This decision to not expand to Role 3 severely limited the ability to evaluate patients (laboratory services), hold patients (in an intensive care unit or ward), and provide other services (i.e., optometry). As a result, more than 50 percent of the patients had to be transported to Germany for treatment. This required 19 air MEDEVAC missions to Landstuhl Regional Medical Center (as of 17 JAN 2015).

**Lessons Learned/Insights/Recommendations.** During humanitarian mission planning, the presence of a Role 3 is critical, especially if there are no in-theater air MEDEVAC assets. In a coastal environment, a Naval amphibious assault ship (general purpose) should be utilized.

#### **Issue: Need for Expanded Laboratory Capabilities**

**Discussion.** West Africa is one of the world's most dangerous environments for disease. Role 2 medical care (the patient is examined and his wounds and general medical condition are evaluated to determine treatment and

evacuation precedence, as a single patient among other patients [FM 4-02]) for OUA was excellent, but had limited capabilities.

At a minimum, this type of mission requires the ability to perform a complete blood count, chemistry panel (to include renal function), liver panel, and rapid malaria screening. In countries with a very high prevalence of malaria and other infectious diseases, these routine tests can differentiate disease entities and provide valuable information about disease severity and a need for higher-level of care and/or evacuation. Additional disease-specific tests (e.g., thick/thin smear/microscopy) and appropriate diagnostics for other prevalent infectious diseases should also be considered, as this may help with patient isolation requirements.

**Lessons Learned/Insights/Recommendations.** If a Role 3 is not deployed to this type of mission, an added laboratory capability must be included. The Role 2 laboratory should have a Piccolo (or similar equipment) vs. iSTAT to add to that capability. Additionally, rapid diagnostic testing should be included (i.e., qualitative cardiac markers, malaria, Lassa, and dengue tests) and tailored to the deployed environment.

### **Issue: Lack of Air MEDEVAC Assets**

**Discussion.** Acquiring inter-theater medical evacuation aircraft was a habitual problem. Due to other priorities (e.g., Iraq and Africa), “gray tail” aircraft were often unavailable or took greater than three days to arrive. To mitigate this risk, the U.S. Transportation Command contracted for transportation needs, but this was often unreliable (in one case it took five days to evacuate a patient with meningitis).

In an immature, high-risk environment (especially with no Role 3 assets available), prioritization of aircraft is essential.

**Lessons Learned/Insights/Recommendations.** The Joint Staff must prioritize the U.S. Air Force aircraft for MEDEVAC to minimize risk to deployed Soldiers. In addition, the aircraft must be staged on the continent (regionally). Civilian contract medical flights are unreliable. Another mitigation is the use of Naval ships with adequate medical resources when a Role 3 is not in theater.

### **Issue: Medical Operations Embed with Forward Planning Team**

**Discussion.** The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) sent a team of nine personnel to assist USARAF with planning and pass information back to the G-3/5 at Fort Campbell. The team was led by the deputy G-3 and conducted planning with USARAF in Vicenza, Italy, and then with USARAF forward (JFC) in Monrovia. The team included one medical plans officer (in the pay grade of O-4/medical operations officer [70H]), who proved to be invaluable. Because the basing concept was developed by USARAF

forward, the medical operations officer was able to integrate medical concerns and essentially set the theater medical footprint before the arrival of JFC-OUA personnel. Key points included the location of Role 2/forward support teams (FSTs), Role 1s, MEDEVACs, and the Class VIII warehouse.

**Lessons Learned/Insights/Recommendations.** Planning for theater opening is fluid and requires a constant presence. Integrate a medical planner with the initial forward-planning element.

### **Issue: Medical Mission Command Construct**

**Discussion.** A medical mission command headquarters was requested to manage JFC-OUA's preventive medicine, veterinary support, area medical treatment (Roles 1 and 2), and medical logistics missions. In addition, the headquarters was needed to execute the OUA-specific mission of training EVD health-care workers (HCWs). A reduced combat support hospital (CSH) headquarters was sourced for the mission. However, a CSH headquarters does not come with the requisite expertise for the mission and is unqualified to provide this kind of mission command.

**Lessons Learned/Insights/Recommendations.** Source a multi-functional medical battalion (MMB) headquarters for future humanitarian missions. Additional plugs can be added to the MMB support operations section for unique requirements such as training EVD HCWs. A CSH headquarters is better utilized as mission command for hospital companies and hospital augmentation teams.

### **Issue: Structure and Priority of the Joint Operation Center's Tactical Operations Center**

**Discussion.** The Joint Operations Center (JOC) is the center of all operations, and its configuration must be tailored to the mission and environment. During the first few weeks of the deployment, computer access was extremely limited for all sections, and most of the designated access was for standard warfighting functions.

**Lessons Learned/Insights/Recommendations.** During a humanitarian mission, priority for access must reflect mission requirements. For JFC-OUA, these mission requirements included the G-4, division engineers, medical, and the public affairs office. Therefore, additional and prioritized computers and access in the operations center for these mission requirements are essential.

## **Issue: Personal Protective Measures, Diagnostic Capabilities, Medical Provider Training, and Treatment**

**Discussion.** Based on in-country surveys of more than 1,200 Service members, JFC personnel demonstrated very high awareness of the malaria threat, the importance of targeted personal protective measures, awareness of the FHP policy, and compliance with malaria chemoprophylaxis.

Compliance with daily use of malarone was greater than 95 percent for JFC personnel. Part of this success was also due to twice daily unit monitoring (targeting Ebola exposure, symptoms, temperature), which included checks on malarone adherence.

Diagnostic resources included rapid diagnosis tests (i.e., BINAXNow) only. Oral medications for malaria were readily available at all JFC medical facilities, and intravenous artesunate was made available through an emergency investigational-new-drug authorization.

**Lessons Learned/Insights/Recommendations.** Continue current strong emphasis on malaria prevention measures during pre-deployment training and medical threat briefings. Maintain robust identification and training on tropical medicine for diagnosing and treating malaria. Consider augmenting diagnostic capabilities for malaria using existing resources (e.g., thick/thin smear microscopy by USN/USAMRIID laboratory personnel). Consider mandated unit monitoring programs for all deployments to areas with high risk of infectious disease.

## **Issue: Recommendation for Waiver Approval Consideration**

**Discussion.** Combatant command waiver criteria apply to the entire region; however, medical assets in the area of operations (AO) may vary greatly (i.e., the presence of acceptable civilian facilities and the presence of a Role 3 in the AO). These factors must be taken into consideration when making a waiver determination. Multiple Soldiers in the JFC deployed to Liberia with limited medical assets (a stark comparison to what many had experienced in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom). This friction point also applied to the JFC's behavioral health patients.

**Lessons Learned/Insights/Recommendations.** Careful diligence must be applied in submission of waivers to ensure that all factors are given sufficient evaluation. In addition, waivers should be routed through the JFC/JTF command surgeon when feasible. Failure to do so increases the risk to the individual, the unit, the command, and the MEDEVAC system.

### **Issue: Unit Deployment Packages**

**Discussion.** The initial coordination of unit deployment packages (UDPs) from the U.S. Army Medical Materiel Agency (USAMMA) to the 501st Area Support Medical Company and FST was successful, but the reception of these packages was not. Some elements of the UDP, such as the quality and regulatory pharmaceuticals, arrived in Senegal, but were not pushed to Monrovia until there was no longer a need for these items. There was a coordination disconnect between USAMMA, U.S. Army Medical Materiel Center-Europe, and the customer.

**Lessons Learned/Insights/Recommendations.** UDPs should be used only if necessary. The unit must maintain its medical equipment sets and keep the sets ready for deployment in an initial-entry theater. If UDPs are used, all players should be involved in the process for the smooth facilitation of UDP delivery to home station, ensuring that special considerations are made for hazardous materials, controlled medications, and cold-chain items.

### **Issue: The U.S. Army's 1st Area Medical Laboratory**

**Discussion.** Historically, the mission of the 1st Area Medical Laboratory (AML) has been to provide environmental, mainly bio-threat, agent-testing capabilities in a deployed environment. During the Ebola epidemic, the 1st AML was employed as a clinical testing laboratory (with four mobile sites) using specific Ebola testing to support rapid diagnostic and clinical decision making at the Ebola treatment units (ETUs). The lack of certification for clinical laboratory testing on U.S. Service members limits utilization of this valuable resource. Efforts to obtain validation/certification for the performance of clinical laboratory testing should be pursued in anticipation of future deployments to similar environments.

**Lessons Learned/Insights/Recommendation.** Based on demonstrated ability to provide timely diagnostic results for Ebola-infected patients, the 1st AML should also have the added capability to provide clinical laboratory diagnostics for other pathogens (e.g., malaria, dengue, Lassa fever). Required certification processes to allow testing of clinical specimens on U.S. personnel should be completed prior to future deployments, to utilize this theater asset at its maximum potential in HSS.

