

RUSSIA

# SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE PRIMER



U.S. ARMY



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# CHAPTER 1

## Introduction

### BACKGROUND

Since 2018, the Army has fielded six purpose-built security force assistance brigades (SFABs) to advise or train with vetted foreign security forces so Army brigade combat teams could focus their training and readiness to participate in large-scale combat operations. Most of the security force assistance (SFA) planners and practitioners interviewed for this SFA primer publication agree that the authorities to conduct SFA are inconsistent with current SFA activities conducted in several countries around the world. A general lack of understanding on how these activities are funded has led to inefficient SFAB use. This primer explores current SFA literature to determine if the doctrine is accurate, understandable, and consistent with other doctrine or if further doctrine revisions are required.

### PURPOSE AND APPROACH

The intent of this primer is to review how the Army provides trained and ready SFA capabilities for combatant commands' (CCMDs') security cooperation (SC) programs and related activities coordinated through their theater armies. The principal audience for this primer is theater army SC planners, division and brigade leaders and staffs, and Soldiers assigned or attached as advisors to brigades that execute SFA missions or echelons above brigade accomplishing the same missions.

The overarching purpose of this primer is to augment, not replace, existing SFA literature, to include planning handbooks that are issued to current planners from the Defense Security Cooperation University, from their assigned CCMDs, or elsewhere.

This primer examines official documents related to SC, SFA, and security assistance (SA). The review starts with documents at the national level that outline the national security strategy (NSS) and work from macro-to-micro down to tactical-level documents whose audience tends to be commanders and their staffs and SFA planners, and units tasked to conduct developmental activities such as organizing, training, equipping, building, and advising foreign security forces. It will not be necessary, therefore, to include all documents examined within this review, but rather to highlight documents that continue the dialogue of SC, SFA, and SA. This primer also reaffirms that the Army, along with the joint force and interagency stakeholders, needs to remain on the cutting edge in its doctrine development as it competes globally for ally and partner influence against malign state and non-state actors.

This introductory chapter presents the problem statement and describes the relationship of SC, SFA, and SA. Chapter 2 examines national strategy documents and public laws. Chapter 3 is a deep dive into SC authorities. Chapter 4 details joint policies and doctrine regarding SC and SFA. Chapter 5 provides a focused discussion on Army guidance and doctrine regarding SFA.

## **INTEGRATING SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE INTO OPERATIONS**

Security cooperation is “all Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to build security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and partner-nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations.”

—Joint Publication 3-20, *Security Cooperation* (9 September 2022)

The competition space where the Army currently operates characterizes the environment in which SC activities are implemented across the competition continuum.<sup>1</sup> Security cooperation (SC) is “all Department of Defense (DOD) interactions with foreign security establishments to build security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and partner-nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations.”<sup>2</sup> Although SC builds important relationships between the DOD and foreign security establishments, those relationships are not its primary purpose. Rather, SC and the relationships these activities build should enable and encourage partner nations to develop and apply their capabilities and capacity to address shared threats, provide U.S. forces with essential access, and in some cases carry out other activities that promote U.S. national interests.

SFA is the set of “DOD activities that support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions.”

—Joint Publication 3-20, *Security Cooperation* (9 September 2022)

SFA is the set of “DOD activities that support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions.”<sup>3</sup>

Each year, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) modifies, eliminates, or creates new SFA authorities and authorizes funding for the CCMDs to conduct SFA activities. These activities are currently the focus of the purpose-built SFABs. The SFAB complements the Department of State (DOS), foreign area officers, special operations, National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP), regionally aligned forces, and other joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational (JIIM) partner activities to expand access and create options for senior military and civilian leaders.

“SFABs also allow the U.S. Army to preserve the readiness of its brigade combat teams by primarily conducting SFA missions and persistent engagement with allies and partners in the cooperation and competition below armed conflict stages of the competition continuum. This allows the brigade combat teams to focus on large-scale combat operations.”<sup>4</sup>

Security assistance is the “group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended; the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended; or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, lease, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives, and those that are funded and authorized through the DOS to be administered by DOD/DSCA are considered part of SC.

—Joint Publication 3-20, *Security Cooperation* (9 September 2022)

Security assistance is the “group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, as amended; the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976, as amended; or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, lease, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives, and those that are funded and authorized through the DOS to be administered by DOD/Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) are considered part of SC.”<sup>5</sup> The DOS supervises and directs the U.S. Government’s SA programs, which are coordinated with the DOD and other government entities.<sup>6</sup> For the Army, it is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Defense Export and Control (DASA [DE&C]),



who oversees the transfer of materiel, engineering activities and related training for foreign partners such as servicing foreign military sales (FMS) cases and armaments cooperation agreements.<sup>7</sup> These cases and armaments cooperation agreements leverage foreign technologies and capabilities that support Army-wide readiness, modernization and interoperability goals.<sup>8</sup> SA programs are at no cost to the U.S. Government as the host nation incurs all the costs or reimburses the U.S. Government.

## **BRIEF HISTORY OF SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE**

SFA, as currently understood, took its initial form in 2006 with the publication of the Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDRR), which was replaced in 2017 by the national defense strategy (NDS).<sup>9</sup> The 2006 QDRR states, “U.S. forces have been engaged in many countries, fighting terrorists and helping partners to police and govern their nations. To succeed in such operations, the United States must often take an indirect approach, building up and working with others.”<sup>10</sup>

The 2006 QDRR would go on to inform the Joint Irregular Warfare Analytic Baseline (JIWAB) study, which, in turn, identified that the DOD lacked adequate SFA policy and understanding.<sup>11</sup>

In May 2009, the Department of the Army published Field Manual (FM) 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance. FM 3-07.1 was the first document to define SFA as the unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority.<sup>12</sup> FM 3-07.1, however, no longer exists as FM 3-22, Army Support to Security Cooperation, superseded it 22 January 2013. FM 3-22 is the primary source document referencing the Army’s support to SC by providing doctrine for Army support to DOD SC programs. However, FM 3-22 is now outdated and does not reflect the changes made in the 2017 NDAA. FM 3-22 is currently under review by the Army SFA and stability proponent and is pending changes and updates.

In 2010, two significant documents were released pertaining to SFA: an updated 2010 QDRR and Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5000.68, *Security Force Assistance* (27 October 2010).

The QDRR was published in February and spotlights SFA as a critical element in U.S. foreign policy. DODI 5000.68 established DOD policy for SFA and assigned responsibilities. The DODI restated the definition of SFA to be, “DOD activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions.”<sup>13</sup>

On 5 April 2013, then-President Obama signed Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 23, which directed U.S. policy on security sector assistance (SSA), which “aimed at strengthening the ability of the United States to help allies and partner nations build their own security capacity, consistent with the principles of good governance and the rule of law.”<sup>14</sup> Prior to the NDAA of Fiscal Year 2017, SSA was the mainstream policy adapted to organize, train, equip, build, and advise foreign security forces, which include “state security and law enforcement providers, governmental security and justice management and oversight bodies, civil society, institutions responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies, and non-state justice and security providers.”<sup>15</sup>

“... the United States must strengthen its own capacity to plan, synchronize, and implement SSA through a deliberate and inclusive whole-of-government process that ensures alignment of SFA activities and resources within the national security priorities.”<sup>16</sup> To this end, PPD 23 further establishes the integrated country strategy (ICS) as the core-organizing document for U.S. Government foreign assistance activities supporting a particular partner nation. ICS, published by the DOS, links goals for the partner nation to U.S. national security priorities, SSA objectives, and if appropriate, to regional security objectives.<sup>17</sup>

The NSS of the United States of America claims that, “Allies and partners are a great strength of the United States. They add directly to U.S. political, economic, military, intelligence, and other capabilities.”<sup>18</sup> The U.S. remains in a state of competition and recognizes China and Russia target their own investments in the developing world to expand influence and gain competitive advantages against the United States. China, similarly, is investing billions of dollars in infrastructure across the globe. Russia projects its influence economically, through the control of key energy and other infrastructure throughout parts of Europe and Central Asia. “The United States must lead and engage in the multinational arrangements that shape many of the rules that affect U.S. interests and values.”<sup>19</sup>

## ENDNOTES

1. The competition continuum is a joint model that describes the strategic security environment in terms of three broad categories of strategic relationships, which are *cooperation*, *competition below armed conflict*, and *armed conflict*. The competition continuum is useful in describing the security environment in a strategic context, such as at the theater level and above, but it does not have much utility below the theater army level. For operations conducted at or below the theater army level, the Army uses the language of *competition below armed conflict*, *crisis*, and *armed conflict*. See also Joint Doctrine Note 1-19, *Competition Continuum* (3 June 2019).
2. Joint Publication (JP) 3-20, *Security Cooperation* (9 September 2022), page GL-5.
3. *Ibid*, page GL-5.
4. Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-96.1, *Security Force Assistance Brigade* (2 September 2020), paragraph 1-4, page 1-1.
5. JP 3-20, page GL-5.
6. As a supplemental funding line, *The Economy Act*, Title 31 U.S. Code (USC), §1535 and §1536, is a general authority for the interagency or intradepartmental for the furnishing of goods and services on a reimbursable basis.
7. Army Regulation (AR) 12-1, *Security Assistance, Training, and Export Policy* (18 February 2021), page 5, stipulates that, “Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology, the DASA (DE&C) is delegated responsibility for select security cooperation activities. The DASA (DE&C) leads, manages, resources, and directs policy and strategy for the conduct of select elements of the Army’s global security cooperation activities, including: foreign military sales; foreign military and foreign national training and education; armaments cooperation; non-Special Access Program technology transfer; and export policy.”
8. Maginnis, Robert and Michael Prater, *Security Cooperation Refresh*; <https://asc.army.mil/web/news-security-cooperation-refresh>. The authors posit that, “Until 2018, a significant shortfall in the Army’s international engagement strategy was a self-imposed division of labor between conventional forces’ exercise-centric security cooperation and the materiel-focused SA enterprise, which resulted in less-than-optimal outcomes. Congress helped the U.S. Army rethink this synergy of effort by issuing new guidance via the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA, which promises (had promised) to result in better-designed capability that meets (met) U.S. and partner shared security goals.” Currently DASA (DE&C) has placed SA strategists at each Army Service component command (U.S. Army Pacific, U.S. Army Europe and Africa, U.S. Army Central, U.S. Army South, and U.S. Army North) to assist them in incorporating SA activities.
9. §941 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 (also known as Public Law 114-328) replaced the QDRR with the NDS.
10. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (6 February 2006), page 11.
11. The JIWB study was a multi-year effort by the U.S. Marine Corps to demonstrate analytic methods better suited to irregular warfare than quantitative computer models and simulations.

12. Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies, *Management of Security Cooperation Ed. 39* (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, January 2019), pages 1-13.
13. DODI 5000.68, *Security Force Assistance* (27 October 2010), page 18.
14. *Presidential Policy Directive 23: U.S. Security Sector Assistance Policy* (5 April 2013). SSA is different from sector security reform as the former refers to the ability of the United States to enable allies and partners to provide security for their own people and respond to common security challenges, whereas the latter refers to programs conducted by the host nation to improve its own security and justice systems.
15. *Ibid.*
16. *Ibid.*
17. JP 3-20, I-6.
18. *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (December 2017), page 37.
19. *Ibid.*, page 40.

