



CALL INSIDER

4th QTR, FY22



## JOINT MULTINATIONAL READINESS CENTER

### Dynamic Front 22

This article assesses the strengths and weaknesses of units participating in Dynamic Front 22 (DF22) as observed by the Vampire Observer Coach Trainer (OCT) Fires Team. This assessment focuses on each unit's ability to conduct interoperability across its formations. This executive summary meets the external assessment criteria utilizing doctrine and historically successful tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to inform recommended training in preparation for future DF rotations.



Members of the 41st Field Artillery Brigade conduct operations and update the common operational picture. (Photo by CPT Zach Thomas)

#### Rotational Overview:

The DF exercise series is the European theater's primary integrated fires exercise involving NATO and partner nations. This US-led exercise focuses on fires interoperability, fires planning, and command and control (C2) at a distance. The C2 nodes within DF train NATO fires interoperability at the battalion and above levels, exercising digital fires kill-chains across

the fires enterprise. As a joint/multinational exercise, DF allows units to train interoperability across the three interoperability domains: **human, procedural, and technical**. The exercise captures the 56th Artillery Command and the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps' (ARRC) ability to demonstrate a capable and credible NATO warfighting headquarters with lethal fires in support of the European theater of operations. DF22 consisted of over 2800 personnel from 19 countries, consisting of a corps headquarters, two field artillery brigades (FABs) (one of those a multinational [MN] FAB made up of Soldiers from 11 countries), and seven rocket/cannon battalions. During DF22 (06 - 24 July 2022), the Vampire OCT Fires Team focused their observations on the three domains of interoperability.

#### Human Domain:

All units participating in DF22 showed high levels of interoperability in the human domain. Teams overcame shortfalls in the procedural and technical domains through the use of liaison officers (LNOs) and face-to-face interactions. LNOs integrated into the staff sections of both FABs and made continuous improvement in staff planning, capability briefs, and information flow to subordinate units. For example, LNOs in the MN FAB safely passed data to Slovakian and Polish units, and the LNOs in the 41st FAB to the Italian unit. Due to the task organization and nature of DF22, members of the MN FAB could not rely on their own TTP, but instead had to develop TTP and standard operating procedures (SOPs) as a newly formed team. They initially had to work through language barriers presented by personnel who spoke 10 different languages. Having the right person at the right echelon, able to overcome the language barrier, proved instrumental to the success across the human domain.

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


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## DIRECTOR'S CORNER


The fall collection season is upon us and CALL has a full slate of events to examine based on the FY23 Army Lessons Learned Annual Plan focused topics. Our dedicated Mission Command Training Program Collection and Analysis Team (CAAT) just returned from Warfighter (WFX) 23-1 and focused their observations on command post responsibilities and survivability, combat aviation brigade employment, and challenges associated with integration within the protection warfighting function. Our WFX 23-1 Post-Exercise Report will be ready to download in about 30 days. CALL is currently supporting Army Futures Command with data collection and analysis during Project Convergence 22 and is focusing attention on emerging division cavalry concepts for the Multi-Domain Operations-Capable Force of 2030. In a few weeks, CALL will send a small collection team to the Joint Pacific Multinational

Readiness Center rotation 23-01 in Hawaii to observe home-station, combat training center-supported events. As you can see, CALL has a wide-angle lens this fall, all while keeping tabs and reporting on the situation in Ukraine. Next week, we pre-brief LTG Beagle (Commanding General, Combined Arms Center) in preparation for the upcoming Army Lessons Learned Forum General Officer Steering Committee. I'll be sure to pass along his thoughts on agenda topics and how he intends to drive Army change through this quarterly forum.



**COL Scott W. Mueller**  
CALL Director

## RECENT PUBLICATIONS



### [People First Task Force: Integrating People and Training — Considerations and Best Practices](#)

This handbook compiles best practices and tools that leaders can use to improve the integration of people and training. The handbook is not regulatory or mandatory; leaders are empowered to use the tools in the handbook to complement their own

unit-specific People First strategies and initiatives. By integrating people into training, leaders can enhance the cohesiveness of their teams and foster an environment where all are treated with dignity and respect. [JLLIS link](#).

### [Commander and Staff Guide to Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems in Large-Scale Combat Operations](#) (CAC required)

With the increasing threat from small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) on the battlefield, what are the best practices and lessons learned from U.S. Army divisions and corps, under current modified table of organization and equipment, to counter enemy sUAS operations in large-scale combat operations (LSCO)? How do division and corps commanders and staff best integrate and synchronize active/passive measures and current and emerging kinetic/non-kinetic capabilities in counter-sUAS operations? This product provides an overview of the sUAS threat and system components, as well as best practices and lessons learned to detect and track, identify and report, and ultimately defeat threat sUAS. [JLLIS link](#).