### **Issue: Policy Determinations Made Without Input by Leaders and Subject Matter Experts on the Ground**

**Discussion.** Multiple policy decisions were made above the combatant command/ASCC level without input from those in country. Additionally, talking points, presentations, and interviews were given without input from those currently deployed. Higher levels of command always have that prerogative; however, there's a missed opportunity for clarification, reality checks, and better leader education when those on the ground have the



opportunity to provide input. As one leader stated, “If you trust someone enough to deploy them, you should also trust their reports on reality in the theater of operations.”

**Lessons Learned/Insights/Recommendations.** Medical leadership (from the combatant command, medical command, and forces command) should request input for policy, policy revision, and talking points from those deployed.

### **Issue: Innovative, First-time Use of 1st AML in Split-based Configuration**

**Discussion.** The 1st AML, in a split-based configuration, proved a valuable asset during the humanitarian mission. Whether deployed as a unit or in tailored teams, the AML is typically in a fixed configuration. The AML command reorganized the unit to operate and sustain four separate Ebola testing laboratories.

**Lessons Learned/Insights/Recommendations.** Consider having the 1st AML’s force deployment update and modified table of organization and equipment reflect a split-based configuration to maintain maximum flexibility for any operation.

### **Issue: 1st AML Provided Clinical Laboratory Support for Non-U.S. Personnel**

**Discussion.** As discussed earlier, the 1st AML was employed as a clinical testing lab for Liberians (with four remote sites) using Ebola-specific testing to support the ETUs. The lack of certification for clinical laboratory testing on U.S. Service members limited this valuable resource.

Testing of local nationals was not done to U.S. military standards due to potential ethical and political implications. Given the chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) mission of the AML, obtaining Clinical Laboratory Improvement Program/Act (CLIP/CLIA) certification to test U.S. military personnel for acetylcholinesterase (in a chemical weapons environment) should be considered. Clinical reference laboratory support for U.S. military personnel should be tailored based on mission requirements.

**Lessons Learned/Insights/Recommendation.** Consider pursuing a CLIP/CLIA certification for current CBRNE mission requirements and for clinical reference laboratory support tailored by mission.

### **Issue: Additional Crucial Skills Training**

**Discussion.** Classes on donning and doffing Tyvek, powered air-purifying respirators and hoods, and working in Class III glove boxes could appropriately augment polymerase chain reaction (PCR) training

(PCR testing is used to detect EVD). An introduction would require less training at the unit level when the time comes to wear this type of personal protective equipment (PPE). It is worth noting that it is not just the AML that uses this PPE, but also medical centers that are part of the laboratory response network. Introducing PCR and PPE training would allow medical laboratory specialists (military occupational skill [MOS] 68K) to work in the biosafety level (BSL)-3 laboratories at medical centers. This technology is common in the research setting, and is becoming increasingly common in the clinical setting. Such additional training will enable the continued evolution of necessary laboratory Soldier skills in garrison and while deployed.

**Lessons Learned/Insights/Recommendations.** Augment 68K training to include PCR theory/methodology/interpretation, BSL-3, and Class III glove-box training at advanced individual training, or create an additional course that is taught by microbiologists (MOS 71As) or equivalent who have PCR and BSL-3 experience.

### **Issue: Maintenance of MOSs 71A and 68K at Garrison**

**Discussion.** Soldiers at the 1st AML can be called upon to conduct a wide array of missions, from endemic disease surveillance of environmental samples to EVD testing of whole blood and swabs from people.

**Lessons Learned/Insights/Recommendations.** Maintenance of crucial 71A and 68K occupational skills while stationed at the AML could be augmented via short-term rotations of USAMRIID personnel or another organizational laboratory to the 1st AML field training exercises or company training areas.

### **Issue: Air MEDEVAC in an Ebola Outbreak**

**Discussion.** The spread of Ebola had a significant impact on the coordination and timeliness of MEDEVAC during OUA. The AML had four remote labs in rural locations in Liberia with potential for accidental lab exposure to Ebola. The primary MEDEVAC plan from remote sites was to utilize rotary-wing assets. However, there were no isolation configured rotary-wing assets in theater. Such assets would have been ideal in an Ebola outbreak setting.

**Lessons Learned/Insights/Recommendations.** In an outbreak setting, due to a highly infectious pathogen, consider having a rotary-wing asset that is isolation configured.

## All Partners Access Network

### Issue: Requirement for an Unclassified Communications Network

**Discussion.** DOD mission planners recognized that to satisfy this information-sharing requirement among unified action partners (UAPs), either an unclassified system had to be rapidly developed or an off-the-shelf system had to be acquired and activated. Based on lessons learned from previous HA/DR operations such as Operation Unified Response in Haiti, USAFRICOM decided to use the All Partners Access Network (APAN) as the primary unclassified knowledge-sharing system during the Ebola crisis. The APAN unclassified information-sharing and collaboration enterprise provided DOD the capability to create an unclassified interactive common operating picture that multiple organizations could use to focus unity of efforts — an advantage that other collaboration sites could not provide.

APAN also provided the JFC with a mechanism to communicate with intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and host nations on a centralized site location to facilitate information and knowledge sharing on the progress of relief efforts against Ebola throughout the joint area of operations. APAN also enabled participating organizations to disseminate maps depicting the location of ETUs and hospitals, to share images cleared for release by the PAO, to post unclassified messages and chats, and to publish unclassified situation reports and intelligence summaries.

**Lessons Learned/Insights/Recommendations.** During HA/DR operations, APAN should be used as the primary knowledge-sharing site. Combatant commands should consider maintaining the APAN site/site template ready for immediate activation in the event a disaster response occurs within its area of responsibility. This would enable combatant command staff members to familiarize themselves with APAN prior to receipt of the HA/DR mission; have trained and proficient site owners; and facilitate the integration of APAN, both the site and the APAN technician team, into training exercises. Incorporating this type of training would allow combatant command site owners, staff, and end users to hone their APAN skills while concurrently revising and refining their operational procedures prior to being immersed into the high operational tempo of a disaster response mission.

Future HA/DR operations will require U.S. military units to be prepared to operate in a strictly unclassified environment and be able to transfer and share information with UAPs engaged in the operation. All participants benefit from having access to unclassified Web-based systems that allow for easy access to information that would otherwise be restricted to DOD channels.

For more information regarding APAN capabilities such as structured and unstructured tools, user-specific tools, other services, tools, and features, go to [www.apan.org](http://www.apan.org).

### **Financial Management Issues**

To improve commander and financial manager understanding throughout the JFC regarding fiscal responsibilities and minimize apprehension in the obligation and liquidation of funds to meet mission requirements, the JFC J-8 created the *Operation United Assistance JFC-UA Financial Management Handbook*. Published 05 JAN 2015, it replicated Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 09-27, *Commander's Guide to Money as a Weapons System*, which commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan used as a guide to effective fiscal management.

This JFC-OUA handbook served as a guide regarding the management of Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) funding as the primary appropriation for the U.S. interagency effort against Ebola. The JFC also used the handbook as a tool to standardize and streamline financial processes between headquarters. More importantly, the J-8 continuously revised the handbook to capture financial management lessons so that commanders involved in similar future HA/DR operations could use it as a guide to accelerate the identification and resourcing of potential priorities.

The handbook provided clarity to unit commanders and financial managers on how to best utilize DOD funding to support USAID's efforts during a humanitarian crisis. Unlike the *Commander's Guide to Money as a Weapons System* handbook, which provided commanders with a menu of options for funding village stability operations, host nation security forces, rewards programs, and emergency response programs, there was only one "color of money" appropriated for OUA — OHDACA.

The OUA handbook outlined the formal allocation of funds process from the tactical to strategic levels, thus bringing the original "white board sketches" to life. The handbook also described the individual financial manager-level tasks and served as a "how to" guide, with the intent of making all current processes repeatable from one unit to the next. These tasks included committing funds in the General Funds Enterprise Business System (GFEBS), paying for commercial shipping, and coordinating and funding emergency leave by commercial air travel. All procedures described were generated from two months of lessons learned and continuous communication with higher and lower headquarters, legal, contracting and financial management professionals.

While the handbook contained fiscal applications relevant to any level of theater-opening operation, the target audience was the financial managers operating in an austere, undeveloped environment. A good part of the handbook read like a user's guide to the Army financial management system

of record, GFEBS. Because of this, there is value to all ASCCs as the commands prepare for the next contingency operation including Title 10 funding responsibility for an Army-led JFC or JTF.

The J-8 divided the handbook into the following four chapters with a comprehensive list of resources along with detailed flow charts of resourcing processes, required forms, and step-by-step GFEBS transaction guides.