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## CHAPTER 2

# National Strategy Documents and Public Laws

### NATIONAL STRATEGY DOCUMENTS

Most politicians, diplomats, and military strategists recognize there must be enough space within the rhetoric of the national security strategy (NSS) to translate strategy into military operations. In other regions of the world, the NSS identifies that instability and weak governance threaten U.S. interests and that the regions afflicted by instability and weak governments also offer opportunities to improve security, promote prosperity, and restore hope. The U.S. seeks to improve the societies of those partners in developing worlds, which in turn builds transparent governments, confronts non-state threats, and strengthens sovereignty and legitimacy.<sup>1</sup>

The *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) of the United States of America* (5 February 2018), as the principal document that outlines U.S. national defense interests, claims that, “Mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships are crucial to our (U.S.) strategy, providing a durable, asymmetric strategic advantage that no competitor or rival can match.”<sup>2</sup> There are three elements nested within this summary that seeks to clarify this statement:

- The United States will uphold its commitments and expect allies and partners to contribute an equitable share to the mutually beneficial collective security, including effective investment in modernizing their defense capabilities.
- The United States will develop new partnerships around shared interests to reinforce regional coalitions and security cooperation (SC).
- The United States acknowledges that interoperability is a priority for operational concepts, modular force elements, communications, information sharing, and equipment.<sup>3</sup>

Supporting the NSS and the NDS is the Department of Defense (DOD) guidance for SC, which describes how SC should be applied to support the NDS. This guidance informs DOD SC planning, implementation, and oversight to achieve defense strategic objectives. Specifically, it provides an SC prioritization framework to aid decision making regarding resources and activities. This document provides guidance for SC planning and execution regarding assessing and planning and identifies a holistic

capability development approach while emphasizing the criticality of using SC objectives designed and articulated as specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and results oriented, and time bound. That said, any SC strategy must be adaptive and requires a sustained investment and keen knowledge of public laws that support the national security enterprise writ large.

### **PUBLIC LAWS**

Public Law 87-195, also known as the *Foreign Assistance Act (FAA)* of 1961, and its amendments, is the principal guiding document the Department of State (DOS) references for how some security assistance (SA) is conducted. International military exchange training, as an SA activity, under Chapter 5, Section 541, for example, the President is authorized to furnish, on such terms and conditions consistent with this Act as the President may determine, military education and training to military and related civilian personnel of foreign countries. Such training and education may be provided through attendance at military educational and training facilities in the United States; attendance in special courses of instruction at schools and institutions of learning or research in the United States and abroad; and observations and orientation visits to military facilities and related activities in the United States and abroad.<sup>4</sup>

The purpose of these training and educational activities, under Section 541, is essentially three-fold:

- To encourage effective and mutually beneficial relations and an increased understanding between the United States and the partner nation.
- To improve partner-nations' ability to use their own resources, which include defense articles and services obtained by them from the United States.
- To increase awareness of foreign nationals participating in such activities of basic issues involving internationally recognized human rights. Thus, the United States maintains a comparative advantage by hosting foreign countries to participate in its exchange programs, as many foreign countries want to be hosted and instructed by U.S. armed forces, but it is not the only SA program leveraged under the FAA.

Public Law 90-629, also known as the *Arms Export Control Act (AECA)* of 1976, and its amendments, provide the authority and general rules for the conduct of foreign military sales (FMS) and commercial sales of defense articles, defense services, and training. The AECA came into existence with the passage of the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968 and established U.S.

governance for military sales authorizations and military export controls. The AECA was amended in 1971 to establish declarations to promote international peace and national security for economic, political, and social progress. Finally, an amendment in the international SA and the AECA changed the name of the Foreign Military Sales Act to the AECA, as it is presently known.

FMS, for example, as a program covered by the FAA and the AECA, is the U.S. Government's program for transferring defense articles, services, and training to eligible foreign governments and international organizations. The FMS program is funded by administrative charges to foreign purchasers or through foreign military financing arrangements and is operated at no cost to taxpayers. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) administers the FMS program for the DOD.<sup>5</sup> Under FMS, the U.S. Government uses the DOD's acquisition system to procure defense articles and services on behalf of its partners. Lastly, eligible countries may purchase defense articles and services with their own funds or funds provided through U.S. Government-sponsored assistance programs.

Public Law 114-328, also known as the *National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2017*, is considered the legislative pivot point for SC, mostly because this law created Chapter 16, Security Cooperation.<sup>6,7</sup> A major part of Chapter 16 is the requirement to professionalize the workforce and have a separate budget. Chapter 16 houses all the relevant authorizations for the DOD to plan and conduct SC programs and related activities, including security force assistance (SFA).

The Secretary of Defense (SecDef), under the NDAA of Fiscal Year 2017, has assigned the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy responsibility for the oversight of strategic policy, guidance, and resource allocation for SC programs. Furthermore, the DSCA director has overall responsibility for the execution and administration of all SC programs and activities within the DOD involving the provisions of defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, cash sale, or lease.<sup>8</sup> That said, the SecDef is required to maintain a program of assessment, monitoring, and evaluation (AM&E) in support of the SC programs of the DOD.



Public Law 115-68, also known as the *Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Act of 2017*, contains provisions relating to SC that is three-fold to securing the national interests of the United States:

- “The meaningful participation of women in conflict prevention and conflict resolution processes helps to promote more inclusive and democratic societies and is critical to the long-term stability of countries and regions.
- The political participation and leadership of women in fragile environments, particularly during democratic transitions, is critical to sustaining lasting democratic institutions; and
- The United States should be a global leader in promoting the meaningful participation of women in conflict prevention, management, and resolution, and post-conflict relief and recovery efforts.”<sup>9</sup>

Complexity will always exist within the operational environment (OE), such as the subjugation of women in divisive regions, and the inclusion of women in decision making to enable partner nations to illuminate best practices that mitigate predatory competitor actions against women and children. Thus, the scale of complexity grows across conducting SC programs in multi-domain environments. Including women in the process of security is not only desired, but also needed, especially along the lines of recruiting additional resources, training, and education initiatives.

Regarding SA and SFA legislation, there are two statutory provisions prohibiting the U.S. Government from using funds for assistance to foreign security forces where there is credible information that implicates those units in the commission of gross violations of humanitarian rights. Informally known as the Leahy Law, the DOD and DOS have their own policy guidance on this issue. Title 10, U.S. Code (USC), Chapter 16, §362 affirms that the SecDef shall, in consultation with the Secretary of State (SecState), “ensure that prior to a decision to provide any training, equipment, or other assistance to a unit of a foreign security force, full consideration is given to any credible information available to the DOS relating to human rights violations by such a unit.”<sup>10</sup>

The FAA, Part III, Section 502B, states that “the President shall substantially reduce or terminate SA to any government which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, including torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged detention without charges; or other flagrant denials of the right to life, liberty, and the security of the person.”<sup>11</sup> Since the initial publication

of the FAA, several addendums have been incorporated into law to reflect the changing priorities of U.S. national interests over the decades, mostly efforts to recognize human rights, such as the shift from rendering aid to then-Soviet-sponsored Cuba to prohibiting assistance to governments that support terrorism or restrict U.S. humanitarian assistance.

SFA is not new, but the current public laws that enable SC and SFA will need reforms soon to keep SFA competitive in balancing adversarial activities worldwide. Currently, conventional SFA units operate under training authorities and this will require some adjustments from Congress if the United States is to maintain satisfactory levels of interoperability with its allies and partners in multiple domains.

## ENDNOTES

1. *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (December 2017), page 45.
2. *Summary of the National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (5 February 2018), page 8. The 2018 NDS replaced the QDRR, which until 2018, was the main public document describing U.S. military doctrine.
3. *Ibid*, page 9.
4. Committee on International Relations, *Legislation on Foreign Relations through 2002* (July 2003), page 266.
5. *Foreign Military Sales Frequently Asked Questions*, DSCA; accessed 30 October 2021, <https://www.dscamilitarysalesfaq>.
6. Public Law 114-328, Chapter 16, Subchapter VII, §382 (a) (b) (1), *Execution and Administration of Program and Activities* (2016). Pursuant to this subsection, (c) (1) further stipulates that funds available to the DSCA, and other funds available to the DOD for security cooperation programs and activities, may be used to implement security cooperation programs and activities of the DOD authorized by this chapter.
7. The current NDAA (fiscal year 2022) (also known as Public Law 117-81) was signed into law 27 December 2021, and has three provisions with major implications on security force assistance: 1) Section 1206, *Security Cooperation Strategy for Certain Combatant Commands*, requires the SecDef, in coordination with the SecState, to develop and implement geographic combatant commands security cooperation strategies for Title 10 security cooperation programs and activities; 2) Section 1323, *Study on Certain Security Cooperation Programs*, requires the SecDef to commission a federally funded research and development center in order to conduct a comprehensive assessment of security cooperation and recommended changes; and 3) Section 1332, *Secretary of Defense Strategic Competition Initiative*, stipulates that the SecDef, with the concurrence of the SecState, may provide funds for one or more DOD activities or programs that advance U.S. national security objectives for strategic competition by supporting DOD efforts to compete below the threshold of armed conflict and by supporting other federal departments and agencies in advancing U.S. strategic interests.
8. Public Law 114-328, Subtitle E, *Reform of Department of Defense Security Cooperation*; Section 1241, *Enactment of New Chapter for Defense Security Cooperation* (2016).
9. Public Law 115-68, Section 3, *Sense of Congress* (1) (2) (3) (2016).
10. Public Law 114-328, §362 (a) (2), *Prohibition on Use of Funds for Assistance to Units of Foreign Security Forces That Have Committed a Gross Violation of Human Rights* (2016).
11. Committee on Foreign Relations. *Legislation on Foreign Relations through 2002* (July 2003), page 229.

## CHAPTER 3

## Security Cooperation Authorities

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of Fiscal Year 2017 designated Chapter 16 of Title 10 as *Security Cooperation* (SC), which came with new amendments to several existing authorities. The legal framework of SC is important to understand as it helps interpret the legal boundaries to what units can and cannot do while deployed under these authorities. The legal framework exists for compliance and serves the planner to ask the most fundamental two-part question of operational planning: *what are my authorities and how are they funded?* This chapter's purpose is to provide insight for planners to assist in finding the answers to this question. This chapter details SC authorities, how Chapter 16 breaks down these authorities, and what it means for commanders and staff planners involved with SC programs. Table 3-1 charts common authorities and their typical use.