### [U.S. Army South Exercise SOUTHERN VANGUARD 22 Integrated Deterrence in the Western Hemisphere](#)

U.S. Army South's SOUTHERN VANGUARD series of exercises are designed to enhance relationships, promote mutual military readiness, improve interoperability, and establish the foundation for lasting integrated deterrence with select partner nations in the United States Southern Command area of responsibility. This second iteration with the Brazilian Army was unique in that this exercise not only committed the largest U.S. Army conventional force ever sent to train in Brazil, but it also integrated two separate national exercises into one. Additionally, it established command and control under a battalion-level combined task force headquarters, versus under a lead nation with normal exchange of liaison officers between armies for interoperability. [JLLIS link](#).

### [Warfighter Exercise 22-5 Post-Exercise Report](#) (CAC required)

The WFX 22-5 Post-Exercise Report contains key highlights and observations covering gaps, trends, and best practices identified in the exercise. [JLLIS link](#).

### [Army Security Force Assistance Newsletter](#)

The Security Force Assistance Newsletter pulls together seven "must-read" articles on security force assistance operations. [JLLIS link](#).

## Recent Publications, cont.

### [Tank Companies: Considerations and References for Task Organization](#) (CAC required)

The National Training Center has observed units without organic armor receive task-organized tank companies and struggle with rapidly integrating or planning for the sustainment of tanks. This article can assist units in reception, integration, and planning for that scenario. [JLLIS link.](#)

### [Fusing Data into a Battle Damage Assessment for the Commander](#)

This article supplements Army doctrine by describing all elements of battle damage assessment (BDA) to help analysts provide commanders with more than just the number of systems removed from the battlefield. It provides recommendations for training and organizing the G-2T section, highlighting the most effective ways to conduct BDA that support both targeting and the commander's decision-making process. [JLLIS link.](#)

### [Sustainment in Support of Large-Scale Combat Operations](#)

Based on observations from leaders at the National Training Center, this publication takes a deep-dive into the sustainment process. It highlights both successes and shortfalls from rotations over the past several years. While many topics are conceptual in nature, the authors placed great effort in providing a way, method, technique, and/or template for sustainers and maneuverists alike to find success as they plan, prepare, and train for LSCO. [JLLIS link.](#)

### [Using the Force Design Update Process to Establish an Expeditionary Sustainment Command](#) (CAC required)

Long-term planning is essential to sustaining LSCO and mitigating the effects of dispersion, disruption of communication lines, and accelerated operational tempo. The 19th Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC), the largest forward-deployed ESC in the Army, operates on the Korean peninsula with multiple no-fail, real-world mission sets. The 19th ESC identified a long-range planning horizon shortfall within the organization that hindered the ability to conduct long-term (deliberate) planning and analysis of operations. This document discusses how the force design update process can be used to establish an ESC G-5 plans section. [JLLIS link.](#)

### [Civil Military Operations Targeting in Large Scale Ground Combat Operations: Lessons from Warfighter 22-01](#) (CAC required)

This article examines the employment of effective civil military operations targeting during LSCO to inform corps-level commands and staff on best practices and lessons learned from WFX 22-01.

### [Joint Warfighting Assessment Newsletter August 2022](#) (CAC required)

In April 2022, the 3rd Infantry Division, 1st Cavalry Division, and 40th Infantry Division participated in WFX 22-04 as members of the III Armored Corps. A key component of this WFX was Joint Warfighting Assessment (JWA) 2022, sponsored by Joint Modernization Command and supported by the Combined Arms Center. WFX 22-04/JWA 22 was the first of several Army-wide training and assessments to assess the effectiveness, capability, and capacity of the Army-designed Armored Division of 2030 as a decisive unit of action, prioritized for organizational and technological transformation. This publication shares initial lessons identified in the application of enhanced capabilities that enable division-level shaping operations. [JLLIS link.](#)

### [Lessons Learned for DOD Food Protection Planning and Support During the COVID-19 Global Pandemic](#) (CAC required)

This document provides a series of observations gathered from the Defense Health Agency Veterinary Services lessons learned working group (post-COVID) to sustain/improve food protection support in response to emergency pandemic situations. [JLLIS link.](#)

### [A Multinational Focus on Operations in the Jungle](#) (CAC required)

CALL, in cooperation with the French LNO to the Combined Arms Center, coordinated to have the officer in charge of the 25th Infantry Division Jungle Operations School, attend the 1st Annual International Jungle Warfare Seminar in Kourou, French Guiana. This article provides his observations and analysis of interoperability implications. [JLLIS link.](#)

### [Handbook: The Army Special Operations Forces Task Force in Large Scale Combat Operations](#) (CAC required)

This document's purpose is two-fold. First, it describes the capabilities that the Special Forces Operational Detachment Bravo (ODB) will require to operate as a tactical-level, multi-domain operations-capable advanced operations base (AOB) during LSCO. Second, based on lessons learned from recent rotations at the combat training centers, it recommends various ways to improve the AOB's capability to manage the intelligence and fires warfighting functions and enhance AOB survivability. [JLLIS link.](#)