- Chapter 1 provided an overview of requirements generation, the current OUA funding process, and procurement and post-procurement steps.
- Chapter 2 presented a detailed look at how JFC-OUA units generated requirements for the Joint Requirements Review Board (JRRB). The JRRB was the only JFC-OUA venue for requirements approval and funding for the joint operations area.
- Chapter 3 covered OHDACA funds flow, from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, through USAFRICOM, down to JFC-OUA; how the USAID mission tasking matrix generated requirements; and associated reports. This chapter also discussed the various funding mechanisms and how individual financial managers took validated requirements with a procurement solution and committed and/or obligated OHDACA funds in GFEBS.
- Chapter 4 closed with a review of the Managers' Internal Control Program and fiscal law basics, which are critical for any expenditure of appropriated funds.

**Lessons Learned/Insights/Recommendations.** Some of the key financial management lessons from the initial phases of OUA include the following:

- Conduct of a routine, structured JRRB led by the deputy commanding general to validate all requirements. Utilize the JFC-OUA Commander's priorities to guide the decision-making process.
- Fight to retain the JFC-OUA Commander's authority to approve all requirements up to \$10 million. Most JFC-OUA requirements fell below this threshold and provided maximum flexibility for the Commander to reallocate manpower and assets to support USAID.
- Utilize the Service component command staff for reachback support. Support during the first 30 days is critical to ensure a successful transition to an enduring JFC. As systems within the forward deployed financial management section are established, reliance on the Service component is lessened.
- The JFC early entry command post must include the entire fiscal triad: resource management (J-8), financial management support team, contingency contracting team, as well as staff judge advocate. Without

these personnel, it is not possible to fund, contract, and pay for host nation support.

- Establish an operational contracting support integration cell at brigade and higher prior to deployment, and utilize this cross-functional team to process garrison contracts.
- Utilize OHDACA funding only for projects that are incremental to the DOD mission (i.e., life support for the JFC) or directly support the humanitarian assistance mission (i.e., build and sustain ETUs).
- Utilize Intelink.gov to share JRRB projects and status of funds. This unclassified venue enabled higher headquarters to maintain situational awareness of funding and command-interest items like national television, leases, and communications purchases.

## Appendix A

### Acronyms and Abbreviations

ADC-S	Assistant Division Commander-Support
ADVON	advanced echelon
AFCAP	Armed Forces Contract Augmentation Program
AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
AMC	Air Mobility Command
AMHS	automated message handling system
AML	Army medical lab
AO	area of operations
AOR	area of responsibility
APAN	All Partners Access Network
ASCC	Army Service component command
ASMC	area support medical company
BFT	Blue Force Tracking
C2	command and control
C4I	command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
CAC	common access card
CAPT	civil affairs planning team
CBRNE	chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives
CCDR	combatant commander
CDC	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CG	commanding general
CI	counterintelligence
CID	Criminal Investigation Division
CIE	collaborative information environment

CIM	civil information management
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CJTF	combined joint task force
CLIA	Clinical Laboratory Improvement Act
CLIP	Clinical Laboratory Improvement Program
CMOC	civil-military operations center
COA	course of action
COCOM	combatant command
COG	center of gravity
COM	chief of mission (usually an ambassador)
CONOPS	concept of operations
CONUS	continental United States
COP	common operational picture
COR	contracting officer's representative
COS	chief of staff
CP	command post
CSA	Chief of Staff of the Army
CSH	combat support hospital
DART	disaster assistance response team
DATT	defense attaché
DCGS-A	Distributed Command Ground System-Army
DCHA	democracy, conflict, and humanitarian assistance
DCM	deputy chief of mission
DCSENG	deputy chief of staff, engineers
DIME	diplomacy, information, military, and economics
DISN-TE	Defense Information Systems Network-Tactical Edge
DJC2	deployable joint command and control



DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
EECP	early entry command post
EEP	early entry package
ESC	expeditionary sustainment command
ETU	Ebola treatment unit
EVD	Ebola virus disease
EXORD	execute order
FDO	foreign disclosure officer
FEST-A	forward engineer support team-advanced
FHA	foreign humanitarian assistance
FHP	force health protection
FLB	forward logistics base
FOO	field ordering officer
FP	force protection
FST	forward support team
FUOPS	future operations
G-2	intelligence
G-3	operations
G-35	political-military staff
G-4	logistics
G-5	plans
G-6	information management
G-7	training
G-8	resource management
G-9	civil affairs

GATOR	ground/air task oriented radar
GENADMIN	general administration
GFEB	General Funds Enterprise Business System
GOL	government of Liberia
GSO	general services officer
HA/DR	humanitarian assistance/disaster relief
HCW	health-care worker
HN	host nation
HOC	humanitarian operations center
HQDA	Headquarters, Department of the Army
HSS	health service support
HUMINT	human intelligence
IGO	intergovernmental organization
IM	information management
IO	information operations
INTSUM	intelligence summary
IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlefield
ISB	intermediate staging base
J-2	intelligence
J-3	operations
J-35	future operations cell
J-4	logistics
J-7	force development-engineering
J-8	force structure, resource management
J-9	civil-military operations
JCSE	Joint Communications Support Element
JECC	Joint Enabling Capabilities Command

JFC	Joint Forces Command
JIIM	joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational
JMD	joint manning document
JNOC	joint network operations center
JOA	joint operations area
JOC	joint operations center
JOPP	Joint Operation Planning Process
JPASE	Joint Public Affairs Support Element
JPSE	Joint Planning Support Element
JRRB	Joint Requirements Review Board
JRSOI	joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
JTF	joint task force
KM	knowledge management
KMO	knowledge management officer
LAD	latest arrival date
LFA	lead federal agency or agent
LHA	amphibious assault ship (general purpose)
LNO	liaison officer
LNP	Liberian National Police
LOE	line of effort
LOGCAP	logistics civil augmentation program
LSA	logistics support area
LSC	lead service for contracting
MCTP	Mission Command Training Program
MEDEVAC	medical evacuation
METT-TC	mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations

MITAM	mission tasking matrix
MMB	multi-functional medical battalion
MMU	Monrovia Medical Enit
MOC	media operations center
MOS	military occupational specialty
MTOE	modified table of organization and equipment
MTP	mission-tailored package
NCO	noncommissioned officer
NDU	National Defense University
NECC	National Ebola Command Center
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NIPR	nonsecure Internet protocol router
OCS	operational contract support
ODC	Office of Defense Cooperation
OE	operational environment
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OFDA	Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
OHDACA	Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OOL	Operation Onward Liberty
OPLAN	operation plan
OPORD	operation order
OPT	operational planning team
OSC	Office of Security Cooperation
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSJA	Office of the Staff Judge Advocate
OUA	Operation United Assistance

PAG	public affairs guidance
PAO	public affairs office
PAPR	powered air-purifying respirator
PCR	polymerase chain reaction (testing for Ebola)
PE	professional engineer
PMP	project management professional
PMESII-PT	political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure-physical environment and time
POTUS	President of the United States
PPE	personal protective equipment
RFA	request for assistance
RFF	request for forces
ROE	rules of engagement
RRK	rapid response kit
RSO	regional security officer
RUF	rules for use of force
SAO	security assistance officer
SDDC	Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
SDO	senior defense officer
SIGINT	signals intelligence
SIPR	SECRET Internet protocol router
SJA	staff judge advocate
SLE	senior leader engagement
SNAP	shipboard non-tactical automated data processing (system)
TAC	tactical command post
TC-AIMS	Transportation Coordinator-Automated Information Management System
TCMS	Theater Construction Management System

## CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

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TOC	tactical operations center
TSC	Theater Sustainment Command
UAP	unified action partner
UN	United Nations
UROC	USACE Reachback Operation Center
USACE	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
USAFRICOM	U.S. Africa Command
USAFE	U.S. Air Forces in Europe
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USAMMA	U.S. Army Medical Materiel Agency
USAMRIID	U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases
USARAF	U.S. Army Africa
USEUCOM	U.S. European Command
USN	U.S. Navy
USTRANSCOM	U.S. Transportation Command
WARNORD	warning order
WFP	World Food Programme
WFX	warfighter exercise
WG	working group

## Appendix B

### Terms and Definitions

**Affected state.** An independent nation whose sovereignty and integrity shall be respected. Therefore, international relief operations shall be conducted only at the request or consent of the affected State. (Source: Graphic Training Aid [GTA] 90-01-030)

**Ambassador.** The chief of mission (COM) (usually an ambassador) operationally reports through his/her regional bureau to the Secretary of State. He/she is nominated by the President of the United States, confirmed by the U.S. Senate, and is the President's representative to the host country for all federal agencies. The COM has authority over all executive branch employees in the host country except those under the authority of a U.S. area military commander or another COM, or those on the staff of an international organization. Where a military chain of command exists, coordination at the operational level should be sought on issues that affect political relations in country. (Source: [http://www.state.gov/courses/rs401/page\\_23.htm](http://www.state.gov/courses/rs401/page_23.htm))

**All Partners Access Network.** An unclassified, non-dot-mil network providing interoperability and connectivity among partners over a common platform. The network fosters information exchange and collaboration between the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and any external country, organization, agency, or individual that does not have ready access to traditional DOD systems and networks. <https://www.apan.org> (Source: GTA 90-01-030)

**Blue Force Tracking.** (DOD) Employment of techniques to actively or passively identify or track U.S., allied, or coalition forces for the purpose of providing the combatant commander enhanced situational awareness and reducing fratricide. (Source: Joint Publication [JP] 3-14)

**Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.** The center works 24 hours a day/seven days a week to protect America from health, safety, and security threats, both foreign and domestic. Whether diseases start at home or abroad, are chronic or acute, curable or preventable, human error, or deliberate attack, center personnel fight disease and support communities and citizens to do the same. The center conducts the following:

- Detects and responds to new and emerging health threats.
- Tackles the biggest health problems causing death and disability for Americans.
- Puts science and advanced technology into action to prevent disease.