**Table 3-1. Common Security Cooperation Authorities. (SFAC G-5)**

Type	Authority	Title	Provides the Authority to:
<b>Military-to-Military Engagements</b>	<b>311</b>	Exchange of Defense Personnel Between the U.S. and Friendly Foreign Countries: Authority	conduct international defense personnel exchange agreements.
	<b>312</b>	Payment of Personal Expense Necessary for Theater Security Cooperation	pay expenses related to senior foreign defense officials, liaison officers, conferences, seminars, and other meetings.
<b>Training with Foreign Forces</b>	<b>321</b>	Training with Friendly Foreign Countries: Payment of Training and Exercise Expenses	train with the military/ security forces of a friendly foreign country and pay training and exercise expenses. Primary purpose of training and exercises is training U.S. forces.
	<b>322</b>	Special Operations Forces: Training with Friendly Foreign Forces	pay training expenses of SOF (includes civil affairs and military information support operations). Primary purpose of training is to train the SOF of the CCMD.

<b>Support for Operations and Capacity Building</b>	<b>331</b>	Friendly Foreign Countries: Authority to Provide Support for Conduct of Operations	provide logistics, supply, and service support to friendly nations conducting operations with or in support of U.S. forces. Allows training in connection with deployment of foreign forces to a U.S. supported operation.
	<b>332</b>	Friendly Foreign Countries: International and Regional Organizations; Defense Institution Building (DIB)	assign DOD civilians and Service members as advisors to the MODs of foreign countries or regional organizations with security missions.
	<b>333</b>	Foreign Security Forces: Authority to Build Capacity	provide training and equipment to the national security forces of one or more foreign countries to build the capacity to conduct one or more of nine detailed mission types.
<b>Educational and Training Activities</b>	<b>341</b>	DOD State Partnership Program	establish a program of activities between National Guard members of a state or territory and the military/security forces or governmental organizations of a foreign country responsible for disaster response or emergency response.
	<b>345</b>	Regional Defense Combating Terrorism and Irregular Warfare Fellowship Program	pay costs associated with education and training of foreign military officers or MOD officials at military or civilian educational institutions, regional centers, conferences, seminars, or other training programs conducted for purposes of regional defense in connection with terrorism or irregular warfare.

## **SUBCHAPTER I, GENERAL MATTERS, §301, DEFINITIONS**

Subchapter I, General Matters, §301, Definitions, sets forth the definitions of terms used throughout NDAA 2017. Terms analogous to the SC enterprise such as defense articles and defense services are also defined within Section 644 of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 and Title 22 §2403, Definitions. The term SC programs and activities, used throughout this primer, is in this subsection defined as “any program, activity (including an exercise), or interaction of the Department of Defense (DOD) with the security establishment of a foreign country to achieve a purpose as follows:

- To build and develop allied and friendly security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations.
- To provide the armed forces with access to the foreign country during peacetime or a contingency operation.
- To build relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests.”<sup>1</sup>

## **SUBCHAPTER II, MILITARY-TO-MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS**

Subchapter II, *Military-to-Military Engagements*, covers the authority for the exchange of defense personnel, payment of personnel expenses, and recognizing noncombat achievements or performance. Thus, §311, §312, and §313 are considered the military-to-military authorities and within these authorities, for example, one can find the guidance to host foreign exchange students from partner countries. Secretary of State (SecState) approval is only needed when §311 and §312 activities are used for certain individuals, such as a non-defense security ministry of a foreign government or an international or regional security organization, or other personnel of friendly foreign governments and nongovernmental personnel.

SecDef has delegated §311 authority down to the combatant commanders in the past and since this activity does not require notification it is the most flexible option to gain access, influence, and presence within a desired country.

§311, Exchange of Defense Personnel between United States and Friendly Foreign Countries (2016), covers the authority to enter into international exchange agreements. The Secretary of Defense (SecDef) may enter into international defense personnel exchange agreements. “For purposes of this section, an international defense personnel exchange agreement is an agreement with the government of a friendly foreign country or international or regional security organization for the reciprocal or non-reciprocal exchange of—

- Members of the armed forces and civilian personnel of the DOD; and
- Military and civilian personnel of the defense or security ministry of that foreign government or international or regional security organization.”<sup>2</sup>

§311 cases are initiated by a country team, thereby identifying and communicating the potential for an exchange. The combatant commander, in turn, endorses the request. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and applicable military department research, development, and acquisition teams, if required, investigate and determine when to begin the international agreement process. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Defense Technology Security Administration determines if the U.S. data to be shared during the assignment is releasable and develops any required Delegation of Disclosure Authority Letters.<sup>3</sup> The SecState is advised of the agreement and notifies Congress, if required.

§312, *Payment of Personnel Expenses Necessary for Theater Security Cooperation*, repeals §168, *Military-to-Military Contacts and Comparable Activities*, thereby impacting the following four programs: *African Cooperation*, *Latin American Cooperation: Payment of Personnel Expenses*, *Payment of Expenses to attend Bilateral or Regional Conferences*, and *Payment of Foreign Nation Liaison Officer Expenses*.<sup>4</sup> The purpose of §312 is to authorize, within certain limitations, the payment of personnel expenses for defense personnel, or with SecState concurrence, other personnel of friendly foreign governments, and nongovernmental personnel the DOD considers necessary for theater SC. §312 could apply for the following example: A lesser-developed Latin American country has a star candidate for critical U.S. training. However, the country cannot afford the tuition and per diem expenses for the student to receive advanced U.S. training. The country has been supportive of peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance in Haiti and the provision of access to exercising U.S. forces.

§313, *Bilateral or Regional Cooperation Programs*, grants the general authority for the SecDef to present awards and mementos purchased with funds appropriated for operation and maintenance of the armed forces to recognize superior noncombat achievements or performance by members of friendly foreign forces and other foreign nationals that significantly enhance or support the national security strategy (NSS) of the United States. Activities that may be recognized as a superior achievement or performance are those that—

- Plays a crucial role in shaping the international security environment in ways that protect and promote U.S. interests.
- Supports or enhances U.S. overseas presence and peacetime engagement activities, including defense cooperation initiatives, security assistance (SA) training and programs, and training and exercises with the armed forces.
- Helps to deter aggression and coercion, build coalitions, and promote regional stability.
- Serves as a role model for appropriate conduct by military forces in emerging democracies.<sup>5</sup>

### **SUBCHAPTER III, TRAINING WITH FOREIGN FORCES**

Subchapter III, *Training with Foreign Forces*, is the primary source of legislative authority of conventional and special operations forces (SOF) that habitually train with friendly foreign forces. The language of this subchapter is clear in that those conventional or SOF that deploy under these authorities are training on their own mission-essential tasks. These units must benefit from this training, as they are not authorized under this subchapter to either train or advise their foreign security force counterparts. Thus, the key language to this subchapter is *train with* foreign partners and not the *training of* foreign partners.

§321, *Training with Friendly Foreign Countries: Payment of Training and Exercise Expenses*, repeals, recodifies, and replaces Title 10 §1203, *Training of General Purpose Forces of the United States Armed forces with Military and other Security Forces of Friendly Foreign Countries and Title 10 §2010, Developing Country Combined Exercise Program*. §321 is the general authorization that U.S. armed forces may train with the military forces or



other security forces of a friendly foreign country if the SecDef determines that such training is in the national security interest of the United States to do so. The general-purpose forces of the U.S. armed forces, however, may *train only with* the military forces of a friendly foreign country and that any training done shall, to the maximum extent practicable, support the mission-essential tasks for which the unit of the U.S. armed forces participating in such training is responsible.

§322, *Special Operations Forces: Training with Friendly Foreign Forces*, repeals and replaces Title 10 §2011 originally codified in the 1991 NDAA. The primary purpose is training the SOF of the combatant command (CCMD). §322 is better known as the joint combined exchange training (JCET) program and provides invaluable opportunities to train U.S. SOF in their mission-essential tasks, particularly foreign internal defense (FID) and unconventional warfare, with foreign forces in their indigenous environments. The JCET program enables U.S. SOF to build their capability to conduct combined operations in an unfamiliar environment, develop language skills, and develop familiarity with local geography and culture. The JCET program also provides important incidental benefits in support of the CCMDs' campaign plan objectives. JCET events foster key military partnerships, build interoperability between U.S. SOF and partner-nation forces, ensure access to key regions, and contribute to operational preparation of the environment. These incidental benefits highlight U.S. SOF's unique capabilities, which are in operational demand for missions on the battlefield and partner-nation engagements around the globe.

## **SUBCHAPTER IV, SUPPORT FOR OPERATIONS AND CAPACITY BUILDING**

Subchapter IV, *Support for Operations and Capacity Building*, comprise §331, §332, and §333. This subchapter includes authorities to provide support for the conduct of operations, defense institutional capacity building, and the authority to build capacity. This subchapter used to have six authorities ascribed, but the latter three have since been renumbered or repealed completely, leaving only the three authorities, which themselves were created from other repealed legislation.

Under §331, *Friendly Foreign Countries: Authority to Provide Support for Conduct of Operations*, the SecDef may provide support to friendly foreign countries in connection with the conduct of operations designated as—

- Logistic support, supplies, and services to security forces of a friendly foreign country participating in a military or stability operation that benefits the national interests of the United States.
- Logistic support, supplies, and services to military forces of a friendly foreign country solely for the purpose of enhancing the interoperability of the logistic support systems of military forces participating in a combined operation with the United States to facilitate such operation.
- To a nonmilitary logistics, security, or similar agency of a friendly foreign government if such provision would directly benefit U.S. armed forces.<sup>6</sup>

§331 also stipulates other support that may be provided includes specialized training to personnel of friendly foreign countries in connection with such an operation, including training of such personnel before deployment in connection with such operation. An example of §331 is U.S. in-theater logistics support to coalition-partner forces deployed in support of the combined operation, such as DOD logistics support to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces during operations in Libya.

§332, *Friendly Foreign Countries; International and Regional Organizations: Defense Institution Capacity Building*, codifies into law the program that allows subject matter experts, civilian advisors, or other experts to help a respective country's ministry of defense (MOD) and/or various security agencies with defense institution building (DIB). DIB is the development of effective and accountable foreign defense establishments.<sup>7</sup> §332 provides institutional, ministerial-level advice and other training to personnel of the ministry or regional organization to which it is assigned to support stabilization or post-conflict activities or assist such ministry in building core institutional capacity, competences, and capabilities to manage defense-related processes. This authorization is for advisor duties only and managed through the MOD advisors program under the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).

§333, *Foreign Security Forces: Authority to Build Capacity*, allows the SecDef to provide equipment, services, and training to the national security forces of one or more foreign countries for building capacity to do one or more of the following nine operations:

- Counterterrorism
- Counter-weapons of mass destruction
- Counter-illicit drug trafficking
- Counter-transnational organized crime
- Maritime and border security
- Military intelligence
- Air domain awareness operations
- Activities that contribute to an international coalition operations
- Cyberspace security and defense cyberspace operations.<sup>8</sup>

In developing and planning a program to build the capacity of the national security forces of a foreign country under this program, the SecDef and SecState should consider political, social, economic, diplomatic, and historical factors, if any, of the foreign country that may affect the success of the program.<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, §333 programs will require elements that promote the law of armed conflict, human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, civilian control of the military, and institutional capacity building.<sup>10</sup>

§333 consolidates authorities previously provided under 10 U.S. Code (USC) 2282, Section 1204 and 1207 of NDAA 2014, Section 1033 of NDAA 1998, and Section 1004 of NDAA 1991. §333 appropriations are considerable and may be derived from amounts authorized for such purposes from DOD operation and maintenance funds and money available to the DSCA for funding capacity building programs and activities. Yet, §333 is not without restrictions. NDAA 2017 mentions the following five restrictions specific to §333:

- Authorized assistance may include the provision of equipment, supplies, training, defense services, and small-scale military construction.
- Along with various reporting requirements, §333 prohibits assistance to units that have committed gross violations of human rights.