*(JMRC Dynamic Front continued from page 1)*



A Soldier from the the 4th Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment conducts a fire mission. (Photo by SFC Tyler Lape)

## Procedural Dimension:

Both the 41st FAB (U.S.) and MN FAB struggled at the beginning of the exercise with incorporating MN subordinate battalions and publishing doctrinally correct fires products. The Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) did not produce sufficient fighting products, which created issues at each echelon. Additionally, insufficient "artillery" military decision-making process or tactical and technical rehearsals at either brigade created a void in producing and publishing fires products amongst subordinate units.

By X3, the ARRC established its role as the higher headquarters and improved its ability to build and distribute products, while simultaneously pushing information to subordinate units. Each brigade received fragmentary orders from the ARRC with updated fire support coordination measures, named areas of interest (NAIs), and target areas of interest (TAIs). Internal battle rhythms continued to improve, enabling dialogue between commanders and a better understanding of shortfalls within the units. Meteorological (MET) distribution relied mostly on the procedural domain between 41st FAB and Italy's 8th RA due to the lack of an Artillery Systems Cooperation Activities (ASCA) connection. Hard copies of MET messages were produced and manually transferred using the Italian LNO team located with the 41st FAB.

Warfighting functions (WfF) outside of the fires WfF communicated with the ARRC; however, the processes to share information between the ARRC and FABs were limited due to internal SOPs. The ARRC did not establish a standard common operational picture for situational awareness during this exercise. These shortfalls were partly mitigated with LNOs and battle rhythm events.

## Technical Dimension:

The exercise started with a four-day ASCA University (ASCA-U) block of instruction. ASCA-U consisted of two days with U.S.-only service members, followed by a two-day validation exercise with all DF22 participating units. Following ASCA-U, the ARRC scheduled a Fire Support

Digital Validation Exercise (FSDVE). The FSDVE was delayed by one day to allow critical mission command systems from the MN FAB to relocate to a new command post location. Additionally, United Kingdom (UK) and U.S. units operated on separate Federated Mission Networks, which resulted in digital fire control system incompatibility amongst teams due to firewall issues.

## Recommendations:

Higher command (HICOM) must incorporate a fire support element(FSE)/joint fire support element and run a targeting cycle to provide standard fighting products that drive training objectives. Outputs should include a fires support execution matrix, target synchronization matrix, high- payoff target list, target selection standards, attack guidance matrix, NAIs, and TAIs.

Establish and publish a higher headquarters battle rhythm to be distributed before the exercise, allowing units to prioritize the higher headquarters commander's intent for information requirements, feeding information up and thus, forcing the function of subordinate units to establish and maintain internal battle rhythm events early on.

The inclusion of a division artillery headquarters (DIVARTY) would benefit future DF exercises. Their higher headquarters experience provides an additional resource for the ARRC to include doctrinal fires products, and integration of cannon units and FSEs. Additionally, DIVARTY provides the capability to demonstrate dynamic support relationship changes during the exercise.

There were challenges concerning the ability to communicate across the battlefield given the task



Fire direction Soldiers from the United Kingdom give their commander a mission update brief. (Photo by CPT Jake Helwig)

organization of units from multiple countries operating across multiple networks. To ensure success in future exercises, JMRC leaders recommend a completely developed network structure and appropriate amount of time dedicated to the FSDVE, ensuring each gate is met before the live execution of DF23.

## BEST PRACTICE SUBMISSIONS

### [Operationalizing the Protection Prioritized List.](#)

During Warfighter 22-4, the 40th Infantry Division honed its skills in synchronizing movement and maneuver with the sustainment and protection warfighting functions. Here, the division developed a best practice of operationalizing the protection prioritized list and aligning it with the air tasking order framework. [JLLIS link.](#)

### [Creating Shared Understanding: Tools, Challenges, and Minimum Requirements](#) (CAC required)

Lessons from Warfighter Exercises have demonstrated that units and staffs struggle to create shared understanding of the battlefield situation during LSCO. This challenge leads to many negative consequences that commanders and

staffs must continuously work to overcome. This article offers a mitigating solution to address this challenge. The article first discusses shared understanding according to doctrine, highlighting the tools and processes units typically rely on to create it. Next, it describes the two main issues that inhibit shared understanding, reviewing both of their impacts on the tools/processes and their causes/contributing factors. Finally, this article offers a recommendation to alleviate this problem: Commanders should personally write and publish both their described visualization and their intent as a daily minimum requirement for shared understanding. [JLLIS link.](#)




## NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER

The National Training Center (NTC) had some great rotations over the past few months. In particular, rotation 22-09 was very successful. Here, the 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, conducted its rotation in August as part of an emergency deployment readiness exercise (EDRE). Likewise, the 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division, from Fort Bliss, TX, finished a great rotation in September, training with three Republic of Korea Army detachments. Looking to the future, NTC will support training in Hawaii in support of the 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), 25th Infantry Division, and host a portion of Project Convergence '22 this fall.