- Promotes healthy and safe behaviors, communities, and environment.
- Develops leaders and trains the public health workforce, including disease detectives.
- Takes the health pulse of the nation.

(Source: <http://www.cdc.gov/about/organization/mission.htm>)

**Chief of mission.** (DOD) The principal officer (the ambassador) in charge of a diplomatic facility of the United States, including any individual assigned to be temporarily in charge of such a facility. The chief of mission is the personal representative of the President to the country of accreditation. The chief of mission is responsible for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all U.S. government executive branch employees in that country (except those under the command of a U.S. area military commander). The security of the diplomatic post is the chief of mission's direct responsibility. (Source: JP 3-08).

**Civil-Military Operations Center.** An organization, normally comprised of civil affairs, established to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of the United States within indigenous populations and institutions, the private sector, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational forces, and other governmental agencies in support of the joint force commander. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) (Source: JP 3-57)

**Command and control.** The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) (Source: JP 1)

**Common operational picture.** A single display of relevant information within a commander's area of interest tailored to the user's requirements and based on common data and information shared by more than one command. (Source: JP 3-0)

**Concept of operations.** A verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely expresses what the joint force commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. (JP 1-02)

**Controlled monitoring area.** A portion of an installation specifically designated for the housing and controlled monitoring of service members returning from the Ebola outbreak area that meets the controlled monitoring area standards contained in CJCSI 4220.01, 7 November 2014.

**Controlled monitoring.** The process by which a trained healthcare professional directly observes the Service members and monitors their



twice daily temperature checks and evaluates daily for symptoms consistent with the Ebola Virus Disease in an area established by the installation commander and due to operational requirements. During controlled monitoring, service members are prohibited from having physical contact with family members and the general population. (Source: CJCSI 4220.01, 7 November 2014)

**Country team.** (DOD) The senior, in-country, United States coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented U.S. department or agency, as desired by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission. (Source: JP 3-07).

**Deputy chief of mission.** Acts as chargé d'affaires (person in charge) whenever the ambassador is absent. He/she is responsible for ensuring the mission can operate with allocated resources and together with the ambassador runs the embassy "front office." In some cases, the deputy will have a small staff to help manage the flow of paper and people, possibly in conjunction with other front office managers. However, it is not on the scale of DOD staff capabilities. There is no reachback to planning cells, information management cells, visitor's bureaus, or other specialized tools. In some cases, the front office is supported by protocol assistants and interpreters (i.e., Iraq), who work exclusively for the front office. Deputy jobs involve some of the most extensive and complex management challenges overseas. (Source: [http://www.state.gov/courses/rs401/page\\_24.htm](http://www.state.gov/courses/rs401/page_24.htm))

**Disaster Assistance Response Team.** A team of specialists, trained in a variety of disaster relief skills, rapidly deployed to assist U.S. embassies and U.S. Agency for International Development missions with the management of U.S. government response to disasters. See also foreign disaster; foreign disaster relief. (JP 3-08) (Source: JP 1-02)

**Defense attaché.** The defense attaché represents the Secretary of Defense; other top military officers and the commander-in-chief of the U.S. military. The Office of the Defense Attaché provides military and political-military advice, assistance, and support to the U.S. Ambassador. The Office of the Defense Attaché also has the full authority and responsibility inherent in the position of any military organization commander except the authority to administer military justice. (Source: <http://monrovia.usembassy.gov/defense.html>)

**Defense Logistics Agency.** Supports the joint task force using a variety of capabilities. The agency has robust logistic planning experience, logistic surge and sustainment expertise, forward deployed and expeditionary organizations, and personnel imbedded physically and virtually with the warfighting and support organizations. In addition to executing its

responsibilities as the executive agent for Classes I (subsistence), III (petroleum, oils, and lubricants), IV (construction materiel), and VIII (medical materiel), the agency exercises item manager duties for supply support across the other classes of supply. It can access and use a variety of information management tools to monitor the availability of supplies and equipment. The geographic combatant commander can request the agency's Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office to augment the combatant command or a joint task force to synchronize and integrate operational contract support. (Source: JP 3-33)

**Department of State.** The executive branch and the U.S. Congress have constitutional responsibilities for U.S. foreign policy. Within the executive branch, the Department of State is the lead U.S. foreign affairs agency, and its head, the Secretary of State, is the president's principal foreign policy adviser, though other officials or individuals may have more influence on foreign policy decisions. The Department of State advances U.S. objectives and interests in the world through its primary role in developing and implementing the president's foreign policy. The Department of State also supports the foreign affairs activities of other U.S. government entities including the U.S. Department of Commerce and the U.S. Agency for International Development. It also provides an array of important services to U.S. citizens and to foreigners seeking to visit or immigrate to the United States. (Source: <http://www.state.gov/>.)

**Defense Security Cooperation Agency.** Provides timely and effective direction, supervision, and oversight of security cooperation programs in support of U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives; and promotes stable security relationships with friends and allies through military assistance. (Source: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Security Assistance Management Manual, at <http://www.samm.dsca.mil/rcg/reg-definitions>.)

**Defense Threat Reduction Agency.** Safeguards America and its allies from weapons of mass destruction (i.e., chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear) by providing capabilities to reduce, eliminate, and counter the threat and mitigate its effects. (Source: JP 3-33)

**Ebola Response Network.** This All Partners Access Network site was established as a platform for information sharing and collaboration support to the U.S. government/U.S. Agency for International Development's foreign humanitarian relief efforts in response to the Ebola virus outbreak in West Africa under the name of Operation United Assistance. (Source: <https://community.apan.org/apcn/ern/default.aspx>.)

**Ebola virus disease.** A virus that causes hemorrhagic fever. The virus is spread through direct contact (through broken skin or mucous membranes) with the body fluids (blood, urine, feces, saliva, and other secretions) of a

person who is sick with Ebola, or with objects like needles that have been contaminated with the virus, or infected animals. (Source: AFRICOM Medical Threat Brief-Operation United Assistance, 25 SEP 2014, Version 3 approved)

**Force protection.** A commander's program to protect personnel, Family members, facilities, and material, in all locations and situations. It is accomplished through the planned and integrated application of operations security, combating terrorism, physical security, base defense, personal protective services, law enforcement, and crime prevention. The program is supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs. (Source: AR 381-10)

**Foreign disaster relief.** Assistance that can be used immediately to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims that normally includes services and commodities as well as the rescue and evacuation of victims; the provision and transportation of food, water, clothing, medicines, beds, bedding, and temporary shelter; the furnishing of medical equipment, medical and technical personnel; and making repairs to essential services. See also foreign disaster. (JP 3-29) (Source: JP 1-02)

**Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.** DOD activities conducted outside the United States and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) (Source: JP 3-29)

**Foreign disclosure officer.** A Department of the Army member designated in writing to oversee and control coordination of specific disclosures of classified military information. Foreign disclosure officers are authorized for appointment to the lowest command level that is a proponent for Army-originated, developed, or derived classified military information. (Source: AR 380-10)

**Force health protection.** Measures to promote, improve, or conserve the behavioral and physical well-being of Service members to enable a healthy and fit force, prevent injury and illness, and protect the force from health hazards. See also force; protection. (JP 4-02) (Source: JP 1-02)

**Force protection.** Preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against DOD personnel (to include Family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. (Source: JP 3-0)

**Field operating guide.** The U.S. Agency for International Development, Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, developed a field operating guide as a reference tool for disaster assessment and response. The guide includes formats and reference materials for assessing and reporting on populations at risk; disaster assistance response team position descriptions

and duty checklists; sample tracking and accounting forms; descriptions of stockpiled commodities; general information related to disaster activities; information on working with the military in the field; and a glossary of acronyms and terms commonly used by the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance and other associated organizations. (Source: GTA 90-01-030 and [http://www.usaid.gov/our\\_work/humanitarian\\_assistance/disaster\\_assistance/resources/pdf/fog\\_v4.pdf](http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/resources/pdf/fog_v4.pdf).)