- No more than five years of sustainment support can be provided for equipment provided by §333 programs.
- Not for countries not otherwise eligible by law for military exports.
- Requires congressional notification.

## **SUBCHAPTER V, EDUCATIONAL AND TRAINING ACTIVITIES**

Subchapter V, *Educational and Training Activities*, covers 12 authorities regarding educational institutions or training programs. Authorities §341, §342, §343 will be analyzed in detail in this section; however, their intent is two-fold:

- Describe the role of the National Guard Bureau (NGB) in security force assistance (SFA).
- Describe the difference between the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) and the six regional centers.

§341, *Department of Defense State Partnership Program*, is a joint DOD SC program managed by the NGB and executed by the states. The SecDef, in coordination with the SecState, approves the State Partnership Program (SPP). §341 allows the National Guard to interact with military, security forces, and emergency response or disaster response organizations of friendly foreign governments, but National Guard members need to be on Title 32 orders when conducting SC programs and activities under this subsection. All countries are eligible for partnership consideration, but the selection process starts with a country request for partnerships through the appropriate U.S. embassy, endorsed and prioritized by the CCMD with final determination by the SecDef in coordination with the SecState. The SPP now includes 85 partnerships with 93 nations around the globe.<sup>11</sup>

Each SPP nation is required to have a partnership support plan synchronized to the CCMD theater campaign plan's country-specific SC section. The SPP is only one of a series of SC programs that will be reviewed as part of DOD's quadrennial review in accordance with Section 1252 of NDAA 2017, *The Quadrennial Review of Security Sector Assistance Programs and Authorities of the United States Government*. The SPP is one of the few programs authorized to engage across the spectrum of country governmental organizations and is a multi-categorization SC tool. Typically, funding of SPP activities is not availed unless the applicable CCMD and chief of mission approve the activity jointly. The NDAA issues annual changes, if they occur, and it is imperative to check with respective CCMDs for the latest guidance.

§342, *Regional Centers for Security Studies*, provides the guidance for the six regionally focused security studies centers that conduct academic-like programs to build institutional capacity and promote common perspectives on regional security. The six regional security studies centers are —

- The *George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies*, located in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, is the only bilateral center and focuses on the partnership between the DOD and the German Federal MOD.<sup>12</sup>
- The *Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies*, located in Honolulu, HI, supports the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command's objective of developing professional and personal ties among national security establishments throughout the region and focuses on a multilateral and multi-dimensional approach to defining and addressing regional security issues and concerns.<sup>13</sup>
- The *William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies*, located in Washington D.C., develops and engages the Western Hemisphere's community of defense and security professionals to seek mutually supportive approaches to common challenges to develop effective sustainable institutional capacity and promote a greater understanding of U.S. regional policy.<sup>14</sup>
- The *Africa Center for Strategic Studies*, also located in Washington D.C., serves as a forum for research, academic programs, and the exchange of ideas aimed at enhancing citizen security by strengthening the effectiveness and accountability of African institutions.<sup>15</sup>
- The *Near East South Asia (NESAs) Center for Strategic Studies*, also located in Washington, D.C., is the preeminent U.S. DOD institution for promoting SC with partner countries in the NESAs region.<sup>16</sup>
- The *Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies* is the newest regional center, located at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, AK.<sup>17</sup>

Directed by Congress, these regional centers prioritize three functional areas of engagement, which are territorial and maritime security, transnational and asymmetric threats, and defense sector governance.<sup>18</sup>

§342 allows for participants in activities of the regional centers to include U.S. and foreign military, civilian, and nongovernmental personnel. The SecDef may waive reimbursement of the costs of activities of the regional centers for foreign military officers and foreign defense and security personnel from a developing country if the SecDef determines that attendance

of such personnel without reimbursement is in the national security interest of the United States.<sup>19</sup> In accordance with Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5105.65, *Defense Security Cooperation Agency* (26 October 2012), the DSCA acts “as the DOD executive agent for DOD regional centers for Security Studies.”<sup>20</sup>

§343, *Western Hemisphere Institution for Security Cooperation*, establishes an education and training facility to provide professional military education and training to eligible personnel from countries of the Western Hemisphere.<sup>21</sup> The curriculum of instruction includes a minimum of eight hours on human rights, rule of law, due process, civilian control of the military, and the role of the military in a democratic society. WHINSEC is a DOD academic institution, but the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is the designated agent that governs the institution administratively, academically, and financially. §343 appears to be consistent with the functions of §342, but WHINSEC provides accredited professional military education to vetted personnel from the Western Hemisphere, whereas the regional security studies centers, such as the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, do not.

§345, *Regional Defense Combating Terrorism and Irregular Warfare Fellowship Program*, provides the guidance for the DOD to pay any costs associated with the education and training of foreign military officers, MOD officials, or security officials at military or civilian educational institutions, regional centers, conferences, seminars, or other training programs conducted for regional defense purposes in connection with countering terrorism or irregular warfare.<sup>22</sup> This program is another authority requiring the SecState and SecDef to jointly develop and plan activities that advance U.S. SC objectives. Activities under this program should be coordinated or deconflicted with activities under *International Military Education and Training* authorities as stipulated in the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976.

## **SUBCHAPTER VI, LIMITATIONS ON USE OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FUNDS**

Subchapter VI, *Limitations on Use of Department of Defense Funds*, addresses two key prohibitions:

- Providing assistance to terrorist countries.
- Providing assistance to foreign security forces that fail Leahy vetting.<sup>23</sup>

The first prohibition is addressed through §361, *Prohibition on Providing Financial Assistance to Terrorist Countries*, and stipulates that funds available to the SecDef may not be obligated or expended to provide financial assistance to any country that grants sanctuary from prosecution to any individual or group that has committed acts of or otherwise supports international terrorism. This prohibition may be waived if the President determines that it is in the national security interest of the United States or that the waiver may be granted for humanitarian reasons.<sup>24</sup>

The second prohibition to this subchapter is §362, *Prohibition on Use of Funds for Assistance to Units of Foreign Security Forces That Have Committed a Gross Violation of Human Rights*, and stipulates that of the amounts of funds made available to the DOD, “none may be used for any training, equipment, or other assistance for a unit of a foreign security force if the SecDef has credible information that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights.”<sup>25</sup> This prohibition may also be waived if the SecDef, in consultation with the SecState, determines that the waiver is required by extraordinary circumstances. Furthermore, this prohibition may be granted an exception if the SecDef determines the government of such country has taken all necessary corrective steps, or if the equipment or other assistance is necessary to assist in disaster relief operations or other humanitarian or national security emergencies.

## **SUBCHAPTER VII, ADMINISTRATIVE AND MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS**

Subchapter VII, *Administrative and Miscellaneous Matters*, while useful to know does not merit as deep of a dive as some of the aforementioned subchapters. That said, §383 *Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation of Programs and Activities*, is important to know from an institutional capacity-building framework in that the SecDef maintains a program of habitual assessment, monitoring, and evaluation (A in support of SC programs of the DOD, which are determined to be significant SC initiatives by (AM&E) he CCMD. These programs are managed by the DSCA through a professional workforce that is required to be certified to oversee assessment, planning, monitoring, execution, evaluation, and administration of such programs and activities under this chapter as well as the execution of SA under the FAA and the AECA by the DOD.

Pursuant to this certification process, §384, *Department of Defense Security Cooperation Workforce Development*, defines the SC workforce as members of the armed forces and civilian employees of the DOD working in the SC organizations of the U.S. missions overseas, in the CCMDs, in military departments performing SC activities, and other military and civilian personnel of Defense Agencies and Field Activities who perform SC activities.<sup>26</sup> The purpose of the DOD SC Workforce Development Program

is to develop a professional workforce to plan, execute, administer, monitor, assess, and evaluate SC programs and activities that advance theater and NSS objectives. Congress directs the SecDef to implement a DOD SC Workforce Development Program to oversee the development and management of a professional workforce supporting SC programs and activities.

Title 10, Chapter 16, *Security Cooperation*, provides a solid foundation for DOD SC programs and related activities, but falls short of addressing legislation surrounding advising activities. Currently, there are no provisions under this chapter that allow conventional SFA units to advise foreign security forces outside of combat operations. Thus, units training with their foreign security force partners cannot advise or direct activities during operations, assist in operational planning with commanders, or accompany their partner forces during operations.

## ENDNOTES

1. Public Law 114-328, §301, (7) (a) (b) (c), *Definitions* (2016).
2. *Ibid*, §311, *Exchange of Defense Personnel between United States and Friendly Foreign Countries* (2016).
3. Delegation of Disclosure Authority Letters are issued by the designated disclosure authority for each information exchange program providing classification levels, categories, scope, and limitations of information to be exchanged. For more information, refer to DODD 5230.20, *Visits and Assignments of Foreign Nationals* (22 June 2005), and Army Regulation (AR) 380-10, *Foreign Disclosure and Contacts with Foreign Representatives* (14 July 2015).
4. Public Law 114-328, §312 as amended by Public Law 116-283, Section 924 (B) (11), *Payment of Personnel Expenses Necessary for Theater Security Cooperation* (2016).
5. *Ibid*, §313, *Bilateral and Regional Cooperation Programs: Awards and Mementos to Recognize Superior Noncombat Achievements or Performance* (2016), page 553.
6. Public Law 114-328, §331, (c) (1) (A) (B) and (2) (A) (B), *Friendly Foreign Countries: Authority to Provide Support for Conduct of Operations* (2016).
7. For more information regarding DIB, refer to DODD 5205.82, *Defense Institution Building*, and the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Newsletter 18-08, *Defense Institution Building: Perspectives on Ministerial Advising* (January 2018).
8. Public Law 114-328, §333, (a) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9), *Foreign Security Forces: Authority to Build Capacity* (2016).
9. *Ibid*, (b) (1), concurrence of the SecState is required to conduct or support any program authorized by subsection (a).
10. *Ibid*, (c) (4), The SecDef shall certify, prior to the initiation of the program, that the DOD or another department or agency is already undertaking, or will undertake as part of the security sector assistance (SSA) provided to the foreign country concerned, a program of institutional capacity building.