NTC is reviewing lessons from the past year and in the process of publishing through CALL a handbook called, *Combining Arms in the Close Fight*, which builds on NTC Operations Group's May 2021 publication, *Mastering the Fundamentals for BCT and Below Formations*. This publication will be organized into three sections. Section I will provide three foundational concepts and 18 critical

TTP that offer "a way" to think about how to combine arms. Section II will focus on BCT sustainment and describe why and how units should design their concept of support and logistics architecture. Section III will deliver a series of "hard problems" for units to consider as they train LSCO. While the CALL production of this product will soon be available, a draft product can be viewed at the following link on the [Operations Group milSuite](#) site at: (CAC required).

NTC also created a tactical products repository. Leaders observed that many rotational training units (RTUs) lack staff fighting products or do not know where to reference them and struggle to maintain synchronization or a common operational picture during operations as a result. Therefore, NTC conducted quarterly review updates for tactical fighting products, utilizing products and SOPs internal to the teams and from the RTUs. The updates are rooted in Army doctrine and based on experiences/observations made during rotations. These products can also be found on the [Operations Group milSuite](#) site.



## ARMY CAPSTONE DOCTRINE CODIFIES SHIFT TO MULTIDOMAIN OPERATIONS

On Oct. 11, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command released the latest version of the Army's capstone operations doctrine, [Field Manual 3-0](#), during the 2022 Association of the United States Army Annual Meeting and Exposition. The manual is available to view and download on the [Army Publishing Directorate](#) website.

The newly updated FM 3-0 establishes multidomain operations as the Army's operational concept. The focus remains on large-scale combat operations against adversaries able to contest the joint force in the land, air, maritime, space and cyberspace domains. The updated doctrine defines multidomain operations as "the combined arms employment of joint and Army capabilities to create and exploit relative advantages that achieve objectives, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains on behalf of joint force commanders." Learn more on [www.army.mil](http://www.army.mil).

## ARMY LESSONS LEARNED PROGRAM UPDATE

[Army Regulation \(AR\) 11-33, Army Lessons Learned Program](#), and [Department of the Army Pamphlet 11-33, Guide to the Army Lessons Learned Program](#), were published with effective dates of 28 August 2022. Copies are available at the [Army Publishing Directorate](#) website. Major revisions include purpose of the Army Lessons Learned Program (ALLP), responsibilities for organizations, the term "lessons and best practices" to "lessons," and Army terms aligned with joint policy.

HQDA Execution Order (EXORD) 193-22, the fiscal year (FY) 23 Army Lessons Learned Annual Plan (ALLAP), was published on 28 July 2022. The EXORD is available from the [Army G-3/5/7 Bolte Portal](#) (CAC required). The ALLP community simultaneously executes the FY23 ALLAP and plans the FY24 ALLAP on 1 October 2022. Continuous analysis of key Army and other documents help refine the FY23 plan and develop the FY24 plan, which consists of Army collection topics and areas identified for CAATs.

### FY24 Army Lessons Learned Synchronization Workshop (ALLSW)

CALL will host the FY24 ALLSW on A365 Teams from 28-31 March 2023 to synchronize Army collection efforts and develop the FY24 ALLAP. The ALLP community develops key information requirements (collection topics, collection events, and outputs) and forwards them NLT 31 December 2022 to CALL. For more information contact the ALLP Division at (913-684-9529/3575 or email the CALL request for information team at [usarmy.leavenworth.mccoe.mbx.call-rfi-manager-mailbox@army.mil](mailto:usarmy.leavenworth.mccoe.mbx.call-rfi-manager-mailbox@army.mil)

### Army Civilians and the 2022 Association for the United States Army's Annual Meeting

This year's Association of the United States Army (AUSA) Annual Meeting and Exposition, held 10-12 October 2022, focused on "Building the Army of 2030." The event was recorded and all Army Civilians are encouraged to watch and learn about the Army People Strategy and Civilian Implementation Plan (CIP) 2022. The theme for the Army Civilian events at AUSA was "I am an Army Civilian – Now and 2030." Army Civilians were represented during several key sessions, as well as the Army Civilian Career Management Activity (ACCMA). A major accomplishment of CIP 2020 was the establishment of ACCMA and the integration of 32 career programs into 11 broad career fields. All of the panels and presentations from this year's AUSA forum can be found on the [Defense Visual Information Distribution Service](#) website.

## CONNECT WITH CALL



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