**General services officer.** Responsible for a broad range of functions including the management of physical resources and logistical functions at diplomatic and consular posts. General services officers develop, plan, implement, and manage an ongoing program of support that includes contracting, inventory/property, physical facilities, space management, travel and transportation, motor pool, and maintenance and repair schedules. (Source: <http://www.careers.state.gov/specialist/career-tracks-printable>.)

**Geospatial intelligence.** The exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on Earth. Geospatial intelligence consists of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information. (Source: JP 2-03)

**Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center.** A temporary center established by a geographic combatant commander to assist with interagency coordination and planning during the early planning and coordination stages of foreign humanitarian assistance operations. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) (Source: JP 3-29)

**HARMONIEWeb.** A portal site built to allow governmental and nongovernmental organizations to collaborate in the areas of humanitarian assistance, disaster response, and stability and reconstruction. Users can request portal sites to meet the collaborative needs of a given situation. Once a site is created, users manage access, provide content, and designate administrators or site owners. (Sources: GTA-90-01-30 and [http://www.harmonieweb.org/Pages/ Default.aspx](http://www.harmonieweb.org/Pages/Default.aspx).)

**Hostile environment.** An operational environment in which hostile forces have control as well as the intent and capability to oppose response operations (such as the environment that existed during the relief efforts in Somalia from 1992 to 1994). (Source: GTA 90-01-030)

**Host nation.** A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or organizations affiliated with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. (Source: JP 3-57)

**Host nation support.** (DOD) Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crisis or emergencies, or war-based agreements mutually concluded between nations. (Source: JP 4-0)

**Human intelligence.** The collection by a trained human intelligence collector of foreign information from people and multimedia to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, and capabilities (FM 2-0). (Source: Army Doctrine Reference Publication [ADRP] 2-0)

**Humanitarian assistance.** Aid to an affected population that seeks, as its primary purpose, to save lives and alleviate suffering of a crisis-affected population. For the purposes of these guidelines, assistance can be divided into the following three categories based on the degree of contact with the affected population:

- **Direct assistance.** Face-to-face distribution of goods and services.
- **Indirect assistance.** At least one step removed from the population and involves such activities as transporting relief goods or relief personnel.
- **Infrastructure support.** Involves providing general services such as road repair, airspace management, and power generation that facilitates relief, but are not necessarily visible to or solely for the benefit of the affected population.

**Note:** These categories are important because they help define which types of humanitarian activities might be appropriate to support with international military resources under different conditions, given that ample consultation has been conducted with all concerned parties to explain the nature and necessity of the assistance. (Source: GTA 90-01-030)

**Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center.** A temporary center established by a geographic combatant commander to assist with interagency coordination and planning during the early planning and coordination stages of foreign humanitarian assistance operations. (Source: JP 3-29)

**Intergovernmental organization.** Created by a formal agreement (e.g., a treaty) between two or more governments. Intergovernmental organizations may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. These organizations are formed to protect and promote national interest shared by member states. Examples include the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union. (Source: JP 3-08)

**International organizations.** May be created by formal agreement between two or more governments. These organizations may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. International organizations are formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. (Source: GTA 90-01-030)

**International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.** A global humanitarian organization that coordinates and directs international assistance following natural and man-made disasters in non-conflict situations. The federation consists of 188-member Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, a secretariat in Geneva, and more than 60 delegations strategically located to support activities around the world. (Source: JP 3-29)

**International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.** The largest humanitarian network in the world is composed of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and 188 individual national societies. Its mission is to alleviate human suffering, protect life and health, and uphold human dignity especially during armed conflicts and other emergencies. It is present in every country and supported by millions of volunteers. Each has its own legal identity and role, but all are united by seven fundamental principles: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality. (Source: JP 3-29)

**Interagency.** Of or pertaining to U.S. government agencies and departments, including DOD.

**Interagency coordination.** (DOD) Within the context of DOD involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of DOD and engaged U.S. government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. (Sources: JP 3-0 and JP 1-02)

**Interoperability.** The ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks (JP 3-0) and the condition achieved among communications-electronics systems or items of communications-electronics equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between the systems/equipment and/or its users. The degree of interoperability should be defined when referring to specific cases. (Sources: JP 6-0 and JP 1-02)

**Interorganizational coordination.** The interaction that occurs among elements of the DOD; engaged U.S. government agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; intergovernmental organizations; nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector. (Sources: JP 3-08 and JP 1-02)

**Joint Communications Support Element.** Provides rapidly deployable, scalable, en route, and early entry communications capabilities across the full spectrum of operations in order to enable rapid action of the joint force. (Source: <http://www.jecc.mil/Subordinates/JointCommunicationsSupportElement.aspx>)

**Joint Deployment and Distribution Operations Center.** (DOD)  
A combatant command movement control organization designed to synchronize and optimize national and theater multimodal resources for deployment, distribution, and sustainment. (Source: JP 4-09)

**Joint Enabling Capabilities Command.** Provides mission-tailored, joint capability packages to combatant commanders to facilitate rapid establishment of joint force headquarters, fulfill global response force execution, and bridge joint operational requirements. (Source: <http://www.jecc.mil/>)

**Joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment.** (DOD)  
The analytical process used by joint intelligence organizations to produce intelligence estimates and other intelligence products in support of the joint force commander's decision-making process. It is a continuous process that includes defining the operational environment; describing the impact of the operational environment; evaluating the adversary; and determining adversary courses of action. (JP 2-01.3) See ATP 3-05.20, ATP 3-05.1. (Source: JP 2-01.3)

**Joint Movement Center.** (DOD) Established to coordinate the employment of all means of transportation (including that provided by allies or host nations) to support the concept of operations. This coordination is accomplished through establishment of transportation policies within the assigned operational area, consistent with relative urgency of need, port and terminal capabilities, transportation asset availability, and priorities set by a joint force commander. See also concept of operations. (Source: JP 4-0)

**Joint manning document.** Identifies all manning billets essential to the command and control of a headquarters organization. The document should include only headquarters functions and not base operating support requirements or units below the joint task force headquarters. Joint manning documents for permanent activities with a joint table of distribution or joint table of manning and distribution should only identify joint implementing agreement positions for temporary military or DOD personnel.

Documents for activities without a joint table of distribution or manning and distribution (e.g., some joint task forces) should identify all positions required for that activity to support the mission. Positions should be identified as unit, coalition, contractor, other government agency, government or foreign organization, or a joint implementing agreement-fill

on the joint manning document. (Source: CJCSI 1301.01F-Joint Individual Augmentation Procedures\_17Nov14 and JP 3-33)

**Joint operations area.** (DOD) An area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a Joint force commander (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. See also area of responsibility; Joint special operations area. (Source: JP 3-0)

**Joint.** Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more military departments participate. (Sources: JP 1-02 and JP 1)

**Joint Operation Planning and Execution System.** (DOD) An adaptive planning and execution system technology. See also joint operation planning; joint operations; level of detail. (Source: JP 5-0)

**Joint operation planning process.** (DOD) An orderly, analytical process that consists of a logical set of steps to analyze a mission, select the best course of action, and produce a Joint operation plan or order. See also Joint operation planning; Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. (Source: JP 5-0)

**Joint Public Affairs Support Element.** A deployable unit assigned to assist a joint force commander in developing and training public affairs forces in joint, interagency, and multinational environments. (Sources: JP 3-61 and JP 1-02)

**Joint Planning Support Element.** On order, the Joint Communications Support Element immediately deploys to provide en route, early entry, scalable command, control, communications, and computers support to the regional combatant commands, special operations command, and other agencies as directed; on order, provides additional command, control, communications, and computers services within 72 hours to support larger coalition joint task force/coalition joint special operations task force headquarters across the full spectrum of operations. (Source: <http://www.jcse.mil/>)

**Joint Requirements Review Board.** The joint task force or sub-unified commander's established board to review, validate, approve, and prioritize selected service component contract support requests. (Approved for replacement of "Joint Acquisition Review Board" and its definition in JP 1-02.) (Source JP 4-10)

**Joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration.** (DOD) A phase of joint force projection occurring in the operational area during which arriving personnel, equipment, and materiel transition into forces capable of meeting operational requirements. See also integration; joint force; reception; staging. (Source: JP 3-35)



**Joint force commander.** (DOD) A general term applied to a combatant commander, sub-unified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. See also joint force. (Source: JP-1)

**Joint task force.** (DOD) A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a sub-unified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. (Source: JP-1)

**Joint security area.** (DOD) A specific surface area, designated by the joint force commander to facilitate protection of joint bases and connecting lines of communications that support joint operations. (Source: JP 3-10)

**Knowledge management.** Knowledge management integrates concepts from a variety of disciplines: information science, communication science, computer science and technology, social science, behavioral science, management science resulting in multiple definitions of knowledge management. In this handbook, knowledge management is defined as the art of creating, organizing, applying, and transferring knowledge to facilitate situational understanding and decision making. (Source: GTA 3-01-30)

**Global Force Management.** A process that provides near-term sourcing solutions while providing the integrating mechanism between force apportionment, allocation, and assignment (Source: JP 3-35) or a process to align assignment, allocation, and apportionment of forces to combatant commanders in support of the national defense strategy and joint force availability requirements (Source: DODI 8260.03P).