11. <https://www.nationalguard.mil/Leadership/Joint-Staff/J-5/International-Affairs-Division/State-Partnership-Program>.
12. <https://www.marshallcenter.org/en>.
13. <https://apcss.org/about>.
14. <https://www.williamjperrycenter.org/content/about-perry-center>.
15. <https://africacenter.org/who-we-are/>.
16. <https://nesa-center.org/about-nesa/>.
17. Public Law 116-283, Section 1089 (1 January 2021), authorizes the establishment of the *Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies* as the sixth regional center for security studies.
18. Public Law 114-328, §342, (c) *Regional Centers for Security Studies* (2016).
19. *Ibid*, (f) (3) (A) (B).
20. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, DODD 5105.65, *Defense Security Cooperation Agency*, (5) (q) (26 October 2012).
21. Public Law 114-328, §343, (a) (1) (b), *Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation* (2016).
22. *Ibid*, §345, (a) (1) (a) (b), *Regional Defense Combating Terrorism and Irregular Warfare Fellowship Program* (2016).
23. The Leahy laws are two distinct but similar statutes under Title 10 (Section 362) and Title 22 (Section 2378d) that respectively prohibit Department of Defense and Department of State (DOS) assistance to a unit of a foreign security force when there is credible information that the unit committed a gross violation of human rights.
24. Public Law 114-328, §361, (a) (3) (A) (B), (b) (1) (A) (B), *Prohibition on Providing Financial Assistance to Terrorist Countries* (2016).
25. *Ibid*, §362, (a) (1) (2), *Prohibition on Use of Funds for Assistance to Units of Foreign Security Forces That Have Committed a Gross Violation of Human Rights* (2016).
26. *Ibid*, §384, (h) (1) (2) (3) (4), *Department of Defense Security Cooperation Workforce Development* (2016). The intent of this program is to professionalize the workforce by mandating training and providing levels of certified expertise, such as basic, intermediate, advanced, etc.

## CHAPTER 4

# Summary of Joint Guidance and Doctrine

Security force assistance (SFA) leaders must understand a variety of strategic guidance, regulations, and doctrine to adequately plan, prepare, execute, and assess SFA activities. This chapter reviews Department of Defense (DOD) policies and joint doctrine regarding SFA. The purpose is to inform readers of connectivity SFA activities have with joint operations in multiple domains. The most applicable document to begin this review is the national military strategy (NMS).

The NMS of 2018 provides a framework for protecting and advancing U.S. interests.<sup>1</sup> The NMS articulates the following five mutually supporting mission areas as the principal ways the joint force operates across the competition continuum in multiple regions and domains:<sup>2</sup>

- Respond to threats.
- Deter strategic attack and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
- Deter conventional attack.
- Assure allies and partners.
- Compete below the level of armed conflict with a military dimension.

It is logical to assume that nested within the last two mission areas is where those units that are tasked to conduct SFA are expected to function properly and operate efficiently. “The 2018 NMS acknowledges the unique contributions of allies and partners, a strategic source of strength for the joint force.”<sup>3</sup>

Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.05, *Stabilization* (13 December 2018), defines stabilization as “an inherently political endeavor that requires aligning U.S. Government efforts—diplomatic engagement, foreign assistance, and defense—to create conditions in which locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent violence.”<sup>4</sup> This DODD establishes that the Department of State (DOS) is the overall lead federal agency for stabilization efforts and further stipulates the DOD is a supporting element, which includes providing security, maintaining basic public order, and providing for the immediate needs of the population where appropriate and consistent with statutory authorities and other federal laws. To the extent authorized by current federal law, the DOD plans and conducts stabilization in support of mission partners across the competition

continuum to counter subversion; prevent and mitigate conflict; and consolidate military gains to achieve strategic success.<sup>5</sup> It is also important to note that consistent with available authorities, the DOD prioritizes efforts to identify, train, equip, advise, assist, or accompany foreign security forces conducting stabilization activities.

DODD 5100.01, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components* (21 December 2010), directs each military department to plan for and perform common functions to fulfill the current and future operational requirements of the combatant commands (CCMDs). These operational requirements includes recruitment, organization, training, and equipping of forces, and providing forces to enhance military engagement and conduct security cooperation (SC) activities as needed to prevent conflict.<sup>6</sup> The Army, for its part, supports DODD 5100.01 by providing combat credible forces for military missions and detachments for service in foreign countries to support the national interests of the United States, and as directed provides assistance in training, equipping, and advising foreign security forces. DODD 5100.01 further states the U.S. Special Operations Command has the authority to provide SFA subject matter expertise to joint task forces or CCMD headquarters as SFA remains one of its core special operations activities, although not exclusively, as conventional forces also conduct SFA.<sup>7</sup>

DODD 5105.65, *Defense Security Cooperation Agency* (26 October 2012), establishes policy that the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) directs, administers, and provides DOD guidance to its components and defense representatives to U.S. missions abroad for the execution of SC programs and activities. DSCA provides general oversight of DOD worldwide SC efforts focusing on the timely transfer of defense articles and services in support of DOD strategic and regional objectives. This directive is on the heels of other SC/SFA-related legislation and doctrine published around this time, and since then there have been numerous updates to SC programs.<sup>8</sup>

Units tasked to conduct SFA activities abroad will, at some point, work at an embassy of the United States, usually through the chief of mission and in coordination with the senior defense official (SDO) or the defense attaché (DATT). Despite this direct working relationship, units still report to their CCMDs through their respective Army Service component commands.

Therefore, it may be advantageous to review DODD 5105.75, *DOD Operations at U.S. Embassies* (22 May 2017). This directive identifies the importance of unified DOD representation in U.S. embassies in accomplishment of national security objectives. There are two important facts to know about working at U.S. embassies:

- The SDO or DATT is the chief of mission's principal military advisor on defense and national security issues, the senior diplomatically accredited DOD military officer assigned to a U.S. diplomatic mission. The SDO or DATT is the single point of contact for all DOD matters involving the embassy or DOD elements assigned to or working from the embassy.
- All DOD elements assigned or attached to or operating from U.S. embassies are aligned under the coordinating authority of the SDO or DATT.

That said, DOD personnel in a foreign country who are not under the command of a U.S. area military commander should be under the authority of the chief of mission in that country. The SDO or the DATT could be the same person, depending upon the location of the embassy, but the SDO will always represent all the DOD on the country team, including the CCMDs, DSCA, Defense Intelligence Agency, and, of course, the security cooperation office(r) (SCO).<sup>9</sup>

The SDO as SCO chief coordinates SC, security assistance (SA), and SFA within U.S. embassies. The SCO's fundamental task is to effect U.S. foreign policy and, in many cases, build host-nation capabilities and capacities to meet future U.S. and host-nation challenges.<sup>10</sup> Thus, at the embassy level and, often, as part of the country team, the SCO is the lead DOD representative for SC programs and activities. The SCO serves as the intermediary between the foreign military sales (FMS), foreign military financing, build-partner capacity case manager, and the host nation to ensure each case is prepared and executed in accordance with U.S. objectives and host-nation desires.<sup>11</sup> Although the DOD, through the DSCA, administers many of the SC programs and activities, such as FMS, it remains under the general control of the DOS.

DODD 5132.03, *Policy and Responsibility Relating to Security Cooperation* (24 October 2008), summarizes SC as programs and related activities undertaken by the DOD to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. This includes all DOD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DOD-administered SA programs that build defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests. It also includes all international armaments cooperation activities and SA activities; developing allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and providing U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.

DODD 5205.82, *Defense Institution Building* (27 January 27 2016), establishes policy, assigns responsibility, and provides direction regarding the conduct of defense institution building (DIB) by the DOD. In accordance with DODD 5132.03, the DOD will conduct DIB activities as an integral part of DOD SC, including larger U.S. SA efforts.<sup>12</sup> DIB will be used in efforts to support allied and partner-nation security sector reform and planning and implementation of U.S. Government-wide security sector assistance (SSA) efforts, which will be coordinated with interagency partners through existing SC mechanisms and with international partners, when feasible.<sup>13</sup>

**DIB.** SC activities that empower partner-nation defense institutions to establish or re-orient their policies and structures to make their defense sector more transparent, accountable, effective, affordable, and responsive to civilian control.


—DODD 5205.82

DODD 5205.82 defines DIB as “SC activities that empower partner-nation defense institutions to establish or re-orient their policies and structures to make their defense sector more transparent, accountable, effective, affordable, and responsive to civilian control.” ... It is conducted typically at the ministerial, general, joint staff, military service headquarters, and related defense agency level, and when appropriate, with other supporting defense entities.<sup>14</sup> DIB is more commonly known as institutional capacity building that is administered by the Institute for Security Governance within DSCA, which includes the ministry of defense (MOD) advisor program.

Pursuant to DODD 5205.82, any effective foreign security force, through its defense and other national institutions, will perform three basic functions: executive direction and oversight, generation and sustainment of forces, and operational employment. Moreover, these functions depend on a partner-nation government’s performance of a fourth function, generally carried out by elected officials: governance of foreign security force activities through authorizations, appropriations, and policies. These combined functions form the basis for the governance, executive, generating, and operating (G-EGO) model, where core processes provide capability and capacity within each function.

Each process within the G-EGO model of the foreign security force has a recognizable workflow of inputs, activities, and outputs that provides a logical framework to conduct planning. That said, planning across the core processes provides a framework for a CCMD to organize an operational or developmental approach. See figure 4-1 for aligning military objectives or

desired effects to appropriate ways and means. In some cases, the sufficiency of inputs and outputs of a core process may qualify as a CCMD’s desired effects to fulfill an objective within the G-EGO model of a foreign security force that leads to the attainment of U.S. military objectives within a combatant command campaign plan (CCP).<sup>15</sup>



**Figure 4-1. SFA developmental approach (Joint Publication [JP] 3-20, Security Cooperation [9 September 2022])**

Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3000.11, *Management of Department of Defense Irregular Warfare and Security Force Assistance Capabilities* (3 May 2016), provides the guidance for the military departments, as joint-Service providers, to identify and track individuals with irregular warfare and SFA capabilities. The resources needed to develop and maintain irregular warfare capability must compete with the resources for conventional warfare. Thus, it becomes important that leadership have the information necessary to manage irregular warfare capability as the DOD continually adjusts its ability to respond to the entire spectrum of threats within the competition continuum.

DODI 5000.68, *Security Force Assistance* (27 October 27 2010), establishes policy and assigns responsibility regarding the preparation of select DOD personnel and operational planning for, as well as the conduct of, SFA activities across the DOD in accordance with DODD 5111.1.<sup>16</sup> SFA encompasses DOD efforts to support the professionalization and sustainable development of the capability and capacity of the foreign security forces and supporting institutions of host countries, as well as international and regional security organizations. SFA can occur across the competition continuum and during all phases of military operations. SFA activities are often conducted primarily to assist host countries to defend against internal and transnational threats to promote stability. DOD may also conduct SFA to assist host countries to with defending against external threats; contribute to coalition operations; or organize, train, equip, and advise another country's security forces or supporting institutions. The portion of SFA oriented toward supporting a host country's efforts to counter threats from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency, is a subset of foreign internal defense (FID).

DODI 5132.14, *Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise* (13 January 2017), is the policy that mandates the DOD will maintain a robust assessment, monitoring, and evaluation (AM&E) program in support of DOD SC programs and related activities.<sup>17</sup>

AM&E is designed to foster accurate and transparent reporting to key stakeholders on the outcomes and sustainability of SC and track, understand, and improve returns on DOD SC initiatives.