**Lead federal agency.** The federal agency that leads and coordinates the overall federal response to an emergency. (Sources: JP 1-02 and JP 3-41)

**Liaison.** That contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. (Source: JP 3-08)

**Level of effort.** (DOD) In the context of joint operation planning, using the purpose (cause and effect) to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions by linking multiple tasks and missions. (Sources: JP 5-0 and <http://www.usamriid.army.mil/aboutpage.htm>)

**Military decisionmaking process.** An iterative planning methodology to understand the situation and mission, develop a course of action, and produce an operation plan or order. (Source: ADP 5-0)

**Medical intelligence.** That category of intelligence resulting from collection, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of foreign medical, bio-scientific, and environmental information that is of interest to strategic planning and to military medical planning and operations for the

conservation of the fighting strength of friendly forces and the formation of assessments of foreign medical capabilities in both military and civilian sectors. (Sources: JP 1-02 and JP 2-01)

**Medical personal protective equipment.** Equipment (e.g., face shields, masks, impermeable gloves, impermeable apron, breathing apparatus) for medical-related activities should be in accordance with established medical operating procedures for the situation and tasking. (Source: USAFRICOM Medical Threat Brief-Operation United Assistance, 25 SEP 2014, Version 3, approved)

**Mission tasking matrix.** (U.S. Agency for International Development) The mission tasking matrix system was established by the military and the agency to facilitate coordination for humanitarian assistance operations and ensure it is conducted appropriately. Mission tasking matrices are orders based on requests for assistance. Normally, the requests are issued by civilians working at the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, the United Nations, and nongovernmental organizations or by military officers in the field. (Source: Independent Review of the U.S. Government Response to the Haiti Earthquake, Final Report, March 2011)

**Measures of effectiveness.** Calculated based on indications of how well mission objectives are being met. If tactical forces are not able to provide accurate needs assessments with in-house resources, the intelligence directorate can employ disaster assessment and surveillance teams to establish levels of need. (Source: GTA 90-01-30)

**Measures of performance.** Measures of performance provide insight into how efficiently tasks are being performed. These measures are usually related to mission essential task accomplishment at the unit or group level. These measures often can stand alone as measures of how efficiently the force is performing specific assigned tasks, though the measures may not provide insight into progress the force is making toward overall mission accomplishment. (Source: GTA 90-01-30)

**National Ebola Command Center.** Essentially analogous to a national-level civil-military operations center or a humanitarian operations center. Thus, in having shared equities, the entire joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational/nongovernmental organizations/ economic sector came together during this process and became a stronger and distinct force. The center of gravity where collective and collaborative decisions are being made is within the National Ebola Command Center.

**Nongovernmental organization.** (DOD) A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. (Source: JP 3-08)

**Non-medical personal protective equipment.** Includes access to impermeable gloves (e.g., rubber or latex) and eye protection (e.g., goggles, eyeglasses/sunglasses). **Note:** Wash hands with soap and water after removing this equipment (hand sanitizer may be used if soap and water are unavailable). (Source: USAFRICOM Medical Threat Brief-Operation United Assistance, 25 SEP 2014, Version 3, approved)

**Office of Defense Cooperation.** The mission of the Office of Security Cooperation is to provide U.S. DOD security assistance to the Republic of Liberia on behalf of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Embassy, Monrovia, to further U.S. strategic goals and objectives and to improve military-to-military relations. Within this mission, the Office of Defense Cooperation's primary objective is to build, equip, and train a professional, apolitical 2,000-soldier Armed Forces of Liberia under the Security Sector Reform for National Defense Program. Included in this force is the development of a 50- to 100-person Liberian Coast Guard. (Source: <http://monrovia.usembassy.gov/defense.html>)

**Operational contract support.** The process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of joint operations. (Source: JP 4-10)

**Operational environment.** A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (Sources: JP 1-02 and JP 3-0)

**Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance.** Responsible for providing international disaster and humanitarian assistance and coordinating the U.S. government's response to declared disasters in foreign countries. The office's mandate is to save lives, alleviate human suffering, and reduce the economic and social impact of disasters. The Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance also provides the following:

- Technical support to the administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, who serves as the U.S. President's special coordinator for international disaster assistance.
- Formulates U.S. foreign disaster assistance policy in coordination with other government agencies.
- Coordinates with the U.S. Agency for International Development and others to provide relief supplies (e.g., blankets, plastic sheeting, and sanitation hygiene kits).
- Funds implementing partners (e.g., UN agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and Red Cross societies) to provide direct support and humanitarian assistance.
- Develops and manages logistical, operational, and technical support for disaster responses. (Source: GTA 90-01-30)

**Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid.** The means by which the Defense Security Cooperation Agency reimburses geographic combatant commands and the Armed Services for U.S. Agency for International Development/Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance and command-validated foreign disaster relief mission support. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency reimburses incremental costs that would not have been incurred had the foreign disaster relief operation not been supported. (Sources: GTA 90-01-30 and DODD 5100.46, 06 JUL 2012)

**Other government agency.** Within the context of interagency coordination, a non-DOD agency of the U.S. government. (Source: JP 1)

**Operation Onward Liberty.** Operation Onward Liberty is a U.S. military-led team that mentored and advised the Armed Forces of Liberia to develop a national military that was responsible, operationally capable, respectful of civilian authority and the rule of law, and was a force for good among the Liberian people. Operation Onward Liberty's goal was to assist the Armed Forces of Liberia in building a professional and capable military force that effectively provided and contributed to the overall security environment in Liberia. (Source: <http://www.africom.mil/what-we-do/operations/operation-onward-liberty>)

**Pandemic.** An outbreak of an infectious disease that may be of natural, accidental, or deliberate origin, occurring over a wide geographic area. It is unique in that it is not a discrete event, but a prolonged environment in which military operations, including any chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear response, continue. (Source: JP 3-27)

**Permissive environment.** An operational environment in which the government of an affected state has control, as well as the intent and capability, to assist response operations. That type of environment was pervasive during the relief efforts in Southeast Asia following the tsunami in 2004. (Source: GTA 90-01-030)

**Political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure–physical environment and time.** A memory aid for the variables used to describe the operational environment (or operational variables identified in FM 3-0). (Source: FM 3-24-2)

**Political adviser.** May also be referred to as the foreign policy adviser, who is a senior Department of State officer, detailed as a personal adviser to the operational-level commander, tasked with providing policy support regarding the diplomatic and political aspects of the commander's responsibilities. To accomplish this tasking, the political adviser must be fully integrated in all activities. (Source: GTA 90-01-030)

**Political-military.** Refers to the broad discipline of integrating diplomacy with military power to foster a stable and secure international environment; generally applied at the strategic/global level. (Source: DOD-3D Planning Guide, Diplomacy, Development, Defense; 31 JUL 2012)

**Personal protective equipment.** The protective clothing and equipment provided to shield or isolate a person from the chemical, physical, and thermal hazards that can be encountered at a hazardous materials incident. See also individual protective equipment. (JP 3-11) (Source: JP1-02)

**Private voluntary organization.** (DOD) Private, nonprofit humanitarian assistance organizations involved in development and relief activities. Private voluntary organizations are normally U.S.-based. Often used synonymously with the term “nongovernmental organizations.” (Source: JP 1-02)

**ReliefWeb.** This website serves as the global hub for the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. It provides time-critical humanitarian information on complex emergencies and natural disasters. (Sources: GTA 90-01-030 and <http://www.reliefweb.int/>)

**Response Management Team.** Provides support to the Disaster Assistance Response Team and coordinates U.S. government disaster response strategy and activities in Washington, D.C. Relays information on activities, needs, and makes recommendations for appropriate U.S. government assistance to the team. Organized into three major functional areas (management, planning, and operations) and serves as the primary liaison between the team, other U.S. Agency for International Development entities, federal agencies, and the U.S. Congress. (Source: GTA 90-01-030)

**Rules of engagement.** Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which U.S. forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. (JP 1-04) (Source: JP 1-02)

**Regional security officer.** Diplomatic security special agents, assigned to U.S. diplomatic missions overseas as regional security officers, serve as the personal adviser to the ambassador or chief of mission on all security issues and coordinate all aspects of a mission’s security program. These officers also:

- Develop and implement effective security programs to protect employees from terrorist, criminal, and technical attack both at work and at home.
- Receive valuable assistance in this effort from other diplomatic security personnel, U.S. Marine Corps security guards, U.S. Naval Construction Force (Seabees), local and cleared American guards,

local investigators, and security engineering officers, and host government officials.