—DODI 5132.14

AM&E is designed to foster accurate and transparent reporting to key stakeholders on the outcomes and sustainability of SC and track, understand, and improve investment returns on DOD SC initiatives. AM&E also identifies and disseminates best practices and lessons learned for SC implementation to

inform decisions about SC policy, plans program management, resources, and the SC workforce.<sup>18</sup> The CCMDs, through country teams, identify significant security cooperation initiatives (SSCIs) for assessment, monitoring, and independent evaluation in the country-specific SC sections of the CCP.

There are two points concerning AM&E programs: Socium and SSCIs. Socium is an innovative cloud-based information management system for DSCA that provides a worldwide common operational picture of SC programs and activities. Socium enables analysts, planners, and reviewers to plan, monitor, and budget SC programs and related activities with global partners within one integrated system. Socium replaces the Global Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (G-TSCMIS).

SSCIs are the series of activities, projects, and programs planned as a unified, multi-year effort to achieve a single desired outcome or set of related outcomes. Generally, the country team initiates SSCIs. CCMDs facilitate the planning, execution, and assessment of SSCIs. SSCIs involve the application of multiple SC tools over multiple years to realize a country or region-specific objective or functional objective as articulated in the country-specific SC sections of the CCP. This, however, is a process and each CCMD will have its own methodology for implementing its own SSCIs.

Finally, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction* (CJCSI) 3210.06, Irregular Warfare, (25 September 2015), establishes responsibilities to develop capabilities and capacities to conduct irregular warfare activities, SFA activities that support irregular warfare core activities, and counter threat finance activities in accordance with other DODDs and DODIs (previously listed). CJCSI 3210.06 establishes policy for, and the retention and development of, capabilities relevant to irregular warfare across all DOD components. In terms of subject matter expertise, this instruction also identifies the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) as a chairman-controlled activity. The organization reports to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the J-7 Directorate for Joint Force Development. As the joint-force SFA integrator, JCISFA collects, analyzes, integrates, disseminates and archives SFA lessons learned from contemporary and historical operations to advise CCMDs, military departments, and other U.S. Government departments and agencies toward advancing joint warfighting capability. JCISFA's enduring purpose is two-fold: 1) develop, disseminate, and institutionalize doctrine, training, and education to enable the joint force to develop partner-nation capability and capacity supporting U.S. national security objectives; and 2) support SFA operational planning and execution through guidance, strategy, and policy formulation.



## JOINT PUBLICATIONS

The following text examines seven joint publications (JPs) regarding SC writ large. The first is JP 3-0, *Joint Campaigns and Operations*, rewritten and republished 18 June 2022, describes military engagements, SC, and deterrence activities as the foundation to a CCP. The second publication is JP 3-05, *Joint Doctrine for Special Operations* (22 September 2020), which merges material from JP 3-05.1, *Joint Special Operations Task Force*, which has been rescinded. JP 3-05 discusses the expanded role of special operations regarding SC activities. The third publication is JP 3-07, *Joint Stabilization Activities* (11 February 2022), describes the role of stability and stabilization efforts in joint operations. The fourth publication is JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Cooperation* (12 October 2016), which describes the relationships between interagency and intergovernmental cooperation with civilian elements involved with SC programs and activities. The fifth publication is JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations* (1 March 2019), which covers the scope and scale of multinational partnerships that the joint force commander will most likely encounter. The sixth publication is JP 3-20, *Security Cooperation* (rewritten and republished 9 September 2022), and remains the primary source document for the planning, execution, and assessment of SC activities. Finally, JP 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense* (17 August 2018) describes the role of FID and how it relates specifically to SFA, as the two can appear similar to the casual observer.

### Joint Publication 3-0

JP 3-0 is the keystone document in the joint operations series and a companion to joint doctrine's capstone JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* and JP 1, Volume 2, *The Joint Force*.<sup>19</sup> Chapter VI of JP 3-0 is a broad discussion about military engagement, SC, and deterrence missions, tasks, and actions that encompass a wide range of actions where the military instruments of national power are tasked to support other instruments of national power. These activities generally shape and occur continuously in all CCMD's areas of responsibility (AORs) regardless of other ongoing joint operations.<sup>20</sup> For the SFA practitioner or planner, the key to understanding JP 3-0 is how SFA shapes the operational environment (OE), sets the theater, and promotes greater access and influence within a combatant commander's AOR.

### JOINT PUBLICATION 3-05

JP 3-05 is a revision of the same JP from 16 July 2014 and cancels JP 3-05.1, *Unconventional Warfare*. JP 3-05 states that special operations provide joint force commanders and chiefs of mission with discrete, precise, and scalable options that are synchronized with activities of other interagency partners to achieve U.S. Government objectives. JP 3-05 affirms that SFA is a core special operations activity often used to assist a host nation to defend against

internal and transnational terrorist threats to stability, while also preparing foreign security forces to defend against external threats and perform as part of a multinational force.<sup>21</sup> Consistent with other joint and Army doctrine, JP 3-05 reinforces that SFA is a means to support host-nation security reform, whether through SC activities for basic stability operations or a for a more complex, structured FID effort.

### **JOINT PUBLICATION 3-07**

JP 3-07 is a revision to the same JP from 3 August 2016. Stability can be described as connective tissue between strong, legitimate host-nation governance institutions, their well-trained security forces, and the well-being of the host-nation populace as a center of gravity for effective governance. Thus, through SFA activities, stability is a core activity that needs to engage with foreign security forces persistently, especially in fragile states. JP 3-07 is authoritative and has made significant changes to terminology used at echelon, such as *stability operations* to *stability actions* at the tactical and operational level, and *stabilization effort* at the strategic level. In general, stabilization efforts are the responsibility of the host nation, DOS, and the U.S. Agency for International Development with support by the DOD conducting stability actions as necessary. Thus, in terms of policy and doctrine, stability is achieved through the process of stabilization efforts through the balanced application of the instruments of national power in partnership with the host nation and local communities.

The subtle difference between stability and stabilization needs clarification. Stability is a *condition*, the desired end state to instability, whereas stabilization is a *process* by which state and non-state actors collectively apply various instruments of their national power to address drivers of conflict, foster host-nation resiliencies, and create conditions that enable sustainable peace and security. To understand the OE, and thus employ proper stability actions, the joint force must understand the root causes and immediate drivers of instability.

JP 3-07 states, “Root causes can produce grievances that, on their own, do not result in instability but can be exploited to mobilize portions of the population to violence.” Instability is the symptom of a political crisis rooted in how political power, often within illegitimate spheres of influence, is distributed and wielded, and by whom.<sup>22</sup> To help resolve the situation, stabilization efforts seek to reshape the complex relationships within the indigenous populations and institutions, the communities that make up the host-nation populace, and elites competing for power. Because of the critical role of the populace in stabilization, the current revision of JP 3-07 includes references to Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) initiatives that were described in Chapter 2 of this primer.

JP 3-07 notes explicitly that stabilization efforts during a joint operation typically require the expertise of civil affairs in civil-military operations.<sup>23</sup> Stabilization efforts are conducted often in support of other U.S. departments or agencies to support a host-nation government and security forces, or an international organization. However, where there is no alternative competent lead organization or as national objectives dictate, the military force must be prepared to plan and execute U.S. stabilization efforts until it becomes feasible to transition that responsibility to another qualified organization.

### **JOINT PUBLICATION 3-08**

JP 3-08, validated without change 18 October 2017, is a revision from its 2011 version and updates the appendices to focus more on what military commanders should know about relevant civilian organizations. JP 3-08 is relevant to the discussion of SC programs and relevant activities because international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private-sector members frequently work in areas where military forces conduct military engagements, SC, and deterrence activities and will most likely remain in the area long after military forces have departed.<sup>24</sup> JP 3-08 is useful and informative for those who have had limited interactions with civilians while conducting SC programs. JP 3-08 also introduces the regional security organizations described in Chapter 3.

JP 3-08 further recognizes the terms *interagency* and *interorganizational* are not interchangeable as these terms do not define structures or organizations, but rather describe processes occurring among various separate entities.<sup>25</sup> Interagency coordination, on one hand, describes the interaction between U.S. executive branch departments and agencies whereas the DOD conducts interorganizational cooperation across a range of operations with each type of operation involving different communities of interest, structures, and authorities, such as domestic governments or with businesses and academia.

### **JOINT PUBLICATION 3-16**

JP 3-16, validated without changes 12 February 2021, is consistent with other joint doctrine and uses the term *competition continuum* throughout the publication. In terms of SC, it is important to build defense relationships with allies and partner nations to advance U.S. national security objectives, promote stability, prevent conflicts, and reduce the risk of having to employ U.S. military forces in a conflict. This is achieved through SC programs and related activities, many of which are shaping activities, which advance progress toward cooperation within the competition continuum by strengthening and expanding the existing network of U.S. allies and partners, which improves the overall warfighting effectiveness of the joint force and enables more effective multinational operations.<sup>26</sup> That said, CCMD theater strategies, as reflected in their CCMD Campaign Plans, typically emphasize military engagement, SC, and deterrence activities as daily operations.

## JOINT PUBLICATION 3-20

JP 3-20 is the core joint document that defines and explains SC programs and related activities. JP 3-20 covers numerous topics focusing on SC at the strategic context, such as discussing the relationships at country team and host-nation levels, SC planning, execution, and the AM&E process. JP 3-20 is consistent with other current joint doctrine.

Regarding the strategic context, JP 3-20 claims the basic nature of war has not changed, but the character of conflict has evolved to include increasingly transregional, multi-domain, and multi-functional threats. The operational environment is fluid, with ever-changing alliances, partnerships, and national and transnational threats that rapidly emerge, disaggregate, and reemerge. SC programs are as likely to be conducted as an element of contingency operations as they are in a CCMD's daily operations.<sup>27</sup> The strategic environment is fluid, with ever changing alliances, partnerships, and national and transnational threats that rapidly emerge, disaggregate, and reemerge. These factors, as such, will demand efficient planning efforts and the sound application of intelligence in concert with the other joint functions to address the uncertainty and ambiguity of future strategic and operational environments.

JP 3-20 further highlights that SFA is a subset of SC initiatives (with an updated and more robust SFA appendix) designed to build capability and capacity. SC activities and programs seeking to generate common security effects employ SC resources in a manner that will reduce risk to priority theaters; create opportunities for allies and partners to increase U.S. readiness within priority theaters; support allies' and partners' contributions to the maintenance of global indicators and warnings of potential threats; and ensure allies and partners in other theaters can maintain credible deterrence against threats.<sup>28</sup> For example, SFA activities as part of FID focuses entirely on the foreign security force, whereas other interagency activities support specific FID objectives shared by the host nation and the U.S. Government. Ideally, SFA activities help build the foreign security force's capacity to manage and maintain their own forces independent of sustained U.S. Government efforts.

JP 3-20 provides planners with an approach to plan, execute, and assess SC activities through the development and execution of CCMD plans (campaign, contingency, and crisis). SC activities are conducted primarily for routine shaping as part of campaign plans, depending on available resources, which also dictate which activities are conducted in the follow-on years. Early coordination of SC activities, during planning, helps facilitate coordination during execution. Many DOD components, and most SCOs, maintain a calendar to help keep track of activities and other important events in their countries. Socium, for example, can be used to document, track, and synchronize SC activities within these countries.