- Provide unclassified security briefings and other professional security advice to U.S. business executives overseas.
- Serve as the primary liaison with foreign police and security services overseas in an effort to obtain support for U.S. law enforcement initiatives and investigations.

(Source: <http://www.state.gov/m/ds/protection/c8756.htm>)

**Staff weather officer.** The U.S. Air Force senior weather representative (officer or noncommissioned officer) at each Army echelon, who serves as a member of the Army commander's special or personal staff. (Source: AR 115-10/AFI 15.157 [IP])

**Senior defense officer/defense attaché.** The chief of mission's principal advisor on defense issues and the senior diplomatically accredited DOD military officer assigned to a U.S. diplomatic mission. All DoD elements under COM authority are under the coordinating authority of the Senior Defense Office/Defense Attaché, except for the U.S. Marine Corps security guard detachment and U.S. Navy support units. (Source: DoDD 5205.75, 4 DEC 2013)

**Status-of-forces agreement.** A bilateral or multilateral agreement that defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. (JP 3-16) (Source: JP 1-02)

**Transit state.** A state through which disaster relief or recovery assistance personnel and supplies have received permission to pass to or from the affected state. (Source: GTA 90-01-030)

**Uncertain environment.** An operational environment in which the government of an affected state does not have effective control of the territory and population in the intended operational area. That type of environment was present during the relief efforts in Pakistan following the earthquake in 2005 and the flooding in 2010.

**Unified action.** The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort.

**Unified action partner.** Those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector with whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations. (Source: ADRP 3-0)

**Unified combatant command.** A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more military departments, established and so designated by the U.S. President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Source: JP 1-02)

There are two types of unified combatant commands: geographic and functional. Commanders of these commands are four-star flag or general officers, who are assigned a geographic area of responsibility. The geographic combatant commands for the purposes of this handbook include the following:

- U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM)
- U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM)
- U.S. European Command (USEUCOM)
- U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM)
- U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM)
- U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

Geographic combatant commands function in either of two capacities: as a supported command or as a supporting command. A supported command has primary responsibility for all aspects of assigned missions. A supported command receives assistance from another command force and is responsible for ensuring that the supporting commands understand the assistance required. A supporting command provides augmentation forces or assets to a supported command and is responsible for providing the assistance requested.

**United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.** Mobilizes and coordinates humanitarian assistance delivered by international and national partners. Headed by the emergency relief coordinator, also titled the Under-Secretary-General, who is responsible for oversight of all emergencies requiring UN humanitarian assistance. Co-leads and is the process owner of the Emergency Telecommunications Cluster, providing overall coordination, preparedness, and initial response. (Source: GTA 90-01-030 and <http://ochaonline.un.org/>)

**United States Agency for International Development.** Provides economic development and humanitarian assistance around the world in support of the foreign policy goals of the United States. Although a separate agency from the Department of State, it shares certain administrative functions with the Department of State and reports to and receives overall foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State. Plays a major role in U.S. foreign

assistance policy and a principal role in interagency coordination. (Sources: GTA 90-01-030 and <http://www.usaid.gov/>)

**U.S. Defense Attaché Office.** The DOD organization established as part of a U.S. diplomatic mission, through which the mission of the Defense Attaché System is accomplished. The Secretary of Defense may direct the assignment or attachment of other military detachments or elements to a Defense Attaché Office. See DoDD 5205.75 for Defense Attaché Office functions. (Source: DoDD 5205.72)

**U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases.** Since 1969, the institute has served as the DOD lead laboratory for medical biological defense research. While its core mission is to protect the warfighter from biological threats, the institute also investigates disease outbreaks and threats to public health. Research conducted at the institute leads to medical solutions — therapeutics, vaccines, diagnostics, and information — that benefit both military personnel and civilians. Serves as a subordinate laboratory to the U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command. (Source: <http://www.usamriid.army.mil/aboutpage.htm>)

**Unity of effort.** Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization.

**Viral hemorrhagic fever.** Viral hemorrhagic fevers refer to a group of illnesses that are caused by several distinct families of viruses. In general, the term “viral hemorrhagic fever” is used to describe a severe multisystem syndrome (multisystem in that multiple organ systems in the body are affected). Characteristically, the overall vascular system is damaged, and the body’s ability to regulate itself is impaired. These symptoms are often accompanied by hemorrhage (bleeding); however, the bleeding is itself rarely life-threatening. While some types of hemorrhagic fever viruses can cause relatively mild illnesses, many of these viruses cause severe, life-threatening disease. (Source: <http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvrd/spb/mnpages/dispages/vhf.htm>)

**World Health Organization.** The directing and coordinating authority for health within the UN system. It is responsible for providing leadership on global health matters, shaping the health research agenda, setting norms and standards, articulating evidence-based policy options, providing technical support to countries, and monitoring and assessing health trends. This organization leads the health cluster. (Sources: GTA 90-01-030 and <http://www.who.int/en/>)

**Whole of government.** Whole-of-government planning refers to National Security Council/Home Safety Council-sponsored processes by which multiple U.S. government departments and agencies come together to



develop plans that address critical challenges to U.S. national interests. DOD supports and is helping to develop the whole-of-government planning capabilities. (Source: DOD-3D Planning Guide, Diplomacy, Development, Defense; 31 JUL 2012)

**Whole-of-government approach.** Integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the U.S. government to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal.

**Working group.** A working group is a grouping of predetermined staff representatives who meet to provide analysis, coordinate, and provide recommendations for a particular purpose or function. Its cross-functional design enables working groups to synchronize contributions from multiple command post cells and staff sections.



## Appendix C

### Internet Resources

#### General Information

Armed Forces Health Surveillance Branch-Public Health Division at <http://afhsc.army.mil/Home/Divisions/EA>

Army Geospatial Center at <http://www.agc.army.mil>

Army Public Health Center-Health Information Products e-Catalog at <https://usaphcapps.amedd.army.mil/HIOShoppingCart/viewItem.aspx?id=668>

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention-Ebola (Ebola virus disease) at <http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola>

Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance at <http://www.cfe-dmha.org>

Central Intelligence Agency World Fact Book at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directives (lists all current Chairman's instructions and manuals) at [http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs\\_directives](http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives)

Common Joint Task Force Headquarters Standard Operating Procedure, Version 3.0-TF at [https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jtfguide/sop\\_index.htm](https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jtfguide/sop_index.htm)

Defense Logistics Agency at [https://headquarters.dla.mil/DLA\\_Customer/Operations/Publications.aspx](https://headquarters.dla.mil/DLA_Customer/Operations/Publications.aspx)

Defense Threat Reduction Agency at <http://www.dtra.mil/Home.aspx>

Health.mil-Ebola at <http://www.health.mil/Military-Health-Topics/Health-Readiness/Infectious-Diseases/Ebola>

Joint Electronic Library Plus at <https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis>

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency at <https://www.nga.mil/Pages/Default.aspx>

Presidential Executive Orders (lists current executive orders) at <http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/executive-orders>

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers at <http://www.usace.army.mil>

U.S. Institute of Peace at <http://www.usip.org/online-courses>

U.S. Army Public Health Command at <http://phc.amedd.army.mil/topics/discond/diseases/Pages/EbolaVirusDisease.aspx>

World Health Organization at <http://www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/en>

## **Disaster Assistance Sites**

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs at <http://www.unocha.org>

U.S. Agency for International Development at <https://www.usaid.gov/ebola/fy16/fs06> and <https://blog.usaid.gov/ebola>

U.S. Agency for International Development-Policy on Cooperation with the Department of Defense at <https://www.usaid.gov/policy/dod-cooperation>

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers-Engineer Research and Development Center at <http://www.erd.usace.army.mil/Media/NewsStories/tabid/9219/Article/476586/dod-tech-demo-supports-humanitarian-assistance-disaster-response.aspx>

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs at <http://www.unocha.org>

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination) at <http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/UN-CMCoord/overview>

U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) at <http://www.usgs.gov>

ReliefWeb at <http://reliefweb.int>

Reuters AlertNet at <http://www.alertnet.org>

## **Training Resources**

Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine-DOD Center for Global Health Engagement at <http://www.cdham.org>

Doctrine Networked Education and Training (training on individual joint publications) at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/docnet>

Humanitarian Assistance Response Training at <https://www.cfe-dmha.org/Training/Humanitarian-Assistance-Response-Training-HART-Course>

Joint Humanitarian Operations Course at <https://www.usaid.gov/work-usaid/partnership-opportunities/us-military/training>

Joint Task Force Headquarters Training Guide (provides checklists and tasks required when standing up a joint task force headquarters) at [https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jtfguide/jtf\\_index.htm](https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jtfguide/jtf_index.htm)