Finally, JP 3-20 seeks to harmonize the SC operational assessment activities of monitor, evaluate, recommend, and direct per AM&E policy and guidance. Typically, SC activities occur incrementally over time and are aligned to desired effects and objectives within CCPs to make progress toward strategic end states. Normally, the cause and effect are spread over a long term. Functional AM&E iterations allow planners to examine the effectiveness of SC activities at the tactical or operational level. Planners should recognize that short-term outcomes may be difficult to judge in light of broader U.S. Government security sector efforts and complex variables associated with partner-nation actions and at the strategic level.<sup>29</sup>

### JOINT PUBLICATION 3-22

FID refers to U.S. activities that support a host-nation internal defense and development strategy designed to protect against subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security, consistent with U.S. national security objectives and policies.

—JP 3-22

JP 3-22, validated without change on 2 February 2021, synchronizes the use of foreign security forces and updates the text to be consistent with JP 3-20. JP 3-22 defines FID as the “participation by civilian agencies and military forces of a government or international organization in any of the programs or activities taken by a host-nation government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, violent extremism, terrorism, and other threats to its security.”<sup>30</sup> FID programs are integrated with interagency activities, as required, and under the coordinating authority of the country team. The U.S. Government applies FID programs or operations within a whole-of-government approach to enhance a host-nation internal defense and development (IDAD) program by specifically focusing on an anticipated, growing, or existing internal threat.

“IDAD encompasses the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, violent extremism and other threats to its security. IDAD focuses on both internal security and building viable civic, social, and economic institutions that respond to the needs of the host-nation populace. ... U.S. involvement may vary from simple military engagement and routine SC activities within an FID program up to a complex FID operation.”<sup>31</sup> The U.S. FID and IDAD support in Columbia, for example, was a success for U.S. foreign policy and saw the end to the conflict between the government of Columbia and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas (FARC).

Regarding content appearing in DODDs, DODs, and JPs, DSCA deserves an honorable mention for providing supplemental reading materials that update current policies while providing further information that interprets the relationship between SC policy and practice. DODD 5105.38-M, *Security Assistance Management Manual* (SAMM) (3 October 2003), establishes the SAMM as mandatory for use by all DOD components. The SAMM is issued as a DSCA manual under the authority of DODD 5105.65, *Defense Security Cooperation Agency* (26 October 2012). The SAMM provides DOD-wide guidance to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, military departments, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, CCMDs, the defense agencies, DOD field activities, SCOs, and all other organizational entities within the DOD engaged in the management or implementation of DOD SA and SC activities. DSCA has responsibility for the management or implementation of these DOD SA and SC activities in accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976, U.S. Code (USC) Title 10, and DODD 5132.03, *DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation* (29 December 2016), and related statutes and directives.,

DSCA also publishes updates to its *Security Cooperation Management Handbook*. The current version as of this publication is Edition 42. This publication is more than 600 pages and is comprehensive in its coverage as topics include an introduction to SC, SC legislation and policy, the FMS process, the SC acquisition policy and process, and many more chapters discussing letters of offers and acceptance. This publication, along with access to the SAMM, should be part of any SC planner or practitioner quick-access library.

## ENDNOTES

1. *Description of the National Military Strategy 2018* (2018), page 1.
2. Ibid, page 3.
3. Ibid.
4. DODD 3005.05, *Stabilization* (13 December 2018), page 3.
5. Ibid, page 4.
6. DODD 5100.01, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components* (21 December 2010), pages 30 and 31.
7. Ibid, page 28.
8. For more information on the DSCA, visit <https://www.dsca.mil> or DODD 5105.65, *Defense Security Cooperation Agency* (26 October 2012).
9. For this primer, SCO may refer to *security cooperation office* or *security cooperation officer*.
10. Defense Security Cooperation University, *Security Cooperation Management*, Edition 41 (May 2021), page 4-1.

11. Ibid, page 4-9.
12. DODD 5205.82, *Defense Institution Building* (27 January 2016), page 3.
13. SSA are generally stabilization activities conducted by the U.S. Government, as defined in Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 23, whereas security sector reform is stabilization activities conducted by the partner nation to strengthen its own institutions, such as rule of law.
14. DODD 5205.82, page 13.
15. JP 3-20 *Security Cooperation* (9 September 2022), page B-10.
16. DODD 5111.1, *Under Secretary of Defense for Policy* (23 June 2020), is not reviewed for this primer as the directive is out of scope other than the provision ascribed to this endnote.
17. DODI 5132.14 *Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise* (13 January 2017), page 3.
18. Ibid, 1.2 (a) (1) (2), page 3.
19. JP 3-0, *Joint Campaigns and Operations* (18 June 2022), I-1.
20. Ibid, I-3
21. JP 3-05, *Joint Doctrine for Special Operations* (22 September 2020), II-11.
22. JP 3-07, *Joint Stabilization Activities* (11 February 2022), I-4.
23. Ibid, I-5.
24. JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Cooperation* (12 October 2016), page II-19.
25. Ibid, page I-1.
26. JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations* (1 March 2019), page I-5.
27. JP 3-20, *Security Cooperation* (23 May 2017), page I-1.
28. Ibid, page II-I.
29. Ibid, page I-7.
30. JP 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense* (17 August 2018), page GL-6.
31. Ibid, I-3.

## CHAPTER 5

# Army Guidance and Doctrine

Security force assistance (SFA) leaders must understand a variety of policy guidance, regulations, and doctrine to adequately plan, prepare, execute, and assess SFA operations. The purpose of this chapter is to inform readers of Army regulations (ARs) and other guidance related to SFA and how SFA activities contribute to the Army's operational concept: multi-domain operations.

### ARMY REGULATIONS

AR 11-31, *Army Security Cooperation Policy* (21 March 2013), explains how the Army develops capabilities and allocates resources in support of Department of Defense (DOD) security cooperation (SC) activities. AR 11-31 is consistent with Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5132.03, *Department of Defense Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation* (29 December 2016). AR 11-31 prescribes responsibilities and procedures for Army organizations within the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution and assessment framework to support the achievement of combatant command (CCMD) functional and theater end states. AR 11-31 asserts that the Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (TSCMIS) is the authoritative data source for DOD's SC programs and related activities worldwide and supports and justifies DOD SC resourcing decisions,<sup>1</sup> although Socium has since replaced TSCMIS.

AR 34-1, *Interoperability* (9 April 2020), defines the concept of Army interoperability with unified action partners in multi-domain operational environments (OEs). AR 34-1 is consistent with other DOD guidance, DODD 5132.03, AR 11-31, and Field Manual (FM) 3-22, *Army Support to Security Cooperation* (22 January 2013). AR 34-1 is useful to know since many DOD SC activities interact with host nations and partner nations and their security forces.

Interoperability is the ability to act together coherently, effectively, and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. AR 34-1 establishes policy for achieving interoperability through international military standardization, other Army SC programs, and Army participation in joint, interorganizational and multinational programs and activities. The Army's policy is to develop interoperability to enhance readiness in support of U.S. national defense and strategic goals, including operating effectively with unified action partners across the full range of military operations<sup>2</sup> and across the human, procedural, and technical dimensions of interoperability.



## **DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY PAMPHLET 11-31**

Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA Pam) 11-31, *Army Security Cooperation Handbook* (6 February 2015), supersedes DA Pam 11-31 (5 March 2013). DA Pam 11-31 complements AR 11-31 and is a foundational document for those new to the SC enterprise as it discusses several broad topics, such as an SC overview, planning, resourcing, assessments, and execution of SC activities. DA Pam 11-31 states that most U.S. Government authorities to carry out SFA resides with the Department of State (DOS) through Title 22 and that Army forces may be used to execute training missions at the direction of higher authority, but outside of exceptional circumstances, the Army *cannot train or equip* foreign security forces at its own discretion.<sup>3</sup> Despite this constraint, Army forces may train with foreign security forces in support of their own training requirements and in support of the theater campaign plan.

During competition, SFA plays a key role in building interoperability with allies, deterring adversary aggression, and achieving theater campaign objectives. During crisis, forward-stationed SFA forces provide critical situational awareness for U.S. commanders and communication with host-nation forces. Deploying SFA forces provide flexible deterrence and response options. During armed conflict, SFA continues as a way of multiplying the effects of allied and partner nations. Advisors are often an important source of intelligence. The presence of SFA units alongside host-nation units can propel host-nation forces to take on greater roles and responsibilities in close combat operations. Capable host-nation's forces unburden U.S. forces from tasks and missions that require close interaction with host-nation populations and play a key role in consolidating gains and securing rear operations.

## **ARMY DOCTRINE PUBLICATION AND FIELD MANUAL FM 3-0**

Army operations doctrine provides the broad context for all warfighting functions and operational themes, including SFA. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Operations* (31 July 2019), describes how Army forces contribute to joint operations to defeat enemy forces, seize and control terrain and populations, and achieve objectives on land. Similar in language, FM 3-0, *Operations* (1 October 2022), expands on the Army's capstone doctrine for multidomain operations described in ADP 3-0. FM 3-0 describes how Army forces contribute land power to the joint force and integrate joint capabilities into operations on land to achieve military objectives and fulfill policy aims. Furthermore, FM 3-0 acknowledges that SFA at the theater army level requires trained, educated professional officers and noncommissioned officers as trusted advisors to partner nation security forces.<sup>4</sup>

## FIELD MANUAL 3-22

FM 3-22 is the principal Army doctrine on how SC programs are an integral component of unified land operations, joint operations, and unified action. FM 3-22 is consistent with joint doctrine and complements AR 11-31 by providing analysis and evaluation of the current Army SC functions, planning, resourcing, execution, and evaluation. Furthermore, FM 3-22 provides guidance to SFA planners and practitioners by providing strategic guidance, legal considerations, planning and assessment considerations, preparation and execution considerations, considerations for brigade operations, and considerations for working with foreign security forces.

FM 3-22 emphasizes that Army forces help shape the security environment through SC programs that enable CCMDs to ensure allies and partners establish trust, foster mutual understanding, and help partners build the capacity to defend themselves and prevent conflict. Regionally aligned forces and conventional and special operations forces (SOF) conduct SFA activities, depending on the situation. Theater armies contribute to these forces through a rotational, cyclical readiness model that provides a predictable and sustainable supply of scalable forces to the CCMDs and a surge capacity for unexpected contingencies.

FM 3-22 states that the Army forces conduct support to SC with a physical presence in close proximity to the partner's security forces, governmental agencies, and population. For this reason, SFA practitioners must have an appreciation for the history, culture, language, laws, and customs of the partner to increase mutual understanding, build, and sustain relationships and trust over time. These relationships will contribute to that partner's willingness to participate with the U.S. in achieving mutual global and regional security objectives and facilitate access to the region.

## ARMY DOCTRINE PUBLICATION AND FIELD MANUAL 3-07

ADP 3-07, *Stability* (31 July 2019), is relevant because one of the Army's stability tasks is SC and because stability is often one of the main goals of SC and SFA operations. "*Stability* is the set of conditions in which a local populace regards its governance institutions as legitimate and its living situation as acceptable and predictable."<sup>5</sup> Consistent with Joint Publication (JP) *Joint Stabilization Activities* (11 February 2022), ADP 3-07 states that "sources of instability manifest themselves locally."<sup>6</sup> Instability may be caused by catastrophic events, humanitarian crisis, foreign power-instigated violence, insurgency, corruption, and civil war. These drivers of instability are addressed generally by the partner nation and U.S. Government efforts through foreign internal defense (FID). In most countries where instability

manifests, SC programs can support FID activities as these activities support stabilization.<sup>7</sup> Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-07.5, *Stability Techniques* (31 August 2012), identifies six mutually supporting stability tasks that the Army either conducts or supports and they are: 1) establish civil security; 2) establish civil control; 3) restore essential services; 4) support to governance; 5) support to economic and infrastructure development; and 6) conduct SC.

FM 3-07, *Stability* (2 June 2014), explains that stabilization is a core activity of irregular warfare, which implies that stability activities are not confined to traditional warfare (called conventional warfare in the updated 3-0). FM 3-07 lists other related activities and missions, which include security sector reform, FID, and counterinsurgency.

Security sector reform, described in FM 3-07, identifies SFA as its subset and further claims it is also used to support FID, which promotes regional stability by helping a host nation respond to its population's needs while maintaining security. This claim may be confusing, as this primer previously mentioned SFA and FID are similar and tend to overlap, but the reforms in National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 2017 expand the definition of foreign security forces as a national security force, which includes national or local-level first responders.<sup>8</sup> For this reason, as it relates to stability, this is why understanding stability activities and the stabilization process is important across the competition continuum.

### **ARMY DOCTRINE PUBLICATION 3-05**

ADP 3-05, *Army Special Operations* (31 July 2019), provides a broad understanding of Army special operations. ADP 3-05 provides a foundation for how the Army meets the joint force commander's needs to achieve unified action by appropriately integrating Army conventional and SOF. Army special operations forces (ARSOF) execute these activities to establish, shape, maintain, and refine relationships with other nations and foreign and domestic civil authorities. Concerning SFA, a core ARSOF activity, ADP 3-05 identifies two core competencies of ARSOF: *special warfare* and *surgical strike*.

“Special warfare is the execution of capabilities that involve a combination of lethal and nonlethal actions taken by a specially trained and educated force that has a deep understanding of cultures and foreign language, proficiency in small-unit tactics, and the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in permissive, uncertain, or hostile environments.”<sup>9</sup> For the purpose of this primer, SFA activities are nested within the realm of special warfare.


“Surgical strike is the execution of capabilities in a precise manner that employ SOF in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover or damage designated targets, or influence threats. .... Surgical strike capabilities should not be confused with tasks or core activities such as direct action. Surgical strike capabilities are applied to shape the OE or influence a threat target audience in support of larger strategic interests.”<sup>10</sup>

### **ARMY TECHNIQUES PUBLICATION 3-07.10**

ATP 3-07.10, *Advising* (13 November 2017), covers several advising-related topics, such as how advising fits into SC programs, advisor team functional areas, assessments, critical individual and collective advising skill sets, interpreter support, and, of course, working with foreign security forces. The advisor mission is critical to achieving U.S. national security objectives and continues to be a primary tool for working with foreign partners to develop their capabilities and capacities to address shared U.S.-partner security interests. ATP 3-07.10 has many applications and is useful to review for those assigned to units tasked to conduct SFA.

**ARMY TECHNIQUES PUBLICATION 3-96.1**

ATP 3-96.1, *Security Force Assistance Brigade* (2 September 2020), is the core document for the U.S. Army’s security force assistance brigades (SFABs). ATP 3-96.1 describes the SFAB’s organization and employment and complements the individual advisor focus of ATP 3-07.10. The role of the SFAB is unique and requires a foundational understanding of how Army doctrine guides the SFAB across the three levels of war. See figure 5-1.



**Figure 5-1. SFAB brigade doctrine (ATP 3-96.1, page 1-5)**

The SFAB plays a key role in allowing the Army to set the theater effectively and simultaneously shape the security environment across the competition continuum, in cooperation with unified action partners. “Through regional engagement and maintaining continuity of relationships within one organization, the SFAB builds increased trust, rapport, and confidence with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational (JIIM) partners.”<sup>11</sup> SFABs allow the Army to set the theater and sustain decisive action competency.<sup>12</sup> Although conventional forces must have the ability to adapt when required, SFABs have the added benefit of allowing brigade combat teams to focus their readiness on large-scale combat operations.

“While the Army has conducted SFA in the past, the SFAB is a unique organization that the Army has purpose built and resourced to conduct this mission. ... SFABs also allow the U.S. Army to preserve the readiness of its brigade combat teams by primarily conducting SFA missions and persistent engagement with allies and partners in the cooperation and competition below armed conflict stages of the competition continuum.”<sup>13</sup> The SFAB’s mission is to conduct worldwide SFA operations at the *operational* and *tactical* level to develop the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions in support of theater SC objectives.

### **ARMY TECHNIQUES PUBLICATION 3-07.5**

ATP 3-07.5, although dated, is consistent with other doctrine, such as JP 3-07, ADP 3-07, and FM 3-07. Commanders staff members must consider the impact of future stability tasks because their decisions may influence current combat operations.<sup>14</sup> ATP 3-07.5 is a resource for units conducting SFA with foreign security forces because building on the capabilities and capacities of foreign security forces through stability techniques supports stronger host-nation governance institutions overall.

### **ARMY TECHNIQUES PUBLICATION 3-05.2**

ATP 3-05.2, *Foreign Internal Defense*, formerly FM 3-05.2, was published in August 2015. “FID is a legislatively directed operation attributable to Public Law 99-433, *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Section 212, Initial Review of Combatant Commands*.<sup>15</sup> The amendments to the Goldwater-Nichols Act established the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, and Title 10 U.S. Code (USC), Section 167, established the unified combatant command for SOF, to include activities in which FID is involved.”<sup>16</sup>

SFA sometimes supports FID. Whereas FID addresses internal threats, such as an insurgency in Columbia, SFA is designed to address external threats, such as preparing a foreign security force to defend against a territorial incursion as seen in Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. In both cases, SFA occurs because SFA is used to train foreign security forces to counter an insurgency within territorial borders and to counter near-peer adversarial encroachment into territorial borders.

“JP 3-22 states that for FID to be successful in meeting a host nation's needs, the U.S. Government must integrate the efforts of multiple government agencies. Management of the FID effort begins at the national level, with the selection of those nations the U.S. will support through FID efforts. This decision is made by the President with advice from the Secretary of State (SecState), Secretary of Defense (SecDef), and other officials. The U.S. will consider FID support when the existing or threatened internal disorder threatens U.S. national strategic goals or when the threatened nation requests and is capable of effectively using U.S. assistance.”<sup>17</sup>

Finally, and similar to the earlier discussion within JP 3-22, “The key differentiating factor between FID many other operations (such as SFA), is the involvement, engagement, and support of the host-nation government. Historically ... there has been confusion and incorrect usage of the term. FID involves the support of a standing government and its lawful military and paramilitary forces, and it is usually conducted in host nations in which the embassy country team is not only present but also frequently the lead agency in the operation. The American Embassy country team develops measures to promote security in conjunction with the host nation through the development of a yearly theater SC plan (which is what links the combatant commander's regional strategies to military operations).”<sup>18</sup>

The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) supports SC activities by conducting lessons learned seminars, lessons learned courses, and lessons learned briefings. Moreover, CALL assists allied nations with establishing their own lessons learned centers. CALL has collected observations and published many reports over the years concerning SC activities. CALL publications relevant to SC and SFA can be ordered or downloaded at <https://call2.army.mil/> (common access card required). Additionally, other reports, after action reviews, and other miscellaneous documents can be retrieved from the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) at <https://www.jllis.mil>.

**ENDNOTES**

1. AR 11-31, *Army Security Cooperation Policy* (21 March 2013), pages 1-2.
2. AR 34-1, *Interoperability* (9 April 2020), page 1.
3. DA Pam 11-31, *Army Security Cooperation Handbook* (6 February 2015), page 5.
4. FM 3-0, *Operations* (1 October 2022), page 6-48
5. ADP 3-07, *Stability* (31 July 2019), page 1-1.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid. “Stabilization is a process in which personnel identify and mitigate underlying sources of instability to establish the conditions for long-term stability. ... While long-term development requires stability, stability does not require long-term development. Therefore, stability operations tasks focus on *identifying, targeting, and mitigating the root causes of instability* to set the conditions for long-term development by building the capacity of local institutions.”
8. Public Law 114-328, §333, (a), *Foreign Security Forces: Authority to Build Capacity* (2016).
9. ADP 3-05, *Army Special Operations* (31 July 2019), page 1-3.
10. Ibid.
11. ATP 3-96.1, *Security Force Assistance Brigade* (2 September 2020), page vii.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid, page 1-1.
14. ATP 3-07.5, *Stability Techniques* (31 August 2012), page 1-4.
15. ATP 3-05.2, *Foreign Internal Defense* (19 August 2015), page 1-1.
16. Foreign Internal Defense existed before the Goldwater-Nichols Act, but it was not included in doctrine until 1976.
17. ATP 3-05.2, pages 1-4 and 1-5.
18. Ibid, page 1-2.



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## GLOSSARY

### ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADP	Army doctrine publication
AECA	Arms Export Control Act
AOR	area of responsibility
AM&E	assessment, monitoring, and evaluation
AR	Army regulation
ARSOF	Army special operations forces
ATP	Army techniques publication
CALL	Center for Army Lessons Learned
CCMD	combatant command
CCP	combatant command campaign plan
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
DA Pam	Department of the Army pamphlet
DASA (DE&C)	Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Defense Export and Control
DATT	defense attaché
DIB	defense institution building
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense directive
DODI	Department of Defense instruction
DOS	Department of State
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
FAA	Foreign Assistance Act
FARC	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas
FID	foreign internal defense
FM	field manual
FMS	foreign military sales
G-EGO	governance, executive, generating, and operating
G-TSCMIS	Global Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System
ICS	integrated country strategy
IDAD	internal defense and development
JCET	joint combined exchange training
JCISFA	Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance
JIIM	joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational

JIWAB	Joint Irregular Warfare Analytic BaselineArms
JLLIS	Joint Lessons Learned Information System
JP	joint publication
MOD	ministry of defense
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
NDS	national defense strategy
NESA	Near East South Asia
NGB	National Guard Bureau
NMS	national military strategy
NSS	national security strategy
OE	operational environment
PPD	presidential policy directive
QDRR	Quadrennial Defense Review Report
SA	security assistance
SAMM	Security Assistance Management Manual
SC	security cooperation
SCO	security cooperation office(r)
SDO	senior defense official
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
SecState	Secretary of state
SFA	security force assistance
SFAB	security force assistance brigade
SFAC	security force assistance command
SOF	special operations forces
SPP	State Partnership Program
SSA	security sector assistance
SSCI	significant security cooperation initiative
TRADOC	U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
TSCMIS	Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System
USC	U.S. Code
WHINSEC	Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation



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**NO. 23-02 (703)  
2023**

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