Joint Doctrine, Education and Training Electronic Information System (listing of joint and Service doctrine, policy, and other resources; CAC required) at <https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis>

U.S. Agency for International Development Center for International Disaster Information at <http://www.cidi.org>

U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation at <https://www.usaid.gov/military>

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs- Thematic Areas: Humanitarian Engagement at <http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/policy/thematic-areas/humanitarian-engagement>

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Civil-Military Coordination at <http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/UN-CMCoord/publications>

U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys at <https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/Armed%20Escort%20Guidelines%20-%20Final.pdf>

United Nations Peace Operations Training Institute at <http://www.peaceopstraining.org>

## **Joint Websites**

Online resources to increase knowledge of joint doctrine and other operational matters includes the following websites:

Joint Chiefs of Staff (official website of JCS) at <http://www.jcs.mil>

Joint and Coalition Warfighting-Central Command Exercise portal for Unified Endeavor mission rehearsal exercises at <https://us.jfcom.mil/sites/Exercises/Joint%20Exercises/CENTCOM/default.aspx>

Joint doctrine updates (summary of Joint doctrine changes) at <https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pinde=15>

Joint Electronic Library (Internet-based joint doctrine library of current pubs) at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/index.html>

NATO Standardization Office public website at <http://nso.nato.int/nso>

U.S. Department of Defense-Unified Command Plan at <http://www.defense.gov/Sites/Unified-Combatant-Commands>

U.S. Department of Defense websites at <http://www.defense.gov/Sites/DOD-Websites>



## Appendix D

### References Quoted or Paraphrased

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Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operation United Assistance, Center for Army Lessons Learned 2020 Report for Follow on Forces

Center for Army Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Special Initial Impressions Report, Umbrella Week, MAY 2015

The Joint Enabling Capabilities Command, Operation United Assistance, After Action Report, 14 JAN 2015

U.S. Army Africa, After Action Report (undated)

U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence and Fort Huachuca, AZ, Capabilities Development and Integration Director's Memo; Subject: USAICoE Lessons Learned (LL) Collection Report, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) Operation United Assistance Umbrella Week, Fort Campbell, KY, 09 JUL 2015.

U.S. Army Africa Surgeon, at USARAF\_AAR-PM Ebola-OUA\_20150212 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) Report, *In Support and Driving the Narrative: How the U.S. Army Division Headquarters Influenced Interagency Collaboration from a Support Role*, LTC Joseph J. Hodgson, U.S. Army [received from the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) historian], undated.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 4220.01, *Post-deployment Policy for 21-day Controlled Monitoring of DOD Service Members and Civilian Employees Returning from Ebola Virus Disease Outbreak Areas in West Africa*, 14 NOV 2014

#### **U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)**

USAID at <http://www.usaid.gov>

Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) at <http://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/organization/bureaus/bureau-democracy-conflict-and-humanitarian-assistance/office-us>

USAID/OFDA Regional Contracts at <http://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/working-crises-and-conflict/crisis-response/resources/usaid-ofda-regional-contacts>

Field Operations Guide for Disaster Assessment and Response, Version 4, September 2005, at [http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/Pnade100.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnade100.pdf)

USAID Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation at <http://www.usaid.gov/work-usaid/partnership-opportunities/us-military/training>

Nongovernmental organizations at <http://www.usaid.gov/partnership-opportunities/ngo>

U.S. government agencies and military at <http://www.usaid.gov/partnership-opportunities/us-government-and-military>

USAID's Development in Vulnerable Environments (Dive 1.0) Resource List at <http://www.usaid.gov/dodtraining>

## **U.S. Department of State**

Country team at [http://www.state.gov/courses/rs401/page\\_25.htm](http://www.state.gov/courses/rs401/page_25.htm)

U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual, Volume 2, Handbook 2, *Post Management Organization Handbook*, at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/89604.pdf>

Regional security officer (RSO) at <http://www.state.gov/m/ds/protection/c8756.htm>

## **Joint Publications**

JP 1, *Doctrine of the Army Forces of the United States*, 25 MAR 2013

JP 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 8 NOV 2012 (Amended 15 MAR 2015)

JP 1-04, *Legal Support to Military Operations*, 17 AUG 2011

JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*, 22 OCT 2013

JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*, 24 JUN 2011

JP 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities* (Appendix F), 31 JUL 2013

JP 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*, 3 JAN 2014

JP 3-31, *Command and Control of Joint Land Operations*, 24 FEB 2014

JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*, 30 JUL 2012

JP 3-35, *Deployment and Redeployment Operations*, 31 JAN 2013

JP 3-68, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations* (Chapter V), 18 NOV 2015



JP 4-01, *Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System*, 6 JUN 2013

JP 4-10, *Operational Contract Support*, 16 JUL 2014

JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, 11 AUG 2011

Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, Joint Task Force Relationship Building Best Practices-Executive Briefing, 24 FEB 2014

## **Army Publications**

Army Doctrine Reference Publication 2-0, *Intelligence*, AUG 2012

Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 2-01.3, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield-Battlespace*, NOV 2014

ATP 3-57.20, *Multi-Service Techniques for Civil Affairs Support to Humanitarian Assistance*, FEB 2013

ATP 3-93, *Theater Army Operations*, NOV 2014

Field Manual 4-02, *Army Health Care System*, AUG 2013

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GTA 41-01-006, *Working with the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance*, OCT 2007

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U.S. Department of Defense, DOD News, *Kirby-Timeline for Operation United Assistance Depends on Ebola Trend*, 20 NOV 2014, at <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=123694>

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Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management Journal (USAID and DOD), *A Guide to Humanitarian Assistance* at <http://www.disamjournal.org/articles/us-aid-and-dod-a-guide-to-humanitarian-assistance-1651>

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## Appendix E

### Operation United Assistance Chronology of Events

16 SEP 2014: MG Darryl A. Williams, Commander, U.S. Army Africa (USARAF), and a 14-member staff arrived in Monrovia, Liberia, for initial leader's reconnaissance and assessment.

20 SEP 2014: Approximately 40 personnel joined the advanced echelon. These personnel were to augment the assessment effort, act as liaison, and report the situation on the ground as they determined it to be.

23 SEP 2014: Approximately 40 personnel, to include a team of 15 U.S. Navy Seabees, joined Joint Forces Command-Operation United Assistance (JFC-OUA). Their purpose was to provide engineering support and conduct site surveys for projects such as hospitals, supply storage, and training facilities for health-care workers fighting the Ebola outbreak.

25 SEP 2014: Twenty-five members of a port operations team from U.S. Transportation Command joined JFC-OUA. The team's purpose was to conduct assessments in Liberia and Senegal for airfield and port locations that would support the arrival of follow-on personnel and equipment.

28 SEP 2014: A 25-bed hospital and two mobile laboratories were delivered to Monrovia.

02 OCT 2014: The first Department of Defense (DOD) mobile Ebola detection laboratory began operating in Montserrado County, Liberia.

05 OCT 2014: The 123rd Contingency Response Group, Kentucky Air National Guard (81 passengers) arrived in Dakar, Senegal, to establish the intermediate staging base cargo hub.

07 OCT 2014: GEN David M. Rodriguez, Commander, U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), held a press conference with the Pentagon press corps.

09 OCT 2014: Approximately 92 personnel from Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force-Crisis Response, based in Moron Air Base, Spain, and four MV-22B Ospreys arrived in Monrovia.

20 OCT 2014: The headquarters element of 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, KY, began arriving in theater. Activities were conducted to transition JFC-OUA leadership from USARAF to the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault).

25 OCT 2014: MG Williams, JFC-OUA commander, officially transferred command of the military portion of OUA to MG Gary J. Volesky, Commander, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault).

27 OCT 2014: A 20-member team of U.S. Army medical trainers began instruction for the first cohort of 68 students to receive Ebola treatment unit (ETU) staff training at a site in Monrovia.

05 NOV 2014: A VIP tour of the Monrovia Medical Unit (MMU) was conducted prior to operational opening.

7 NOV 2014: MMU was pronounced operational. The facility, staffed by U.S. Public Health Service personnel, was designated to treat any health-care workers who became ill while treating Ebola patients.

10 NOV 2014: Tubmanburg ETU construction was completed. The 100-bed facility was transferred to the nongovernmental International Organization for Migration, and opened for patients.

12 NOV 2014: MMU admitted first patient.

07 DEC 2014: U.S. force levels peaked at 2,900 personnel in West Africa.

01 FEB 2015: DOD began drawdown and transition activities.

01 APR 2015: Most DOD forces redeployed.

15 APR 2015: The 48th Chemical Brigade Headquarters, Fort Hood, TX, assumed responsibility for providing DOD support.

06 MAY 2015: The USAFRICOM Commander sent a “Termination Memorandum” to the Secretary of Defense.

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
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